Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty:
Background and Current Developments
Jonathan Medalia
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
January 6, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33548
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments
Summary
A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control
agenda. Three treaties currently bar all but underground tests with a maximum force equal to
150,000 tons of TNT. The Natural Resources Defense Council states the United States conducted
1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715, the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45.
The last U.S. test was held in 1992; Russia claims it has not tested since 1990. In 1998, India and
Pakistan announced several nuclear tests. Each declared a test moratorium; neither has signed the
CTBT. North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006.
Since 1997, the United States has held 23 “subcritical experiments” at the Nevada Test Site to
study how plutonium behaves under pressures generated by explosives. It asserts these
experiments do not violate the CTBT because they cannot produce a self-sustaining chain
reaction. Russia reportedly held some since 1998.
The U.N. General Assembly adopted the CTBT in 1996. As of January 6, 2010, 182 states had
signed it; 151, including Russia, had ratified. Of the 44 that must ratify the treaty for it to enter
into force, 41 had signed and 35 had ratified. Five conferences have been held to facilitate entry
into force, most recently in 2009.
In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate. In October 1999, the Senate rejected it,
48 for, 51 against, 1 present. It is on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s calendar. It would
require a two-thirds Senate vote to send the treaty back to the President for disposal or to give
advice and consent for ratification. In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said,
“my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” U.S. ratification would be followed by a diplomatic effort to
secure ratification by the remaining states that must ratify for the treaty to enter into force.
Past nuclear testing treaties have been accompanied by “safeguards,” unilateral measures
consistent with the treaties that the United States can take to buttress its nuclear intelligence and
weapons. President Clinton conditioned his support for the CTBT on a package of safeguards,
and President Obama said in his Prague speech, “As long as these weapons exist, the United
States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that
defense to our allies.” Thus, safeguards may accompany a future CTBT debate.
Congress addresses nuclear weapon issues in the annual National Defense Authorization Act and
the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. It considers the Stockpile Stewardship
Program (listed as Weapons Activities), which seeks to maintain nuclear weapons without testing;
the FY2010 appropriation is $6.384 billion. Congress considers a U.S. contribution to a global
system to monitor possible nuclear tests. The FY2010 appropriation is $30.0 million.
This report will be updated. For a detailed presentation of pros and cons, see CRS Report
RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, by Jonathan Medalia.
For a discussion of safeguards and the CTBT, see CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty: Updated “Safeguards” and Net Assessments, by Jonathan Medalia.
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments
Contents
Most Recent Developments......................................................................................................... 1
History........................................................................................................................................ 1
National Positions on Testing and the CTBT ............................................................................... 2
The North Korean Nuclear Tests .................................................................................................8
The October 2006 Nuclear Test ............................................................................................. 8
The May 2009 Nuclear Test ................................................................................................ 11
The CTBT: Negotiations and Key Provisions ............................................................................ 12
Preparing for Entry into Force................................................................................................... 17
Suspension of U.S. Voting Rights in the Preparatory Commission ............................................ 19
Stockpile Stewardship ............................................................................................................... 25
CTBT Pros and Cons ................................................................................................................ 32
Chronology............................................................................................................................... 32
For Additional Reading ............................................................................................................. 34
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Nuclear Tests by Calendar Year ............................................................................ 31
Appendixes
Appendix. Chronology, 1992-2006............................................................................................ 40
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 46
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments
Most Recent Developments
On December 2, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/64/69, urging, among
other things, prompt signature and ratification of the CTBT, by a vote of 175 for, 1 against (North
Korea), and 3 abstentions. On October 28, the Marshall Islands became the 151st state to ratify the
treaty. On September 24 and 25, the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was held at U.N. headquarters in New York. Secretary
of State Clinton addressed the conference. On September 24, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously adopted resolution 1887, sponsored by the United States, addressing nuclear
nonproliferation and a world without nuclear weapons; among other things, the resolution calls on
all states to take the steps needed to bring the CTBT into force at an early date. On June 8,
Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda of Indonesia said that his nation would “immediately” ratify
the CTBT once the United States did so.1 Indonesia is one of the nine remaining nations that must
ratify the treaty for it to enter into force. On April 5, in a speech in Prague, President Obama said,
“my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”
History
A ban on nuclear testing is the oldest item on the arms control agenda. Efforts to curtail tests have
been made since the 1940s. In the 1950s, the United States and Soviet Union conducted hundreds
of hydrogen bomb tests. The radioactive fallout from these tests spurred worldwide protest. These
pressures, plus a desire to reduce U.S.-Soviet confrontation after the Cuban Missile Crisis of
1962, led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned nuclear explosions in the
atmosphere, in space, and under water. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1974, banned
underground nuclear weapons tests having an explosive force of more than 150 kilotons, the
equivalent of 150,000 tons of TNT, 10 times the force of the Hiroshima bomb. The Peaceful
Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed in 1976, extended the 150-kiloton limit to nuclear explosions
for peaceful purposes. President Carter did not pursue ratification of these treaties, preferring to
negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty, or CTBT, a ban on all nuclear explosions. When
agreement seemed near, however, he pulled back, bowing to arguments that continued testing was
needed to maintain reliability of existing weapons, to develop new weapons, and for other
purposes. President Reagan raised concerns about U.S. ability to monitor the two unratified
treaties and late in his term started negotiations on new verification protocols. These two treaties
were ratified in 1990.
With the end of the Cold War, the need for improved warheads dropped and pressures for a CTBT
grew. The U.S.S.R. and France began nuclear test moratoria in October 1990 and April 1992,
respectively. In early 1992, many in Congress favored a one-year test moratorium. The effort led
to the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment to the FY1993 Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Bill, which banned testing before July 1, 1993, set conditions on a resumption of
testing, banned testing after September 1996 unless another nation tested, and required the
President to report to Congress annually on a plan to achieve a CTBT by September 30, 1996.
1 “The United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership,” speech by H.E. Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at a breakfast forum with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and
USINDO, Washington, DC, June 8, 2009, p. 6.
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President George H.W. Bush signed the bill into law (P.L. 102-377) October 2, 1992. The CTBT
was negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. It was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
on September 10, 1996, and was opened for signature on September 24, 1996.2 As of January 6,
2010, 182 states had signed it and 151 had ratified.3
National Positions on Testing and the CTBT
United States: Under the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment, President Clinton had to decide
whether to ask Congress to resume testing. On July 3, 1993, he said, “A test ban can strengthen
our efforts worldwide to halt the spread of nuclear technology in weapons,” and “the nuclear
weapons in the United States arsenal are safe and reliable.” While testing offered advantages for
safety, reliability, and test ban readiness, “the price we would pay in conducting those tests now
by undercutting our own nonproliferation goals and ensuring that other nations would resume
testing outweighs these benefits.” Therefore, he (1) extended the moratorium at least through
September 1994; (2) called on other nations to extend their moratoria; (3) said he would direct
DOE to “prepare to conduct additional tests while seeking approval to do so from Congress” if
another nation tested; (4) promised to “explore other means of maintaining our confidence in the
safety, the reliability and the performance of our own weapons”; and (5) pledged to refocus the
nuclear weapons laboratories toward technology for nuclear nonproliferation and arms control
verification. He extended the moratorium twice more; on January 30, 1995, the Administration
announced his decision to extend the moratorium until a CTBT entered into force, assuming it
was signed by September 30, 1996.
On September 22, 1997, President Clinton submitted the CTBT to the Senate. He asked the
Senate to approve it in his State of the Union addresses of 1998 and 1999. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Helms rejected that request, saying that the treaty “from a non-
proliferation standpoint, is scarcely more than a sham” and had low priority for the committee. In
summer 1999, Senate Democrats pressed Senators Helms and Lott to permit consideration of the
treaty. On September 30, 1999, Senator Lott offered a unanimous-consent request to discharge the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee from considering the treaty and to have debate and a vote.
The request, as modified, was agreed to. The Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings
October 5-7; the Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing October 7. It quickly became clear
that the treaty was far short of the votes for approval, leading many on both sides to seek to delay
a vote. As the vote was scheduled by unanimous consent, and several Senators opposed a delay,
the vote was held October 13, rejecting the treaty, 48 for, 51 against, and 1 present. At the end of
the 106th Congress, pursuant to Senate Rule XXX, paragraph 2, the treaty moved to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee calendar, where it currently resides.
The Bush Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review and Nuclear Testing: In the FY2001 National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398, Sec. 1041), Congress directed the Secretary of Defense,
in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, to review nuclear policy, strategy, arms control
objectives, and the forces, stockpile, and nuclear weapons complex needed to implement U.S.
strategy. Although the resulting Nuclear Posture Review is classified, J.D. Crouch, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, presented an unclassified briefing on it on
2 For treaty text and the State Department’s analysis, see http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16411.htm.
3 For a current list of signatures and ratifications, see “Status of Signature and Ratification” at the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization website, http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/.
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January 9, 2002, dealing in part with the CTBT and nuclear testing.4 He stated there would be “no
change in the Administration’s policy at this point on nuclear testing. We continue to oppose
CTBT ratification. We also continue to adhere to a testing moratorium.” Further, “DOE is
planning on accelerating its test-readiness program” to reduce the time needed between a decision
to test and the conduct of a test, which was then 24 to 36 months. He discussed new weapons. “At
this point, there are no recommendations in the report about developing new nuclear weapons ...
we are trying to look at a number of initiatives. One would be to modify an existing weapon, to
give it greater capability against ... hard targets and deeply-buried targets. And we’re also looking
at non-nuclear ways that we might be able to deal with those problems.” A Washington Post
article of January 10, 2002, quoted White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer as saying that the
President has not ruled out testing “‘to make sure the stockpile, particularly as it is reduced, is
reliable and safe. So he has not ruled out testing in the future, but there are no plans to do so.’”5
Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A
statement by Physicians for Social Responsibility said, “The Administration’s plan ... would
streamline our nuclear arsenal into a war-fighting force, seek the opportunity to design and build
new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”6
Another critic felt that increased funding for test readiness would in effect give prior approval for
testing.
In July 2002 a National Academy of Sciences panel report on technical aspects of the CTBT
concluded, in the words of a press release, “that verification capabilities for the treaty are better
than generally supposed, U.S. adversaries could not significantly advance their nuclear weapons
capabilities through tests below the threshold of detection, and the United States has the technical
capabilities to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its existing weapons stockpile
without periodic nuclear tests.”7
A U.N. draft document of August 5, 2005, for signature by heads of government and heads of
state at the U.N. General Assembly meeting of September 2005, contained a provision that the
signers “resolve to ... [m]aintain a moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending the entry into
force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and call upon all States to sign and ratify
the Treaty.”8 John Bolton, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., reportedly called for major changes
to the draft; the CTBT passage was one of many drawing his objection.9
On June 25, 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated:
4 U.S. Department of Defense. News Transcript: “Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review,” January 9, 2002;
see http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html.
5 Walter Pincus, “U.S. Aims for 3,800 Nuclear Warheads,” Washington Post, January 10, 2002.
6 Physicians for Social Responsibility, “PSR: Bush Nuclear Weapons Plan Sets Stage for new Bombs, Resumption of
Testing; Plan Endangers National Security, Public Health,” press release via U.S. Newswire, January 8, 2002.
7 The National Academies, “Academy Addresses Technical Issues in Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ...,” press release, July
31, 2002. The full report, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, is available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10471#toc.
8 U.N. General Assembly. “Revised draft outcome document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General
Assembly of September 2005 submitted by the President of the General Assembly,” A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev.2,
advance unedited version, August 5, 2005.
9 Julian Borger, “Question Mark over the Summit,” Manila Bulletin, August 27, 2005.
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the Administration does not support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and does not intend
to seek Senate advice and consent to its ratification. There has been no change in the
Administration’s policy on this matter. By reducing the likelihood of the need to return to
underground nuclear testing, RRW [the Reliable Replacement Warhead] makes it more
likely that the United States would be able to continue its voluntary nuclear testing
moratorium. We cannot, however, provide guarantees regarding the voluntary moratorium.
We may find at some future time that we cannot diagnose or remedy a problem in a warhead
critical the U.S. nuclear deterrent without conducting a nuclear test.10
Similarly, a Statement of Administration Policy on S. 1547, FY2008 National Defense
Authorization Act, included the following:
While supporting the continued voluntary moratorium on testing, the Administration
strongly opposes a provision of section 3122 that calls for the ratification of the CTBT. It
would be imprudent to tie the hands of a future administration that may have to conduct a
test of an element of an aging, unmodernized stockpile in order to assure the reliability of the
nuclear deterrent force. Absent such a test, the United States may not be able to diagnose or
remedy a problem in a warhead critical to the Nation’s deterrent strategy.11
The Obama Administration, the Senate, and the CTBT. In a speech in Prague, Czech Republic, on
April 5, 2009, President Obama said, “my administration will immediately and aggressively
pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”12 Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton stated, “The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an integral part of our non-
proliferation and arms control agenda, and we will work in the months ahead both to seek the
advice and consent of the United States Senate to ratify the treaty, and to secure ratification by
others so that the treaty can enter into force.”13 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, asked if the
United States should ratify the CTBT, replied, “I think that if there are adequate verification
measures, probably should.”14
Vice President Joseph Biden wrote, “the President has made ratification of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty an Administration priority. He has asked me to guide the Administration’s effort
to gain Senate support for the treaty.”15 Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher described
elements of the Administration’s strategy to win Senate approval of the treaty. “This
administration will not attempt to [seek ratification] unless we believe it can actually pass.… [We
are] laying the groundwork for the support of a supermajority in the Senate, 67 votes.… We [will]
10 Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Honorable Pete Domenici, United States Senate, June 25, 2007.
11 U.S. Executive Office of the President. Office of Management and Budget. “Statement of Administration Policy: S.
1547—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” p. 7, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/
sap/110-1/s1547sap-s.pdf.
12 U.S. White House. Office of the Press Secretary. “Remarks by President Obama,” Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech
Republic, April 5, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-
Prague-As-Delivered/.
13 “Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks at CTBT Article XIV Conference, New York, NY, September
24, 2009,” p. 2.
14 Robert Gates, “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21st Century,” address to the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, DC, October 28, 2008.
15 Letter from Vice President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to The Honorable Edward Pastor, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, September 16, 2009.
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have a very, very short window to talk about CTBT. But when we believe that we have the right
conditions, we will begin to engage the Senate.”16
But obtaining Senate advice and consent to ratification may well prove to be a challenge. Senator
John Kerry, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated, “I will begin working
to build the necessary bipartisan support for US ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty ... success would be the single greatest arms control accomplishment for the new
Senate and it would reestablish America’s traditional leadership role on nonproliferation.”17 On
the other hand, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell said, “I also disagree with the
administration’s recent pledge to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”18 And Senator Jon
Kyl, who led the opposition to the CTBT in 1999, reportedly said, “I will lead the charge against
it [the CTBT] and I will do everything in my power to see that it is defeated.”19
United Kingdom: The United Kingdom cannot test because it held its nuclear tests for several
decades at the Nevada Test Site and does not have its own test site. Its last test was held in 1991.
Britain and France became the first of the original five nuclear weapon states to ratify the CTBT,
depositing instruments of ratification with the United Nations on April 6, 1998. On February 14,
2002, and February 23, 2006, the United Kingdom conducted subcritical experiments jointly with
the United States at the Nevada Test Site.
France: On June 13, 1995, President Jacques Chirac announced that France would conduct eight
nuclear tests at its test site at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific, finishing by the end of May
1996. The armed services had reportedly wanted the tests to check existing warheads, validate a
new warhead, and develop a computer system to simulate warheads to render further testing
unneeded. Many nations criticized the decision. On August 10, 1995, France indicated it would
halt all nuclear tests once the test series was finished and favored a CTBT that would ban “any
nuclear weapon test or any other nuclear explosion.”20 France conducted six tests from September
5, 1995, to January 27, 1996. On January 29, 1996, Chirac announced the end to French testing.
On April 6, 1998, France and Britain deposited instruments of ratification of the CTBT with the
United Nations.
Russia: Several press reports between 1996 and 1999 claimed that Russia may have conducted
low-yield nuclear tests at its Arctic test site at Novaya Zemlya; other reports stated that U.S.
reviews of the data determined that these events were earthquakes. Several reports between 1998
and 2000 stated that Russia had conducted “subcritical” nuclear experiments, discussed below,
which the CTBT does not bar. The report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic
Posture of the United States presents arguments for and against the CTBT; one argument by
opponents is, “Apparently Russia and possibly China are conducting low yield tests.”21
16 “Pressing a Broad Agenda for Combating Nuclear Dangers: An Interview with Undersecretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher,” interviewed by Daniel Horner and Tom Collina, Arms Control
Today, November 2009, pp. 8-9. Brackets in the quote are from the text of the article.
17 John Kerry, “New Directions for Foreign Relations,” Boston Globe, January 13, 2009.
18 Senator Mitch McConnell, “U.S. Foreign Policy,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, April
27, 2009, p. S4727.
19 “Push for Controversial Nuke Treaty Expected Next Spring at the Earliest,” The Cable, October 2, 2009.
20 Craig Whitney, “France to Back Ban After Its Atom Tests,” New York Times, August 11, 1995, p. 3.
21 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture, Washington,
DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009, p. 83.
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Russia ratified the treaty on June 30, 2000. In September 2005, Russia reportedly stated that it
intends to continue to observe the moratorium on testing until the CTBT enters into force as long
as other nuclear powers do likewise, and expressed its hope that the nations that must ratify the
treaty for it to enter into force will do so as soon as possible.22 In November 2007, according to
Itar-Tass, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov “confirmed Russia’s unchanging support for
the treaty as one of the key elements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and an effective
nuclear arms limitation tool.”23 In September 2009, Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian
Federation, said, “we need to encourage leading countries to sign and ratify the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as soon as possible in order to ensure its ultimate entry into force. That
is very important.”24
China: China did not participate in the moratorium. It conducted a nuclear test on October 5,
1993, that many nations condemned. It countered that it had conducted 39 tests, as opposed to the
1,054 that the United States had conducted, and needed a few more for safety and reliability.
According to one report, “China will immediately stop nuclear testing once the treaty on the
complete ban of nuclear tests takes effect, [Chinese Premier] Li Peng said.”25 It conducted other
tests on June 10 and October 7, 1994, May 15 and August 17, 1995, and June 8 and July 29,
1996. It announced that the July 1996 test would be its last, as it would begin a moratorium on
July 30, 1996. On February 29, 2000, the Chinese government submitted the CTBT to the
National People’s Congress for ratification. In a white paper of December 2004, China stated its
support of early entry into force and, until that happens, its commitment to the test moratorium.
As of January 2010, China had not ratified the treaty.
India: On May 11, 1998, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced that India had
conducted three nuclear tests. The government stated, “The tests conducted today were with a
fission device, a low yield device and a thermonuclear device.... These tests have established that
India has a proven capability for a weaponised nuclear programme.”26 It announced two more
tests May 13. An academic study concluded, based on seismic data, that India and Pakistan
overstated the number and yields of their tests. India has conducted no tests since May 1998, but
questioned whether the United States should expect India to sign a treaty that the United States
views as flawed. In an Indian-Pakistani statement of June 20, 2004, “Each side reaffirmed its
unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions” barring “extraordinary
events.”27 On December 22, 2005, Shri Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State in the Ministry of
External Affairs, said, “India has already stated that it will not stand in the way of the Entry into
Force of the Treaty.”28 On August 16, 2007, India’s External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee,
22 “Russia Intends to Continue Moratorium on Nuclear Tests,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, excerpt from a
report by Russian News Agency ITAR-TASS, September 23, 2005.
23 “Russia Supports CTBT as Key Element of Nuclear Non-Proliferation—FM,” Itar-Tass, November 12, 2007.
24 United Nations. Security Council. 6191st meeting, September 24, 2009, S/PV.6191, provisional version, p. 7.
25 “Li Peng: China’s Nuclear Tests Pose No Threat,” Xinhua, October 8, 1995, in FBIS-TAC-95-006, December 6,
1995, p. 13.
26 India. Ministry of External Affairs. Press statement, New Delhi, May 11, 1998, at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/
India/Indianofficial.txt.
27 India. Ministry of External Affairs. “Joint Statement, India-Pakistan Expert-Level Talks on Nuclear CBMs
[Confidence-Building Measures],” June 20, 2004.
28 India. Ministry of External Affairs. Rajya Sabha. Unstarred Question No. 3260, to be answered on December 12,
2005, by Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs. http://164.100.24.219/rsq/quest.asp?
qref=108782.
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reportedly told Parliament, “India has the sovereign right to test and would do so if it is necessary
in national interest.”29
A statement on U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation of July 18, 2005, by President Bush and Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, said, “The Prime Minister conveyed that for his part, India
would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to ... continu[e] India’s unilateral moratorium on
nuclear testing.”30 In a Senate hearing of November 2, Robert Joseph, Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security, stated, “India’s pledge to maintain its nuclear testing
moratorium contributes to nonproliferation efforts by making its ending of nuclear explosive tests
one of the conditions of full civil nuclear cooperation.”31 At that hearing, Michael Krepon, co-
founder of the Stimson Center, argued that statements by Indian government officials that there
are no current plans to test “do not carry equal weight, nor do they impose equal responsibility, to
the obligations accepted by the 176 states that have signed the CTBT.”32 Press reports of April
2006 said the sides were negotiating a detailed nuclear cooperation agreement. The reports
indicated that the United States would insist that India maintain its moratorium on nuclear testing
or else the United States would have the right to terminate the agreement. India responded that it
had already pledged to maintain the moratorium, rendering this provision out of place in the final
agreement. A press report of January 2007 quoted National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan as
saying, “There is no question of signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We have our
voluntary moratorium. That position remains.”33 According to a report of November 2007, when
some members of Parliament criticized the U.S.-Indian nuclear agreement on grounds it would
bar Indian nuclear testing, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh responded, “If a necessity for
carrying out a nuclear test arises in future, there is nothing in the agreement which prevents us
from carrying out tests.”34 (See CRS Report RL33529, India-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan
Kronstadt.)
In August 2009, a former Indian official said that India should not be “railroaded” into signing the
CTBT because its hydrogen bomb tests of 1998 did not produce the desired yield. Accordingly, he
said, India “should conduct more nuclear tests which are necessary from the point of view of
security.”35 In response, other Indian officials claimed that the thermonuclear tests were
successful, so no further tests were needed.36 In December 2009, in response to “the renewed
pressure from President Obama on [India] in recent months to sign the CTBT,” 11 scientists and
29 “Pranab Mukherjee Says India Has Sovereign Right to Conduct Nuclear Test,” AndhraNews.net, August 16, 2007;
available at http://www.andhranews.net/India/2007/August/16-Pranab-Mukherjee-says-11996.asp.
30 U.S. White House. “Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,” July
18, 2005, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html.
31 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing, Implications of U.S.-India Nuclear Energy
Cooperation, statement by Robert Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
November 2, 2005. Transcript by CQ Transcriptions, Inc.
32 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing, Implications of U.S.-India Nuclear Energy
Cooperation, statement by Michael Krepon, Co-Founder, The Henry L. Stimson Center, November 2, 2005. Transcript
by CQ Transcriptions, Inc.
33 “India Not to Accept Any Legal Binding on N-Testing,” Press Trust of India Limited, January 13, 2007.
34 “Indian Lawmakers Attack U.S. Nuclear Deal,” Global Security Newswire, November 29, 2007.
35 “No CTBT, India Needs More Nuclear Tests: Pokhran II Coordinator,” The Times of India, August 27, 2009.
36 “Top Indian Scientists Say Nuclear Tests Were Successful,” Global Security Newswire, September 25, 2009.
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others formerly in the Indian nuclear weapons program urged the Indian government not to sign
the treaty. 37 As of January 2010, India had not signed the CTBT.
Pakistan: Pakistan announced on May 28, 1998, that it had conducted five nuclear tests, and
announced a sixth on May 30. Reports placed the yields of the smallest devices between zero and
a few kilotons, and between 2 and 45 kilotons for the largest. Some question the number of tests
based on uncertain seismic evidence. Pakistan made no claims of testing fusion devices.
Pakistan’s weapons program apparently relies heavily on foreign technology. Pakistan claimed
that it tested “ready-to-fire warheads,” not experimental devices, and included a warhead for the
Ghauri, a missile with a range of 900 miles, and low-yield tactical weapons. In response to the
Indian and Pakistani tests, the United States imposed economic sanctions on the two nations. In
November 1999, Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar said that his nation would not sign the CTBT
unless sanctions were lifted, but that “[w]e will not be the first to conduct further nuclear tests.”38
In August 2000, President Pervez Musharraf said the time was not ripe to sign the CTBT because
so doing could destabilize Pakistan.39 In September 2005, Pakistan reportedly said it would not be
the first nation in the region to resume nuclear testing.40 In April 2007, Pakistan’s Prime Minister,
Shaukat Aziz, reportedly said that Pakistan would not unilaterally sign the CTBT since it shares a
border with India.41 Replying to the statement on nuclear testing by Pranab Mukherjee, India’s
External Affairs Minister, Tasnim Aslam, a spokeswoman for Pakistan’s Foreign Office,
reportedly said, “We take seriously the assertions by the Indian leadership about the possibility of
renewing nuclear tests.... Resumption of nuclear tests by India would create a serious situation
obliging Pakistan to review its position and to take action, appropriate, consistent to our supreme
national interest.”42 According to a press report of June 2009, the situation had changed: “‘Let me
tell you, Pakistan has no plan to sign the CTBT,’ Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul
Basit said, adding that circumstances have changed since Islamabad pledged in 1998 to sign off
on the agreement if nuclear rival India did the same.”43 As of January 2010, Pakistan had not
signed the CTBT.
The North Korean Nuclear Tests
The October 2006 Nuclear Test
Negotiations to halt North Korea’s nuclear program have been underway for years, most recently
between that nation, the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia (Six-Party Talks).
37 P.K. Iyengar et al., “On Thermonuclear Weapon Capability and Its Implications for Credible Minimum Deterrence:
Statement by Deeply Concerned Senior Scientists,” Mainstream, December 26, 2009,
http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1865.html.
38 Kathy Gannon, “New Pakistani Government Gives First Official Foreign Policy Statement,” newswire, Associated
Press, November 8, 1999.
39 Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, “Signing CTBT Can Destabilize Pakistan, Says Musharraf,” newswire, Kyodo News
International, Inc., August 17, 2000.
40 “Pakistan Today Said It Will Abide by Its ‘Solemn Pledge’ That It Would Not Be the First Country in the Region to
Resume Nuclear Tests ...,” newswire, Press Trust of India Limited, September 26, 2005.
41 “Pak Says No to Signing NPT, CTBT Unilaterally,” Press Trust of India Limited, April 26, 2007.
42 “Pakistan Would Consider Nuclear Test If India Tests,” Reuters, August 20, 2007, available at http://in.reuters.com/
article/topNews/idINIndia-29063920070820.
43 “Pakistan Rules Out Test Ban Treaty Endorsement,” Global Security Newswire, June 19, 2009.
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A CIA report of late 2004 stated that during talks in April 2003, “North Korea privately
threatened to ‘transfer’ or ‘demonstrate’ its nuclear weapons.”44 On February 10, 2005, North
Korea declared, “We ... have manufactured nukes for self-defence to cope with the Bush
administration’s evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle North Korea,”45 and on June 9 it
claimed it was building more such weapons. On May 15, 2005, the United States warned that it
and other nations would take punitive action if North Korea conducted a nuclear test.46 In a joint
statement from the Six-Party Talks in September 2005, North Korea “committed to abandoning
all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.”47 In November 2005, North
Korea began a boycott of the talks. On October 3, 2006, North Korea stated that it “will, in the
future, be conducting a nuclear test.”48 In response, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States warned of consequences if North Korea conducted a test; South Korea expressed “deep
regret and concern.” For updates on the Six-Party Talks, see CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s
Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksch.
On October 9, 2006, North Korea declared that it had conducted an underground nuclear test. One
report placed the yield at as little as 0.2 kilotons.49 According to other reports, South Korean
geologists placed the explosive yield at 550 tons of TNT equivalent (0.55 kilotons),50 the French
Atomic Energy Commission’s estimate was 0.50 kilotons,51 and Russian Minister of Defense
Sergei Ivanov placed the yield at 5 to 15 kilotons.52 For comparison, the Hiroshima bomb had a
yield of 15 kilotons. A yield of less than a kiloton is well below the 9 or more kilotons of other
nations’ first nuclear tests,53 and below the 4 kilotons that North Korea reportedly told China that
it expected.54 On October 16, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a
statement on the test: “Analysis of air samples collected on October 11, 2006 detected radioactive
debris which confirms that North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the
vicinity of P’unggye on October 9, 2006. The explosion yield was less than a kiloton.”55
44 “Attachment A: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003.” Note: “The Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in response to a congressionally directed action in Section 721 of
the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act ...,” c. 2004, p. 5.
45 “Korean Central News Agency North Korea February 10,” The Guardian, February 12, 2005.
46 David Sanger, “U.S. in Warning to North Korea on Nuclear Test,” New York Times, May 16, 2005, p. 1.
47 “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” Beijing, September 19, 2005, at http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm.
48 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Foreign Ministry Statement, Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting
Station, October 3, 2006.
49 “White House Casts Doubt on N. Korean Nuclear Arms,” Reuters newswire, October 10, 2006.
50 Evan Ramstad, Jay Solomon, and Gordon Fairclough, “Bomb Fallout: Explosion by North Koreans Imperils
Nuclear-Control Effort,” Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2006, p. 1.
51 Michael Abramowitz and Colum Lynch, “U.S. Urges Sanctions on North Korea,” Washington Post, October 10,
2006, in graphic, “North Korea’s Big Test,” p. 13.
52 William Broad and Mark Mazzetti, “Blast May Be Only a Partial Success, Experts Say,” New York Times, October
10, 2006, p. 8.
53 James Sterngold, “U.S. Urges Sanctions to Restrain North Korea,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 10, 2006, p. 1.
54 Broad and Mazzetti, “Blast May Be Only a Partial Success, Experts Say.”
55 U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Public Affairs Office. “Statement by the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence on the North Korea Nuclear Test,” October 16, 2006, ODNI News Release No. 19-06, 1 p.
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Most U.S. observers cited in news reports believe that the event was a small nuclear explosion,
but at most a partial success. One hypothesis is that, through poor design, the device did not
implode properly, greatly reducing its yield.56 Other hypotheses are that the device reduced the
amount of plutonium used in order to conserve that material, or engineers sought to test the
design rather than yield of the device, or the device was smaller and more sophisticated than
anticipated.57 On the latter point, Siegfried Hecker, former Director, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, stated that the North Korean weapon designers most likely did not test a Nagasaki-
type device (a basic implosion device) because they could have had high confidence, without
testing, that such a device would work. Instead, his analysis is that the North Koreans most likely
tested a more advanced design, even at the risk of partial failure, which is what the seismic
signals appear to confirm. He considers it highly unlikely that they intentionally designed a mini-
nuke. However, even if the test was not fully successful, he believes they learned much from the
test.58
A more advanced warhead would be of greater military value to North Korea than a Nagasaki
bomb because a missile could carry it, but further tests might well be needed to make the warhead
militarily usable. The press carried reports that North Korea said it would not conduct further
tests, but according to another report, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that Chinese
officials, briefing her on the North Korean situation, said nothing about a North Korean test
halt.59 It would take some time to prepare for another test by determining the lessons of the first
test, redesigning the device, and testing components of the new design. A moratorium during that
time would have little if any impact on its test program.
The seismic record of the North Korean test, when compared with recordings of a 2002
earthquake recorded at a seismic station in Wonju, Republic of Korea, shows differences in
seismic wave patterns that are diagnostic of an explosive source.60 For example, seismic waves
from the earthquake build up over several seconds, while waves from the explosion arrive
suddenly. Once the amplitudes are measured, the yield may be estimated, but this is complicated
by factors such as the local geology and the specifics of the burial. Arthur Lerner-Lam, Associate
Director for Seismology, Geology, and Tectonophysics, Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory,
Columbia University, said that the seismic record is not useful for determining whether the event
was a nuclear or conventional explosion without making additional assumptions or inferences.61
Mining explosions are typically detonated over several seconds in order to break rock efficiently,
so their seismological signature can be interpreted in terms of such “ripple firing.” However, if
North Korea attempted to mimic the signature of a nuclear explosion by setting off all the
explosive at the same time, Lerner-Lam said, it would be virtually impossible to discriminate
between conventional and nuclear explosions using seismological data alone. Complementary
observations provide more direct evidence. A nuclear explosion releases radioactive isotopes of
56 Dafna Linzer and Thomas Ricks, “U.S. Waits for Firm Information on Nature and Success of Device,” Washington
Post, October 11, 2006, p. 14.
57 Dafna Linzer, “Low Yield of Blast Surprises Analysts,” Washington Post, October 10, 2006, p. 12.
58 Personal communication, October 13, 2006.
59 Burt Herman, “U.S. Says No Sign of NKorea Promise Not to Test; SKorea’s Ex-President Warns of Backlash,”
Associated Press Newswires, October 21, 2006.
60 For the two seismographs, see “The CTBT Verification Regime Put to the Test—The Event in the DPRK on 9
October 2006,” Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission, at http://www.ctbto.org/
press_centre/featured_articles/2007/2007_0409_dprk.htm. For a detailed discussion of the seismic record of the North
Korean test, see Paul Richards and Won-Young Kim, “Seismic Signature,” Nature Physics, January 2007, pp. 4-6.
61 Personal communication, October 10, 2006.
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certain gases. They may take days to reach the surface, but once they dissipate into the
atmosphere, he said, they may be detected by specially equipped aircraft or ground stations.62
The ability of the seismic network to detect an explosion that most sources place at or below one
kiloton, and in one case as low as one-fifth of a kiloton, may hold implications for the CTBT. The
treaty’s supporters claim that the ability to detect subkiloton tests should negate arguments
against the treaty on grounds of inadequate monitoring capability. The Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, for example, states, “the CTBT
verification regime proved that it was capable of meeting the expectations set for it,”63 even
though the test was low yield, the IMS was 60% completed, and the noble gas system was 25%
completed.64 Critics respond that the test was not evasively conducted; that evasion scenarios,
such as testing during an earthquake or in a large underground cavity, could defeat monitoring
efforts; and that subkiloton tests could aid in developing nuclear weapons.
The May 2009 Nuclear Test
North Korea announced on May 25, 2009, that it had conducted a second nuclear test.65 The U.S.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence stated: “The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses
that North Korea probably conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of
P'unggye on May 25, 2009. The explosion yield was approximately a few kilotons. Analysis of
the event continues.”66 The lack of certainty on whether the test was nuclear arises because
seismic signals, including those detected by 61 stations of the International Monitoring System
(described below),67 were consistent with a nuclear test, and seismic signals from the 2006 and
2009 events were very similar,68 but open sources did not report the detection of physical
evidence that would provide conclusive proof of a nuclear test, such as radioactive isotopes of
noble gases, especially those having short half-lives, or radioactive particulates (i.e., fallout). For
example, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission stated:
The detection of radioactive noble gas, in particular xenon, could serve to corroborate the
seismic findings. Contrary to the 2006 announced DPRK nuclear test, none of the CTBTO’s
noble gas [detection] stations have detected xenon isotopes in a characteristic way that could
62 For a technical analysis of the North Korean test, see Richard Garwin and Frank von Hippel, “A Technical Analysis:
Deconstructing North Korea’s October 9 Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Today, November 2006.
63 “The CTBT Verification Regime Put to the Test—The Event in the DPRK on 9 October 2006.” This source also has
links to many documents on the North Korean test.
64 Information provided by CTBTO PrepCom, personal communication, February 15, 2008.
65 For further information on North Korea’ nuclear program, see CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear
Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksch, and CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear
Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth Nikitin.
66 U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Public Affairs Office. “Statement by the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence on North Korea’s Declared Nuclear Test on May 25, 2009,” ODNI News Release No. 23-09,
June 15, 2009, at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20090615_release.pdf .
67 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission, “Homing in on the Event,” May 29, 2009,
http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2009/homing-in-on-the-event/.
68 For seismograms of these two events and an earthquake from the same region, see Won-Young Kim, Paul Richards,
and Lynn Sykes, “Discrimination of Earthquakes and Explosions Near Nuclear Test Sites Using Regional High-
Frequency Data,” poster SEISMO-27J presented at the International Scientific Studies conference, June 2009,
http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ISS_2009/Poster/SEISMO-27J%20%28US%29%20-
%20Won_Young_Kim%20_Paul_Richards%20and%20Lynn_Sykes.pdf .
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be attributed to the [2009] DPRK event so far, even though the system is working well and
the network’s density in the region is considerably higher than in 2006.…
Nor have CTBTO Member States using their own national technical means reported any
such measurements. Given the relatively short half-life of radioactive xenon (between 8
hours and 11 days, depending on the isotope), it is unlikely that the [International Monitoring
System] will detect or identify xenon from this event after several weeks.69
Possible reasons why no radioactive effluents were detected include progress in containment of
such effluents by North Korea, drawing on lessons learned from the 2006 test; detailed study of
the geology at the test site to locate the test away from potential pathways by which the effluents
could reach the surface; release of effluents below the threshold of detection; the possibility that
the test was a large chemical explosion; good luck; or some combination.
In response to the event, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 1874 on June 12, 2009.70
Among other things, the resolution “express[es] the gravest concern” at the nuclear test,
“condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test,” calls for inspection of cargo to and from North
Korea under certain circumstances and conditions, and provides for various financial sanctions.
As of January 2010, North Korea had not signed the CTBT.
The CTBT: Negotiations and Key Provisions
The Conference on Disarmament, or CD, calls itself “the sole multilateral disarmament
negotiating forum of the international community.” It is affiliated with and funded by the United
Nations, yet is autonomous from the U.N. It operates by consensus; each member state can block
a decision. On August 10, 1993, the CD gave its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban “a
mandate to negotiate a CTB.” On November 19, 1993, the United Nations General Assembly
unanimously approved a resolution calling for negotiation of a CTBT. The CD’s 1994 session
opened in Geneva on January 25, with negotiation of a CTBT its top priority.
The priority had to do with extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).71 That
treaty entered into force in 1970. It divided the world into nuclear “haves”—the United States,
Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China, the five 72 declared nuclear powers, which are also the
permanent five (“P5”) members of the U.N. Security Council—and nuclear “have-nots.” The P5
would be the only States Party to the NPT to have nuclear weapons, but they (and others) would
negotiate in good faith on halting the nuclear arms race soon, on nuclear disarmament, and on
69 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, “Experts Sure about the Nature of
the DPRK Event,” (referring to the May 2009 North Korean test), June 12, 2009, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/
highlights/2009/experts-sure-about-nature-of-the-dprk-event/. The International Monitoring System is a system to
detect nuclear explosions worldwide. It is being built up by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
Preparatory Commission. See http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/.
70 United Nations. Security Council. Resolution 1874 (2009) adopted by the Security Council at its 6141st meeting, on
12 June 2009, S/Res/1874 (2009), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/368/49/PDF/N0936849.pdf?
OpenElement.
71 For text of the treaty, see http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16281.htm#treaty.
72 For detailed information on the CTBT negotiations, see Jaap Ramaker, Jenifer Mackby, Peter Marshall, and Robert
Geil, The Final Test: A History of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Negotiations, Vienna, Austria,
Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization, 2003, 291 p.
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general and complete disarmament. Nonnuclear weapon states saw attainment of a CTBT as the
touchstone of good faith on these matters. The NPT provided for reviews every five years; a
review in 1995, 25 years after it entered into force, would determine whether to extend the treaty
indefinitely or for one or more fixed periods. The Review and Extension Conference of April-
May 1995 extended the treaty indefinitely. Extension was accompanied by certain measures,
including a Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament that set forth goals on universality of the NPT, nuclear weapon free zones, etc., and
stressed the importance of completing “the negotiations on a universal and internationally and
effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996.”
The extension decision, binding on States Party to the NPT, was contentious. Nonnuclear States
Party argued that the P5 failed to meet their NPT obligations by not concluding a CTBT. They
saw progress on winding down the arms race as inadequate. They assailed the NPT as
discriminatory because it divides the world into nuclear and nonnuclear states, and argued for a
regime in which no nation has nuclear weapons. The CTBT, in their view, symbolized this regime
because, unlike the NPT, the P5 would give up something tangible, the ability to develop new
sophisticated warheads. Some nonnuclear states saw NPT extension as their last source of
leverage for a CTBT. Other nonnuclear states felt that the NPT was in the interests of all but
would-be proliferators, that anything less than indefinite extension would undermine the security
of most nations, and that the NPT was too important to put at risk as a means of pressuring the P5
for a CTBT. The explicit linkage finally drawn between CTBT and NPT lent urgency to
negotiations on the former.
The CD reached a draft treaty in August 1996. India argued that the CTBT “should be securely
anchored in the global disarmament context and be linked through treaty language to the
elimination of all nuclear weapons in a time bound framework.”73 India also wanted a treaty to
bar weapons research not involving nuclear tests. The draft treaty did not meet these conditions,
which the nuclear weapon states rejected, so India vetoed it at the CD on August 20, barring it
from going to the U.N. General Assembly as a CD document. As an alternate way to open the
treaty for signing, Australia on August 23 asked the General Assembly to consider a resolution to
adopt the draft CTBT text and for the Secretary-General to open it for signing so it could be
adopted by a simple majority, or by the two-thirds majority that India sought, avoiding the need
for consensus. A potential pitfall was that the resolution (the treaty text) was subject to
amendment, yet the nuclear weapon states viewed amendments as unacceptable. India did not
raise obstacles to the vote, which was held September 10, with 158 nations in favor, 3 against
(India, Bhutan, and Libya), 5 abstentions, and 19 not voting.
A sixth five-year NPT review conference was held April 24-May 19, 2000, in New York. U.S.
rejection of the CTBT, lack of Chinese ratification, U.S. efforts to seek renegotiation of the ABM
Treaty, and efforts to ban nuclear weapons in the Middle East led some to fear dire outcomes
from the conference. However, some contentious issues were ironed out, some were avoided, and
concessions were made. For example, a joint statement by the P5 to the conference on May 1
said, “No efforts should be spared to make sure that the CTBT is a universal and internationally
and effectively verifiable treaty and to secure its earliest entry into force.”74 As a result of effort
73 India. Embassy. “Statement by Ms. Arundhati Ghose, Ambassador/Permanent Representative of India to UN,
Geneva, in the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament on January 25, 1996,” at http://www.indianembassy.org/
policy/Disarmament/cd(jan2596).htm.
74 France. Embassy of France in the United States. “2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Statement by the Delegations of France, The People’s Republic of China, The
(continued...)
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by many nations, the final document of the conference was adopted by consensus. The document
included a 13-step Nuclear Disarmament Plan of Action, the first two elements of which called
for the early entry into force of the treaty and a moratorium on nuclear explosions pending entry
into force.
At the NPT Review Conference of May 2005, the CTBT was a point of contention. For example,
Alberto Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, said, “Plans to
develop new nuclear weapons technology and failure to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) into force seriously erode the historic foundations of the NPT.”75 Ihor Dolhov, Deputy
Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, said, “Ukraine continues to underscore the
importance and urgency of an early entry into force of the Treaty and calls upon all States who
have not yet done so to adhere to the Treaty without delay and unconditionally.”76 Ambassador
Ronaldo Sardenberg of Brazil said, “Brazil has consistently called for the universalization of the
CTBT, which we consider to be an essential element of the disarmament and non-proliferation
regime.”77 The next NPT review conference will be held at U.N. Headquarters in New York May
3-28, 2010. By all indications, the CTBT will be an issue at the conference.
The balance of this section summarizes key CTBT provisions.78
Scope (Article I): The heart of the treaty is the obligation “not to carry out any nuclear weapon
test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.” This formulation bars even very low yield tests
that some in the nuclear weapon states had wanted, and bars peaceful nuclear explosions that
China had wanted, but rejects India’s concern that a CTBT should “leave no loophole for activity,
either explosive based or non-explosive based, aimed at the continued development and
refinement of nuclear weapons.”79 Views differ on whether the ban covers tests with the tiniest
nuclear yield; unless cooperative monitoring measures were used, the yield of such tests would be
below the threshold of detection.
Organization (Article II): The treaty establishes a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBTO), composed of all member states, to implement the treaty.80 Three groups
are under this Organization. The Conference of States Parties, composed of a representative from
(...continued)
Russian Federation, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The United States of America,”
New York, May 1, 2000, at http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2000/tnp5.asp.
75 Philippines. Mission to the United Nations. “Collective Action: Regional Responsibility and Global Accountability
Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Statement by H.E. Dr. Alberto G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of the Philippines, at the General Debate of the 2005 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, New York, 11 May 2005,” p. 2, at http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt11philippines.pdf.
76 Ukraine. Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations. “Statement by H.E. Mr. Ihor Dolhov, Deputy
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, New York, 5 May 2005,” p. 4, at
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt05ukraine.pdf.
77 Brazil. “VII Review Conference of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Statement by the Head of
the Delegation of Brazil, Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg, New York, 2 May 2005,” p. 4, at http://www.un.org/
events/npt2005/statements/npt04brazil.pdf.
78 For treaty text and analysis, see U.S. Congress. Senate. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: Message from the
President of the United States Transmitting Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty ... , Treaty Doc. 105-28,
September 23, 1997. Washington: GPO, 1997, xvi + 230 p, or http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16411.htm.
79 India, “Statement by Ms. Arundhati Ghose, ... January 25, 1996.”
80 For further information on the CTBTO, see its website at http://www.ctbto.org.
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each member state, shall meet in annual and special sessions to consider and decide issues within
the scope of the treaty and oversee the work of the other groups. An Executive Council with 51
member States shall, among other things, take action on requests for on-site inspection, and may
request a special session of the Conference. A Technical Secretariat shall carry out verification
functions, including operating an International Data Center (IDC), processing and reporting on
data from an International Monitoring System, and receiving and processing requests for on-site
inspections.
Verification (Article IV): The treaty establishes a verification regime. It provides for collection
and dissemination of information, permits States Party to use national technical means of
verification, and specifies verification responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat. It establishes
an International Monitoring System (IMS) and provides for on-site inspections. The treaty calls
for the IMS to have, when complete, 321 stations worldwide to monitor for signals that might
indicate a nuclear explosion: 170 seismic stations to monitor seismic waves in the Earth; 11
hydroacoustic stations to monitor underwater sound waves; 60 arrays of infrasound detectors to
monitor very low frequency sound waves in the atmosphere; and 80 radionuclide stations to
detect radioactive particles and (for half the stations) gases that a nuclear explosion might
produce, as well as 16 radionuclide laboratories to analyze radioactive samples. Of the seismic
stations, 50 are to be primary stations to provide data to IDC continuously and in real time, while
120 are to be auxiliary stations to provide data when requested by the IDC. As of January 2010,
of the 337 facilities, 33 are planned, 28 are under construction, 22 are undergoing testing, and 254
have been certified, that is, they are completed and meet the technical requirements of the
Preparatory Commission.81 Certified stations transmit data automatically and continuously to the
IDC, excepting for the auxiliary stations and the radionuclide laboratories, which transmit data as
requested by the IDC.82 In March 2008, the Preparatory Commission launched the International
Scientific Studies Project. A conference to report the results was held in Vienna, Austria, on June
10-12, 2009.83 “The ISS aim is to foster the CTBTO Preparatory Commission’s ability to keep
pace with scientific and technological progress and to strengthen cooperation between the
organization and the scientific community.”84 Critics would note that a focus on progress implies
less focus on possible difficulties. In September 2008, the PrepCom conducted its large-scale
Integrated Field Exercise 2008 in Kazakhstan to simulate a complete on-site inspection.85 The
PrepCom called the exercise a success.86
81 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission provides updated information on these
facilities at http://www.ctbto.org/map/#ims.
82 Information provided by Annika Thunborg, Chief, Public Information, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Preparatory Commission, personal communication, November 26, 2007.
83 For links to publications of the conference, see “ISS09, International Scientific Studies,” http://www.ctbto.org/
specials/the-international-scientific-studies-project-iss/.
84 ISS09—International Scientific Studies, “International Scientific Studies Conference, Vienna, 10-12 June 2009,” p.
1.
85 Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, “CTBTO Inspectors
Implement On-site Inspection Test Scenario in Kazakh Steppe,” press release, September 12, 2008, at
http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2008/ctbto-inspectors-implement-on-siteinspection-test-scenario-in-
kazakh-steppe/12-september-2008-page-1/.
86 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission, “Integrated Field Exercise 2008 Concludes
Successfully,” http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2008/integrated-field-exercise-2008concludes-successfully/
8-october-2008-page-1/.
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Review of the Treaty (Article VIII): The treaty provides for a conference 10 years after entry into
force (unless a majority of States Party decide not to hold such a conference) to review the
treaty’s operation and effectiveness. Further review conferences may be held at subsequent
intervals of 10 years or less.
Duration and Withdrawal (Article IX): “This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.” However,
“Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have
jeopardized its supreme interests.” President Clinton indicated his possible willingness to
withdraw from the Treaty using this withdrawal provision, which is common to many arms
control agreements, in his speech of August 11, 1995, discussed below, as one of several
conditions under which the United States would enter the CTBT.
Entry into force (Article XIV): The treaty shall enter into force 180 days after 44 states named in
Annex 2 have deposited instruments of ratification, but not less than two years after the treaty is
opened for signature. If the treaty has not entered into force three years after being opened for
signature, and if a majority of states that have deposited instruments of ratification so desire, a
conference of these states shall be held to decide how to accelerate ratification. Unless otherwise
decided, subsequent conferences of this type shall be held annually until entry into force occurs.
The 44 states are those with nuclear reactors that participated in the work of the CD’s 1996
session and were CD members as of June 18, 1996. This formulation includes nuclear-capable
states and nuclear threshold states (in particular Israel, which, along with other States, joined the
CD on June 17, 1996), and excludes the former Yugoslavia. Of the 44, as of January 2010, India,
North Korea, and Pakistan had not signed the treaty and China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and
the United States had not ratified it. The most recent Article XIV conference was held September
24-25, 2009, at U.N. Headquarters in New York; Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton,
among others, delivered remarks at the conference.
Annexes: Annex 1 lists the regional groupings of states; Annex 2 lists the 44 states that must ratify
the treaty, pursuant to Article XIV, for it to enter into force.
Protocol: The Protocol provides details on the IMS and on functions of the International Data
Center (Part I); spells out on-site inspection procedures in great detail (Part II); and provides for
certain confidence-building measures (Part III). Annex 1 to the Protocol lists International
Monitoring System facilities: seismic stations, radionuclide stations and laboratories,
hydroacoustic stations, and infrasound stations. Annex 2 provides a list of variables that, among
others, may be used in analyzing data from these stations to screen for possible explosions.
Resolution: While not part of the treaty per se, the states signatory to the CTBT adopted a
resolution establishing the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO on November 29, 1996, “for
the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and for preparing for the first session of the Conference
of the States Parties to that Treaty.”87
87 “Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
Organization,” Adopted by the States Signatories, November 19, 1996: “Annex—Text on the Establishment of a
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization,” paragraph 1,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/ctbt4.htm.
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Preparing for Entry into Force
As noted, states that had signed the CTBT established the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom)
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to prepare for entry into
force of the treaty, such as by creating the structures and instruments of the CTBT. The PrepCom
states that its main task “is to establish the global verification regime foreseen in the Treaty so
that it will be operational by the time the Treaty enters into force.” The PrepCom held 33
meetings from November 1996 through November 2009. Eleven meetings of working groups and
advisory groups were held in 2009. The PrepCom also holds training sessions, workshops, etc.88
The United Nations conducted entry-into-force conferences under Article XIV every second year
beginning in 1999. The final declaration of the 2009 conference stated, “Relevant international
developments since the 2007 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT make
entry into force of the Treaty more urgent today than ever before,” and adopted 10 measures to
promote entry into force.89 The CTBTO PrepCom served as the secretariat of these conferences.
There have been other calls for entry into force. In September 2002, a statement by 18 foreign
ministers, including those of Britain, France, and Russia, called for early entry into force. On
November 22, 2002, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution 57/100 (164 for, 1 against
(U.S.A.), 5 abstentions) urging states to maintain their nuclear test moratoria and urging states that
had not signed and ratified the CTBT to do so as soon as possible and to avoid actions that would
defeat its object and purpose. In a message to the 2003 conference, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan urged the nations that had to ratify the treaty for it to enter into force, and especially North
Korea, to ratify, and urged continuing the moratorium: “No nuclear testing must be tolerated under
any circumstances.”90 A conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, which has 116 members, ended
on February 25, 2003. Its Final Document stated that the heads of state or government “stressed the
significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT), including by all the Nuclear Weapons States.”91 On September 23, 2004, foreign ministers
from 42 nations called for prompt ratification of the CTBT, especially by nations whose ratification
is required for entry into force.92 A report by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, an
international commission organized by Sweden, issued a report in June 2006 that, among other
things, urged all states that have not done so to sign and ratify the CTBT “unconditionally and
without delay.” It recommended that the 2007 conference of CTBT signatories “should address
the possibility of a provisional entry into force of the treaty.” It stated, “The Commission believes
that a U.S. decision to ratify the CTBT would strongly influence other countries to follow suit. It
would decisively improve the chances for entry into force of the treaty and would have more
88 For a calendar of meetings for 2009, see http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/conferenceservices/workshops/
2009/2009_Calendar_18_Sept.pdf.
89 “Annex: Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty,” in Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New York,
24-25 September 2009, “Report of the Conference,” CTBT-Art. XIV/2009/6, October 8, 2009, http://www.ctbto.org/
fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2009/CTBT-Art.XIV-2009-6.pdf.
90 U.N. “No Nuclear Testing Must Be Tolerated under Any Circumstances.” Press Release SG/SM/8843, DC/2885,
September 3, 2003, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8843.doc.htm.
91 Non-Aligned Movement, Kuala Lumpur Summit, February 20-25, 2003, “Non-Aligned Movement Conference Stresses
Importance of CTBT,” at http://pws.ctbto.org/press_centre/featured_articles/250203_nam.html.
92 Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT,” New York, September 23, 2004,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/ctbt/joint0409.html.
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positive ramifications for arms control and disarmament than any other single measure.”93 In
September 2006, to mark the tenth anniversary of the CTBT’s opening for signature, 59 foreign
ministers issued a joint statement on the treaty that “[calls] upon all States that have not yet done
so to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay, in particular those whose ratification is needed for
its entry into force.”94
In January 2007, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn urged the United
States to work toward a world without nuclear weapons, with one step “Initiating a bipartisan
process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic
review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent
technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.”95 In response, a few
weeks later, Mikhail Gorbachev called on nuclear weapon states to ratify the CTBT, among other
actions.96 On November 19, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and former Director of
Central Intelligence John Deutch suggested a five-year renewable CTBT in lieu of the current
treaty.97 In January 2008, Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn renewed their call for, among other
things, “a process for bringing the [CTBT] into effect” and called IMS “an effort the U.S. should
urgently support even prior to [CTBT] ratification.”98 In Senate testimony of April 2008,
Siegfried Hecker, former Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, stated that without nuclear
tests, “slowly our confidence [in U.S. nuclear weapons] zeroes,” but that resumed U.S. testing
runs the risk that other nations would resume testing. “And as I personally today weigh those
risks, I definitely come out in favor that it’s in our nation’s and the world’s interest to actually
ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”99
The first Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2010 NPT Review Conference was held in
Vienna, Austria, in April and May 2007. The chair of the committee released a paper that stated,
“Strong support was expressed for the CTBT. The importance and urgency of its early entry into
force was underscored. States which had not ratified the Treaty, especially those remaining 10
States whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force, were urged to do so without delay
and without conditions.”100 A representative of Germany, speaking on behalf of the European
Union, said, “The EU reiterates its call on States, particularly those listed in Annex II, to sign and
ratify the said Treaty without delay and without conditions and, pending its entry into force to
93 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Arms. June 2006, p. 107, 108, at http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf.
94 “Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT,” New York, September 20, 2006, at http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/
20060920_CTBT_Joint_Ministerial_Statement.pdf#search=
%22%20%22joint%20ministerial%20statement%20on%20the%20ctbt%22%22.
95 George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street
Journal, January 4, 2007, p. 15.
96 Mikhail Gorbachev, “The Nuclear Threat,” Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2007, p. 13.
97 Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007, p.
19.
98 George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street
Journal, January 16, 2008, p. 13.
99 Testimony of Siegfried Hecker, former Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory, in U.S. Congress. Senate.
Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development. Hearing on the Department of
Energy and the U.S. Nuclear Weapon Non-Proliferation Efforts, 110th Congress, 2nd Session, April 30, 2008. Transcript
by CQ Transcriptions.
100 “2007 NPT PrepCom Chair’s factual summary (now to be called a Chair’s Paper),” May 11, 2007, available at
http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/chair.pdf.
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abide by a moratorium on nuclear testing and to refrain from any action contrary to the
obligations and provisions of the CTBT.”101 The second Preparatory Committee meeting was held
in Geneva in April and May 2008. At the meeting, several dozen states made statements in
support of the CTBT and its entry into force.102 The conference is scheduled for May 3-28, 2010.
On September 24, 2008, the fourth CTBT Ministerial Meeting was held at U.N. headquarters; 96
nations signed a statement calling for signing and ratifying the treaty without delay and for
continuation of the nuclear testing moratorium.103 On December 2, 2008, the U.N. General
Assembly adopted a resolution (document A/63/395) urging states to sign and ratify the CTBT;
the vote was 175 in favor, 1 against (United States), and 3 abstentions (India, Mauritius, Syria).104
In December 2008, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American
Physical Society, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a report, “Nuclear
Weapons in 21st Century U.S. National Security,” that listed one component of “a possible new
centrist package of nuclear initiatives” as a view commonly held by the committee, “Ratify the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), if coupled with other interconnected nuclear
initiatives described below.” These initiatives include, among many others, “development of an
international nuclear forensics data bank,” “pursuit of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty,” and
“[t]he U.S. should continue to refurbish and update its stockpile as necessary without creating
new nuclear weapon capabilities through the ‘spectrum of options’ approach.”105 The
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States released its report in
May 2009 and was divided on the issue of U.S. ratification of the CTBT.106 A Council on Foreign
Relations task force, in a 2009 report, “believes that the benefits outweigh the costs and that the
CTBT is in U.S. national security interests.”107
Suspension of U.S. Voting Rights in the
Preparatory Commission
U.S. funding for the PrepCom is: FY2002 actual, $16.6 million; FY2003 actual, $18.2 million;
FY2004 actual, $18.9 million; FY2005 actual, $18.8 million; FY2006 actual, $14.2 million;
101 “First session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, General Debate, Statement by Ambassador Rudiger Ludeking, Deputy
Commissioner of the Federal Government [of Germany] for Arms Control and Disarmament on behalf of the European
Union,” Vienna, April 30, 2007 p. 5, available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom07/statements/
30aprilEU.pdf.
102 Reaching Critical Will, “Government Statements from the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the
2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
28 April -9 May 2008,” at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/statements.html.
103 “Registration as UN Document of a Joint Statement of 4th Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Ministerial Meeting,” States News Service, January 8, 2009.
104 U.N. General Assembly. 63rd General Assembly. 61st Meeting (AM). “On Recommendation of First Committee,
General Assembly Adopts 57 Texts ...,” GA/10792, December 2, 2008.
105 “Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century U.S. National Security,” report by a joint working group of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Physical Society, and the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, December 2008, pp. ii, 7, 9.
106 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. America’s Strategic Posture, final report.
Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, May 2009, pp. 81-87.
107 Council on Foreign Relations. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, 2009, p. 89.
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FY2007 actual, $13.5 million; FY2008 requested, $18.0 million; and FY2008 appropriated, $23.8
million (net of an across-the-board cut in the Consolidated Appropriations Act). The FY2009
request was $9.9 million; P.L. 111-8, FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, provided $25.0
million. The FY2010 appropriation is $30.0 million. These funds are in the International Affairs
budget under Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs. The FY2007
budget justification stated that these funds “pay the U.S. share for the ongoing development and
implementation of the International Monitoring System (IMS), which supplements U.S.
capabilities to detect nuclear explosions. Since the United States does not seek ratification and
entry-into-force of the CTBT, none of the funds will support Preparatory Commission activities
that are not related to the IMS.”108 In September 2009, Secretary of State Clinton said, “we are
prepared to pay our share of the Preparatory Commission budget so that the global verification
regime will be fully operational when the CTBT enters into force.”109
U.S. voting rights in the CTBTO Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) were suspended in 2007
because of a shortfall in U.S. “assessed contributions” (i.e., dues). They were restored on October
1, 2007, when the PrepCom received an additional U.S. payment. The United States again lost its
voting rights on January 1, 2008, but restored them with a payment on February 25. This section
explains the basis for the suspensions, possible consequences, and the restoration of voting rights.
Article II of the treaty deals with the CTBTO. Section 11 provides,
A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payment of its assessed contribution
to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears equals
or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full years. The
Conference of the States Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is
satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.
However, since the CTBT has not entered into force, the CTBTO has not come into existence.
Instead, there is a PrepCom for the CTBTO. The annex to the resolution establishing the
PrepCom states:
A State Signatory which has not discharged in full its financial obligations to the
Commission within 365 days of receipt of the request for payment shall have no vote in the
Commission, until such payment is received. The Commission may, nevertheless, permit
such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the
control of the member.110
While the treaty and the resolution form the legal basis for the operation of the PrepCom, the
resolution governs decisions on voting rights.
108 U.S. [no agency listed]. Summary and Highlights, International Affairs Function 150, Fiscal Year 2007 Budget
Request, p. 40, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60297.pdf.
109 Clinton, “Remarks at CTBT Article XIV Conference,” p. 4.
110 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-ban Treaty. Meeting of States Signatories. Resolution establishing the Preparatory
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Adopted November 19, 1996.
CTBT/MSS/RES/1, October 17, 1996. Annex: Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Section 5(b), p. 2. Available at http://www.ctbto.org/reference/
legal_resources/prepcom_resolution.pdf.
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The PrepCom’s budget is presented in dollars plus euros. Its 2007 budget was $48.277 million
plus €48.564 million, or $114.622 million as of May 2007.111 (The PrepCom uses the calendar
year as its fiscal year.) The U.S. assessment is 22.3% of the total, or $23.411 million, net of
adjustments.112 In addition to this sum, the United States had an arrearage of $14.912 million for
prior years as of May 2007, for a total outstanding net amount payable of $38.323 million.113 For
comparison, U.S. funding for the IMS was $14.207 million for FY2006 and $10.0 million for
FY2007; the FY2008 request was $18.0 million.114
U.S. voting rights in the PrepCom were suspended each year for several years. The suspensions
began in 2003 because the United States did not pay its 2002 dues in full by December 31, 2002.
These suspensions have lasted for a few months between the end of a calendar year and the date
when the United States paid its contribution for that year. Because the United States has
contributed less than the amount assessed for 2002 and each subsequent year, it paid fully the
previous year’s balance but contributed lesser amounts to the current year’s assessment, so the
arrearage has grown.
The arrearage resulted from U.S. policy. Since the United States did not seek entry into force of
the CTBT but favored improving means of monitoring nuclear testing, the George W. Bush
Administration requested only those funds for the PrepCom that directly supported the IMS.
These funds are in the International Affairs Function 150 budget in the Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account. The FY2007 budget
justification, for example, stated that the requested funds, $19.8 million, would “pay the U.S.
share for the ongoing development and implementation of the International Monitoring System
(IMS), which supplements U.S. capabilities to detect nuclear explosions. Since the United States
does not seek ratification and entry-into-force of the CTBT, none of the funds will support
Preparatory Commission activities that are not related to the IMS.”115
On June 4, 2007, the United States made a payment of $10.0 million, labeled “International
Monitoring System for FY2007,” to the CTBTO PrepCom.116 This was less than the $14.207
million provided for IMS for FY2006, and not enough to restore U.S. voting rights. When asked
why the IMS payment was less than the FY2006 level, as might have been expected under a
continuing resolution, a State Department staff member indicated that there were other priorities
within the NADR account.117 However, on September 16, 2007, the United States paid the
PrepCom another $3.5 million, enough to restore its voting rights for calendar 2007.118
111 Of these amounts, $47.077 million and €48.564 million are financed by contributions from states that have signed
the treaty. The Preparatory Commission uses the U.N. operational exchange rate for May 2007 of $1 = €0.732
(approximately €1 = $1.3661).
112 Information provided by Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO, personal communication, May 22, 2007. The
adjustments are $292,384 as the U.S. share of a cash surplus, and an assessment reduction of $1,592,000 for services
related to a seismic station in South Korea and a radionuclide station in Antarctica.
113 Ibid.
114 FY2006 and FY2008 data are from U.S. [no agency listed]. Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign
Operations, Fiscal Year 2008, p. 90, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/84462.pdf. FY2007 data provided
by Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission, personal communication, June 5, 2007.
115 U.S. [no agency listed]. Summary and Highlights: International Affairs Function 150, Fiscal Year 2007 Budget
Request, p. 40, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60297.pdf.
116 Information provided by CTBTO PrepCom, personal communication, June 5 and 6, 2007.
117 Personal communication, June 1, 2007.
118 Information provided by CTBTO PrepCom, personal communication, February 15, 2008.
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In action on H.R. 2764, FY2008 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Bill, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $28.0 million for IMS
vs. $18.0 million requested, and the House passed H.R. 2764, with $10.0 million for IMS. The
final version of H.R. 2764 became the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-161; it
included $23.8 million for IMS.
The PrepCom stated that its actions so far have been taken by consensus rather than by votes, and
that the PrepCom has its first meeting of each year in June,119 so the immediate consequences of
the United States not having a vote are limited. CTBT supporters, though, see consequences for
the IMS. That system represents a major investment: as of December 2007, $274.9 million had
been spent out of a total estimated investment cost of $328 million.120 (The annual cost to operate
IMS, the International Data Center, and the Global Communications Infrastructure is over $70
million, or nearly 70% of the total CTBTO PrepCom budget.121) Its capacity for monitoring
nuclear tests is of use to the United States as well as to other nations. Treaty supporters state that
the United States gains the full benefit of the IMS but pays only a fifth of its cost. They note that
IMS operates in conjunction with other monitoring systems. This combined system, in their view,
is capable of detecting very low yield nuclear tests and defeating many evasion attempts.122 They
maintain that the ability of the IMS, along with other networks, to detect the North Korean
nuclear test of October 2006 argues for accelerating IMS deployment, yet the shortfall in dues
precludes such acceleration. Indeed, the PrepCom states that the shortfall makes it difficult to
build additional stations and to fund operation and maintenance of existing IMS stations
adequately..123 Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, said, “the
U.S. failure to pay its share will hinder the CTBTO’s ability to complete construction and certify
for use the remaining stations of the International Monitoring System. Many of these remaining
stations are to be built in remote and/or strategic areas, such as Turkmenistan, which borders
Iran.”124 While many other nations are in arrears in their dues, U.S. dues far exceed those of any
other nation that has its voting rights suspended, so its shortfall will have a correspondingly
greater impact. For example, a statement by the Group of 77 plus China noted “the non-payment
by a major contributor of its financial obligations to the PrepCom. The Group is very concerned
that during the recent years nearly $15 million has not been paid by a major contributor. Such a
situation, if it continues, would create a serious challenge to the CTBT verification regime and
jeopardize the future of the whole system.”125 Supporters also express concern over potential
political consequences. In this view, U.S. failure to meet its obligations weakens the incentive for
119 Information provided by CTBTO PrepCom, personal communication, May 16 and 22, 2007.
120 Information provided by CTBTO PrepCom, personal communication, February 15, 2008.
121 Information provided by CTBTO PrepCom, personal communication, March 4, 2008.
122 See, for example, National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Technical Issues Related to Ratification of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
Washington, National Academy Press, 2002, especially Chapter 2, “CTBT Monitoring Capability,” pp. 35-59; and Paul
Richards and Won-Young Kim, “Seismic Signature,” Nature Physics, January 2007, pp. 4-6.
123 Information provided by Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO, personal communications, May 17, 2007, and
February 15, 2008.
124 “Congress Must Remedy Past U.S. Funding Shortfalls for Global Nuclear Test Monitoring System,” media
advisory, Arms Control Association, May 21, 2007.
125 “Statement by the Group of 77 and China Before the Joint Meeting of WGA [Working Group A] and WGB of the
Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO, Delivered by H.E. Ambassador Sayed Galal E. Elamin, Permanent
Representative of Sudan,” CTBT/WGB-29, WGB-31/SD/1, May 23, 2007, pp. 2-3. The Group of 77 is a group of 130
nations (originally 77) and is, in its words, “the largest intergovernmental organization of developing states in the
United Nations.” Group of 77, “About the Group of 77,” available at http://www.g77.org/doc/.
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other nations to pay their dues to the PrepCom, and undercuts support for other international
organizations more generally.
Opponents of the CTBT see little value in being able to cast a vote in an organization that
operates by consensus and that would implement a treaty the United States opposes. They feel
that adverse consequences to U.S. security of ratifying the CTBT and having it enter into force
outweigh immeasurably whatever beneficial consequences might accrue from having the right to
vote in the PrepCom. They note that 79 nations had their voting rights in the PrepCom suspended
as of January 22, 2009, because of failure to pay dues,126 so the U.S. arrearage is far from unique.
According to one report, “Most political appointees working on the issue appear unperturbed by
the voting rights suspension and the Vienna group’s [i.e., the PrepCom’s] future.”127 Opponents
question the value of IMS on two grounds. First, they point to several scenarios for clandestine
testing, such as decoupling128 or conducting a test in a remote ocean area in a way that hides the
identity of the testing nation. Second, since IMS data is available to all states party to the treaty, it
would be available to states party seeking to test clandestinely as well as to states party seeking to
detect such testing. In this view, detailed access to the data would show evaders weaknesses of
the monitoring systems, enhancing the effectiveness of evasion techniques.
With payments for the prior year due each January 1, U.S. voting rights for 2008 were suspended
on January 1, 2008. The CTBTO PrepCom stated that the United States would need to pay $23.8
million to restore its 2008 voting rights.129 The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act
provided that amount for IMS.130 The United States paid the PrepCom that amount on February
25, 2008.131 As of September 5, 2008, the U.S. arrearage was $10.9 million plus €8.8 million.132
With 2008 dues added on January 1, 2009, the U.S. arrearage as of January 22, 2009, was $31.7
million plus €10.8 million, resulting in a suspension of U.S. voting rights.133
The Administration’s FY2009 request for “CTBT International Monitoring System” is $9.9
million.134 If this amount is appropriated, the United States would lose its voting rights in 2009.
According to the CTBTO PrepCom,
126 Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Table, status of 2008 assessed
contributions as of September 5, 2008, at http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/treasury/
assessed_contributions_04Sep_08.pdf.
127 Nicholas Kralev, “Unpaid U.S. Dues Hit Nuke-Test Monitoring,” Washington Times, May 24, 2007, p. 13.
128 “Decoupling” is an evasion technique first proposed around 1959 in which a nuclear explosion is conducted in a
large underground cavity, thereby lowering the seismic signature resulting from the explosion.
129 Personal communication, February 6, 2008.
130 The amount appropriated was $24.000 million. However, the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008, P.L.
110-161, Division J (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs), Section 699P, provided an
across-the-board rescission for Division J of 0.81 percent, or $23.8 million. See http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_house_committee_prints&docid=f:39564j.pdf, p. 2145.
131 Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, “The United States Pays
US$ 23.8 Million to the CTBTO,” press release, February 26, 2008.
132 Arrearage figures are from a CTBTO PrepCom table of contributions and outstanding balances, at
http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/treasury/assessed_contributions_04Sep_08.pdf, updated September 5,
2008, p. 4.
133 Arrearage figures and voting-rights suspension data are from a CTBTO PrepCom table of contributions and
outstanding balances, at http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/treasury/220109_assessed_contributions.pdf,
updated January 22, 2009, p. 4.
134 U.S. [no agency listed]. Summary and Highlights, International Affairs Function 150, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget
Request, p. 82, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100014.pdf.
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If the United States pays $24 million in calendar year 2008, it still owes the CTBTO
PrepCom almost as much in past arrears as its assessed contributions (i.e., dues), which are
about $24 million per year. In practice, if the United States owes more than its annual
assessed contributions, it will lose its voting rights. Since it is now so deeply in arrears at the
CTBTO PrepCom, it will need to pay at least its assessed contributions each calendar year in
2009 and beyond in order to retain its voting rights.135
In S. 3288, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill,
2009, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended providing $31.0 million for this
purpose. The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act for
FY2009, P.L. 110-329, apportions funds for FY2009 at the rate for FY2008 as contained in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008, P.L. 110-161 for the period covered by P.L. 110-
329 (i.e., October 1, 2008 through March 6, 2009). According to OMB, that period is 43.01% of a
year. So, the partial-year amount appears to be 43.01% of $23.8 million, or $10.2 million, though
the amount might be somewhat different if the Department of State shifts funds within the
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs account, which includes the
U.S. contribution to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission.
Then-Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton presented the Obama Administration’s
approach to funding the IMS and PrepCom in her response to questions for the record by Senator
Kerry for her January 13, 2009, confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee:
[Question:] For the last several years, the State Department has requested insufficient
funding to pay all of our voluntary contributions to the Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (Preparatory Commission). While
Congressional actions have restored some of the funding, this shortfall has impaired
construction of the International Monitoring System and has jeopardized U.S. voting rights at
the Preparatory Commission. What are your views with regard to allowing sufficient and
timely funding to make effective contributions to the Preparatory Commission?
[Answer:] The Obama Administration will fully support the CTBT’s International
Monitoring System, which gives the United States better capability to detect and identify
very low-yield nuclear tests than we would have on our own. We will also support the work
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization’s Preparatory Commission and will
want to ensure that it is adequately funded. On specific questions regarding the timing and
level of U.S. funding, the new Administration will want to review the situation and consult
with Congress on how to proceed.136
As of November 20, 2009, the U.S. arrearage was $6.697 million plus €10.829 million. The
United States had partially paid its assessment for the current year. As of that date, 60 states had
their voting rights suspended because of non-payment of assessments, and total arrearage was
$19.827 million plus €13.106 million.
135 Personal communication, February 6, 2008.
136 “Questions for the Record, Senator John Kerry, Nomination of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Department of State,
Secretary of State,” c. January 2009, p. 27, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/KerryClintonQFRs.pdf.
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments
Stockpile Stewardship
P5 states want to maintain their nuclear warheads under a CTBT and assert that they need
computers and scientific facilities to do so. They also want to retain the ability to resume testing if
other nations leave a CTBT, or if maintaining high confidence in key weapons requires testing.
Nonnuclear nations fear that the P5 will continue to design new warheads under a CTBT, with
computation and nonnuclear experiments replacing testing. Maintaining nuclear weapons,
especially without testing, is termed “stockpile stewardship.”
Congress established the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in 1999 as a
semiautonomous DOE agency to manage stewardship and related programs. In NNSA’s budget,
stewardship is funded by the Weapons Activities account, the main elements of which are
Directed Stockpile Work, activities directly supporting weapons in the stockpile; Campaigns,
technical efforts to develop and maintain capabilities to certify the stockpile for the long term;
and Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities, mainly infrastructure and operations for the
weapons complex. Appropriations were as follows: FY2001, $5.006 billion; FY2002, $5.429
billion; FY2003, $5.954 billion; FY2004, $6.447 billion; FY2005, $6.626 billion; FY2006,
$6.370 billion; FY2007, $6.259 billion; FY2008, $6.302 billion; FY2009, $6.380 billion; and
FY2010, $6.384 billion. (See CRS Report R40669, Energy and Water Development: FY2010
Appropriations, coordinated by Carl E. Behrens.)
Stewardship is a contentious issue. It bears on Senate advice and consent to CTBT ratification.
Beginning with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the United States has implemented
“safeguards,” or unilateral steps to maintain its nuclear weapons capability consistent with treaty
limitations. President Kennedy’s agreement to safeguards was critical for obtaining Senate
approval of the 1963 treaty. Safeguards were modified in 1990 as part of the resolutions of
ratification for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. The
safeguards were modified again by President Clinton. In his August 11, 1995, speech announcing
a zero-yield CTBT as a goal, he stated:
As a central part of this decision, I am establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define
the conditions under which the United States will enter into a comprehensive test ban. These
safeguards will strengthen our commitments in the areas of intelligence, monitoring and
verification, stockpile stewardship, maintenance of our nuclear laboratories, and test
readiness.137
These safeguards are: Safeguard A: “conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program
to insure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active
stockpile”; Safeguard B: “maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs”;
Safeguard C: “maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by
the CTBT”; Safeguard D: “a comprehensive research and development program to improve our
treaty monitoring”; Safeguard E: intelligence programs for “information on worldwide nuclear
arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs”; and Safeguard
F: the understanding that if the Secretaries of Defense and Energy inform the President “that a
high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two
137 President William J. Clinton, “Remarks Announcing a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Test Ban,” August 11,
1995, in U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Office of the Federal Register. Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, August 14, 1995, p. 1432.
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Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the
President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under
the standard ‘supreme national interests’ clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be
required.”138 The Clinton Administration transmitted the CTBT to the Senate with virtually
identical safeguards in 1997, and the Senate modified these safeguards further in adopting an
amendment to the resolution of ratification of the CTBT. (The amendment passed, but the
resolution was defeated.) A CRS report discusses the possible role of updated safeguards in a
future CTBT debate.139
Regarding the stewardship program, President Clinton said that the Secretary of Energy and the
directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories had assured him that the United States could
maintain its nuclear deterrent under a CTBT through a science-based stockpile stewardship
program. “In order for this program to succeed,” he said, “both the administration and the
Congress must provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship program over
the next decade and beyond.”140
The ability of the stewardship program to maintain nuclear weapons without testing was a crucial
issue in the Senate debate on the CTBT. The treaty’s opponents claimed that stewardship offered
no guarantee of maintaining weapons, and that experiments, computer models, and other
techniques might offer no clue to some problems that develop over time. They further argued that
it could be perhaps a decade before the tools for the program were fully in place, and by that time
many weapon designers with test experience would have retired. Supporters held that the program
was highly likely to work, having already certified the stockpile three times, and that safeguard
“F” provided for U.S. withdrawal from the treaty in the event high confidence in a key weapon
type could not be maintained without testing. By December 2008, DOD and DOE had completed
the 13th stockpile certification. As of January 2010, the 14th annual assessment was in process.141
Several reports from 2009 raised concerns about stockpile stewardship. The Congressional
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States observed, “The physical infrastructure
is in serious need of transformation... The intellectual infrastructure is also in serious trouble.”142
A Council on Foreign Relations task force found, “concerns about ensuring the highest caliber
workforce at the weapons laboratories.”143 And a JASON report stated, “continued success of
stockpile stewardship is threatened by lack of program stability, placing any LEP [life extension
program] strategy at risk” and “the study team is concerned that this [nuclear weapons] expertise
is threatened by lack of program stability, perceived lack of mission importance, and degradation
of the work environment.”144 On the other hand, the latter report stated, “JASON finds no
138 U.S. White House. Office of the Press Secretary. “Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Safeguards,” August
11, 1995, 1 p.
139 U.S. Congress. Congressional Research Service. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated “Safeguards”
and Net Assessments. CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated “Safeguards” and Net
Assessments, by Jonathan Medalia.
140 President William J. Clinton, “Statement on a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Test Ban,” August 11, 1995, in
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Office of the Federal Register. Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, August 14, 1995, p. 1433.
141 Information provided by National Nuclear Security Administration, January 6, 2010.
142 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture, p. 62.
143 Council on Foreign Relations. Independent Task Force Report No. 62, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 76.
144 “Lifetime Extension Program (LEP) Executive Summary,” JASON Program Office, the MITRE Corporation, JSR-
09334E, September 9, 2009, pp. 3-4, http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/
(continued...)
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evidence that accumulation of changes incurred from aging and LEPs have increased risk to
certification of today’s deployed nuclear warheads,” and “lifetimes of today’s nuclear warheads
could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches
similar to those employed in LEPs to date.”145
Section 1251 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647, P.L. 111-84)
required the President to submit a report on, among other things, a plan to enhance the safety,
security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, modernize the nuclear weapons complex,
and maintain nuclear weapon delivery platforms. On December 15, 2009, 40 Republican Senators
and Senator Lieberman, in a letter to President Obama, cited Section 1251 and said that “a plan to
modernize the U.S. nuclear deterrent” should include
Full and timely Lifetime Extension Programs for the B61 and W76 warheads consistent with
military needs.
Funding for a modern warhead that includes new approaches to life extension involving
replacement, or, possibly, component reuse.
Full funding for stockpile surveillance work through the nuclear weapons complex, as well
as the science and engineering campaigns at the national laboratories.
Full funding for the timely replacement of the Los Alamos plutonium research and
development and analytical chemistry facility, the uranium facilities at the Oak Ridge Y-12
plant, and a modern pit facility.146
Subcritical experiments (SCEs): As part of the stockpile stewardship program, NNSA is
conducting SCEs. CRS offers the following definition based on documents and on discussions
with DOE and laboratory staff: “Subcritical experiments at Nevada Test Site involve chemical
high explosives and fissile materials in configurations and quantities such that no self-sustaining
nuclear fission chain reaction can result. In these experiments, the chemical high explosives are
used to generate high pressures that are applied to the fissile materials.” The only fissile material
that has been used in SCEs is plutonium. All SCEs to date have been conducted in a tunnel
complex, about 1,000 feet underground at Nevada Test Site. The complex could contain
explosions up to 500 pounds of explosive and associated plutonium. Another SCE, “Unicorn,”
was conducted in a “down-hole” or vertical shaft configuration similar to an underground nuclear
test, not in a tunnel, to exercise operational readiness.147 SCEs try to determine if radioactive
decay of aged plutonium would degrade weapon performance. Several SCEs have been used to
support certification of the W88 pit. (A pit is the “trigger” of a thermonuclear weapon.) In 1998,
Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson called SCEs “a key part of our scientific program to provide
new tools and data that assess age-related complications and maintain the reliability and safety of
the nation’s nuclear deterrent.”148 As they produce no chain reaction, the Clinton Administration
(...continued)
JASON%20LEP%20REPORT%20SUMMARY%2009-09_0.pdf.
145 Ibid., p. 2. Original text was bolded.
146The Honorable Mitch McConnell et al., letter to The Honorable Barack Obama, President, December 15, 2009.
147 “Nanos Tours Nevada Test Site,” Daily Newsbulletin, Los Alamos National Laboratory, November 10, 2003, at
http://www.lanl.gov/orgs/pa/newsbulletin/2003/11/10/text04.shtml.
148 U.S. Department of Energy. “DOE to Conduct Fourth Subcritical Experiment; Scientific Data to Help Ensure the
Safety and Reliability Of the Stockpile Without Nuclear Testing,” press release, September 23, 1998.
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments
saw them as consistent with the CTBT. Critics counter that they would help design new weapons
without testing; are unnecessary; may look like nuclear tests if not monitored intrusively; and are
inconsistent with the spirit of a CTBT, which, critics believe, is aimed at halting nuclear weapons
development, not just testing. NNSA stated that subcritical experiments cost between $5 million
and $30 million.149 (For further information on subcritical experiments and test readiness, see
CRS Report RL32130, Nuclear Weapon Initiatives: Low-Yield R&D, Advanced Concepts, Earth
Penetrators, Test Readiness, by Jonathan Medalia.)
The 23 SCEs held so far are: 1997: Rebound, July 2; Holog, September 18; 1998: Stagecoach,
March 25; Bagpipe, September 26; Cimarron, December 11; 1999: Clarinet, February 9; Oboe,
September 30; Oboe 2, November 9; 2000: Oboe 3, February 3; Thoroughbred, March 22; Oboe
4, April 6; Oboe 5, August 18; Oboe 6, December 14; 2001: Oboe 8, September 26; Oboe 7 (held
after Oboe 8), December 13; 2002: Vito (jointly with U.K.), February 14; Oboe 9, June 7; Mario,
August 29; Rocco, September 26; 2003: Piano, September 19; 2004: Armando, May 25; 2006:
Krakatau (jointly with U.K.), February 23; Unicorn, August 30. NNSA’s FY2006 request stated
that, for pit certification, “The major activities in FY2006 include the preparation and execution
of subcritical experiments to confirm nuclear performance of the W88 warhead with a newly-
manufactured pit.”150 NNSA’s FY2007 request states, “The Pit Campaign Support Activities at
NTS provide support in fielding subcritical experiments essential to pit certification with
completion of activities at the end of FY2006. There is no funding provided for these activities in
FY2007. All subcritical experiment activities in support of the LANL-manufactured W88 pit
certification effort will be completed in FY2006.”151 NNSA stated to CRS in March 2006 that
Unicorn is the last SCE supporting the W88 pit program, but SCEs for other purposes are
anticipated. In March 2007, NNSA stated to CRS that “Subcritical experiments are not currently
being scheduled by the laboratories until the FY2008 time frame.” In January 2009, NNSA stated
that it had not conducted subcritical experiments in FY2008. In November 2009, NNSA stated
that the SCE program is still active, with SCEs planned for FY2010.152
The laboratories have conducted two other types of experiments involving plutonium at NTS.
“Thermos” experiments are material property studies. NNSA stated in March 2007 that they do
not use enough plutonium to sustain a chain reaction, and the plutonium “does not approximate
any part of weapons design.” Twelve such experiments were conducted between February and
May 2007; as of September 2007, no more were planned.153 The Joint Actinide Shock Physics
Experimental Research (JASPER) Facility is a gas gun that shoots a high-velocity projectile at a
plutonium target to produce “high shock pressures, temperatures, and strain rates similar to that of
a nuclear weapon” in the plutonium. According to NNSA, the resulting data help “refine the
computer codes used to certify the U.S. nuclear stockpile.154 Seventy shots were conducted
between March 2001 and July 2007, of which 27 used plutonium and 43 used surrogate materials.
149 U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Management, Budget and Evaluation/CFO. FY 2006 Congressional Budget
Request. Volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration. DOE/ME-0046, February 2005, p. 88, at
http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/06budget/Content/Programs/Vol_1_NNSA_2.pdf.
150 Ibid., p. 177.
151 U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Chief Financial Officer. FY 2007 Congressional Budget Request. Volume 1,
National Nuclear Security Administration. DOE/CF-002, February 2006, p. 192, at http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/
07budget/Content/Volumes/Vol_1_NNSA.pdf.
152 Information provided by Nevada Site Office, National Nuclear Security Administration, email, November 25, 2009.
153 Information provided by National Nuclear Security Administration, September 19, 2007.
154 U.S. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration. Nevada Site Office. “Joint Actinide Shock
(continued...)
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Test Readiness: President Clinton directed DOE to be prepared to conduct a nuclear test within
three years of a decision to do so. Yet a September 2002 report by DOE’s Office of Inspector
General found this ability “at risk.”155 In January 2002 the Nuclear Posture Review briefing called
for an unspecified acceleration of nuclear test readiness, and in March 2002 the Panel to Assess
the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile assessed that “test
readiness should be no more than three months to a year.”156 The FY2003 National Defense
Authorization Act, P.L. 107-314, sec. 3142, required the Secretary of Energy to report on
alternative test readiness postures and recommend the optimal readiness posture. The resulting
report argued that the three-year posture was increasingly at risk and recommended moving to an
18-month readiness posture by the end of FY2005.157
The FY2004 Weapons Activities request included $24.9 million to reduce the posture from three
years to 18 months. The National Defense Authorization Act and the Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Act provided the funds requested. Conferees on the latter expected
NNSA to focus on a program that can meet the current 24-month requirement “before requesting
significant additional funds to pursue a more aggressive goal of an 18-month readiness
posture.”158 In contrast, the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136, sec. 3112)
stated, “Commencing not later than October 1, 2006, the Secretary of Energy shall achieve, and
thereafter maintain, a readiness posture of not more than 18 months for resumption by the United
States of underground tests of nuclear weapons.”
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 24, 2004, NNSA
Administrator Linton Brooks said that NNSA’s goal “is to achieve the 18-month test readiness
posture called for in the Defense Authorization Act.”159 The FY2005 National Defense
Authorization Act provided the full $30.0 million requested for test readiness. In the FY2005
energy and water bill, the House Appropriations Committee recommended reducing the Primary
Assessment Technologies campaign request of $81.5 million, which included $30.0 million for
test readiness, by $15.0 million “to limit the enhanced test readiness initiative to the goal of
achieving a 24-month test readiness posture. The Committee continues to oppose the 18-month
test readiness posture.”160 The FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act reduced this campaign
by $7.5 million.
(...continued)
Physics Experimental Research (JASPER),” DOE/NV-1015, September 2004, at http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/
factsheets/DOENV_1015.pdf.
155 U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Inspector General. Office of Audit Services. National Nuclear Security
Administration’s Test Readiness Program, Audit Report, September 2002, p. 1.
156 Letter report from John Foster, Chairman, Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States
Nuclear Stockpile, to Senator Carl Levin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 15, 2002, p.
ES-2, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/foster01.doc.
157 U.S. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration. Nuclear Test Readiness. Report to Congress,
April 2003, p. 5-8.
158 U.S. Congress. Committee of Conference. Making Appropriations for Energy and Water Development for the Fiscal
Year Ending September 30, 2004, and for Other Purposes, H.Rept. 108-357, to accompany H.R. 2754, 108th Congress,
1st Session, 2003, p. 159-160.
159 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. Hearing on strategic
forces, March 24, 2004, transcript by FDCH e-Media, Inc. Testimony of Ambassador Linton Brooks, Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration.
160 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2005,
H.Rept. 108-554, to accompany H.R. 4614, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, 2004, p. 116.
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NNSA’s FY2006 test readiness request was $25.0 million “to continue improving the state of
readiness to reach an 18-month test-readiness posture in FY2006.”161 In a Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing on February 15, 2005, Senator John Warner asked Secretary of Energy
Samuel Bodman whether DOE would meet the 18-month test readiness requirement by October
1, 2006. Secretary Bodman replied, “We continue to be committed to that requirement of the law”
and was informed that DOE is on track to meet the October 1 deadline.162 In testimony before the
Senate Appropriations Committee’s Energy and Water Development Subcommittee on April 14,
2005, Ambassador Brooks explained the rationale for the 18-month posture: “Shorter than that,
and you were paying money for readiness you couldn’t use, because the experiment [the nuclear
test] wouldn’t be ready. Longer than that, and you were running the risk of being ready to test to
find out whether you had corrected an important problem, but the test site wasn’t ready.”163 The
House Appropriations Committee continued to favor a 24-month posture and stated that the
Reliable Replacement Warhead program “obviates any reason to move to a provocative 18-month
test readiness posture.”164 The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act reduced test
readiness funding to $20.0 million; conferees directed DOE to maintain the 24-month posture.
The National Defense Authorization Act also provided $20.0 million; the accompanying
conference report did not address the readiness posture. (See Legislation, below.)
For FY2007, NNSA requested $14.8 million for test readiness and noted that the target test
readiness posture for FY2006-FY2011, 24 months, was achieved in FY2005.165 The House
Armed Services Committee’s report on FY2007 defense authorization stated, “While the
committee has no indication of the need to resume underground nuclear testing in the near future,
it does believe that maintaining the 18 month readiness posture as directed by Congress is
important to national security. The committee notes that funding shortfalls have precluded the
Department of Energy from achieving the 18 month readiness posture as required by law.”166 In
the FY2007 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill (H.R. 5427), the House provided
the requested amount, and the Senate Appropriations Committee (in S.Rept. 109-274)
recommended providing that amount. NNSA requests no funds under test readiness for FY2008,
noting that the program has achieved its goal of a 24-month readiness posture, current capabilities
will be maintained through other parts of the budget, and “a more forward looking program is
planned.”167 The House Armed Services Committee made no mention of test readiness in its
report, while the Senate Armed Services Committee provided no funds, as requested. The House
Appropriations Committee sharply criticized the decision not to request funds, and added funds:
161 Department of Energy, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 1, p. 93.
162 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Hearing on FY2006 budget request for Atomic Energy
Defense Activities of DOE and NNSA, February 15, 2005, transcript by FDCH e-Media, Inc. Testimony of Samuel
Bodman, Secretary of Energy.
163 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development. Hearing
on FY2006 appropriations for NNSA, April 14, 2005, transcript by FDCH e-Media, Inc. Testimony of Ambassador
Linton Brooks, Under-secretary, Nuclear Security, [and] Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
164 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2006.
H.Rept. 109-86, to accompany H.R. 2419, 109th Congress, 1st Session, 2005, p. 134.
165 Department of Energy, FY 2007 Congressional Budget Request. Volume 1, National Nuclear Security
Administration, p. 97.
166 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
H.Rept. 109-452 to accompany H.R. 5122, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 2006, p. 464.
167 U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Chief Financial Officer. FY 2008 Congressional Budget Request. Volume 1,
National Nuclear Security Administration. DOE/CF-014, February 2007, p. 101. Available at http://www.mbe.doe.gov/
budget/08budget/Content/Volumes/Vol_1_NNSA.pdf.
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The Committee supports the 24-month test readiness posture at the Nevada Test Site and
provides an additional $20,000,000 to restore the funding in the Administration’s budget
request which terminated the activity. The Committee is baffled by the Administration’s
decision to eliminate funding for nuclear test readiness after four budget cycles of insisting
that shortening to an 18-month test readiness posture was required for national security
reasons.... In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, the NNSA proposes what the Committee
believes to be a wasteful investment by allowing the restored test readiness activities to be
degraded.168
Section 3112 of the conference version of H.R. 1585, the FY2008 defense authorization bill,
repealed a provision (P.L. 108-136, section 3113; 50 U.S.C. 2528a) requiring an 18-month
nuclear test posture, and required the Secretary of Energy to submit a report on nuclear test
readiness every two years. For test readiness, the FY2008 estimate is $4.9 million and the
FY2009 request is $10.4 million.169 NNSA stated that it had achieved a 24-month test readiness
posture in FY2007, but that “forecasted budget levels resulted in a change in the test readiness
posture target to 24 to 36 months.”170 The FY2009 defense authorization bills as passed by the
House and as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee include the requested amount for
test readiness. The House Appropriations Committee recommended eliminating FY2009 funds
for test readiness. It stated that the “outstanding Stockpile Stewardship program ... has performed
better than expected and has created a technically superior alternative to nuclear testing,” and “the
Committee finds no evidence that nuclear testing would add a useful increment to the immense
and expanding body of weapons knowledge arising from Stockpile Stewardship.”171 The joint
explanatory statement (submitted in lieu of a conference report) on S. 3001, Duncan Hunter
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, provided $5.4 million for test readiness.172
In a statement by Ambassador Andrej Logar on behalf of the European Union (EU), “The EU
urges all States to dismantle all their nuclear testing sites in a manner that is transparent and open
to the international community.”173
Table 1. U.S. Nuclear Tests by Calendar Year
1945-1949 6
1960-1964 202
1980-1984 92
1950-1954 43
1965-1969 231
1985-1989 75
1955-1959 145
1970-1974 137
1990-1992 23
1975-1979
100
Total
1054
168 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2008,
H.Rept. 110-185, to accompany H.R. 2641, 110th Congress, 1st Session, 2007, p. 102.
169 Department of Energy, FY2009 Congressional Budget Request, vol. 1, p. 133.
170 Ibid., p. 135.
171 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2009,
unnumbered committee print, 110th Congress, 2nd Session, June 2008, p. 126.
172 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009, joint explanatory statement to accompany S. 3001, Committee Print HASC No. 10, 110th Congress,
2nd Session, 2008, p. 799.
173 Statement by H.E. Ambassador Andrej Logar, Permanent Representative of Slovenia, on Behalf of the European
Union, presented to the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Second Session, Geneva, April 28-May 9, 2008, p. 6, at
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/statements/EUApril28.pdf.
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Source: U.S. Department of Energy.
Note: These figures include all U.S. nuclear tests, of which 24 were joint U.S.-U.K. tests conducted at the
Nevada Test Site between 1962 and 1991. They reflect data on unannounced tests that DOE declassified on
December 7, 1993. They exclude the two atomic bombs that the United States dropped on Japan in 1945. On
June 27, 1994, Secretary O’Leary announced that DOE had redefined three nuclear detonations (one each in
1968, 1970, and 1972) as separate nuclear tests. This table reflects these figures. She also declassified the fact
that 63 tests, conducted from 1963 through 1992, involved more than one nuclear explosive device.
CTBT Pros and Cons
The CTBT is contentious. For a detailed analysis of the case for and against the treaty, see CRS
Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments. Key
arguments include the following:
Can the United States maintain deterrence without testing? The treaty’s supporters hold that U.S.
programs can maintain existing, tested weapons without further testing, pointing to 12 annual
assessments that these weapons remain safe and reliable, and claim that these weapons meet any
deterrent needs. Opponents maintain that there can be no confidence in existing warheads, as
many minor modifications will change them from tested versions, so testing is needed to restore
and maintain confidence. They see deterrence as dynamic, requiring new weapons to counter new
threats, and assert that these weapons must be tested.
Are monitoring and verification capability sufficient? “Monitoring” refers to technical capability;
“verification” to its adequacy to maintain security. Supporters hold that advances in monitoring
make it hard for an evader to conduct undetected tests. They claim that any such tests would be
too small to affect the strategic balance. Opponents see many opportunities for evasion and
believe that clandestine tests could put the United States at a serious disadvantage.
How might the treaty affect nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament? Supporters claim that the
treaty makes technical contributions to nonproliferation, such as limiting weapons programs;
some supporters believe that nonproliferation requires progress toward nuclear disarmament, with
the treaty a key step. Opponents believe that a strong nuclear deterrent is essential for
nonproliferation, that nonproliferation and disarmament are unrelated, and that this nation has
taken many nonproliferation and disarmament actions that the international community ignores.
Chronology
05/00/10—The eighth Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference is to be held May 3-
28 at U.N. Headquarters in New York. All indications are that the CTBT will be an issue at this
conference.
09/24/09—A conference on CTBT entry into force, pursuant to Article XIV of the treaty, was
held at U.N. Headquarters in New York on September 24 and 25.
06/10/09—An international scientific conference was held in Vienna, Austria, June 10-12 to
present the results of the International Scientific Studies project.
06/08/09—Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda of Indonesia said that his nation would
“immediately” ratify the CTBT once the United States did so.
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05/25/09—North Korea announced that it had conducted a nuclear test, its second.
04/05/09—In a speech in Prague, President Obama said, “my administration will immediately
and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”
01/13/09—In her answers to questions for the record prepared for her confirmation hearing of this
date, Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton said, “The President-Elect and I are both
strongly committed to Senate approval of the CTBT and to launching a diplomatic effort to bring
on board other states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force.”
11/21/08—Lebanon became the 148th nation to ratify the CTBT.
09/24/08—A joint ministerial statement urging states that have not done so to sign and ratify the
CTBT was launched; as of December 12, 2008, 96 nations had associated themselves with the
statement.
09/00/08—The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization conducted a large-scale Integrated Field Exercise in Kazakhstan to simulate a
complete on-site inspection.
08/19/08—Iraq became the 179th nation to sign the CTBT.
06/26/08—The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization concluded its 30th meeting.
05/27/08—Senator John McCain said he would “tak[e] another look at the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty to see what can be done to overcome the shortcomings that prevented it from entering
into force.”
02/25/08—The United States paid $23.8 million to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Preparatory Commission, restoring its voting rights in the commission.
01/29/08—Colombia, one of the Annex 2 states that must ratify the CTBT for it to enter into
force, became the 144th nation to ratify the treaty.
12/17/07—Representative Tauscher introduced H.Res. 882, expressing the sense of the House
that the Senate should initiate a bipartisan process to give its advice and consent to ratification of
the CTBT.
11/26/07—The conference report on H.R. 1585, the FY2008 defense authorization bill, was
ordered to be printed. The bill provided for biennial reports on U.S. nuclear test readiness and
dropped a provision in the Senate bill expressing the sense of Congress that “the Senate should
ratify” the CTBT.
12/05/07—By a vote of 176 for, 1 against (United States), and 4 abstentions, the U.N. General
Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/62/59 stressing the importance of achieving the earliest
entry into force of the CTBT.
11/19/07—Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and former Director of Central
Intelligence John Deutch suggested a five-year renewable CTBT in lieu of the current treaty.
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11/14/07—The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization concluded its 29th meeting.
10/24/07—Senator Jon Kyl delivered a speech critical of the CTBT and of Section 3122 of H.R.
1585, the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, expressing the sense of Congress that the
Senate should ratify the CTBT. Senator Kyl included a letter signed by 41 Senators opposing the
treaty and Section 3122.
09/00/07—The United Nations held the fifth conference on facilitating CTBT entry into force on
September 17 and 18 in Vienna, Austria.
06/22/07—The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization concluded its 28th meeting.
06/04/07—The Senate Armed Services Committee reported S. 1547, FY2008 National Defense
Authorization Act. Section 3122, Sense of Congress on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy of
the United States and the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, included a provision, “the
Senate should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.”
06/04/07—The United States paid $10.0 million toward the International Monitoring System to
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission.
03/29/07—The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission
certified the 200th and 201st International Monitoring System stations.
01/31/07—Mikhail Gorbachev called on nuclear weapon states to ratify the CTBT.
01/04/07—Four former government officials urged “[i]nitiating a bipartisan process with the
Senate ... to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”
For earlier chronology, see the Appendix.
For Additional Reading
American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Physical Society, and Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Joint Working Group, “Nuclear Weapons in 21st
Century U.S. National Security, December 2008.
Andreasen, Steve, and Sidney Drell, “Untested Solutions,” Foreign Affairs, March/ April 2005:
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Arms Control Association, “Congress Must Remedy Past U.S. Funding Shortfalls for Global
Nuclear Test Monitoring System,” media advisory, May 21, 2007.
“Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q&A: President-elect Barack Obama,” Arms Control
Today, December 2008, pp. 31-36.
Bailey, Kathleen, “The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: An Update on the Debate,” National
Institute for Public Policy, March 2001, 23 p.
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Bailey, Kathleen, and Robert Barker. “Why the United States Should Unsign the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty and Resume Nuclear Testing.” Comparative Strategy. April-June 2003: 131-
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Brown, Harold. “New Nuclear Realities.” Washington Quarterly. Winter 2007-08, pp. 7-22.
Brown, Harold, and John Deutch. “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy.” Wall Street Journal,
November 19, 2007, p. 19.
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Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,” five pages, c. May 2008, at
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center%20publication%20pdfs/towards%20a%20new%20deterrent%20516.pdf.
Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,
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Council on Foreign Relations. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. U.S. Nuclear Weapons
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Deutch, John, “A Nuclear Posture for Today,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005: 49-60.
Erlanger, Steven, “Europeans Seek to Revive Nuclear Ban,” New York Times, December 9, 2008.
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8bfe1d1dc9cd.html.
Gallucci, Robert, “Nuclear Shockwaves: Ramifications of the North Korean Nuclear Test,” Arms
Control Today, November 2006.
Giacomo, Carol, “Testing Is New Wrinkle in US-India Nuclear Deal,” Reuters newswire, April
24, 2006.
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Graham-Silverman, Adam, “Nuclear Treaty Vote Could Be at Least a Year Away,” CQ Today
Online News, December 5, 2008.
Grossman, Elaine, “U.S. General Wants to Retain Nuclear Test Option,” Global Security
Newswire, July 22, 2008.
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Hafemeister, David, “The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Effectively Verifiable,” Arms Control
Today, October 2008.
Hafemeister, David, “Progress in CTBT Monitoring Since Its 1999 Senate Defeat,” Science and
Global Security, no. 15, 2007, pp. 151-183.
Hansen, Keith, “CTBT: Forecasting the Future,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April
2005: 50-57.
Harden, Blaine, “North Korean Nuclear Blast Draws Global Condemnation,” Washington Post,
May 26, 2009: 1.
“Joint Ministerial Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,” New York,
September 24, 2008 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A%2F63%2F634&
Submit=Search&Lang=E..
Kerry, John, “New Directions for Foreign Relations,” Boston Globe, January 13, 2009.
Kessler, Glenn, “Signs Stir Concern North Korea Might Test Nuclear Bomb,” Washington Post,
April 23, 2005: 13.
Kimball, Daryl, “The Enduring Value of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Prospects for Its
Entry Into Force,” Presentation Delivered at the Ettore Majorana Centre, Erice, Sicily, August
22, 2008, at http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3300.
Kimball, Daryl, “CTBT: Now More Than Ever,” Arms Control Today, December 2008, p. 3.
Kimball, Daryl, “Learning from the 1999 Vote on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” Arms Control
Today, October 2009, pp. 46-52.
Kralev, Nicholas, “Unpaid U.S. Dues Hit Nuke-Test Monitoring,” Washington Times, May 24,
2007, p. 13.
Kyl, Senator Jon, “Defense Authorization” [speech critical of the CTBT], Congressional Record,
October 24, 2007, pp. S13357-S13358.
Kyl, Senator Jon, “Why We Need to Test Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, October 21,
2009, p. 23.
Lakshmi, Rama, “Key Indian Figures Call for New Nuclear Tests Despite Deal with U.S.,”
Washington Post, October 5, 2009, p. 7.
Lay, Jennie, “Test Site Rising,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007, pp. 58-62.
Linzer, Dafna, and Thomas Ricks, “U.S. Waits for Firm Information on Nature and Success of
[North Korean Nuclear] Device,” Washington Post, October 11, 2006: 14.
Lynch, Colum, “Test Ban Network Probably Detected Quake but Was Unequipped to Warn of
Tsunami,” Washington Post, December 30, 2004: 24.
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Mackby, Jenifer, and Ola Dahlman, “Nuclear Fears, Alarming Arrears,” Baltimore Sun, July 25,
2007.
Mathews, Jessica Tuchman, “This Time, Ban the Test,” International Herald Tribune, October
21, 2009.
Monroe, Robert, “North Korea’s Impact on Nuclear Testing,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 26,
2007, pp. 55-58.
Monroe, Robert, “A Critical Moment in History,” remarks at Exchange Monitor’s First Annual
Nuclear Deterrence Summit, December 4, 2008, 3 p.
Monroe, Robert, “‘Grounds for Opposition’ to CTBT,” manuscript, January 21, 2009, 3 p.
National Academy of Sciences. Committee on Technical Issues Related to Ratification of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, National Academy Press, 2002. http://www.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record_id=10471.
“Nuclear Disarmament: The Long, Long Half-Life,” The Economist, June 10, 2006.
Parakilas, Jacob, “Congress Cuts CTBTO Funding,” Arms Control Today, December 2005: 25.
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, website,
http://www.ctbto.org.
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Annual
Report 2007, June 2008, 60 p., at http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/
Annual_Report_2007/AR_2007_linked_final.pdf.
Ramaker, Jaap, Jenifer Mackby, Peter Marshall, and Robert Geil, The Final Test: A History of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Negotiations, Vienna, Austria, Provisional Technical
Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization, 2003, 291 p.
Richards, Paul, “Forensic Seismology and CTBT Verification,” CTBTO Spectrum, January 2007,
pp. 1, 6, 19.
Robbins, Carla Anne, “U.S. Weighs Whether to Build Some New Nuclear Warheads,” Wall Street
Journal, December 14, 2005: 1, 15.
Russian Federation. Ministry for Atomic Energy and Ministry of Defense. USSR Nuclear
Weapons Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, 1949 through 1990. 1996. 63 p.
Russian Federation. Ministry for Atomic Energy. Catalog of Worldwide Nuclear Testing. 1999.
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Sang-Hun, Choe, and John O’Neil, “North Korea Vows First Nuclear Test,” New York Times
(online version), October 3, 2006.
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Sanger, David, “U.S. in Warning to North Korea on Nuclear Test,” New York Times, May 16,
2005: 1.
Sanger, David, “North Koreans Say They Tested Nuclear Device,” New York Times, October 9,
2006: 1.
Scowcroft, Brent, and Daniel Poneman, “Confront North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, May26,
2005: 12.
Shultz, George, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free ofNuclear
Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007: 15.
Shultz, George, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,”
Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2008: 13.
Sykes, Lynn, “Four Decades of Progress in Seismic Identification Help Verify the CTBT,” Eos (a
publication of the American Geophysical Union), October 29, 2002: 497, 500.
Sokolski, Henry, and Gary Schmitt, “Advice for the Nuclear Abolitionists,” Weekly Standard,
May 12, 2008.
U.N. General Assembly. “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.” Report of the First
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“UNICORN Experiments Yield Crucial Data,” Nuclear Weapons Journal (a publication of Los
Alamos National Laboratory), Issue 2, 2006, pp. 20-21.
U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory and National Nuclear Security Administration. Proceedings
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U.S. Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State. “National Security and
Nuclear Weapons: Maintaining Deterrence in the 21st Century.” July 2007, 3 p.
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Appendix. Chronology, 1992-2006
09/23/92—The United States conducted its most recent nuclear test, “Divider.”
10/02/92—President Bush signed the FY1993 Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Act, P.L. 102-377; sec. 507 restricted U.S. nuclear testing.
10/13/92—Russia announced an extension of its test moratorium at least to mid-1993.
01/13/93—President François Mitterrand said France would extend its test moratorium as long as
the United States and Russia did.
04/24/93—At the Vancouver summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that negotiations on a
multilateral test ban should begin soon.
07/03/93—President Clinton announced his plan to continue the test moratorium through
September 1994 as long as no other nation tests.
08/10/93—The Conference on Disarmament (CD) gave its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test
Ban a mandate to negotiate a CTBT.
10/05/93—China held the world’s first nuclear test since September 1992.
01/25/94—The Conference on Disarmament opened its 1994 session in Geneva, with negotiation
of a CTBT its top priority.
03/15/94—The United States extended its test moratorium through September 1995.
06/10/94—China conducted an underground nuclear test.
09/26/94—President Yeltsin, in an address to the U.N. General Assembly, said, “Russia favors
signing this treaty [the CTBT] next year.”
10/07/94—China conducted an underground nuclear test.
01/24/95—President Clinton said in his State of the Union address, “The United States will lead
the charge to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [and] to enact a
comprehensive nuclear test ban.”
01/30/95—President Clinton continued the U.S. moratorium until a CTBT enters into force,
assuming it is signed before September 30, 1996.
05/11/95—The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference agreed to
extend that treaty indefinitely, and by reference called for completing CTBT negotiations not later
than 1996.
05/15/95—China conducted a nuclear test, its fourth since September 1992.
06/13/95—President Jacques Chirac announced that France would conduct eight nuclear tests in
the South Pacific between September 1995 and May 1996.
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08/04/95—The Senate tabled, 56 to 44, an amendment by Senator Exon and others to delete $50
million for conducting hydronuclear tests (those producing extremely low nuclear yield). The
amendment was to S. 1026, the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Bill.
08/10/95—France announced that once it completed its nuclear test program, it would support a
CTBT that bans all nuclear tests of any yield.
08/11/95—President Clinton announced his decision to pursue a “true zero yield” CTBT, banning
all nuclear tests regardless of yield, accompanied by six “safeguards” to assure confidence in U.S.
nuclear weapons under a CTBT.
08/17/95—China conducted a nuclear test, its fifth since September 1992.
09/05/95—France conducted a nuclear test, its first since 1991.
12/13/95—A U.N. General Assembly resolution, passed 85-18, “strongly deplores” current
nuclear testing and “strongly urges” an immediate end to testing.
01/23/96—In his State of the Union Address, President Clinton stated,”We must end the race to
create new nuclear weapons by signing a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty—this year.”
01/27/96—France held the sixth nuclear test in its test series.
01/29/96—President Chirac announced “the final end to French nuclear tests.”
03/07/96—The Washington Times reported U.S. intelligence agencies have ambiguous evidence
that Russia may have conducted a nuclear test in January 1996.
04/19/96—President Yeltsin formally endorsed a zero-yield CTBT and reserved the right to
resume testing if Russia’s supreme interests are threatened. The next day, the Group of Seven plus
Russia expressed their commitment to complete and sign a zero-yield CTBT by September 1996.
05/28/96—Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, Chairman of the CD’s Ad Hoc
Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, tabled a draft text of a CTBT incorporating compromises on
key outstanding issues.
06/04/96—France and the United States signed an agreement to share information relevant to
maintaining nuclear weapons.
06/08/96—China held a nuclear test and declared that after one more test it would join an
international moratorium on nuclear explosions.
06/20/96—India stated it would not sign a CTBT unless the five declared nuclear weapon states
agreed to a timetable to give up their nuclear weapons.
06/26/96—The Senate tabled, 53-45, an amendment by Senators Kyl and Reid to the FY1997
National Defense Authorization Bill to permit U.S. nuclear testing after September 30, 1996,
under certain conditions if the Senate had not given its advice and consent to ratification of a
CTBT.
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07/23/96—The United States and Russia announced their joint support for the existing draft
CTBT. While this draft did not fully satisfy either nation, they saw it as acceptable and the only
route to achieving a CTBT in 1996.
07/29/96—China conducted what it said would be its last nuclear test, and pledged to begin a
moratorium on testing on July 30.
08/07/96—China and the United States reportedly reached an agreement on modifying the draft
treaty so as to resolve China’s concerns over CTBT verification, clearing the way for China to
support the treaty.
08/20/96—India vetoed the draft CTBT in the CD, barring the treaty from going to the U.N.
General Assembly as a CD document.
08/23/96—Australia asked the U.N. General Assembly to begin consideration of the draft CTBT
on September 9.
09/10/96—The U.N. General Assembly adopted, 158 to 3 (with 5 abstentions and 19 nations not
voting), the draft CTBT negotiated at the CD.
09/24/96—The CTBT was opened for signing; President Clinton and others signed.
11/20/96—The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization
(CTBTO) began its first meeting.
07/02/97—The Department of Energy conducted its first subcritical experiment, “Rebound,” at
the Nevada Test Site. It conducted one more in 1997.
08/28/97—The Washington Times reported Administration officials as saying Russia may have
conducted a nuclear explosion on August 16.
09/22/97—President Clinton submitted the CTBT to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification.
11/04/97—The Washington Post reported the Administration formally dropped its claim that a
seismic event of August 16, 1997, was a Russian nuclear test.
01/21/98—Senator Jesse Helms, in a letter to President Clinton, said “the CTBT is very low on
the [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee’s list of priorities.”
01/27/98—In his State of the Union address, President Clinton asked the Senate to approve the
CTBT this year and announced that four former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
endorsed the treaty.
03/25/98—The Department of Energy conducted its third subcritical experiment, “Stagecoach,”
at the Nevada Test Site. It conducted two more in 1998.
04/06/98—Britain and France became the first declared nuclear weapon states to ratify the CTBT,
depositing instruments of ratification with the U.N.
05/11/98—Prime Minister Vajpayee announced India conducted three nuclear tests.
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05/13/98—India announced that it conducted two nuclear tests.
05/28/98—Pakistan announced that it conducted five nuclear tests.
05/30/98—Pakistan announced that it conducted one nuclear test.
06/05/98—The foreign ministers of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, in a joint communique, condemned the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, urged India and
Pakistan to refrain from weaponizing or deploying nuclear weapons, and called on them to adhere
to the CTBT “immediately and unconditionally.”
09/23/98—Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, in an address to the U.N., said his nation
would adhere to the CTBT if other nations lifted economic sanctions, as long as India refrained
from testing.
12/00/98—Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson and Secretary of Defense William Cohen
submitted the third annual nuclear stockpile certification memorandum to the President stating,
“The nuclear stockpile has no safety or reliability concerns that require underground testing at
this time.”
02/09/99—The Department of Energy conducted its sixth subcritical experiment, “Clarinet,” at
the Nevada Test Site. It conducted two more in 1999.
05/25/99—The Cox Committee, in its report, stated its belief that China may be continuing to
conduct underground nuclear tests.
07/20/99—In separate press conferences, President Clinton and nine Senators urged the Senate to
consider the CTBT. A survey found 82% of Americans want the treaty approved. All 45
Democratic Senators wrote to Senator Helms urging him to hold hearings on the treaty and to
report it to the Senate.
07/26/99—Responding to the July 20 letter, Senator Helms stated that “I do not share your
enthusiasm for this treaty” and that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would consider it
after amendments to the ABM Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol.
09/30/99—Senator Lott proposed a unanimous-consent request that would bring the CTBT to the
Senate floor for 10 hours of debate beginning October 6, and then to a vote.
10/08/99—(1) States that had ratified the CTBT ended a three-day conference on expediting entry
into force. (2) The Senate began debate on the treaty.
10/11/99—President Clinton wrote to Senators Lott and Daschle to request that a vote on the
CTBT be delayed.
10/13/99—The Senate rejected the CTBT, 48 for, 51 against, 1 present.
01/28/00—Secretary of State Albright announced that Gen. John Shalikashvili (ret.) would head
the Administration’s effort to achieve bipartisan support for CTBT ratification, but the State
Department indicated the Administration did not expect to seek Senate approval of the treaty in
2000.
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02/04/00—DOE conducted the ninth U.S. subcritical experiment, “Oboe 3.” It held four more in
2000.
02/04/00—Russia announced that it conducted seven subcritical experiments between September
23, 1999, and January 8, 2000.
06/30/00—Russia ratified the CTBT.
11/03/00—Russia announced that it completed its fifth and final series of subcritical experiments
for 2000 at Novaya Zemlya during the week of October 30.
01/17/01—Colin Powell, as nominee for Secretary of State, said the Administration would not
ask for CTBT ratification in this session of Congress.
03/04/01—The New York Times reported U.S. intelligence experts were divided on whether
Russia had conducted clandestine tests over the past several years.
06/26/01—The House Appropriations Committee declined to add funds to the FY2002 Energy
and Water Development Appropriations Bill to increase nuclear test readiness, arguing the
Secretary of Defense, President, Armed Services Committees, and Congress must first request or
approve these funds.
09/26/01—The National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) held the 14th U.S. subcritical
experiment, “Oboe 8.” It conducted one more in 2001.
11/11/01—The Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT began on this date at
U.N. headquarters in New York and ended November 13.
02/15/02—NNSA held the 16th U.S. subcritical experiment, and the first with U.K. participation,
“Vito.” It conducted three more subcritical experiments, without U.K. participation, in 2002.
05/10/02—The House passed H.R. 4546, the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2003; it called for DOE to achieve the ability to conduct a nuclear test within a year of a
presidential direction to test.
07/31/02—The National Academy of Sciences issued a report asserting that the main technical
concerns raised in regard to the CTBT are manageable.
09/26/02—NNSA held the 19th U.S. subcritical experiment, “Rocco.”
02/00/03—A House Policy Committee report recommended “a test readiness program that could
achieve an underground diagnostic [nuclear] test within 18 months”; the Bipartisan Congressional
Task Force on Nonproliferation urged President Bush “not to resume nuclear weapons testing.”
05/22/03—The Senate passed, 98-1, S. 1050, the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Bill.
Sec. 3132 directed the Secretary of Energy to achieve by October 1, 2006, and to maintain
thereafter, the ability to conduct a nuclear test within 18 months of a decision to test, unless the
Secretary determines that a different number of months is preferable.
09/00/03—A conference on facilitating the CTBT’s entry into force was held in Vienna, Austria,
September 3-5.
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments
09/19/03—NNSA held the 20th U.S. subcritical experiment, “Piano.”
10/30/03—The U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee (Disarmament and International
Security) approved a draft resolution, “A Path to Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” 146-2,
with 16 abstentions. A provision stressed the importance of achieving early entry into force of the
CTBT. The United States and India voted no; the U.S. representative stated that he did so because
of U.S. opposition to the CTBT.
11/00/03—The 21st meeting of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission was held November 10-13
in Vienna, Austria.
12/08/03—The U.N. General Assembly adopted, 164-2, with 2 abstentions, a resolution, “A Path
to Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.”
01/06/04—Libya became the 109th nation to ratify the CTBT.
05/25/04—NNSA held the 21st U.S. subcritical experiment, “Armando.”
06/20/04—In a joint statement, India and Pakistan agreed to reaffirm their unilateral moratoria on
nuclear testing, barring extraordinary events, and to establish a dedicated and secure hotline
between the two foreign secretaries.
06/00/04—The 22nd meeting of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission was held June 22-24 in
Vienna, Austria.
09/24/04—Foreign ministers from 42 nations issue a statement calling entry into force of the
CTBT “more urgent today than ever before.”
12/03/04—The U.N. General Assembly adopted, 177-2, with 4 abstentions, a resolution,
“Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.”
2/10/05—North Korea declared, “We ... have manufactured nukes for self-defense to cope with
the Bush Administration’s evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK.”
03/10/05—The European Parliament passed a resolution that, among other things, “reiterates its
call for the USA ... to sign and ratify the CTBT.”
05/00/05—At the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, held May 2-27, some
nations criticized the United States for not ratifying the CTBT.
05/16/05—The New York Times reported that on May 15, National Security Advisor Stephen
Hadley stated, “Action would have to be taken” if North Korea conducted a nuclear test.
08/29/05—Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit reportedly stated that Egypt would not
ratify the CTBT until Israel joins the NPT.
09/00/05—A conference, Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty, was held September 21 to 23 at U.N. Headquarters.
11/00/05—The 25th session of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization was held November 14 to 18.
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments
12/08/05—The U.N. General Assembly adopted, 168-2, a resolution on nuclear disarmament that,
among other things, urged nations to ratify the CTBT.
2/23/06—The United States and United Kingdom conducted a subcritical experiment,
“Krakatau,” at the Nevada Test Site.
6/00/06—The 26th meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty Organization was held June 20-23.
8/30/06—The United States conducted its 23rd subcritical experiment, “Unicorn,” at the Nevada
Test Site.
9/20/06—Fifty-nine foreign ministers called on states that have not done so to ratify the treaty.
9/28/06—Representative Tauscher introduced H.Res. 1059, calling on the Senate to give its
advice and consent to CTBT ratification.
10/03/06—North Korea declared that it will conduct a nuclear test.
10/09/06—North Korea claimed to have conducted its first nuclear test; most reports placed the
explosive yield of the test at one kiloton or less.
10/16/06—The United States confirmed that the North Korean event of October 9 was a nuclear
test.
11/17/06—The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization concluded its 27th meeting.
Author Contact Information
Jonathan Medalia
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
jmedalia@crs.loc.gov, 7-7632
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