Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
January 26, 2010
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
R40479
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Summary
In recent years, many analysts have expressed concern that the international community’s efforts
since 1995 to stabilize Bosnia are beginning to come apart. They noted that the downward trend
has been especially evident since 2006, with the election of leaders with starkly divergent goals.
Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two semi-autonomous
“entities” within Bosnia, has obstructed efforts to make Bosnia’s central government more
effective and has at times asserted the RS’s right to secede from Bosnia. Efforts to reform
Bosnia’s constitution have made little progress.
There has been a debate about the future role of the international community in Bosnia. The
Office of the High Representative (OHR), chosen by leading countries and international
institutions, oversees implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the 1992-1995
war in Bosnia. An EU peacekeeping force, called EUFOR, is charged with keeping the peace in
Bosnia and overseeing the Bosnian armed forces. The international community has vowed to
close OHR after Bosnia meets a series of reform objectives, ending direct international oversight.
After OHR’s closure, international support for Bosnian reforms would be limited to aid and
advice from the United States, European Union, NATO, and other institutions, with the prospect
of eventual NATO and EU membership. An EU Special Representative (EUSR) would remain in
Bosnia, although the post would likely have a smaller staff than OHR. In addition, it would likely
be limited to an advisory and reporting role, lacking OHR’s powers to veto legislation and
remove local officials.
There has been pressure within the EU to scale back EUFOR, which has a current strength of
about 2,100 troops. Citing the improved security situation in Bosnia, France and other EU
countries have called for EUFOR to be sharply reduced in size and limited to an advisory
function. However, in January 2010, the EU did not agree on a reduction, perhaps out of concern
about the lack of progress on reforms in Bosnia.
Some observers are concerned that the combination of increasing internal tension within Bosnia
and a declining international role could seriously set back over a decade of peace in Bosnia,
perhaps leading to violence and the destabilization of the region as a whole. They call for greater
international engagement in Bosnia, including an increase in EUFOR’s capabilities and strong
powers for the EUSR, if OHR leaves. The United States has strongly supported Bosnia’s
integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. However, the U.S. role in the country has declined in
recent years as the EU role has increased.

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Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Current Situation......................................................................................................................... 3
Political Situation.................................................................................................................. 3
Economic Situation............................................................................................................... 5
International Role in Bosnia ........................................................................................................ 6
U.S. Policy............................................................................................................................ 8
Policy Concerns and Issues for Congress............................................................................... 9

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina................................................................................. 12

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 13

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Background
Before the breakup of Yugoslavia in
Bosnia at a Glance
1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina was
Area: 51, 209 sq. km. (slightly smaller than West Virginia)
one of Yugoslavia’s six republics. It
Population: 4.6 million (July 2009 est.)
had an ethnically-mixed population.
The rise of hard-line nationalism in
Ethnic Composition: 48% Bosniak (Muslims of Slavic origin), 37.1%
Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic
Serb, 14.3% Croat, Others 0.6% (2000)
and a similar movement in Croatia
Gross Domestic Product: $16.96 billion (current exchange rates,
led by Franjo Tudjman in the late
2009 est.)
1980s and early 1990s posed a grave
Political Leaders:
threat to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s
Bosnian central government
unity. Bosnia’s own republic
government was split among
collective Presidency: Nebojsa Radmanovic (Serb), Haris Silajdzic
(Bosniak), Zeljko Komsic (Croat)
Bosniak (Slavic Muslim), Croat and
Serb nationalists. The secession of
Chairman of the Council of Ministers: Nikola Spiric (Serb)
Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991
Republika Srpska (largely Serb entity)
upset the delicate balance of power
President: Rajko Kuzmanovic
within Yugoslavia. Milosevic
conceded Slovenia’s independence
Prime Minister: Milorad Dodik
after a few days, but Croatia’s
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (largely Bosniak and Croat entity)
secession touched off a conflict
President: Borjana Kristo (Croat)
between Croat forces and Serb
irregulars supported by the Serb-
Prime Minister: Mustafa Mujezinovic (Bosniak)
dominated Yugoslav Army. Bosnian
Source: CIA World Factbook.
Serb nationalists demanded that
Bosnia remain part of a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. Bosnian Croat nationalists threatened to
secede if Bosnia remained in Yugoslavia.
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, a Bosniak, worried about the possible spread of the conflict
to Bosnia, tried to find a compromise solution. However, these efforts were made very difficult
by the Milosevic and Tudjman regimes, both of which had designs on Bosnian territory. In
addition, Izetbegovic’s hand was forced by the European Community (EC) decision in December
1991 to grant diplomatic recognition to any of the former Yugoslav republics that requested it,
provided that the republics held a referendum on independence, and agreed to respect minority
rights, the borders of neighboring republics, and other conditions. Izetbegovic and other Bosniaks
felt they could not remain in a Milosevic-dominated rump Yugoslavia and had to seek
independence and EC recognition, even given the grave threat such a move posed to peace in the
republic. Bosnian Serb leaders warned that international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina
would lead to civil war.
In March 1992, most Bosniaks and Croats voted for independence in a referendum, while most
Serbs boycotted the vote. In April 1992, shortly before recognition of Bosnia by the European
Community and the United States, Serbian paramilitary forces and the Yugoslav Army launched
attacks throughout the republic. They quickly seized more than two-thirds of the republic’s
territory and besieged the capital of Sarajevo. At least 97,000 people were killed in the war.1

1 Associated Press wire service dispatch, June 21, 2007. This estimate is based on a detailed database of war dead and
(continued...)
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Approximately 2.3 million people were driven from their homes, creating the greatest flow of
refugees in Europe since World War II. Serbian forces attacked Bosniak and Croat civilians in
order to drive them from ethnically mixed areas that they wanted to claim. Croats and Bosniaks
were initially allied against the Serbs, but fighting between Croats and Bosniaks broke out in
ethnically mixed areas in 1993-1994, also resulting in “ethnic cleansing” by both sides. Bosniak
forces also engaged in ethnic cleansing against Serbs in some areas. In addition to the inter-ethnic
bitterness it created and the damage it caused to Bosnia’s economy, the war also greatly
strengthened organized crime groups and their links with government officials, an important
stumbling block to Bosnia’s postwar recovery.
The war came to an end in 1995, after NATO conducted a series of air strikes against Bosnian
Serb positions in late August and early September. The strikes were in response to a Bosnian Serb
refusal to withdraw its artillery from around Sarajevo after an artillery attack on a Sarajevo
marketplace caused many civilian deaths. Bosniak and Bosnian Croat forces, now better equipped
and trained than ever before, simultaneously launched an offensive against reeling Bosnian Serb
forces, inflicting sharp defeats on them. The Bosnian Serbs agreed to a cease-fire in October
1995, as did the Croats and Bosniaks, after strong international pressure. Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, as
well as representatives of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, met at the Wright-Patterson Air Force
base in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 to negotiate a peace agreement mediated by the United
States, the EU, and Russia. On November 21, 1995, the presidents of Serbia-Montenegro,
Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as Bosniak, Croat and Serb leaders in Bosnia, initialed
a peace agreement. The final agreement was signed by the parties at a peace conference in Paris
on December 14.
Under the Dayton Peace Accords, Bosnia-Herzegovina remains an internationally recognized
state within its pre-war borders. Internally, it consists of two semi-autonomous “entities:” the
(largely Bosniak and Croat) Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the (Bosnian Serb-dominated)
Republika Srpska (RS). Under the accords, the Bosnian Federation received roughly 51% of the
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Republika Srpska received about 49%.
Each of the entities has its own parliament and government with wide-ranging powers. Each
entity may establish “special parallel relationships with neighboring states consistent with the
sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most powers are vested in the
entities; the central government has responsibility for foreign policy, foreign trade and customs
policy, monetary policy and a few other areas. Decisions of the central government and
parliament are nominally taken by a majority, but any of the three main ethnic groups can block a
decision if it views it as against its vital interests. The Federation is further divided into ten
cantons, each of which has control of policy in areas such as policing and education.
A U.N.-appointed Office of the High Representative (OHR), created by the Dayton accords,
oversees civilian peace implementation efforts. The High Representative is supported by the
Peace Implementation Council (PIC), a broad umbrella group of 55 countries and agencies. As
the PIC’s size and composition makes it unwieldy for decision-making, the PIC provides ongoing

(...continued)
missing developed by the Research and Documentation Center Sarajevo. The RDC estimated that the real figure could
be increased by about another 10,000, as research continues. Some earlier estimates for the dead and missing, for which
the methodological bases were unclear, were over 200,000.
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political guidance to OHR mostly through a Steering Board composed of key countries and
institutions, including the United States, Russia, France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Canada, Japan,
Turkey, and the EU Commission and Presidency.
At a December 1997 PIC conference in Bonn, Germany, the international community granted the
High Representative powers (known as the “Bonn powers”) to fire and take other actions against
local leaders and parties as well as to impose legislation in order to implement the peace
agreement and more generally bring unity and reform to Bosnia. The High Representative also
holds the post of the European Union’s Special Representative in Bosnia. A peacekeeping force,
at first NATO-led, but led by the EU since 2004, implements the military aspects of the accord.2
Since 1997, the United States and other Western countries have pressed local leaders in Bosnia to
build the effectiveness and governing capacity of the Bosnian central government. The United
States and the EU have maintained that the Dayton institutions have proved to be too
cumbersome to provide for the country’s long-term stability, prosperity, and ability to integrate
into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Some successes have been scored in this area, including merging
the armed forces and intelligence services of the two entities, and creating central government
institutions such as border and customs services, and a state prosecutors’ office and ministry of
justice. However, even these achievements have required pressure on local leaders or even direct
imposition of changes by the High Representative. International efforts have had the support of
Bosniak politicians, but usually have faced strong resistance from Serbian ones, as well as from
some Croat leaders.
The state consolidation process suffered a serious setback in April 2006, from which it has not
recovered. A constitutional reform package pushed by the United States and EU was defeated in
the Bosnian parliament by a narrow margin. The relatively modest proposal would have replaced
the three-member collective central government presidency with a single presidency, increased
the powers of the Prime Minister, and strengthened the central Bosnian parliament.
Current Situation
Political Situation
In recent years, many analysts have expressed concern that the international community’s efforts
to stabilize Bosnia are beginning to come apart. The problem became acute after the failure of the
constitutional reforms and the October 2006 Bosnian general elections, in which voters chose
their representatives to the central Bosnian parliament and to the three-member Bosnian
collective presidency, as well as for some entity-level offices. The campaign was notable for its
nationalist tone. This rhetorical struggle has continued and intensified in the past few years. One
prominent participant in raising the political temperature in Bosnia has been Haris Silajdzic, the
Bosniak member of the central government presidency and leader of the Party for Bosnia and
Herzegovina. He has condemned the Republika Srpska (RS) as an illegitimate product of
genocide. He has called for the abolition of the entities and a stronger central government.

2 For the text of the Dayton accords, see the OHR website at http://www.ohr.int.
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Silajdzic’s main antagonist has been Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik. His party
emerged with a dominant role in the RS after the 2006 vote. Since then, Dodik has tried to
distance the RS from cooperation with Bosnian central authorities and the High Representative.
He has stated that the RS reserves the right to secede from Bosnia, although he has stopped short
of actually calling for secession. Pressure by the European Union and the United States in 2006
and 2007 to put Bosnia’s entity police forces under greater central government control met with
sharp opposition by RS leaders, for whom the police are a key power base. In 2008, Bosnian
leaders eventually agreed to a less ambitious police reform package that focused on greater
coordination between entity police forces.
Some hopes for breaking the deadlock on reforms in Bosnia rose in December 2008. Sulejman
Tihic, head of the largest Bosniak party, the Party for Democratic Action; Dragan Covic, the head
of the largest Croat party, the Croatian Democratic Community; and Dodik, signed an agreement
to amend the Constitution, resolve disputes over state property, and agreed on the terms for
holding Bosnia’s first post-war census. The agreement excluded Silajdzic, who condemned it.
Indeed, Tihic may have pushed for the agreement as part of a long-standing struggle with
Silajdzic over leadership of the Bosniak community. Dodik may have seen the agreement as a
way to increase pressure for the termination of the Office of the High Representative (OHR).
A follow-up agreement in January 2009 called for the establishment of four unspecified territorial
units within Bosnia. It appeared that each ethnic group would have one unit largely under its
control, with a separate district for Sarajevo. Observers speculated on whether the agreement
appears to scrap the Federation, and sets up a de facto third, Croat entity. The views of the leaders
differed on the borders of these units. Dodik remained adamant that the RS will remain as it is,
and may gain territory, and expresses indifference to how the rest of Bosnia is divided. Tihic and
Covic have raised the possibility of exchanges of territory between three largely Serb, Croat, and
Bosniak units.
In February 2009, the Bosnian central government’s State Protection and Investigative Agency
(SIPA) forwarded a document to Bosnian prosecutors alleging corruption by Dodik and other
senior RS officials in the handling of construction contracts. Dodik blamed the charges on an
alleged plot by Deputy High Representative and U.S. diplomat Raffi Gregorian to depose him. In
what was perhaps a response to the move, Dodik brought the negotiations to a halt on February
21 by demanding that Tihic and Covic recognize a right by the RS to secede from Bosnia. Dodik
said he was considering the withdrawal of all officials from the RS from central government
institutions and a referendum on independence. The negotiations, known as the Prud process after
the place were the talks were first held, eventually lost what little momentum that they had
gained.
In March 2009, the Bosnian central parliament approved a constitutional amendment to resolve
issues related to the Brcko District. However, since then little progress was made on the
constitutional reform or on conditions and objectives set forth by the international community for
the closure of OHR.
Bosniak leaders criticized a July 2009 decision by the EU to permit visa-free travel to the EU for
Serbia and Macedonia as of January 2010, while continuing to require visas for Bosnia until
Bosnia meets EU conditions. As many Bosnian Croats hold citizenship of Croatia (which already
enjoys visa-free travel to the EU) and a large number of Bosnian Serbs hold Serbian citizenship,
some Bosniaks say they have been isolated and even “ghettoized” by the decision.
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In October 2009, the United States and the European Union brokered talks between the leaders of
the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia, the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks (Slavic Muslims), in an
effort to break the deadlock on meeting the conditions and objectives that the international
community had set for the closure of the OHR. The talks were also aimed at reforming Bosnia’s
central government institutions to make them effective enough to allow the country to move
closer to joining NATO and the EU. The first meeting was held on October 9 at the Bosnian army
base at Butmir, near the capital, Sarajevo. The United States and the EU submitted a draft
proposal for reforms. The proposal has not been publicly released, but was almost immediately
leaked to the Bosnian press.
According to these press accounts, the reforms would establish the post of Prime Minister in
order to raise the profile of the current chairman of the council of ministers of the central
government. Three new ministries would be added to the central government. The upper house of
the parliament would lose its legislative powers and the number of deputies in the lower house of
the parliament would be doubled. The three-person collective presidency (one person from each
of the three main ethnic groups) would be replaced with a single president with two deputies.
They would be elected by the parliament rather than the voters. The reform document also
reportedly suggests the elimination of entity voting in the Bosnian parliament, which permits a
majority of representatives of either entity to block the passage of a law, even if they do not form
a majority of the parliament as a whole.
At a second round of talks on October 20-21, Dodik flatly rejected the package as proposing too
radical a change in Bosnian institutions. He said he would no longer participate in negotiations
over it. Bosnian Croat leader Dragan Covic also rejected the package, saying it did not
sufficiently address Croat concerns. Bosniak leaders felt the package did not go far enough in
strengthening central institutions. In late November, the U.S. and EU issued a revised proposal.
Bosniak leaders complained that it was even weaker than the previous draft as a result of the
negotiators’ efforts to incorporate Serb suggestions. Nevertheless, Serb leaders said that they still
did not support the revised draft. Observers warn that the time for effective action this year may
be rapidly shrinking (or indeed may have already expired), as campaigning for the Bosnian
general elections in October 2010 may make it even less likely that Bosnian leaders will make
compromises.
Economic Situation
Bosnia’s economic growth has been hampered by Bosnia’s cumbersome governing structure,
excessively large and expensive government bureaucracies, and long-standing problems with
organized crime and corruption. Bosnia’s public sector amounts to nearly 50% of the country’s
GDP. Observers have noted that the Republika Srpska has moved more quickly on economic
reforms and has enjoyed high economic growth than the Federation, due to a less cumbersome
governing structure in the RS. The Federation has also been plagued by infighting among
politicians that has delayed some privatization projects and driven away foreign investors. In
contrast, Dodik’s hegemony has simplified matters in the RS, while at the same time allegedly
fostering high-level corruption.
Nevertheless, despite these problems, living standards have improved in Bosnia in recent years;
real wages increased by 44% between 2000 and 2007. Real GDP increased by 30% in the same
period, and by 5.4% in 2008. However, the Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that the global
economic crisis is expected to cause a drop in GDP of 3.2% in 2009. The EIU projects a GDP
growth rate of 1% for 2010. Remittances from Bosnians living abroad amounted to nearly 20% of
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GDP in 2006, and may be affected by the downturn, as have falling demand for some of Bosnia’s
key exports, such as steel and aluminum.
On the other hand, Bosnia may face less of an impact than other eastern European countries
because it is less heavily indebted than many countries in the region. The fact that its currency,
the convertible mark, is tightly linked to the Euro through a currency board system may help
Bosnia to weather global financial shocks. The currency board system has kept inflation relatively
low in Bosnia, at a rate of 3.8% in December 2008, on a year-on-year basis. As a result of the
economic crisis consumer price inflation dropped to -0.7% in November 2009, on a year-on-year
basis.3
In May 2009, the International Monetary Fund offered Bosnia a $1.6 billion loan over three years,
if the government can sharply rein in spending. Bosnia has received one tranche of the loan, but a
second one has been held up until RS and Federation to trim the cost of government
bureaucracies and reduce to cost of veterans benefits. The RS is more likely to meet the
conditions than the Federation, where a weaker and more divided government has had trouble
standing up to the powerful veterans’ lobby.4 The situation is made even more critical by the fact
that loans from the World Bank and budgetary support from the EU are also conditioned on
meeting IMF conditions.
International Role in Bosnia
There has been a debate about the future role of the international community in Bosnia. The
Peace Implementation Council (PIC) has appeared eager to end the direct international oversight
of Bosnia through the OHR. This may partly be due to “political fatigue” after having played
such a prominent role in the country for over 13 years. Since 2007, the High Representative has
been reluctant to use his wide-ranging Bonn powers to impose legislation and fire obstructionist
officials, due to a lack of political support for such actions by leading countries in the PIC. In
January 2009, Miroslav Lajcak abruptly announced his resignation as High Representative to
become Slovakia’s foreign minister. He expressed frustration at the ineffectiveness of OHR’s
powers. On March 13, 2009, Valentin Inzko, formerly Austria’s ambassador to Slovenia, was
approved by the PIC as the next High Representative.
The international community’s desire to move away from direct oversight may be designed to
encourage Bosnian leaders to take greater responsibility for their country. Direct international
tutelage will have to be eliminated if the country is to join NATO and the EU, the members of
which are all fully sovereign states. The PIC has agreed to close OHR after five objectives have
been met. These include a decision on ownership of state property, a decision on defense
property; implementing the Brcko Final Award (which made the town of Brcko a self-governing
unit within Bosnia); ensuring fiscal sustainability; and entrenching the rule of law. The PIC and
OHR have demanded specific action and legislation from the central and entity levels to meet
these objectives. Two additional objectives were also set: the signing of a Stabilization and
Association Agreement with the EU (already accomplished) and a positive assessment of the

3 Milan Cuc, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: On the Road to EU Accession,” IMF Survey, December 2008, 199; Economist
Intelligence Unit Country Report: Bosnia and Hercegovina, February 2009; Oxford Analytica, “Bosnia: Politicians
Ignore First Signs of Downturn,” November 6, 2008.
4 Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina, January 2010.
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situation in Bosnia by the PIC. If OHR is withdrawn, an EU Special Representative will remain,
although the post will likely have a small staff and may be limited to an advisory and reporting
role, without the powers to veto legislation and remove local officials that OHR has had.
In the past year, the RS leadership has wrangled with OHR and the international community on
the OHR’s Bonn powers. On May 14, 2009, the RS parliament passed a resolution which said that
the parliament will review all powers transferred from the RS to the central government at the
direction of OHR since the Dayton Peace Accord was signed in 1995. The resolution said that the
RS should launch legal challenges to have the powers returned to the RS. The resolution also
called for the High Representative to stop using his Bonn powers. The High Representative,
Valentin Inzko of Austria, demanded that the Bosnian Serb parliament retract its May 14
resolution by June 11. The deadline passed with no action by the RS or the High Representative,
posing a challenge to his credibility and that of the international community. Bosnian press
reports claimed that the United States was in favor of the use of the Bonn powers against the
Bosnian Serb leadership in response to the May 14 resolution, but that EU foreign policy chief
Javier Solana and some EU countries were opposed. Finally, on June 20, Inzko used his Bonn
powers to annul the RS parliament resolution. Dodik and the RS government remained
unrepentant after the decision, casting doubt on its real value.
In another battle over OHR’s role in December 2009, Inzko extended the role of international
judges and prosecutors trying war crimes cases for another three years, after the Bosnian state
parliament failed to pass legislation extending their stay. Inzko said that international judges and
prosecutors dealing with organization crime and corruption could remain only in an advisory
capacity. Nevertheless, the RS parliament passed legislation rejecting the decision. Prime Minster
Dodik has called for the parliament to adopt a law permitting the RS to hold referendums. Dodik
says that he hopes that the RS will be able to hold a referendum on support for the Dayton Peace
Accords as early as February. While seemingly innocuous in the abstract, the referendum may be
aimed at discrediting the OHR and undermining any substantial constitutional reform effort. For
example, it is the RS government’s contention that the Bonn powers are a violation of the Dayton
Peace Accords. The RS leadership has also attacked most constitutional reform ideas as being
contrary to Dayton.
There has been pressure within the EU to scale back the international military presence in Bosnia.
The EU-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia, dubbed EUFOR Althea, has a current strength of about
1,950 troops. Some EU countries have called for a sharp reduction of EUFOR to about 200
troops. They want the force to have exclusively a training and advisory mission, with no
peacekeeping functions. Supporters of EUFOR withdrawal may have also been motivated by a
desire to ease the burdens on their armed forces, which may have units deployed in Afghanistan
and other places. Other EU countries remain concerned about the negative political signal that
could be sent by a rapid downsizing of the force at a time when political tensions in Bosnia are
high and reforms are foundering.
In January 2010, the European Council issued a statement saying that EUFOR would add the
“non-executive” task of support for security sector reform to its mission while retaining its
“executive” functions of maintain a safe and secure environment, as needed. Press reports claim
that the EU foreign ministers backed away from sharply reducing EUFOR at this stage, due to the
lack of progress in reforms in Bosnia. Nevertheless, observers are concerned that some force
contributors may withdraw their troops from EUFOR in the future with or without a formal EU
decision. Britain and France already have fewer than 10 personnel each in EUFOR.
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As direct control declines, the international community expects to continue to encourage reform
in Bosnia by providing aid, advice, and the eventual prospect of joining NATO and the EU. In
November 2006, NATO leaders invited Bosnia to join its Partnership for Peace (PFP) program,
which provides Bosnia with assistance in improving its armed forces and making them
interoperable with NATO. At their April 2008 summit in Bucharest, the Allies agreed to upgrade
its relationship with Bosnia by launching an Intensified Dialogue. However, the Alliance has
stopped short of granting Bosnia a Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is designed to prepare
a country for NATO membership. In June 2008, Bosnia signed a Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA) with the European Union. The SAA offers Bosnia increased aid and advice and
recognizes it as a potential membership candidate.5 However, it is unclear whether these
incentives are strong enough for Bosnian leaders to change their policies.
U.S. Policy
The United States has strongly supported Bosnia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.
However, the U.S. role in the country has declined in recent years. There have been no U.S.
peacekeeping troops in Bosnia since 2004, when a NATO-led peacekeeping force was replaced
by the current EU-led force. Some observers have claimed that the U.S. political role in Bosnia
has also declined, particularly since the failure of constitutional reforms in 2006, despite strong
U.S. pressure on the Bosnian parties at the time. Although the Office of the High Representative
is dominated by EU countries, U.S. diplomats play significant roles. The current Deputy High
Representative is Raffi Gregorian, an American diplomat. As Deputy High Representative, he has
also been in charge of enforcing the Brcko Final Award. If OHR is eliminated, it is unclear what
role the United States will play in subsequent EU-led efforts to assist Bosnia’s reforms.
The United States provided large amounts of aid to Bosnia in the years after the 1992-1995 war,
as the country was rebuilding. However, aid totals gradually declined thereafter, and current US
aid to Bosnia is modest. For FY2009, Bosnia will receive an estimated $29.4 million in aid to
promote political and economic reform; $3.6 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), $1
million in IMET military training funds, and $1.4 million in Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,
Demining and Related Programs (NADR) aid. For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested
$38.6 million in political and economic aid, $1 million in IMET, $6 million in FMF, and $2.1
million in NADR.6 The FY2010 State Department-Foreign Operations appropriations language is
contained in Division F of P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010. The
conference report accompanying the measure recommended $36 million in aid for political and
economic reform for Bosnia from the Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia account.
U.S. aid has focused on strengthening state-level institutions in Bosnia. The United States
provides assistance to Bosnia’s state-level police organizations to fight organized crime and
terrorism. U.S. aid also is aimed at improving the functioning of Bosnia’s judiciary; improving its
border controls; and creating a better legal and regulatory environment for economic growth and
investment. The objective of U.S. military aid is to unify Bosnia’s military more effectively and
improve its capabilities so that it may become interoperable with NATO. Bosnia has dispatched

5 For more on Bosnia’s progress toward closer ties with the EU, see the EU Commission’s November 2008 progress
report at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-
documents/reports_nov_2008/bosnia_herzegovina_progress_report_en.pdf
6 FY2010 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Justification,
http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/fy2010cbj/pdf/index.htm/
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Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

ten soldiers to serve as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. Bosnia is
planning to send an infantry company of 137 men and a 30-person explosive ordinance disposal
platoon to Afghanistan in 2010.
Vice President Joseph Biden visited Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo on May 19-21, 2009. In a speech
on May 19 to the Bosnian parliament he warned that the “sharp and dangerous rise in nationalist
rhetoric” that has occurred in Bosnia since 2006 must stop. He warned that Bosnia faced a future
of poverty and possibly even violence if it did not abandon this path.
Biden appeared to tacitly underscore continued U.S. support for the framework of the Dayton
Peace Accords by saying Bosnia could integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions as a state “with
two vibrant entities.” However, he said that Bosnia needed a functioning central government that
controls the national army, prevails where there is a conflict between central and local laws, has
an electoral system that does not exclude any group, has the power to raise revenue, and has the
authority to negotiate with the EU and other states to implement its obligations. Biden warned
that the United States would not support the closure of OHR until the five objectives and two
conditions were met.7
Although the Administration has so far declined to appoint a special envoy to the Balkans, as
some in Congress and elsewhere have recommended, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg
participated in the initial rounds of the Butmir talks brokered by the U.S. and EU on Bosnian
reforms. Despite its lack of success so far, U.S. officials have touted the reform initiative as a
remarkable example of U.S.-EU coordination on policy toward the region
Policy Concerns and Issues for Congress
The international community appears to have decided to reduce its direct role in Bosnia, and
indeed to hold out the timetable for that reduction as an incentive for the local parties in Bosnia to
make progress on key issues. This is expected to work together with the other main incentive,
Euro-Atlantic integration. However, it is unclear whether these incentives are strong enough for
Bosnian leaders (particularly Dodik) to change their policies.
Many observers believe a more active use of the Bonn powers by OHR to force changes is
unrealistic because it would provoke strong resistance by the RS. OHR would not have the strong
backing from many PIC countries (especially Russia) to deal with such resistance, and some
believe EUFOR lacks the military capability and political will to deal with unrest. Those favoring
a more active international role in Bosnia call for OHR’s closure to be delayed until the objectives
laid out by the PIC have been met. They say that the EU Special Representative that will remain
after OHR’s closure should be given powers to sanction Bosnian leaders if necessary, as well as
power over the disbursement of EU funding to Bosnia. They call for EUFOR to increase its
capabilities and to engage in patrolling and other activities to enhance its profile.8 Given the EU’s
recent actions, however, the political will for such a policy appears to be lacking.

7 A text of Vice President Biden’s speech can be found at the White House website at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Prepared-Remarks-Vice-President-Joe-Biden-Addresses-Parliament-of-
Bosnia-and-Herzegovina/
8 International Crisis Group, “Bosnia’s Incomplete Transition Between Dayton and Europe,” March 9, 2009, at the ICG
website http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm
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It is possible that the international community may have encouraged the investigation of Dodik
for corruption in order to undermine him politically or put pressure on him to make compromises.
However, it is unclear whether Dodik’s power could truly be threatened by such actions. In fact,
they may have provoked him to take a more confrontational stance instead of compromising.
Moreover, it can be argued that Dodik’s opposition to a stronger central government reflects the
preferences of most Bosnian Serbs, and therefore any successor to Dodik would follow similar
policies.
One important consideration is what policy objectives the international community realistically
expects to achieve in Bosnia and its analysis of the consequences of failure. Avoiding widespread
violence or even the breakup of Bosnia would presumably be the most basic international
objective. Large-scale violence would put EUFOR in danger and likely require a U.S. and NATO
military response, at a time when forces are severely stretched due to missions in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and elsewhere. In addition, neighboring Serbia and Croatia could be pulled into such a
conflict. This could also implicate NATO, as Croatia joined the Alliance in April 2009. Increased
regional instability could also revive conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.
Those who argue that a renewed conflict is unlikely note that the political environment around
Bosnia now is completely different than it was during the 1990s. Then, nationalist regimes in
Serbia and Croatia tried to cement their support at home by expanding their countries’ borders at
Bosnia’s expense. Now, pro-Western democratic regimes in these countries appeal to their
electorates by trying to build prosperous democracies integrated with Europe. This goal would be
shattered by renewed war. Bosnia’s army is also much smaller now than during the war, with
fewer heavy weapons. Some observers assert that police forces, private security companies, and a
well-armed population could in principle provide forces for substantial levels of violence. Yet
public opinion polls seem to indicate very little support for violence in support of nationalist
causes. Most Bosnians appear more concerned about high unemployment (estimates range as
high as 40%) and low living standards.
Renewed conflict (if perhaps on a smaller and more localized scale than in the 1990s) would be
most likely to occur if the RS attempted to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bosniaks
tried to prevent such an action by force of arms. Observers are divided on whether the current
impasse, caused in part by RS obstructionism, could eventually destabilize the country even
without a provocative act such as secession. If the United States and other international actors
conclude that such a nightmare scenario is unlikely to unfold, they may continue to follow their
current approach, even if it does not bear fruit in the short term, in part due to a lack of
alternatives and in part due to their focus on more pressing international issues.
The international community has not considered trying to broker a peaceful breakup of Bosnia.
This is despite the possibility that Bosnia’s shortcomings as a state may not be primarily due to
the inherent flaws of the Dayton accords, the alleged lack of skill of international overseers, or the
foibles of particular Bosnian politicians. Instead, it can be argued that many of the failures
ultimately stem from a more fundamental problem – the fact that at least a large minority of the
population (Bosnian Serbs and many Croats) never wanted to be part of an independent Bosnia.
International rejection of partition is in part due to strong opposition by the Bosniaks, who would
have the most to lose in such an arrangement. A mainly Bosniak Bosnia would be a small,
landlocked country surrounded by less than sympathetic neighbors. In contrast, Bosnian Serb and
Croat nationalists would hope for support and eventual union of territories they control with
Serbia and Croatia respectively.
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The United States and other Western countries may feel that they owe the Bosniaks a lingering
moral debt, due to the perceived indecision and tardiness of the international community in
averting or ending the 1992-1995 war, in which the Bosniaks were the main victims. Perhaps at
least equally importantly, there are concerns that a partition of Bosnia could be destabilizing for
the region as a whole, given that Kosovo and Macedonia have ethno-territorial problems of their
own. Leaders in the Balkans often look to the example of others in the region as justification for
their own positions and actions.
The international community’s more ambitious goals include strengthening the central
government and encouraging other political and economic reforms in order to bring Bosnia into
NATO and the EU. Bosnia’s deep-rooted structural problems may prevent rapid success in these
areas in the near future, unless NATO and the EU decide to advance Bosnia’s candidacies even in
the absence of marked improvement in hopes such moves themselves would help stabilize the
country.
Some observers have called for the Obama Administration to appoint a special envoy to the
Balkans. On February 13, 2009, Representative Howard Berman introduced H.Res. 171, which
called for a U.S. “Special Envoy to the Balkans who can work in partnership with the EU and
political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina to facilitate reforms at all levels of government and
society, while also assisting the political development of other countries in the region.” The
resolution also called on the OHR not to be closed unless the PIC can “definitively determine”
that the five conditions and two principles have been met. It also suggests that the EU rethink its
plans to draw down EUFOR and should ensure that the EU Special Representative will have the
tools to “manage effectively post-OHR Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Some observers believe that
such an envoy could help to energize what they see as a moribund international effort in the
region. Others are skeptical, saying the envoy would unnecessarily duplicate existing efforts, and
therefore would find little to do. On May 12, 2009, the House passed H.Res. 171
Some observers have claimed that the RS parliament’s resolution attacking OHR was prompted
by the passage of the House resolution. Others have claimed that an ongoing corruption
investigation of Dodik by central government authorities, which Dodik has charged was
prompted by Raffi Gregorian and OHR, was the main cause.
On August 3, 2009, Senator Kerry introduced S. 1559. The bill authorizes U.S. aid for the NATO
membership candidacy of Bosnia and Herzegovina (as well as that of Montenegro) under the
terms of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (Title II of P.L. 103-447.) In its Findings section, S.
1559 says that the NATO accession effort can focus efforts to improve the functionality and
efficiency of Bosnia’s armed forces and the Bosnian state as a whole. NATO membership could
reduce regional tensions, according to the language of the bill.

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Figure 1. Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Source: CRS.

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Author Contact Information

Steven Woehrel

Specialist in European Affairs
swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291


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