Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
March 3, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21968
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks

Summary
Iraq’s political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, has been increasingly
characterized by peaceful competition, as well as by attempts to form cross-sectarian alliances.
However, ethnic and factional infighting continue, as evidenced by the successful efforts by
Shiite Arab political leaders to disqualify some prominent Sunni Arab candidates in the March 7,
2010, national elections. Election-related violence has occurred, although not at levels of earlier
years. Some believe that, in light of the disqualifications, sectarian violence will flare anew, after
the elections, and may increase further as the U.S. military presence recedes in 2010 and 2011.
Adding to the tensions is the perception among many Iraqi politicians that Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki, strengthened politically by the January 31, 2009, provincial elections, is increasingly
authoritarian. This is in part to demonstrate that he is committed to law and order, but perhaps
also to win Shiite Muslim votes by portraying himself as intent on preventing any possible return
of the Baath Party to power in Iraq. He has tried, with only mixed enthusiasm and success, to
form cross-sectarian alliances with a range of Sunni and Kurdish factions. However, the slates
that oppose him in the election are somewhat more broad ethnically and politically than is his,
and Maliki is not assured of remaining Prime Minister when a new government is formed.
The infighting among the major communities delayed the National Assembly’s passage of the
election law needed to hold the elections. An initial version of the election law was passed by the
Council of Representatives (COR, parliament) on November 8, 2009, but was vetoed by one of
Iraq’s deputy presidents, Tariq al Hashimi, because of what he considered inadequate guarantees
of representation for Sunni Iraqis. After continued disputes, threatened election boycotts, and
adoption of another draft law that attracted another veto threat, all major factions adopted a
draft—similar to the first version—on December 6, 2009. The next Assembly will have 325 seats,
compared to 275 seats in the current Assembly. The election date of March 7, 2010, is well
beyond the January 31, 2010, date that was originally targeted. This same difficulty of achieving
consensus has delayed key outstanding legislation considered crucial to political comity going
forward, such as national hydrocarbon laws, and may account for an apparent increase in violence
in Iraq as campaigning begins (February 12).
To date, the election infighting and violence—evidenced most notably by major bombings in
Baghdad—have not jeopardized the Obama Administration’s announced reduction of the U.S.
troop presence to about 50,000 U.S. forces by August 2010. Under the U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement that took effect January 1, 2009, and which President Obama has said would be
followed, all U.S. forces are to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. Senior U.S. military leaders
continue to say that the U.S. draw-down plans are “on track.” However, U.S. plans could be upset
if the political infighting causes a major increase in violence or if the post-election political
process of choosing the executive branch is held up for several months. See CRS Report
RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.

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Contents
Overview of the Political Transition ............................................................................................ 1
January 2005 National Assembly and Provincial Elections .................................................... 1
Permanent Constitution ......................................................................................................... 1
December 15, 2005, Elections ............................................................................................... 2
Political Reconciliation and Subsequent Elections ....................................................................... 3
The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi Government: 2008-2009....................................... 3
January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections and Implications.................................................. 4
Outcomes........................................................................................................................ 5
Maliki’s Position as March 7, 2010, Elections Approach........................................................ 6
The March 7, 2010, Elections: Other Coalitions, Processes, and Political Infighting .............. 7
Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions ..................................................................... 8
Flashpoint: Possible Sunni Disillusionment With the Elections ........................................ 9
Other Ongoing Frictions: KRG-Central Government Disputes....................................... 11
Sadr Remains Weakened ............................................................................................... 12
Other Elections Possible...................................................................................................... 13

Tables
Table 1. Major Coalitions Formed for 2010 National Elections.................................................... 7
Table 2. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates) ....................................... 14
Table 3. Election Results (January and December 2005) ............................................................ 15
Table 4. Assessments of the Benchmarks................................................................................... 16

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 18

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Overview of the Political Transition
Iraq has largely completed a formal political transition from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein
to a plural polity that encompasses varying sects and ideological and political factions. However,
grievances and disputes among these groups remain over the relative claim of each on power and
economic resources. These disputes permeate and complicate almost every issue in Iraq,
including security, the terms and framework for elections, economic decision making, and foreign
policy.
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, the United States set up an occupation
structure, reportedly based on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions
and not produce democracy. In May 2003, President Bush, reportedly seeking strong leadership in
Iraq, named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to head a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA),
which was recognized by the United Nations as an occupation authority. Bremer discontinued a
tentative political transition process and instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi
advisory body, the 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). After about one year of
occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi interim government on
June 28, 2004. It was headed by a Prime Minister, Iyad al-Allawi, leader of the Iraq National
Accord, a secular, non-sectarian faction. Allawi is a Shiite but many INA leaders were Sunnis,
and some of them were formerly members of the Baath Party. The president of this interim
government was Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni tribal figure who spent many years in Saudi Arabia.
January 2005 National Assembly and Provincial Elections
A series of elections in 2005 produced the full-term government that is in power today. In line
with a March 8, 2004, “Transitional Administrative Law” (TAL, interim constitution), the first
post-Saddam election was held on January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly (which formed an executive), four-year term provincial councils in all 18 provinces
and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). According to the “proportional
representation/closed list” election system, voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a
coalition of parties, or persons); 111 entities were on the national ballot, of which nine were
multi-party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17
Assembly seats, and only one seat on the 51-seat Baghdad provincial council. That council was
dominated (28 seats) by representatives of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, then at odds with U.S. forces, also
boycotted, leaving his faction poorly represented on provincial councils in the Shiite south and in
Baghdad. The resulting transitional government placed Shiites and Kurds in the highest
positions—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was President and Da’wa
(Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was Prime Minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker, deputy
president, a deputy prime minister, and six ministers, including defense.
Permanent Constitution
The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum
by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On
May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting committee was appointed, but with only two Sunni Arabs
(15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005, the talks
produced a draft, providing for a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether
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Kirkuk (Tamim province) would join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designation of Islam as “a
main source” of legislation;1 a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); families choosing
which courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only primary education mandatory
(Article 34); and having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme court
(Article 89). Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much discretion to
male family members. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition
Provisional Authority, CPA) applicable until amended (Article 126), and established a
“Federation Council” (Article 62), a second chamber with size and powers to be determined in
future law (not adopted to date).
The major disputes—still to some extent unresolved—centered on regional versus centralized
power. The draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions”—
reaffirmed in passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions. Article 117 allows
“regions” to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding of the Kurds’ peshmerga
militia (allowed by the TAL). Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas
revenues from “current fields” in proportion to population, and gave regions a role in allocating
revenues from new energy discoveries. Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage
of national hydrocarbons legislation. Sunnis dominate areas of Iraq that have few proven oil or
gas deposits, and favor centralized control of oil revenues, whereas the Kurds want to maintain
maximum control of their own burgeoning energy sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to
defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11, 2005) providing for a
panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election government
took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another two months (under the same rules as the
October 15 referendum). The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no”
vote, respectively, but the constitution was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55%
“no,” missing the threshold for a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
December 15, 2005, Elections
The December 15, 2005, elections were for a full-term (four-year) national government (in line
with the schedule laid out in the TAL). Under the voting mechanism used for that election, each
province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR)—
a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated
this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won additional seats had the
constituency been the whole nation. There were 361 political “entities,” including 19 multi-party
coalitions, competing in a “closed list” voting system (in which party leaders choose the persons
who will actually sit in the Assembly). As shown in Table 3, voters chose lists representing their
sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The COR was inaugurated
on March 16, 2006, but political infighting caused the Shiite bloc “United Iraqi Alliance” to
replace Jafari with another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister.
On April 22, 2006, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president. His two deputies are
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq al-
Hashimi, leader of the broad Sunni-based coalition called the Accord Front (“Tawafuq”—within

1 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html.
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which Hashimi leads the Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Accord figure, the hardline Mahmoud
Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), became COR speaker. Maliki won COR approval
of a 37-member cabinet (including two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots
(Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 2006, due to
infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four were
women.
Political Reconciliation and Subsequent Elections
The 2005 elections were considered successful by the Bush Administration but did not resolve the
Sunni Arab grievances over their diminished positions in the power structure. The Sunni-led
insurgency accelerated in the two subsequent years, in turn prompting the empowerment of Shiite
militia factions to counter the insurgency. The sectarian violence was so serious that many experts
said that the U.S. mission in Iraq was failing.
In August 2006, the Administration and Iraq agreed on a series of “benchmarks” that, if adopted
and implemented, might achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on 18 political and security benchmarks—
as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15, 2007, and then September 15, 2007—was
required for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq.
President Bush used the waiver provision. The law also mandated an assessment by the GAO, by
September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been met, as well as an outside
assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).
As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of many of the major legislative benchmarks—and a
dramatic drop in sectarian violence that the Administration attributed largely to the U.S. “troop
surge”—the Bush Administration asserted that political reconciliation was advancing. However,
U.S. officials maintained that the extent and durability of reconciliation would depend on the
degree of implementation of adopted laws, on further compromises among ethnic groups, and on
continued attenuated levels of violence. For Iraq’s performance on the “benchmarks, see Table 4.
The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi Government: 2008-2009
The passage of key legislation in 2008 and the continued calming of the security situation
enhanced Maliki’s political position through 2008 and 2009. A March 2008 offensive ordered by
Maliki against the Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs pacified the city,
weakened Sadr politically, and caused many Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as even-handed and
non-sectarian. This contributed to a decision in July 2008 by the Accord Front to end its one-year
boycott of the cabinet. Other cabinet vacancies were filled with independents, essentially putting
to rest indicators that major blocs might vote Maliki out of the Prime Ministership. (In 2007, the
Accord Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi pulled out
of the cabinet, leaving it with 13 vacant seats, out of 37 cabinet slots, severely weakening Maliki
politically.)
Although Maliki’s growing strength increased the Bush and then Obama Administration’s
optimism for continued stability, Maliki’s strength caused concern even among Maliki’s erstwhile
political allies. They saw him as increasingly building a following in the security forces, and
creating new security organs loyal to him and his faction. Through his Office of the Commander-
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in-Chief, he directly commands the National Counter-Terrorism Force (over 5,000 and set to rise
to 9,000 personnel) as well as the Baghdad Brigade, responsible for security in the capital. In
2008, the Kurds were highly critical of his formation of government-run “tribal support councils”
in northern Iraq, which the Kurds see as an effort to prevent them from gaining control of
disputed territories that they want to integrate into their Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Other support councils were created in southern Iraq. As another example, in February 2010,
Maliki’s government reportedly directed the Iraqi Army’s Fourth Division to cordon a provincial
council building in Tikrit to influence the resolution of a dispute over the Salahuddin provincial
council’s ousting of the former governor of the province.2 A further February 2010 incident
involved the government’s order to arrest a major Sunni leader south of Baghdad (Shaykh Turki
Talal), an arrest that was later reversed after reported U.S. intervention.3
January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections and Implications
The political fears of some factions about Maliki’s consolidation of power were evident in the
context of the January 31, 2009, provincial elections. Under a 2008 law, provincial councils in
Iraq choose the governor and provincial governing administrations in each province, making
them powerful bodies that provide ample opportunity to distribute patronage and guide provincial
politics. ISCI, which had already been distancing itself from its erstwhile ally, Maliki’s Da’wa
Party, ran under a separate slate from Maliki’s in the provincial elections. This represented a
fracturing of the successful UAI bloc that had dominated the 2005 elections. Ideologically, ISCI
favors more power for the provinces and less for the central government; centralization is
Maliki’s preferred power structure.
The provincial elections had originally been planned for October 1, 2008, but were delayed when
Kurdish restiveness over integrating Kirkuk and other disputed territories into the KRG caused a
presidential council veto of the July 22, 2008, election law needed to hold these elections. That
draft provided for equal division of power in Kirkuk (among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until
its status is finally resolved, prompting Kurdish opposition to any weakening of their dominance
in Kirkuk. On September 24, 2008, the COR passed a final election law, providing for the
elections by January 31, 2009 and putting off provincial elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG
provinces.4
In the elections, in which there was virtually no violence on election day, about 14,500 candidates
vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-dominated provinces of Iraq. About 4,000
of the candidates were women. The average number of council seats per province was about 30,5
down from a set number of 41 seats per province (except Baghdad) in the 2005-2009 councils.
The new Baghdad provincial council has 57 seats. This yielded an average of more than 30
candidates per council seat, which some see as enthusiasm for democracy in Iraq. However, the
reduction in number of seats also meant that many incumbents would not be reelected.

2 Myers, Steven Lee and Anthony Shadid. “Maliki Faulted On Using Army in Iraqi Politics.”New York Times, February
11, 2010.
3 Levinson, Charles. “In Iraq, U.S. Forces Hang On To Power.” Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2010.
4 The election law also stripped out provisions in the vetoed version to allot 13 total reserved seats, spanning six
provinces, to minorities. An October 2008 amendment restored six reserved seats for minorities: Christian seats in
Baghdad, Nineveh, and Basra; one seat for Yazidis in Nineveh; one seat for Shabaks in Nineveh; and one seat for the
Sabean sect in Baghdad
5 Each provincial council has 25 seats plus one seat per each 200,000 residents over 500,000.
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The provincial elections were conducted on an “open list” basis—voters were able to vote for a
party slate, or for an individual candidate (although they also had to vote for that candidate’s slate
as well). This procedure encourages voting for slates, and strengthened the ability of political
parties to choose who on their slate will occupy seats allotted for that party. This election system
was widely assessed to favor larger, well-organized parties, because smaller parties might not
meet the vote threshold to obtain any seats on the council in their province.6 This was seen as
likely to set back the hopes of some Iraqis that the elections would weaken the Islamist parties,
both Sunni and Shiite, that have dominated post-Saddam politics.
About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible for the vote, which was
run by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election-related violence was minimal,
although five candidates and several election/political workers were killed. There were virtually
no major violent incidents on election day. Turnout was about 51%, somewhat lower than some
expected, and some voters complained of being turned away at polling places because their
names were not on file. Other voters had been displaced by sectarian violence in prior years and
were unable to vote in their new areas of habitation.
The vote totals were finalized on February 19, 2009, and were certified on March 29, 2009.
Within 15 days of that (by April 13, 2009) the provincial councils began to convene under the
auspices of the incumbent provincial governor, and to elect a provincial council chairperson and
deputy chairperson. Within another 30 days after that (by May 12, 2009) the provincial councils
elected (by absolute majority) a provincial governor and deputy governors. The term of the
provincial councils is four years from the date of first convention.
Outcomes
The fears of Maliki’s opponents were realized when his list (“State of Law Coalition”) was the
clear winner of the provincial elections. His Shiite opponents (his former allies) all ran separate
slates and fared generally poorly. With 28 out of the 57 total seats, the Maliki slate gained
effective control, by itself, of the Baghdad provincial council (displacing ISCI). Da’wa also
emerged very strong in most of the Shiite provinces of the south, including Basra, where it won
an outright majority (20 out of 35 seats).
The apparent big loser in the elections was ISCI, which had been favored because it is well
organized and well funded. ISCI did not win in Najaf province, which it previously dominated
and which, because of Najaf’s revered status in Shiism, is considered a center of political gravity
in southern Iraq. It won seven seats there, the same number that was won by the Maliki slate.
ISCI won only 3 seats on the Baghdad province council, down from the 28 it held previously, and
only five in Basra. Some observers believe that the poor showing for ISCI was a product not only
of its call for devolving power out of Baghdad, but also because of its perceived close ties to Iran,
which some Iraqis believe is exercising undue influence on Iraqi politics. The Sadrist lists fared
little better than did ISCI’s slate, although post-election coalition politics put some Sadrists in
senior posts in some provinces.
The unexpected strength of secular parties such as that of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi,
corroborated the view that voters favored slates committed to strong central government and “rule
of law,” as well as to the concept of Iraqi nationalism. This trend was also reflected in the strong

6 The threshhold for winning a seat is: the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats up for election.
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showing of a single candidate in Karbala province who was well thought of in the province for
even-handedness.
Although Maliki’s coalition was the clear winner in the elections, the subsequent efforts to form
provincial administrations demonstrated that he still needed to strike bargains with rival factions,
including Sadr, ISCI, and even the Sunni list of Saleh al-Mutlaq (National Dialogue Front) that
contains many ex-Baathists. The provincial administrations that took shape, mostly in line with
set deadlines above, are in Table 4 below.
Maliki’s Position as March 7, 2010, Elections Approach
Because of his slate’s showing in the provincial elections, Maliki was deemed throughout 2009 to
be well positioned for the March 7, 2010, parliamentary elections, which will choose the next
full-term government. He has reached compromise with political competitors in some provinces,
including those dominated by Sunni Arabs, and he has included Sunni tribalists and other diverse
figures into his State of Law coalition that will compete in the March vote. Maliki also derived
strength from the ongoing U.S. implementation of the U.S.-Iraq “Security Agreement”
(sometimes referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA). The agreement passed the
COR on November 27, 2008, over Sadrist opposition. The pact took effect January 1, 2009,
limiting the prerogatives of U.S. troops to operate in Iraq and setting a timetable of December 31,
2011, for a complete U.S. troop withdrawal. President Obama, on February 27, 2009, outlined a
U.S. troop drawdown plan that comports with the major provisions of the Agreement.
The first major milestone of the U.S.-Iraq Agreement was the June 30, 2009, withdrawal of U.S.
combat troops from Iraq’s cities. This was strictly implemented by U.S. forces, to the point where
U.S. forces pulled out of locations in the restive Mosul area and from Sadr City, where Gen.
Raymond Odierno (top U.S. commander in Iraq) felt U.S. forces should stay. Maliki hailed this
interim milestone as a “victory” and declared it a national holiday.
However, as 2010 began, Maliki has been increasingly perceived as vulnerable. Polling data is
sporadic, but many observers now expect his slate to win a plurality, but not a majority that would
ensure his continuation as Prime Minister. The Iraqi constitution mandates that the slate with the
largest share of votes gets the first opportunity to form a government, but a failure to win a
majority would throw the governmental formation process open to other Prime Ministerial
candidates. Maliki’s image as protector of law and order was shaken by the several high-profile
attacks since June 2009, including several major multiple bombing attacks in central Baghdad.
Additional bombings have taken place in Baghdad, Diyala Province, Anbar Province, and
elsewhere as the election has approached. Some believe that insurgents conducted these attacks
with the intent of weakening Maliki’s image as a strong leader. Others see these incidents as an
effort by Al Qaeda in Iraq or other un-reconciled Sunni insurgent groups to reduce Sunni
participation in the elections and/or reignite civil war.
Realizing the potential for security lapses to reduce his chances to remain Prime Minister, Maliki
ordered several ISF commanders questioned for lapses in connection with the major bombings in
Baghdad on August 20, 2009, in which almost 100 Iraqis were killed and the Ministry of Finance
and of Foreign Affairs were heavily damaged. The makeshift new Ministry of Finance buildings
were attacked again on December 7, 2009. After this bombing, which also resulted in the
parliament’s insistence that it hear Maliki’s explanation of his responses, Maliki replaced the
commander of the Baghdad Brigade. He also has attempted to place substantial blame for the
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lapses on the Interior Minister, Jawad Bolani, who is running a rival slate in the March 2010
national elections. (See box below on major slates in the election.)
The infighting between Maliki and his critics has also had the effect of stalling movement on
remaining crucial legislation, such as that discussed in Table 4 below. Some note that efforts to
rein in official corruption are failing because no comprehensive anti-corruption law has been
passed. Also not passed are laws on the environment, those governing other elections, consumer
protections, intellectual property rights, building codes, and a new national flag.
The March 7, 2010, Elections: Other Coalitions, Processes, and
Political Infighting
Apparently because of its weakness going into the national elections, ISCI reportedly tried to
enlist the support of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the senior clerical leader in Iraq, to call for
reconstituting the UIA for the March 7 National Assembly elections. That did not succeed, and
several major competing coalitions, including Shiite slates, have formed to compete against
Maliki’s slate. Sistani has remained completely neutral in the election, endorsing no slate, but
calling on all Iraqis to participate.
As noted, some of the new coalitions—particularly the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) that groups
ISCI and the Sadr faction, along with other Shiite figures—may have substantial support. The
INA coalition believes that each of its component factions can draw support from their individual
constituencies to produce an election majority or clear plurality. There are about 6,500 total
candidates running on all slates registered for the election. All blocs are offering voters gifts and
favors at pre-election rallies, and all available press reports indicate that campaigning has been
vibrant and vigorous. The slate led by Interior Minister Bolani held a huge public rally in
Baghdad, the only slate to make extensive use of such campaign tactics.
The table below outlines what appear to be the strongest coalitions in the elections, and some
political figures in those slates that could emerge as national leaders in the next government, if
their slates fare well.
Table 1. Major Coalitions Formed for 2010 National Elections
State of Law Coalition
Led by Maliki and his Da’wa Party. Includes Anbar Salvation Front of Shaykh
Hatim al-Dulaymi, which is Sunni, and the Independent Arab Movement of Abd
al-Mutlaq al-Jabbouri. However, has appealed to Shi te sentiments and
sectarianism during the campaign, particular in supporting excluding candidates
with links to outlawed Baath Party. Was previously widely favored in the 2010
election because of strong showing in January 2009 provincial elections. Now
perceived as likely to win a relatively narrow plurality and not outright majority,
clouding Maliki’s prospects to continue as Prime Minister.
Iraqi National Alliance
Formed in August 2009, considered the most formidable challenger to Maliki’s
slate. Consists mainly of his erstwhile Shiite opponents and is perceived as
somewhat more Islamist than the other slates. Includes ISCI, the Sadrist
movement, the Fadilah Party, the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmad Chalabi, and
the National Reform Movement of former Prime Minister (Da’wa) Ibrahim al-
Jafari. Likely Prime Ministerial nominee if this bloc prevails is current deputy
President Adel Abd al-Mahdi, a moderate ISCI leader well respected by U.S.
officials. However, some observers say Chalabi – the key architect of the effort
to exclude candidates with Baathist ties -- may be scheming to try to become
Prime Minister if the bloc later divides over Abd al-Mahdi’s elevation. Some ISCI
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members of this slate are candidates in Kurdish-dominated districts, raising
questions about what the slate’s election strategy is. This slate is considered
closest to Ayatollah Sistani, but did not persuade him to make a formal
endorsement.
Iraqi National Movement
Formed in October 2009. Led by former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi (Iraq
National Accord) who is Shi te but his faction appeals to Sunnis, and Sunni leader
Saleh al-Mutlaq (ex-Baathist who leads Iraq Front for National Dialogue). Backed
by Iraqi Islamic Party leader and deputy President Tariq Al-Hashimi. However,
Justice and Accountability Commission (formerly the De-Bathification
Commission) has disqualified Mutlaq and another senior candidate on this slate,
Dhafir al Ani, for supporting the outlawed Baath Party. An appeals court affirmed
their disqualification. Slate protested the disqualifications and considered, but did
not decide to, cal for outright election boycott.
Kurdistan Alliance
Competing again in 2010 as a joint KDP-PUK Kurdish list. However, Kurdish
solidarity was shaken by July 25, 2009, Kurdistan elections in which a breakaway
PUK faction called Change (Gorran) did unexpectedly well. Gorran is running its
own separate list for the March 2010 elections, and there has been some
violence between PUK and Gorran supporters. PUK’s ebbing strength in the
north could compromise Talabani’s continuation as President after the March
2010 elections, if Talabani, as expected, seeks to remain in office.
Unity Alliance of Iraq
Led by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, a moderate Shiite who has a reputation for
political independence. Bolani has not previously been affiliated with the large
Shiite parties such as ISCI and Dawa, and was only briefly affiliated with the
Sadrist faction (which has been strong in Bolani’s home town of Amarah, in
southeastern Iraq). Considered a non-sectarian slate, this list Includes Sunni tribal
faction led by Shaykh Ahmad Abu Risha, brother of slain leader of the Sunni
Awakening movement in Anbar. The list includes first post-Saddam defense
minister Sadun al-Dulaymi.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions
The holding of the elections required passage of an election law setting out the rules and
parameters of the election. Under the Iraqi constitution, the elections needed to held by January
31, 2010, in order to allow 45 days before the March 15, 2010, expiry of the current COR’s term.
An election held beyond that term expiration date would almost certainly provoke a constitutional
crisis. Iraq’s election officials had ideally wanted a 90-day time frame between the election law
passage and the election date, in order to facilitate the voter registration process.
Because the provisions of the election law (covering such issues as voter eligibility, whether to
allot quota seats to certain constituencies, the size of the next COR) have the potential to shape
the election outcome, the major Iraqi communities were divided over the substance of the law.
These differences caused the COR to miss almost every self-imposed deadline to pass the election
law. One dispute was over the election system, with many COR members leaning toward a closed
list system (which gives the slates the power to determine who occupies actual COR seats after
the election), despite a call by Grand Ayatollah Sistani for an open list vote (which allows voters
to also vote for candidates as well as coalition slates). The final law, passed on December 6, 2009,
provides for an open list. Each province serves as a single constituency and a fixed number of
seats for each province.
There was also a dispute over how to apply the election in disputed Kirkuk province, where
Kurds fear that the election law drafts would cause Kurds to be underrepresented in the election.
The version of the election law passed by the COR on November 8, 2009 (141 out of 195 COR
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deputies voting), called for using 2009 food ration lists as representative of voter registration. The
Kurds had sought this provision, facing down the insistence of many COR deputies to use 2005
voter lists, which presumably would contain fewer Kurds. A compromise in that version of the
law allowed for a process to review, for one year, complaints about fraudulent registration, thus
easing Sunni and Shiite Arab fears about an excessive Kurdish vote in Kirkuk.
However, this version left many Sunni Arabs angry because it guaranteed a small quota of seats
for Iraqis living abroad or who are displaced. The mechanism for that guarantee was to create a
separate electoral constituency for Iraqis voting from outside Iraq—essentially, a “19th province”
constituency. Sunni Iraqis felt that because it is mainly members of their sect who remain
displaced, that election law version would underrepresent them. On this basis, one of Iraq’s
deputy presidents, Tariq al Hashimi, a Sunni Arab, vetoed the law. The veto, on November 18,
sent the law back to the COR.
A new version was adopted on November 23, but it was viewed as even less favorable to Sunni
Arabs than the first version, because it eliminated any reserved seats for Iraqis in exile. Hashimi
again threatened a veto, which he was required to exercise within 10 days. As that deadline was
about to lapse, the major factions, reportedly at the urging of U.S. and other diplomats in
Baghdad, reached agreement and adopted a new law on December 6, 2009. It was not vetoed by
any member of the presidency council. (According to Article 138 of the Iraqi constitution, after
the next election, Iraq is to have a President and at least one Vice President—the “presidency
council” concept was an interim measure that is to expire at the end of the current government’s
term.)
The election law that was adopted provides for the following:
• Expansion of the size of the COR to 325 total seats. Of these, 310 are allocated
by province, with the constituency sizes ranging from Baghdad’s 68 seats to
Muthanna’s 7 seats. The COR size, in the absence of a census, was based on
taking 2005 population figures and assuming a 2.8% per year growth rate in each
province. 7
• The remaining 15 seats are “compensatory seats”—seats allocated from
“leftover” votes; votes for parties and slates that did not meet a minimum
threshold to achieve any seats outright. Eight of the compensatory seats are
reserved for minorities, and the remaining seven are distributing among the top
vote-getting lists in accordance with their vote totals nationwide.
• There is no separate electoral constituency for Iraqis in exile, so Iraqis in exile
will have their votes counted in the provinces where these voters originated.
• The election date was set for March 7, 2010.
Flashpoint: Possible Sunni Disillusionment With the Elections
The electoral process since the end of 2005 has, to a large extent, furthered U.S. goals to bring
Sunni Muslims ever further into the political structure. Sunnis boycotted the January 2005
parliamentary and provincial elections and were, as a result, poorly represented in all governing

7 Analysis of Iraq expert Reidar Visser. “The Hashemi Veto.” http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/the-
hashemi-veto/
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bodies. However, Sunni slates, consisting mainly of urban, educated Sunnis, participated in the
December 2005 parliamentary elections.
The 2009 provincial elections furthered the Sunni entry into the political process by attracting the
participation of Sunni tribal leaders (“Awakening Councils”) who recruited the Sons of Iraq
fighters. These Sunnis had largely stayed out of the December 2005 elections because their
attention was focused primarily on the severe violence and instability in the Sunni provinces,
particularly Anbar. These tribal figures were intimidated by Al Qaeda in Iraq, which urged Sunnis
to stay completely out of what AQ-I asserted was a U.S. occupation-dominated political process.
In the 2009 provincial elections, as the violence ebbed, these Sunni tribalists offered election
slates and showed strength at the expense of the established Sunni parties, particularly the Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP). The main “Iraq Awakening” tribal slate came in first in Anbar Province,
according to the final results. At the same time, the established, mostly urban Sunni parties, led by
the IIP, had been struggling in 2008 as the broader Accord Front (Tawafuq) fragmented. In the
provincial elections, one of its component parties—the National Dialogue Council—ran on slates
that competed with the IIP in several provinces.
As noted, in the March 7 election, there is one slate—the Iraq National Movement—that is
expected to have strong appeal among Sunnis. In addition, other Sunni figures have joined the
predominantly Shiite slates as part of an effort by the leaders of those blocs to appear non-
sectarian.
Disqualification Crisis
The Sunni commitment to the political process may now be in jeopardy in the context of a major
dispute over candidate eligibility for the March 7, 2010, elections. Although there does not appear
to be a broad Sunni boycott of the elections materializing, there is a widespread Sunni Arab
perception that the election is unfair because of this dispute. Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent
groups are attempting to play on this dispute to justify attacks intended to dissuade Sunnis from
voting and spoil the election. Recognizing the potential for renewed sectarian violence, in late
February 2010 the government reinstated to duty about 20,000 (most of them Sunni Arab)
military officers who had served in the military during Saddam’s rule but who were purged from
the roles after his overthrow.
The acute phase of this political crisis began in January 2010 when the Justice and Accountability
Commission (the successor to the “De-Baathification Commission” that worked since the fall of
Saddam to purge former Baathists from government) invalidated the candidacies of 499
individuals (out of 6,500 candidates running), spanning many different slates, including some
candidates of Maliki’s State of Law list. The Justice and Accountability Commission is headed by
Ali al-Lami, a Shiite who had been in U.S. military custody during 2005-2006 for alleged
assistance to Iranian agents active in Iraq. He is perceived as answerable to or heavily influenced
by Ahmad Chalabi, who had headed the De-Baathification Commission. Both are part of the Iraqi
National Alliance slate and both are Shiites, leading many to believe that the disqualifications
represented an attempt to exclude prominent Sunnis from the vote.
The Justice and Accountability Commission argued that the disqualifications were based on law
and careful evaluation of candidate backgrounds and not based on sect, because many of the
candidates disqualified were Shiites. The IHEC reviewed and backed the invalidations on January
14, 2010. Disqualified candidates had three days to file an appeal in court. Apparently due in part
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to entreaties from the U.S. Embassy, Vice President Joseph Biden (during a visit to Iraq on
January 22, 2010) and partner embassies in Iraq—all of which fear a return to instability that
could result from the disqualifications—the appeals court at first ruled that disqualified
candidates could run in the election and clear up questions of Baathist affiliation after the
election.
However, reported pressure by Maliki and other Shiites caused the court to reverse itself on
February 12, 2010, and announce that 145 candidates would be ineligible to run. Twenty-six
candidates who had been barred were reinstated. The remaining approximately 300 disqualified
candidates had already accepted their disqualification and been replaced by other candidates on
their respective slates. The slate most affected by the disqualifications is the Iraq National
Movement slate, because two of its leading candidates, National Dialogue Front party leader
Saleh al-Mutlaq and Dhafir al-Ani, both Sunnis, were barred from running. This caused the slate
to suspend its campaign for three days subsequent to the beginning of campaigning on February
12 (which was a one-week postponement from the original date set for the start of the campaign).
However, the slate did not, as a whole, call for a broad boycott and Mutlaq himself dropped his
own calls for boycotting the election; the slate is campaigning.
The disqualifications crisis has caused a measure of alarm within the Obama Administration,
which perceives in it the potential for re-ignition of sectarian violence, a long delay in forming
the next government, and the jeopardizing of U.S. military draw-down plans. U.S. plans call for a
withdrawal of about 50,000 forces from the time of the election until August 2010, to a level of
about 50,000 force remaining after August 2010. It is conceivable that, if the formation of a
government is delayed substantially, the drawdown of 50,000 combat troops may have to be
extended beyond August 2010.
The crisis might account for February 16, 2010, comments by Gen. Ray Odierno, the top U.S.
commander in Iraq, that Iran is working through Chalabi and al-Lami to undermine the
legitimacy of the elections. Gen. Odierno specifically asserted that Chalabi is in close contact
with a close Iraqi ally of Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani, who commands the Qods Force unit of
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).8 The Iraqi, whose name is Jamal al-Ibrahimi,
is a member of the COR. Chalabi’s successful efforts to turn the election into a campaign
centered on excluding ex-Baathists—which Sunnis view as a codeword for their sect—has caused
particular alarm among experts.
This crisis adds to already growing Sunni resentment because of the slow pace with which the
Maliki government has implemented its pledge to fully integrate the “Sons of Iraq” fighters into
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). About 100,000 (80% are Sunni Arab) of these fighters nationwide
cooperated with U.S. forces against Al Qaeda in Iraq and other militants. Only about 30,000 have
been integrated into the ISF or given the civilian government jobs they were promised, to date.
Other Ongoing Frictions: KRG-Central Government Disputes
The elections processes have not healed the disputes between the KRG and the central
government. However, KRG President Masoud Barzani visited Washington, DC, in January 2010
and, according to participants in his meetings, discussed with senior officials ways in which the
Kurds will cooperate with Iraq’s Arabs after the election to form a new government. Still, the

8 Gertz, Bill. “Inside the Ring.” Washington Times, February 18, 2010.
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elections, and any likely new government, will not likely produce a resolution of KRG-Baghdad
disputes over KRG insistence that it control its own oil resources, disputes over security control
over areas inhabited by Kurds, and the Kurds’ claim that the province of Tamim (Kirkuk) be
formally integrated into the KRG.
These differences were aggravated by the 2009 provincial elections because Sunni Arabs wrested
control of the Nineveh (Mosul) provincial council from the Kurds, who won control of that
council in the 2005 election because of the broad Sunni Arab boycott of that election. A Sunni list
(al-Hadba’a) won a clear plurality of the Nineveh vote and subsequently took control of the
provincial administration there. Al-Hadba’a is composed of hardline Sunni Arabs who openly
oppose Kurdish encroachment in the province and who are committed to the “Arab and Islamic
identity” of the province. A member of the faction, Ajil al-Nufaiji, is the governor, and the Kurds
have prevented his visitation of areas of Nineveh where the Kurds’ peshmerga militia operates.
In part to prevent outright violence, Gen. Odierno, in August 2009, proposed to send U.S. forces
to partner with peshmerga units (a development without precedent) and with ISF units in the
province to build confidence between the two forces and reassure Kurdish, Arab, Turkomen, and
other residents of the province. That plan began implementation in January 2010. Nineveh has
seen several high-profile attacks since the U.S. pullout from Iraqi cities on June 30, 2009.
Additional friction surrounded the KRG’s parliamentary and presidential elections on July 25,
2009. The KRG leadership had been planning, during that vote, to conduct a referendum on a
separate KRG constitution. However, the central government asserted that a KRG constitution
would conflict with the publicly adopted national constitution, and that the KRG draft
constitution, adopted by the Kurdish parliament on June 23, 2009, claimed Kurdish control over
disputed territories and oil resources. The KRG backed down and did not hold the referendum.
The KRG elections also, to some extent, shuffled the political landscape. A breakaway faction of
President Talabani’s PUK, called “Change” (“Gorran”), won an unexpectedly high 25 seats (out
of 111) in the Kurdistan national assembly, embarrassing the PUK and weakening it relative to
the KDP. KRG President Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP, easily won reelection against weak
opposition. Maliki met with Barzani in the Kurdish region on August 2, 2009, the first direct
meeting between the two in a year, signaling Maliki’s inclination to appear magnanimous and
open to compromise. Gorran is running its own list in the March 2010 elections.
Another mixed province, Diyala, was hotly contested among Shiite and Sunni Arab and Kurdish
slates, reflecting the character of the province as another front line between the Kurds and the
central government. The provincial version of the Accord Front narrowly beat out the Kurds for
first place in the province, but has subsequently allied with the Kurds and with ISCI to set up the
provincial administration. There continues to be substantial friction between Sunni and Shiite
Arabs in that province, in part because Sunni militants drove out many Shiites from the province
at the height of the civil conflict during 2005-2007.
Sadr Remains Weakened
U.S. officials are hoping that the March 2010 elections continue a trend toward weakening
Moqtada al-Sadr’s faction. The faction was already weakened by the March 2008 government
offensive against Sadr’s militia in Basra, as well as by its poor showings in the January 2009
provincial elections. In the provincial elections, the Sadr faction, represented mainly in the
“Independent Liberals Trend” list, did not come close to winning outright control of any councils,
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although it won enough seats in several southern provinces to, through deal making, gain senior
positions in a few southern provinces.The relatively poor showing of the Sadrists was viewed as
reflecting voter disillusionment with parties that continue to field militias—which many Iraqis
blame for much of the violence that has plagued Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein.
As noted above, Sadr has joined an anti-Maliki Shiite coalition (Iraqi National Alliance) for the
March 2010 national elections. On October 17, 2009, the Sadr movement held a “primary”
election to determine who would fill the 329 total candidate slots that will be fielded by the Sadr
movement in the elections (as part of the broader Iraqi National Alliance bloc discussed above).
Although Sadr is participating full force in the March elections, some worry that militias loyal to
him or splinter militias could become more active after the elections, depending on the outcome.
The U.S. ability to constrain them will decline as U.S. forces draw down between the elections
and August 2010. Some U.S. commanders say in early 2010 that they are starting to see some
signs of increased Shiite militia activity around Iraq, including the south, as the elections
approach. A number of splinter groups of Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, including the “Special
Groups,” the Promised Day Brigade, and Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Battalions) operate in
southern Iraq. On July 2, 2009, the State Department named Kata’ib Hezbollah as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO). About 800 total candidates competed for the slots.
Other Elections Possible
There has been consistent speculation that the March National Assembly elections would be held
concurrently with a referendum on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The referendum was to be
held by July 31, 2009, but the United States, which views the referendum as unnecessary,
supported a delay. In mid-October 2009, Iraqi parliamentarians quietly shelved the referendum
vote by failing to act on legislation to hold the referendum and focusing instead on the broader
election law needed for the National Assembly elections.9
District and sub-district elections were previously slated for July 31, 2009, as well. However,
those are delayed, and the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said in a report on
U.N. operations in Iraq, released August 3, 2009, that these elections would likely be held later in
2010, after the National Assembly elections.
Several other possible elections in Iraq are as yet unscheduled. If there is a settlement between the
KRG and Baghdad over Kirkuk and other territories, there could be a referendum to ratify any
settlement that is reached. Under Article 140 of the Constitution, a referendum was to be held by
December 31, 2007, but the Kurds have agreed to repeated delays in order to avoid jeopardizing
overall progress in Iraq. Because the three Kurdish-controlled provinces and the disputed
province of Kirkuk did not hold provincial elections with the rest of Iraq on January 31, 2009,
elections are required in those provinces at some point, presumably subsequent to a settlement of
the Kirkuk dispute. (For more information on Kurd-Baghdad disputes, see CRS Report RS22079,
The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq , by Kenneth Katzman.)
There could also be a vote on amendments to Iraq’s 2005 constitution if and when the major
factions agree to finalize the recommendations of the constitutional review commission (CRC).

9 Sly, Liz. “Iraqi Push Fades For Referendum on U.S. Troop Pullout.” Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2009.
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There have been no recent major developments reported that would indicate if and when such a
referendum might be ready.
Table 2. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)
Baghdad—55 regular seats, plus
State of Law (Maliki)—38% (28 seats); Independent Liberals Trend (pro-Sadr)—
one Sabean and one Christian set-
9% (5 seats); Accord Front (Sunni mainstream)—9% (9 seats); Iraq National
aside seat
(Al awi)—8.6%; Shahid Mihrab and Independent Forces (ISCI)—5.4% (3 seats) ;
National Reform list (of former P.M. Ibrahim al-Jafari)—4.3% (3 seats)
Basra—34 regular seats,
State of Law—37% (20); ISCI—11.6% (5); Sadr—5% (2); Fadhila (previously
plus one Christian seat
dominant in Basra)—3.2% (0); Allawi—3.2% (0); Jafari list—2.5% (0). New
Governor : Shiltagh Abbud (Maliki list); Council chair: Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)
Nineveh—34 regular seats, plus
Hadbaa—48.4%; Fraternal Nineveh—25.5%; IIP—6.7%; Hadbaa has taken
one set aside for Shabaks, Yazidis, control of provincial council and administration, excluding the Kurds. Governor
and Christians
is Atheel al-Nujaifi of Hadbaa.
Najaf—28 seats
State of Law—16.2% (7); ISCI—14.8% (7); Sadr—12.2% (6); Jafari—7% (2);
Allawi—1.8% (0); Fadhila—1.6% (0). Council chairman: Maliki list
Babil—30 seats
State of Law—12.5% (8); ISCI—8.2% (5); Sadr—6.2% (3); Jafari—4.4% (3);
Al awi—3.4%; Accord Front—2.3% (3); Fadhila—1.3%. New Council chair:
Kadim Majid Tuman (Sadrist)
Diyala—29 seats
Accord Front list—21.1%; Kurdistan Alliance—17.2%; Allawi—9.5%; State of
Law—6 %. New council leans heavily Accord, but allied with Kurds and ISCI.
Muthanna—26 seats
State of Law—10.9% (5); ISCI—9.3% (5); Jafari—6.3% (3); Sadr—5.5% (2);
Fadhila—3.7%.
Anbar—29 seats
Iraq Awakening (Sahawa-Sunni tribals)—18%; National Iraqi Project Gathering
(established Sunni parties, excluding IIP)—17.6%; Al awi—6.6%; Tribes of Iraq—
4.5%.
Maysan—27 seats
State of Law—17.7% (8); ISCI—14.6% (8); Sadr—7; Jafari—8.7% (4); Fadhila—
3.2%; Allawi—2.3%. New Governor: Mohammad al-Sudani (Maliki); Council
chair: Hezbollah Iraq
Dhi Qar—31 seats
State of Law—23.1% (13); pro-Sadr—14.1% (7); ISCI—11.1% (5); Jafari—7.6%
(4); Fadhila—6.1%; Allawi—2.8%. New governor—Maliki list; Council chair:
Sadrist
Karbala—27 seats
List of Maj. Gen. Yusuf al-Habbubi (Saddam-era local official)—13.3% (1 seat);
State of Law—8.5% (9); Sadr—6.8% (4); ISCI—6.4% (4); Jafari—2.5% ; Fadhila—
2.5%.
Salah Ad Din—28 seats
IIP-led list—14.5%; Al awi—13.9%; Sunni list without IIP—8.7%; State of Law—
3.5%; ISCI—2.9%. New council leans Accord/IIP
Qadissiyah—28 seats
State of Law—23.1% (11); ISCI—11.7% (5); Jafari—8.2% (3); Al awi—8%; Sadr—
6.7% (2); Fadhila—4.1%. New governor: Salim Husayn (Maliki list)
Wasit—28 seats
State of Law—15.3% (13); ISCI—10% (6); Sadr—6% (3); Al awi—4.6%; Fadhila—
2.7%. New governor: Shi te independent; Council chair: ISCI
Source: UNAMI translation of results issued February 2, 2009, by the Independent Higher Election Commission
of Iraq; Vissar, Reidar. The Provincial Elections: The Seat Allocation Is Official and the Coalition-Forming Process
Begins. February 19, 2009.

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Table 3. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Bloc/Party
Seats
Seats
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 85 seats after departure of Fadilah (15
seats) and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz
al-Hakim has 30; Da’wa Party (25 total: Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13);
140 128
independents (30).
Kurdistan Alliance—KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Al awi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni parties for Dec.
40 25
vote.
Iraq Accord Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP,
— 44
Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General
People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7); independents (4).
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan.
— 11
2005 vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Al awi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (smal Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Notes: Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10
million)/ December: 75% (12 million).
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Table 4. Assessments of the Benchmarks
July 12,
Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May 2008 Administration
Benchmark
2007
GAO
Sept. 14, 2007
report, June 2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq
Admin.
(Sept. 07) Admin. Report
Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports
Report
(and various press sources)
1. Forming Constitutional Review
(S)
unmet
S
CRC filed final report in August 2008 but major issues remain unresolved and
Committee (CRC) and completing review
satisfactory
require achievement of consensus among major faction leaders.
2. Enacting and implementing laws on De-
(U)
unmet
S
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12, 2008. Allows about 30,000
Baathification
unsatisfact.
fourth ranking Baathists to regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three
party ranks would receive pensions. Could al ow for judicial prosecution of al

ex-Baathists and bars ex-Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs. As
noted, De-Baathification officials have used the new law to try to harm the
prospects of their rivals in March 2010 elections.
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that
U
unmet
U
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over KRG-central government
ensure equitable distribution of resources
disputes; only framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being
distributed equitably, and 2009 budget maintains 17% revenue for KRG. Kurds
also getting that share of oil exported from newly producing fields in KRG area.
Some U.S. assessments say factions unlikely to reach agreement on these laws
in the near term.
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form
S
partly met
S
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshold (petition by
semi-autonomous regions
33% of provincial council members) to start process to form new regions, but
main blocs agreed that law would take effect April 2008. November 2008:
petition by 2% of Basra residents submitted to IHEC (another way to start
forming a region) to convert Basra province into a single province “region.
Signatures of 8% more were required by mid-January 2009; not achieved.
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to
S on (a)
overall
S on (a) and (c)
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted February 13,
establish a higher electoral commission, (b)
and U on
unmet; (a)
2008, took effect April 2008. Implementing election law adopted September 24,
provincial elections law; (c) a law to specify
the others
met
2008, provided for provincial elections by January 31, 2009. Those elections
authorities of provincial bodies, and (d) set
were held, as discussed above.
a date for provincial elections
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
no rating
unmet
Same as July
Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 Iraq-held detainees passed
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
February 13, 2008. Of 23,000 granted amnesty, about 6,300 released to date.
19,000 detainees held by U.S. being transferred to Iraqi control under SOFA.
7. Enacting and implementing laws on
no rating
unmet
Same as July
Basra operation, discussed above, viewed as move against militias. On April 9,
militia disarmament
2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as condition for their parties to
participate in provincial elections. Law on militia demobilization stalled.
8. Establishing political, media, economic,
S
met
met
No change. “Executive Steering Committee” works with U.S.-led forces.
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July 12,
Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May 2008 Administration
Benchmark
2007
GAO
Sept. 14, 2007
report, June 2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq
Admin.
(Sept. 07) Admin. Report
Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports
Report
(and various press sources)
and services committee to support U.S.
“surge”
9. Providing three trained and ready
S
partly met
S
Eight brigades assigned to assist the surge. Surge now ended.
brigades to support U.S. surge
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with
U
unmet
S to pursue
No significant change. Still some U.S. concern over the Office of the
authorities to make decisions, without
extremists U on
Commander in Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the
political intervention, to pursue all
political
ISF—favoring Shiites. Still, some politically motivated leaders remain in ISF. But,
extremists, including Sunni insurgents and
interference
National Police said to include more Sunnis in command jobs and rank and file
Shiite militias
than one year ago. Defense and Interior ministers filed candidacies for the
March 2010 elections, involving them in national political contest.
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
U
unmet
S on military, U
U.S. interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law even-
providing even-handed enforcement of law
on police
handedly. Tribal support councils not even-handed.
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad
S
partly met
S
No change. Ethno-sectarian violence has fallen sharply in Baghdad.
will not provide a safe haven for any
outlaw, no matter the sect
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
Mixed. S
unmet
same as July 12
Sectarian violence has not re-accelerated. Shiite militias weak.
eliminating militia control of local security
on (a); U
on (b)
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security
S
met
S
Over 50 joint security stations operated in Baghdad at the height of U.S. troop
stations
surge. Now closed in compliance with June 30, 2009, U.S. pul out from the
cities. U.S. troops ring cities, including Baghdad.
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating U
unmet
U
ISF expected to secure Iraq by the end of 2011 under the SOFA, which
independently
requires U.S. troops to be out by then. Obama Administration officials say ISF
will meet the challenges, although some decrease in U.S. confidence in light of
high profile attacks. Iraqi Air Force not likely to be able to secure airspace by
then and has requested advanced weaponry, including F-16s.
16. Ensuring protection of minority parties
S
met
S
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution.
in COR
Minorities given a minimum seat allocated in election law for march vote.
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in
S
partly met
S
About 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was spent.
2007 capital budget for reconstruction.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not
U
unmet
U
Some governmental recriminations against some ISF officers still observed.
falsely accusing ISF members
Source: Compiled by CRS
CRS-17

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Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks


Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612


Congressional Research Service
18

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