International Drug Control Policy
Liana Sun Wyler
Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics
March 8, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34543
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
International Drug Control Policy
Summary
This report provides an overview of U.S. international drug control policy. It describes major
international counternarcotics initiatives and evaluates the broad array of U.S. drug control policy
tools currently in use. The report also considers alternative counterdrug policy approaches to
current initiatives and raises several counterdrug policy issues and considerations for policy
makers.
Illegal drugs refer to narcotic, psychotropic, and related substances whose production, sale, and
use are restricted by domestic law and international drug control agreements. Common illegal
drugs include cannabis, cocaine, opiates, and synthetic drugs. International trade in these drugs
represents a lucrative and what at times seems to be an intractable criminal enterprise, affecting
countries worldwide and generating between $100 billion and $1 trillion in illicit profits per year.
Revenue from the illegal drug industry provides international drug trafficking organizations with
the resources to evade and compete with law enforcement officials; penetrate legitimate economic
structures through money laundering; and, in some instances, challenge the authority of national
governments. Despite apparent national resolve to address international narcotics trafficking,
tensions appear at times between U.S. international drug control policy and other U.S. foreign
policy goals and concerns. Pursuit of international drug control policies can sometimes negatively
affect national interests by exacerbating political instability and economic dislocation in countries
where narcotics production is entrenched economically and socially. Drug supply interdiction
programs and U.S. systems to facilitate the international movement of legitimate goods, people,
and wealth also are often at odds. The high priority of terrorism in U.S. foreign policy has
resulted in increased attention to links between drug and terrorism groups; a challenge facing
policy makers, however, is how to avoid diverting counterdrug resources for anti-terrorism ends
in areas of potentially low payoff.
Congress is involved in all aspects of U.S. international drug control policy, regularly
appropriating funds for counterdrug initiatives, conducting oversight activities on federal
counterdrug programs, and legislating changes to agency authorities and other counterdrug
policies. Major U.S. programs to combat drug production and trafficking exist in the Andean
region of South America, Afghanistan, and Mexico. The U.S. government is also involved in
developing several new counternarcotics programs, including in West Africa, the Caribbean
(Caribbean Basin Security Initiative), and Central America (Central America Regional Security
Initiative). Through its appropriations and federal oversight responsibilities, the 111th Congress
may chose to continue tackling several emerging policy issues concerning U.S. international drug
control policy, including the role of the Department of Defense in counterdrug foreign assistance;
the balance between alternative development and eradication programs; and how to address the
vast array of cross-cutting and transnational dimensions of the international drug trade, ranging
from police corruption to drug-related violence to links between drug trafficking organization and
terrorist groups.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
U.S. Policy Context............................................................................................................... 2
International Policy Context .................................................................................................. 4
U.S. National Drug Control Strategy ........................................................................................... 7
Funding ................................................................................................................................ 7
Agency Roles........................................................................................................................ 8
International Drug Control Toolbox........................................................................................... 10
Multilateral Cooperation ..................................................................................................... 10
Foreign Assistance Sanctions .............................................................................................. 11
The FY2010 “Drug Majors”.......................................................................................... 11
Drug Certification Procedures ....................................................................................... 13
Methamphetamine Precursor Chemicals........................................................................ 14
Other Drug-Related Foreign Aid Certification Requirements ......................................... 15
Crop Eradication ................................................................................................................. 15
Alternative Development .................................................................................................... 17
Interdiction ......................................................................................................................... 19
Anti-money Laundering Efforts........................................................................................... 20
Extradition .......................................................................................................................... 23
Institutional Capacity Building............................................................................................ 23
Selected Legislative Issues for the 111th Congress ..................................................................... 25
Counternarcotics Aid to U.S. Transit Zone Countries: Mérida Initiative and Beyond............ 25
Beyond Mérida: The Four Pillar Strategy ...................................................................... 26
The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) and the Central American
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) ......................................................................... 27
Plan Colombia, the Andean Counterdrug Program, and the Future of
Counternarcotics Aid to South America ............................................................................ 28
Afghanistan Counterdrug Programs..................................................................................... 31
West Africa ......................................................................................................................... 32
Alternative Policy Approaches .................................................................................................. 34
Rebalance Current Drug Policy Tools.................................................................................. 34
Emphasize “Hard-Side” of Counternarcotics Policy ...................................................... 34
Emphasize “Soft-Side” of Counternarcotics Policy........................................................ 36
Emphasize Drug Demand Reduction ............................................................................. 37
Reevaluate Prohibitionist Drug Regime............................................................................... 38
Legalize Illegal Drugs ................................................................................................... 38
Decriminalize Illegal Drugs .......................................................................................... 40
Allow Government-Supervised Drug Use for Addicts.................................................... 41
Figures
Figure 1. Map of World Drug Majors in FY2010 ....................................................................... 13
Figure 2. Major Money Laundering Countries and Jurisdictions of Primary Money
Laundering Concern in FY2010 ............................................................................................. 22
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Tables
Table 1. U.S. Drug Control Funding ............................................................................................ 8
Table 2. U.S. Assistance for Crop Eradication............................................................................ 16
Table 3.U.S. Alternative Development Foreign Assistance, FY2009 Estimate ............................ 18
Appendixes
Appendix. CRS Reports on International Drug Policy ............................................................... 42
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 42
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International Drug Control Policy
Introduction
Illegal drugs refer to narcotic, psychotropic, and related substances produced, traded, or used in
contravention to domestic law or international drug control agreements.1 Narcotic drugs include
cannabis, cannabis resin, coca leaf, cocaine, heroin, and opium. Psychotropic substances include
ecstasy,2 LSD,3 amphetamine, and methamphetamine. Examples of other related substances
include precursor chemicals used to make narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances—such as
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine—which are used to make methamphetamine, and potassium
permanganate, which is used to make cocaine. With few exceptions, production and sale of
controlled substances is legally permitted only if used for medical and scientific purposes.
Illegal drug use generates a lucrative underground trade that affects virtually every country in the
world. Estimates of the global proceeds from illegal drugs vary significantly, ranging from $100
billion to more than $1 trillion per year.4 These proceeds are laundered and invested through
foreign banks and other financial institutions, providing transnational drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs) with resources to penetrate legitimate economic structures; undermine the
rule of law through corruption, extortion, or more violent forms of influence; and, in some
instances, challenge the authority of national governments.
Globally, between 172 million and 250 million people (between 4% and 5.8% of the global
population) are estimated to be at least casual drug users, while a smaller subset of these, between
18 million (0.4%) and 38 million (0.9%), are termed problem drug users; the latter category
constitutes most illegal drug consumption.5 U.S. data indicate that approximately 35 million
people in the United States (14.4% of the U.S. population) are at least casual drug users and
slightly less than 5 million (1.9%) are problem drug users.6 The Western Hemisphere has
traditionally been the main consumer of cocaine and cocaine-type drugs, with Europe’s demand
for cocaine rising in recent years. Europe and Asia have been the traditional markets for opiate-
type drugs, including heroin.
Among illegal drugs, cocaine and heroin are considered most problematic for international
welfare and security.7 Both cocaine and heroin are plant-derived drugs, cultivated and harvested
in typically low-income countries or in countries with uneven economic development and
conflict-ridden regions of the world. With regard to cocaine, the majority coca bush cultivation is
1 This report expands and replaces CRS Report RL33582, International Drug Trade and U.S. Foreign Policy, by
Raphael F. Perl.
2 Ecstasy is the street name for MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine).
3 LSD is the street name for lysergic acid diethylamide.
4 The most recent international effort to estimate the value of the illicit drug market was undertaken by the U.N. Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which estimated that for CY2003, the international drug market was valued at $322
billion at the retail level. Subsequent UNODC reports do not give global estimates on proceeds. Debate continues to
surround methodological limitations to drug market estimates. See UNODC, 2005 World Drug Report, “Estimating the
Value of Illicit Drug Markets,” at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2005/volume_1_chap2.pdf. See Francisco E.
Thoumi, “The Numbers Game: Let’s All Guess the Size of the Illegal Drug Industry!” Journal of Drug Issues, Vol. 35,
No. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 185-200.
5 UNODC, 2009 World Drug Report.
6 National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), 2009 National Drug Threat
Assessment, December 2008.
7 Based on the UNODC’s 2009 World Drug Report and the NDIC’s 2009 National Drug Threat Assessment.
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concentrated in three countries in South America (Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia). For heroin,
opium cultivation is concentrated mainly in Southwest Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), but also
in Southeast Asia (Burma/Myanmar and Laos); a small amount of opium is also cultivated in
Colombia and Mexico, mainly for heroin consumption in the United States. In total, the United
Nations estimates that approximately 735 metric tons of heroin were produced in 2007, with
approximately 19% seized by authorities before consumption; while approximately 994 metric
tons of cocaine were produced in 2007, with approximately 41.5% seized.8
Major trafficking routes connect the drug producers with the drug consumers, with highly
sophisticated DTOs controlling the various aspects of the supply chain. Current transit hotspots
include Mexico (for drugs produced in South America and destined for the United States), West
Africa (for cocaine destined for Europe and heroin en route to Europe and the United States), and
all the countries surrounding Afghanistan (heroin destined to Europe and elsewhere). The U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) considers Mexican DTOs the “greatest organized crime threat” to
the United States and estimates that the combination of Mexican and Colombian DTOs “generate,
remove, and launder” between $18 billion and $39 billion in wholesale drug proceeds annually.9
Besides the Mexican and Colombian DTOs, other major DTOs include the West African/Nigerian
DTOs and Southwest and East Asian DTOs. While DTOs are commonly identified by their
nationality of origin, they are known to be aggressively transnational and poly-criminal—seeking
to expand their consumer markets, to diversify their criminal enterprises and product variety, and
to explore new transit points and safe havens with low law enforcement capacity and high
corruption. Many of them also have links to other illicit actors, including arms traffickers, money
launderers, terrorists and insurgent groups, and corrupt officials.
U.S. Policy Context
Illegal drugs first emerged in U.S. policy debates as a national security threat in the late 1960s—
and has been perceived mainly through a security and law enforcement lens, among successive
Administrations as well as Congresses, ever since. In a 1971 press conference, then-President
Richard Nixon identified illicit drugs as America’s “public enemy number one.”10 That same year,
Congress enacted a chapter into the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to define U.S. policies and
authorities relating to international narcotics control.11 In 1986, President Ronald Reagan declared
narcotics trafficking a threat to U.S. national security.12 That same year, Congress expanded drug
interdiction authorities and criminal penalties for drug trafficking.13 Successive administrations
have continued to feature combating the illicit drug trade prominently among U.S. national
security objectives. At the same time, Congress continues to exercise its oversight responsibilities
on U.S. counternarcotics policy and appropriate funds for international counternarcotics
programs.
8 UNODC, 2009 World Drug Report.
9 NDIC, 2009 National Drug Threat Assessment.
10 Richard Nixon, “Remarks about an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,” June 17, 1971.
Briefing transcript at John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/WS/?pid=3047.
11 P.L. 92-226, Section 109, added Ch. 8, International Narcotics Control, to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L.
87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2291 et seq.).
12 Ronald Reagan, National Security Decision Directive 221, “Narcotics and National Security,” April 8, 1986, partially
declassified on November 7, 1995, redacted version available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-221.htm.
13 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-570) U.S.C. 801 note.
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Perceived threats to U.S. interests from the global illicit drug industry include threats to American
lives and money, as well as systemic threats to international security. Drug threats to American
lives and money include health consequences of drug use, infiltration of foreign DTOs into U.S.
territory, drug-related violence and potential spillover effects, drugs as a source of illicit income
to fund insurgent or terrorist group attacks on U.S. civilian and military personnel domestically
and abroad, and the economic cost of the illicit drug market on legitimate American businesses
and productivity. The consequences of a thriving illicit drug trade co-located in a U.S. combat
zone are illustrated today in Afghanistan, where some portion of the approximately $3 billion to
$4 billion in drug-related proceeds annually help facilitate the current insurgency.14 In other
regions, such as in the Western Hemisphere, Americans have been murdered, taken hostage, and
tortured for their involvement in counternarcotics operations—highlighting the past and ongoing
dangers associated with the international drug trade.15 Currently, many observers are concerned
about the potential spread of DTO-related violence from Mexico into the United States.
Moreover, several groups listed by the U.S. Department of State as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs) are known to be involved in drug trafficking, including but not limited to
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)/Kongra-
Gel, and the Tamil Tigers.16
Observers suggest that systemic threats to international security include the undermining and co-
optation by major international DTOs and their criminal associates of legitimate social, political,
and economic systems through corruption, extortion, and violence. In the process, a transnational
network of criminal safe havens are established in which DTOs operate with impunity. As in the
recent emergence of West Africa as a major cocaine transit hub for Latin American drug
traffickers, DTOs prey on states with low capacity for effective governance or the enforcement of
the rule of law. This can exacerbate pre-existing political instability, post-conflict environments,
and economic vulnerability. As the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) explains:
Drug traffickers use their war-chests to attack vulnerable countries, through business
acquisitions, corruption and violence. These processes inevitably converge, as at stake is
more than just money-laundering and intimidation: drug cartels buy more than real estate,
banks and business. They buy elections, candidates and parties. In a word, they buy power.17
By many accounts, drug trafficking, state weakness, political corruption, and powerful DTOs are
part of a seemingly self-perpetuating cycle.18 On the one hand, a drug trafficking presence in a
country can increase corruption and undermine political stability, while on the other hand, social
and political instability may be causal factors for attracting a thriving drug industry. Further,
academic literature on conflict duration indicates that control of a lucrative illegal drug trade in
14 U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign
Plan for Support to Afghanistan, August 10, 2009.
15 Examples include the shooting down of a drug eradication plane in Colombia in 1993, which resulted in the
immediate shooting of the pilot and the taking hostage of three American defense contractors; the killing of five U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in Peru during the shooting down of a plane on a drug reconnaissance
mission; and the torture and murder of DEA undercover agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena Salazar in Mexico in 1985.
16 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” July 7,
2009; see also CRS Report R41004, International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy,
and Considerations for Congress, by John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler.
17 Report by the Executive Director of the UNODC, “Organized Crime and its Threat to Security: Tackling a
Disturbing Consequence of Drug Control,” March 1, 2009, p. 4. Emphasis in the original.
18 See for example, Cornelius Graubner, Drugs and Conflict: How the Mutual Impact of Illicit Drug Economies and
Violent Conflict Influences Sustainable Development, Peace and Stability, 2007.
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the hands of a particular political actor, rebel or insurgent group can lengthen a conflict. State
powers in the hands of a DTO through deeply entrenched kleptocracy serve as a force multiplier
to enhance a DTO’s power by harnessing the capacity of a state’s infrastructure—roads, seaports,
airports, warehouses, security apparatus, justice sector, and international political sovereignty—to
further the DTO’s illicit business aims.
The Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, presented the intelligence community’s
annual threat assessment to Congress in February 2010 and, among other issues, highlighted
narco-threats to political and regional stability, illicit finance for insurgents and terrorist groups,
and the expanding role and capabilities of organized crime in the illicit drug trade.19 The threat
assessment made reference to the following key trends:
1. The Afghan Taliban received in 2008 “up to $100 million in opium, cash, and
goods and services from the opiate trade in Afghanistan.” This makes the drug
trade the largest source of local funding for the Taliban-dominated insurgency.
2. Drug trafficking organizations and related drug violence “undermine basic
security” in parts of Mexico and Central America.
3. International organized crime networks, including drug traffickers, have
improved their capacity to gather intelligence related to law enforcement pressure
against their organizations. As a result, they “pose a growing threat to the United
States.”
4. The Taliban, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and
Hizballah are cited examples of terrorists or insurgent groups known to be
involved in drug trafficking.
5. Well-established organized criminal groups, which have not historically been
involved in producing narcotics—including those in Russia, China, Italy, and the
Balkans—are now expanding their ties to drug producers to develop their own
distribution markets and trafficking networks.
International Policy Context
At the international level, drugs and related threats have been subjects of recent discussion. In
December 2009, the U.N. Security Council met to debate the threat posed by drug trafficking to
global security, with a particular focus on drug trafficking effects on the stability of Africa.20 The
Executive Director of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) briefed the Security
Council, stating that drugs were enriching not only organized crime but also terrorists and other
anti-government forces. In February 2010, the U.N. Security Council followed up with a
subsequent debate on threats to global peace and security posed by drug trafficking and other
organized criminal activity. The framing of illicit drugs as an international security issue
19 Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2010, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf.
20 U.N. Security Council, Security Council Presidential Statement Calls for Stronger International Cooperation with
Global, Regional Bodies against Drug Trafficking, SC/9807, December 8, 2009, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
2009/sc9807.doc.htm.
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represents a recent—and somewhat controversial—development, as drug issues have traditionally
been considered to be domestic social and economic issues.21
Although drug trafficking has been an issue of international policy concern for more than a
century and a subject of longstanding multilateral policy commitment, tensions appear at times
between U.S. foreign drug policy and policy approaches advocated by independent observers and
some foreign countries. Many U.S. analysts would argue that the confluence of political and
security threats surrounding international drug trafficking necessitates a policy posture that
emphasizes the disruption and dismantlement of the criminal actors and organizations involved in
all aspects of the drug trade. At the same time, however, other observers argue that security and
law enforcement approaches to international drug control have failed to achieve notable successes
in “eliminating or reducing significantly” the supply of illicit drugs—a goal the United Nations
committed in 1998 to achieve by 2008 (and in 2009, recommitted to achieve by 2019).22 The UN
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), for example, argues that international concern with
“public security” during the past decade has overshadowed other key tenets of drug control
policy, including public health and drug demand reduction.23 Numerous international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) also argue that greater emphasis should be placed on policies
that emphasize harm reduction efforts to address and prevent the adverse health and social
consequences; programs to promote treatment, rehabilitation, and social re-integration for drug
users; as well as sustainable and comprehensive alternative development projects.24
An emerging block of observers, mainly but not limited to observers and policymakers from
Latin America, is calling for the consideration of alternatives to the prohibitionist international
drug control regime currently in place. Their recommendations broadly support shifts in drug
policy similar to how many European countries approach illegal drugs, with an emphasis on
neutralizing the health impacts of drug users and focusing on harm-reduction techniques. In
February 2009, a non-governmental, independent study group called the Latin American
Commission on Drugs and Democracy—co-chaired by former presidents from Brazil, Colombia,
and Mexico—concluded that the current international drug control model has failed. In May
2009, former Mexican President Vicente Fox publicly commented that it is time to consider
alternative drug policies, including legalizing certain drugs.25 In August 2009, to add to the
existing collection of countries that variously support some amount of drug decriminalization, a
new law in Mexico went into effect, decriminalizing “personal use” amounts of marijuana,
heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and other internationally sanctioned drugs.26
21 Venezuela’s representative at the U.N. Security Council meeting, for example, said that drug trafficking did not fall
under the Security Council’s jurisdiction and must be fought in a way that gained the approval of the entire
international community, through United Nations units that reported to the General Assembly.
22 p. 215, UNODC, 2008 World Drug Report, June 2008,available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/
775/09/PDF/N9877509.pdf?OpenElement; UN Commission on Drugs, Report on the 52nd Session, E/2009/28,
E/CN.7/2009/12 (2009), p. 44.
23 Ibid, p. 217.
24 See for example Vienna NGO Committee on Narcotic Drugs, “Beyond 2008 Declaration,” July 9, 2008; available at
http://www.vngoc.org/images/uploads/file/BEYOND%202008%
20DECLARATION%20AND%20RESOLUTIONS%20FINAL(1).pdf; Latin American Commission on Drugs and
Democracy, “Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift,” April 2009.
25 Arthur Brice, “Former Mexican President Calls for Legalizing Marijuana,”CNN.com, May 13, 2009.
26 “Mexico Legalizes Drug Possession,” Associated Press, August 21, 2009.
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While many critics remain against changes to the current drug control policy status quo,
advocates for a reevaluation of current drug policies appear to be gaining ground.27 Antonio
Maria Costa, the UNODC’s executive director, acknowledges in the UNODC’s most recent
annual World Drug Report, released June 2009, that a growing number of observers have
concluded that the current international drug control policy “is not working.” Although arguing
against drug legalization, Costa nevertheless supports a new look at, and possible rebalancing of,
the current mix of international drug policies.28
Such calls for a new look at international drug policies are being advocated from an increasingly
growing sector of the policy community.29 It remains unclear whether recent policy debates can
translate into lasting improvements to reduce the production, trafficking, use, and consequences
of illegal drug trade. However, changes could affect a range of foreign policy considerations for
the United States, including foreign aid reform, counterinsurgency strategy (particularly in
Afghanistan), the distribution of domestic and international drug control funding, and the relative
balance of civilian, law enforcement, and military roles in anti-drug efforts.
In 2010, the 111th Congress may choose to continue its oversight and assessment of existing U.S.
international drug policy. In this process, several questions may emerge:
• In what ways are counternarcotics strategies facilitating or driving recent
increases in drug-related violence? Are spikes in drug-related violence common
or inevitable consequences of heightened counternarcotics operations? In what
ways might governments mitigate or dampen current and potentially future
increases in drug-related violence?
• How do counternarcotics policies interact with counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, and anti-money laundering priorities, particularly in countries
such as Afghanistan, where the U.S. government may have an interest in all three
issues?
• What role should the U.S. military play in providing foreign counternarcotics
assistance?
• How should U.S. policymakers weigh the benefits of aerial eradication as a
counternarcotics policy tool with the social, financial, and political costs it may
incur?
• To what extent is it a common phenomenon that human rights are violated over
the course of drug-related investigations and operations? In what ways might
human rights violations undermine or threaten drug control policies?
27 In support of current prohibitionist policies, see “Drug Legalization Would Be ‘Catastrophe’, Says Ex-White House
Drug Spokesman Bob Weiner; Drugs Have Not ‘Won the War’; Op-ed Letter in New York Times Today,” PR
Newswire, June 18, 2009; Bob Weiner, “Time to End Prohibition for Drugs?” New York Times, op-ed, June 18, 2009;
“How to Stop the Drug Wars,” The Economist, March 5, 2009; John P. Walters, “Drug Legalization Isn’t the Answer,”
Wall Street Journal, op-ed, March 6, 2009.
28 UNODC, World Drug Report, 2009; see also “UN Drug Czar Gives up on Drug Free World, Admits New Strategy is
Needed,” States News Service, June 24, 2009.
29 See for example H.R. 2134, Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act of 2009; Rafael Pardo and Juan
Gabriel Aires, “Before Washington Ramps Up Yet another Losing War on Drugs, Why Not Let A Commission
Construct a Better Policy,” Christian Science Monitor, op-ed, August 11, 2009; Nicholas D. Kristof, “Drugs Won the
War,” New York Times, op-ed, June 14, 2009.
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• To what extent should U.S. counternarcotics policy take into account economic
development, social development, and health and harm reduction programs and
are such efforts sufficiently coordinated with international and bilateral partners?
• How do counternarcotics policies interact with related foreign policy goals of
anti-corruption, justice sector reform, and improving the rule of law?
• How might international regulatory and legal constraints limit the reach of U.S.
counternarcotics policy and potentially offer drug syndicates foreign safe havens?
And what legislative options might be available to prevent such legal safe havens
from existing?
U.S. National Drug Control Strategy
U.S. involvement in international counterdrug policy rests on the central premise that helping
foreign governments combat the illegal drug trade abroad will ultimately curb illegal drug
availability and use in the United States. To this end, the current Administration maintains the
goal of reducing, and ultimately cutting off, the international flow of illegal drugs into the United
States.
Since 1999, successive Administrations have developed an annual National Drug Control
Strategy, which describes the total budget for drug control programs and outlines U.S. strategic
goals for stemming drug supply and demand.30 The international component of the
Administration’s 2009 National Drug Control Strategy centers on the goal of disrupting the
market for illegal drugs through foreign counternarcotics assistance, targeted economic sanctions
against drug traffickers, diplomatic efforts, and international law enforcement investigations.
Funding
For FY2011, the Administration has requested approximately $15.5 billion for federal drug
control programs, up from $15 million enacted for FY2010 (see Table 1).31 Of this, 39%, or $6
billion, is requested for international and interdiction programs.
30 Congress requires that the White House submit to Congress a National Drug Control Strategy report each year. This
requirement was first established by Section 706 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of
1998 (Division C, Title VII, P.L. 105-277; 21 U.S.C. 1705) and has been subsequently amended. The current National
Drug Control Strategy is available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs08/index.html.
31 Office on National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control Strategy, FY2009 Budget Summary,
February 2008, p. 11, at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/09budget/tbl_1.pdf.
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Table 1. U.S. Drug Control Funding
(in U.S. $ millions)
FY2010 FY2011
Activitiesa FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 Enact.
Req.
International 1,084.5 1,105.1 1,159.3 1,393.3 1,434.5 2,050.2 1,824.6 2,082 2,288 2,308
Interdiction 1,913.7 2,147.5 2,534.1 2,928.7 3,287.0 3,175.9 2,901.4 2,910 3,640 3,727
Domestic
7,783.2 7,967.5 8,312.2 8,462.2 8,377.7 8,618.0 8,550.3 9,164 9,105 9,519
Total
10,781.4 11,220.1 12,005.6 12,784.3 13,144.1 13,844.0 13,276.3 15,156 15,033 15,554
Source: Adapted from Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control Strategy,
FY2010 Budget Summary, May 2009, p. 15; and ONDCP, National Drug Control Budget FY2011 Funding
Highlights, February 2010. Totals may not add due to rounding.
a. “International” refers to activities primarily focused on or conducted in areas outside the United States,
including a wide range of drug control programs to eradicate crops, seize drugs (except air and riverine
interdiction seizures), arrest and prosecute major traffickers, destroy processing capabilities, develop and
promote alternative crops to replace drug crops, reduce demand, investigate money laundering and financial
crime activities, and promote the involvement of other nations in efforts to control the supply of and
demand for drugs. “Interdiction” refers to activities designed to intercept and disrupt shipments of illegal
drugs and their precursors en route to the United States from abroad. “Domestic” refers to activities
related to domestic demand reduction, including federal drug treatment and drug prevention programs, as
well as domestic law enforcement.
Agency Roles
Several U.S. agencies are involved in implementing U.S. international counternarcotics activities
in support of the Administration’s National Drug Control Strategy.32 These agencies include the
following:
• Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).33 Located within the
Executive Office of the President, ONDCP establishes U.S. counterdrug policies
and goals, and coordinates the federal budget to combat drugs both domestically
and internationally. Every year, ONDCP’s director, sometimes referred to as the
U.S. drug czar, produces the National Drug Control Strategy and the federal
counterdrug budget summary.
• Department of State.34 The Secretary of State is responsible for coordinating all
international counterdrug programs implemented by the U.S. government,
including foreign counternarcotics assistance. The State Department identifies
fighting the production, transportation, and sale of illegal narcotics among its
primary goals.35 Every March, the State Department’s Bureau of International
32 The 2010 strategy, required by law to be presented to Congress by February 1, has not been released as of February
26, 2010.
33 Congress established ONDCP in 1988 in the National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988 (Title I, Subtitle A of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690), which has since been amended. For additional information on ONDCP,
see CRS Report RL32352, War on Drugs: Reauthorization and Oversight of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, by Mark Eddy.
34 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; Sec. 481(b)(1); 22 U.S.C. 2291(b)(1)), as amended by Section 4(c) of
the International Narcotics Control Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-583).
35 U.S. Department of State, Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2007-2012, p. 15, at http://www.state.gov/documents/
(continued...)
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Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) produces the International
Narcotics Strategy Report (INCSR), which describes the efforts of key countries
to attack all aspects of the international drug trade, including anti-money
laundering during the previous calendar year.
• Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID provides assistance
for long-term economic and social development. The USAID Administrator
serves concurrently as the State Department’s Director of U.S. Foreign
Assistance, with a rank equivalent to Deputy Secretary of State. USAID plays a
role in counternarcotics development assistance, especially regarding alternative
livelihood programs, which are designed to offer alternatives to farmers that will
enable and encourage them to discontinue planting poppy and other illicit crops.
• Department of Defense (DOD). DOD maintains the lead role in detecting and
monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States36 and
plays a key role in collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence on illegal drugs
with U.S. law enforcement and international security counterparts. In addition,
DOD provides counternarcotics foreign assistance to train, equip, and improve
the counternarcotics capacity and capabilities of relevant agencies of foreign
governments with its Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account
appropriations.37
• Department of Justice (DOJ). The Attorney General is responsible for federal
law enforcement and to ensure public safety against foreign and domestic threats,
including illegal drug trafficking. This translates into an array of responsibilities
that include law enforcement operations, drug-related intelligence analysis,
prosecution and criminal justice activities, as well as police and justice sector
training. Primary agencies under DOJ that focus on international drug control
include the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF), and the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC).
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Secretary of Homeland
Security is responsible for U.S. policies related to interdiction of illegal drugs
entering the United States from abroad. The Strategic Plan for DHS identifies
securing the U.S. border against illegal drugs as one of its primary objectives.38
Key offices within DHS that participate in counterdrug activities include the
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Coast Guard, and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE).
• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA’s Crime and Narcotics Center
collects intelligence information and develops intelligence analyses to support or
(...continued)
organization/86291.pdf.
36 10 U.S.C. 124, as added by Section 1202(a) of P.L. 101-189.
37 Congress provides the Department of Defense (DOD) with these authorities under Section 1004 of P.L. 101-510, as
amended (10 U.S.C. 374 note), and Section 1033 of P.L. 105-85, as amended.
38 See p. 14 of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Strategic Plan at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
DHS_StratPlan_FINAL_spread.pdf.
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conduct operations countering illicit drug activities, including trends in illegal
drug crop cultivation and production.
• Department of the Treasury. The Treasury Department participates in
counterdrug efforts as they pertain to targeting the illicit financial proceeds that
result from drug trafficking. Key offices that participate in combating drug-
related money laundering include the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
and the Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCEN).39
International Drug Control Toolbox
Over the years, U.S. counterdrug efforts have expanded to include a broad array of tools to attack
the drug trade using several approaches. The following sections describe and analyze U.S. use of
eight major drug control tools and their legislative sources, if applicable: (1) multilateral
cooperation, (2) foreign assistance restrictions, (3) crop eradication, (4) alternative development,
(5) interdiction, (6) extradition, (7) anti-money laundering, and (8) institutional capacity building.
Multilateral Cooperation
For nearly a century, the United States has been involved in multilateral international drug control
efforts, beginning with the International Opium Commission of 1909. This 1909 Commission led
to the development of the first ever international drug control treaty, the Hague Opium
Convention of 1912.40 Since the early 1900s, the U.S. government has been a primary advocate
for broadening and deepening the scope of international drug control, especially through the
United Nations’ three active multilateral drug control treaties: the 1961 Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, as amended; the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and the 1988
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.41
Today, more than 95% of U.N. member states, including the United States, are parties to these
three international drug control treaties.42 In total, these international agreements limit
international production and trade of a defined set of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and
the precursor chemicals used to make these substances for primarily medical and scientific
purposes. The treaties also establish international mechanisms to monitor treaty adherence—
through the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)—and for the collection of data related
to the illicit cultivation, production, or manufacture of proscribed drugs.
39 For additional information, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “What You Need
to Know about U.S. Sanctions Against Drug Traffickers,” at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
programs/narco/drugs.pdf; see also p. 10 of FinCEN’s Strategic Plan, at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/
strategic_plan_2008.pdf.
40 Article 44 of the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961 Single Convention) provides that
the Hague Opium Convention of 1912 would be succeeded by the 1961 Single Convention when it entered into force.
41 A copy of the 1961 Single Convention, as amended, is at http://www.incb.org/incb/convention_1961.html; the 1971
Convention is at http://www.incb.org/incb/en/convention _1971.html; and the 1988 Convention is at
http://www.incb.org/incb/en/convention_1988.html.
42 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), 2008 Report, 2009, at http://www.incb.org/incb/en/annual-report-
2008.html.
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The United States also participates in multilateral assistance programs to control illegal drug
production and trafficking through the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Inter-
American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). UNODC was established in 1997 to
provide field-based technical assistance on counternarcotics projects, as well as research and
analysis on illegal drug market trends.43 As the drug control arm of the Organization of American
States (OAS), CICAD serves as a regional policy forum for all aspects of Western Hemisphere
illegal drug issues.44 In FY2007, the United States provided UNODC with an estimated $4
million and OAS/CICAD with $1.4 million. In FY2008, the United States provided UNODC with
approximately $2.1 million and OAS/CICAD with $1.4 million.45
Today, many observers highlight the importance of multilateral cooperation to combat drugs,
particularly because of the transnational nature of the drug trade, while others continue to criticize
existing institutions for failing to achieve sufficient progress in combating illegal drugs.46 The
UNODC has reported in recent years that global drug use has stabilized, on average; global
opium poppy and coca cultivation is in decline; and global illicit drug seizures are up—and that a
major contributing factor has been the continued international support for drug control policies.47
Global coordination, many say, is vital for lasting success in combating the international drug
trade. At the same time, however, others criticize the international drug control system for failing
to achieve the United Nation’s stated goal of “eliminating or reducing significantly” by 2008 the
production and availability of synthetic drugs and precursors, as well as the cultivation of the
coca bush, cannabis plant, and opium poppy.48 In 2009, the U.N.’s Commission on Narcotic
Drugs set a new date of 2019 to “eliminate or reduce significantly and measurably” the
cultivation of illegal plant-based drugs, the demand for illegal drugs, the production and
trafficking of synthetic drugs, the diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals used in the
manufacture of illegal drugs, and drug-related money laundering.49
Foreign Assistance Sanctions
The FY2010 “Drug Majors”
In an effort to deter foreign governments from aiding or participating in illicit drug production or
trafficking, the President may suspend U.S. foreign assistance appropriations to countries that are
major illegal drug producers or major transit countries for illegal drugs, known as “drug
majors.”50 For FY2010, the President has identified 20 drug majors (see Figure 1). Of these,
43 The UNODC website is available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/index.html. UNODC’s budget in the 2006-2007
biennium totaled $283 million, $120.2 million of which was devoted for drug control assistance projects.
44 The CICAD website is available at http://www.cicad.oas.org/.
45 U.S. Department of State response to CRS request, February 5, 2009.
46 “The International War on Drugs,” Cato Handbook for Congress, 2003, 2009.
47 UNODC, World Drug Report, 2008 edition for the stability of drug use patterns and the 2009 edition for cultivation
and seizures trends in 2008.
48 UN General Assembly, Political Declaration, A/RES/S-20/2, October 21, 1998.
49 UN Commission on Drugs, Report on the 52nd Session, Political Declaration, E/2009/28, E/CN.7/2009/12 (2009).
50 Since 1992, Congress has required that the President submit annual reports, which identify major drug transit and
major drug producing countries, known as the “drug majors.” Major illicit drug producing countries are defined by
section 481(e)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)(2)) as a country in which (1) 1,000 hectares
or more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year, (2) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is
cultivated or harvested during a year, or (3) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a
(continued...)
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Congress requires that the President certify that the drug majors have not “failed demonstrably”
to make at least “substantial efforts” to adhere to their obligations during the previous year under
international counternarcotics agreements.
Defining the Drug Majors
A “major illicit drug producing country” is statutorily defined in Sec. 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(FAA), as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)(2)), as a country in which:
• (a) 1,000 hectares of more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year;
• (b) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is cultivated or harvested during a year; or
• (c) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the President
determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United States.
A “major drug transit country” is statutorily defined in Sec. 481 of the FAA, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)(5)), as a
country
• (a) in which there is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled
substances significantly affecting the United States; or
• (b) through which such drugs or substances are transported.
Failure to receive a presidential certification of substantial counternarcotics efforts may result in
certain foreign assistance prohibitions against those drug majors. Decertified drug majors may
continue to receive U.S. foreign assistance, however, if the President determines that assistance is
“vital” to U.S. national interests. Alternatively, foreign assistance to drug majors countries may
nevertheless be withheld by Congress, despite a presidential certification, if Congress enacts a
joint resolution disapproving of the President’s certification.
For FY2010, the President did not certify three drug majors—Bolivia, Burma and Venezuela.
However, for two of the three countries, Bolivia and Venezuela, the President partially waived the
aid sanctions, permitting the U.S. government to provide assistance to Venezuela for “programs to
aid Venezuela’s democratic institutions” and to Bolivia for “continued support for bilateral
programs in Bolivia” (see Figure 1).51
(...continued)
year, unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United
States. Major drug-transit countries are defined by section 481(e)(5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2291(e)(5)) as a country (1) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled
substances significantly affecting the United States, or (2) through which are transported such drugs or substances.
51 Barack Obama, Presidential Determination No. 2009-30, “Memorandum to the Secretary of State: Major Drug
Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2010,” September 15, 2009.
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Figure 1. Map of World Drug Majors in FY2010
Source: Barack Obama, Presidential Determination No. 2009-30, “Memorandum to the Secretary of State:
Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2010,” September 15, 2009.
Since its creation in 1986, the drug majors designation process has garnered significant
controversy. Supporters of the process argue that, overall, it is an “effective diplomatic
instrument” to enforce international drug control commitments because it holds foreign
governments “publicly responsible for their actions before their international peers.”52 However,
in a few extreme cases, the drug majors designation does not appear to have much effect on a
country’s drug control policies. In the case of Bolivia’s designation in 2008, the policy appears to
have had the opposite effect, in part causing a further rift in counternarcotics policy between
Bolivia and the United States.53 Observers from many countries criticize the unilateral and non-
cooperative nature of the drug certification requirements; such critics recommend moving toward
multilateral and regional fora for evaluating governments’ counterdrug efforts. Others question
the extent to which the process reduces the scope of the illegal drug trade, when many of the
world’s drug producers and transit areas are located in countries that are not designated as drug
majors or decertified by the President.
Drug Certification Procedures
Two codified narcotics control certification procedures are available under 22 U.S.C. 2291j and
22 U.S.C. 2291j-1. Beginning 1986 (P.L. 99-570), Congress required that the President determine
52 See for example U.S. Department of State, 1996 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), 2007, at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1996_narc_report/exesum96.html.
53 See for example Antonio Regalado, “Bolivia Plants Coca and Cocaine Flows,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2009;
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Fourth Report to the Congress on the Operation of the Andean Trade
Preference Act as Amended,” April 30, 2009.
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and certify to Congress that major illicit drug producing or drug transit countries (i.e., drug
majors) were “fully cooperating” with the U.S. government to combat the illegal drug trade. Prior
to the President’s determination and certification, 22 U.S.C. 2291j requires that 50% of certain
bilateral assistance be withheld and that the U.S. government oppose multilateral development
assistance to the drug majors.54 If the President could not determine and certify a drug major as
having met the “fully cooperating” requirement (or if Congress enacts a joint resolution
disapproving of a Presidential certification), then one of two options exist:
• U.S. Denial of Assistance: 100% of bilateral assistance is prohibited from being
obligated and the U.S. government continues to oppose multilateral development
assistance until the country is eligible for certification; or
• Continuance of All or a Portion of Aid for National Interest Reasons: Aid
continues, not because the country qualifies for certification, but because the
President determines that “the vital national interests of the United States require
that the assistance withheld ... be provided.” In this scenario, multilateral
development assistance could also be supported.
While not eliminating the certification procedures under 22 U.S.C. 2291j, the Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-115), temporarily
allowed for the suspension of the prior certification procedures and their replacement with a new
set of procedures. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228),
made permanent the modified certification requirement under P.L. 107-115, and this new
requirement became codified under 22 U.S.C. 2291j-1.
In place of 22 U.S.C. 2291j, 22 U.S.C. 2291j-1 required the President to designate and withhold
assistance from only the worst offending drug majors—those that were determined by the
President as having “failed demonstrably” to make substantial efforts to combat illicit drugs—and
it eliminated the requirement to withhold initially 50% of bilateral aid prior to the President’s
designation and certification to Congress.
The change in standards from whether a country had “cooperated fully” to whether it had “failed
demonstrably” effectively shifted the “burden of proof to an assumption that foreign nations were
cooperating with the United States and had to be proved otherwise to trigger the restrictions” in
foreign assistance.55 For those countries that were designated as having failed demonstrably, the
same two options remained as under 22 U.S.C. 2291j: (1) 100% denial of U.S. bilateral and
multilateral assistance or (2) continuance of all or a portion of aid for national interest reasons.
Methamphetamine Precursor Chemicals
An additional certification process was enacted by Congress as part of the Combat
Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005.56 This law amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
54 Aid subject to withholding included all aid under Chapter 32 of Title 22 of the U.S. Code except (1) aid under Part
VIII (International Narcotics Control) of Subchapter I of Chapter 32 of Title 22 of the U.S. Code; (2) any other
narcotics-related aid under Subchapter I of Chapter 32 of Title 22 of the U.S. Code; and (3) aid involving disaster
relief, refugees, and provisions of food and medicine.
55 H.Rept. 108-167, Part I, p. 18.
56 Section 722 of Title VII of USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177; 21 U.S.C.
801 note) amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 at Sections 489 and 490; for further explanation, see also
H.Rept. 109-133.
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to require the State Department to report the five largest importing and exporting countries of two
precursor drugs, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, commonly used to produce methamphetamine,
and certify whether these countries are fully cooperating with the United States on
methamphetamine chemical precursor control. Nations deemed not to be fully cooperating face a
loss of U.S. bilateral assistance and U.S. opposition to multilateral assistance in the multilateral
development banks.57 For FY2010, the State Department identified 16 major precursor chemical
source countries: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Germany, India, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. So far, the President has not decertified any country for its efforts to control
methamphetamine precursor chemicals.
Other Drug-Related Foreign Aid Certification Requirements
Several additional drug-related certification requirements appear in recent appropriations
legislation for specific countries. While not codified certifications processes, failure to be
certified under these provisions can result in the prohibition of various amounts of foreign aid.
For example, since 2006, Congress has placed conditions on a portion of U.S. economic
assistance to Afghanistan (the amount varies in appropriations legislation for different fiscal
years) by requiring the President to certify that the Afghan government is “cooperating fully”
with counternarcotics efforts prior to the obligation of funds, or to issue a national security waiver
in order to allow assistance to continue even when counternarcotics cooperation does not reach
the cooperating fully standard.58 For each year, the President has issued a national security
waiver.59 For Mexico in FY2009 and FY2010, for example, 15% of U.S. aid for counternarcotics
efforts is similarly contingent on a certification that human rights complaints and violations,
which have reportedly increased from 182 in 2006 to 1,230 in 2008 as counternarcotics efforts
have been ramped up, are addressed.60
Crop Eradication
Eradication programs seek to combat the flow of cocaine, opium, heroin, and marijuana at the
root of the supply chain—in the fields. Illicit drug crop eradication can take several forms,
including (1) aerial fumigation, which involves the spraying of fields with herbicide; (2) manual
removal, which involves the physical up-rooting and destruction of crops; and (3) mechanical
removal, which involves the use of tractors and all-terrain vehicles to harrow the fields. The
United States supports programs to eradicate coca, opium, and marijuana in a number of
countries, including primarily Colombia and Afghanistan (see Table 2). These efforts are
conducted by a number of U.S. government agencies and contractors that administer U.S.
eradication programs providing producer countries with chemical herbicides, technical assistance
57 As with the drug majors certification process, the President can waive the foreign assistance restrictions if he
determines that providing aid to the country is vital to U.S. national interest.
58 For FY2006, see the 2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, P.L. 109-102; for FY2007, see the Revised
Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, P.L. 110-5; for FY2008, see the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations
Act, P.L. 110-161; and for FY2009, see the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 111-8.
59 See CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard, for additional
information on this congressional certification requirement.
60 Ginger Thompson and Marc Lacey, “Mexico Drug Fight Fuels Complaints,” New York Times, August 19, 2009.
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and specialized equipment, and spray aircraft. In FY2009, the State Department spent
approximately $432 million on international eradication programs.61
Table 2. U.S. Assistance for Crop Eradication
(in current U.S. $ millions)
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
Afghanistana 166.7 169.9
237.0
Bolivia 8.5
7.3
8.5
Colombiab 170.7
137.9
126.0
Guatemala 0.1
0.2
0.3
Laos 0.0
0.1
0.0
Mexico 0.2
0.0
0.0
Pakistan 2.3
1.0
1.0
Peru 32.5
14.9
14.4
INLc 86.2
48.0
45.1
Total 467.2
379.3
432.3
Source: U.S. Department of State response to CRS request, February 5, 2009 and updated February 26, 2010.
Funds are rounded to the first decimal. Final implementation numbers are based on additional post reporting
requirements to update their operational plans.
a. Funds listed for Afghanistan in FY2007 include $20 million in FY2007 emergency supplemental
appropriations and $85 million in FY2008 emergency supplementals.
b. For FY2008 and FY2009, the Critical Flight Safety is included in the Colombia subtotals.
c. For FY2007, Colombia’s Critical Flight Safety was a separate budget line item and therefore included in the
INL subtotal.
Eradication is a long-standing but controversial U.S. policy regarding international drug control.
As recently as 2008, the State Department had considered crop control the “most cost-effective
means of cutting supply,” because drugs cannot enter the illegal trade if the crops were never
planted, destroyed, or left unharvested.62 Without drug cultivation, the State Department’s
rationale continued, “there would be no need for costly enforcement and interdiction operations.”
Proponents of eradication further argue that it is easier to locate and destroy crops in the field
than to locate subsequently processed drugs on smuggling routes or on the streets of U.S. cities.
Put differently, a kilogram of powder cocaine is far more difficult to detect than the 300 to 500
kilograms of coca leaf that are required to make that same kilogram. Also, because crops
constitute the cheapest link in the narcotics chain, producers may devote fewer economic
resources to prevent their detection than to conceal more expensive and refined forms of the drug
product.
Opponents of expanded supply reduction policy generally question whether reduction of the
foreign supply of narcotic drugs is achievable and whether it would have a meaningful impact on
levels of illicit drug use in the United States. Manual eradication requires significant time and
61 State Department response to CRS request, February 26, 2010.
62 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR, at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/.
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human resources, reportedly involving upward of 20 work-hours of effort to pull up and destroy
one hectare of coca plants.63 Aerial application of herbicide is not legal or feasible in many
countries and is expensive to implement where it is permitted.64 Aerial fumigation in Colombia
has also raised allegations that the herbicide chemical used has caused negative human, animal,
and environmental consequences.65
Others question whether a global policy of simultaneous crop control is cost-effective or
politically feasible because eradication efforts may also potentially result in negative political,
economic, and social consequences for the producing country, especially in conflict or post-
conflict environments.66 Some argue that this has been the case with respect to eradication efforts
in Afghanistan, where some U.S. officials have acknowledged that poppy eradication may have
caused many poor Afghan farmers to ally with insurgents and other enemies of the Afghan
government.67 Richard Holbrooke, the Obama Administration’s Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, has called Western eradication policies in Afghanistan “a failure” and
that they have “wasted hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars.”68 Further, aerial eradication
remains a high-risk activity, as spray planes and their crew are targeted by drug traffickers. In
2003, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which the State Department lists as
a foreign terrorist organization, shot down a U.S. government plane in the Colombian jungle,
killing the American pilot and a Colombian air force sergeant and taking three other crew
members, all U.S. defense contractors, hostage.69 They remained FARC hostages until July
2008.70
Alternative Development
U.S. counterdrug policy also includes foreign assistance specifically targeted to illicit drug crop
farmers. Alternative development is a form of drug crop eradication. The ultimate goal is to
convince current farmers to abandon their drug crops and switch to licit, sustainable livelihoods
and sources of income. Whereas other eradication methods involve the physical removal or
chemical destruction of illicit drug crops, alternative development involves the introduction of
crop substitution options, training in sustainable farming techniques, infrastructure development,
and other projects that make alternative livelihoods economically more attractive.71 The U.S.
63 Kevin J. Riley, Snow Job? The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 1996), p. 112.
64 Colombia is currently the only country that conducts regular aerial spraying of coca and opium poppy.
65 For further discussion of eradication policy in Colombia, see CRS Report RL33163, Drug Crop Eradication and
Alternative Development in the Andes, by Connie Veillette and Carolina Navarrete-Frias.
66 Barnett R. Rubin and Alexandra Guaqueta, Fighting Drugs and Building Peace: Towards Policy Coherence between
Counter-Narcotics and Peace Building, Dialogue on Globalization, Occasional Paper No. 37, November 2007.
67 Thom Shanker and Elisabeth Bumiller, “U.S. Shifts Afghan Narcotics Strategy,” New York Times, July 23, 2009;
Staff of Senator John F. Kennedy, “Afghanistan’s Narco War: Breaking the Link between Drug Traffickers and
Insurgents,” A Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 10, 2009.
68 Ibid.
69 For further discussion see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by June S. Beittel, and CRS Report
RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan.
70 “Colombia: U.S. Hostages Spotted,” New York Times, June 10, 2008; “Betancourt, U.S. Contractors Rescued from
FARC,” CNN.com, July 3, 2008.
71 For a broader discussion of international drug control policies, see CRS Report RL34543, International Drug
Control Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler.
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government considers alternative development a key component to drug supply reduction policies
and has active programs in Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and South America (see Table 3).
Table 3.U.S. Alternative Development Foreign Assistance, FY2009 Estimate
Funding
Country
Amount
Laos $100,000
Afghanistan $161,518,000
Bolivia $13,621,000
Colombia $109,831,000
Ecuador $7,737,000
Peru $29,205,000
TOTAL $322,012,000
Source: State Department response to CRS, October 26, 2009. Data updated as of October 19, 2009.
Note: Alternative development funding listed above includes efforts to combat not only opiate production but
also cocaine.
U.S. alternative development programs, funded and run mainly by the State Department and U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by
helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production, expand legal
employment opportunities, and offer other incentives to farmers to discontinue planting illicit
drug crops. In theory, this approach is designed to complement law enforcement and eradication
efforts to provide both a “carrot and stick” strategy.
For several decades, alternative development has been implemented in various forms and with
varying success.72 Since the late 1960s, when alternative development policies were initially
conceived as simply crop substitution projects, efforts have somewhat expanded to include a
broader concept of alternative development. Current U.S. programs include not only crop
substitution projects but also the development of and assistance for roads, infrastructure, and
health care.
Some observers, however, claim that while current U.S. efforts often aim to achieve this
broadened concept of alternative development, they may not always achieve it in practice. Some
indicate that a relationship between alternative development projects and a reduction in illicit
drug production may be tenuous, as policy coordination between alternative development projects
and eradication and interdiction efforts remains limited in some cases.73 Further, it appears that
alternative development projects are not implemented in most regions where illicit crops are
grown today. According to reports, approximately 10% to 15% of areas under illicit cultivation
are covered by alternative development projects supported by the international community, and,
on average, 5% of farmers of illicit crops receive alternative development assistance.74 Common
72 See, for example, UNODC, Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation, Final Synthesis Report, 2005,
at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Alternative_Development_Evaluation_Dec-05.pdf.
73 See, for example, “A Failed Balance: Alternative Development and Eradication,” Transnational Institute, Drugs and
Conflict Debate Paper 4, March 2002.
74 See, for example, UNODC, The Economic Viability of Alternative Development, UNODC internal paper, 1999, at
(continued...)
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factors limiting the reach and prevalence of alternative development projects include ongoing
security threats in areas of illicit crop cultivation, lack of political will or resources to administer
alternative development projects, and local distrust of government or external influences.
Interdiction
Interdiction efforts seek to combat the drug trade as traffickers begin moving drug products from
source countries to their final destinations. Several U.S. federal agencies are involved in
coordinating operations with foreign government interdiction forces and providing law
enforcement training and other forms of assistance to foreign countries in order to deny drug
traffickers the use of transit routes. Within the so-called “transit zone”—a 42 million square-mile
area between Central and South America and the U.S. southern borders, which covers the
Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean—a DOD-led interagency group
called the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South (JIATF-South) coordinates interdiction operations
across federal agency participants, as well as international liaisons from Great Britain, France, the
Netherlands, and several Latin American countries. The U.S.-Mexican border is the primary point
of entry for cocaine shipments and other drugs smuggled into the United States.75
Outside the transit zone, other international interdiction operations involving U.S. agencies,
mainly DEA, include Operation Containment, Project Cohesion, and Project Prism. Operation
Containment, a multinational law enforcement effort established in 2002 and led by DEA, aims to
place a “security belt” around Afghanistan to prevent processing chemicals for converting opium
poppy to heroin from entering the country and opium and heroin from leaving.76 Project
Cohesion, an international precursor chemical control initiative established in 2005 and led by the
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB),77 tracks precursor chemicals involved in the
production of cocaine and heroin. Project Prism, a U.N.-sponsored initiative, monitors and
controls illicit trade in precursor chemicals used in the production of amphetamine-type synthetic
drugs. The Obama Administration’s new counternarcotics policy for Afghanistan will reportedly
emphasize interdiction and the dismantling of Afghan drug trafficking syndicates.78
Several U.S. agencies also provide foreign law enforcement training and assistance in order to
enhance interdiction efforts abroad. The Department of State, the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, and DEA are involved in providing anti-narcotics law
enforcement training, technical assistance, and equipment for foreign personnel. The U.S.
military provides international support for drug monitoring and detection. In addition, the United
(...continued)
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Alternative%20Development/EconomicViability_AD.pdf; UNODC, Alternative
Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation, Final Synthesis Report, 2005; and UNODC, World Drug Report,
Chapter 3: Alternative Development, 2000, p. 152.
75 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), National Drug Threat Assessment
2008, October 2007, Product No. 2007-Q0317-003, at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs25/25921/index.htm#Top.
76 Statement of the Honorable Michele M. Leonhart, Acting Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March 12,
2008, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct031208.html.
77 The INCB is an independent and quasi-judicial control organ monitoring the implementation of the United Nations
drug control conventions.
78 James Risen, “U.S. to Hunt Down Afghan Drug Lords Tied to Taliban,” New York Times, August 10, 2009; “U.S.
Drug Agents Target Afghan Poppy Pushers,” National Public Radio, July 29, 2009.
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States regularly contributes funding and expertise to law enforcement assistance activities of the
United Nations and other international organizations.
U.S. interdiction activities in the transit zone, spanning the continental and maritime border areas
between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean, are sometimes considered
among the bright spots of U.S. counterdrug efforts. The State Department reports that its
interdiction activities in the Caribbean, including Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos
(OPBAT), contributed to a drop in illegal drug flows from 70% in the 1980s to less than 10% in
recent years.79 A 2005 report released by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), for
example, highlighted the role of improved interagency coordination and international cooperation
for improvements in transit zone interdiction operations.80 Drug trafficking organizations,
however, are reportedly growing increasingly sophisticated in their evasion techniques, and some
observers are concerned that current interdiction capabilities may not be sufficient for long-term
reductions in drug supplies. Proponents of strong drug interdiction policies, for example, have
long been concerned that the nation’s focus on anti-terror objectives will detract from resources
and political will needed to combat foreign illicit drug production and trafficking. Supporting
such concerns, the 2005 GAO report states that the commitment of U.S. military assets to Iraq
and Afghanistan may hamper the ability of U.S. law enforcement to intercept drug shipments in
the future.
Some observers also caution that interdiction efforts could raise the retail price of illegal drugs,
potentially resulting in a perverse incentive that actually increases the economic rewards to drug
traffickers; interdiction efforts that appear to be reaping success in dismantling major drug
trafficking networks may nevertheless pose the unintended consequence of sparking short-term
increases in drug-related violence, as surviving drug traffickers compete with one another for
control—often violently—of drug routes. This appears to have been in part a contributing factor
to the ongoing drug-related violence in Mexico—and some observers are raising the concern that
similar consequences may occur in Afghanistan under the Obama Administration’s renewed
emphasis on interdiction efforts to combat the Afghan opiate trade.
Anti-money Laundering Efforts
To reap the financial benefits of the illegal drug trade, traffickers must launder their illicit profits
into the licit economy. As a result, the United States and other members of the international
community have sought to use anti-money laundering efforts as a tool to combat this upstream
activity in the illegal drug market. Currently, several U.S. agencies are involved in international
anti-money laundering efforts designed to enhance financial transaction transparency and
regulation, improve cooperation and coordination with foreign governments and private financial
institutions, and provide foreign countries with law enforcement training and support.
Congress has been active in pursuing anti-money laundering regulations and program oversight.
In 1999, Congress passed the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act to authorize the
President to target the financial profits that significant foreign narcotics traffickers and their
79 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Program and Budget
Guide, Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, Publication No. 11453, September 2007, p. 92.
80 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Decline in Drug
Interdiction Assets and Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations, GAO-06-200, November
2005.
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organizations (known as “Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker Kingpins,” or SDNTKs)
have accumulated from their illicit activities.81 This tool seeks to deny SDNTKs and their related
businesses access to the U.S. financial system and all trade transactions involving U.S. companies
and individuals.82 Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress further
strengthened U.S. measures to combat money laundering by providing the Secretary of the
Treasury with new authorities to impose a set of regulatory restrictions, or “special measures,”
against foreign jurisdictions, foreign financial institutions, and certain classes of financial
transactions involving foreign jurisdictions, if deemed by the Treasury Secretary to be “of
primary money laundering concern.”83 These anti-money laundering tools are designed not only
to address drug trafficking, but also combat other forms of related criminal activity, including
terrorist financing.
In addition, Congress requires that the State Department include in its annual International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) a separate volume devoted to the state of
international money laundering and financial crimes in each country. Among the report’s
congressionally mandated requirements, the State Department annually identifies the world’s
“major money laundering countries,” defined as those countries “whose financial institutions
engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international
narcotics trafficking” and other serious crimes (see Figure 2).
81 Title VIII, International Narcotics Trafficking, of P.L. 106-120, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000 (21 U.S.C. 1901-1908; 8 U.S.C. 1182).
82 The law was reportedly modeled on Treasury’s sanctions program pursuant to Executive Order 12978 (October
1995) against Colombia drug cartels under authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (Title II of
P.L. 95-223; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and the National Emergencies Act (P.L. 94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
83 Section 311 of the International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (Title III,
Subtitle A of P.L. 107-56, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001) amends the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 at 31 U.S.C. 5318A.
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Figure 2. Major Money Laundering Countries and Jurisdictions of Primary Money
Laundering Concern in FY2010
Sources: U.S. Department of State, 2010 INCSR; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, Section 311 Special Measures, at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/
section311.html.
U.S. officials and some observers have highlighted the value of anti-money laundering efforts in
combating drug trafficking. In 2007, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) reported that anti-money laundering efforts against Colombian drug cartels have been
effective in isolating and incapacitating designated supporters, businesses, and front companies
linked to the Cali Cartel and Norte del Valle Cartel.84 Some observers also describe the Treasury
Secretary’s additional authorities to designate jurisdictions of primary money laundering concern
and apply “special measures” against these jurisdictions as having “potentially profound effects
on the financial services industry.”85 Treasury’s designation of Banco Delta Asia, for example,
successfully resulted in the freezing of some $25 million in North Korean assets—funds that
reportedly included counterfeit U.S. currency and profits from other North Korean criminal
activity, including drug trafficking.86
Skeptics of the use of anti-money laundering efforts to combat drug trafficking argue that tracking
illicit financial transactions may be more difficult and may yield less success than other
counterdrug tools.87 As the State Department’s 2008 money laundering and financial crimes
84 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Impact Report: Economic Sanctions against
Colombian Drug Cartels, March 2007.
85 See for example Douglas N. Greenburg, John Roth, and Katherine A. Sawyer, “Special Measures under Section 311
of the USA PATRIOT Act,” The Review of Banking and Financial Services, Vol. 23, No. 6, June 2007.
86 See also CRS Report RL33885, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, by Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto.
87 See for example R. T. Naylor, “Wash-Out: A Critique of Follow-the-Money Methods in Crime Control Policy,”
Crime, Law, and Social Change, Vol. 32, 1999, pp. 1-57.
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report reveals, major challenges in tracking and disrupting international money laundering
activities remain.88 The same types of money laundering methods—bulk cash smuggling, trade-
based money laundering, and others—that the State Department identified as issues of concern
more than a decade ago remain among the most utilized forms of money laundering today.
Further, emerging challenges include the growing volume of financial transactions, especially the
volume of international electronic transfers, and the movement of illegal money laundering
outside formal banking channels, including through “hawala”-type chains of transnational money
brokers.
Extradition
The U.S. government regularly uses extradition as an important judicial tool against suspected
drug traffickers located abroad. Extradition refers to the formal surrender of a person by a state to
another state for prosecution. Proponents of extradition to the United States argue that suspected
criminals are more likely to receive a fair trial in U.S. courts than in countries where the local
judicial process may be corrupt and where suspects can use bribes and intimidation to manipulate
the outcome of a trial.
Some anecdotal evidence appears to suggest that the threat of extradition has affected the
behavior of foreign drug trafficking organizations. For example, some Colombian drug traffickers
are reportedly distancing themselves from overt drug distribution activities, which could be used
as evidence to trigger extradition. Nevertheless, this counterdrug tool remains controversial and is
not universally supported. Many countries simply refuse to extradite drug traffickers, citing
concerns about the potential use of the death penalty in the United States against its citizens and
state sovereignty rights. Burma is one such country, which continues to refuse to extradite four
suspected drug traffickers under indictment in the United States. Some observers claim that
suspected traffickers often take advantage of such limitations in the extradition system and seek
safe haven in countries that are unwilling to extradite.
Recently, U.S. bilateral judicial cooperation with Mexico and Colombia has improved, yielding
record numbers of extradited traffickers.89 Mexico extradited 83 fugitives to the United States in
2007, up from 63 in 2006. Colombia extradited 164 to the United States in 2007, yielding a total
of more than 600 individuals since 1997, when Colombia’s legislature enacted a non-retroactive
law to formalize U.S.-Colombian extradition cooperation. In addition, although the United States
does not have a formal extradition agreement with Afghanistan, the country voluntarily
transferred to the United States two alleged traffickers in 2007 for prosecution.
Institutional Capacity Building
Another element of U.S. international narcotics control increasingly involves institutional
development, such as strengthening judicial and law enforcement institutions, boosting governing
capacity, and assisting in developing host nation administrative infrastructures to combat the
illicit drug trade. Institutional development programs focus mainly on fighting corruption and
training to support criminal justice system reforms and the rule of law. A variety of U.S. agencies
88 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR, Vol. 2, at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol2/.
89 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR; see also CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,
by Clare Ribando Seelke, Mark P. Sullivan, and June S. Beittel.
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are involved in counterdrug-related capacity building efforts abroad, including the State
Department, Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense.
According to the State Department, drug trafficking organizations often seek to subvert or coopt
governments in order to guarantee a secure operating environment and essentially “buy their way
into power.”90 Anti-corruption efforts thus seek to prevent traffickers from undermining the
legitimacy and effectiveness of foreign government institutions. Some observers, however, argue
that counterdrug policies are placing too little emphasis on projects that help foreign countries
develop a culture supportive of the rule of law. One expert explained in congressional testimony
in 2007, “unless foreign police organizations recognize and internalize what the rule of law
means, what its key characteristics are, and why the rule of law is necessary to accomplish their
mission, no amount of aid will get the job done.”91
Military Role in Counterdrug Training and Equipping92
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has multiple roles and responsibilities in the area of counternarcotics. It is
the single lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime movement of illegal drugs
toward the United States and plays a key role in collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence on illegal drugs with U.S.
law enforcement and international security counterparts. In addition, Congress authorizes DOD to offer
counternarcotics assistance to train and equip foreign countries in their efforts to build institutional capacity and
control ungoverned spaces used by drug traffickers.
DOD maintains two counternarcotics foreign assistance training and/or equipping authorities, originating from Section
1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101-510) and Section 1033 of the
NDAA for FY1998 (P.L. 105-85). Under Section 1004, Congress authorized DOD to provide counterdrug-related
training and transport of law enforcement personnel to foreign law enforcement agencies worldwide, among other
provisions. Section 1033 enables DOD to assist specific countries’ counterdrug efforts by providing non-lethal
protective and utility personnel equipment, including navigation equipment, secure and non-secure communications
equipment, radar equipment, night vision systems, vehicles, aircraft, and boats. Currently, DOD is authorized to
provide Section 1033 assistance to 22 countries, including (in chronological order): Peru and Colombia (Sec. 1033,
P.L. 105-85); Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ecuador, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Sec. 1021, P.L. 108-
136); Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Guatemala, Belize, and Panama (Sec. 1022, P.L. 109-364); Mexico
and the Dominican Republic (Sec. 1022, P.L. 110-181); and Guinea Bissau, Senegal, El Salvador, and Honduras (Sec.
1024, P.L. 110-417).
As authorities expand, analysts continue to critique DOD’s role in counterdrug assistance. Proponents of DOD's
expanded role generally argue that narcotics trafficking poses a national security threat to the United States and that
the military is especially equipped with the resources and skills to help foreign governments counter powerful drug
trafficking organizations. Many analysts also acknowledge that although DOD and civilian agencies have seemingly
overlapping and redundant authorities, the absence of DOD's participation in counterdrug assistance would be
detrimental to the effectiveness of U.S. programs. Opponents, by contrast, insist that counterdrug foreign assistance
is not a military mission and that the training of military elements in foreign countries may have serious political and
diplomatic repercussions abroad.
Critics of DOD's role in counterdrug assistance also fear that the balance between military and civilian participation
and resources in counternarcotics may disproportionately favor the military. For example, longstanding concerns over
the perceived reliance on the military to provide counternarcotics assistance have resurfaced, with new plans to
remodel by 2018 the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), DOD's regional combatant command for Central and
South America. SOUTHCOM has long played a key role in DOD counterdrug assistance planning in the Andes
region, and in DOD's new vision, planners are seeking a broader interagency role for SOUTHCOM, akin to the U.S.
90 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR.
91 Statement of Dr. Roy S. Godson, Emeritus Professor, Government, Georgetown University, President, National
Strategy Information Center, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, “Violence
in Central America,” June 26, 2007.
92 This textbox is derived from Appendix F (by Liana Wyler) of CRS Report RL34639, The Department of Defense
Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino.
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Africa Command (AFRICOM), which includes building foreign governments' security capacity and improving
accountable governance as part of its core mission.
In addition, some analysts have voiced concern over the difficulty in reconciling DOD and State Department
counterdrug policy planning. Some observers claim that DOD's counternarcotics planning processes differ from the
State Department's and may make cross-agency policy coordination and evaluation of assistance programs difficult.
For example, unlike the State Department, DOD programming strategies are not developed on a country-by-country
basis; instead, planning is based on capabilities, because most of DOD's counternarcotics programs cover geographic
regions that span several countries. This difference in planning strategies is also reflected in the way counterdrug
funds are disbursed and reported. DOD funds are al ocated by function rather than by country. The State
Department annual y provides Congress with counterdrug assistance program summaries by country and function; in
contrast, no equivalent DOD document is regularly published.
Selected Legislative Issues for the 111th Congress
The following section describes counternarcotics issues of concern to the 111th Congress,
including (1) the Mérida Initiative targeting Mexico and Central America, (2) the Andean
Counterdrug Program (ACP) and related assistance to the region, (3) Afghanistan counterdrug
programs, and (4) counterdrug efforts in West Africa.
Counternarcotics Aid to U.S. Transit Zone Countries: Mérida
Initiative and Beyond
The United States and Mexico announced on October 22, 2007, the start of a multiyear, bilateral
security agreement called the Mérida Initiative.93 This Initiative aims to combat drug trafficking
and other criminal activity along the U.S.-Mexican border, as well as in Central America.94 The
U.S.-Mexican border is viewed as especially important for U.S. counternarcotics efforts because
Mexico is currently the primary point of entry for cocaine and other drug shipments smuggled
into the United States. Proposed U.S. bilateral assistance to Mexico and Central America under
the Initiative consists of a $1.4 billion, three-year security package (ending FY2010) that would
provide two main forms of assistance: (1) equipment, including helicopters and surveillance
aircraft, and technical resources to combat drug trafficking, and (2) training and technical advice
for Mexican and Central American military, judicial, and law enforcement officials.95 Since
FY2008 through FY2010, Congress has to date appropriated $1.33 billion for Mexico and $248
million for Central America through State Department-controlled assistance accounts.96 In
93 The Mérida Initiative is named for the city where it was first conceived by Presidents George W. Bush and Felipe
Calderon in March 2007.
94 See CRS Report RS22837, Mérida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central
America, by Clare Ribando Seelke and CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Clare
Ribando Seelke, Mark P. Sullivan, and June S. Beittel.
95 U.S. domestic commitments will be or have already been implemented under the National Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, the Security Cooperation Initiative, and the Southwest
Border Initiative. See CRS Report RL33106, Border Security and the Southwest Border: Background, Legislation, and
Issues, coordinated by Lisa M. Seghetti.
96 P.L. 110-252 appropriated $400 million to Mexico and $60 million to Central America; P.L. 111-8 appropriated
$300 million to Mexico and $105 million to Central America; P.L. 111-32 appropriated $420 million to Mexico; and
P.L. 111-117 appropriated $210.3 million to Mexico and $83 million to Central America.
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FY2009 the Department of Defense expended approximately $51.9 million on counternarcotics-
related efforts in Mexico and Central America, up from $28.9 million in FY2008.97
Despite apparent initial frustration expressed by some Members of Congress about not having
been notified of the Mérida Initiative as it was being developed, observers report that the
Initiative carries bipartisan support for its goals.98 Many observers and policy makers welcomed
this effort to address the increasingly violent illegal drug trade along the U.S-Mexico border.
Some Members of Congress and others continue to raise several issues for concern with regard to
the implementation and monitoring of the Initiative’s programs. Some are especially concerned
about the possibility that U.S. military personnel might be deployed into Mexico, despite U.S.
pledges not to do so, and that the United States is not doing enough domestically to cut demand
for illicit drugs from abroad. On the U.S. side, some observers raise concerns about how to ensure
that U.S. assistance funds are not illicitly diverted by corrupt Mexican officials. Others raise
concerns that the Initiative, as currently conceived, might not have a long-term effect on
stemming the flow of drugs into the United States and reducing the drug economy’s negative
societal effects in both the United States and Mexico.
Substantial congressional criticism surrounded the length of time it took State Department to
expend Mérida appropriations. In December 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) released the first of two reports on the disbursement of U.S. counternarcotics assistance
under the Mérida Initiative.99 In its December 2009 report on the “Status of Funds for the Mérida
Initiative,” GAO found that by the end of FY2009, State Department had obligated $830 million
(two-thirds of the intended $1.3 billion appropriated) but had expended only 2% of available
funds, or $26 million. A variety of institutional and bureaucratic factors were implicated in the lag
time between obligation of funds and expenditure, some of which have been overcome since the
end of FY2009. Specifically, GAO reported the following contributing factors to the lag time: (1)
statutory conditions on the funds, (2) challenges in fulfilling administrative procedures, and (3)
the need to enhance institutional capacity on the part of both recipient countries and the United
States to implement the assistance. GAO intends to update its initial analysis with a second report
by summer 2010.
Beyond Mérida: The Four Pillar Strategy
Counternarcotics funding for Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean through the Mérida
Initiative is slated to end in FY2010, with at least three successor programs in various stages of
development or initiation. These three successor programs include (1) post-Mérida support to
Mexico, (2) the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and (3) the Central America Regional
Security Initiative (CARSI). Final strategies have not been finalized for the latter two programs,
97 DOD response to CRS, October 13, 2009. According to DOD, counternarcotics funding in the Central America
region was provided, in addition to Mexico, to Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Panama. Additional funding to Mexico in FY2009 contributed to the growing in DOD counternarcotics contributions in
FY2009 compared to FY2008. Additionally, DOD provided $93,000 in FY2008 and $101,000 in FY2009 to Haiti and
$1 million in FY2008 and $1.1 in FY2009 to the Dominican Republic. Both of these countries also received
counterdrug funding from the State Department under the Central America portion of the Merida Initiative.
98 See, for example, comments by Eliot Engel, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, quoted in Lourdes Heredia, “Doubts over Bush Plan on Mexico Drugs,” BBC News, October 22,
2007.
99 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Status of Funds for the Merida Initiative,” December 3, 2009,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10253r.pdf.
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CBSI and CARSI, though an action plan and framework is expected to be developed for CBSI in
early 2010. Taken together, these three successor programs appear to reflect a growing emphasis
on counternarcotics efforts in the transit zone between South America and the United States.
In mid-January 2010, the State Department approved a new strategy for Mexico as a follow-on to
the Mérida Initiative.100 According to the State Department’s 2010 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, the character of U.S. support for the Mérida Initiative will shift from a focus on
major counternarcotics equipment acquisition that was designed to improve operational ability
against drug traffickers to a longer-term emphasis on institutional development and capacity
building to the Mexican justice sector as well as social reforms that can galvanize community
support to fight organized crime, including drug trafficking.101 This new strategy has four pillars,
which incorporate not only continued counternarcotics support but also institutional and social
reform efforts:
1. disrupt and dismantle organized criminal group;
2. institutionalize justice sector reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect for
human rights;
3. create an efficient, economically competitive border crossing that ensures “secure
two-way flows” of travelers and trade; and
4. support Mexican government efforts to build strong and resilient communities
through community organizations, civil society participation, sustainable
economic opportunities, community cohesion, and violence reduction.
The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) and the Central American
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)
As the 111th Congress continues to evaluate and monitor the remainder of the Mérida Initiative,
ending in FY2010, some of the long-term policy issues of concern include what types of
counternarcotics activities to fund after the official end of the Mérida Initiative and how to ensure
that the drug trade does not simply shift to other countries in the transit zone and move through
different pathways to reach drug consumer destinations. Many analysts compare international
counternarcotics efforts to squeezing a balloon: squeeze it in one place and it bulges out
elsewhere.102 Some experts caution that as the United States and other countries place pressure on
certain major drug sources or trafficking zones, traffickers will likely adapt by changing routes
and exploiting other paths of less resistance.103 Partially in response, P.L. 111-117, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2010, includes provisions for two new counternarcotics
programs in the Transit Zone: the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) and the Central
American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).
100 U.S. Department of State, “Mexico: Evolution of the Merida Initiative,” document provided to CRS in January
2010.
101 INCSR 2010.
102 See for example, “Troublesome Boomerang: Illicit Drug Policy and Security,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 28, No. 3,
1997, p. 294.
103 For a discussion of another example, the displacement of the illegal drug industry from Peru to Colombia in the late
1980s and early 1990s, see Cornelius Friesendorf, “Squeezing the Balloon?” Crime, Law, and Social Change, Vol. 44,
2005, pp. 35-78.
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President Obama announced CBSI at the Summit of the Americas in April 2009 as a security
cooperation effort focused on combating drug trafficking organizations, gangs, and other criminal
groups. Initial U.S.-Caribbean meetings to advance the CBSI program were held in 2009, and a
ministerial meeting is expected to take place early in 2010, where a political declaration, action
plan, and CBSI framework could be adopted. According to the Administration’s National Drug
Control Budget for FY2011, the Administration is requesting $31.2 million to the State
Department for the counterdrug aspects of CBSI. Drug control funding reportedly would support
bilateral and regional counternarcotics initiatives, including Sovereign Skies, interdiction,
eradication, law enforcement reform and development, and demand reduction.104
According to the State Department’s 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,
CARSI will extend U.S. commitments to assistance Central American states to combat criminal
organizations, gangs, and related-violence in the region; to support justice sector capacity
building; and to improve law enforcement intelligence sharing within and among regional
governments.105 For FY2011, the Administration requests foreign assistance to fund equipment
purchases, training, community policing, and economic and social development programs.
Plan Colombia, the Andean Counterdrug Program, and the Future
of Counternarcotics Aid to South America
Plan Colombia was developed by the government of Colombia in 1999 as a six-year plan,
concluding in 2005, to end the country’s decades-long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking,
and promote economic and social development. The plan aimed to curb trafficking activity and
reduce coca cultivation in Colombia by 50% over five years. Congress approved legislation in
support of Plan Colombia in 2000, appropriating foreign assistance funds under the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) account each year ever since.106 ACI has not only provided
counternarcotics assistance for Colombia, but also for other countries in the Andean region,
including Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.107 Beginning in FY2008,
Congress renamed ACI the “Andean Counterdrug Program,” or ACP. Since its inception in
FY2000 and through FY2008, Congress has appropriated to the State Department more than $6
billion for Plan Colombia, ACI, and ACP. For FY2009, the last fiscal year in which the ACP
account will remain in existence, the State Department requested $406.8 million. From FY2010
on, funding previously under the ACP account will be provided under the INCLE account. DOD
has provided additional counterdrug assistance for training and equipping foreign
counternarcotics personnel to the region; in FY2009, this amounted to approximately $136.1
million for Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.108
Since ACI and ACP were first implemented, U.S. assistance has focused mainly on four strategic
pillars: (1) eradication of coca and opium poppy crops, (2) illegal drug interdiction, (3) alternative
development to provide coca and opium poppy farmers other sources of income, and (4)
104 ONDCP, National Drug Control Budget FY2011 Funding Highlights, Febrar
105 INCSR 2010.
106 The first appropriations legislation for Plan Colombia was located in the Military Construction Appropriations Act,
2001 (P.L. 106-246, Title III, Chapters 1 and 2).
107 In FY2005 ACI funds were also used for counternarcotics assistance in Guatemala and Nicaragua. Currently, ACI
funds are no longer used for counternarcotics assistance in Venezuela.
108 DOD response to CRS request, October 13, 2009.
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institution-building to train security forces and to strengthen democratic governance capacity.
Supporters of the program argue that U.S. assistance has been vital to building foreign
government counternarcotics capacities. Critics of ACI and ACP often question the program’s
effectiveness to reduce the amount of cocaine and heroin entering the United States, because the
Andean region still accounts for the production of virtually all of the world’s cocaine and
increasing amounts of high-quality heroin. Some also criticize the program for excessively
emphasizing supply-side eradication and interdiction, especially in Colombia, without sufficient
focus on economic development, institution-building, and public and private sector reform.109
Others warn of a so-called “spillover” effect of counternarcotics activity in Colombia on
neighboring countries such as Ecuador, where narco-linked insurgents and paramilitaries
reportedly operate, and Venezuela, from where the flow of drugs destined for the United States
has reportedly increased substantially in recent years.110
In FY2008, funding for ACP declined 55.7% as compared with FY2007 levels.111 This decline
can be attributed to three notable changes. First, counternarcotics aid to the region is increasingly
disbursed in several other foreign aid accounts, including Economic Support Fund (ESF) and
Development Assistance (DA). For FY2008, this transfer from ACP to ESF amounts to $192.5
million. Some say this programming move will allow more flexibility in the use of economic aid
to the Andean countries. At the same time, this programming move will also cause ACP to be
even more focused on supply-side eradication and interdiction, which has been a criticism of the
program. Second, as of FY2008, Venezuela is no longer receiving ACP assistance. The
Administration’s FY2009 request also does not include a request for any ACP funding to be
allocated to Venezuela. Third, the U.S.-supported Air Bridge Denial program, which the U.S.
government has spent at least $80 million on from FY2002 through FY2006, will soon be entirely
funded by Colombia.112
As the 111th Congress evaluates the current status of counternarcotics aid to the Andean region,
policymakers may choose also to reevaluate several ongoing related issues of interest, including
the use of aerial eradication in Colombia, as well as the future of U.S. counternarcotics
engagement with Bolivia and Venezuela. Efforts to reduce production of illicit narcotics at the
source are sometimes met by active and violent opposition from a combination of trafficker,
political, and economic groups. In the case of Colombia, some traffickers have aligned
themselves with terrorist and insurgent groups, and have reportedly funded political candidates
and parties, pro-narcotic peasant workers and trade union groups, and high-visibility, popular
public works projects to cultivate support through a “Robin Hood” image. Critics have
consequently argued that counternarcotics efforts, especially aerial eradication campaigns, can
have the unintended effect of aggravating the country’s ongoing civil conflict. Although many
109 See, for example, Daniel W. Christman and John G. Heimann, Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of
Colombia and the Region, report of an independent commission sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Center
for Preventive Action, 2004, p. 19, at http://www.cfr.org/publication/6640/andes_2020.html.
110 See for example U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR; GAO, “U.S. Counternarcotics Cooperation with Venezuela
has Declined,” GAO-09-806, July 2009.
111 The FY2009 request represents a 43.6% decline from FY2007.
112 The Air Bridge Denial program aims to target drug traffickers through the air by forcing down suspicious aircraft,
using lethal force if necessary. Historically, this Air Bridge Denial program, which was originally developed in the late
1980s to interdict cocaine from Peru, has been the subject of controversy. From 2001 to 2003, the United States
suspended operation of the program because operators shot down a legitimate civilian aircraft in Peru and two U.S.
citizens were killed. Nevertheless, many observers highlight this program as having been one of the main contributors
to the decline in Peruvian cocaine production.
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argue that the use of aerial eradication in Colombia is an important counternarcotics tool,
extending the reach of drug crop reduction operations into otherwise dangerous or inaccessible
regions, others argue that aerial eradication increases the likelihood that farmers will align with
insurgent groups rather than support government policies. Because Colombia’s guerrilla groups
pose as advocates of growers, spraying may broaden support for such groups, thereby
contradicting the objectives of the government’s counterinsurgency efforts in the affected zones.
Alternatives do exist, including shifting to manual eradication or targeting the drug trade at later
points in the production chain by expanding interdiction operations. One alternative, which some
analysts favor, is to shift counternarcotics priorities to targeting critical nodes in transportation
and refining and, to the extent possible, sealing off traffic routes to and from the main coca
producing zones. The argument is made that interdiction can disrupt internal markets for coca
derivatives and that, compared to eradication, it imposes fewer direct costs on peasant producers
and generates less political unrest. A decision to support the discontinuation of aerial eradication
or the reduction in U.S. assistance for aerial eradication operations in Colombia, however, could
involve a careful weighing of the political and social costs that current counternarcotics policies
might be causing against the relative effectiveness of counternarcotics policy alternatives.
Another counternarcotics policy challenge that the 111th Congress confronts is how to address
Bolivia and Venezuela, two countries that have in previous years been recipients of ACP funding.
The President decertified both Bolivia and Venezuela for FY2010 for having “failed
demonstrably” at making substantial efforts to combat the drug trade. This development raises
numerous counternarcotics policy questions that the 111th Congress might face, particularly as
Bolivia is the third largest coca producer in the world and, though Venezuela does not produce
illicit drugs, it is a key transit point for drugs from Colombia.
The decertification label will not affect Bolivia and Venezuela’s ability to receive certain types of
U.S. aid in FY2010; however, the deterioration in U.S.-Bolivian and U.S.-Venezuelan relations
with regard to counternarcotics policy will affect U.S. efforts to assist these countries to combat
illicit drugs.113 Already in 2008, President of Bolivia Evo Morales expelled USAID workers and
DEA agents from coca producing regions in Bolivia and the government of Venezuela has refused
to sign counternarcotics cooperation letters of agreement with the United States to make funds
available for cooperative programs to fight the trafficking of drugs from and through Venezuela to
the United States. The questions that analysts are now asking include the following: How will the
expulsion of USAID and DEA personnel in Bolivia affect cocaine production and trafficking?
Should the United States reevaluate Bolivia’s arguments for legalizing the production and sale of
coca leaf, which is currently an internationally controlled narcotic substance? How can the United
States attempt to stem the flow of drugs emanating from Venezuela, particularly those traveling
via one of the new drug transit hot spots, West Africa, to Europe, in the face of limited bilateral
relations?
113 According to the State Department, Venezuela will continue to receive assistance for civil society and small
community development programs and Bolivia will continue to receive assistance for agriculture development,
exchange programs, small enterprise development, police training, among other programs. See David T. Johnson,
“Remarks on Release of the Annual Report on the Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2008,”
September 16, 2008.
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Afghanistan Counterdrug Programs
Drug control policy in Afghanistan has undergone a shift in strategy since June 2009, when
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the Obama Administration’s Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, announced a halt to U.S. eradication efforts in Afghanistan and a
concurrent increase in priority to agricultural development (or alternative livelihoods) assistance
as well as interdiction.114 The drug policy shift was formalized with the release of the Afghanistan
and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy in January 2010, which had sections on combating
the Afghan narcotics trade and disrupting illicit financial flows, among others.115 The Afghanistan
and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy essentially supersedes the previous the U.S.
Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, which consisted of five key elements, or pillars, that
mirror Afghan initiatives and call for increased interagency and international cooperation.116 The
five pillars of the U.S. initiative are (1) public information, (2) alternative development, (3)
eradication, (4) interdiction, and (5) law enforcement and justice reform.
The most significant changes in January 2010 include the elimination of eradication as a strategic
goal, the addition as a key initiative of increasing U.S. government personnel in Afghanistan
(particularly DEA), and the enhancement civilian-military coordination with new coordination
centers in London, Kabul, and Kandahar. Key initiatives to disrupt illicit financial flows include
the Illicit Finance Task Force117 and the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell—with plans to make the
Threat Finance Cell fully operational during the first half of 2010. The State Department, USAID,
and DOD are the main providers of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan and the
region, with additional law enforcement and training support from DEA, DHS, and other
agencies. For the State Department, USAID, and DOD alone, the Administration estimates that
approximately $937.5 million in FY2009 funds were anticipated spent for counternarcotics aid to
Afghanistan—representing a 62% increase from FY2008. Western European countries are large
consumers of Afghanistan source opium, and increasingly other nations, notably the United
Kingdom, are playing a prominent role in supporting Afghan counternarcotics efforts.
The opium drug industry is a significant factor in Afghanistan’s fragile political and economic
order—and many argue that the United States can play an important role in combating its growth.
According to the 2007 Afghanistan Opium Survey conducted by UNODC and the Afghan
Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN), Afghanistan remained the source of 93% of the world’s
illicit opium in 2007. In 2009, the potential export value of Afghanistan’s opiates, at border prices
in neighboring regions, was approximately $2.3 billion or equivalent to 21% of Afghanistan’s licit
gross domestic product (GDP).118 This record production occurred in spite of ongoing efforts by
the Afghan government, the United States, and their international partners to combat poppy
cultivation and drug trafficking. Observers remain concerned about how to break the links
114 Richard C. Holbrooke, “Holbrooke’s Briefing on Trip to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Brussels, July 2009,” July 29,
2009. For further information on U.S. drug policy in Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics
and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
115 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, “Afghanistan and
Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,” January 2010, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf.
116 See CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. See also David
Shelby, “United States to Help Afghanistan Attack Narcotics Industry,” Washington File, U.S. Department of State,
November 17, 2004.
117 Subsumed under the Illicit Finance Task Force includes a U.S.-Russia Counternarcotics/Financial Intelligence
Working Group with the first meeting convened in Moscow in December 2009.
118 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009, December 2009.
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between the illegal narcotics industry and political instability, as conflict and regional instability
have reportedly accompanied efforts to expand existing counternarcotics efforts.
As the 111th Congress considers Afghanistan counternarcotics policy objectives and assistance,
policymakers remain challenged by evaluating how the pursuit of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency objectives might hinder or support counternarcotics goals. Some observers
explain that U.S. and allied counterinsurgency actors are placed in a dilemma when their
informants also happen to be known drug traffickers. Difficulty thus remains in balancing
between developing “tactical coalition allies” in militia and other irregular forces who could help
with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency objectives, when these same individuals have ties to
the drug trade. If U.S. counterterrorism and counterinsurgency objectives are a higher priority
than counternarcotics objectives, such issues could affect the feasibility and success of
counternarcotics policy goals in Afghanistan.
The 111th Congress may also seek to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of recent shifts in
counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan—particularly following a December 2009 audit report by
the State Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) on counternarcotics programs in
Afghanistan managed by the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL).119 The report concluded that there is a lack of agreement on the
overall desired end-state for the counternarcotics program. Major questions include the future role
of eradication in U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan; how to incorporate the increased
U.S. military role in counternarcotics; how to enhance interagency coordination, which was
described as “generally ad hoc and informal”; and how to improve INL oversight and
management of counternarcotics contracts.
West Africa
Africa has historically held a peripheral role in the transnational illicit drug trade, but in recent
years has increasingly become a locus for drug trafficking, particularly of cocaine.120 Recent
estimates suggest that in recent years, between 46 and 300 metric tons of South American cocaine
may transit West Africa en route to Europe each year. Africa’s emergence as a trafficking nexus
appears to have resulted from structural shifts in international drug trafficking patterns, including
heighted European demand for cocaine, international counternarcotics pressure driving drug
traffickers away from traditional trafficking routes, and the operational allure for traffickers of
low levels of law enforcement capacity and high rates of corruption in many African countries.
After several years of record-level, multi-ton cocaine seizures in the region and interception of air
couriers from West Africa to Europe, however, the latter half of 2008 and 2009 witnessed a
decline in both. It remains unclear what caused the recent decline, but many suspect that cocaine
continues to transit through the region—with traffickers possibly adopting new techniques to
evade detection. Traffickers, for example, may be increasingly using private unscheduled flights
119 U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General, “Middle East Regional
Office: Status of the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Counternarcotics Programs in
Afghanistan,” Performance Audit, Report Number MERO-A-10-02, December 2009, http://oig.state.gov/documents/
organization/134183.pdf.
120 This section is drawn from CRS Report R40838, Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy, by Liana
Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook.
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to transit drugs to West Africa.121 News reports in early 2010 reference a U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) report from 2008 that claims that these private aircraft constitute a
“rogue aviation network,” comprising at least 10 aircraft discovered since 2006, which include
twin engine turboprops, executive jets, and Boeing 727s.122 In December 2009, officials
discovered the abandoned and burned wreckage of a Boeing 727 in northeastern Mali, which
reportedly had the potential capacity to carry as much as 10 metric tons, or roughly one-fifth of
the total estimated annual amount of cocaine trafficked through West Africa in recent years.
In late December 2009, DEA announced the arrest on narco-terrorism charges of three individuals
alleged to have agreed to transport cocaine for the Colombian drug trafficking and terrorist
organization, the FARC, through West and North Africa.123 The charged conspirators, Oumar Issa,
Harouna Toure, and Idriss Abelrahman, reportedly intended for the shipment to be protected by
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Qaeda. The arrests reinforce ongoing claims
that drug traffickers and terrorist organizations in the region may increasingly collaborate.124
UNODC stated in February 2010 that “there is more than just spotty evidence” of drug trafficker
and terrorist links, as well as “plenty of evidence of a double flow” of cocaine exchanged for
illicit arms.125
The threat of drug trafficking in Africa has drawn attention in recent Congresses. On June 23,
2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing entitled Confronting Drug
Trafficking in West Africa. The 111th Congress may choose to continue its monitoring of the threat
of drug trafficking in Africa. As drug flows through the region have shifted in 2009, Congress
may choose to evaluate if existing counterdrug policies for the region should adapt in response. In
recent years, U.S. agencies have begun to devote greater resources to combating the drug trade in
Africa. The State Department requested $13.2 million for counternarcotics assistance in Africa in
FY2011, up from about $0.5 million in FY2006, while the Department of Defense (DOD) plans
to allocate $19.3 million in FY2009 and $28 million in FY2010 to counternarcotics programs in
Africa. In response to recent and ongoing executive branch efforts to devote increased resources
and attention to this problem, Congress may choose to review existing authorities and funding
levels for counternarcotics programs in Africa. Key policy questions that may arise in this respect
include how best to reduce gaps in intelligence and data collection relating to the drug trade in
Africa, how to balance short-term and long-term counternarcotics goals and strategies, how
various U.S. civilian and military and international agency counternarcotics roles and
responsibilities in Africa should be defined, and what types and levels of resources these efforts
may require.
121 Tim Gaynor and Tiemoko Diallo, “Al Qaeda Linked to Rogue Aviation Network,” Reuters, January 13, 2010.
122 Ibid. It is unclear in public sources if this alleged network or fleet of aircraft is controlled by a unitary actor or group
or not.
123 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), “Three Al Qaeda Associated Arrested on Drug and Terrorism
Charges,” Press Release, December 18, 2009.
124 Scott Baldauf, “Air Al Qaeda: Are Latin American’s Drug Cartels Giving Al Qaeda a Lift?” The Christian Science
Monitor, January 15, 2010.
125 Rukmini Callimachi, “UN: Cocaine Being Traded for Arms in West Africa,” Associated Press, February 15, 2010.
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Alternative Policy Approaches
Several approaches have been proposed to reshape U.S. international narcotics control policy.
This section explores selected examples of alternative international drug control policy
approaches and identifies U.S. participation and positions, if any, in the debates. The following
section is not exhaustive, but emblematic of a broad spectrum of frequently discussed drug policy
alternatives or recalibrations.
Rebalance Current Drug Policy Tools
Emphasize “Hard-Side” of Counternarcotics Policy
Some argue that the United States should intensify military and law enforcement activities,
including activities funded by foreign assistance, designed to disrupt the transit of illicit drugs
into the United States. Such so-called “hard-side” activities include interdiction, forced
eradication, and training, equipping, and supporting other law enforcement and military activities
geared toward directly targeting drug trafficking organizations and related traffickers. For
FY2007, hard-side counternarcotics activities constituted roughly 33% of the total domestic and
international U.S. counterdrug budget—$3.2 billion for interdiction, $468 million for eradication,
and $946 million for other international hard-side activities.126 Policy makers justify the
continued emphasis on hard-side activities because they directly disrupt the flow of foreign drugs.
These tasks are also conceded to require disproportionately more funding to implement than soft-
side activities. The cost of a helicopter to combat drug traffickers, for example, is substantially
more than the cost of providing seeds and agricultural training for alternative crop development
projects. Further, some argue that the U.S. emphasis on hard-side counternarcotics activities is
necessary to carry the burden of other international participants in counterdrug efforts and foreign
aid donors, who reportedly tend to shy away from hard-side projects.127
Among those who agree that hard-side activities are a vital component of international
counternarcotics strategy, some support expanding U.S. eradication efforts and recommend that
the United States assume a greater role in counternarcotics activities. Some U.S. policy makers
have advocated the expansion of crop eradication programs. The Bush Administration’s August
2007 U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, for example, argued that “eradication is
essential to controlling the narcotics industry in Afghanistan” and that a “critical improvement” to
current efforts would involve the expansion of forced eradication. The Strategy further
recommended the consideration of aerial spraying as a method for implementing expanded forced
eradication. Expanded eradication activities, especially those involving aerial spraying of
herbicides, remain a source of controversy. Proponents argue that swift, widespread eradication is
necessary to establish a credible deterrent against cultivating illicit crops. Critics, however, argue
that eradication may have public health and environmental safety implications, may encourage
local villagers to align with anti-government insurgents, and, in the absence of alternative
126 U.S. Department of State, INL, Program and Budget Guide, Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, and discussions with State
Department representatives.
127 For example, European countries reportedly provided Colombia with approximately $131.4 million of foreign
assistance in CY2006, which mainly supported alternative development, human rights, humanitarian assistance, and
good governance projects. Based on CRS discussions with State Department consultant, April 8, 2008.
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livelihood options, may deepen peasant impoverishment. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has
long expressed categorical opposition to the use of aerial eradication, and U.S. officials state that
the Administration will defer to the government of Afghanistan regarding its future use.128
Eradication is not the only hard-side counternarcotics policy option available. In early 2009,
Ambassador Holbrooke, the Obama Administration’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, announced that the U.S. government will no longer participate in eradication efforts in
Afghanistan, refocusing U.S. efforts instead on drug interdiction and dismantling trafficking
networks. The number U.S. DEA personnel in Afghanistan is expected to rise from approximately
31 in 2008 to 81 by the end of 2009.129 Under a policy that reportedly went into effect in early
2009, DOD has also compiled a list of insurgents with links to the drug trade that are targeted to
be “captured or killed.”130 In a July 2009 press briefing, Holbrooke explained:
The United States and the ISAF forces are not going to go around assisting or participating in
the destruction of poppy fields anymore. The United States has wasted hundreds of millions
of dollars doing this.... All we did was alienate poppy farmers who were poor farmers, who
were growing the best cash crop they could grow in a market where they couldn’t get other
things to market, and we were driving people into the hands of the Taliban.131
Some analysts also suggest that the U.S. military should assume a greater role in counternarcotics
activities. Since the 1980s, the U.S. military’s role in counternarcotics efforts has gradually
become more focused on training and equipping foreign counternarcotics officials. Outside the
United States, U.S. military personnel have been involved in training and transporting foreign
anti-narcotics personnel since 1983. Periodically, there have also been calls for multilateral
military strikes against trafficking operations, as well as increased use of U.S. military forces in
preemptive strikes against drug fields and trafficker enclaves overseas. DOD’s role in
counternarcotics activity first became institutionalized in 1986 when President Ronald Reagan
issued National Security Decision Directive-221 (NSDD-221), which directed U.S. military
forces to “support counter-narcotics efforts more actively.”132 DOD’s role further expanded under
President George H. Bush in 1989, who issued National Security Directive-18 (NSD-18) to
explicitly direct the Secretary of Defense to redefine the Pentagon’s mission to include
counternarcotics as one of its main priorities.133 Over the years, Congress has continued to expand
DOD’s international counternarcotics authorities to provide counternarcotics training and
operational support to an increasing number of foreign governments, as well as to provide
counterterrorism support to foreign law enforcement personnel who are also conducting
counternarcotics activities.
128 See for example Kirk Semple and Tim Golden, “U.S. Presses Again to Eradicate Afghan Opium Poppies,”
International Herald Tribune, October 7, 2007.
129 “U.S. Drug Agents Target Afghan Poppy Pushers,” National Public Radio, July 29, 2009.
130 James Risen, “U.S. to Hunt Down Afghan Drug Lords Tied to Taliban,” New York Times, August 10, 2009.
131 Richard C. Holbrooke, “Holbrooke’s Briefing on Trip to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Brussels, July 2009,” July 29,
2009.
132 Ronald Reagan, National Security Decision Directive 221 (NSDD-221), “Narcotics and National Security,” April 8,
1986, partially declassified on November 7, 1995, redacted version available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/
nsdd-221.htm.
133 George Bush, National Security Directive 18, “International Counternarcotics Strategy,” August 21, 1989, released
in full on August 23, 2001, unclassified version available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/nsd/nsd18.pdf.
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Despite the military’s ability to support drug law enforcement organizations, questions remain as
to the overall effectiveness of a major military role in narcotics interdiction. Proponents of
substantially increasing the military’s role in supporting civilian law enforcement narcotics
interdiction activity argue that narcotics trafficking poses a national security threat to the United
States, that only the military is equipped and has the resources to counter powerful trafficking
organizations, and that counterdrug support provides the military with beneficial, realistic
training. In contrast, opponents argue that drug interdiction is a law enforcement mission rather
than a military mission, that drug enforcement is an unconventional war that the military is ill-
equipped to fight, that a drug enforcement role detracts from readiness for future combat
operations, and exposes the military to corruption, and that the use of the military may have
serious political and diplomatic repercussions overseas. Moreover, some personnel in the military
remain concerned about an expanded role, seeing themselves as possible scapegoats for policies
that have failed, or might fail.
Emphasize “Soft-Side” of Counternarcotics Policy
Those promoting expansion of efforts to reduce production at the source face the challenge of
instituting programs that effectively reduce production of narcotic crops and production of refined
narcotics without creating unmanageable economic and political crises for target countries. A
major area of concern of such policy makers is to achieve an effective balance between the
“carrot” and the “stick” approaches in U.S. relations with major illicit narcotics-producing and
transit countries. As a result, some analysts have suggested increasingly linking hard-side
activities with so-called “soft-side” activities, such as alternative livelihood development,
economic development, and institutional reform efforts.
Proponents of soft-side activities argue that long-term success in halting drug production involves
motivating producers to refrain permanently from growing illicit crops. Many observe that
because short-term economic stability of nations supplying illegal drugs may depend on the
production and sale of illicit substances, it is unrealistic to expect such nations to limit their drug-
related activities meaningfully without an alternative source of income. It has been suggested by
some analysts that a massive foreign aid effort—a so-called “mini-Marshall Plan”—is the only
feasible method of persuading developing nations to curb their production of illicit drugs.134 Such
a plan would involve a multilateral effort, including participation of the United States and other
industrialized donor nations susceptible to the drug problem. The thrust of such a plan would be
to promote economic development, replacing illicit cash crops with other marketable alternatives.
In Afghanistan, the Obama Administration is beginning a new phase of counterdrug policy that
emphasizes alternative development, including programs to subsidize alternative agriculture,
provide low-cost loan and credit options to farmers, and pay seasonal poppy harvesters to work
instead on road construction, irrigation and other projects.135
Critics have concerns regarding positive incentive concepts. They warn of the open-ended cost of
agricultural development programs, economic development projects, and institutional capacity
building efforts. Programs would likely be coupled with rigid domestic law enforcement and
134 See for example comments by former Colombian President Andres Pastrana in NewsHour with Jim Lehrer,
transcript of interview on October 6, 1998, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/july-dec98/pastrana_10-
6.html.
135 Karen DeYoung, “U.S. and Britain Again Target Afghan Poppies; Farmers Would Be Paid Not to Grow Crop,” The
Washington Post, August 8, 2009.
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penalties for non-compliance, which could require a U.S. commitment of further foreign
assistance that aids a country to strengthen its institutional capacity to implement the rule of law.
Sometimes, marketable alternatives are more difficult to develop than simply substituting illicit
crops with licit crops. Drug crop zones are often located in geographically remote areas, with
marginal soil quality and extreme insecurity that tend to limit prospects for legal commercial
agriculture. In some parts of Colombia, for example, observers claim that the most promising
strategy to stem drug crop production is to improve educational opportunities and foster the
development of new economies in other locales, including urban settings, that former farmers
could transition into with their new skill sets. In the view of these analyses, the best substitute
crop for coca or opium could well be an assembly plant producing electronic goods or
automobiles for the international market. Developing such new economies, however, could
involve potentially costly commitments in foreign assistance.
Emphasize Drug Demand Reduction
According to the ONDCP’s National Drug Control Strategy budget, roughly 35% of the total drug
control budget in FY2009 was allocated for demand reduction activities, including treatment and
prevention, while 65% was allocated for domestic and international supply-side reduction
activities.136 In FY2002, roughly 46% of the total drug control budget was for demand reduction
activities, and 54% was for supply-side activities. Some observers point to this gradual shift in
resources toward supply-side activities to claim that U.S. counternarcotics policy focuses
primarily on combating the supply of illegal drugs, to the detriment of focusing on domestic drug
demand reduction. Such arguments are especially voiced by observers in drug producing
countries and drug transit countries, who view U.S. consumption of illegal drugs as the source of
the problem.137 Supporters of stronger drug demand reduction programs also argue that it could
be more cost effective to combat illegal drug use and trafficking domestically than in drug source
and transit countries in the developing world, where resources and government capacity to
combat drugs may be limited.138 As a result, such critics urge the Administration to rebalance the
drug control budget to include more funding for drug demand reduction and less for drug supply
reduction.139
The Administration, however, posits that issues related to the balance between counternarcotics
resources for drug demand reduction and supply reduction have already been adequately
addressed. At the same time, others argue that further emphasis on supply-side drug control
activities is warranted, as transnational drug trafficking organizations continue to pose threats to
U.S. and international security.
136 ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy, FY2010 Budget Summary, May 2009.
137 See for example International Crisis Group, “Latin American Drugs II: Improving Policy and Reducing Harm,”
Latin America Report No. 26, March 14, 2008; “Africa: New Front in Drugs War,” BBC News, July 9, 2007; “West
Africa: More Funds Needed to Tackle Drug Use, NGOs Say,” IRIN News, November 5, 2007.
138 http://domesticpolicy.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080324124013.pdf.
139 See also CRS Report RL32352, War on Drugs: Reauthorization and Oversight of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy, by Mark Eddy.
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Reevaluate Prohibitionist Drug Regime
Legalize Illegal Drugs
For decades, many critics of the current international drug control regime have argued for
legalizing drugs. Drug legalization proposals take several forms, which differ in the extent to
which the legalized drug trade would be regulated by the government. At one end of the spectrum
are those who call for a wholesale deregulation of the drug industry. Such laissez faire advocates
argue that individuals should be able to exert their own free will in deciding whether to engage in
an activity, including potentially dangerous ones. Few proponents of drug legalization, however,
endorse wholesale deregulation. Instead, some support modified legalization schemes that involve
various amounts of government regulation. These proposals, for example, recommend legalizing
some, but not all, types of currently banned drugs; restricting the sale of drugs to minors, similar
to those currently placed on tobacco products and alcohol in many countries; or restricting the
locations and types of vendors that would be allowed to sell drugs.
Proponents of drug legalization suggest that removing current sanctions against the drug trade
could improve the political and social stability of producer countries. The Economist argues that
legalizing drugs could undercut powerful drug traffickers who threaten state stability and corrupt
political institutions, as it reportedly has in countries such as Mexico and Colombia, and could
eliminate use of the illicit drug trade as a source of revenue for certain regimes, including North
Korea.140 In addition, some argue that legalizing drugs would allow the United States and others
to reduce the amount of resources devoted to eliminating the illicit drug supply through
eradication, interdiction, and other law enforcement efforts.141
Legalizing the trade in substances currently proscribed by the international drug control regime
would involve removing them from the U.N. lists of controlled substances. One such effort is
currently led by the Bolivian government with regard to coca leaf, which is listed as a controlled
narcotic drug by the United Nations, along with heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and others that are
considered to be “liable to abuse” and “productive of ill effects.”142 Proponents of this move
argue that coca leaf has been an integral part of Bolivian culture, especially for many of the
country’s indigenous people, for generations and the option of exporting coca leaf internationally
could provide a new, licit source of income to Bolivian peasants. The leaves are often chewed or
consumed in teas and reportedly serve as a mild stimulant, an appetite suppressant, and an herbal
remedy to altitude sickness, among other uses.143 International debate continues to surround the
justifications for including coca leaf as a narcotic drug.144 Proponents argue that consumption of
coca leaf is not addictive or harmful to public health. They also claim that the original decision to
list coca leaf may have been politically motivated and the consequence of ethnic discrimination.
140 “The Case for Legalising Drugs: Time for a Puff of Sanity,” The Economist, July 28, 2001.
141 See, for example, Paul Stares, “Drug Legalization: Time for a Real Debate,” Brookings Review, March 1996, Vol.
14, No. 2.
142 Article 49 of the 1961 Convention gave countries practicing coca leaf chewing 25 years following the Convention’s
entry into force to abolish coca leaf chewing.
143 See, for example, “Bolivia Could Put Coca Leaves on Coat of Arms,” Reuters, March 14, 2007.
144 For a short summary, see Francisco E. Thoumi, “A Modest Proposal to Clarify the Status of Coca in the United
Nations Conventions,” Crime, Law, and Social Change, Vol. 42, 2004, pp. 297-307.
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Others, including the Administration, argue that coca leaf should remain on the U.N. list of
banned substances.145 As early as 1952, the World Health Organization (WHO) Expert Committee
on Drug Dependence concluded that coca chewing “must be defined and treated as an addiction,
in spite of the occasional absence of some of those characteristics.”146 In 1993, the WHO Expert
Committee revisited coca leaf and reported that it should remain internationally controlled
because cocaine is “readily extractable” from coca leaf.147 In 2006, the Bolivian government
requested another review of coca leaf by the WHO Expert Committee, which has not yet been
completed. In the meantime, the INCB’s 2007 annual report calls for Bolivia and Peru to abolish
and prohibit coca leaf chewing and the manufacture of coca tea (mate de coca) and other products
containing coca alkaloids for domestic use and export.148
Successive U.S. administrations have remained steadfast against such legalization policy
proposals at the international level. According to DEA, legalization could lead to several negative
consequences that may outweigh many of the positive effects.149 These include the possibility that
legalization could increase the demand, abuse, and addiction stemming from an increased
availability and access to potentially harmful drugs. Further, legalization may reduce the
perception of the social and health risks and costs associated with drug abuse. Others have also
raised concerns about the potentially complex array of regulatory questions and legislative
challenges that may arise from a decision to legalize drugs.150 Such concerns may be especially
relevant to less-developed countries with limited institutional capabilities, which would likely
face significant challenges and resource constraints with regulating a legalized drug trade. No
current legislative proposals have been introduced to advocate the legalization of controlled
substances both domestically and internationally. Some Members of Congress, however, have at
various times expressed interest in exploring legalization options.151 Congress has occasionally
played a role in evaluating such considerations through oversight of agencies involved in carrying
out international drug control policy and hearings.152
145 U.S. Department of State, 2008 INCSR.
146 World Health Organization, WHO Expert Committee on Drugs Liable to Produce Addiction, Third Report,
Technical Series Report No. 57, at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/trs/WHO_TRS_57.pdf.
147 World Health Organization, WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence, Twenty-Eight Report, Technical Series
Report No. 836, at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/trs/WHO_TRS_836.pdf.
148 INCB, Report for 2007, pp. 37-38.
149 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), FY2008 Performance Budget,
Congressional Budget Submission, p. 22, at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2008justification/pdf/35_dea.pdf.
150 Among the most basic questions are those about which types of drugs would be legalized, where they would be
allowed to be sold, and whether drug production and sales would be under government or private control. Regulatory
questions also arise, including what types of quality control and drug safety precautions on use would be implemented,
how would quality and safety standards be monitored and enforced, whether production and sale of drugs would be
taxed, and what types of penalties would follow in cases of regulatory violations.
151 See, for example, statements by Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) and Janice Schakowsky (D-IL) in House Government
Reform Committee Hearing on Heroin Crisis, December 12, 2002.
152 The most recent hearing on drug legalization policy options occurred in 1999. See House Government Reform
Criminal Justice Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Drug Policy, June 16, 1999. More recently, Members occasionally
ask questions related to drug legalization during other hearings on subjects related to drug control policy. See, for
example, House Government Reform Committee Hearing on Heroin Crisis, December 12, 2002.
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Decriminalize Illegal Drugs
Several countries in Europe, including the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, have supported
efforts to decriminalize drugs.153 In contrast to drug legalization schemes, drugs remain illegal
while criminal penalties associated with drug use and sale are reduced or removed in certain
circumstances. The 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances obligates signatory parties to criminalize the production, sale, transport, and
cultivation of these substances, including the profits from drug-related activity. However, the
Convention also allows for states to use their own discretion in dealing with lower-level offenses.
Specifically, it states that in “appropriate cases of a minor nature” it is left to the discretion of
member states to provide “as alternatives to conviction or punishment” measures such as
education, rehabilitation, social reintegration, drug treatment, and aftercare. Further, none of the
U.N. drug control agreements prevent a state from applying more strict or severe measures if it
considers them desirable or necessary.
Proponents of decriminalization argue that it is a novel policy solution that should be considered
as an alternative to what many consider strictly prohibitionist policies. Some proponents also
argue that decriminalization of small-scale and less-severe drug trafficking or drug use cases is a
logical cost-benefit decision that can help countries with limited resources to concentrate on
combating higher-level offenders and traffickers. Critics remain concerned that decriminalization
could provide welcome loopholes for traffickers who could avoid penalties for possession and
distribution of illegal drugs if caught. Countries that have experimented with decriminalization
policies, however, reveal mixed results.154 In certain parts of the Netherlands, where marijuana
use in so-called coffee houses has long been effectively decriminalized, some local districts are
closing the coffee houses down, due to reportedly disruptive behavior of drug tourists, mainly
from France and Belgium, and the increased presence of drug traffickers near the coffee houses,
seeking to sell other drugs, such as cocaine and heroin, to coffee house patrons.155 Further, the
wide variance in criminalization policies across countries has reportedly been a source of tension
and confusion between countries and could hamper international cooperation for drug control.156
On August 21, 2009, a controversial law essentially decriminalizing possession of several major
illicit drugs—including marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and others—went into
effect in Mexico. While the new law does not legalize any type of drug, it states that drug users
found in possession of illegal drugs below the newly established limit (5 grams of marijuana, 500
milligrams of cocaine, 50 milligrams of heroin, 40 milligrams of methamphetamine, and 0.015
milligrams of LSD) will not face criminal prosecution.157 The impetus for this new law in
Mexico—variations of which have previously passed the Mexican legislature but never signed by
a Mexican President, which is required for enactment—is to allow Mexican counternarcotics
efforts to focus on targeting major drug traffickers and their networks rather than drug users, free
153 In the United States, some state and local governments have also chosen to decriminalize some types of illegal drug
activities. For such a discussion related to marijuana, see CRS Report RL33211, Medical Marijuana: Review and
Analysis of Federal and State Policies, by Mark Eddy.
154 Robert J. MacCoun and Peter Reuter, “Does Europe Do It Better?” in Drug War Deadlock: The Policy Battle
Continues, Laura E. Huggins, ed. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 2005).
155 “Coffee Shop Trial a Test for Dutch Drug Policies,” Spiegel Online, March 18, 2009.
156 INCB and Caroline Chatwin, “Drug Policy Developments within the European Union: The Destabilizing Effects of
Dutch and Swedish Drug Policies,” The British Journal of Criminology, Summer 2003, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 567-582.
157 “Mexico Legalizes Drug Possession,” Associated Press, August 21, 2009.
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up space in Mexican jails to make room for traffickers, and emphasize drug user rehabilitation
and treatment rather than incarceration. The new law, however, remains controversial among
many policymakers and observers, as concerns about the possibility of increased drug use and
addiction, the ability of the law to encourage users to seek treatment, and how the new law can
translate into improved incarceration rates of higher-level drug traffickers.158 In the meantime, the
Obama Administration maintains a “wait-and-see” attitude toward what consequences, positive
and negative, may or may not transpire.159
Allow Government-Supervised Drug Use for Addicts
Some analysts urge policy makers to shift drug policy efforts toward a focus on public health and
harm reduction and less of a focus on law enforcement. Such efforts focus on reducing the public
health consequences of drug use and include needle exchange programs and government-
sponsored injection rooms. Drug injection rooms, or “maintenance clinics,” have existed in
several countries, including Canada, Germany, and Australia; in November 2008, Switzerland
voted to make permanent its heroin supervised injection, which began in 1994.160 They have
provided certain addicts with drugs or clean needles on a regular basis. Some of the same
countries also provide free testing of drugs for purity and potentially deadly contaminants.
A major impetus for such a policy approach began with concerns about the spread of HIV/AIDS
among intravenous drug users in the 1980s, which raised attention to the health issues related to
drug use. According to advocates of this approach, complete eradication of drugs from society is
unrealistic and a better approach would be to focus on containing the damage caused by drugs.
Nevertheless, government-supervised drug use programs exist in contravention to U.N.
international drug control agreements, which obligates parties to ensure that drug use and trade
are limited to scientific and medical purposes only. The INCB regularly urges those countries that
maintain drug injection facilities to discontinue their operation.161 Others remain concerned that
these facilities could encourage increased levels of drug use and potentially make drug use more
socially acceptable. Some studies on the effects of drug injection facilities, however, offer some
tentative, but promising indications of positive results.162 According to one drug injection clinic
trial study in Switzerland, for example, researchers reported that the crime rate and the
unemployment rate among its patients dropped over the course of treatment.163
158 Marc Lacey, “In Mexico, Ambivalence on a Drug Law,” New York Times, August 24, 2009.
159 Mark Stevenson, “US ‘Wait-and-See’ Attitude on New Mexican Drug Law,” Associated Press, July 29, 2009.
160 Alexander Higgins, “Swiss Approve Heroin Program, Reject Decriminalization of Marijuana,” Associated Press,
November 30, 2008.
161 INCB, 2007 Report.
162 See, for example, European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction, European Report on Drug
Consumption Rooms, 2004, at http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/
att_2944_EN_consumption_rooms_report.pdf.
163 Cited in MacCoun and Reuter, who also note that this study reportedly garnered some criticism for methodological
weaknesses.
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Appendix. CRS Reports on International Drug
Policy
For further information related to drug policy issues see the following CRS reports:
• CRS Report RL34543, International Drug Control Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler.
• CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America:
Funding and Policy Issues, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
• CRS Report R40582, Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence , by June S. Beittel.
• CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher
M. Blanchard.
• CRS Report RL32352, War on Drugs: Reauthorization and Oversight of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, by Mark Eddy.
• CRS Report RL34225, Burma and Transnational Crime, by Liana Sun Wyler.
• CRS Report R41004, International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security
Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress, by John Rollins and
Liana Sun Wyler.
Author Contact Information
Liana Sun Wyler
Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics
lwyler@crs.loc.gov, 7-6177
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