Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206”
Background and Issues for Congress
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
February 18, 2010
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
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CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 provides
the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime
security forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) values this authority as an important tool to
train and equip military partners. Funds may be obligated only with the concurrence of the
Secretary of State. Thus far, the Department of Defense (DOD) has used Section 1206 authority
primarily to provide counterterrorism support. Because Section 1206 authority expires in
FY2011, Congress may wish to examine the utility and suitability of this special DOD authority.
In its FY2011 budget request, the Obama Administration indicates that it seeks about $490
million in Section 1206 funding for FY2011; this would require both an extension of Section
1206 authority and an increase in the current $350 million authorized level.
As of October 13, 2009, Section 1206 allocations total a little under $1 billion for FY2006
through FY2009. Section 1206 allocations totaled some $100 million for FY2006, $274 million
for FY2007, $272 million for FY2008, and $340 million for FY2009. (The amounts allocated are
somewhat less than the amounts notified to Congress, which totaled over $1 billion for FY2006-
FY2009.) For FY2010, Congress provided $345 million in the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2010, P.L. 111-118. (The amount is not specified in the act, but is included
under the total appropriated to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.) The FY2010 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) put in place a temporary limit of $75 million on the use of
Section 1206 funds for each FY2010 and FY2011 to train military troops that would deploy to
military or stability operations in which U.S. armed forces participate. The President signed the
FY2010 NDAA into law on October 28, 2009 (P.L. 111-84).
Through the use of FY2006 through FY2009 funds, Section 1206 has supported bilateral
programs in 24 countries, 13 multilateral programs, and a global human rights program. Just over
40% of the FY2006-FY2009 Section 1206 funding has been obligated for three countries:
Pakistan, Lebanon, and Yemen. Pakistan has been by far the largest recipient, receiving $203.4
million or over 20% of total. About 20% has been allocated to bilateral programs in four
countries: Bahrain, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Most of the Section 1206 funding to
the latter three focuses on controlling the Celebes Sea that sits among them, as well as adjoining
waters. Smaller allocations (i.e., those ranging from $1 million to $32 million) comprise close to
40% of the total.
Some Members are concerned with several issues related to Section 1206 authority, both narrow
and broad. Specific current concerns include whether Section 1206 funds are being used
appropriately and effectively, and whether the authority should be expanded to provide training
not only military forces but also to a wide range of foreign security forces. (Currently, Section
1206 limits security force training to maritime security forces.) An overarching issue is whether
Congress should place Section 1206 train and equip (T&E) authority under the State Department
with other T&E authorities. (Members have thus far refrained from codifying Section 1206 in
permanent law, as requested by DOD.) A related issue is whether Congress should grant the State
Department its own security assistance contingency fund with purposes that overlap Section
1206, as provided in the House-passed FY2010-FY2011 Foreign Relations Authorization Act
(H.R. 2410, Section 841). Finally, as the Obama Administration conducts an overall assessment
of foreign assistance, including security assistance, some Members may wish to examine the
status of Section 1206 in the context of broader security assistance reform.
This report will be updated as warranted.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 2
Section 1206 In Action................................................................................................................ 5
Purpose, Scope, and Timeline of Current Activities ............................................................... 5
Section 1206 Recipients ........................................................................................................ 5
Conditions on Section 1206 Programs ................................................................................... 9
Joint DOD-State Department Selection and Approval Process ............................................... 9
Funding Provisions and Obligations .......................................................................................... 10
FY2011 Administration Request................................................................................................ 11
Issues for Congress ................................................................................................................... 11
Should DOD Retain Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority? ............................................ 11
Are Section 1206 Funds Being Used Appropriately? ........................................................... 14
Are Section 1206 Funds Being Used Effectively?................................................................ 15
Sustainability ................................................................................................................ 16
Timeliness..................................................................................................................... 17
Should Congress Provide the State Department and DOD with Overlapping Section
1206-type Authorities? ..................................................................................................... 17
Should Congress Broaden Section 1206 Authority to Include T&E for Security
Forces? ............................................................................................................................ 19
Should Congress Consider Broader Security Assistance Reform? ........................................ 19
Tables
Table 1. FY2006-FY2009 Section 1206 Funding Allocations by Magnitude ................................ 8
Table 2. Section 1206 Funding: FY2006-FY2009 Allocations.................................................... 21
Appendixes
Appendix. Evolution of Section 1206 Legislation: 2005-2009 ................................................... 28
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 34
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
mong the issues related to U.S. assistance to foreign military and security forces, one of
the most salient for the 111th Congress is the status of Section 1206 of the FY2006
A National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA ), P.L. 109-163, as amended. This authority,
enacted in 2005, provides the Secretary of Defense with a new authority to train and equip
foreign military forces and foreign maritime security forces for two purposes:
• To enable foreign military forces, as well as foreign maritime security forces, to perform
counterterrorism (CT) operations. Nearly all Section 1206 assistance to date has been CT
training and equipment, and
• To enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support military and stability
operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating. (To date, the Department of
Defense (DOD) has authorities other than Section 1206 authority to train and equip
foreign militaries in conjunction with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, although the
use of Section 1206 for that purpose is permitted by law.)
Section 1206 is the first major DOD authority to be used expressly for the purpose of training and
equipping the national military forces of foreign countries. For almost the past half-century, DOD
generally has trained and equipped foreign military forces under State Department Title 22
authority and through State Department programs. On occasion, Congress has given DOD
authority to train and equip specified countries, and over the years Congress has provided DOD
with specific Title 10 authorities or DOD funding to provide foreign military forces with
opportunities attend military schools, but Section 1206 is the first DOD global train-and-equip
authority since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which placed oversight for
military assistance with the Secretary of State.
Congress’ decision to grant DOD Section 1206 authority has been controversial. Some Members
have stressed the need for a DOD authority that combatant commanders can use to respond to
emerging threats that put the well-being of U.S. military personnel at risk or might eventually
require robust, and costly, U.S. military action. But others have questioned whether Section 1206
funds are being used appropriately and effectively, and, above all, whether providing DOD with
its own train-and-equip (T&E) authorities undermines the Secretary of State’s statutory
responsibility to ensure coherence of U.S. foreign policy.
While no other single DOD security assistance authority has generated as much controversy as
Section 1206, some analysts have been concerned with the addition of a few new security
assistance authorities after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States, as
well as the perceived expansion of pre-9/11 DOD security assistance and other foreign assistance-
type activities. Of particular concern to some Members is Section 1208 of the FY2005 NDAA, an
authorization to provide support to “foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals” that
assist or facilitate U.S. military operations conducted by special operations forces to combat
terrorism.1 Two other post 9/11 security assistance authorities of concern are the Regional
Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), which funds foreign military officers and
1 This authority was established by Section 1208 of the FY2005 NDAA, P.L. 108-375, entitled Support of Military
Operations to Combat Terrorism, and is often referred to as “Section 1208” authority. The initial authorization
extended from FY2005 through FY2007, with a $25 million limit on funding. It was subsequently extended, first
through FY2010, and then in 2008 through FY2013, with a spending limit of $35 million and a requirement for Chief
of Mission concurrence (Section 1208, FY2009 NDAA, P.L. 110-417). Information concerning this program is
classified.
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defense and security officials to attend U.S. military educational institutions, regional centers, and
conferences and later made permanent law, and the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), which funds
countries assisting in U.S. military operations. The former is viewed by some analysts as
overlapping with the State Department International Military and Education Training (IMET)
program, the latter is viewed as performing the same function as the State Department Economic
Support Fund (ESF).2
This report provides background on the pre-Section 1206 status of security assistance authorities
and the factors contributing to the enactment of Section 1206. It then sets out the purposes of the
legislation and scope of its activities, restrictions on its use, the DOD-State Department planning
process, and funding. It concludes with a discussion of issues for Congress. An appendix provides
a descriptive legislative history of the bill and evolving Congressional committee attitudes
towards the appropriate division of labor between the Department of Defense and the State
Department regarding Section 1206 authority.
Background
For nearly 50 years, since the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended
(FAA), the Secretary of State has exercised the leadership role for foreign assistance, including
military assistance, specifically military education and training.3 With the exception of a period
from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s inclusive of the Vietnam War, major foreign military
assistance programs have been carried out under State Department authority, oversight and
guidance,4 with a DOD agency responsible for implementation.5 “Traditionally the State
Department plans, budgets and oversees security assistance programs and is the lead agency in
charge of all U.S. foreign policy and global engagement,” according to a recent report co-
2 Other DOD foreign assistance-type accounts of concern are two post-9/11 authorities, the Commander’s Emergency
Response Program (CERP), used by military commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines for small-scale
humanitarian or development projects, and the Security and Stabilization fund (“Section 1207”) through which DOD
transfers funds to the State Department for stabilization and reconstruction activities, mostly outside of Iraq and
Afghanistan.
3 As now stated in the FAA of 1961, as amended, Section 622(c) (22 U.S.C. 2382) states that the Secretary of State,
under the direction of the President, “shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of
economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to
determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training
program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and
abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.”
4 Before the FAA, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (P.L. 82-165, 65 Stat. 373) created a Mutual Security Agency in the
Executive Office of the President, whose Director was responsible for the “continuous supervision, general direction,
and coordination of all foreign aid—military, economic, and technical assistance.” U.S. Congress, House. U.S. Foreign
Aid: Its Purposes, Scope, Administration and Related Information, prepared by the Legislative Reference Service,
Library of Congress. 86th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 116, Washington: USGPO, June 11, 1959, p. 69.
During part of the 1950s, DOD administered the military assistance programs under the White House’s policy direction
and guidance. Congress subsequently moved responsibility for non-military aid to the State Department (P.L. 81-329,
63 Stat. 714). Two lower-ranking State Department officials were charged (consecutively) with coordinating with DOD
regarding military aid before the responsibility was finally bestowed on the Secretary of State. For more detail on the
further evolution of Military Assistance Authority, see CRS Report RL34639, The Department of Defense Role in
Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino.
5 The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), under the DOD Under Secretary for Policy, and its predecessor
agency. While the original language in 1961 applied specifically to assistance authorized under the FAA, a 1976
amendment deleted this restriction.
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sponsored by The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center. “The
DOD has supported overall foreign and national security policy by implementing these programs.
This relationship was designed to ensure that security assistance was aligned with general U.S.
foreign policy goals.”6
For many years, DOD had little interest in security assistance activities, as they were regarded
neither as a military mission nor as an activity of more than marginal value to ensuring national
security. In particular, training foreign military forces was not considered a task for the general
purpose military forces, and until recently limited training was most often conducted by U.S.
military Special Operations Forces, often under State Department authority.7
DOD perspectives on training foreign military forces slowly began to change after the terrorist
attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Defense officials began to regard the
defeat of terrorist groups in the countries where they train and prepare as essential to U.S.
national security. But some realized that these groups could not be disrupted and defeated solely
with U.S. forces employed under existing U.S. arrangements. U.S. military forces lacked the
language, country knowledge and cultural sensitivity to conduct effective counterterrorist (CT)
activities in many countries where threats could be expected to emerge. Some DOD officials
realized that foreign military and security forces would have to take the lead in conducting such
activities, and would need training to assume that role. At the same time, DOD officials
considered the State Department as lacking the necessary expertise and capabilities to carry out
an effective counterterrorism program. DOD officials also viewed the State Department’s
planning and implementation processes under authorities for traditional T&E programs8 as too
slow and cumbersome to meet emerging threats.
In the mid-2000s, DOD officials developed a proposal for a “Global Train and Equip” authority
to increase U.S. support for foreign military and security forces in order to disrupt terrorist
networks, to build the capacity of legitimate states to provide security within their sovereign
territory to prevent terrorists from establishing footholds, and to build the capacity of legitimate
states to participate in U.N., regional, and U.S. coalition military missions. This proposal called
for a DOD lead, but also required State Department concurrence. Although this proposal was
initially resisted by certain sectors at both DOD and the State Department, it won the support of
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and the
enthusiastic endorsement of geographic Combatant Commanders, according to one DOD official
who promoted the legislation.9
6 The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future:
Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness, Ambassador Thomas Boyatt, Project Chairman, October 2008, p. 22.
Hereafter referred to as A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future.
7 Special Operations Forces also train together with foreign troops under a DOD authority, Title 10 U.S.C. Section
2011, Special Operations Forces: training with friendly foreign forces. The primary purpose of the Joint Combined
Exchange Training program, conducted under this authority, is to provide training for the U.S. forces.
8 State Department programs under which foreign military forces are trained are the International Military Education
and Training (IMET) and the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) programs. Equipment is provided to foreign governments
through the State Department Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Financing (FMS/FMF) programs. According to
DOD, this “traditional security assistance takes three to four years from concept to execution,” while “Global Train and
Equip authority allows a response to emergent threats or opportunities in six months or less.” U.S. Department of
Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, February 4, 2008, p. 103. Hereafter referred to as
FY2009 DOD Summary Justification. In practice, however, the time frame for a Section 1206 response is sometimes
considerably longer than six months; see the section below on“Timeliness.”
9 Jeffrey (Jeb) Nadaner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations.
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At the same time, perspectives on the use of U.S. military forces to train foreign military forces
began to evolve. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has asserted that training foreign forces is a
military mission for U.S. general purpose forces.10
In early 2005, DOD requested, and Congress granted, Section 1206 as a special contingency
authority. Nevertheless, the armed services committees repeatedly expressed hesitation about
conceding this authority to DOD and cautioned that it was to be regarded as a pilot program. (See
the Appendix for a legislative history of Section 1206, FY2006-FY2009.)
In April 2008 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that still stands as the DOD
position on Section 1206, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described this authority as “a means
to fill longstanding gaps in an effort to help other nations build and sustain capable military forces
... ” Explaining DOD’s need to carry out such activities, Secretary Gates stated that after the
terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), “building partner capacity is a
vital and enduring military requirement” for DOD to fulfill its national security mission. The
“security of America’s partners is essential to America’s own security,” according to Gates, and
Section 1206 is a preventive tool through which the United States helps allies and partners to
“confront extremists and other potential sources of global instability within their borders ... before
festering problems and threats become crises requiring U.S. military intervention.” At the same
time, Secretary Gates dismissed the idea that Section 1206 duplicates or could be viewed as a
substitute for State Department Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs. (However, other
government personnel state that Section 1206 has been used as a substitute for FMF, especially in
the early years, given what many analysts believe is a shortage of FMF funds to meet legitimate
foreign defense equipment needs. See the section below entitled “Are Section 1206 Funds Being
Used Effectively?”)
The Obama Administration has opted to continue the program begun under the George W. Bush
Administration. According to the Administration’s FY2010 Budget Request Summary
Justification Document accompanying DOD’s May 2009 budget request, U.S. Combatant
Commanders consider this the Section 1206 program “the single most important tool for the
Department to shape the environment and counter terrorism.”11 According to that document, the
Section 1206 program is important because it allows the United States to train and equip foreign
military forces to respond to “urgent and emergent threats,” and because it “provides
opportunities to solve problems before they become crises....”12
10 See, for instance: Robert M. Gates. A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age. Foreign
Affairs, January/February 2009. In this article, Gates worries that the military personnel and promotions system is not
able “to reflect the importance of advising, training, and equipping foreign troops—something still not considered a
career-enhancing path for the best and brightest officers.”
11 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification, May 2009, pp. 1-13.
12 Ibid.
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Section 1206 In Action
Purpose, Scope, and Timeline of Current Activities
As noted above, Congress provided Section 1206 authority for two purposes. One is to enable
foreign military forces, as well as foreign maritime security forces, to perform counterterrorism
(CT) operations. The other is to enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support
military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating. Despite Section
1206’s dual purpose, as of FY2009, nearly all Section 1206 funding has been used to provide
counterterrorism equipment and related training. The types of equipment provided include radios
and communications systems; surveillance and reconnaissance systems; trucks, ambulances,
boats, and other vehicles; small arms and rifles; night vision goggles and sights; and clothing.
Through the use of FY2006 through FY2009 funds, Section 1206 has supported bilateral
programs in 24 countries and 13 multilateral programs. The multilateral programs include 2 to 15
countries. In addition, a DOD organization, the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies
(DIILS), has been provided funds for training foreign troops in human rights and respect for
civilian authority. The cost for bilateral and multilateral projects has ranged from $40,000 to
$30.6 million, with most between $1 million and $15 million. (See Table 1, below.)
Although a primary rationale for Section 1206 funding was that it would enable the U.S.
government to respond more quickly to emerging needs than possible under the FMF process, the
delivery of Section 1206 equipment has not always proved as expeditious as originally expected.
Although DOD stated in a FY2009 budget request document that Section 1206 authority “allows
a response to urgent and emergent threats or opportunities in six months or less,”13 the actual
delivery time for much equipment can be much longer. A January 2009 DOD letter to certain
Members of Congress states that “Section 1206 authority can provide training and equipment in
one to two years, or less.”14 State Department officials attribute the lag on some cases to multiple
causes, most importantly the shortage of readily-available equipment in many cases due to the
small number of U.S. producers. Some analysts also cite processing delays at the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) as a factor.15
Section 1206 Recipients
Just over 40% of the $986 million in allocated Section 1206 funds from FY2006 through FY2009
(as of October 13, 2009) has gone to three countries. Pakistan has been by far the largest
recipient, receiving $203.4 million or over 20% of total. It received almost twice as much as
Lebanon, the second largest recipient at $105.5 million. Yemen is the third largest recipient at
13 FY 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, p. 103.
14 A copy of the letter was provided by DOD, with the permission of a Congressional recipient. It is signed by the
former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric S Edelman, who occupied that post as of the date of the letter,
January 16, 2009. Hereafter referred to as OSD letter of January 16, 2009 responding to Members of Congress.
15 The DSCA is a defense agency (under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) that administers and implements a
wide variety of security assistance programs, including Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales,
International Military Education and Training, Excess Defense Articles, and drawdowns, as well as Section 1206. More
information on the DSCA is available at http://www.dsca.mil.
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$97.3 million. Pakistan and Lebanon have received Section 1206 funds in each of the program’s
four fiscal years. Yemen has received funds in three fiscal years.
For Pakistan, Section 1206 has provided equipment and training to increase the government’s
ability to counter terrorism threats emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA).
• A central feature has been helicopter support. In FY2006, Section 1206
assistance was first used to address spare part shortages that limited
availability from Pakistan’s “impressive inventory of helicopters.”16 These
funds provided spare parts for Mi-17 and Cobra helicopters, as well as aviation
body armor, night vision goggles, and limited visibility training for pilots.
FY2008 and FY2009 funds also have provided the means, technical support,
and training to repair, maintain, shelter, and operate Pakistan’s helicopters for
use in FATA operations. FY2009 funds supply four Mi-17 helicopters and
spare parts for use along Pakistan’s western border.
• Support to Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG), a special forces unit, to
operate more effectively in the FATA has included a variety of equipment in
FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009. Equipment contracted during those fiscal
years includes radios and other communications equipment, targeting systems,
sniper rifles, ammunition, night vision goggles, global positioning systems
units, lifesaver kits, body armor and other field gear. In FY2007 it included
training for conducting nighttime raids from helicopters (FY2007). In FY2008,
equipment was also provided to the Pakistan Army Aviation 21st reaction
squadron.
• Additional FY2009 aid includes support to build a ground-based intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capability for counterterrorism operations to
support Pakistan Army counterterrorism operations in the FATA, and kits to
assist the Pakistan Army and Navy effectively investigate improvised
explosive devises (IEDs) and other explosives used in terrorism operations.
For Lebanon, Section 1206 assistance first focused on helping the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
to bring order to southern Lebanon and secure the country’s northern border in the wake of the
July 2006 Israel strikes against Hizbullah in Lebanon. FY2006 assistance bought spare parts for
trucks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters. FY2007 assistance purchased trucks, secure
communications equipment, vehicles and helicopter spare parts, spare parts for guns, and soldier
equipment, including night vision goggles and body armor. FY2008 and FY2009 assistance has
focused on equipment for Lebanese special operations forces. FY2008 items include secure
communications equipment, as well as vehicles, night vision sights, Global Positioning System
(GPS) receivers, vehicles and ambulances, small arms, clothing, textiles, and individual
equipment. FY2009 Urban Solider Equipment items are intended to help Lebanese force conduct
CT operations in an urban environment. This package includes bulldozers, Humvee ambulances,
tactical armor vests, rifles, and night vision device rifle scopes. FY2009 funds are also supplying
four Cessna Caravan aircraft, as well as related spare parts and training.
16 CNA Corporation, Assessments of the Impact of 1206-Funded Projects in Selected Countries: Lebanon, Pakistan,
Yemen, Sao Tome and Principe, by Eric Thompson and Patricio Asfura-Heim, CRM D0017988.A4/1Rev. July 2008, p.
25, http://www.cna.org/documents/D0017988.A4.pdf. Hereafter referred to as CNA Corporation Assessments.
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For Yemen, Section 1206 assistance started in FY2006 with a relatively small package of
equipment (small arms and ammunition, computers, radios and their installation, and light tactical
vehicles) to aid the Yemeni Armed Forces in preventing cross-border arms trafficking.
Significantly more FY2007 funds were devoted to enhance Yemen’s border security CT
capability, with vehicles of various types (as well as maintenance training and support), spare
parts, crisis action center equipment, and transportation. Most Section 1206 assistance to Yemen
is being provided with FY2009 funds. This assistance includes not only trucks, radio systems
(with operation and maintenance training) and body armor to help the Yemeni Border Security
Force deter, detect, and detain terrorists along the Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Oman borders, but
also equipment for the Yemeni Coast Guard (patrol boats and accessories, and shipboard radios),
and for the Yemini Air Force (helicopter spare parts and surveillance cameras) to enhance CT
capability. FY2009 funds also will support Yemen’s Ministry of Defense with an explosive
ordnance disposal program.
About 20% of the FY2006-FY2009 funding has been allocated to bilateral programs in these four
countries: Indonesia ($57.4 million), Philippines ($55.1 million), Bahrain ($50.3 million), and
Malaysia ($43.9 million). Most of the Section 1206 funding to Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Malaysia focuses on controlling the Celebes Sea (also known as the Sulawesi Sea), which
provides a water border for all three countries, as well as the adjoining Molucca Sea and Sulu
Sea. Assistance to these countries has consisted of various coastal and maritime surveillance and
detection systems and items, communications systems and equipment, aircraft equipment and
training, and maritime interdiction packages. For Bahrain, Section 1206 focuses also on maritime
assistance, providing coastal patrol crafts and related equipment and upgrading Bahrain’s coastal
surveillance system, as well as building the Bahrain Navy’s special forces CT capability. Section
1206 assistance also helped to equip Bahrain’s Defense Force special operations personnel for
rapid deployment to rugged areas.
The remaining allocations, all under $32 million and comprising close to 40% of the total,
supported bilateral programs in 17 countries, 13 multilateral programs, and the DIILS program.
Most of these programs focus on controlling adjacent maritime waters and on securing land and
maritime borders. Some help military forces control their territories against terrorist threats.
About 10% of these allocations is equally divided between bilateral and multilateral programs in
Sub-Saharan Africa, much of it for surveillance and control of maritime and land borders.
Through FY2009, only a small part of Section 1206 allocations was provided to enhance the
ability of partner nations to contribute to stability operations. FY2007 funds provided stability
operations training and equipment to Kazakhstan and to a group of four countries (Albania,
Macedonia, Georgia, and Ukraine) to enable their current and future participation in NATO
and/or U.S. led stability operations.
Table 1, directly below, groups programs by magnitude of funding. For details, see Table 2,
below.
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Table 1. FY2006-FY2009 Section 1206 Funding Allocations by Magnitude
($ US millions, as of October 13, 2009)
Upper Middle
Top Tier
Tier
Lower Middle Tier
Bottom Tier
Pakistan: $203.4 Indonesia: $57.4
Kazakhstan: $31.8
Djibouti: $16.4
Lebanon: $105.5 Philippines: $55.1
Kenya: $25.9
Bangladesh: $15.7
Yemen: $97.3
Bahrain: $50.3
Ethiopia: $25.5
DR/Panama: $14.4
Malaysia: $43.9
Caribbean Basin I: $23.4
Mexico: $13.9
Kyrgyzstan: $21.2
Albania: $12.0
Tunisia: $18.6
Ukraine: $12.0
Sri Lanka: $18.2
Caribbean Basin II: $11.1
EARSI: $14.2
West Africa Maritime Capability: $10.9
Georgia: $18.0
West & Central Africa Maritime Equip: $9.8
Caribbean Basin CT unit: $9.3
South East Africa Maritime Security: $8.4
Nigeria and Sao Tome: $6.8
Chad and Nigeria: $6.2
Africa Maritime Awareness/ Territorial
Water Threat Response: $5.8
Mali: $5.1
TSCP Support: $3.4
Macedonia: $3.0
Nigeria: $2.3
DIILS: $ 2.1
Azerbaijan: $1.7
Chad: $1.7
Africa Intelligence Aid: $1.1
Source: Based on data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and compiled from more detailed
information provided in Table 2, below.
Notes: DR = Dominican Republic. Sao Tome = Sao Tome and Principe. EARSI = East Africa Regional Security
Initiative. TSCP = TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership.
Recipients in groups are as follows: 5 in Caribbean Basin I (Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and
Nicaragua); 4 in EARSI (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania); 4 in Caribbean Basin CT unit (Belize, Guyana,
Honduras, and Suriname); 5 in West and Central Africa Maritime Capability (Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal, Sierra
Leone); 6 in Caribbean Basin II (Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama); 8 in
West & Central Africa Maritime Equip (Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Togo); 15 in Africa Maritime Awareness/Response (Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of
the Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome
and Principe); 4 in TSCT Support (Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Senegal); and 8 in Africa Intelligence Aid
(Algeria, Niger, Chad, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Mali).
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Conditions on Section 1206 Programs
Section 1206 of the FY2006 NDAA requires that programs conducted under its authority observe
and respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the “legitimate civilian authority within that
country.” The authority may not be used to provide any type of assistance that is otherwise
prohibited by any provision of law. It also may not be used to provide assistance to any country
that is otherwise prohibited from receiving such assistance under any other provision of law. The
legislation also requires a 15-day advance notification to the congressional defense, foreign
affairs, and appropriations committees before initiating each program. This notification must
specify, among other things, the program country, budget, and completion date, as well as the
source and planned expenditure of funds.
Joint DOD-State Department Selection and Approval Process17
Section 1206 programs are developed and selected under a “dual-key” process that culminates
with the signature of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. As modified by the
FY2007 John Warner NDAA, Section 1206 authority permits the Secretary of Defense to provide
Section 1206 support with the “concurrence” of the Secretary of State. According to DOD and
State Department officials, that term has been interpreted to mean the Secretary of State’s
approval. Section 1206 also requires both secretaries to jointly formulate any program and
coordinate in its implementation. Coordination for the first year programs in FY2006 was
reported to be spotty,18 but since then DOD and the State Department agencies have developed an
extensive joint review process.
Early in the fiscal year, the DOD Joint Staff and the State Department’s Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs (PM) kick off the process with a call for proposals issued with identical guidance.
Most recommendations originate at the field level, where geographic Combatant Commands
(COCOMs) and U.S. embassy country teams jointly formulate proposals, although the degree of
collaboration may vary. For proposals originated by the military, the COCOM forwards the
proposal to Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For proposals originated in
State Department channels, the Embassy forwards it to the State Department. The relevant
Ambassador and Combatant Commander each must personally sign off on a proposal.
At the Pentagon and the State Department, staff conduct an extensive review process to prioritize
the many proposals (they have numbered in the hundreds in recent years). The OSD Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Capabilities and Counterterrorim19
takes the DOD lead. It coordinates reviews for feasibility, political-military considerations, and
legal status with OSD and Joint Staff regional and functional offices. At the State Department, the
17 A joint report by the DOD and State Department Inspectors General dedicates Chapter 2 to the approval process and
recommends several changes intended to strengthen and formalize the process. Inspectors General U.S. Department of
Defense and U.S. Department of State, Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program,
Department of Defense and Department of State, Department of Defense Report No. IE-2009-007 and Department of
State Report No. ISP-I-09-69, August 31, 2009, pp. 9-15, http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/129491.pdf.
Hereafter referred to as Inspectors General Report.
18 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Section 1206 Security Assistance Program—Findings on Criteria,
Coordination, and Implementation, GAO-07-416R, February 28, 2007. See p. 3.
19 This office is located under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and International Cooperation (SO/LIC&IC).
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Bureau for Political-Military affairs consults with the Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism (S/CT), the regional bureaus, and the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign
Assistance (F), and then forwards proposals to the State Department legal and Congressional
liaison offices for vetting. The offices of the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and of State may also
indicate their priorities. Selection criteria include the urgency of the threat, the ability of the host
nation to address that threat from its own resources, the ability of the host nation to sustain the
capability, either from its own resources or through FMF funding, and the risks of inaction.20
Once prioritized within each agency, the DOD and State lead offices convene a joint DOD-State
review board to select those proposals that will be recommended to the Secretaries. Either
Secretary can veto a project.
Once program memoranda are signed by both secretaries, DOD sends Congressional notifications
to the armed services, foreign affairs, and appropriations committees. No funds can be obligated
until 15 days after these committees are notified and given the opportunity to review the projects.
A DOD document described this joint review process in 2008 as the “gold standard” for
interagency planning and cooperation.21 Nonetheless, some participants have described their
experiences with the process as competitive and time-consuming, absorbing staff hours that are
needed for other priorities. Some have expressed frustration that considerable time can be spent
developing projects that are not approved. (Hundreds more proposals have been developed than
approved, according to some participants.) Some participants state that the process has improved
as those involved in developing projects get a better of understanding of the intended purposes of
Section 1206 and do not offer inappropriate projects. A recent Senate Foreign Relations
Committee report recommends that the Combatant Commands, after consultation with the State
Department, should appraise Embassy staff whether a project is likely to be approved before
Embassy staff invest too much time in developing it.22
Funding Provisions and Obligations
Section 1206 programs are funded from the DOD operations and maintenance (O&M) account.
During the first two years of the program, DOD transferred funds from lower-priority missions to
fund activities under Section 1206, according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Policy
(OSD/P). Since then, Congress has appropriated funds under the defense-wide O&M account.
The current authorized limit for Section 1206 spending is $350 million.
As of October 13, 2009, Section 1206 allocations total a bit under $1 billion for FY2006 through
FY2009. Section 1206 allocations totaled some $100 million for FY2006, $274 million for
FY2007, $272 million for FY2008, and $340 million for FY2009. (See Table 2 below.) The
20 Author’s interviews with Department of State officials, September 2009, and e-mail exchanges with DOD and State
Department officials, October and November 2009.
21 FY2009 DOD Summary Justification, p. 103.
22 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Following the Money in Yemen and Lebanon: Maximizing
the Effectiveness of U.S. Security Assistance and International Financial Institution Lending, committee print, 111th
Cong., 1st sess., January 5, 2010, S. Prt. 111-38 (Washington: GPO, 2010), pp. 13 and 24. Hereafter cited as Following
the Money.
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amounts allocated are somewhat less than the amounts notified to Congress, which totaled over
$1 billion for FY2006-FY2009.
For FY2010, the DOD Appropriations Act as signed into law on December 19, 2009, (P.L. 111-
118), contains about $345 million for Section 1206 Global Train and Equip programs. In
authorizing legislation,23 Congress put in place a temporary $75 million limit for FY2010 and
FY2011 on Section 1206 funds used to train military troops of coalition partners to participate in
or support military and stability operations (NDAA for FY2011, P.L. 111-84, signed into law
October 28, 2009). Planning and consultations for FY2010 obligations are underway.
FY2011 Administration Request
The Obama Administration’s DOD appropriations request for FY2011 will be about $490 million,
according to a DOD budget document estimate.24 An appropriation of this amount would require
an increase in the authorized amount.
Issues for Congress
Congress established Section 1206 as a flexible funding mechanism in order to provide the U.S.
government with a means to respond rapidly to emerging (and some would say urgent) threats to
U.S. security, and in particular the security of U.S. military forces that would pose too great a risk
if left unattended. Established as a “pilot program,” Section 1206 authority is subject to
continuous Congressional scrutiny. Issues range from the broad question of whether DOD should
retain its own T&E authority, and whether it should be expanded or limited, to questions
concerning Section 1206’s utility and whether it should be reconsidered in the context of broader
security assistance reform.
Should DOD Retain Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority?
Because Congress has bestowed responsibility on the Secretary of State for the oversight of all
foreign assistance, including military education and training programs, and for ensuring foreign
policy coherence,25 many analysts argue that Section 1206 authority should be transferred to the
Department of State, perhaps as a subset of FMF authority. On the other hand, those who believe
23According to a 2010 DOD document, the amount appropriated for Section 1206 FY2010 obligations was $344.18
million. Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates: Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA), February 2010, p. 435.
24 Ibid.
25 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), Section 622(c)(22 U.S.C. 2382), states that the Secretary of
State, under the direction of the President, “shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of
economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to
determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training
program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and
abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.” The Armed Export Control Act, which as of
1968 authorizes the FMS/FMF program, similarly mandates that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the
President, be responsible for “the continuous supervision and general direction of sales, leases, financing, cooperative
projects, and exports under this chapter... .” (P.L. 90-629, as amended, Chapter 1, Section 2(b), 22 U.S.C. 2752).
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DOD should retain Section 1206 authority, and even that Congress should make it a permanent
DOD authority under Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code, argue that Section 1206 serves
very different purposes than FMF or Title 22 (Foreign Assistance) military education and training.
Those who believe DOD should retain Section 1206 authority emphasize its perceived
importance as a military tool, as explained above, and differentiate the general purposes of
Section 1206 and FMF. Over the past four years, defense and military officials, including
geographic combatant commanders, have come to regard Section 1206 funding as vital to the
U.S. defense efforts.26 The January 2009 letter from the Under Secretary of Defense to Members
of Congress (cited above) states that Section 1206 funds meet the military needs determined by
the geographic Combatant Commanders “for tools to build capable, reliable, and interoperable
partners as they prepare for—and seek to minimize the necessity for—military missions in the
AORs [Areas of Responsibility].” Section 1206, according to the letter, is a flexible, strategic tool
“to meet urgent and emergent threats and opportunities to build partner capacity... [and] ... to
address critical counterterrorism needs as defined by the U.S. Government.”
In contrast, the DOD letter presents FMF as a political tool “critical ... for executing our foreign
policy” and “key to improving bilateral relationships, encouraging behavior in the U.S. interest,
increasing access and influence, and building capacity where host-nation and U.S. interests
align.” While Section 1206 responds to needs identified by the U.S. government, FMF is often
used to meet the security needs of foreign countries as perceived by their governments. “Because
many countries rely on FMF as a major resource for their military procurement budgets,” FMF
allocations are “affected by host-nation preferences and political engagement,” the letter states.
One indicator of differing uses of Section 1206 and FMF assistance may be the relative size of
funds spent in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region whose insecure borders and ungoverned spaces
present, many argue, an ideal habitat for terrorist groups and thus a threat to U.S. military forces
and U.S. national security. Estimated FY2009 FMF obligations in Africa are less than 2% of total
obligations ($8.3 million compared to $4.6 billion overall). Section 1206 allocations for Africa
are relatively greater, representing some 14% of total FY2009 allocations ($48.7 million of
$339.9 million as of October 13, 2009.
In the letter, DOD denies that Section 1206 programs are “as some have claimed, programs
historically conducted by the State Department....” The United States “has not conducted
programs like this before.”
On the other hand, critics of Section 1206 deny any significant distinction between Section 1206
and State Department train and equip authorities, and some frequently cite it as one of a number
of programs that signal the “militarization” of U.S. foreign assistance,27 which is perceived as
detrimental to U.S. relations with foreign governments and damaging to the U.S. image with
foreign populations. Advocates of placing Section 1206 under the State Department’s authority
and budget see an inevitable difference of perspective between a military commander and those
vested with authority for foreign policy. A military commander, they argue, rightfully focuses on
the objectives of the current mission, without necessarily taking into account the long-term
26 According to a DOD document, the “geographic Combatant Commanders consider global train and equip authority
the Department’s single most important tool for building partner operational capacity, shaping the environment, and
countering terrorism outside Iraq and Afghanistan.” FY2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, p. 102.
27 I.e., Congress’ grant to DOD of several new or expanded DOD authorities and funding accounts such as the Regional
Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP),
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implications for foreign relations. Providing DOD with authority and funding for Section 1206
and other foreign assistance-type activities outside of active combat zones gives DOD undue
influence over shaping and conducting foreign relations and U.S. diplomacy, which are the
responsibility of the Ambassador and the State Department, proponents argue. Some also state
that DOD Section 1206 authority “weakens congressional oversight, including human rights
protections.”28
Several foreign policy research institutions have advocated placing Section 1206 programs under
State Department authority and the oversight of the Secretary of State.
• The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center argue
that “the Secretary of State has and should have responsibility for assuring that
all foreign and security assistance is carried out in accord with U.S. foreign
policy, including setting overall policy, approving countries to receive
assistance, and setting the budget for such assistance.”29 The authors of this
report, drawing on a panel comprised of former Ambassadors and other State
Department personnel, stated that to do otherwise would undermine the
Secretary of State’s responsibility for the “fundamental direction of U.S.
foreign policy.”30
• The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Task Force on
Nontraditional Security Assistance, while recognizing Section 1206’s
importance to DOD, nevertheless voiced concern that Section 1206 “has the
potential to impinge on State Department leadership in U.S. foreign policy and
the authorities given the secretary of state under the Foreign Assistance Act
(FAA).”31
• A Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) report expresses concrete
concerns regarding coherence, transparency, and fiscal discipline. Authors
Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams argue that authority for Section 1206 (as
well as for other security assistance programs) should be vested in the State
Department “in order to ensure that security assistance does not drive or
conflict with overall U.S. international engagement.”32 They view Section
1206 and other recent security assistance authorities as generally parallel to or
duplicating State Department’s traditional security assistance programs.33 “The
28 Adam Isacson, The Pentagon’s military aid role grows, on the Just the Facts website http://justf.org/blog, January 26,
2010.
29 A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, p. 23.
30 A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, p. 12.
31 Representative Robert Andrews and Representative Mark Kirk, co-chairs, Integrating 21st Century Development and
Security Assistance: Final Report of the Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, January 2008, p. 7. (On the same page, the report further notes: “A number of legislators on
Capitol Hill have expressed fear that Section 1206 could undermine the coherence of U.S. foreign policy, by allowing
combatant commanders to assist foreign security forces without taking account of broader U.S. considerations at stake
in bilateral and regional relationships.”) Hereafter referred to as Integrating 21st Century Development and Security
Assistance.
32 Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource
Allocation, MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 2008, p. 21.
Hereafter referred to as Strengthening Statecraft and Security.
33 Other DOD security assistance authorities specifically discussed in this report are Coalition Support Funds, CERP,
and CTFP.
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risks in this parallel system of authorities and programs are that security
assistance becomes more complex and confusing, that it is disconnected from
overall, long-term U.S. diplomacy and national security strategy, and that
money is wasted through overlapping, uncoordinated, or conflicting efforts,”
they wrote.34
Despite this widespread perception, some may argue that there may be ways in which DOD-
controlled Section 1206 assistance can benefit U.S. interests. For instance, recipients may
perceive DOD assistance as representing a serious, enduring U.S. security interest in that country,
facilitating military-to-military contacts.
Are Section 1206 Funds Being Used Appropriately?
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that Section 1206 funds are being used in
some countries for programs that would be funded more appropriately under FMF. An August
2009 report by the DOD and State Department Inspectors General that reviewed programs in
eight countries carried out with FY2006 funds stated that “the Defense and State Departments
have conducted the Section 1206 program in compliance with the law.”35 Member concerns seem
to center on other countries and a longer timeframe, however.
Member concerns were reflected in a Members’ letter to Secretary Gates in October 2008. In that
letter, the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs
committees expressed concern that the DOD and the State Department were requesting funds for
projects that did not fit within Section 1206’s stated purposes.36 They also expressed concern that
some Section 1206 programs seemed to address general foreign policy and security concerns,
rather than an identifiable link to a transnational terrorist movement or threat to the United States
as required for Section 1206 funding.
In some cases, these Members stated that Section 1206 proposals appeared identical to FMF
programs or substitutes for FMF where a country did not want to use FMF funds. The letter
pointed specifically to Pakistan in this regard, stating that the helicopter maintenance provided by
Section 1206 could not be considered an emerging need because the Pakistani government had
requested such assistance in 2005. The letter also pointed to the provision of certain equipment to
Kazakhstan as failing to meet “an identifiable terrorist threat,” and noted that Indonesia had
communicated that it would not use radar systems provided through Section 1206 primarily for
CT purposes.
To clarify accepted purposes for Section 1206 funding and prioritize the requests that DOD
presented to Congress, the Members requested that DOD provide “greater clarification as to the
threshold test for the ‘emerging threats’ concept.... Absent sufficient metrics to evaluate an
emerging threat, the 1206 program remains just as susceptible as FMF to be used as a political
34Strengthening Statecraft and Security, p. 70.
35 The countries are reviewed were Dominican Republic, Georgia, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Panama, Sao Tome
and Principe, and Sri Lanka. Inspectors General Report, p. ii (quotation)..
36 Addressed to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, the letter was dated October 8, 2008, and signed by
Representatives Howard L. Berman, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (HFAC), Ike Skelton,
Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services (HASC), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, HFAC ranking member, and
Duncan Hunter, HASC ranking member.
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tool with foreign countries, not as a strategic tool to address critical U.S. counterterrorism needs.”
The Members stated that they believed Section 1206 “should be provided in cases where there is
more than just a potential terrorist threat....”
As noted earlier, the outgoing Bush Administration responded to the Members with a three and
one-half page defense of the program in a letter from the Under Secretary of Defense. In that
letter, DOD not only differentiated between Section 1206’s military and strategic purposes and
FMF’s political purposes (as discussed in the section above), but also stated that Section 1206
funds “can play a useful role in addressing security concerns before they develop into acute
threats, and thereby mitigate the need for future U.S. military intervention.” 37
The letter did not specify criteria for a “threshold test” that would define and identify an emerging
threat. It did, however, explain in general terms the basis on which Section 1206 programs are
chosen. In addition to Section 1206 emphasis on strategic purposes (as discussed above), the
letter states that the authority is used “proactively” to take the early steps necessary to counteract
negative trends to forestall crises.
The letter also discusses the parameters within which Section 1206 funds are used. “There has
been no attempt to ensure that all regions are provided assistance under this authority—or that all
elements of a foreign military are provided with equipment,” according to the letter. “To the
contrary, Section 1206 programs are targeted at countries—and particularly military units within
countries—where focused training and equipment will have the most significant impact in
achieving the objectives of the Section 1206 authority.” Programs are chosen “not only based on
current threats, but also on the gap between these threats and partners’ capacity to prevent or deter
them, and the likelihood that this gap will grow without U.S. military support.”
Addressing the Members’ concerns about Section 1206 aid to Pakistan, the letter describes
Section 1206 support for Pakistan’s helicopter fleets as meeting U.S. military needs by supporting
“security operations in Pakistan’s border region that are critical to the United States [emphasis in
the original] for success in Afghanistan.” There is a separate five-year FMF with Pakistan that
serves a different purpose: it was designed “to build our bilateral relationship and assist Pakistan
as it procures the capabilities it sees as important for its own defense,” according to the letter.
Some analysts have questioned whether the purposes for which FMF and Section 1206 can be
used are as different as described by DOD. Some also wonder whether items provided under
Section 1206 assistance could not just as well be provided through FMF, a State Department fund,
if that pot of money were increased.
Are Section 1206 Funds Being Used Effectively?
With the Section 1206 program in its fourth year, some policymakers and analysts have begun to
question whether the program is effective. Some are troubled by the lack of criteria for
determining the effects of Section 1206 programs.
37 OSD letter of January 16, 2009, responding to Members of Congress. op. cit. Moreover, the letter notes that
Secretary of State Gates “has argued consistently for increased funding for Title 22 programs—including FMF—
because our diplomats need additional resources to advance U.S. interests.”
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A July 2008 assessment of Section 1206 assistance to four countries was generally positive, citing
improvements in operational capacity, greater information-sharing and cooperation, and troop
morale, but also noting one country’s lack of capacity to investigate warnings produced by
sensors and another’s inability to identify known or suspected terrorists.38 Likewise, an August
2009 joint report by the DOD and State Department inspectors general found the projects that it
examined in eight countries (all conducted with FY2006 funds, as noted above) to be “effective in
building partner nation capacity for counterterrorist and military or stability operations and helped
those nations increase control over their borders and ungoverned spaces and counter terrorism.”39
Nevertheless, this same report recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
together with Joint Staff and Combatant Commands “should develop metrics of effectiveness for
building Section 1206 partnership capacity and establish clearly defined outputs and outcomes.”40
Some proponents note that establishing the outcomes of programs that are essentially preventive
in nature is impossible, not unlike trying to prove a negative. Some, however, suggest that a
possible indicator of utility would be an estimate of the cost to the U.S. military of compensating
for the lack of the capability provided under Section 1206 or of carrying out that function itself.
Two issues related to effectiveness are whether Section 1206 programs can be sustained and
whether they can be carried out in a timely manner.
Sustainability
For Section 1206 CT programs to be effective, most believe that they must be sustained over the
long-run. Some policymakers are concerned that recipient countries will not continue to fund
Section 1206 programs when Section 1206 funding ends. (Because Section 1206 authority
established to meet immediate needs, Section 1206 must cease when a threat is no longer
“emerging,” however that may be defined.) The HFAC-HASC letter of October 2008 stated that
DOD and the State Department had not provided sufficient information on how recipient
countries would sustain Section 1206-provided equipment. “We understand the Departments’ plan
to use FMF (or encourage a recipient country to use national funds) for this purpose, but this
approach simply defers resource shortcomings by a few years.” According to DOD’s January
2009 letter, DOD and the State Department have determined that “Section 1206 authority could
be used to begin critical programs, after which we would work with host nations to identify
national funds or, failing that, include sustainment requirements in FMF requests.” The ability of
recipient governments to sustain programs is taken into account in program planning, and at times
programs have been cut back to ensure a recipient government could sustain the program,
according to the letter. In addition, Section 1206 programs all provide “two-year spare parts
packages and training to operate and sustain equipment, including train-the-trainer support.” This
is intended to minimize future costs.
Some analysts question whether the U.S. government can be adequately assured that a program
will be sustained unless, in the planning stages, the host nation government expressly agrees to
the program and promises to sustain it. The 2009 joint State Department and DOD Inspectors
38 CNA Corporation Assessments. The countries are Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, and Sao Tome and Principe. The study
was conducted in response to a request from the OSD Global Security Affairs Office. The report noted that in some
cases it relied on secondary source reporting. See the Executive Summary, pp. 1-4.
39 Inspectors General Report, p.iii.
40 Inspectors General Report, p. iv, Recommendation 9.
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General report recommends that, during the planning process, host nation governments commit to
a program and demonstrate the capability to sustain it.41
Timeliness
A major rationale for establishing Section 1206 authority was to provide an antidote to the long
lead time required by FMF to supply equipment. As mentioned in a section above, some Section
1206 deliveries are taking longer than originally anticipated. The August 2009 joint report of the
DOD and State Department Inspectors General indicates a 6- to 18-month timeline for delivery of
Section 1206 equipment and supplies provided through FY2006 funds and stated that DSCA
agency actions are needed to reduce procurement and shipping delay to respond more quickly to
actual or emerging terrorist threats, and to ensure all approved case funds are obligated before
funding authorization expires.42
State Department officials attribute lags, where they occur, to multiple causes, most importantly
the shortage of readily-available equipment due to the small number of U.S. producers. They also
cite processing delays at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), attributed to an
insufficient number of staff to handle the agency’s workload and time-consuming procedures, as a
factor. Some analysts point out that these same factors affect deliveries of FMF-provided
equipment.
The DOD and State Department Inspectors General report, cited above, indicates that consistent
information on Section 1206 expenditures and deliveries is not available to U.S. Embassy country
team members. As a result, the report recommends that DOD develop a periodic report to track
actual obligations and expenditures of funds and other data.43 Similarly, a January 2010 Senate
Foreign Relations Committee report recommends that the Administration “develop a centralized
information management system, with appropriate checks and balances for accuracy, to
accurately track the status of all Section 1206 assistance.”44
Should Congress Provide the State Department and DOD with
Overlapping Section 1206-type Authorities?
As discussed in the Appendix below, Section 841 of the House version of the foreign relations
authorization bill for FY2010 and FY2011 (H.R. 2410, H.Rept. 111-136) would create a new
“Security Assistance Contingency Fund” for the State Department with purposes that would
overlap with Section 1206 (i.e., for counterterrorism programs and for training foreign military
and other security forces for participating in operations with U.S. forces). The bill would provide
41 Inspectors General Report, p. iii (Recommendation 1) and p. iv (Recommendation 8). Recommendation 1 suggests
that DOD and the State Department revise the Section 1206 proposal submission template to require a statement
describing the actual or potential terrorist threat in detail, as well as the “bilateral consultation and coordination process
for formulating the proposal” and the “partner nation’s commitment and capability to sustain project implementation.”
Recommendation 8 states that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “in coordination with the Director of the Joint
Staff and Department of State’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs, should direct Security Cooperation Officers to
work with partner nations to develop a full Concept of Operations by the final approval of the project.”
42 Inspectors General Report, pp. ii and iv (Recommendation 3).
43 Inspectors General Report, p. iv (Recommendation 4), and pp. 21-23.
44 Follow the Money, p. 21.
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$50 million in each FY2010 and FY2011, half by authorizing new appropriations and half by
authorizing the use of FMF funds for these purposes.
There is no indication in the bill’s report language that it is intended to replace Section 1206. As
drafted, it seems designed as a complementary measure. The accompanying House Foreign
Affairs Committee report states merely that the “authority is necessary for the Department of
State to start stepping up to the responsibility to provide assistance to train and equip foreign
military forces to support U.S. security operations and to better engage in counter-terror
operations.” (H.Rept. 111-136)
Some policymakers may regard such a contingency fund as a means to provide the State
Department with funds for activities that it may regard as a higher priority than does DOD or the
armed services committees. For instance, the State Department is interested in providing
resources to train troops to participate in U.S. stability operations as a means to cultivate foreign
relations.45 This has not been a priority for DOD, and the Senate Armed Services Committee
version of the FY2010 NDAA would cap funding for such purposes at $75 million. In addition,
some policymakers may view Section 841 as a means to provide the State Department with
resources to provide follow-up to counterterrorism activities begun under Section 1206, rather
than using FMF funds for that purpose.
However, some might question whether Section 841 would provide sufficient advantage over the
existing FMF funding mechanism to justify creating a new authority. As Section 841 would not
require consultation with DOD on the use of the funds, this authority may somewhat expedite
decisionmaking within the State Department on counterterrorism funding. The amount of time
that could be saved over the current three-year timeline for FMF funding decisions might well
depend on the procedures developed by the State Department to process such funding, including
coordination with DOD, and on possible reforms to the DSCA. Another factor would be whether
Congress was willing to consider such funds in a expedited manner through Congressional
committees, as it does for Section 1206 funding, rather than as part of the annual budget request
as it does with FMF funding.
For some policymakers and analysts, Section 841 might fall far short of the ample reform that
some advocate to address what they perceive as a serious imbalance between DOD and State
Department resources and authorities, including in the security assistance area.46 Some Members
may not wish to create yet another flexible funding mechanism that puts funds beyond the
oversight of Congress as a whole, although as Section 1206 specified congressional committees
would exercise oversight before the State Department could obligate funds.47 (Section 841 would
45 Author’s interview with State Department officials, September 2009.
46 Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance. This report suggests an alternative to Section 1206
would “simply be to build a larger State Department budget with increased and more flexible counterterrorism funding.
In principle, there is no reason that the administration could not propose—and Congress fund—a contingency fund
within the FMF account to respond rapidly to unforeseen contingencies by training security forces in counterterrorism
and stability operations.” (p. 11) It specifically recommends “the gradual phasing out of Section 1206 authority with
the creation of a substantial, flexible contingency fund (notionally within FMF) to support current 1206 programs.” (p.
39)
47 Congress in general has resisted providing the executive branch with “blank checks” by creating contingency
accounts. One often cited example is the standing Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) emergency
relief account, funded through foreign operations appropriations. This account is drawn on in urgent situations and is
replenished automatically as needed. In establishing Section 1206 years later, Congress built in a higher level of
Congressional review by requiring notification to specified committees.
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require that the State Department notify the two foreign affairs committees and the two foreign
operations appropriations subcommittees 15 days before obligation funds.)
Should Congress Broaden Section 1206 Authority to Include T&E
for Security Forces?
For several years, DOD has argued for authority to train and equip a variety of counterterrorism
security forces outside the military structure. DOD’s original proposal included “armies, guard,
border security, civil defense, infrastructure protection, and police forces,” but the initial Section
1206 legislation restricted the use of funds to military forces. Subsequent requests by DOD (in
2007 and 2008) proposed expanding Section 1206 authority to include other security forces.
DOD’s FY2009 NDAA proposal requested that a wide range of police and security forces be
included, specifically gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil
defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces. In 2008,
Congress amended Section 1206 authority to include only non-military maritime security forces,
such as coast guards,48 a category not named in the DOD request.
Because foreign counterterrorism units sometimes are configured as civilian forces under foreign
Ministries of the Interior rather than as military forces, some analysts argue that the lack of
authority to train and equip foreign security forces impedes the United States’ ability to build
foreign capacity for counterterrorism. In January 2008, the final report of the Task Force on
Nontraditional Security Assistance at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
recommended the expansion of 1206 authority to include non-military security forces because of
“the operational necessity of working with foreign security forces to advance key
counterterrorism objects....”49
However, some analysts argue that Congress should reserve funding for civilian security force
training to the State Department. Some argue that there are fundamental differences in training
civilian and military personnel and U.S. military forces are suited solely for training the latter.
Some stress that the use of U.S. military forces to train civilian police and other security forces
conveys an undesirable blurring of police and military roles and functions, and puts a military
face on U.S. assistance in a sensitive area, undermining the concept that civilians should be in the
lead on internal security affairs.
Should Congress Consider Broader Security Assistance Reform?
Discussion about Section 1206 often takes place in the context of a perceived need for broad
security assistance reform. Section 1206 represents a significant part of the security assistance
package, but many analysts are concerned with the problems involving the whole gamut of
security assistance programs under both State Department and DOD authorities.50 Indeed, some
relate the establishment of Section 1206, as well as perceived problems with it, to problems
48 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, P.L. 110-417, Section 1206.
49 Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, p. 10.
50 According to the report by the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, one of “the most
striking trends during the past two decades has been the growing role of the Defense Department in providing foreign
assistance under its own statutory authorities.....by the end of the 1990s ... DOD was directly managing 15 security
assistance programs accounting for well over $1 billion annually.” A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, p. 22.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
experienced with traditional State Department authorities: “The current [State Department]
mechanisms, some of which reflect statutory requirements, are antiquated and slow to respond to
changing security threats, one of the explanations for DOD’s expanded assistance portfolio in
recent years,” according to one report.51 Some analysts question whether Section 1206 authority
would be needed at all if the systems carrying out traditional security assistance authorities were
provided sufficient funds and personnel, and were reorganized to operate more efficiently.
Several recent reports have reviewed current security assistance programs, authorities, and
resources, and recommended substantial reform. The MIT report mentioned in a section above
advocates the creation of “a new architecture that is agile, flexible and adequately funded to deal
with the new security challenges” and that “can and should make ample use of DOD’s
capabilities....”52 Specific recommendations call for changes that would improve strategic
planning, policy coherence, interagency coordination, budgeting procedures, transparency, and
discipline, and Congressional oversight. Among their suggestions where Congress has a direct
role are the following:53
• Restructure security assistance authorities by grouping State Department and
DOD authorities to create new programs.
• Expand contingency authority for all security assistance, and provide multiyear
funding in order to provide the State Department and DOD with broader
discretion to reallocate and target funds as requirements change.
• Consolidate security assistance budgets, with the executive branch agencies
presenting a single, multiagency, security assistance budget. (Some would
emphasize the need for a single counterterrorism budget.)54
• Undertake reforms within the State Department to “right-size” the Bureau of
Political Military (PM) Affairs, as well as the Office of the Director of Foreign
Assistance, to enable the State Department to oversee budgeting for security
assistance programs.55
• Review the DSCA structure and processes to “to right-size its bureaucracy and
reduce inflexibility.”56
51 A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, p. 23.
52 Strengthening Statecraft and Security, p. 71. This recommendation would place the new architecture under State
Department authority, however.
53 This section draws principally on specific recommendations made in three reports: Strengthening Statecraft and
Security, A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, and Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance,
although other reports may have similar proposals. Related proposals are contained in Beyond Assistance: The HELP
Commission Report on Foreign Assistance Reform, December, 2007, and Project on National Security Reform,
Forging a New Shield, November 2008, as well as other publications.
54 See Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, p. 38, which recommends that “DOD, State and
USAID present relevant Congressional committees with a joint CT security assistance budget as part of a broader effort
to require executive branch transparency on how State, USAID, and DOD budgets fit together.” (p. 38)
55 Strengthening Statecraft and Security, p. 73. In A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, the American Academy of
Diplomacy and the Stimson Center also express concerned about State Department staffing levels for security
assistance, in particular the number of foreign service personnel who specialize in political-military affairs. (p. 23)
56 Strengthening Statecraft and Security suggests creating three new programs: (1) a more flexible train and equip
program combining FMF, Section 1206, and the State Department’s peacekeeping account (PKO); (2) a more coherent
foreign military education program by combining IMET and the DOD Counterterrorism Fellowship Program; and (3) a
revamped support program combining the coalition support and the economic support (CSF and ESF) funds. It also
(continued...)
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
• Consider joint Congressional hearings on security assistance programs,
involving both defense and foreign policy authorization and appropriations
committees.57
Recommendations for systemic reforms that are largely within the purview of the executive
branch include:
• Provide White House oversight of security assistance by establishing a
permanent interagency group under the National Security Council (NSC);58
and
• Provide for stronger State/DOD joint strategic planning and coordination at the
regional level.
Table 2. Section 1206 Funding: FY2006-FY2009 Allocations
(as of October 13, 2009)
($ U.S. millions)
Recipient(s)
Program
FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 Totals
General Human Rights/Respect for Civilian Authority (HR/RCA) Training
Recipients unspecified.
Funding to Defense Institute
— — 0.6 —
of International Legal
Studies to conduct training.
HR/ RCA)Training
Follow-on to FY2008
Recipients and trainer(s)
HR/RCA training for 35
— — — 1.2
unspecified.
countries
Bangladesh, Guyana,
Kyrgyzstan, Suriname,
Indonesia are named
Follow-on to FY2008
— — — 0.3
recipients. Trainer(s)
HR/RCA training. (Notified
unspecified.
Amount)
Total HR/RCA Training
0 0 0.6 1.5 2.1
(...continued)
suggests redistributing responsibility for activities carried out under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program
(CERP) and other DOD ‘foreign assistance” programs, assigning responsibility for longer-term governance and
development programs to the State Department and USAID, and reserving to DOD responsibility for shorter-term,
urgent projects closely related to combat needs or to operations in insecure areas. (p.74)
57 Strengthening Statecraft and Security, p. 75.
58 Strengthening Statecraft and Security recommends that this group be co-chaired by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) in order to ensure “the integration of security assistance policies and programs into the broader national
security strategy,” to resolve “policy and program disagreements between the Departments of State and Defense,” and
to provide “overarching policy guidance to improve consistency with overall national security strategy... .” (pp. 72-73).
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Recipient(s)
Program
FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 Totals
AFRICA
Chad Tactical
Airlift
Capacity
Training
— 1.7 — —
1.7
Djibouti
Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA), Response,
Interdiction, and Coastal
— 8.0 — —
Security Enhancement
16.4
Counterterrorist (CT)
Communications Package
— — 5.1 —
CT
Capabilities
Package
— — — 3.3
Ethiopia
CT Communications and
Combat Engineering
— —
13.3 —
Capability
Night Vision Capability
25.5
Package
— — 1.9 —
Regiment and Platoon CT
Initiative
— — —
10.3
Kenya
Border
Security
Initiative
— — 4.1 —
Border and Coastal Security
25.9
Enhancement
— — 6.6 —
Maritime
Security
Initiative
— — —
15.2
Mali
Light infantry Equipment for
CT (Redirected FY2007
Mauritania aid and additional
4.5
0.6
5.1
storage and transportation
costs charged in FY2009.)
Nigeria
CT Capacity Building for
Military Forces
— — — 1.5
Light infantry Vehicles,
Communications Equipment,
2.3
and other equipment
— — — 0.8
(Equipment redirected from
Chad FY2007 program.)
Tunisia
Suppressing Trans-Border
Terrorist Activity
— —
10.0 —
Intelligence, Surveillance and
18.6
Reconnaissance Capability to
— — — 8.6
secure borders.
Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria
Civil-Military Operations
and Senegal
Training in Support of the
— 3.4 — —
3.4
TransSahara CT Program
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya,
East Africa Regional Security
Tanzania
Initiative
—
14.2 — —
14.2
Nigeria and Sao Tome and
Gulf of Guinea Regional
Principe
Maritime Awareness
6.8 — — —
6.8
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Recipient(s)
Program
FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 Totals
Capability Aid
Chad and Nigeria
Multinational Information-
sharing Network Aid
6.2 — — —
6.2
Algeria, Chad, Mali,
Partner Nation Intelligence
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger
Capability Aid
— 1.1 — —
1.1
and Senegal
Algeria, Benin, Cameroon,
MDA and Territorial Water
Cape Verde, Republic of the Threat Response Capability
Congo, Gabon, Ghana,
Establishment
Gambia, Guinea, Liberia,
— 5.8 — —
5.8
Morocco, Mozambique,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, and
Sao Tome and Principe
Benin, Cameroon, Cape
West and Central Africa
Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Sao
Maritime Equipment Package
Tome & Principe, Senegal,
— — 9.8 —
9.8
Togo
Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal, West Africa Maritime
Sierra Leone (Guinea
Security Capability
deleted due to the Dec.
Enhancement
— —
10.9 —
10.9
2008 coup d’etat.)
Mozambique, Tanzania,
South East African Maritime
Mauritius, Seychelles
Security Initiative
— — — 8.4
8.4
Total
Africa
13.0 38.7 61.7 48.7
162.1
GREATER EUROPE
Albania
CT Capability Aid
—
6.7
—
—
Maritime Coastal Patrol CT
12.0
Capability Enhancement
— — 5.3 —
Georgia
CT
Capability
Aid
— 6.5 — —
18.0
Special Forces T&E
11.5
—
Macedonia
CT
Capability
Aid
— 3.0 — — 3.0
Ukraine
CT
Capability
Aid
—
12.0 — — 12.0
Total Greater Europe
—
28.2 16.8
0 45.0
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (Including Central Asia)
Indonesia
Integrated Maritime
Surveillance System
18.4 — — —
57.4
Eastern Fleet Regional
Command Center
— 3.8 — —
Eastern Fleet Maritime
Equipment
— 7.3 — —
Celebes Sea and Malacca
Strait Network
— 6.1 — —
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Recipient(s)
Program
FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 Totals
Coastal Surveillance Stations
— 11.5 4.3 —
Western Fleet Command and
Control (C2) Center and HQ
— — 2.0 —
Command, Control,
Communications and
Computers (C4) Surveillance
— — 4.0 —
and Reconnaissance
Kazakhstan
Coalition CT and Stability
Operations Capacity Aid
—
19.3 — —
31.8
Caspian Security
— —
12.5 —
Kyrgyzstan
Increasing Armed Forces CT
Capabilities
— —
11.6 —
21.2
CT
Forces
Support
— — — 9.6
Malaysia
Eastern Sabah MDA Radars
—
13.6
—
—
Strait of Malacca MDA
Support
— 2.2 — —
MDA Package
— —
11.5 —
43.9
CENTRIX Stations
— 0.5
—
C2 Center for Joint Forces
Sabah HQ
— — 7.1 —
Maritime Interdiction Package
— — 9.0 —
Philippines
Maritime T&E for Interdiction
Purposes
— 3.0 — —
Coast Watch South High
Frequency Radios (FY07)/
— 1.8 11.1 —
Radars for Sulu Archipelago
(FY08)
Maritime Interdiction
Capability
— 6.4 — —
Interdiction and Offensive
55.1
Capabilities Improvement (of
— 4.4 — —
UH-1 Huey helicopters)
Border Control Interdiction
— — 5.8 —
Coast Watch South (CWS)
Radars for Eastern Mindanao
and adjacent border
— — —
14,5
surveillance
CWS Intelligence –
Operations CT Capability
— — — 8.1
Sri Lanka
Maritime Security T&E for
Interdiction Purposes
10.8 — — —
18.2
Aircraft
C2
Integration
— 6.0 — —
Maritime Security and Navy
—
1.4
—
—
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Recipient(s)
Program
FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 Totals
Interdiction Capability
Total
Asia
and
the
Pacific
29.2 87.3 78.9 32.2
227.6
MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH/SOUTHWESTERN ASIA
Azerbaijan
Naval Commando CT
Training
— — 1.7 — 1.7
Bahrain
Patrol Boats
(Value of equipment
5.3 — — —
redirected from cancelled
Thailand program)
Coastal Patrol Capability
Development
— 24.6 — —
Defense Force
50.3
Counterintelligence Analysis
— 0.04 — —
Center Development
Defense Force Special
Operations T&E
— — 4.3 —
Coastal Surveillance System
Upgrade
— — —
16.1
Bangladesh
Maritime Patrol and
Interdiction Initiative
— — 7.2 —
15.7
Naval Special Forces CT T&E
—
—
—
8.5
Lebanon
Military Assistance to
Lebanese Armed Forces
10.5
30.6 — —
Special Operations Forces
T&E
— — 7.2 —
105.5
Secure Communications for
Special Operations Forces
— — 7.9 —
Urban Soldier Equipment
—
—
—
21.5
Cessna
Caravan
— — —
27.8
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Recipient(s)
Program
FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 Totals
Pakistan
Border Area T&E/ Marines
T&E
23.3 5.7 — —
Enhance Shared MDA and
Cooperative Maritime
— 8.1 — —
Security Aid
Helicopter CT Capability
— —
20.9 —
Special Services Group COIN
Kick Start Initiative
— —
14.9 —
Mi-17 Support
— —
17.0 —
Mi-17
Helicopters
— — —
80.0
203.4
Aviation Maintenance
Shelters in Federally
— — — 3.1
Administered Tribal Areas
Army and Navy Capability
Building to Investigate
— — — 0.6
Explosives
Special Operations Forces
CT Package
— — —
17.0
Ground-Based Intelligence
S&R Capability
— — —
12.8
Yemen
Cross Border Security and
CT Aid
4.3 — — —
Yemeni Special Operations
Capacity Development to
—
26.0 — —
enhance border security
Air Force Aerial Surveillance
Initiative
— — — 5.9
97.3
Coast Guard Maritime
Security Initiative
— — —
29.9
Increased Border Security CT
Initiative
— — —
25.4
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Initiative
— — — 5.8
Total Middle East and South Asia
43.4
95.0
81.1
254.4
473.9
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Mexico
CT Capabilities (FY07)/ CT
Capability Package (FY08)
— 1.0 12.9 — 13.9
Dominican Republic and
Joint Maritime CT Capability
Panama
Aid
14.4 — — — 14.4
Bahamas, Dominican
Caribbean Basin Maritime
Republic, Honduras,
Security Aid (radios and
—
23.4 — — 23.4
Jamaica, and Nicaragua
boats)
Bahamas, Belize, Dominican
Caribbean Basin Capability
—
—
11.1
— 11.1
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Recipient(s)
Program
FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 Totals
Republic, Honduras,
Enhancements
Jamaica, and Panama
Belize, Guyana, Honduras,
CT Unit T&E for participation
and Suriname
in Operation Enduring
— — 9.3 — 9.3
Freedom
Total Western Hemisphere
14.4
24.4
33.3
—
72.1
Additional Transportation Expenses for items
— — — 3.1
3.1
obligated during FY06-FY08 but delivered later.
Totals
100.0 273.6 272.4 339.9 985.9
Source: Based on data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Al ocations as of October 13, 2009.
In one case, as noted, the figure is the amount notified to Congress.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix. Evolution of Section 1206 Legislation:
2005-2009
The George W. Bush Administration’s proposed National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006
contained a provision for a new partnership capacity-building authority. As submitted to
Congress, the DOD-proposed authorization legislation differed in several important respects from
the “Section 1206” legislation that was eventually passed.
DOD’s proposed authorization bill would have vested new authority with the President to
“authorize building the capacity of partner nations’ military or security forces to disrupt or
destroy terrorist networks, close safe havens, or participate in or support United States, coalition,
or international military or stability operations.” The proposed legislation provided the Secretary
of Defense the lead on implementation, but gave a veto power to the Secretary of State: “The
Secretary of Defense may, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, implement partnership
security capacity building....” DOD could implement capacity building projects on its own, or by
transferring DOD funds to the Department of State or to any other federal agency. The
presidential and agency roles changed in subsequent versions.
DOD’s proposed authorization language would have allowed assistance to build up foreign
military and security forces for purposes similar to but more specific than those ultimately
enacted into law (Section 1206, P.L. 109-163). The types of forces that could be assisted were
much broader, and included “armies, guard, border security, civil defense, infrastructure
protection, and police forces.” The proposed annual cap on such assistance was $750 million,
much greater than that eventually approved.
DOD’s proposed appropriations language would have provided for the appropriation of up to
$750 million of funds from operations and maintenance accounts to provide assistance to military
or security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and provide assistance to other military forces in
friendly nations in the nearby region to enhance their capability to combat terrorism and to
support U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary of Defense could use
those funds only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.
Congressional Action in 2005
Congressional action in 2005 on the DOD proposals started with Senate approval of a floor
amendment to the Senate version of the FY2006 NDAA (S. 1042). The legislation that emerged
from conference committee action on the conference version of the bill (H.R. 1815) and was
signed into law on January 6, 2006 (P.L. 109-163) differed significantly from the DOD proposals.
Not one of the armed services or appropriations committees included the DOD proposals for a
global train and equip authority or appropriation in legislation they reported that year.
Congressional action began when Senator Inhofe introduced a modified version of the DOD
authorization proposal as a floor amendment (S.Amdt. 2432) to S. 1042. On November 8, 2005,
the Senate approved an amended version of that amendment, supported by Senator Lugar. Both
would provide authority for the purposes requested by DOD. Each version of the Inhofe
amendment progressively strengthened the State Department role compared to the DOD proposal.
Conference committee negotiators made further changes, however, strengthening the DOD role,
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diminishing the State Department role, restricting the types of forces that could be supported, and
lowering the funding cap.
The Inhofe amendment introduced on November 4, 2005, was similar to the DOD authorization
request in that it would have conferred authority on the President to build partnership security
capacity of foreign military and security forces on the President and authorized the use of up to
$750 million a year in DOD funds for the same purposes as the original DOD authorization
request. A major difference was the role of the State Department. The Inhofe amendment made a
request by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense the trigger to initiate DOD support, a
seemingly stronger role than that of the DOD proposed legislation which required the Secretary
of Defense to seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State for any support. Like the DOD
proposal, however, the Inhofe amendment left DOD free to implement programs itself, or to
transfer funds to the Department of State or any other federal agency for implementation. (These
funds would remain available until expended.) In introducing the amendment, Senator Inhofe
indicated that the purpose of the new authority was to expedite train and equip assistance, and
expressed displeasure with then-current arrangements for train and equip programs conducted
through the State Department. For instance, he noted that assistance to train and equip Georgia
forces for counterterrorism required that “Seven different authorities for funding and sources ...
be stitched together” in a process that took eight months.59
The revised Inhofe amendment further strengthened the Secretary of State’s role by making three
changes. One change eliminated DOD’s ability to implement proposals on its own. Another
eliminated DOD’s ability to transfer funds to any civilian agency other than the State Department.
In short, the Secretary of Defense could provide partnership support only by transferring DOD
funds to the Department of State. A third change made such support subject to the authorities and
limitations in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the FY2006 Foreign Operations bill.
In a November 8, 2006 floor statement, Senator Lugar stated that “the amendment as now written
leaves the authority for deciding which countries, and when, how, and why foreign assistance
should be provided, in the hands of the Secretary of State. The amendment does not provide
statutory authority to the Secretary of Defense to establish a new foreign aid program outside the
purview of the Secretary of State. It does authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide funding to
the State Department for a new train and equip foreign assistance program....”60 At the same time,
Senator Lugar acknowledged DOD concerns that the “State Department oversight of these kinds
of programs [is] cumbersome and slow.” He stated: “These obstacles need to be overcome. State
Department procedures should be streamlined and the two Departments should develop plans to
push these important programs forward efficiently and quickly.” (Congressional Record, Senate,
S12495.)
59 Senator James Inhofe, Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, November 4, 2005, p. S12395.
60 Senator Lugar further stated that “The Secretary of State should retain full authority over decisions as to which
countries should receive assistance, the timing of its provision, and the way in which it should be provided. The
Department of Defense should continue implementing train and equip programs under the purview of the Secretary of
State.” He concluded: “All foreign assistance programs need to take place within a foreign policy context, with
consideration of the traditional concerns—the recipient country’s treatment of its own people, potential reactions from
neighboring sates in the region, and the overall bilateral relationship with the recipient country, including the assistance
in the war against terrorism. It is the Secretary of State’s job to weigh such foreign policy issues and make
recommendations to the President that strike the right balance for American interests. The amendment as now written
meets the concerns I had and I would request that I be listed as a co-sponsor.” (Congressional Record, Senate, S12495.)
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A distinct final version, as mentioned above, emerged from the conference committee. There
were four important changes from the Senate version. First, the conference committee version of
H.R. 1815 stripped the leadership role from the Secretary of State and bestowed it on the
Secretary of Defense. Section 1206 broadened DOD’s role by providing authority for the
President to direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support a program to build the capacity
of a foreign military forces. It reduced the Secretary of State’s role by providing that the
Secretaries of Defense and State were to “jointly formulate any program directed by the
President” and the Secretary of Defense was to “coordinate with the Secretary of State in the
implementation of any program directed by the President....” Second, the conference committee
version did not provide authority to assist security forces of any type. Third, it lowered the annual
funding cap considerably, to $200 million. And fourth, it broadened the purpose of the
counterterrorism element of the assistance from enabling foreign forces to disrupt or destroy
terrorist networks and to close safe havens to enabling them to conduct counterterrorist
operations.
In their explanatory statement (H.Rept. 109-360, accompanying H.R. 1815), the conferees
described Section 1206 as a two-year pilot program, which would be reviewed at the end of that
period. They noted that “under current law, foreign military training programs are conducted
exclusively under the authority of the Secretary of State. The conferees signaled the importance
of ensuring that any changes in statutory authorities for foreign military assistance do not have
unintended consequences for the effective coordination of U.S. foreign policy writ large, nor
detract from DOD’s focus on core responsibilities, particularly warfighting tasks.
Congressional Action for FY2006-FY2009
Congress made further changes to Section 1206 authority through amendments in subsequent
NDAAs. Most important among them was the 2007 modification elevating the State
Department’s role while, at the same time, vesting authority for the program in the Secretary of
Defense. Section 1206 of the John Warner NDAA for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) amended Section
1206 by eliminating the President’s role in directing the Secretary of Defense to conduct or
support such programs. Instead, it authorized “the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of
the Secretary of State” to conduct or support those programs. Other changes in that legislation
raised the authorized amount to $300 million, and it extended the authority through FY2008.61
This amendment was the result of a conference committee compromise over a proposed Senate
amendment that would have extended Section 1206 authority to combatant commanders. In their
explanatory statement, the conferees stated that “the authorities provided in this section are
provided in the spirit of a pilot program.... The conferees believe it will be important to
demonstrate through experience that these expanded authorities can and will be exercised
consistent with the effective coordination of U.S. foreign policy writ large. Furthermore, the
61 The DOD proposal for FY2007 NDAA authorization language had requested that authority to direct Section 1206
programs be vested in the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, rather than the
President, in order to “increase responsiveness by relieving the President of having to approve each Section 1206
program personally, while preserving important roles of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State in
authorizing capacity-building programs under this provision. This would enable the Department of Defense, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, to pursue time-sensitive opportunities to build capacity of partner nations.” DOD
also requested the expansion of the types of forces that could be assisted to include security forces (“specifically
gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, border protection, and
counterterrorism forces ... ”), and an increase in the spending cap to $750 million.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
conferees strongly believe that foreign assistance programs are more appropriately funded
through the foreign assistance accounts, as administered by the Department of State, and urge the
administration to request sufficient funding for foreign military assistance in those accounts in
future years budget requests.”62
For FY2008, Congress appropriated $300 million for Section 1206 in the DOD Appropriations
Act, 2008 (also known as the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, P.L. 110-116).
In 2008, the Bush Administration requested that Section 1206 authority be made permanent law
under Title 10 (Armed Services) of the United States Code. It also asked that spending authority
be increased to $750 million, but in its FY2009 budget request asked for $500 million in
appropriations for that year. Congress denied the Bush Administration’s requests. Instead, through
the enactment of the Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417), Congress extended
Section 1206 temporary authority for three years (i.e., through FY2011). P.L. 110-417 also
expanded Section 1206 authority to include the provision of assistance to maritime security
forces,63 and raised the spending cap to $350 million. In the same bill, Congress also provided
authority for funds to be used in consecutive fiscal years (i.e., funds made available for a program
begun in one fiscal year may also be used for that program in the next fiscal year).
In their respective reports on the FY2009 NDAA, both the House and the Senate armed services
committees expressed concern about whether Section 1206 funds were being appropriately used.
• The Senate Armed Services Committee report reiterated the committee’s earlier position
that Section 1206 was intended as a pilot program, “not intended to duplicate or
substitute for other foreign assistance authorities, nor ... intended to sustain train and
equip programs over multiple years.” It expressed the committee’s concerns that Section
1206 funds were “being used for programs, particularly in countries where the terrorist
threat is currently low, that primarily serve to build counter-narcotics capabilities.”64
62 These changes were the result of a conference committee compromise on a Senate amendment to Section 1206 in S.
2766, its version of the FY2007 NDAA. See H.Rept. 109-702, the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007,
Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 5152.
The Senate amendment would have permitted the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State,
to authorize commanders of the geographic combatant commands “to respond to unanticipated changes in a security
environment” within their area of responsibility (AOR) to spend up to $50 million per year per commander for Section
1206 purposes, with total spending limited to $200 million. In addition, the Senate Amendment would have permitted
the Secretary of Defense to authorize geographic combatant commanders “to respond to urgent and unanticipated
humanitarian relief or reconstruction requirements in a foreign country within the commander’s AOR” if the
commander determined that such assistance would promote the security interest of the United States and the recipient
country, up to a total of $200 million “in any country in a fiscal year.” In response, the House, which had no similar
provision, offered the amendment which was adopted. Although the proposed section to provide combatant
commanders with funding for existing Section 1206 purposes was deleted, elsewhere in the bill the conferees included
a provision to expand authority under the Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund to provide urgent and unanticipated
humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.
63 As passed by the Senate, S. 3001 would have extended Section 1206 authority to security forces, specifically “a
foreign country’s coast guard, border protection, and other security forces engaged primarily in counterterrorism
missions in order for that country to conduct counterterrorism operations.” The Administration had requested authority
to train and equip a wide spectrum of security forces, including gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense,
infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces.
64 S.Rept. 110-335 continued: “While recognizing a degree of overlap between counterterrorism and counternarcotics
capabilities, the committee urges the Department of Defense to fund programs to build counter-narcotics capabilities
using funds and authorities intended to support counter-narcotics activities, and if appropriate, seek any necessary
(continued...)
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
• The House Armed Services Committee report stated DOD had “pushed beyond the
clearly articulated limits of this authority” in the case of Panama, raising concern “about
the responsible execution of this authority in the future.” In the report, the committee
expressed its belief “that capable foreign partners play a vital role in the international
security environment but remain unconvinced that this authority should reside
permanently with the Department of Defense. The committee expects that, over the long-
term, these ‘train and equip’-type authorities, which appear to be migrating to the
Department of Defense, might better remain within the Department of State’s
jurisdiction.”65
Congressional Action for FY2010
DOD Appropriations Action
The FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326) contained the full Obama Administration
request of $345 million, despite House appropriations action to cut that amount. As reported by
the House Appropriations Committee (July 16, 2009, H.Rept. 111-230) and passed by the House
(July 22, 2009), the House version of the DOD appropriations act would have appropriated $195
million for Section 1206 funding. The Senate Appropriations Committee version (reported
September 10, 2009, S.Rept. 111-74) approved the full $345 million requested by the Obama
Administration; no change was made by the Senate in approving the bill on October 6, 2009. As
signed into law on December 19, 2009, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010
(P.L. 111-118), contains $345 million for Section 1206 Global Train and Equip programs. (The
amount is not specified in the act itself but is included under the total appropriated to the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency under the Operations and Maintenance [O&M] Defense-wide
budget.)
DOD Authorization Action
In action on the proposed FY2010 NDAA (H.R. 2647/S. 1390), HASC set forth its evolving
views on whether Congress should move Section 1206 authority from DOD to the State
Department and SASC proposed new stipulations on Section 1206 use. As signed into law in
October 2009 (P.L. 111-34), the FY2010 NDAA retains the $350 authorized funding level but
introduces a new funding provision by specifying that up to $75 million could be used to train the
military troops of coalition partners in each FY2010 and FY2011.
As marked up by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on June 10, and reported to the
House on June 18 (H.R. 2647), the FY2010 NDAA would have authorized $350 million for
Section 1206, according to the HASC press release. The committee report accompanying the bill
(H.Rept. 111-166) noted an evolution of the HASC position on Section 1206 funding.
(...continued)
modifications to existing counter-narcotics authorities to support these activities.” The committee also indicated that it
viewed U.S. Africa Command AOR counterterrorism needs as a priority for Section 1206 assistance.
65 H.Rept. 110-652 also encouraged DOD “to use members of the United States military to conduct the training
provided under this authority whenever possible.”
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
In discussing Section 1206, HASC stated that while it previously had regarded Section 1206 “as
part of the foreign assistance family of authorities that has traditionally resided within the
Department of State’s purview” in order to assist foreign countries meet their own security needs
as part of a U.S. foreign policy framework, it now views Section 1206 as a “new type of
authority” to meet a perceived need “to build certain capacities in partner nations to satisfy
specific theater security requirements.” (p. 411) While not discounting the idea that the authority
might better be placed at the Department of State than at DOD, HASC reflects that wherever the
authority ultimately lies, the need for projects responding to a DOD-led assessment of U.S.
national security needs means that the “Secretary of Defense must play a primary role in
generating requirements.” (p 412)
As reported July 2, 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee version of the FY2011 NDAA
(S. 1390) would have permitted the use of up to $75 million (of the total $350 authorized for
Section 1206) on programs to build the capacity of foreign military forces to participate in or
support military and stability operations in which the U.S. armed forces are a participant. This
limitation would pertain to programs that begin on or after October 1, 2009, and be effective for
FY2010 and FY2011. Previously, there was no specification regarding the amount that could be
spent for either of Section 1206’s two stated purpose. (As noted elsewhere, little funding had been
spent through FY2009 on building capacity other than counterterrorism capacity.)
As described in the SASC report (S.Rept. 111-35), this limitation was made in response to DOD’s
request for new authorities to build the capacity of a foreign country’s national military forces
preparing to support a coalition operation conducted as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, or by the NATO International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and to built the capacity of NATO and partner special
operations forces to support NATO or coalition special operations conducted as part of OIF or
OEF in Afghanistan, or by the NATO ISAF.
SASC stated that “both these activities can be conducted within the existing authority of section
1206” and that the committee “would be open to considering proposals to use the authority under
this section to help build the capacity of NATO and other coalition partners whose ability to
contribute to ongoing military or stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would otherwise be
limited.” Nevertheless, SASC explains the cap as a means to ensure that Section 1206 funding
serves its intended purpose (i.e., to provide a means to address emerging needs) and not as
substitute for security assistance under the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
authority. As expressed in the report accompanying its bill, DOD’s “stated desire to conduct
sustained capacity building to prepare special operations to deploy for coalition operations
suggests that it intends to establish multi-year programs with respect to certain recipient
countries.” The $75 million limit is intended to reduce “the potential impact of such multi-year
programs on the section 1206 program as a whole.”
The SASC report emphasized the temporary nature of Section 1206 authority. It also urged the
Obama Administration to review existing DOD and State Department security assistance
authorities in order “to reconcile, de-conflict, and improve the effectiveness of these authorities.”
As signed into law on October 28, 2009 (P.L. 111-84), the FY2010 NDAA put in place a
temporary $75 million limit for FY2010 and FY2011 on Section 1206 funds used to train military
troops of coalition partners to participate in or support military and stability operations.
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress
Foreign Relations Authorization Action
Congressional concerns regarding the appropriate agency to exercise responsibility for security
assistance programs emerged in House action on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY2010-FY2011 (H.R. 2410). In that bill, the House Foreign Affairs Committee proposed a new
“Security Assistance Contingency Fund” for the State Department with purposes that would
overlap with Section 1206. The House passed H.R. 2410 with that proposal intact in June 2009.
No Senate action has occurred on H.R. 2410, received by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (SFRC) on June 22, 2009. No corresponding Senate bill has been introduced.
H.R. 2410, Section 841, as reported to the House on June 4 (H.Rept. 111-136) and passed by the
House on June 10, would authorize the Secretary of State “to conduct a program to respond to
contingencies in foreign countries or regions by providing training, procurement, and capacity-
building of a foreign country’s military forces and dedicated counterterrorism forces in order for
that country to (1) conduct counterterrorist operations; or (2) participate in or support military and
stability operations in which the United States is a participant.” Section 841 would authorize the
appropriation of $25 million in each FY2010 and FY2011 for these purposes, as well as the use of
up to $25 million in Foreign Military Financing funds in each of those fiscal years for the same
purposes. Funds would remain available until expended.
Like Section 1206, this authority could not be used to provide any type of assistance otherwise
prohibited by law nor used to assist any foreign country otherwise prohibited from receiving such
type of assistance under any provision of law. Unlike Section 1206, this authority would be
exercised by the Secretary of State, with the only coordination requirement being that the
Secretary “shall consult with the head of any other appropriate department or agency in the
formulation and execution” of programs conducted under this authority. Section 841 would
require a 15-day notification to congressional foreign affairs and appropriations committees
before funds are obligated.
The first session of the 11th Congress took no further action on this bill.
Author Contact Information
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
nserafino@crs.loc.gov, 7-7667
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