Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance
Curt Tarnoff
Specialist in Foreign Affairs
January 21, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40699
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance
Summary
The U.S. program of assistance to Afghanistan is intended to stabilize and strengthen the Afghan
economic, social, political, and security environment so as to blunt popular support for extremist
forces in the region. Since 2001, about $47 billion has been appropriated toward this effort.
More than half of U.S. assistance—roughly 57%—has gone to the training and equipping of
Afghan forces. The remainder has gone to development and humanitarian-related activities from
infrastructure to private sector support, governance and democratization efforts, and counter-
narcotics programs.
Key U.S. agencies providing aid are the Department of Defense, the Agency for International
Development, and the Department of State.
In December 2009, Congress approved the FY2010 State, Foreign Operations appropriations
(H.R. 3288, Division F, P.L. 111-117), providing $2 billion in the Economic Support Fund (ESF)
and $420 million in the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) accounts. It also
approved the FY2010 DOD appropriations (H.R. 3326, P.L. 111-118), providing $6.6 billion to
the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and allocating $1 billion for the Commander’s
Emergency Response Program (CERP) activities in Afghanistan.
This report provides a “big picture” overview of the U.S. aid program and congressional action. It
describes what various aid agencies report they are doing in Afghanistan. It does not address the
effectiveness of their programs. It will be updated as events warrant.
For discussion of the Afghan political, security, and economic situation, see CRS Report
RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman. For greater detail on security assistance provided by the Department of Defense, see
CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress,
by Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale. For fuller information on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in
Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher
M. Blanchard. For discussion of allied security and reconstruction aid activities, see CRS Report
RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Vincent Morelli and
Paul Belkin. For information on the United Nations effort, see CRS Report R40747, United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues, by Rhoda Margesson.
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Contents
Most Recent Developments......................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
U.S. Assistance Programs............................................................................................................ 1
Development Assistance Programs ........................................................................................ 4
Infrastructure .................................................................................................................. 4
National Solidarity Program............................................................................................ 5
Economic Growth ........................................................................................................... 5
Agriculture...................................................................................................................... 5
Health ............................................................................................................................. 6
Education........................................................................................................................ 6
Democracy and Governance............................................................................................ 6
Rule of Law .................................................................................................................... 7
Women and Girls ............................................................................................................ 7
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)..................................................... 8
Humanitarian Assistance Programs ....................................................................................... 8
Counter-Narcotics Programs ................................................................................................. 9
Security Assistance Programs................................................................................................ 9
Afghan Security Forces Fund .......................................................................................... 9
Other Security Programs ............................................................................................... 10
Congress and U.S. Assistance.................................................................................................... 13
FY2010 Regular Appropriations.......................................................................................... 13
House Action on FY2010 Aid to Afghanistan ................................................................ 13
Senate Action on FY2010 Aid to Afghanistan................................................................ 14
Final Action on FY2010 Aid to Afghanistan .................................................................. 14
Major Conditions and Reporting Requirements on Afghan Aid............................................ 14
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan by Fiscal Year .............................................................. 11
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 15
Key Afghanistan Assistance Policy Staff ................................................................................... 15
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Most Recent Developments
On January 28, 2010, an international donor conference on Afghanistan will convene in London.
In December 2009, Congress approved the FY2010 State, Foreign Operations appropriations
(H.R. 3288, Division F, P.L. 111-117), providing assistance to Afghanistan amounting to $2
billion in the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and $420 million in the International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement (INCLE) accounts. It also approved the FY2010 DOD appropriations (H.R.
3326, P.L. 111-118), providing $6.6 billion to the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and
allocating $1 billion for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Afghanistan.
Introduction
Afghanistan, one of the poorest countries in the world, would be a candidate for U.S.
development assistance under normal circumstances. But today, as a result of the war on Al
Qaeda and the 2001 military effort that removed Taliban rule, Afghanistan is a U.S. strategic
priority and recipient to date of roughly $47 billion in U.S. foreign assistance serving multiple
objectives. About three-quarters of this assistance has been provided since the beginning of
FY2007. Assistance efforts are broadly intended to stabilize and strengthen the country, through a
range of development-related programs and through training and materiel support for the Afghan
police and military.
This report provides a “big picture” overview of the U.S. aid program and congressional action. It
describes what various aid agencies report they are doing in Afghanistan. It does not address the
effectiveness of their programs. It will be updated as events warrant.
For discussion of the Afghan political, security, and economic situation, see CRS Report
RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman. For greater detail on security assistance provided by the Department of Defense, see
CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress,
by Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale. For fuller information on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in
Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher
M. Blanchard.
U.S. Assistance Programs
The U.S. program of assistance to Afghanistan has multiple objectives implemented by a range of
actors working in diverse sectors. The main purpose of the program is to stabilize and strengthen
the Afghan economic, social, political, and security environment so as to blunt popular support
for extremist forces in the region.
The bulk of U.S. assistance is in security-related activities. Since 2001, more than half (57%) of
total U.S. assistance has gone to the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the account supporting
the training and equipping of Afghan security forces and related aid accounts. The proportion of
U.S. assistance going to security programs appears to be increasing—in FY2010, 65% is going to
this purpose.
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The second-largest portion of assistance has been aimed at economic, social, and political
development efforts. The main provider of these programs is the Agency for International
Development (USAID), with the Department of State playing a significant role in democracy and
governance activities. These programs account for roughly 31% of total aid since 2001.
A third element of assistance, humanitarian aid, largely implemented through USAID and
international organizations, represents about 4% of total aid since 2001.
The fourth main component of the aid program is counter-narcotics, implemented largely by the
State Department in conjunction with DOD, USAID, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. It
accounts for about 8% of total aid since 2001.
U.S. assistance must be viewed within the broader context of the Afghan government’s
development strategy and the contributions of other donors. In April 2008, an Afghanistan
National Development Strategy (ANDS) was offered by the government as a program of specific
goals and benchmarks in 18 sectors from security to poverty reduction to be accomplished from
2008 to 2013. The Afghan government estimated the cost of achieving these goals at $50 billion,
with Afghanistan providing $6.8 billion and international donors asked to provide the rest. The
strategy sought to have most funds provided through the central government in order to
strengthen its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. Persistent questions regarding corruption and
the ability of the government to effectively implement programs have prevented donors from
more fully adopting this approach.
Of the $58.2 billion pledged in assistance to Afghanistan by donors since 2002, U.S. assistance
represented about 57% as of early 2009.1 However, these numbers are questionable, as the June
2009 DOD report notes that much of $20 billion pledged in a June 2008 Paris Conference, and
included in these totals, had been previously pledged, leaving only about $14 billion in new
pledges.2 An international donor conference will be held in London on January 28, 2010.
Apart from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Japan, the bulk of aid contributions
comes from the other NATO nations operating in the country as part of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF). For related discussion, see CRS Report RL33627, NATO in
Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin. The United
Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is meant to play a major role coordinating aid from
all donors. For details, see CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues, by Rhoda Margesson.
Fourteen NATO countries lead the 27 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) located in the
majority of Afghan provinces. The United States leads 13 of these. An innovation in the delivery
of assistance that facilitates access to more remote regions of the country, the PRT is a significant
element in the U.S. aid program (and was later adopted and modified for Iraq). Its mission is to
help extend the authority of the Government of Afghanistan by fostering a secure and stable
environment. PRT personnel work with government officials to improve governance and
provision of basic services. In 2009, the District Support Team (DST), building Afghan
government capacity at a more local level, was introduced. There are currently roughly 18 U.S.-
led DSTs. The British are also actively involved at the district level in British or U.S.-led DSTs.
1 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30, 2009, p. 45.
2 DOD, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2009 Report to Congress, p. 48.
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PRTs are composed of both civilian and military personnel in conjunction with military forces
providing physical security. In the case of the United States—the model differs by lead country—
U.S. PRTs, with one exception, are led by a military officer and report up a military chain of
command. Most of the coalition PRTs are civilian-led. Most PRTs have a predominance of
military staff, although this is changing, particularly in Kandahar and Helmand PRTs. However,
there is now a civilian lead at each PRT and DST to act as counterpart to the military commander.
Further, whereas in early 2009 there were generally only three to five civilians among 50 to 100
total personnel, civilian representation has been rising substantially throughout the year. In May
2009, there were 65 civilian personnel in the field, in early January 2010 there were 252, and this
number continues to increase. The civilian team at the PRT and DST usually includes officers
from the State Department, USAID, and Department of Agriculture. Similar but usually smaller
teams are posted to non-U.S.-led PRTs. In Kandahar and Helmand, large U.S. teams are
integrated with British and Canadian counterparts.
The U.S. PRTs and other field entities utilize funding under a range of programs to meet their
objectives. Programs provide targeted infrastructure aid to meet locally identified needs and aid to
address employment and other local concerns, provide management training to local government
personnel, and ensure that national-level development efforts in key sectors reach the local
population. Other U.S. assistance is provided through the U.S. mission in Kabul. Working
throughout the country, aid project implementors in most cases are either U.S. or Afghan non-
governmental organizations receiving grants or private sector for-profit entities on contract.
Despite significant progress in Afghanistan during the past eight years, insurgent threats to
Afghanistan’s government have escalated since 2006 to the point that some experts began
questioning the success of stabilization efforts. An expanding militant presence in some areas
previously considered secure, increased numbers of civilian and military deaths, growing
disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and
Pakistan’s inability to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration into Afghanistan led the
Obama Administration to conduct its own “strategic review,” the results of which were
announced on March 27, 2009.
The thrust of the new strategy has been a focus, not only on adding U.S. troops—a point
reiterated and expanded following a second review that led to the announcement in December
2009 of an additional U.S. troop increase—but also on enhancing assistance efforts. The March
strategy led to the formulation of a new aid strategy encapsulated in an “Integrated Civilian-
Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan,” jointly published on August 10, 2009, by
Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal. The strategy emphasizes economic
development, coordination among international donors, building local governing structures,
improving capacity and reforming the Afghan government, and expanding and reforming the
Afghan security forces. In practice, the new strategy is leading to an increase in U.S. assistance to
Afghanistan, a greater emphasis on geographic centers of instability along the southern and
eastern borders, more integrated military-civilian aid activity, and a significant increase in civilian
aid personnel to formulate, administer, and monitor aid programs. With regard to the latter, U.S.
civilian staff—State, USAID, USDA, Justice, etc.—was projected to triple from about 320 in
early 2009 to 974 in early 2010.
The changes in aid strategy are well-illustrated in several significant steps USAID is taking. For
one, it is promoting the Afghanization of assistance, directing assistance as much as feasible
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through Afghan entities, public and private. USAID anticipated that, by early 2010, as much as
40% of assistance would go to the Afghan government.3 The intent is to increase the
administrative capabilities of the Afghan government and at the same time enable the public to
see that their government is providing services. USAID is also said to be directing funding away
from U.S. contractors and NGOs and more to Afghan NGOs and business.
Another key shift in USAID policy is to move more funds to regions and sectors previously less
well-supported. More money is expected to go to the southern and eastern parts of the country,
especially as the military goes in and secures an area. More funding is going to agriculture, a
sector that had been relatively neglected, but is a way to reach rural areas that had been under the
influence of the insurgents and is the most critical part of the Afghan economy. At least $1.2
billion over three years is expected to support this sector.
Below is a menu of the range of assistance programs the United States is now implementing in
Afghanistan.4
Development Assistance Programs
As one of the lesser-developed countries in the world, battered by decades of war and instability,
Afghanistan could benefit from assistance in every aspect of its political, economic, and social
fabric. U.S. development assistance programs, mostly implemented through the Agency for
International Development, are directed at a wide range of needs.
Infrastructure
As much as a quarter of total USAID assistance to Afghanistan through FY2008 went to road
construction throughout the country. As of September 2008, USAID had constructed or
rehabilitated over 1,650 miles of roads—with a particular focus on the Ring Road, which spans
the country—facilitating commercial activity and helping reduce time and costs in the transport
and mobility of security forces. Substantial additional road construction has been undertaken by
DOD as well as other international donors.
Construction of a new 100-megawatt power plant in Kabul is one aspect of U.S. support for
electrical infrastructure. Another includes efforts to ensure that the national electric utility is
sustainable by improving rates of payment for services. It has outsourced operations,
maintenance, and billing to an international contractor, which has installed $14 million in meters,
3 Traditionally, USAID conducts its own projects through contractors and NGOs. To enable host-country contracting,
USAID is vetting recipient ministries to insure they are able to administer funds and meet audit requirements. The
ministries of health, finance, and communications were first approved, with others to follow. To further meet concerns
regarding the appropriate use of funds, USAID maintains authority over key uses of the money, it only dispenses funds
for a 45 day period, and international NGOs work with the ministries to actually utilize the funding. In addition to
increased direct funding of ministries, more U.S. funds are going to the World Bank-managed Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund which funnels funds to the Afghan government in large part to support the government’s
National Solidarity Program. The NSP provides small grants to villages around the country, and local communities
determine the use of these funds.
4 The program breakdown in this section draws in part on USAID project descriptions, many available at
http://afghanistan.usaid.gov; Department of Defense Reports to Congress, Progress Toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan, most recently June 2009; and Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Quarterly
Reports to Congress, most recently October 30, 2009.
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hoping to significantly reduce losses. Other infrastructure efforts include support for a drilling
team to assess gas availability in the Sheberghan gas fields and funding the Kajaki dam
rehabilitation project in Helmand province that will increase output from 33 MW to 51 MW,
providing electricity for 2 million Afghans. Infrastructure construction activities in specific
sectors, such as health, education, governance, and security are noted below.
National Solidarity Program
Although its purpose is to strengthen Afghan governance at the local level and local ties to the
central government, the National Solidarity Program, to which the United States heavily
contributes and to which Congress has directed significant funding in explanatory statements
accompanying appropriations ($175 million in FY2010), has been chiefly employed to construct
village infrastructure. The Program is funded by international donors and implemented by the
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. Community Development Councils (CDCs),
established at the grassroots level throughout the country with the help of international and local
NGOs, apply for program funds after first reaching consensus on village needs. As of December
2009, over 22,000 CDCs had been established. Program grants generally support drinking water
and irrigation systems, rural roads, school buildings and community centers, and electrification
facilities. The extent to which the program has been affected by the departure of NGOs
administering the NSP due to an increasing lack of security in rural areas is not yet clear.5
Economic Growth
U.S. assistance supports a number of efforts to stimulate growth of the Afghan economy—the
most prominent part of which, agriculture, is discussed below. Projects to facilitate economic
growth in the broader business sector include the provision of technical expertise to help reform
the legal framework in which business operates, including taxation and administrative policies.
U.S. aid also seeks to improve access to credit for the private sector, through micro and small
business loans and by promoting bank reform to ease establishment of private banks. The
Treasury Department maintains advisers in the central bank. The United States attempts to build
business associations, such as chambers of commerce and the women’s business federation, by
providing training and development services to those emerging institutions. An economic growth
program that is of importance as well to agriculture is the effort to improve land titling, through
simplification of the registration process and assistance to commercial courts in land dispute
adjudication. Under USAID’s Rule of Law project, such assistance includes conducting
commercial law and dispute resolution training for judges, a seminar series on commercial law
for government officials, and assisting ministries in drafting commercial laws.
Agriculture
The United States supports two major and sometimes overlapping agriculture efforts: one
nationwide and another, under the rubric of alternative development, aimed at fostering legal
alternatives to poppy and targeted at specific areas where poppy is grown.
5 See letter to editor by Ted Callahan, a former cultural advisor to the military, in the New York Times, December 5,
2009.
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Among broad agriculture project efforts are the distribution of chickens, training in poultry
management, vaccination of livestock, establishment of Veterinary Field Units, seed distribution,
capacity building for extension services, and loans to farmers. The United States also assists in
the establishment of food processing plants, such as flour mills and vegetable dehydration plants.
Infrastructure assistance to Afghan agriculture includes repair of farm-to-market roads and
rehabilitation of irrigation systems. USAID’s alternative development effort, the Alternative
Livelihoods Program, supports in poppy districts many of the same efforts it undertakes
throughout Afghanistan. It attempts to increase commercial agricultural opportunities for licit,
market-value crops and provides access to materials and expertise to produce those crops.
Most of these agriculture programs are implemented by USAID. However, two other agencies are
involved in this sector. USDA provides one advisor to each of the U.S.-run PRTs, through which
it seeks to build the capacities of provincial agricultural systems and assist local farmers. At the
national level, it provides technical expertise to the Agriculture Ministry, the agriculture extension
service, and agricultural associations, and works with the Ministry of Higher Education to
improve agriculture education. DOD fields Agriculture Development Teams, National Guard
personnel with backgrounds in agribusiness who provide training and advice to universities,
provincial ministries, and farmers.
Health
Health sector assistance, largely provided by USAID, has been aimed at expanding access to
basic public health care, including rehabilitation and construction of more than 600 clinics and
training of over 10,000 health workers. Health projects also address specific health concerns, such
as polio prevention and vulnerable children. Technical expertise is provided to the Ministry of
Health, which is one of the few ministries considered by USAID to be sufficiently transparent to
directly handle U.S. assistance funds. Direct U.S. funding goes to support the Afghan
government’s Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) and Essential Package of Hospital
Services (EPHS) that deliver basic health care provided through five provincial level hospitals
and 22 Afghan and international NGOs serving 480 district level health facilities and 5,000 health
posts in 13 provinces.
Education
USAID supports a number of education efforts. Technical expertise has been provided to the
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Higher Education to build management capacities. More
than 600 schools have been constructed or rehabilitated, thousands of teachers have been trained,
and millions of textbooks printed. The women’s dorm at the University of Kabul has been
rehabilitated. The American University of Afghanistan and the International School of Kabul
have been established. Literacy programs are being implemented nationwide.
Democracy and Governance
A wide range of U.S. assistance programs address the elements of democracy and government
administration. Democracy programs include efforts to support the development of civil society
non-governmental organizations. Afghan NGOs receive small grants, and training is provided to
their leadership and staff. Independent radio stations have been built with U.S. aid. At the national
level, a law facilitating NGO development was drafted with U.S. expertise. U.S. funds supported
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the 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council elections, and support the Independent Elections
Commission, and a Civil Voter Registry.
U.S. assistance seeks to strengthen local and national government institutions through efforts to
build the competency of the civil service, increase the capacity of the National Assembly to draft
legislation, help the government identify problems and carry out policy, and improve delivery of
social services,
Rule of Law
U.S. rule of law (ROL) programs are extensive and multiple agencies—the State Department’s
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), the Department of Justice,
USAID, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and DOD—are all involved to some extent in rule
of law issues. There is some overlap between agency programs; these efforts are coordinated
through the Kabul embassy Special Committee for Rule of Law, chaired by a Rule of Law
Coordinator. The embassy’s ROL Implementation Plan defines objectives for U.S. programs to
help meet the aims of the Afghan National Justice Program, the Afghan government’s own ROL
strategy.
Among other efforts, USAID seeks to improve legal education by assisting with a redesign of the
core curriculum for the Law and Sharia Faculties at Kabul University, and by providing training
in teaching methodology, legal writing, computer research, and legal English to members of
faculties of Kabul University and three regional universities. It provides training in substantive
and procedural law to sitting judges and trains trainers to continue such activities. Together, INL
and USAID programs have built or renovated 40 provincial courthouses and trained more than
900 sitting judges—over half of the judiciary—and more than 400 judicial candidates.
INL is principally concerned with reforming the criminal justice and corrections system. Its
Justice Sector Support Program supports 30 U.S. justice advisors and 35 Afghan legal consultants
who work together in provincial teams to address needs of key provinces. These have trained
about 1,900 Afghan justice professionals as of April 2009. INL also brings Afghan law professors
to the United States for degrees and U.S. Assistant Attorneys to Afghanistan. Its Corrections
Systems Support Program, addressing prison capacity issues, is building prisons in all 34
provinces and funds 30 U.S. corrections advisors who provide training and mentoring. As of April
2009, these had trained more than 3,800 Afghan corrections staff.
Women and Girls
Although much assistance is meant to ultimately benefit Afghans of both genders, in
appropriations legislation and report language, Congress often directs funding to programs
specifically assisting Afghan women and girls—most recently, requiring that at least $175 million
in total FY2010 funding from ESF and INCLE accounts be used for this purpose (P.L. 111-117,
section 7076). Of this, conferees directed that $20 million be used for capacity building for
Afghan women-led NGOs, that $25 million be used for the programs of such NGOs, and that $15
million be used to train women investigators, police officers, judges, and social workers to
respond to crimes of violence against women.
Among these efforts is a USAID rule of law project that attempts to raise awareness of women’s
rights by conducting public forums and through discussion in the media. USAID supports the
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introduction of legal rights education to women audiences and legal aid through legal service
centers. Another project provides financial support to NGOs working to improve the lives of
women and girls and seeks to strengthen their policy advocacy capacities. U.S. assistance also is
supporting the establishment of a Women’s Leadership Development Institute to train women for
leadership roles.
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
The CERP seeks to improve the security environment in which U.S. combat troops operate by
offering small grants to local villages to address urgent relief and reconstruction needs. It also,
increasingly supports large-scale projects. While funded by DOD appropriations and
implemented by the military, the CERP often performs a development function, on the surface,
indistinguishable from the activities of USAID and is a major assistance tool of the U.S.-run
Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Most of the CERP has been used for infrastructure purposes—
nearly two-thirds through FY2008 went for road repair and construction.
While Congress strongly supports the program—doubling Afghanistan funding in FY2010 from
the previous year’s level—it has also questioned DOD’s management and oversight of the
program. The FY2010 DOD appropriations statement of managers voices the concern that there
are an insufficient number of personnel responsible for these functions.
Humanitarian Assistance Programs
U.S. funds address a number of humanitarian situations in Afghanistan, most stemming from the
years of war that preceded the U.S. intervention as well as the insurgency that has followed.
During this period, large numbers of people fled from their homes, many of whom became
refugees in neighboring countries. U.S. assistance in Afghanistan, provided through international
organizations and NGOs under the State Department’s Migration and Refugee Program and
through USAID’s International Disaster Assistance program, targets both those individuals who
are returning and those who have been displaced. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, there were an estimated 231,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 278,000
returning refugees in early 2009. Roughly 3 million Afghans remain outside the country.
Where the insurgency is ongoing, assistance programs address the needs of affected vulnerable
populations. USAID’s Civilian Assistance Program provides assistance targeted to individuals or
communities directly affected by military incidents. Medical care to those injured, vocational
training to make up for loss of an income earner, and repair of damaged homes are among the
activities supported by the program. The NATO/ISAF Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund,
to which the United States contributes, provides immediate food, shelter, and infrastructure repair
assistance following military actions. The DOD’s CERP also provides battle damage repair as
well as condolence payments for deaths or injury.
U.S. food assistance has been aimed at both short- and long-term food security needs. During the
2008-2009 drought, which led to a shortage of wheat, the United States contributed food aid.
Chronic malnutrition has been addressed in U.S. funding of a school feeding program
implemented by the World Food Program and a World Vision program aimed at children under
two years of age.
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The United States also supports demining and disposal of other explosive ordinance remaining
from years of war. These efforts protect the civilian population and clear land that can be utilized
for agriculture.
Counter-Narcotics Programs
According to Administration officials, narcotics profits are a major source of funding for the
insurgency. Counter-narcotics efforts, therefore, are viewed as an intrinsic part of the U.S.
stabilization strategy. Counter-narcotics programs are managed through the State Department’s
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL), funded under the INCLE
account; through USAID’s alternative development program funded under the ESF account; and
through the DOD counternarcotics program account.
The United States supports a “5 Pillar Strategy” in addressing counter-narcotics concerns. First,
alternative development, noted above, is largely the USAID effort to develop other sources of
income for poppy farmers. In addition, INL funds a “good performers” initiative that offers
rewards to provinces that are making progress in reducing poppy cultivation. Second, a U.S.-
supported Poppy Eradication Force seeks to eliminate poppy. Third, assistance seeks to build the
capacity of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan and other forces to interdict heroin and
opium traffic. Fourth, a range of law enforcement and justice reform programs noted above
address the investigation and adjudication of drug trafficking cases. The fifth pillar is the raising
of public awareness through dissemination of information to farmers, opinion leaders, politicians,
and others.
As a result of the March 2009 strategic review, greater emphasis has been given to alternative
development, eradication efforts have been diminished for fear of alienating farmers, and
interdiction aimed at drug lords has been increased. Along with INL, the Department of Defense
has supported eradication and interdiction efforts mostly by provision of equipment and
weaponry to Afghan counternarcotics entities. A December 2009 State Department Inspector
General report asserts that the Department lacks a long-term strategy and has insufficient
personnel for adequate oversight.6 See CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S.
Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard, for further information.
Security Assistance Programs
Security assistance programs address the capabilities of the Afghan police, army, and other
security forces.
Afghan Security Forces Fund
Most U.S. security assistance efforts are funded through the Afghan Security Forces Fund
(ASFF), an account supported under the DOD appropriations. At $26.2 billion, the ASFF
accounts for 57% of total U.S. assistance to Afghanistan since FY2002.
6 Department of State Inspector General, Status of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Counternarcotics Programs in Afghanistan Performance Audit, MERO-A-10-02, December 2009.
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The United States provides equipment, training, and mentoring to police and army forces and
works with responsible Afghan ministries—Interior and Defense—to ensure they are capable of
organizing and leading these forces. The total Afghan National Security Force level of roughly
191,000 is expected to rise to 305,600 by end of 2011. For discussion, see CRS Report R40156,
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, by Steve Bowman
and Catherine Dale, and CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security,
and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Other Security Programs
The State Department’s Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs
(NADR) account supports a program for the training and equipping of the Afghan Presidential
protection service, which protects the Afghan leadership and diplomats. It also funds counter-
terrorist finance and terrorist interdiction efforts. The International Military Education and
Training Program (IMET), co-managed by the State Department and DOD, exposes select Afghan
officers to U.S. practices and standards.
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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan by Fiscal Year
(appropriations in $ millions)
2002-2010
Fiscal Year
2002
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2009
2010 Total
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
117.5 239.3 894.8
1,280.3 473.4
1,210.7 1,399.5 2,048.0 2,037.0 9,700.5
Development Assistance (DA)
18.3 42.5 153.1 169.6 191.2 166.8 149.4
0.4
—
891.3
Child Survival/Health (CSH)
7.5 49.7 33.4 38.0 41.5 100.8 63.1 58.2 (94.3) 392.2
MRA (Migration & Refugee Asst.)
135.8 63 67.1 47.1 41.8 54.0 43.5 50.0
— 502.3
Food Aida
213.3 75.8 99 96.7 108.3 69.5 232.2
81.7 (15.5)
976.5
Int’l Disaster Asst (IDA)
197.1 86.7 11.2 4.2
0
0
17
27.3
—
343.5
INCLE (Int’l Narcotics & Law Enforcement)
60.0 0.0 220.0 709.3 232.7 251.7 320.7 484.0 420.0 2,698.4
NADR (Nonprolif, Anti-Terror, De-mining)
44.0 34.7 63.8 36.6 18.2 36.6 26.6 48.6 (57.8) 309.1
Int’l Military Education & Training (IMET)
0.2 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.6 1.4 (1.5)
6.8
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
57.0 191.0 413.7 396.8 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0 1,058.5
Otherb
58.3 23.1 42.2 18.1 0.6 1.4 22.3
9.6
— 175.6
Total 150 Account
909.0
806.1
1,998.9
2,797.5
1,108.5
1,892.6
2,275.9
2,809.2
2,457.0c
17,054.7
DOD - Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
0.0 0.0 0.0
995.0
1,908.1
7,406.4
2,750.0 5,606.9 6,562.8 25,229.2
DOD - CERP
0.0 0.0 40.0 136.0 215.0 209.0 488.5 550.7 1,000.0 2,639.2
DOD - Other
0.0 165.0 356.8 764.5 108.1 291.0 199.5 229.0
— 2,113.9
Total 050 Account
0.0
165.0
396.8
1,895.5
2,231.2
7,906.4
3,438.0
6,386.6
7,562.8c
29,982.3
Other Functional Accountsd
0.6
2.9
3.7
16.8
23.7
20.4
40.6
18.8
—
127.5
Total U.S. Assistance
909.6
974.0
2,399.4
4,709.8
3,363.4
9,819.4
5,754.5
9,214.6
10,019.8c
47,164.5
Sources: SIGAR Report to Congress, October 30, 2009; Department of State annual budget presentation documents; and CRS calculations.
Notes: Where appropriation or statement of conferees did not specify Afghanistan al ocation, amounts in parenthesis are request levels (not counted in totals). Request
and blank fields will be filled with actual amounts as they become available.
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Totals may not add up due to rounding. The 150 budget function account encompasses International Affairs spending and is mostly appropriated in the State/Foreign
Operations bill; food aid is appropriated in the Agriculture appropriations. The 050 account is Defense appropriations.
a. Includes P.L.480 Title II, Food for Education, Food for Progress, 416b Food Aid, Emerson Trust, and USAID CCC.
b. Other 150 account includes USAID Other, Office of Transition Initiatives, Treasury Technical Assistance, and Peacekeeping accounts.
c. Does not count request amounts not yet al ocated.
d. Includes Drug Enforcement Administration anti-narcotics activities.
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Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance
Congress and U.S. Assistance
Although authorization of aid programs for a specific country are usually not required, in 2002,
Congress approved the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (P.L. 107-327). It authorizes the full
range of economic assistance programs supporting the humanitarian, political, economic, and
social development of Afghanistan. A separate title (II) authorized support for the development of
the Afghanistan security forces; its authority expired at the end of September 2006. Since then,
security aid has been authorized in annual DOD authorization legislation.
Economic assistance to Afghanistan has been provided in most years since 2001 in both regular
appropriations and supplemental appropriations bills. Defense assistance has largely been
provided in emergency supplemental appropriations legislation. For FY2010, the Obama
Administration expected all aid to be provided under the regular appropriations. However, the
“surge” announced in December 2009 will require a supplemental appropriation to support
additional U.S. military forces, and it is possible that a request for additional assistance funds
could accompany that request.
As noted in Table 1, most aid has been provided in accounts that fall under one of two budget
functions. Most economic and humanitarian aid, as well as IMET and the operational expenses of
the Embassy, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, and USAID, is in the
150 International Affairs function, encompassed largely by the State, Foreign Operations
appropriations. Food aid, also under the 150 function, is provided in the Agriculture
appropriations bill. Most security aid, as well as the CERP, is in the 050 Defense budget function,
encompassed by the DOD appropriations.
FY2010 Regular Appropriations
On May 4, 2009, the Administration submitted an FY2010 budget request to Congress. The State,
Foreign Operations request included $2.8 billion in economic aid to Afghanistan—mostly
consisting of $2.2 billion in ESF, $450 million in INCLE, $93.8 million under USAID’s Global
Health and Child Survival account, and $57.8 million in NADR funds. The total FY2010 foreign
operations request represented a roughly 6% increase from the total FY2009 level.
The DOD budget request for FY2010 included $7.5 billion for the ASFF, a 33% increase over
total FY2009 appropriations. The Administration also requested $1.5 billion for the CERP, the
latter shared with Iraq.
House Action on FY2010 Aid to Afghanistan
On June 26, 2009, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 3081 (H.Rept. 111-187),
the FY2010 State, Foreign Operations Appropriations, providing $2.1 billion in ESF and $420
million in INCLE funds to Afghanistan. The full House approved the measure on July 9, 2009.
Among other things, the Committee report recommends not less than $175 million of ESF be
used for the National Solidarity Program; $175 million for programs for women and girls,
including $20 million to improve the capacity of women-led NGOs; not less than $25 million for
maternal and child health; and $15 million for USAID’s Civilian Assistance Program.
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Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance
On July 30, the House approved H.R. 3326, the DOD appropriations, providing $7.5 billion for
the ASFF, matching the Administration request, and $1.3 billion for the CERP, a cut of $200
million from the request. The bill would withhold $500 million from the CERP until a review is
completed, including analysis of its management and oversight and the appropriate use of funds.
Senate Action on FY2010 Aid to Afghanistan
On July 9, 2009, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 1434, its version of the
FY2010 State, Foreign Operations Appropriations (S.Rept. 111-44), providing $2.15 billion in
ESF and $450 million in INCLE funds to Afghanistan. Of the ESF, the committee directed that
$15 million go to the Civilian Assistance Program, $100 million to the National Solidarity
Program, $150 million for programs benefitting women and girls, and $10 million for strategic
communication activities highlighting the efforts of the Afghan government and international
partners to bring security, services, and the rule of law to the Afghan people. The committee
directed that two reports be submitted: one on the use of funds for Afghan women and girls, and
the other on steps being taken to standardize condolence payments.
On September 10, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved H.R. 3326, its version of the
DOD appropriations, providing $6.6 billion for the ASFF, a $900 million cut from the
Administration request, and $1.2 billion for the CERP, a $300 million cut from the request.
Final Action on FY2010 Aid to Afghanistan
In December 2009, Congress approved the FY2010 State, Foreign Operations appropriations
(H.R. 3288, Division F, P.L. 111-117), providing $2 billion in the Economic Support Fund (ESF)
and $420 million in the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) accounts. From
amounts appropriated in ESF, the legislation (sec. 7076) designates that at least $175 million will
go to the National Solidarity Program. In addition, the conferees directed that $15 million be used
for the Civilian Assistance Program. The legislation further requires that at least $175 million of
ESF and INCLE funds will go to programs addressing the needs of women and girls. Of this,
conferees directed that $20 million be used for capacity building for Afghan women-led NGOs,
that $25 million be used for the programs of such NGOs, and that $15 million be used to train
women investigators, police officers, judges, and social workers to respond to crimes of violence
against women.
Congress also approved the FY2010 DOD appropriations (H.R. 3326, P.L. 111-118), providing
$6.6 billion to the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and allocating $1 billion to Afghanistan
(of the total $1.2 billion shared with Iraq) under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program
(CERP).
Major Conditions and Reporting Requirements on Afghan Aid
Congress has imposed conditions and reporting requirements on its authorization and
appropriations of aid. In the FY2010 appropriations, conditions are imposed on the INCLE
account. No FY2010 funds are available for eradication through aerial spraying of herbicides
unless the Secretary of State determines that the President of Afghanistan has requested such a
program. Ten percent of the FY2010 INCLE appropriations available to assist the Afghan
government are withheld pending a report from the Secretary of State that the Afghan central
government is taking steps to remove any official credibly alleged to have engaged in narcotics
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Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance
trafficking, gross violations of human rights, or other major crimes. Congress also withholds $200
million in FY2010 ESF until the Secretary of State certifies that the Afghan government is
cooperating fully with U.S. efforts against the Taliban and Al Qaeda and U.S. poppy eradication
and interdiction efforts. This condition may be waived on national security grounds.
Among congressional reporting requirements, there are several of special note with regard to
assistance to Afghanistan. The 2008 Defense Authorization (section 1229, P.L. 110-181), which
established a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, requires the SIGAR to
submit a quarterly report describing aid activities and funding. The same legislation (section
1230) requires DOD, in coordination with all other agencies, to submit a report every six months
on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, including descriptions of the ASFF,
PRTs, counter-narcotics activities, and other assistance matters. The FY2009 supplemental
(section 1117, P.L. 111-32) requires a report to be submitted by the President by March 30, 2010
and every six months thereafter (until end of FY2011), on the objectives of U.S. policy in
Afghanistan with metrics to assess progress, an assessment of progress by U.S. agencies,
including the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and USAID, and recommendations for
additional resources. The statement of managers of the DOD appropriations (P.L. 111-118)
requires a report by June 2010 containing a thorough review of the CERP.
Author Contact Information
Curt Tarnoff
Specialist in Foreign Affairs
ctarnoff@crs.loc.gov, 7-7656
Key Afghanistan Assistance Policy Staff
Area of Expertise
Name
Phone
E-mail
USAID Development Assistance
Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in
77656 ctarnoff@crs.loc.gov
Foreign Affairs
Political, Economic, Social, and Security Kenneth Katzman,
77612 kkatzman@crs.loc.gov
Issues in Afghanistan and U.S. Policy
Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs
DOD assistance and Afghanistan
Steven Bowman, Specialist
75841 sbowman@crs.loc.gov
Security Forces Fund
in National Security
Counter-narcotics Programs
Christopher M. Blanchard,
70428 cblanchard@crs.loc.gov
Analyst in Middle Eastern
Affairs
Humanitarian Assistance, Refugees and
Rhoda Margesson,
70425 rmargesson@crs.loc.gov
IDPs, UNAMA/Civilian Reconstruction
Specialist in International
Humanitarian Policy
Rule of Law Programs
Liana Wyler, Analyst in
76177 lwyler@crs.loc.gov
International Crime and
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Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance
Area of Expertise
Name
Phone
E-mail
Narcotics
NATO Allies Security and
Paul Belkin, Analyst in
70220 pbelkin@crs.loc.gov
Reconstruction Programs
European Affairs
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