Stability in Russia’s Chechnya and Other
Regions of the North Caucasus:
Recent Developments

Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
December 16, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34613
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress

Stability in Russia’s Chechnya and Other Regions of the North Caucasus

Summary
Terrorist attacks in Russia’s North Caucasus—a border area between the Black and Caspian Seas
that includes the formerly breakaway Chechnya and other ethnic-based regions—have appeared
to increase in recent months. Moreover, civilian and government casualties are reaching levels not
seen in several years and terrorist attacks again are taking place outside the North Caucasus.
Illustrative of the new level of violence, the Nevskiy Express passenger train was bombed after
leaving Moscow in late November 2009, resulting in over two dozen deaths and dozens of
injuries.
Before the recent rise in terrorist attacks, it seemed that government security forces had been
successful in tamping down their range and scope by aggressively carrying out over a thousand
sweep operations (“zachistki”) in the North Caucasus. During these operations, security forces
surround a village and search the homes of the residents, ostensibly in a bid to apprehend
terrorists. Critics of the operations allege that the searches are illegal and that troops frequently
engage in pillaging and gratuitous violence and are responsible for kidnapping for ransom and
“disappearances” of civilians. Through these sweeps, as well as through direct clashes, most of
the masterminds of previous large-scale terrorist attacks were killed.
Some observers suggest that the increasing scope of public discontent against zachistki and
deepening economic and social distress are contributing to growing numbers of recruits for
terrorist groups and to increasing violence in the North Caucasus. Inter-ethnic and religious
tensions are also responsible for some of the increasing violence. Many ethnic Russian and other
non-native civilians have been murdered or have disappeared, which has spurred the migration of
most of the non-native population from the North Caucasus. Russian authorities argue that
foreign terrorist groups continue to operate in the North Caucasus and to receive outside financial
and material assistance.
The United States generally has supported the Russian government’s efforts to combat terrorism
in the North Caucasus. However, successive Administrations and Congress have continued to
raise concerns about the wide scope of human rights abuses committed by the Russian
government in the North Caucasus. The conference agreement on Consolidated Appropriations
for FY2010 (H.R. 3288), calls for $7.0 million to continue humanitarian, conflict mitigation,
human rights, civil society and relief and recovery assistance programs in the North Caucasus. It
also repeats language used for several years that directs that 60% of the assistance allocated to
Russia will be withheld (excluding medical, human trafficking, and Comprehensive Threat
Reduction aid) until the President certifies that Russia is facilitating full access to Chechnya for
international non-governmental organizations providing humanitarian relief to displaced persons.

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Stability in Russia’s Chechnya and Other Regions of the North Caucasus

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Impact of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia Conflict .................................................................... 4
Recent Developments in the North Caucasus............................................................................... 5
Chechnya .............................................................................................................................. 5
Ingushetia ............................................................................................................................. 6
Dagestan............................................................................................................................... 8
Other Areas of the North Caucasus........................................................................................ 9
Contributions to Instability........................................................................................................ 10
Implications for Russia ............................................................................................................. 13
International Response .............................................................................................................. 14
Implications for U.S. Interests ............................................................................................. 15

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Russia’s North Caucasus Region, FY2007 and FY2008 ................... 17

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 18

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Stability in Russia’s Chechnya and Other Regions of the North Caucasus

Introduction
Terrorist attacks in Russia’s North Caucasus1 have appeared to increase in recent months.
Moreover, civilian and government casualties are reaching levels not seen in several years and
terrorist attacks again are taking place outside the North Caucasus. 2 Illustrative of the new level
of violence, the Nevskiy Express passenger train was bombed after leaving Moscow in late
November 2009, resulting in over two dozen deaths and dozens of injuries.
Before the recent rise in terrorist attacks, it seemed that government security forces had been
successful in tamping down their range and scope by aggressively carrying out over a thousand
counter-terrorism operations (termed “zachistki” or “cleaning-up” operations) in the North
Caucasus. During these operations, security forces surround a village and search the homes of the
residents, ostensibly in a bid to apprehend terrorists. Critics of the operations allege that the
searches are illegal and that troops frequently engage in pillaging and gratuitous violence and are
responsible for kidnapping for ransom and “disappearances” of civilians. Through these sweeps,
as well as through direct clashes, most of the masterminds of previous large-scale terrorist attacks
were killed and terrorist groups appeared unable to mount attacks on the scale of the September
2004 attack at the Beslan grade school (in North Ossetia), where 300 or more civilians, police,
and troops were killed, or the October 2005 attack on the town of Nalchik (in Kabardino-
Balkaria), where 50 or more were killed.
The rise in terrorist attacks is being met by an increase in zachistki and in reported human rights
abuses linked to security forces, such as abductions for ransom or “disappearances.” The
increased conflict also is placing human rights and aid workers in renewed jeopardy. Some
observers suggest that the increasing scope of public discontent against zachistki and deepening
economic and social distress are contributing to growing numbers of recruits for terrorist groups
and to increasing violence in the North Caucasus. Inter-ethnic and religious tensions are also
responsible for some of the increasing violence.
The violence in the North Caucasus has spurred migration from the North Caucasus of some of
the native population and most of the non-native population. Unlike in most other federal
subunits of Russia, eponymous or other native ethnic groups have strengthened their majority
status in all the North Caucasian republics except Adygea, and ethnic Russians are a declining
minority (even in Adygea). In Chechnya and Ingushetia, few ethnic Russians reportedly remain as
residents, except for military personnel.3
In February 2009, President Medvedev stated that “the situation in the North Caucasus remains
strained. Extremists are stepping up their subversive terrorist activities and at the same time are
trying to conduct a campaign to discredit the government bodies of the North Caucasus
republics.”4 Anatoly Safonov, the presidential representative for international cooperation on

1 Russia’s North Caucasus as used here includes the “republics” of Adygea, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabarda-Balkaria,
North Ossetia-Alania, Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Dagestan. Some sections of the Krasnodar and Stavropol “territories”
also are usually included as parts of the North Caucasus.
2 Center for Strategic and International Studies, Violence in the North Caucasus: Summer 2009.
3 Valery Dzutsev, “North Caucasus’ Ethnic Russian Population Shrinks as Indigenous Populations Grow,” Eurasia
Daily Monitor
, November 13, 2009.
4 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), February 6, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950260.
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combating terrorism and organized crime, also warned in February 2009 that al Qaeda and its
affiliates were increasing their influence in the North Caucasus.5 The Center for Strategic and
International Studies, a U.S. think tank, has estimated that the incidence of violence started to
increase in the North Caucasus in early 2007 and was much higher by mid-2009.6
Seeming to contradict his earlier concern about ongoing terrorism, President Medvedev argued in
April 2009 that “the situation [in Chechnya] has to a substantial degree normalized, life there is
becoming normal,” and declared an end to the counter-terrorist operations regime in Chechnya
(declared nearly 10 years ago and later extended to other areas of the North Caucasus). He
specified that security agencies could still impose “if need be individual provisions of the
counter-terrorist operation regime ... in Chechnya and the other republics in southern Russia.”7
Some observers viewed this caveat as indicating that the formal lifting of the regime would not
substantially improve the human rights situation. They also argued that budgetary pressures
associated with keeping sizable forces in Chechnya and Prime Minister Putin’s support for force
reductions might have spurred Medvedev’s decision. According to media reports, some of the
remaining 50,000 federal military and police troops deployed in Chechnya began to be
withdrawn, although about 20,000 permanently based troops will remain.
Even though the counter-terrorist operations regime in Chechnya was formally lifted, dozens of
zachistki against terrorists have continued to be carried out or have even increased in the republic
as well as elsewhere in the North Caucasus, involving the declaration of counter-terrorist
operations areas in villages and rural areas where civil rights were curtailed.8
Among prominent recent terrorist incidents:
• Dagestani Internal Affairs Minister Adilgerey Magomedtagirov was killed on
June 5, 2009. Partly in response to this murder, President Medvedev flew to
Dagestan and convened a session of the Russian Security Council to discuss
regional counter-measures against terrorism. He stated that during the first half of
the year, over 300 acts of terrorism had taken place in the North Caucasus
(including over 100 bombings), that 75 police and other local government
officials had been killed, that 48 civilians had died, and that 112 terrorists had
been “eliminated.”9
• The president of Ingushetia, Yunus-bek Yevkurov, was severely wounded by a
bomb blast on June 22, 2009.

5 RIA Novosti, February 17, 2009.
6 Center for Strategic and International Studies, Violence In The North Caucasus: Trends Since 2004, 2008; Violence in
the North Caucasus: Summer 2009
. CSIS defines violent incidents as including “abductions of military personnel and
civilians, bombings, assassinations of key civilian and military leaders, rebel attacks, police or military operations
against suspected militants, destruction of property by militants, and the discovery of weapons.”
7 President of Russia. Beginning of Working Meeting with Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander
Bortnikov
, March 27, 2009, at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/03/27/2210_type82913_214418.shtml.
8 Council of Europe. Commissioner for Human Rights. Report by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human
Rights of the Council of Europe, Following His Visit to the Russian Federation (Chechen Republic and the Republic of
Ingushetia) on 2 -11 September 2009
, November 24, 2009.
9 President of the Russian Federation. Russian president addresses Security Council meeting on Caucasus, June 10,
2009, at http://www.kremlin.ru.
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• In July 2009, prominent human rights advocate Natalia Estemirova was abducted
in Chechnya and, after passing through police checkpoints, was found murdered
in Ingushetia.
• In August 2009, Zarema Sadulayeva and Alik Dzhabrailov, who ran a child
rehabilitation center in Chechnya, were murdered.
• A suicide truck bombing in Ingushetia killed 21 policemen and wounded 150
civilians in August 2009. President Medvedev fired the republic’s Interior
Minister and at a meeting of the Security Council in Stavropol he admitted that
“some time ago, I had an impression that the situation in the Caucasus had
improved. Unfortunately, the latest events proved that this was not so.” He
reportedly ordered a purge of corrupt policemen throughout the North Caucasus,
called for rotating policemen into and out of the North Caucasus to combat
corruption and inefficiency, and urged legal and judicial changes that would
reduce procedural rights and streamline the prosecution of “bandits.”10
• The Nevskiy Express railway train was bombed outside of Moscow on
November 27, 2009, killing over two dozen passengers and injuring over 100.
Some of the victims were high-ranking Russian officials, including a member of
the Federation Council (upper legislative chamber). The same train had been
bombed in 2007, allegedly by Pavel Kosolapov (an associate of Chechen rebel
leader Doku Umarov and the late Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev). Other
explosions targeted trains in Dagestan the day before and the day after the
Nevskiy Express bombing, although no casualties were reported. Russian media
termed the Nevskiy Express bombing the worst terrorist act outside of the North
Caucasian region since the August 2004 bombing of two airliners that had taken
off from Moscow, killing 89. On December 2, Umarov allegedly took
responsibility for ordering the Nevskiy Express bombing and warned that “acts
of sabotage will continue for as long as those occupying the Caucasus do not stop
their policy of killing ordinary Muslims.”11
In his annual address to the Federal Assembly on November 12, 2009, President Medvedev stated
that terrorism in the North Caucasus was Russia’s “most serious domestic political problem.” He
averred that terrorist attacks against local government and law enforcement officials were still
hindering economic recovery, admitted that corruption and “cronyism” among officials also were
factors retarding recovery, and warned that such opposition would “be dealt with.” He reported
that federal economic assistance to the region had totaled $888.1 million in 2009, but criticized
local officials for “shamelessly stealing” some of the aid “at a time when unemployment and
therefore mass poverty in the Caucasus has reached alarming levels.” He raised concerns about
unemployment rates of more than 50% in Ingushetia and more than 30% in Chechnya, and rates
even higher among young people, and announced that investment projects in energy, construction,
tourism, healthcare, agriculture, and small business would soon be launched to combat
unemployment. He urged people who had migrated from the region to return and invest, called
for raising educational standards to foster economic growth, and supported the creation of a “pan-
Caucasian youth camp” to encourage inter-ethnic harmony and civil society. He announced that

10 CEDR, August 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950185; and August 25, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-546006.
11 Reuters, December 2, 2009.
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he would soon appoint “someone with enough authority to effectively coordinate” development
programs in the region.12
Impact of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia Conflict
Several Russian policymakers and others have suggested that the August 2008 Russia-Georgia
conflict contributed to increased instability in the North Caucasus. In August 2009, President
Medvedev stated (as mentioned above) that terrorism had not abated. Similarly, Russian analyst
Viktor Nadein-Raevsky has claimed that “external forces and the so-called Wahhabi underground
... aiming to weaken Russia and to sever the Caucasus from it laid great hopes on Georgia’s
attack.” These groups “had planned a large-scale offensive in the Russian Caucasus in the wake
of Georgia’s aggression. When it proved to be a failure these forces changed tactics,” and
launched terrorist attacks instead.13 Dagestani President Mukhu Aliyev also asserted in late
November 2009 that the activity of foreign terrorists had increased in the republic since August
2008. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, there was a “lull in
violence” in the North Caucasus during the Russia-Georgia conflict, but “following the conflict,
the level of violence in the North Caucasus rose sharply, particularly in Ingushetia.”14
Several observers have accused Russia of hypocrisy in recognizing the independence of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia while suppressing separatism in Chechnya. These observers warn that
separatists in the North Caucasus could be encouraged by the example of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.15 Attempting to refute such a linkage, Prime Minister Putin claimed in September 2008
that before the conflict, some groups in the North Caucasus had advocated separatism because
they felt that Russia was not defending the rights of South Ossetians. He asserted that by
defending South Ossetia, Russia averted destabilization of the North Caucasus.16 Offering what
may be a more plausible rationale, Russian analyst Aleksey Malashenko has argued that Russia’s
use of overwhelming force against Georgia served as a potent example to the North Caucasus (as
was the recent case of Chechnya) that Russia would continue to use force to safeguard its
interests in the Caucasus. He has suggested that this example will constrain separatism, as will the
fear of civil conflict and the fear of breaking what are regarded as essential economic ties with
Moscow. He has warned, however, that Russia’s ongoing civil rights abuses in the North
Caucasus are spurring the growth of Islamic terrorism.17
Some residents of the North Caucasus have criticized Russia’s economic assistance to Abkhazia
and South Ossetia—which ostensibly are foreign countries after being recognized by Moscow in
the wake of the Russia-Georgia conflict—while the North Caucasus remains mired in poverty.
Russian analyst Alexey Malashenko has warned that the global economic downturn and Russia’s
boosted financial commitments to Abkhazia and South Ossetia could result in fewer Russian

12 The Kremlin, Moscow. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, November 12,
2009.
13 “Wave of Terror Looming Over the Caucasus?” Russia Today, November 7, 2008.
14 Violence in the North Caucasus.
15 The Economist, August 28, 2008-September 3, 2008.
16 Interfax, September 11, 2008; “Chairman of the Government of Russia Vladimir Putin Meets with Members of the
International Discussion Club Valdai,” at
http://www.government.ru/content/governmentactivity/mainnews/archive/2008/09/11/8225672.htm.
17CEDR, October 8, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-8015.
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subsidies to the North Caucasus, perhaps triggering more discontent.18 President Medvedev’s
pledge in late 2009 to allocate at least $1.1 billion over the next few years to address
unemployment in Ingushetia might be part of an effort to assuage the local population, after
promising but failing to deliver a similar allocation a year before.
Recent Developments in the North Caucasus
Chechnya
Some observers have argued that Russia’s efforts to suppress the separatist movement in its
Chechnya region have been the most violent in Europe in recent years in terms of ongoing
military and civilian casualties.19 In late 1999, Russia’s then-Premier Putin ordered military,
police, and security forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region. By early 2000, these forces
occupied most of the region. High levels of fighting continued for several more years, and
resulted in thousands of Russian and Chechen casualties and hundreds of thousands of displaced
persons. In 2005, then-Chechen rebel leader Abdul-Khalim Saydullayev decreed the formation of
a Caucasus Front against Russia among Islamic believers in the North Caucasus, in an attempt to
widen Chechnya’s conflict with Russia.
The high levels of conflict in Chechnya appeared to ebb markedly after mid-decade with the
killing, capture, or surrender of leading Chechen insurgents. However, Russian security forces
and pro-Moscow Chechen forces still contend with residual insurgency. Remaining rebels have
split into two basic groups, one led by Doka Umarev, who emphasizes jihad, and the other a more
disparate group represented by Akhmed Zakayev, who stresses independence for Chechnya more
than jihad. Reportedly, Zakayev has little or no influence over paramilitary operations. Umarev
allegedly attempted to replace Zakayev as Chechnya’s European emissary with the father of the
terrorist who led hostage-taking at a Moscow theater in 2002. In late 2007, Umarov declared
himself the amir of the Caucasus Emirate and declared an end to the rebel Chechen Republic of
Ichkeriya. Umarov allegedly called for establishing Sharia (Islamic law) in “all lands in
Caucasus, where mujahidin who gave oaths to me wage Jihad ... including Dagestan, Chechnya,
Ingushetia, Ossetia, the Nogai steppe and the combined areas of Kabardino-Balkaria and
Karachai-Cherkessia.” In August 2008, a colleague of Umarov’s declared that the Caucasus
Emirate could include other areas of Russia where mujahidin had given oaths to Umarov, such as
Tatarstan.20
Russia’s pacification policy has involved setting up a pro-Moscow regional government and
transferring more and more local security duties to this government. An important factor in
Russia’s seeming success in Chechnya has been reliance on pro-Moscow Chechen clans affiliated
with regional president Ramzan Kadyrov. Police and paramilitary forces under his authority
allegedly have committed flagrant abuses of human rights, including by holding the relatives of

18 Alexey Malashenko, “The North Caucasus Today: The View on the Ground and from Moscow,” Event Summary,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 21, 2008.
19 For background information, see CRS Report RL32272, Bringing Peace to Chechnya? Assessments and
Implications
, by Jim Nichol.
20 “The Official Version of Amir Dokka’s Statement of Declaration of the Caucasian Emirate,” Kavkaz Center,
November 22, 2007, at http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2007/11/22/9107.shtml; “We Have Taken Up Arms
to Establish Laws: Interview with Movladi Udugov, Part I,” Prague Watchdog, July 24, 2008.
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insurgents as hostages under threat of death until the insurgents surrendered. Another technique
has been the torching of relatives’ homes and crops.
Russia’s efforts to rebuild the largely devastated region have been impressive but are undermined
by rampant corruption. Some types of crimes against civilians reportedly have decreased, such as
kidnapping and disappearances, according to the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, a non-
governmental organization (NGO). Many displaced Chechens still fear returning to the region,
and a sizeable number have emigrated from Russia.
In late June 2008, Colonel-General Gennadiy Troshev, adviser to the Russian president and
former commander of the Joint Group of Forces in the North Caucasus, stated that “all large
organized armed groups in Chechnya have been eliminated, defeated or dispersed. The remaining
small disconnected armed groups [have moved to] Dagestan and Ingushetia.” Nonetheless, he
warned that “it is too soon to say that the situation in [Chechnya] as well as in the entire North
Caucasus has completely normalized.”21 In a summing up of results in 2008, Lt. Gen. Mikhail
Shepilov, Director of the Operational Group of the Interior Ministry, praised police for preventing
any large-scale terrorism in Chechnya, and Kadyrov and other Chechen officials claimed that
terrorism and other violence had declined during the year.22
In contrast to these views, Major General Nikolay Sivak warned in May 2008 that a new
generation of Chechen youth were becoming rebels and were receiving help from the population,
so that Russia’s national security continued to be threatened.23 Analyst Gordon Hahn similarly
suggested in late 2008 that after popular support for the Chechen insurgents declined following
large-scale terrorist attacks such as at Beslan, it may have increased recently, contributing to a
spurt in the numbers of youth joining the mujahedin.24 According to data from the U.S.-based
Center for Strategic and International Studies, the decline in violent incidents in Chechnya in
2008 was reversed in 2009 and included a rising number of violent deaths. The Council of
Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner, Thomas Hammerberg, reported after a September 2009
trip to Chechnya that the number of terrorist acts, killings, and abductions in the region
apparently had increased during 2009 compared to 2008.25
Ingushetia
According to some observers, Ingushetia in recent years has threatened to become the “new
Chechnya” of disorder and violence in the region, a “mini-failed state.”26 The Chechen-Ingush
Autonomous Republic, divided in the late Soviet period into separate Chechen and Ingush
Republics, has proven unable to demarcate a common border. This has contributed to tensions
between Chechens and Ingushes. Stalin’s deportation of the Ingush during World War II and their

21 CEDR, June 25, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950138.
22 CEDR, January 26, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-546001.
23 CEDR, May 20, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-548001.
24 Gordon J. Hahn, “The Caucasus Emirate and Its New Tactics,” Mideast Monitor, December 2008.
25 Council of Europe. Report by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe
Following his visit to the Russian Federation (Chechen Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia) on 2 -11 September
2009
, CommDH(2009)36, November 24, 2009.
26 “Commentators See Ingushetia as a ‘Failed State’ Where an Uprising Could Occur,” Chechnya Weekly, Vol. 8, Issue
34 (September 6, 2007); “Ingushetia Takes Chechnya’s Place as the North Caucasus Hot Spot,” Chechnya Weekly,
September 6, 2007.
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return in the 1950s to find that some of their lands had been ceded to the North Ossetian
Autonomous Republic, has contributed to Ingush-Ossetian clashes. In October 1992, hundreds of
Ingush reportedly were killed and over 60,000 forced from their homes in the Prigorodny District
of North Ossetia.
According to Congressional testimony by Russian human rights advocate Gregory Shvedov in
June 2008, there are up to 200 terrorists based in Ingushetia.27 Small-scale rebel attacks
intensified in 2007 and 2008, prompting Russia to deploy more and more security, military, and
police forces to the republic. Since 2007, there allegedly have been more killings, attacks, and
abductions in Ingushetia—perpetrated by government and rebel forces, criminals, and others—
than in any other republic in the North Caucasus.28 Ingushetia prosecutor Usman Belkharoyev has
reported that more than 70 security personnel were killed in armed attacks in Ingushetia in 2008,
compared to 32 in 2007. He also reported that 167 police and troops were injured in such attacks
in 2008, compared to 80 in 2007.29 According to the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, the level of violent incidents in Ingushetia, particularly violent deaths, continued to
increase in 2009.
What Russian analyst Sergey Markedonov termed a “loyal opposition” movement in
Ingushetia—that supports Russian rule in the republic—increasingly opposed the leadership of
Federal Security Service official Murat Zyazikov, who became governor in 2002 after an election
that many observers viewed as manipulated by Moscow. Another group, the Islamic extremists,
wants to evict “kafirs” (infidels) and “murtads” (apostate Muslims) and create a North Caucasus
emirate.30 This “loyal opposition” organized several rallies in 2007 and 2008 to protest local
government corruption, extrajudicial killings, and other alleged abuses by security forces. On
August 31, 2008, opposition figure Magomed Yevloyev was shot by police and dumped along the
road. The Ingush opposition appealed to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, condemning the
killing as a sign of the “genocide” against the Ingush that was prompting more and more Ingush
to seek independence from Russia.31
After Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, an opposition People’s
Assembly of Ingushetia—composed of emissaries from nearly two dozen clans—called for
Ingushetia’s secession from Russia if Zyazikov was not removed from office. Opposition activist
Magomed Khazbiyev likewise stated that “We must ask Europe or America to separate us from
Russia.”32 On 18 October, 2008, a Russian military convoy came under grenade attack and
machine gun fire near Nazran. Russia officially reported that two soldiers had been killed, but
other reports were that as many as 40-50 Russian soldiers were killed. On October 30, 2008

27 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Briefing: Ingushetia, the New Hot Spot in Russia’s North
Caucasus
, June 19, 2008.
28 Andrei Smirnov, “Kremlin Adopts New Counter-Insurgency Methods in Ingushetia,” Chechnya Weekly, September
27, 2007. U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2007, March 11, 2008. According
to testimony by Magomed Mutsolgov, the Director of the Ingush Mashr Human Rights Organization, kidnappings in
Ingushetia have decreased over the past year or so from previously high levels, but murders by the police have
increased. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Briefing: Ingushetia, the New Hot Spot in Russia’s
North Caucasus
, June 19, 2008.
29 CEDR, December 20, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950098.
30 CEDR, June 17, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-379001. See also CEDR, November 26, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-25007.
31 Open Source Center. Open Source Feature, September 18, 2008, Doc. No. FEA-775593.
32 Adrian Blomfield, “Russia Faces New Caucasus Uprising In Ingushetia,” The Telegraph (London), September 1,
2008.
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President Zyazikov was removed from office and Army Col. Yunus-Bek Yevkurov was nominated
by President Medvedev and quickly approved by the Ingush legislature. Yevkurov declared that
he would suppress the local insurgency while reducing abuses against civilians by federal forces.
Analyst Mairbek Vatchagaev has reported that in 2009, “bombings and armed attacks are
everyday occurrences in Ingushetia, with several such incidents sometimes taking place during a
single day.”33 In May 2009, federal security forces—assisted by Chechen units—launched large-
scale zachistki aimed at eliminating terrorists. Yevkurov was severely wounded by a car bomb in
June 2009. In August 2009, a bomb devastated Nazran’s police department, resulting in dozens
killed or wounded. In October 2009, human rights advocate Maksharip Aushev was killed, who
had supported Yevkurov’s efforts to get security forces to commit fewer human rights abuses.
President Yevkurov denounced the killing and suggested that security forces might have been
involved in the killing.
Some observers have warned that since Russia has strengthened ethnic Ossetian influence by
recognizing the “independence” of South Ossetia, this ethnic group will be even less amenable to
Russia’s efforts to bring conciliation between Ossetians and Ingush, including by encouraging
North Ossetia to permit some Ingush to resettle in Prigorodny.
Dagestan
The majority of the citizenry in Dagestan, a multi-ethnic republic, reportedly support membership
in the Russian Federation rather than separatism. In August 1999, however, some Islamic
fundamentalists—with the support of Chechen rebels—declared the creation of an Islamic
republic in western Dagestan. Russian and Dagestani security forces quickly defeated this
insurgency. There has been some growth in Islamic extremism in recent years, and terrorist
attacks have occurred in northern and central areas bordering Chechnya. In late 2007, thousands
of security personnel were deployed for a zachistka against the village of Gimry in central
Dagetan, which continued for several months and resulted in the arrest of dozens of villagers on
charges of terrorism. During 2008, attacks on government offices have spread to southern
Dagestan. Some of these attacks allegedly were triggered by a local government crackdown on
practicing Muslims.34 The International Crisis Group NGO has claimed that the extremist Islamist
group Sharia Jamaat is responsible for a large share of the rising violence that has resulted in the
killing of hundreds of local officials in Dagestan. The recruitment efforts of Sharia Jamaat benefit
from the allegedly arbitrary and corrupt actions of local police and security forces. In 2007,
Sharia Jamaat endorsed Umarov’s goal of establishing a North Caucasian Emirate.35
In mid-March 2009, Dagestani Interior Minister Lieutenant-General Adilgerey Magomedtagirov
estimated that there remained only about 50-70 militants in Dagestan, because of intensified
counter-terrorist efforts during 2008. He pointed out that “we recently killed Omar Sheykhullayev
[on February 5, 2009], the emir of Dagestan who was appointed by Doku Umarov. Before him
there was [Ilgar Mollachiyev, who was killed on September 7, 2008], also an emir and the closest

33 Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Moscow Struggles to Stabilize Ingushetia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 26, 2009.
34 “North Caucasus: Instability In Dagestan Spreads To South,” RFE/RL Russia Report, February 15, 2008.
35 Russia’s Dagestan: Conflict Causes, International Crisis Group, June 3, 2008.
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associate of Doku Umarov and Khattab. He was killed along with ten other people. I think all we
need right now is a bit more time, and we will deal with these groups as well.”36
Appearing to belie Magomedtagirov ‘s assessment of the situation, counter-terrorism operations
legal regimes were declared at least four times in February 2009. In March 2009, one was
declared in mountain areas of Dagestan, where several insurgent groups—allegedly including
some foreign mujahedin—engaged in fierce fighting with security forces. In December 2009, the
Dagestani Interior Ministry reported that attacks on police had increased from 100 in 2008 to 193
in 2009, and that 76 police had been killed and 155 wounded in 2009. It also reported that 15
civilians had been killed and 30 wounded in 2009.37
Other Areas of the North Caucasus
The influence of Islamic fundamentalism that embraces jihad reportedly has spread throughout
the North Caucasus, leading to the formation of terrorist groups in Chechnya, Dagestan,
Ingushetia, Kabarda-Balkaria, and Karachay-Cherkessia.38 According to testimony by Shvedov,
700 to 900 rebels are active in various areas of the North Caucasus, even though there are parts of
Northern Caucasus where there are almost no rebels. He warns that “the most important point [is
not] the number of active rebels nowadays. It’s an issue of the number of supporters among the
civilian population.” Shvedov states that the civilian population has become widely radicalized
and is able to quickly mobilize to join the rebels in attacks.39
According to U.S. analyst Gordon Hahn, the Caucasus Emirate proclaimed by Chechen Doku
Umarev in 2007 forms the hub of Islamic terrorism in Russia. The Caucasus Emirate provides
ideological, financial and weapons support and loose guidance and some coordination for the
activities of perhaps up to three dozen republic/regional and local combat jamaats (assemblies or
groups of believers) in the North Caucasus and Volga areas, Moscow, and elsewhere. The
Caucasus Emirate may provide close coordination for major terrorist operations. In April 2009,
Umarov announced that the former ‘Riyadus Salikhin’ Martys’ Battalion (which had taken
responsibility for attacking the grade school in Beslan in September 2004 and which appeared
defunct after its leader, Shamil Basiyev, was killed in 2006) had been revived and was carrying
out suicide bombings across Russia.40
In October 2005, Chechen guerrillas were joined by dozens of members of the Yarmuk Islamic
extremist group and others in attacks on government offices in Kabarda-Balkaria’s capital of
Nalchik and other areas. The president of Kabarda-Balkaria, Arsen Kanokov, criticized local law
enforcement officials for “not taking timely preventive measures with regard to representatives of
religious organizations on the one hand, and [for treating] ordinary believers in an unjustifiably

36 CEDR, March 20, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-4001.
37 CEDR, December 10, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950292.
38 Mairbek Vatchagaev, “The Truth about the ‘Kataib al-Khoul’ Ossetian Jamaat,” Chechnya Weekly, September 20,
2007.
39 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Briefing: Ingushetia, the New Hot Spot in Russia’s North
Caucasus
, June 19, 2008.
40 Russia’s Islamic Threat, pp. 59-66; Gordon Hahn, “The Caucasus Emirate’s Return to Suicide Bombing and Mass
Terrorism,” Islam, Islamism, And Politics In Eurasia Report, November 30, 2009, reported on Johnson’s Russia List,
November 30, 2009.
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harsh manner on the other.”41 By mid-2008, however, he voiced concern that “Wahhabism” (a
label attached by many officials to Islamic extremism and disfavored Islamic religious practices)
was increasing among the youth and might contribute to a rise in terrorism.42 In February 2009, a
firefight resulted in the deaths of seven alleged terrorists, and in March 2009, security forces
killed four alleged terrorists. In March 2009, Prosecutor Oleg Zharikov claimed that a well-
organized Islamic extremist group that was responsible for the 2005 Nalchik attack continued to
operate in Kabarda-Balkaria. In late November 2009, the al-Garb jamaat in Adyghea issued a call
for Muslims in the republic and elsewhere to join the jihad to establish the Caucasian Emirate.43
Gregory Shvedov has claimed that Islamic extremists in North Ossetia have been targeting
gambling clubs (which were banned but are still operating surreptitiously), while in Karachay-
Cherkessia they mostly have been targeting government-appointed religious leaders.44
Contributions to Instability
Former President Putin has claimed that terrorism in the North Caucasus has been caused mainly
by foreign forces, but President Medvedev recently has appeared to stress domestic factors.
Former President Putin claimed in a speech to the State Council in February 2008 that foreign
elements had been responsible for the guerrilla attack on Dagestan in late 1999 that started the
second Chechnya conflict. According to Putin, the conflict “was a case of the undisguised
incitement of separatists by outside forces wishing to weaken Russia, and perhaps even to cause
its collapse.”45 While he remained vague, a “documentary” aired on a Russian state-owned
television channel in April 2008 alleged that France, Germany, Turkey, and the United States
instigated and supported Chechen separatism.46 Putin also has in recent years blamed
“international criminal networks of arms and drug traffickers,” for supporting Chechen terrorists,
and has been careful to assert that “terrorism must not be identified with any religion or cultural
tradition,” in order to sidestep criticism from the Islamic world for his actions in the North
Caucasus.47
In June 2009, President Medvedev argued that “no doubt, the situation [in the North Caucasus] is
partially influenced by ... extremism brought from abroad,” but he appeared to shift the
responsibility for the conflict by stressing that the “problems in the North Caucasus ... are
systemic. By saying that I am referring to the low living standards, high unemployment and
massive, horrifyingly widespread corruption....” 48 In his address to the nation in November 2009,

41 “Kabarda-Balkaria: Leader Blames Law Enforcement Agencies for Harsh Treatment of Devout Muslims,” Caucasus
Reporting Service
, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, April 13, 2006.
42 CEDR, June 18, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950445.
43 North Caucasus Weekly, March 20, 2009; CEDR, March 24, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950169; November 30, 2009, Doc.
No. CEP-950153.
44 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Briefing: Ingushetia, the New Hot Spot in Russia’s North
Caucasus
, June 19, 2008.
45 CEDR, February 8, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950541.
46 “Documentary Alleges West Sought Chechen Secession,” RFE/RL Russia Report, April 23, 2008.
47 Jacques Lévesque, “Russia and the Muslim World: The Chechnya Factor and Beyond,” Russian Analytical Digest,
July 2, 2008.
48 President of the Russian Federation. Russian president addresses Security Council meeting on Caucasus, June 10,
2009, at http://www.kremlin.ru. Perhaps reflecting a desire to provide a different explanation to a Western audience, at
a joint news conference with visiting German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Sochi, President Medvedev claimed that
(continued...)
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President Medvedev similarly reiterated that Russia would defeat international terrorists operating
in the North Caucasus, but also emphasized that “it is obvious that the source of many problems
lies first and foremost in economic backwardness and the fact that the majority of people there
lack normal life prospects. Let us speak frankly: the level of corruption, violence and cronyism in
the North Caucasus republics is unprecedented. Therefore, we will give priority attention to
resolving the socio-economic problems of our citizens there.”49
Evidence of economic distress as a factor in the rise of terrorism in Kabardino-Balkaria Republic
includes the closure of the main industry, the Tyrnyauz Mining Complex, as well as the shuttering
of many defense-related factories, and the decline of the agricultural sector. Infrastructure such as
roads and airports also is in disrepair, and social services are inadequate.50 Dagestan and
Ingushetia have the most unemployment and poverty in Russia, and major income inequality has
fueled attacks against corrupt and wealthy officials.51 Ingushetia’s economy suffered greatly
during the Chechnya conflict, mainly from the influx of displaced persons which in effect
doubled the population during intense periods of fighting in 1995 and 2000. According to
Shvedov, the educational system in much of the North Caucasus is getting worse and
unemployment is increasing. Shvedov warns that the lack of career prospects has contributed to
growing support for “Wahhabi agendas” among the population.
Ethnic tensions are another factor contributing to violence in the North Caucasus. Besides those
between Ossetians and the Ingush (mentioned above), in early 2006, the Putin administration
abolished the Dagestani State Council, which represented the 14 largest ethnic groups, and whose
chairman (an ethnic Dargin) served as the chief executive of the republic. The State Council had
helped to mollify ethnic tensions. Putin then appointed an ethnic Avar as the president of the
republic. Ahead of the expiration of the president’s term in early 2010, some Dagestanis are
calling for re-establishing the State Council. Nonetheless, ethnic tensions have not yet led to
large-scale ethnic conflict in Dagestan.
Increasing Circassian nationalism has contributed to tensions and violence in Adyghea, Karachay-
Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, three republics with large numbers of ethnic Circassians
(termed Adyghe, Kabardin, and Cherkes in the three republics), where they have clashed with
Karachay and Balkar ethnic groups. In November 2008, a Congress of the Circassian People
called for unifying Circassians in a new federal republic, even though Russian officials had
warned it against issuing such a call. On November 26, 2009, reportedly about 3,000 Circassians
demonstrated for ethnic rights in Karachay-Cherkessia. Some Circassians from Kabardino-
Balkaria took part in this demonstration. Two days later, officials in Kabardino-Balkaria
denounced leaders of the demonstration as terrorists. On November 30, some Circassian rights
advocates issued an appeal to create an independent Circassian state. The next day, the legislature
of Kabardino-Balkaria called for Circassian rights advocates to be arrested as terrorists and spies,
and unidentified attackers beat some of the Circassian rights advocates.

(...continued)
the murders of human rights workers and officials were carried out by enemies of Russia financed and supported from
abroad. See Voice of America. Press Releases and Documents. Medvedev: Caucasus Murders Aim at Destabilizing S.
Russia
, August 14, 2009.
49 The Kremlin, Moscow. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, November 12,
2009.
50 “Kabardo-Balkaria Seeks To Break Out Of Economic Stagnation,” RFE/RL Russia Report, February 01, 2008.
51 Russia’s Dagestan: Conflict Causes, p. 12; CEDR, November 4, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-548006.
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Russian analyst Aleksey Malashenko suggests that the North Caucasus region is undergoing “re-
traditionalization,” which will result in the consolidation of Sufi52 and other traditional forms of
Islam as part of the political and social fabric of the region. While Moscow and its local agents
focus on combating visible elements of “Wahabbism,”53 the region is becoming broadly Islamic
and less integrated politically and socially with the rest of Russia, Malashenko warns. He also
suggests that to the extent that sitting officials and favored Islamic leaders try to retain their
unrepresentative control in the North Caucasus and ignore economic problems, Islamic extremist
violence will continue.54 Analyst Mark Kramer likewise suggests that disaffection among youth in
the North Caucasus is so deep and widespread that they are prone to distrust such favored Islamic
leaders and institutions and to be receptive to underground Islamic extremism.55
Reportedly, authorities have enlisted the assistance of Sufi Imams in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and
Chechnya to identify “Wahabbi” Muslims, who are then arrested, killed, or disappear. Young
Muslims may be targeted as “Wahabbis” if they end their prayers at the mosque too soon (Sufis
pray longer), attend the mosque frequently, or attend early services at the mosque. In Kabarda-
Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Adygea, where there are few Sufis and Islam does not have
such deep roots as elsewhere in the North Caucasus, Muslims allegedly may be targeted as
“Wahabbis” merely for attending the mosque or praying in public.56 There are some reports that
foreign Sunni Salafi terrorists operating in the North Caucasus in turn are targeting Sufis.
Analysts Emil Souleimanov and Ondrej Ditrych have urged students of events in the North
Caucasus not to fail to consider the role of clans, members of which may become radicalized by
zachistki and repression by Moscow-installed authorities. According to these analysts, “in the
North Caucasus, there has occurred over time a mutual intertwining of ... jihadist ideology and
the mechanism of blood feud.... It is the young people in particular who ... are the ones who are
physically able [to take revenge. They were] not raised in the established traditions in these
regions of traditionalist Sufi Islam and is thus more susceptible to absorbing the extremist
ideologies of jihad.” These analysts caution that “rather than vague ideas of global jihad, the
resistance in the North Caucasus is far more driven by the ideas of North Caucasian, mountain

52 According to the Encyclopedia Britannica Online, July 8, 2008, Sufism is a “mystical Islamic belief and practice in
which Muslims seek to find the truth of divine love and knowledge through direct personal experience of God. It
consists of a variety of mystical paths that are designed to ascertain the nature of man and God and to facilitate the
experience of the presence of divine love and wisdom in the world.” Central concepts of Sufism were developed in the
8th-12th centuries C.E. Three denominations (or Tariqahs) of Sufism—the Naqshbandiya, Qadiriya, and Shazaliya—are
prominent in the North Caucasus.
53 Wahabbism is a term used by some observers to identify a form of Sunni Islam dominant in Saudi Arabia and Qatar
that calls for a return to fundamental or pure principles of Islam. The term is often used interchangeably with Salafism.
As used in a derogatory sense by some in Russia, it can refer to any non-approved practice of Islamic faith. Quintan
Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 2006.
54 Aleksey Malashenko, “Islam and the State in Russia,” Russian Analytical Digest, July 2, 2008. See also Vakhit
Akayev, “Conflicts Between Traditional and Non-Traditional Islamic Trends: Reasons, Dynamics, and Ways to
Overcome Them (Based on North Caucasian Documents), Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2, 2008. Unlike
Malashenko, Akayev does not view the counter-Wahabbism alliance of Russia’s central authorities with the
traditionalists as eventually unraveling.
55 Mark Kramer, “Prospects for Islamic Radicalism and Violent Extremism in the North Caucasus and Central Asia,”
PONARS Eurasia Memo, No. 28, August 2008.
56 Andrei Smirnov, “The Kremlin Intensifies Reprisals against Muslims in the North Caucasus,” Chechnya Weekly,
October 4, 2007.
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dweller Muslim solidarity and the necessity of a joint struggle in the name of a common religion
(Islam) and the liberation of holy ground from the yoke of the ‘infidels’.”57
Implications for Russia
Ethnic prejudice by Russians against North Caucasian migrants reportedly has increased and has
contributed to a rise in hate crimes. In the southern and eastern parts of the Stavropol region,
several riots targeting these migrants have been reported. In late June 2008, the Congress of
Peoples of the Caucasus sponsored a rally in Moscow to combat what they claimed were racist
views of Caucasians propagated in the Russian press.58 The Moscow Human Rights Bureau
estimated that about 300 xenophobic attacks occurred in Russia in 2008, leaving 122 people dead
and about 380 injured. Some hate crimes in Moscow and elsewhere against North Caucasians
have been linked to military and police veterans of the Chechnya conflict.59 Reacting to the hate
crimes, Caucasian youths in Moscow formed a group they termed “Black Hawks” to carry out
revenge attacks. Members of the Congress of the Peoples of the Caucasus have attempted to
intercede between the “hawks” and Slavic ultranationalist groups.
As Russia reduces its security forces in Chechnya, terrorist incidents might become (even) more
frequent, some observers warn. Other factors, such as the effects of the global economic
downturn, could facilitate (more) terrorism in other areas of the North Caucasus and beyond,
including in the Volga River area of Russia.60 Kadyrov’s harsh methods of combating terrorism
have contributed to vendettas. Kadyrov’s reportedly widespread human rights violations have
received the acquiescence, if not support, of central authorities, and his methods have been used
to certain degrees by other leaders in the North Caucasus. As a recent sign of such support,
Vladimir Vasilyev, head of the Duma Security Committee, stated during a late March 2009 visit
to Chechnya that the region “could be an example to other regions of how terrorism should be
countered. The experience and positive practice employed here in the fight against terrorism are
of great interest, particularly against the background of the unstable situation that remains tense in
some regions of the North Caucasus.”61
Some observers warn that Russia’s encouragement and support for individuals from the North
Caucasus to travel to Abkhazia and South Ossetia to fight against Georgia in 2008 may have
future unfavorable repercussions in Russia. These individuals might have gained sentiments that
Caucasian guerrillas can defeat government forces. Personnel from Chechnya’s Vostok (East)
Battalion served in South Ossetia, and “the Adyge and Cherkes formed groups of fighters and,
alongside Chechens, participated in removing the Abkhaz government-in-exile from the Kodori
gorge. They also temporarily patrolled Georgian villages in the Gali region of Abkhazia.” Among
other repercussions, surreptitious arms transfers from Georgia through South and North Ossetia to
other North Caucasian areas could increase. 62 On the other hand, a perhaps favorable

57 Emil Souleimanov and Ondrej Ditrych, “The Internationalization of the Russian–Chechen Conflict: Myths and
Reality,” Europe-Asia Studies, September 2008, pp. 1199 – 1222.
58 BBC Monitoring, June 23, 2008.
59 Interfax, March 10, 2009; CEDR, March 11, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-25004.
60 Neil J. Melvin, Building Stability in the North Caucasus: Ways Forward for Russia and the European Union,
SIPRI Policy Paper No. 16, May 2007.
61 CEDR, March 26, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-21002.
62 C W Blandy, Provocation, Deception, Entrapment: The Russo-Georgian Five Day War, Defense Academy of the
(continued...)
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repercussion—from Russia’s viewpoint—might be the easing of population pressures in North
Ossetia if some residents move to South Ossetia, where there is more arable land.63
International Response
The United States and several other countries and international organizations have maintained
that while Russia has the right to protect its citizenry from terrorist attacks, it should not use
“disproportionate” methods that violate the human rights of innocent bystanders. They have
objected to Russia’s 2006 counter-terrorism law, which permits police and other security forces to
declare a “counter-terrorism operations regime” in a locality and to detain suspects for up to 30
days, search homes, ban public assemblies, and restrict media activities without any pre-approval
by the courts or legislative oversight. As a result of this and other permissive laws and
government actions, HRW has argued that Russia’s security forces “believe they may act with
impunity when carrying out any operation related to counter-terrorism.”64 The U.N. Human
Rights Committee in October 2009 reflected these concerns when it urged Russia to “take
stringent measures to put an end to enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and
other forms of ill-treatment and abuse committed or instigated by law enforcement officials in
Chechnya and other parts of the North Caucasus; ensure the prompt and impartial investigations
by an independent body of all human rights violations allegedly committed or instigated by state
agents, [and] prosecute perpetrators,” among other measures.65
The European Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe (COE) has ruled in dozens of
cases brought by Chechens that the Russian government used indiscriminate force that resulted in
civilian casualties and failed to properly investigate and prosecute Russian personnel involved.
Hundreds of cases remain to be adjudicated. According to Russian human rights advocate and
jurist Karinna Moskalenko, the Russian government has paid damages awarded by the Court to
the plaintiffs, but has not taken the verdicts into account by reforming the justice system.66 In
many cases, the plaintiffs have been attacked and even killed by unknown assailants in Chechnya
and elsewhere before their cases are adjudicated.
In June 2008, the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE appointed Dick Marty a rapporteur on the
North Caucasus to prepare a special report on the human rights situation in the region. The
findings are to be incorporated into a report on Russia prepared by the Committee on the
Honoring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the COE (Monitoring
Committee). He has prepared two progress reports about the situation in the region. In the second
report in September 2009, he stated that the North Caucasus “seems to offer the worst example, at

(...continued)
United Kingdom, March 2009; Stacy Closson, “The North Caucasus after the Georgia-Russia Conflict,” Russian
Analytical Digest
, December 4, 2008.
63 Provocation, Deception, Entrapment.
64 HRW. ‘As If They Fell From the Sky’: Counterinsurgency, Rights Violations, and Rampant Impunity in Ingushetia,
June 2008, p. 5.
65 United Nations. Human Rights Committee. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of
the Covenant: Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee [Regarding] Russia
, CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6,
October 29, 2009.
66 Karinna Moskalenko, “Civil and Human Rights and the Judicial System in Today’s Russia: A Legal Practitioner’s
View,” Carnegie Endowment, September 28, 2007.
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least in Europe, of the pernicious effects of anti-terrorism measures implemented without regard
for the law. As could already be observed with regard to the so-called global war on terror,
injustice—torture, abductions and extrajudicial secret detentions—simply strengthens
terrorism.”67 After COE Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, visited
Chechnya and Ingushetia in September 2009, he recommended that the Russian government
adopt an approach “which combats terrorism effectively while ensuring full respect of human
rights standards; guarantees effective investigations into killings, abductions and past
disappearances, ending the pattern of impunity for the perpetrators of such crimes; fosters the rule
of law by strengthening the judiciary and the law enforcement system; [and] creates a propitious
environment for human rights activists,” among other measures.68
Implications for U.S. Interests
The former Bush Administration appeared to increasingly stress the threat of terrorism in
Chechnya and the North Caucasus, although there continued to be criticism of Russian
government human rights abuses in the region.69 Russian analyst Igor Obdayev has stated that
U.S. worldwide anti-terrorism efforts were instrumental in reducing terrorist financing in the
North Caucasus.70 In keeping with such an Administration stress, the State Department in April
2008 reported that “the majority of terrorist attacks [in Russia during 2007] continued to occur in
the North Caucasus, where the pacification of much of Chechnya has correlated with an increase
in terrorism in Dagestan and Ingushetia.... There was evidence of a foreign terrorist presence in
the North Caucasus with international financial and ideological ties.”71 Similarly, in June 2008 at
the 16th session of the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Counter-terrorism, the two sides mentioned
that they had cooperated on a case involving financial support for terrorist activity in
Chechnya.”72
In a “get acquainted” meeting on April 1, 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev pledged to
cooperate in countering terrorism, although the North Caucasus was not publicly singled out. In
the first few days of the Obama Administration, the State Department issued its annual human
rights report for 2008, which contained (as in 2007) lengthy descriptions of human rights abuses

67 PACE. Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. Legal Remedies For Human Rights Violations In The North
Caucasus: Supplementary Introductory Memorandum
, AS/Jur (2008) 21, April 11, 2008; Situation in the North
Caucasus Region: Security and Human Rights
, AS/Jur (2009) 43, September 29, 2009.
68 Council of Europe. Report by Thomas Hammarberg, November 24, 2009.
69 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. President Commemorates Veterans Day, Discusses War on Terror,
November 11, 2005. President Bush stated that some “militants are found in regional groups, often associated with al
Qaeda—paramilitary insurgencies and separatist movements in places like Somalia, the Philippines, Pakistan,
Chechnya, Kashmir and Algeria.” The last Bush Administration report on its efforts to advance human rights stated that
“senior U.S. officials expressed concern to government leaders about the conduct of Russian security services and the
government of the Chechen Republic, which was linked to abductions and disappearances of civilians. In meetings with
federal and local officials during a visit to the North Caucasus in December [2006], the ambassador conveyed US
concerns and expressed US willingness to assist in ways that promote respect for the rule of law.” U.S. Department of
State. Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2006, April 5, 2007.
70 Olga Shlyahtina, “Igor Obdayev on the Origins And Meaning Of North Caucasian Terrorism,” at
http://www.kavkazforum.ru.
71 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, April 2008. The Report stated that it was “often
difficult to characterize whether [violence in Ingushetia and Dagestan was] the result of terrorism, political violence, or
criminal activities” (p. 87).
72 U.S. Department of State. The United States-Russia Working Group on Counter-terrorism: Joint Press Statement and
Fact Sheet, June 20, 2008.
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in the North Caucasus. 73 In July 2009, the State Department called for bringing the killers of
Natalia Estemirova in Chechnya to justice, and in August 2009, it called for bringing the killers of
Zarema Sadulayeva and Alik Dzhabrailov in Chechnya to justice. The U.S. Mission to the OSCE
also has raised concerns about these killings, as well as about the killing of Dagestani journalist
Abdulmalik Akhmedilov in August 2009 and Ingush opposition politician and government human
rights council member Maksharip Aushev in October 2009. During her October 2009 visit to
Moscow, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly did not stress U.S. concerns about human
rights problems in the North Caucasus, although she did mention “attacks against human rights
defenders” in Russia as a concern.74 During her visit, a civil society working group, set up as part
of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, held an initial meeting, but no details were
released.
Omnibus Appropriations for FY2009 (P.L. 111-8), signed into law on March 11, 2009, called for
$9.0 million for the North Caucasus for humanitarian, conflict mitigation, human rights, civil
society, and relief and recovery assistance. The Administration’s budget request for FY2010
called for $6.0 million for conflict mitigation and reconciliation activities in the North Caucasus,
“to help stem the spread of violence and instability.” The request also called for unspecified
amounts of assistance for the North Caucasus to promote economic opportunities, youth
employment, health, sanitation, and community development, and to discourage “the spread of
extremist ideologies.”75 The conference agreement on Consolidated Appropriations for FY2010
(H.R. 3288), signed into law on December 16, 2009, called for not less than $7.0 million for the
North Caucasus, slightly less than that provided in FY2009 but still above the Administration’s
budget request. The conference agreement also repeats language used for several years that
directs that 60% of the assistance allocated to Russia will be withheld (excluding medical, human
trafficking, and Comprehensive Threat Reduction aid) until the President certifies that Russia is
facilitating full access to Chechnya for international non-governmental organizations providing
humanitarian relief to displaced persons. See Table 1 for a breakdown of spending by program
for the North Caucasus for FY2007-FY2008.
In Congressional testimony on February 25, 2009, Russian human rights advocate Andrey
Illarionov urged that Obama Administration efforts to “reset” relations with Russia should not
mean soft-pedaling Moscow’s democratization and human rights abuses.76 According to the
Obama Administration, some human rights issues were discussed during President Obama’s April
1, 2009, meeting with President Medvedev.
According to some international NGOs and the State Department, all foreign NGOs face
constraints by the authorities on their access and operations in Chechnya. While almost all NGOs
operating in Chechnya have offices there with local staff, most continue to retain their main or at
least branch offices outside the region. However, if the security situation continues to improve in
Chechnya and deteriorate in Ingushetia and elsewhere in the North Caucasus, NGOs may
consider moving more operations to Chechnya. Access to Chechnya by international staff is

73 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008, February 25, 2009.
74 U.S. Department of State. Secretary Clinton’s Remarks at Town Hall Meeting at Moscow State University, October
14, 2009.
75 U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2010, May 12, 2009.
76 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearing on from Competition To Collaboration:
Strengthening The U.S.-Russia Relationship. Statement of Andrei Illarionov, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, February
25, 2009.
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Stability in Russia’s Chechnya and Other Regions of the North Caucasus

strictly controlled by the regional branch of the Federal Security Service (FSB), according to
reports, and NGOs must provide detailed monthly information on activities and travel to the FSB
and other authorities. At times, the local authorities have limited or refused access, although
reportedly the FSB has been more cooperative in recent months. Local authorities in Chechnya,
Ingushetia, and Dagestan closely oversee the finances and programs of foreign NGOs. In
addition, the Russian Migration Service and other federal offices require financial and program
information. Chechen officials repeatedly have turned down requests by UNHCR to open an
office in Grozny to monitor whether returnees are ensured international standards of safety and
dignity.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Russia’s North Caucasus Region, FY2007 and FY2008
(U.S. dollars)
Program Area
Activity
Implementer
FY2007
FY2008
Conflict Mitigation &
Socio-Economic Recovery
IRC
Reconciliation
929,211 2,200,000

Poverty Reduction
World Vision
565,000
200,000
Improved
Community
Infrastructure
CFNO
100,000
500,000

Youth Exchange & Development
IREX
1,050,000 1,300,000

TBD & Prog. Support

—-
748,000
Rule of Law & Human
Judicial Reform
Chemonics
Rights
30,000
Human
Rights Faith,
Hope,
Love
100,000
Human
Rights Perspektiva
15,000


Tolerance Regional Councils
Bay Area
Council
75,000
Good Governance
Local Governance
IUE
250,000
400,000

Public Finance & Budgeting
CFP
235,000
230,000
Policy
Advocacy
CIPE
—-
30,000
Political Competition
Election Monitoring
Golos
20,000
—-
Civic Participation
Sustainable Community Development
FSD
400,000
400,000

Community Connections
World Learning
50,000
400,000

Civil Society Development In Southern
SRRC
Russia
350,000 400,000
Civic
Education JAR
15,000


Key Stone Program in the Region
Key Stone
340,000


Civil Society Support Program
IREX
70,000

Program
Support

122,000
Health TB
Control
IFRC
300,000
300,000
Social Services
Psycho-Social Support for Childern in the
UNICEF
NC
200,000
Program
Support

15,000
Congressional Research Service
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Stability in Russia’s Chechnya and Other Regions of the North Caucasus

Program Area
Activity
Implementer
FY2007
FY2008
Economic Opportunity
Microfinance Support
RMC
332,000
500,000

Rural Credit Coops and Agric. Business
ACDI/VOCA
Development
1,167,000 1,100,000

Economic Opportunity/Program Support

60,000

Total

6,653,211
8,845,000
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Assistance to Europe and Eurasia.
Note:
ACDI/VOCA—Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative
Assistance
CFNO—Children’s Fund of North Ossetia
CFP—Center for Fiscal Policy
CIPE—Center for International Private Enterprise
FSD—Foundation for Sustainable Development
IFRC—International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
IRC—International Red Cross
IREX—International Research and Exchanges Board
IUE—Institute for Urban Economics
JAR—Junior Achievement Russia
RMC—Russian Microfinance Center
SRRC—Southern Regional Resource Center

Author Contact Information

Jim Nichol

Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289


Congressional Research Service
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