Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in
Nine Nations

Jonathan Medalia, Coordinator
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
January 25, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40439
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations

Summary
Seven nations—China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States—possess nuclear weapons. In addition, North Korea tested a nuclear explosive device in
2006 and announced that it had conducted another such test in 2009, and Israel is widely thought
to have nuclear weapons. As an aid to Congress in understanding nuclear weapons, nuclear
proliferation, and arms control matters, this report describes which agency is responsible for
research and development (R&D) of nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear explosive devices, as distinct
from the bombers and missiles that deliver them) in these nations and whether these agencies are
civilian or military. It also traces the history of such agencies in the United States from 1942 to
the present. This report will be updated annually, or more often as developments warrant.
In the United States, the Army managed the nuclear weapons program during World War II. Since
1946, weapons R&D has been managed by civilian agencies, at present by the National Nuclear
Security Administration, a semiautonomous agency in the Department of Energy.
China’s nuclear weapons R&D is apparently under the direction of the military, collectively
called the People’s Liberation Army.
France’s nuclear weapons R&D is supervised by the Ministry of Defense, which delegates the
direction of these programs to the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission (CEA).
However, as with NNSA in the United States, CEA is not a part of the Ministry of Defense. CEA
also conducts nuclear programs in science and industry, under the supervision of other ministries.
India’s nuclear weapons R&D appears to be controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy,
which is under the direct control of the Prime Minister.
Israel’s nuclear program is under civilian control, but since Israel neither confirms nor denies that
it possesses nuclear weapons, it classifies information on nuclear weapons, including
organizations responsible for R&D. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission reportedly has overall
responsibility for Israel’s nuclear weapons program, and the Director General of that commission
reports directly to the Prime Minister.
North Korea’s Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry is in charge of the day-to-day operation of the
nuclear weapons program. Under it are nuclear-related organizations. Policy is decided by leader
Kim Jong-il and other Communist Party and military leaders who advise him.
Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) supervises the functions and administration of all
of Pakistan’s “Strategic Organizations,” which are composed of all organizations involved in
nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister is the chair of the NCA, and the membership includes
senior civilian and military leaders.
Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is responsible for nuclear weapons R&D
and production. It is a civilian agency, though it has many links to the military.
In the United Kingdom, a private company, AWE Management Limited, manages and operates
the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), a government-owned, contractor-operated entity. The
Ministry of Defence (MoD), which is headed by a civilian, controls the operations, policy, and
direction of AWE and can veto actions of the company. The MoD provides most of the funding
for AWE.

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Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
United States............................................................................................................................... 1
China .......................................................................................................................................... 3
France......................................................................................................................................... 3
India ........................................................................................................................................... 4
Israel........................................................................................................................................... 5
North Korea ................................................................................................................................ 6
Pakistan ...................................................................................................................................... 7
Russia ......................................................................................................................................... 7
United Kingdom ......................................................................................................................... 8

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 10

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Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations

Introduction
Since 1945, seven nations—China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States—have developed and currently deploy nuclear weapons. In addition, North Korea
tested a low-yield nuclear explosive device in October 2006 and announced that it had conducted
another nuclear test in May 2009,1 and Israel is generally thought to possess nuclear weapons,
although it maintains a policy of ambiguity on this matter. This report describes the organizations
controlling research and development (R&D) on nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear explosive devices,
as distinct from the bombers and missiles that carry them) in these nations, and presents a brief
history of the organizations controlling nuclear weapons R&D in the United States. It discusses
whether these organizations are civilian or military, though in many nations the lines between
civilian and military are blurred. This information may be of use to Members of Congress and
their staff interested in nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, and arms control matters.
United States
The U.S. program for research, development, and production of nuclear weapons began during
World War II. It was initially under the control of the Office of Scientific Research and
Development, a civilian agency within the Executive Office of the President. In 1942, control
shifted to the Army, in substantial part because the Army had the capability to manage projects to
design and build the massive plants to produce uranium and plutonium for atomic bombs.2 In
1945 and 1946, debate raged in Congress, the White House, the War Department, and among
scientists and the public about whether to place atomic energy under civilian or military control.3
Congress resolved the issue in favor of civilian control of atomic energy in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-585).4 That act created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to develop
nuclear weapons and, more generally, to foster and control research into atomic energy. The AEC
was an independent organization, separate from the War Department and, later, from the
Department of Defense (DOD). Ever since, nuclear weapons R&D has been conducted by the
AEC and its successor organizations, all of which have been under civilian control and separate
from DOD.5
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703), as amended, replaces the Atomic Energy Act of
1946.6 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission states that the 1954 act “is the fundamental U.S. law
on both the civilian and the military uses of nuclear materials.”7

1 Since no radioactive materials (particles or gases) were reported to have been detected from the 2009 explosion, it is
not certain that that event was in fact a nuclear test.
2 Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939/1946, Volume I: A History of the United States
Atomic Energy Commission
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), pp. 71-83.
3 Ibid., pp. 7, 408-411.
4 “Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 585, 79th Congress), Excerpted from ‘Legislative History of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 585, 79th Congress),’” Compiled by James D. Nuse, AEC Headquarters Library,
Volume 1, Principal Documents, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, 1965, http://www.osti.gov/
atomicenergyact.pdf.
5 For a detailed timeline of the history of DOE and its predecessor agencies, see “Energy Timeline” at the DOE website
at http://www.energy.gov/about/timeline.htm.
6 The Act, as amended, is available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode42/
(continued...)
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The Energy Research Reorganization Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-438) abolished the AEC. It established
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which regulated civilian uses of nuclear energy; the Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA), which was in charge of nuclear weapons,
among other things; and the Energy Resources Council. In 1977, the Department of Energy
Organization Act (P.L. 95-91) abolished ERDA and the Federal Energy Administration and
established DOE.
In 1999, Title XXXII of P.L. 106-65, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000, established
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as a semiautonomous agency within DOE.
That act stated, regarding the semiautonomous status:
SEC. 3213. STATUS OF ADMINISTRATION AND CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL
WITHIN DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.
(a) Status of Administration Personnel.—Each officer or employee of the Administration, in
carrying out any function of the Administration—
(1) shall be responsible to and subject to the authority, direction, and control of—
(A) the Secretary acting through the Administrator and consistent with section 202(c)(3) of
the Department of Energy Organization Act;
(B) the Administrator; or
(C) the Administrator’s designee within the Administration; and
(2) shall not be responsible to, or subject to the authority, direction, or control of, any other
officer, employee, or agent of the Department of Energy.
Section 3203 states that the Secretary of Energy “shall be responsible for establishing policy” for
NNSA, while Section 3251 requires that NNSA’s budget shall be treated separately in the DOE
budget.
NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs is responsible for such nuclear weapons work as R&D,
production, transportation between DOE sites and between DOE and DOD sites, maintenance of
weapons (except for minor maintenance at DOD sites), and dismantlement. NNSA’s other major
program areas are Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) and Naval Reactors. DNN’s Office
of Fissile Materials Disposition is responsible for the disposition of surplus plutonium and highly
enriched uranium. The Nuclear Weapons Council coordinates NNSA and DOD work on nuclear
weapons. The council was established pursuant to P.L. 99-661, FY1987 National Defense
Authorization Act, Section 3137.8 According to DOD, the members of the council are the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security of the Department of Energy (who is

(...continued)
usc_sup_01_42_10_23_15_A.html.
7 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Our Governing Legislation,” http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/governing-
laws.html#aea-1954.
8 See 10 U.S.C. 179, at http://frwebgate3.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=22986610749+0+2+0&
WAISaction=retrieve.
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also the Administrator of NNSA), and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; there are also
10 nonvoting observers.9
At present, NNSA’s nuclear weapons activities are conducted at eight sites: Los Alamos National
Laboratory (NM), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (CA), and Sandia National
Laboratories (NM and CA), all of which conduct weapons R&D; Pantex Plant (TX), Kansas City
Plant (MO), and Y-12 Plant (TN), all of which are involved in the production, maintenance, and
dismantlement of nuclear weapons; and the Savannah River Site (SC), which processes tritium, a
key ingredient of nuclear weapons, and the Nevada Test Site (NV). While the last U.S. nuclear
test was conducted in September 1992, the test site conducts weapons-related experiments not
involving nuclear explosions and remains available to conduct nuclear tests if needed. A DOE
website contains summary and detailed DOE budget requests for FY2005-FY2010.10 (Written by
Jonathan Medalia, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy.)
China
The research, development, testing, and production of nuclear weapons in the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) appear to be under the control of the military, which is collectively called the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The work is conducted by the China Academy of Engineering
Physics (CAEP), a large organization that encompasses many institutes. CAEP seems to report to
the Science and Technology Commission of the PLA’s General Armaments Department (GAD),
which was established in 1998. The PLA, through the GAD, also controls the nuclear weapon test
site at Lop Nur in the northwestern Xinjiang region. At the same time, the PRC’s defense
industrial policy has integrated military and civilian efforts, including work at military and
civilian universities. The China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) is a defense industrial
state-owned conglomerate that plays a role in nuclear weapons development, civilian nuclear
power plants, enrichment, and other related nuclear facilities. CNNC is one of 11 defense
industrial conglomerates under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), a
“super ministry” organized in 2008. The MIIT seems to fall under the State Council (similar to a
Cabinet) and the Central Military Commission (the Communist Party of China’s command
authority of the PLA).11 (Written by Shirley Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs.)
France
France’s nuclear weapons R&D is supervised by the French Ministry of Defense, which delegates
the direction of these programs to the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission

9 U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters.
“Nuclear Weapons Council,” updated March 2, 2009, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nuclearweaponscouncil.html.
10 U.S. Department of Energy. Office of the Chief Financial Officer, Office of the Chief Financial Officer Products and
Services
, http://www.cfo.doe.gov/crorg/products.cfm, and select “Budget Justifications & Supporting Docs” from the
drop-down menu.
11 This section is based on unclassified sources, including Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China (Cornell University
Press, 2009); Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman, “The Nuclear Express,” Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2009;
Thomas Reed, “The Chinese Nuclear Tests, 1964-1996,” Physics Today, September 2008; numerous articles published
by CAEP, CNNC, MIIT, and PRC and Hong Kong media; and Nuclear Threat Initiative (http://www.nti.org).
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(Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux energies alternatives, or CEA).12 CEA was established
in 1945 and is “a public entity … Independent in terms of administration and finances.”13 It is
active in three main fields: energy; information and health technology; and defense and national
security.14
According to the Embassy of France, CEA’s general programs are determined by a committee,
Comité à l’Energie Atomique, which is chaired by the French Prime Minister. The CEA Chairman
serves as “a sort of Chief Executive Director” of the organization. He or she is appointed by the
government, chairs the CEA Board, and is a permanent member of the aforementioned Comité. A
High Commissioner, also appointed by the government, is tasked with advising the CEA
Chairman on scientific and technical issues. The High Commissioner chairs the CEA Scientific
Committee and is usually a member of the Comité.
CEA activities in the military field are carried out in the CEA’s “Direction for Military
Applications” (DAM). DAM’s activities are supervised by the Ministry of Defense, but program
management is in large part delegated to CEA. A Commission, the Comité Mixte Armées-CEA,
oversees program execution, particularly the financial aspects. As is the case for other CEA
directorates, DAM is not a part of the Ministry of Defense or any other government Ministry.
CEA receives its funding from three government ministries: the Ministry of Ecology, Energy,
Sustainable Development and Sea; the Ministry for Higher Education and Research; and the
Ministry of Defense. Funding decisions are based on a common CEA strategy, but each ministry
submits to parliament a separate budget proposal for programs in its area. (Written by Paul
Belkin, Analyst in European Affairs.)
India
The organizations concerned with research and development for India’s nuclear weapons all
appear to be controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), which was set up in 1954
under the direct charge of the Prime Minister.15 The Department continues to function under the
direct control of the Prime Minister.16 According to publicly available information from the DAE,
the Department includes facilities widely believed by experts to be part of (or potentially part of)
India’s nuclear weapons program, including nuclear reactors, reprocessing facilities, and
enrichment facilities.17 All of these facilities appear to be under the control of the Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre and the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, both of which are part of the
DAE. (Written by Paul Kerr, Analyst in Nonproliferation.)

12 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section provided by the Embassy of France, Washington, DC.
13 E-mails from the embassy of France, February 2009.
14 Commissariat a l’energie atomique, “Facts and Figures,” http://www.cea.fr/english_portal/cea/identity. For an
organization chart, see http://www.cea.fr/english_portal/cea/identity/organization_chart.
15 Statement from the Atomic Energy Commission. Available at http://www.aec.gov.in/.
16 Statement from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre. Available at http://www.barc.ernet.in/webpages/about/.
17 Information about organizations under control of the DAE is available at http://www.barc.gov.in/dae_units.html. For
more information about India’s civilian and military nuclear facilities, see CRS Report RL33292, India's Nuclear
Separation Plan: Issues and Views
, by Sharon Squassoni.
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Israel
Israel follows a policy of strategic ambiguity or nuclear opacity regarding its nuclear weapons
program, neither confirming nor denying its existence.18 Its officials simply state that Israel would
not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region, without explaining what that means.
Israel believes that this policy enhances its deterrence. Therefore, the Office of the Military
Censor does not permit reporting on the country’s nuclear infrastructure, facilities, and
organizations. Nonetheless, there have been many reports alleging and concerning Israel’s nuclear
weapons program.19 Indeed, as far back as 1974 a U.S. Special National Intelligence Estimate
stated, “We believe that Israel already has produced and stockpiled a small number of fission
weapons.”20
Israel’s nuclear program is under civilian control. In 1952, the Israel Atomic Energy Commission
(IAEC) was created to advise the government on nuclear policy and on nuclear research and
development priorities, and to implement policies. In 1957, then Director General of the Ministry
of Defense Shimon Peres sidelined the IAEC during the development of the nuclear center at
Dimona and gave the responsibility for developing the center to the Armament Development
Authority in the Ministry of Defense. As are all other aspects of the IAEC’s operations, its
relations with the military are classified. The IAEC was restructured after Peres resigned his post
in 1966, when it reportedly assumed overall responsibility for Israel’s nuclear weapons
program.21 The Director General of the IAEC officially reports directly to the prime minister, who
often delegates the responsibility to another minister in order to build up a portfolio for political
purposes. With the active involvement of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office, Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence and Atomic Energy Dan Meridor is responsible for
oversight of the IAEC in the government that took power in March 2009. In August 2007, then
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert named Dr. Shaul Horev (alternate transliteration: Chorev), formerly
deputy chief of the Israeli navy and then head of a secret “special means unit” within the Defense
Ministry, to be the new Director General of the IAEC.
The IAEC directs research at the Center for Nuclear Research at Nahal Sorek (alternative
transliteration: Soreq) south of Tel Aviv and at the larger Center for Nuclear Research in the
Negev south of Dimona. According to journalists, the Ministry of Defense provides most of the

18 A consensus among media and expert reports is that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal of 100 to 200 weapons,
although some suggest a higher figure. See Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Israel Nuclear Facilities,” http://www.nti.org/
e_research/profiles/Israel/nuclear/3583.html, and Douglas Frantz, “Israel Gains Full Nuclear Arsenal,” Los Angeles
Times
, October 12, 2003, among others. National Public Radio reporter Eric Weiner used the range of 200 to 400
nuclear weapons, citing the CIA as his source, in a report on All Things Considered, March 22, 2001.
19 The most notable revelations may have been those of Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at Israel’s nuclear
reactor complex, who provided data on and photographs of the nuclear reactor center at Dimona to the Sunday Times
(London) in 1986. Vanunu reported that Israel had been building nuclear weapons for 20 years and possessed a
stockpile of between 100 and 200 warheads. In 1988, Israel convicted Vanunu of espionage and treason for selling
secrets to the Times, but did not admit that his disclosures were truthful. Several books rely on Vanunu’s information,
including Yair Evron, Israel’s Nuclear Dilemma, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994, and Seymour Hersh, Samson
Option
, New York, Vintage Books, 1993. Other sources include Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 1, and “Completing the Deterrence Triangle,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Non-Proliferation Project, v. 3, no. 18, June 29, 2000.
20 U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, Special National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Further Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons
, SNIE 4-1-74, 1974, p. 20.
21 Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/agency/iaec.htm.
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operating funds for the research centers. The Ministry of Defense is headed by a civilian minister,
who is often, but not always, a retired general. In the current government, the minister is former
Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces Lt. Gen. Ehud Barak (Ret.) The Sorek center
reportedly conducts nuclear weapons research and design. Dimona is the site of the nuclear
reactor and fissile material processing plant, and reportedly both highly enriched uranium and
plutonium are produced there.22 (Written by Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs.)
North Korea23
Policy-making toward North Korea’s nuclear program has been vested in the National Defense
Council since 1991. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il heads this body. The other members
represent the North Korean Workers (Communist) Party and the North Korean military. Kim
Jong-il has had the supreme decision-making authority on nuclear policy since he succeeded his
father, Kim Il-sung in 1994. However, in August 2008, he suffered a severe stroke. Since then, a
collective decision-making apparatus has emerged, apparently headed by his brother-in-law,
Chang song-taek. It contains key North Korean military commanders, and the military has been
more influential in the policy-making context since Kim’s stroke. While U.S. and South Korean
intelligence officials have stated that Kim Jong-il appears to have partially recovered from the
stroke, most experts believe the leaders in this collective group will continue to have an important
policy-formulation role in the future.
At the top of the operational organization is North Korea’s Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry, a
full-fledged cabinet ministry. Under this ministry, there are a number of nuclear-related
organizations and research centers. There are two committees: an Isotope Application Committee
and a Nuclear Energy Committee. The Ministry also directs a nuclear research center at
Yongbyon, the site of North Korea’s known plutonium facilities. There also is a nuclear energy
institute in Pyongyang, the capital.
The Yongbyon nuclear research center consists of 10 branches: (1) Uranium Resources
Development Institute; (2) Nuclear Physics Institute; (3) Radiochemical Laboratory (plutonium
reprocessing); (4) Nuclear Material Institute; (5) Nuclear Energy Research Institute; (6) Isotope
Utilization Institute; (7) Neutron Physics Institute; (8) Reactor Design Institute; (9) Nuclear
Electromagnetics Institute; (10) Radiation Protection Institute.
Under this organization framework, the South Korean government estimates that there are about
20 nuclear facilities. The main ones at Yongbyon are a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor, a plutonium
reprocessing plant, and a fuel fabrication plant. There also are at least five uranium mining and
milling facilities. It also is believed that North Korea has facilities for storing its stockpile of
plutonium, which it has produced at Yongbyon, and for storing a few nuclear weapons that it may
have produced. In 2009, North Korea admitted after years of denial that it had an active uranium
enrichment program.24 The South Korean government estimates that there are about 3,000 people

22 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Israel Nuclear Facilities.”
23 This section is based largely on North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Problems and Prospects, edited by
Kim Kyong-soon, Hollym Publishers, 2004. See also CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons:
Technical Issues
, by Mary Beth Nikitin.
24 Blaine Harden, “North Korea: Uranium Program Near Completion,” Washington Post, September 4, 2009,
(continued...)
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working throughout North Korea’s nuclear facilities.25 (Written by Larry Niksch, Specialist in
Asian Affairs.)
Pakistan
The National Command Authority (NCA) supervises the functions and administration of all of
Pakistan’s organizations involved in nuclear weapons research, development, and employment, as
well as the military services that operate the strategic forces.26 The Prime Minister is Chairperson
of the NCA.27 Other members of the NCA include senior military and civilian officials.28 The
NCA, as Pakistan’s main decision-making body for nuclear weapons issues, is made up of two
committees. One, the Development Control Committee (DCC), includes several military officials;
its Deputy Chairperson is also the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The DCC “exercises
technical, financial and administrative control over all strategic organisations, including national
laboratories and research and development organisations associated with the development and
modernisation of nuclear weapons.”29 The second is the Employment Control Committee. A
Strategic Plans Division (SPD) acts as the secretariat for the NCA.30 The SPD is tasked with the
daily management of Pakistan’s strategic assets and has oversight over the “Strategic
Organizations,” which include Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and Dr. A.Q. Khan Research
Laboratories; it oversees “the systematic progress of weapon systems.”31 (Written by Paul Kerr,
Analyst in Nonproliferation.)
Russia
The Russian Federation has continued the Soviet pattern of civilian government control of the
nuclear infrastructure, including military and civilian programs. The Soviet Union’s nuclear
weapons program began in the late phases of World War II and developed into 10 closed “nuclear

(...continued)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/04/AR2009090401083.html.
25 “N. Korea Employs 3,000 Workers in 20 Nuclear Facilities,” Asia Pulse, October 22, 2009.
26 December 2007 Ordinance To Provide For The Constitution And Establishment Of National Command
Authority.
27 When the NCA was established in 2000, the government’s announcement designated the Head of
Government, or Prime Minister, as Chairperson. At that time, General Musharraf, as Chief Executive,
became Chairperson and stayed in that position after becoming President in 2002. He appointed the Prime
Minister as Vice Chairman. However, President Zardari returned the NCA to its original structure when, in
a November 2009 re-promulgation of the 2007 NCA Ordinance, he specified that the Prime Minister would
be Chairperson, removing himself from that position. This re-promulgation also abolished the position of
Vice Chairman.
28 December 2007 Ordinance.
29 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, (London: The
International Institute of Strategic Studies), 2007. p. 111; Pakistan Announcement of Nuclear-Weapons
Command-and-Control Mechanism, Associated Press of Pakistan, February 3, 2000. Nuclear Black
Markets,
pp. 110-111, has organization charts of the NCA and SPD.
30 The SPD is headed by a Director General from the Army.
31 Nuclear Black Markets, p. 111.
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cities.” The Soviet nuclear complex was under the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry,
which in 1992 became the Ministry for Atomic Energy (MinAtom). The Russian Federation
inherited the vast majority of the Soviet Union’s nuclear assets. After government restructuring in
2004, MinAtom became the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (FAAE, known as Rosatom).
After being appointed head of the agency, former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko led a
restructuring of the nuclear complex to facilitate an expansion of nuclear power exports and
international collaboration. A 2007 law, the “Tunnel Law,” consolidated all civilian nuclear assets
under a new joint stock company, Atomenergoprom, under Rosatom. A further restructuring
converted Rosatom itself from a federal agency to a government-owned corporation, the Rosatom
State Atomic Energy Corporation (which retained nearly all of its functions as a government
agency). Kiriyenko, who stayed in his post as head of the organization, is accountable to the
Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. Rosatom manages Atomenergoprom and is directly
responsible for defense-related nuclear work, nuclear science, the back end of the fuel cycle, and
nuclear safety and security matters.
Rosatom’s Nuclear Weapons Complex branch is responsible for developing, testing, producing,
and dismantling all nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Weapons Complex branch consists of two
divisions: the Nuclear Weapons Production Division and the Development and Testing Division.
The latter oversees the two major Russian nuclear weapon design research institutes—the All-
Russian Scientific Research Institute for Experimental Physics in Sarov (VNIIEF) and the All-
Russian Scientific Research Institute for Technical Physics in Snezhinsk (VNIITF), founded in
1946 and 1955, respectively. A number of research centers also participate in nuclear weapons
work. Russia also maintains a test site at Novaya Zemlya. The Ministry of Defense oversees the
storage and deployment of nuclear weapons. 32 (Written by Mary Beth Nikitin, Analyst in
Nonproliferation.)
United Kingdom
The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) is responsible for the design, production, assembly,
and maintenance of the UK’s nuclear weapons, as well as decommissioning and disassembly.33
The British government owns all AWE sites and assets, which are based at two facilities in
Berkshire: Aldermaston and Burghfield. Government control of AWE is exercised by the civilian-
led Ministry of Defence (MoD) and vested in its top official, the Secretary of State for Defence.34
Since creation of this post in 1964, this official has always been a civilian, a Member of
Parliament, and a member of the Prime Minister’s cabinet. Within the MoD structure, the

32 Unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement Pursuant to Section 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as Amended, With Respect to the Proposed Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Russian Federation For Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, May
1, 2008; NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, http://www.nti.org; and Rosatom State
Corporation website, http://www.minatom.ru/.
33 AWE’s mission also covers nuclear threat reduction, including threat assessment, response to defense-related nuclear
incidents, and verification (for example, monitoring Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty compliance and conducting
research into future multilateral arms control regimes). See AWE website, http://www.awe.co.uk/set/
national_nuclear_security.aspx.
34 Nuclear Information Service, Hansard on Control of Atomic Weapons Establishment - 26th Jan 09,
http://www.nuclearinfo.org/view/nuclear+sites/AWE+Aldermaston/a1983.
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Minister of State for Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), also a civilian and a Member of
Parliament, has specific lead responsibility for government policy and direction regarding AWE.35
In 1993, AWE was made a government-owned, contractor-operated entity, and its management
was contracted to the private consortium Hunting-BRAE.36 In 2000, the MoD awarded a new 10-
year contract to AWE Management Limited (AWE ML), a partnership of Lockheed Martin,
Serco, and British Nuclear Fuels Limited. This contract has since been extended through 2025.
With the management contract, AWE ML took over the operating company AWE plc, which
handles day-to-day operations and employs the workforce of around 4,500 staff and 2,000
contractors. The MoD retains a “golden share”—a nominal share allowing it to veto corporate
action—in AWE plc.37 In December 2008, Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. acquired British
Nuclear Fuels Limited’s share of AWE ML.38 AWE ML is contractually obligated to consult with
the government regarding all such changes in the composition of its ownership.39
The great majority of funding for AWE comes from the UK defense budget, primarily under
allocations for the DE&S section of the MoD.40 The Directorate Strategic Weapons of DE&S
manages the AWE contract, leading MoD monitoring and liaison with AWE ML to ensure the
execution of government decisions regarding Britain’s strategic requirements.41 AWE facilities
are subject to the same regime of licensing and safety regulations as civil nuclear plants, and are
regularly inspected for compliance by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, a division of the
Nuclear Directorate of the UK Health and Safety Executive.42 (Written by Derek Mix, Analyst in
European Affairs.)


35 UK Ministry of Defence website, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ministerial_responsibilities/departments/
mod.aspx#ministers5.
36 UK Ministry of Defence, The United Kingdom's Defence Nuclear Weapons Programme, http://www.mod.uk/NR/
rdonlyres/B31B4EF0-A584-4CC6-9B14-B5E89E6848F8/0/plutoniumandaldermaston.pdf.
37 AWE website, http://www.awe.co.uk/aboutus/the_company_eb1b2.aspx.
38 “Britain sells stake in nuclear warhead factory,” Agence France-Presse, December 20, 2008.
39 Nuclear Information Service, op. cit.
40 A small percentage of AWE’s funding is understood to come from other government departments, with this money
allocated mainly for its threat reduction mission.
41 Nuclear Information Service, op. cit.
42 See Henrietta Wilson, “Renewing Trident: Can the UK's Atomic Weapons Establishment Cope?,” Disarmament
Diplomacy
, no. 88 (Summer 2008).
Congressional Research Service
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Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations

Author Contact Information

Jonathan Medalia, Coordinator
Carol Migdalovitz
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jmedalia@crs.loc.gov, 7-7632
cmigdalovitz@crs.loc.gov, 7-2667
Paul Belkin
Derek E. Mix
Analyst in European Affairs
Analyst in European Affairs
pbelkin@crs.loc.gov, 7-0220
dmix@crs.loc.gov, 7-9116
Shirley A. Kan
Mary Beth Nikitin
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
Analyst in Nonproliferation
skan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7606
mnikitin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7745
Paul K. Kerr
Larry A. Niksch
Analyst in Nonproliferation
Specialist in Asian Affairs
pkerr@crs.loc.gov, 7-8693
lniksch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7680


Congressional Research Service
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