Defense: FY2010 Authorization and
Appropriations
Pat Towell, Coordinator
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
December 14, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40567
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
Summary
For the Department of Defense (DOD) in FY2010, the Administration requested a total of $663.8
billion in discretionary budget authority. This includes $533.8 billion for the so-called “base
budget”—all DOD activities other than combat operations—and $130.0 billion for “overseas
contingency operations,” including operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Administration also
requested $75.9 billion in supplemental DOD appropriations for FY2009 to cover war costs. The
Administration’s DOD request, made public May 7, 2009, incorporated Defense Secretary Robert
Gates’ April 6 recommendations to curtail funding for several major weapons programs focused
on conventional warfare.
The FY2010 national defense authorization bills drafted by the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees generally supported this shift in policy, which the Obama Administration’s budget
request reflected. However, both committees added to their respective bills authorization to
continue production of the Air Force’s F-22 fighter, and to continue development of an alternative
engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The Obama Administration warned that a bill that
continued either program would be vetoed. On June 25, the House passed by a vote of 389-22 its
version of the FY2010 national defense authorization act, H.R. 2647, which would authorize a
total of $534.0 billion for the DOD base budget—$264.8 million more than requested—and
$129.3 billion for war costs. The bill also would authorize $16.5 billion for defense-related
nuclear activities of the Energy Department, which was $83.3 million more than requested. On
July 2, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the authorization bill, S.
1390, which would authorize $534.6 billion for the DOD base budget, $129.3 billion for war
costs, and $16.4 billion for the Energy Department. The Senate passed the bill July 23 by a vote
of 87-7 after adopting several amendments, including two that would, in effect, end production of
the F-22 and terminate the F-35 alternate engine programs, as the Administration had requested.
The conference report on the authorization bill authorizes a total of $680.2 billion for military
activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) and defense-related activities of other federal
agencies, which is $14.9 million more than the Obama Administration requested. The conference
report, which terminates the F-22 but continues the alternate engine program, was adopted by the
House on October 8 by a vote of 281-146. The Senate adopted the conference report October 22
by a vote of 68-29 and President Obama signed the bill (P.L. 111-84) on October 28.
The House passed its version of the FY2010 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3326) on July 30,
by a vote of 400-30. The bill would appropriate $497.6 billion for the DOD base budget (covering
all accounts except military construction) and $128.2 billion for FY2010 war costs. As reported
July 24 by the House Appropriations Committee, the bill would have continued F-22 production
and the F-35 alternate engine programs. But the House adopted a floor amendment that would
have the effect of terminating F-22 production.
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported September 10 an amended version of H.R. 3326
which would appropriate $497.6 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for war
costs. The committee bill funded neither continued F-22 production nor the F-35 alternate engine.
During floor debate, the Senate rejected two amendments that would have eliminated $2.5 billion
for the purchase of 10 C-17 cargo planes, which the Senate committee added over the
Administration’s objection. The Senate passed the bill October 6 by a vote of 93-7.
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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
Contents
Most Recent Developments......................................................................................................... 1
Defense Authorization Conference ........................................................................................ 2
Conference Issues in Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326) .............................................. 3
Overview of the Administration’s FY2010 Request ..................................................................... 3
Status of Legislation.................................................................................................................... 5
War Costs and Issues................................................................................................................... 6
Debate About Potential Troop Increases in Afghanistan......................................................... 7
Basis and Status of War Cost Request in Pending Legislation ................................................ 9
Authorization Action on War Funding Request .................................................................... 13
Changes to DOD’s Request ........................................................................................... 13
Extensions and Additional Reporting Requirements ...................................................... 14
House-Passed and Senate-Passed Appropriations Action ..................................................... 16
Assessing Uncertainties In Operations Funding ............................................................. 16
Funding for Force Protection Vehicles ........................................................................... 16
Transfers from Funding in the Base Budget ................................................................... 17
Coalition Support and Commanders Emergency Response Program Funding ................ 17
Funding for Training Afghan Security Forces and for Guantanamo Bay......................... 18
Base Budget: Comparison and Context...................................................................................... 18
Defense Priorities: Budget and Strategy..................................................................................... 22
Background: Strategic Direction.......................................................................................... 23
Strategic Processes.............................................................................................................. 24
Issues for Congress: Secretary Gates’s Proposals....................................................................... 25
Quality of Life Issues .......................................................................................................... 25
End-Strength Increase ................................................................................................... 26
Health Care and Family Support ................................................................................... 26
Preparing for “The Wars We’re In”...................................................................................... 28
Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) .................................................... 28
Developing Partner Capacity (Section 1206) ................................................................. 29
Army Brigade Combat Teams ....................................................................................... 30
Special Operations Forces ............................................................................................. 31
Helicopter Crew Training.............................................................................................. 31
Shipbuilding—Request ....................................................................................................... 31
Aircraft Carriers............................................................................................................ 32
DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyers.............................................................................. 33
CG(X) Cruiser .............................................................................................................. 33
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) .......................................................................................... 34
LPD-17, Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), and Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)........... 34
Aircraft—Request ............................................................................................................... 35
Tactical Combat Aircraft (F-35, F-22, F/A-18) .............................................................. 35
F-22 Raptor................................................................................................................... 36
Air Mobility (KC-X, C-17) ........................................................................................... 37
Acquisition Reform (VH-71, CSAR-X)......................................................................... 38
Missile Defense—Request .................................................................................................. 39
Theater Defenses (THAAD, SM-3, Aegis) .................................................................... 39
Ground-Based National Missile Defense ....................................................................... 40
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Boost-Phase Defenses (Airborne Laser and KEI)........................................................... 40
Congressional Perspectives ........................................................................................... 41
Ground Combat Systems (FCS and EFV)—Request............................................................ 41
Congressional Perspectives ........................................................................................... 42
Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to Date .............................................................. 43
FY2010 Congressional Budget Resolution .......................................................................... 43
National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647, S. 1390) ................................................... 43
Ballistic Missile Defense—Authorization...................................................................... 44
Shipbuilding—Authorization ........................................................................................ 46
Combat Aircraft—Authorization ................................................................................... 48
Ground Combat Systems—Authorization...................................................................... 51
Military Personnel Policy: End-Strength, Pay Raise ...................................................... 52
DOD Civilian Employees: NSPS, A-76 ......................................................................... 52
Concurrent Receipt ....................................................................................................... 53
Military Commissions, Detainees and Guantanamo Bay................................................ 53
Hate Crimes (Title XLVII) ............................................................................................ 55
Economic Development Conveyance of Surplus Real Property (BRAC)........................ 56
Guam Realignment ....................................................................................................... 56
Other Senate Provisions ................................................................................................ 57
FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bill................................................................................... 59
Ballistic Missile Defense—Appropriation ..................................................................... 61
Shipbuilding—Appropriation ........................................................................................ 62
Aircraft—Appropriation................................................................................................ 64
Ground Combat Systems—Appropriation ..................................................................... 67
Other Provisions ........................................................................................................... 68
Tables
Table 1. DOD Base Budget Request Discretionary Budget Authority, FY2009-2010.................... 4
Table 2. Status of FY2010 Defense Authorization Bills, H.R. 2647/S. 1390 ................................. 6
Table 3. Status of FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bills (H.R. 3326) .......................................... 6
Table 4. Congressional Action on DOD’s War FY2010 Budget Request..................................... 12
Table 5. Actual and Projected DOD Base Budgets Compared with 4% of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) ....................................................................................................................... 19
Table 6. DOD Discretionary Budget Authority, FY1998-FY2009 .............................................. 19
Table 7. FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, House and Senate Action by Title,
H.R. 2647, S. 1390................................................................................................................. 58
Table 8. FY2010 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326) Summary by Title ............................ 70
Table A-1. Congressional Action on FY2010 Missile Defense Funding: Authorization............... 71
Table A-2. Congressional Action on FY2010 Missile Defense Funding: Appropriations............. 75
Table A-3. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Army and Marine Corps Programs:
Authorization......................................................................................................................... 78
Table A-4. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Army and Marine Corps Programs:
Appropriations ....................................................................................................................... 82
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Table A-5. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Shipbuilding Programs:
Authorization......................................................................................................................... 87
Table A-6. Congressional Action on FY2010 Shipbuilding Programs: Appropriations................ 89
Table A-7. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force
Aircraft Programs: Authorization ........................................................................................... 93
Table A-8. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force
Aircraft Programs: Appropriations........................................................................................ 103
Table A-9. Congressional Action on FY2010 DOD War Funding Request (Defense
Appropriations and Military Construction Appropriations Bills) ........................................... 109
Appendixes
Appendix. Program Funding Tables........................................................................................... 71
Contacts
Author Contact Information .................................................................................................... 115
Key Policy Staff...................................................................................................................... 115
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Most Recent Developments
The conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 defense
authorization bill (H.R. 2647), as well as both the House-passed and Senate-passed versions of
the FY2010 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3326), largely support proposals by the Obama
Administration to terminate some major weapons programs designed for traditional combat—
such as the Air Force’s F-22 fighter—so DOD could focus more resources on equipment better
suited to the type of operations underway in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the outcome of some
Administration initiatives remains unsettled.
The House approved the authorization conference report on October 8 by a vote of 281-146. The
Senate approved the conference report October 22 by a vote of 68-29 and the President signed the
bill into law (P.L. 111-84) on October 28.
On July 30, the House passed by a vote of 400-30 its version of the FY2010 defense
appropriations bill (H.R. 3326) which would appropriate $497.6 billion for the DOD base budget
(covering all accounts except military construction) and $128.2 billion for FY2010 war costs. The
Senate passed an amended version of the bill October 6, by a vote of 93-7.
The final version of the defense authorization bill—and the House version of the appropriations
bill—would continue development of an alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The
Office of Management and Budget has warned in its official Statement of Administration Policy
(SAP) on each of the defense bills that the President might veto any bill that continues the
alternate engine program. Defense Secretary Robert Gates echoed that warning in an October 13
letter to the chairman and ranking minority member of the House Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee.
The Administration’s veto threats concerning the alternate engine program have been more
ambiguous than the flat, unqualified declaration by President Obama earlier in the year that he
would veto any bill that funded continued production of the F-22. In the case of the alternate
engine program, both OMB and Secretary Gates said that the President’s senior advisors would
recommend a veto of any bill that would “seriously disrupt” the F-35 program which,
Administration officials contend, the alternate engine program might do. For details on the
alternate engine issue, see “Defense Authorization Conference,” below.
The Administration has taken a less adamant stance in its opposition to provisions of the House
and Senate versions of the appropriations bill that would continue production of the C-17, wide-
body cargo jet. Like OMB, Secretary Gates said that he “strongly objects” to the Senate bill’s
addition of $1.5 billion for 10 C-17s and to the House bill’s addition of $674 million for three of
the planes. Neither OMB’s SAP nor Secretary Gates’ letter contains any explicit warning that
President Obama might veto the defense bill over that issue.
On the other hand, both OMB and Secretary Gates warned that the President’s senior advisers
would recommend that he veto the DOD appropriations bill if it included funds to continue
procurement of VH-71 helicopters, which were intended to transport the President and other
senior officials. The Administration cancelled the project because of cost overruns, but the House
version of the appropriations bill added $400 million to complete work on five of the aircraft
which already are under construction. For details on the C-17 and VH-71 issues, see “Conference
Issues in Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326),” below.
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Defense Authorization Conference
The conference report on H.R. 2647 authorizes a total of $680.2 billion for military activities of
the Department of Defense (DOD) and defense-related activities of other federal agencies. The
total authorization, which is $14.9 million higher than the Obama Administration requested,
includes $550.2 billion for the so-called “base budget”—all DOD activities other than combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—and $130.0 billion for “overseas contingency operations,”
including operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees each had added to the versions of the
authorization bill they reported to their respective chambers authorization to continue production
of the F-22 and to continue development of an alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
In a July 13 letter to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, President Obama
said he would veto any defense bill that continued F-22 procurement.1 But regarding other
programs that one or both chambers of Congress acted to fund over the Administration’s
objections, the Administration stated its objections in terms that were less unequivocal.
For example, in the Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) regarding versions of the defense
authorization bill drafted by the House Armed Services Committee2 and by the Senate Armed
Services Committee3, OMB said the President’s senior advisors would recommend that he veto
any bill that would “seriously disrupt” the F-35 program.
The version of H.R. 2647 passed June 25 by the House authorized both procurement of additional
F-22s and development of the alternative F-35 engine. The Senate dropped both authorizations
before passing its version of the bill (S. 1390) on July 23. The conference report on the
authorization bill would terminate the F-22 but would allow the alternate engine program to
continue.
The defense authorization conference report also incorporated, with some modifications, Senate-
passed provisions that broaden federal jurisdiction over “hate crimes” to include crimes motivated
by the victim’s actual or perceived gender, sexual orientation or gender identity. Previously,
federal jurisdiction over hate crimes extended to crimes motivated by the victim’s real or
perceived race, color, national origin, or disability. For additional information, see “Hate Crimes
(Title XLVII),” below.
The conference report also included, with modifications, several provisions relating to the
treatment of detainees, including those currently held at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. Among
these were provisions relating to the operation of military commissions established to adjudicate
the cases of detainees. For additional information, see “Military Commissions, Detainees and
Guantanamo Bay,” below.
1 Letter from President Barack Obama to Senator Carl Levin, July 13, 2009, accessed at http://insidedefense.com/
secure/data_extra/pdf8/dplus2009_1826.pdf.
2 OMB Statement of Administration Policy regarding H.R. 2647, June 24, 2009, accessed at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/sap_111/saphr2647h_20090624.pdf.
3 OMB Statement of Administration Policy regarding S. 1390, July 15, 2009, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/assets/sap_111/saps1390s_20090715.pdf
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(For additional highlights of H.R. 2647, see “National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647, S.
1390), below.)
Conference Issues in Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326)
On October 6, 2009, by a vote of 93-7, the Senate passed H.R. 3326, the FY2010 defense
appropriations bill, which would appropriate $497.6 billion for DOD’s base budget. That amount
is $3.5 billion less than the Administration requested for programs covered by this bill. The bill
also would provide $128.2 billion for war costs, which is $373.6 million below the
Administration’s request.
The Senate Appropriations Committee had reported the bill on September 10 (S.Rept. 111-74).
The House had passed its version of H.R. 3326, on July 30, by a vote of 400-30. The House-
passed version of the bill provides $497.6 billion for all DOD base budget accounts except
military construction, which is funded in another bill. The House version of the defense bill also
provides $129.2 billion for war costs. The House bill’s $625.8 billion total is $3.8 billion less than
the President’s request.
Both the House-passed and Senate-passed versions of the defense appropriations bill concurred
with most of the Obama Administration’s proposals to terminate or reduce funding for several
high-profile weapons programs including production of the F-22 fighter and of the CSAR-X
search and rescue helicopter. However, the House version of the bill added to the
Administration’s request $560 million to continue development of the alternate engine for the F-
35 fighter and $674 million to purchase three C-17 cargo jets (which would sustain a production
line that was slated to shut down).
The Senate’s version of H.R. 3326 also included substantial additions to the DOD budget request,
including $2.5 billion to buy 10 C-17s, $1.7 billion for a second DDG-51-class destroyer (in
addition to the one requested), and $400 million to complete the manufacture of five VH-71
helicopters intended to transport the President and other senior officials. The Administration had
cancelled the VH-71 program because of cost overruns.
The Senate bill also would cut $900 million from the $7.46 billion requested to support the
training and equipping of Afghanistan’s army and police force. In its report on the bill, the Senate
Appropriations Committee said the funds it cut from the Afghan forces support account were not
slated to be spent until FY2011. The committee added $900 million to the $5.46 billion requested
for the purchase of Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles. (For additional
highlights of H.R. 3326, see FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bill, below.)
Overview of the Administration’s FY2010 Request
The President’s FY2010 request of $533.7 billion for the DOD base budget is $20.4 billion higher
than the total of $513.3 billion the Obama Administration cites as the total appropriated for the
DOD base budget in the regular FY2009 appropriations process.4 In an April 6 press conference,
4 Office of Management and Budget, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise, Feb. 26, 2009, Table
S-7, “Funding Levels for Appropriated (“Discretionary”) Programs by Agency,” p. 130. Based on data published by the
(continued...)
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said this nominal increase of 4% would amount to an increase
in real purchasing power of 2%, taking into account the cost of inflation.5 (See Table 1.)
Table 1. DOD Base Budget Request
Discretionary Budget Authority, FY2009-2010
(amounts in billions of dollars)
FY2009Enacted
FY2010 Requested
(Excluding War
(Excluding War
Percentage
Funds)
Funds)
Change
Military Personnel 124.9
136.0
+8.9%
Operations and Maintenance
179.1
185.7
+3.7%
Procurement 101.7
107.4
+5.6%
Research and Development
79.5
78.6
-1.1%
Military Construction
21.9
21.0
-4.1%
Family Housing
3.2
2.0
-38.0%
Other 3.2
3.1
-1.1%
Total 513.5
533.8
+4.0%
Source: Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Budget Briefing, p. 16,
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_BudgetBriefing.pdf
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, H.R. 1, P.L. 111-5), also known
as the “economic stimulus” package, provided an additional $7.5 billion in DOD appropriations
for FY2009, bringing the FY2009 discretionary appropriations for the Pentagon to a total of
$520.7 billion. Compared with this amount, the FY2010 request would amount to an increase of
$13.0 billion, a nominal increase of 2.5% (not adjusted for inflation).
Comparison of the FY2010 DOD base budget request with the corresponding appropriation for
FY2009 is complicated by the fact that the Administration is funding in the FY2010 base budget
several activities that were covered by war cost supplemental appropriations bills in FY2009 and
prior years. In an April 7 conference call with Internet defense reporters, Secretary Gates said the
total amount of funding shifted into the base budget was about $13 billion, which included
ongoing costs of expanding the Army and Marine Corps, increased funding for medical research
and quality-of-life improvements for military personnel.6 However, in testimony before the
Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on June 9, after the Administration’s detailed
(...continued)
House Appropriations Committee summarizing amounts appropriated for FY2009 (Congressional Record, September
24, 2008, Part I, pp.H291-94) the total discretionary appropriation for DOD in FY2009 was $512.7 billion. The Obama
Administration’s February 26 FY2010 budget document, which provided only gross funding totals for Cabinet
agencies, did not contain sufficient information to account for the fact that the Administration’s total for the FY2009
DOD base budget is higher by some $600 million.
5 Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, Budget Briefing , April 6, 2009 http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1341.
6Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Gen. James Cartwright with
Internet Security Writers, April 7, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4398.
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budget request had been released, Secretary Gates said the amount of funding shifted into the
base budget was $8 billion, rather than the $13 billion he had cited earlier.
Setting aside those funds allocated to costs that were not included in the FY2009 DOD base
budget (for the sake of an apples-to-apples comparison), President Obama’s FY2010 request for
the DOD base budget includes about $520.7 billion, which is roughly $7.4 billion more than was
appropriated for DOD in the regular appropriations process. If the $7.4 billion provided to DOD
in FY2009 by the economic stimulus package is added to the regular FY2009 appropriations, the
FY2009 appropriation and the FY2010 request are roughly the same.
Comparison of President Obama’s FY2010 DOD base budget request with the FY2010 budget
projected by the Bush Administration is uncertain because the budget outline made public on
February 26 listed only an aggregate total for the DOD base budget, without specifying whether
or not that sum included each of several elements of DOD funding that might or might not
reasonably be included and which could affect the total by several billions of dollars. In his April
7 conference call with reporters, Secretary Gates said that the comparable Bush Administration
projection of the FY2010 DOD base was $524 billion. By that standard, President Obama’s
FY2010 request is nearly $10 billion higher. However, since the Obama request includes about $8
billion for programs that the Bush Administration did not fund in the DOD base budget, the
Obama request is about $2 billion higher than the Bush projection, on an apples-to-apples basis.
In the fall of 2008, DOD reportedly drew up a projected FY2010 base budget request that was
$57 billion higher than the request the Bush Administration had projected in February 2008.7 That
larger request, details of which were not published, was not subjected to the regular budget
review process within the executive branch.
Status of Legislation
Although the Administration’s detailed budget request was not transmitted to Congress until May
7, 2009, Congress began acting on the annual defense authorization bill only about a month later
than it typically does.
The House Armed Services Committee reported its version of the bill (H.R. 2647) on June 18,
2009 and it was passed by the House on June 25. The Senate Armed Services Committee reported
its version of the bill (S. 1390) on July 2 and the Senate passed the bill July 23. The conference
report on H.R. 2647 was filed October 7 and the House adopted it on October 8 by a vote of 281-
146.
7 Tony Capaccio, “Pentagon Seeks $57 Billion More in 2010, says Jonas,” Bloomberg.com, October 2, 2008.
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Table 2. Status of FY2010 Defense Authorization Bills, H.R. 2647/S. 1390
Conference
Report
Committee Markup
Approval
House
House
Senate
Senate
Conf.
Public
House Senate
Report Passage Report Passage Report House Senate Law
6/17/09 6/25/09
H.Rept.
6/25/09
S.Rept.
7/23/09
H.Rept. 10/8/09 10/22/09 111-84
111-166
389-22
111-35
87-7
111-288 281-146
68-29
The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee reported its version of the FY2010 defense
appropriations bill on July 16. The House Appropriations Committee reported the bill H.R. 3326
on July 24 and House passed it on July 30.
The Senate Appropriations committee reported its amended version of the bill on September 10
and the Senate passed the bill September 6 by a vote of 93-7.
Table 3. Status of FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bills (H.R. 3326)
Subcommittee
Conference Report
Markup
Approval
House
House
Senate
Senate
Conf.
Public
House Senate Report
Passage
Report
Passage
Report
House Senate Law
7/16/09 9/9/09 H.Rept. 7/30/09
S.Rept.
10/6/09
111-230
400-30
111-74
93-7
War Costs and Issues8
The Obama Administration’s request for $130 billion for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
during FY2010 was submitted to Congress with the FY2010 base budget request on May 7, 2009
and has been considered as part of DOD’s overall request for the year. The currently pending
FY2010 war request reflects the Administration’s review of U.S. strategy for both wars that was
completed in March 2009, but not the new debate about President Obama’s December 1, 2009
announcement that he intended to deploy about 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan in the
first half of 2010.
Although President Obama said in his speech that the additional deployments are “likely to cost
us roughly $30 billion for the military this year,” some press reports have suggested the cost
could run as high as $35 billion.9 DOD is in the process of developing its supplemental request to
cover additional costs in FY2010 according to testimony by Secretary of Defense Gates.10 While
8 Prepared by Amy Belasco, Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget.
9 The White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and
Pakistan,” p. 7; delivered at West Point, December 1, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. For the $35 billion cost estimate, see, for example,
Reuters, “Q+A: Understanding Obama’s Afghan Strategy,” by Phil Stewart, December 8, 2009, accesseed at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B70QE20091208.
10 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Transcript, “Hearing on U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan,” December 2, 2009, p. 15.
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there was some speculation that the Administration would propose that additional war funding be
included in the still-pending FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act, both Congressman Murtha and
Senator Inouye, chairs of the House and Senate Appropriations Committee, respectively,
reportedly objected. The Administration is likely to submit a FY2010 Supplemental to Congress
in early February 2010 along with DOD’s regular and war requests for FY2011.11
It is not clear whether DOD will assume in its war funding request for FY2011 any decrease in
the number of troops in Afghanistan. The President said in his December 1 speech that the United
States would “begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011” as part of
handing over responsibility to Afghan forces but did not specify any timeline, which may be
decided after the Administration conducts a full-scale evaluation in December 2010.12
Debate About Potential Troop Increases in Afghanistan
The current debate about potential increases in troop levels in Afghanistan began with the
appointment of General Stanley McChrystal to the position of overall U.S. and NATO
Commander in Afghanistan on June 15, 2009 after the dismissal of his predecessor General David
McKiernan, reportedly because of concerns about rising levels of violence in Afghanistan.
Tasked to re-assess U.S. military strategy, General McChrystal submitted his report to Secretary
of Defense Gates on August 31, 2009, which Secretary Gates passed along to the President.
Citing worse-than-anticipated conditions in Afghanistan, the report said that additional resources
would be necessary to carry out a full-fledged counterinsurgency strategy focusing on population
protection. In addition, the report argued that the “eventual success” of this proposed new strategy
would require “capable Afghan governance capabilities and security forces.”13 At the direction of
the Secretary of Defense, this assessment did not include a specific request for additional
resources.
In response to the McChrystal report, the White House began its own wide-ranging strategy
review, which reportedly included not only General McChrystal’s approach but may have also
included a counter-terrorism approach focusing more on Pakistan where most al Qaeda are
located, along with training of more Afghan Security Forces, an option that Vice President Biden
was said to favor.14 According to White House National Security Advisor, General Jim Jones, the
maximum al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan is “less than 100 operating in the country. No bases,
No ability to launch attacks on either us or our allies,” with the problem being “sanctuaries across
the border” in Pakistan.15 According to Afghan government and U.S. military estimates, there are
11 The Hill, “House Likely to Move Defense Bill; Senate plans less clear,” by Roxanna Tiron, December 8, 2009, pp.
22, 26.
12 Ibid, p.5; Senate Armed Services Committee, Transcript, “ Hearing on Afghanistan Assessment,” p. December 2,
2009, p. 24.
13 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan,
“Commander’s Initial Assessment,” August 30, 2009, p. 2-3 to 2-4. Available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf.
14 Wall Street Journal, “Gates Doubts U.S.’S Afghan Strategy,” October 1, 2009.
15 New York Times, “Afghan War Debate Now Leans to Focus on Al Qaeda,” October 8, 2009.CNN, “State of the
Union with John King,” Interview with General Jones, Senators Kyl and Barbara Boxer,” October 4, 2009, p. 2.
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some 10,000 to 15,000 Taliban in Afghanistan plus an additional 2,000 Afghan insurgents from
other factions.16
On October 8, 2009, Secretary Gates passed along to the President General McChrystal’s troop
request, a document separate from the earlier strategy assessment. According to press reports, the
White House ultimately considered several options for Afghanistan ranging from a low option of
10,000 to 15,000 to train Afghan forces and possibly conduct more counter-terrorism operations
on the border to 40,000 to conduct counter-insurgency in the southern and eastern parts of the
country to a high option of 80,000 to conduct counter-insurgency operations throughout the
country.17 In all cases, high priority was placed on training and assisting Afghan Security Forces.
An October report by a UN monitoring commission that found widespread fraudulent voting
affecting as much as one-third of the votes during the August 2009 presidential election in
Afghanistan raised concerns about the legitimacy of the Karzai government, which played an
important part in the While House policy debate over the last three and a half months. White
House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel said that the main question is not “how many troops you
send, but do you have a credible Afghan partner.”18
On October 21st, under heavy U.S. pressure, President Karzai agreed to a run-off election with his
chief rival Abdullah Abdullah to be conducted on November 7, 2009. The runoff was scheduled
for November 7, 2009, but asserting that fraud was likely in the runoff, Abdullah dropped out of
the race on November 1, and Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission declared Karzai
the winner on November 2, 2009. Appearing to welcome a resolution of the issue, the United
States congratulated Karzai and praised Abdullah for diplomatic restraint. Karzai was inaugurated
on November 19, 2009 with Secretary of State Clinton in attendance.19
On December 1, 2009, President Obama announced his intention to deploy an additional 30,000
troops to Afghanistan in addition to the 68,000 already approved, almost all of which were in-
country as of late November.20 In testimony, Secretary of Defense Gates stated that the President
had given him flexibility to deploy 10% more troops or a total of 33,000 to Afghanistan to
provide “enablers,” such as engineers, medevac, and road clearance teams.21 This could bring
total U.S. forces in Afghanistan to 101,000.
In addition, NATO recently announced a commitment to deploy an additional 5,000 to 7,000
troops to Afghanistan, which could bring the total close to General McChrystal’s 40,000
16 See Table 5 in CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman.
17 New York Times, “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan,” December 6, 2009; New York Times,
“Obama Hears General’s Request for Afghanistan,” October 10, 2009. According to one expert, a strictly counter-
terrorism option focusing on border operations could allow the United States to reduce troop levels to about 13,000
over several years; see Foreign Policy, “What a CT mission in Afghanistan would actually look like,” by Austin Long;
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/13/what_a_ct_mission_in_afghanistan_would_actually_look_like.
18 Reuters, “U.S. Decision Can’t Wait for Afghan Legitimacy: Gates,” October 20, 2009.
19 Wall Street Journal, “Security Fears Revive Ahead of Afghan Runoff,” October 22, 2009; Washington Post, “Karzai
Voiced Doubts About Runoff until Last Moment,” October 21, 2009.
20 DOD, “News Briefing with Press Secretary Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon,” November 24, 2009, p. 6.
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4498.
21 Washington Post, Obama to Let Pentagon Deploy Even More Troops But Number Remains Murky,” December 3,
2009; New York Daily News, “ Make it 33,000 Troops – Gates,” December 4, 2009.
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request.22 As of late October, 2009, NATO allies had about 36,000 troops in Afghanistan. The
Afghan Army has about 89,000 troops.23 That would bring the total number of troops in
Afghanistan from the U.S., NATO allies, and the Afghan army to more than 190,000.
If 30,000 more U.S. troops are approved, plus NATO contributes an additional 5,000, that would
bring the total to almost 230,000 Afghan and foreign troops in-country, with an additional 81,000
in the Afghan police forces also contributing to security.
Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about deploying additional troops, and recent
public opinion polls suggest that a bare majority approve the President’s new plan with
Americans divided almost evenly about whether the buildup is too high or about right.24
Basis and Status of War Cost Request in Pending Legislation
The FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act enacted on October 28, 2009 (P.L. 111-84) and
the FY2010 DOD appropriations bill deal only with the $130 billion war cost estimate that was
based on the Administration’s strategy review in the spring of 2009 and was included in the
FY2010 budget request sent to Congress on May 7.
That request was based on the Administration’s adoption, last spring, of a withdrawal plan for
Iraq under which the number of troops in-country would be reduced from about 140,000 in
February 2009 to between 35,000 and 50,000 by August 31, 2010. Under that plan, all U.S. troops
are slated to be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011, to comply with the U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement that went into effect on January 1, 2009.
At the same time, President Obama decided to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan by
21,000 above the total already approved by former President Bush before he left office. (Before
leaving office, President Bush approved an increase of about 13,000 troops in Afghanistan on top
of the 33,000 in country as of September 2008.)25 With President Obama’s increase, the number
of troops in Afghanistan is slated to average 68,000 during FY2010, which represents a 68%
increase above the previous year.26
22 The 7,000 figures appears to include 2,000 troops expected to go home. New York Times, “NATO Pledges 7,000
troops but avoids details,” December 5, 2009.
23 For latest U.S. troop levels, see DOD, “News Briefing with Press Secretary Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon,”
October 14, 2009; http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4498. For Afghan troop levels,
see DOD, Report to Congress, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Section 1230, P.L. 110-181
Report to Congress, June 2009,p. 26; http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/1230_June-2009Final.pdf. For non-U.S.
NATO troops, see International Security and Assistance Force, “Troop Contributing Nations, at http://www.nato.int/
isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf.
24 Washington Post, “U.S. Deeply Split On Troop Increase For Afghan War,” October 21, 2009.
25 In a DOD press conference, spokesman Geoff Morrell cited an increase of 6,000 approved by President Bush before
leaving office who deployed in February 2009; see Transcript, “Briefing with Geoff Morrell at the Pentagon,” October
14, 2009; in addition, President Bush also approved an additional 7,000 troops for Afghanistan in the fall of 2009,
which deployed before he left office and brought the number in-country from 33,000 in October 2008 to 38,000 by
February 2009.
26 See CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential
Issues, by Amy Belasco.
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The $130 billion currently requested for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in FY2010 is $15.8
billion or 11% lower than the amount appropriated for FY2009 primarily because average troop
strength for both wars was expected to be about 19% lower than the previous year; the reduction
of troops deployed in Iraq was expected to more than offset the original plan to maintain troop
strength in Afghanistan at 68,000.27 War costs make up 21% of the $629.7 billion requested for
DOD, a share that is slightly lower than in FY2009.28
On August 13, 2009, the Administration submitted an amended war funding request that
reallocated $1 billion within the original $130 billion request to cover the cost of “temporarily”
adding 22,000 Army military personnel in FY2010 and FY2011.29 According to the
Administration, the additional troops were intended to “increase the number of troops available
to deploy while also helping the Army to end the practice of retaining soldiers beyond their
period of obligated service,” a practice often referred to as “stop-loss.”30
This budget amendment did not change the Administration’s plans for troop deployment levels to
Afghanistan or Iraq. To cover the cost of the additional personnel, the budget amendment re-
allocated $1 billion from procurement funds to military personnel and operation and maintenance
accounts. Of the additional 22,000 troops, 15,000 would be deployed in FY2010, and the
remaining 7,000 the following year.
House and Senate authorization action on H.R. 2647 and S. 1390, respectively, and House
appropriations action on H.R. 3326 were completed before this August 13 budget amendment was
submitted and therefore reflect the original request. The Senate’s version of the DOD
Appropriations Act does, however, reflect the amended request, and the conference is likely to do
so as well.
According to DOD, its request includes $60.8 billion for Operation Iraqi Freedom and $65.4
billion for Afghanistan or Operation Enduring Freedom, and $3.9 billion for non-DOD classified
activities. DOD funding would be allocated 48% for Iraq and 51% for Afghanistan in FY2010,
compared to a split in FY2009 of 65% for Iraq and 35% for Afghanistan.31
In testimony, Secretary of Defense Gates stated that this war funding request did not include
about $8 billion for activities that are expected to persist beyond the Afghanistan and Iraq wars
but which had been included in earlier war-funding bills. According to the Secretary, DOD shifted
funding to the base budget for activities considered likely to persist, such as monies for increased
27 Ibid., Table 1.
28 In FY2009, war costs made up 24% of DOD’s total appropriations; CRS calculations based on S.Rept. 111-74, p. 1.
2929 OMB, FY2010 Budget Amendment, “Estimate No. 6, Overseas Contingency Operations,” August 13, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/amendment_08_13_09.pdf.
30 The White House, “Letter Transmitting Department of Defense Budget Amendment,” August 13, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Letter-from-the-President-to-the-Speaker-of-the-House/. Under the
Administration’s proposal, the cost of these additional Army personnel was offset by reducing by a total of $1 billion
the amounts requested for procurement of certain items including High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, or
HMMWVs, Hellfire missiles, and Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, the requirements for which are being
reassessed. See DOD, Budget Amendment to the FY2010 President’s Budget Request for Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO), Summary and Explanation of Changes, Exhibits for FY2010, Amended Justification Material,
August 2009, p. 3-5; http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_oco.pdf.
31 See Table 5-9 in Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Summary Justification, May 2009;
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_SSJ.pdf.
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strength levels in the Army, recruiting and retention, more funds for Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance, countering threats from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), longer-term
medical care such as Traumatic Brain Injury and psychological health, and “Global Train and
Equip” funds for countries facing terrorist threats.32
If Secretary Gates had not transferred this $8 billion into the base budget in FY2010, on an
“apples-to-apples” basis, with no other changes, the FY2010 war request would be $8 billion
lower than in FY2009. In addition, CRS estimates that reductions in average monthly troop
strength from 186,000 in FY2009 to 152,000 in Iraq and Afghanistan could reduce war costs by
an additional $7.7 billion. Taking these two factors into account, CRS estimates that DOD’s
FY2010 request of $130 billion could be reduced by some $15.7 billion.33
In the current FY2010 request, total military personnel funding declines between FY2009 and
FY2010, reflecting the fact that as previously planned, decreases in troop strength for Iraq pick up
speed and more than offset increases in troop levels in Afghanistan. Operation and maintenance
(O&M) funding, however, remains at the same level in FY2010 as in FY2009 and FY2008
despite the fall in overall troop levels in the coming year.
After remaining about the same in FY2008 and FY2009, overall troop strength for Iraq and
Afghanistan is expected to fall by almost 20% in FY2010. According to DOD’s final FY2009 war
cost report, O&M average monthly obligations averaged $11.4 billion a month for both
operations in FY2009 compared to 13.4 billion in FY2008, a 15% overall decline. Average
monthly obligations for Iraq decrease by 30% from $10.9 billion to $7.5 billion while those for
Afghanistan increase by 44% from $2.7 billion to $3.9 billion.34
In the last month (September) of FY2009, DOD obligations spiked to $11.9 billion, substantially
above the $6.7 billion average for the rest of the year, a pattern similar to last year when DOD
obligated its remaining funds at the end of the fiscal year.35 Despite the fact that average monthly
troop strength for both operations was slated to decrease by 20%, DOD requested almost identical
amounts for military personnel and operation and maintenance in FY2010.
The decline in FY2010 primarily reflects a lower DOD request for Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles that cost $16.8 billion in FY2009 to purchase the full requirement.
Instead, DOD is funding a lighter, cheaper version of the MRAP – an all-terrain fighting vehicle –
expected to be more effective in Afghanistan. Lower procurement spending also reflects a
decision by DOD to return to its traditional definition of reconstitution, repairing equipment and
32 Senate Appropriations Committee, ”Statement by Secretary of Defense,” Robert M. Gates, June 9, 2009, p. 2. In an
earlier speech at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Secretary Gates stated that $13 billion had been
transferred; see Transcript, “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Army War College, Carlisle, Pa,”
April 16, 2009, pp. 2-3; http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4404.
33 See CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential
Issues, by Amy Belasco, Table 3 and p. 18-p. 19. Average monthly troop strength takes into account increases and
decreases each month in the number of deployed troops. This figure compares the request with the adjusted amounts.
34 DOD, “Cost of War Card,” September 30, 2008 and September 30, 2009.
35 DOD, “Summary Cost of War Obligations by Component, Appropriations and Operation,” in FY2009 Cost of War
for FY2009 Appropriations as of September 30, 2009; monthly obligations in September 2008 were $12.9 billion
compared to an average for the rest of the year of $6.5 billion; see DOD, Supplemental & Cost of War Execution
Report As of September 30, 2008.
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funding as war costs only the replacement of equipment lost in combat rather than using war
funds to upgrade equipment.36
Table 4 summarizes congressional action on the Administration’s FY2010 war funding request.
For congressional action at the account level, see Table A-9).
Table 4. Congressional Action on DOD’s War FY2010 Budget Request
in billions of dollars
FY2010
House-
Senate-
Authoriz-
House-
Senate-
FY2009
Revised
passed
passed
ation
passed
Reported
Enacted
Requesta
Authoriz-
Authoriz-
Conference
Approps
Approps
ation
ation
H.R. 2647
Bill,
Bill,
Title
H.R. 2647
S. 1390
H.R. 3326
H.R. 3326
Military
Personnel
19.9
14.1
13.6 13.6 14.1 16.2 14.1
Operation and Maintenanceb
80.5
81.0
80.7 80.1 80.8 80.5 80.3
Procurementc
32.0
21.4
23.0 22.3 21.8 20.4 22.2
Research, Development,
1.2
.3
.4 .3 .3 .2 .3
Test and Evaluation
Revolving and Management
.9
.4
.4 .4 .4 .4 .4
Funds
Other Department of
2.5
1.6
1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.9
Defense Programsd
Special Fundse
10.1
9.8
9.0 9.7 9.6 9.0 8.6
Military
Construction
2.7
1.4
1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
General Provisions and
-4.0 0 0 0
0
0
.3
Rescissions
Cap on Transfer Authorityf [6.5]
[4.0] [4.0] [4.5] [4.0] [3.0] [4.0]
Total, Department of
145.8
130.0
130.0 129.3 130.0 129.6 129.6
Defense
Sources: Revised request from DOD, Budget Amendment to the FY 2010 President’s Budget Request for Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO), August 2009; http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/
fy2010_oco.pdf. Congressional action from H.R. 2647 as passed by the House, S. 1390 as passed by the Senate,
H.Rept. 111-166, S.Rept. 111-35, H.Rept. 111-230, H.R. 3326 as passed by the House and the Senate
Appropriations Committee, H.Rept. 111-230, S.Rept. 111-74; and for FY2009, House Appropriations Committee
Table, Congressional Record, June 16, 2009, p. H6871.
a. Reflects amended budget request for war funding to cover adding 22,000 military personnel to the Army
temporarily in order to reduce stress on the force from deployments that is to be financed by shifting $800
million from procurement to military personnel and operation and maintenance within the $130 billion
original request. Authorization action and House appropriation action took place before this amendment,
and Senate appropriation action after the change.
b. Operations and Maintenance total excludes the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund,
and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, which are included under Special Funds.
36 Ibid.
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c. Procurement total includes Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Transfer Fund, and excludes Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Fund, which is included under Special Funds.
d. Other Defense Department Programs includes Defense Health Program, Drug Interdiction, and the Office
of the Special Inspector General.
e. Special Funds includes Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund, Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, and Joint Improvised Explosive Device Fund.
f.
Congress sets annual caps or ceilings on the amounts that DOD can transfer between accounts after
enactment.
Authorization Action on War Funding Request
The Conference report on the FY2010 Authorization request (H.R. 2647/H.Rept. 111-288) largely
supports DOD’s funding request as did both the House and Senate authorizing committees. (See
Table A-9)
Changes to DOD’s Request
Significant instances in which the conference report on the authorization bill changed DOD’s
funding request include:
• reducing funding in procurement accounts by $625 million from the original
request to provide for the temporary 22,000 increase in Army end-strength
requested in a budget amendment;
• reducing DOD’s $1.5 billion request for the Commanders’ Emergency Response
Program to $1.3 billion, following the Senate recommendation;
• adding $600 million to DOD’s request for $5.5 billion (thus authorizing $6.1
billion) in funding for a new lighter-weight Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
Program (MRAP) vehicles for Afghanistan to meet DOD’s revised requirement;
together with an additional $600 million in DOD’s base budget, these funds
would purchase the requirement of 6,466 vehicles; and
• funding almost all of the $1.4 billion in military construction for Afghanistan but
adding funds for several projects at Bagram Air Force Base the cost of which was
offset by reduced funding for troop or contingency housing at various bases in
Afghanistan.
Significant policy changes made in the authorization conference report include:
• deleting DOD funding requested for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability
Fund but allowing transfers from funds appropriated to the State Department;
• transferring the $600 million requested in DOD’s base budget for the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund from DOD’s base budget, considered
to be an “enduring” requirement, to Title XV war funding, because the
authorizers consider the organization to be a temporary one; and
• not providing $115 million for Guantanamo Bay detainee relocation because of
lack of a plan, which was the position taken by both the House and the Senate.
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Extensions of Special War-Related Authorities
The authorization conference report also extends several war-related authorities and associated
reporting requirements created since the 9/11 attacks, including:
• a one-year extension of the Commanders’ Emergency Response Progam
requiring 15-day advance notifications for expenditures, setting a $1.3 billion cap
on the program, and allowing funds to be used to reintegrate individuals
renouncing violence into Afghan society in section 1222 (a program similar to
the Sons of Iraq or Concerned Local Citizens groups in Iraq);
• a one-year extension (and a $1.6 billion cap) on coalition support funds with an
expansion in the types of logistical support that can be provided to nations aiding
U.S. military operations to include specialized training, supplies, and equipment
as requested by the Administration; Section 1223 of the conference report
continues to require 15-day advance notifications of specific expenditures and
quarterly reports on the program; this authority appears similar to that in the
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund;37
• an expansion and modification of reporting requirements in Section 1202 for
DOD support for special operations support to foreign nations;
• an extension in Section 1203 of reporting requirement for foreign-assistance
related programs carried out by DOD;
• a requirement in Section 1204 for a report by March 1, 2010 on the relationship
between DOD authorities to train, equip and build the capacity of foreign nations
compared to Foreign Assistance Act authorities; and
• a limitation in Section 1206 of funds that can be used to build the capacity of
foreign military forces to $75 million in FY2010 and $75 million in FY2011.
Extensions and Additional Reporting Requirements
Based on recommendations of both chambers, the Authorization conference report extends and
adds various reporting requirements for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan as described below.
New Pakistan Reporting Requirements
H.R. 2647 includes new reporting requirements (or extends current requirements) relating to
Pakistan including the following:
• Section 1232 requires a new DOD report assessing Pakistan’s progress toward
long-term security and stability, including timelines for Pakistan to demonstrate
effectiveness in defeating, eliminating safe havens for, and preventing the return
of Al Qaeda in Pakistan. The report is to be submitted every 180 days
concurrently with the Afghanistan security report (originally required under
37 Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Appendix, p. 350; http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/Appendix/.
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Section 1217, P.L. 110-417 and under Section 1230, P.L. 110-181, that was most
recently submitted in June 2009);
• Section 1231 requires that DOD and State Department assess alternatives to
reimbursements to Pakistan for logistical, military and other support that would
encourage Pakistan to focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
operations. The report is due 180 days after enactment;
• Section 1224 requires a quarterly report listing individual projects using funds
transferred to DOD from the State Department’s new Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Fund (which the Administration and both chambers agreed would be
appropriated to the State Department rather than DOD beginning in FY2010), as
well as an assessment by DOD of whether Pakistan is making “concerted efforts”
to confront the Al Qaeda, Taliban and insurgent threats.38
New Reports and Extensions of Reporting Requirements Regarding Afghanistan
H.R. 2647 adds or extends existing requirements for the following reports relating to Afghanistan.
• Section 1236 expands and extends to FY2011 the semi-annual report, “Progress
Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” with new sections on agreements
or commitments by NATO and non-NATO ISAF countries on goals, strategies,
resource and force requirements and pledges of troops and resources, along with
an assessment of progress in ending the ability of the insurgency to establish safe
havens in Afghanistan, as well as coordination of reconstruction and
development activities.
• Section 1235 requires that DOD contract for a study of force levels needed to
secure the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan.
• Section 1225 requires that DOD certify that it has established a program to
register and monitor the end use of defense articles and services transferred to
Afghanistan and Pakistan before making transfers although the requirement can
be waived for 120 days by the Secretary of Defense for vital U.S. interests;
• Section 1228 requires an assessment and report on the scope, character, and DOD
funding of “community-based security programs” in Afghanistan within 120 days
of enactment.
New Reports and Extensions of Reporting Requirements Regarding Iraq
H.R. 2647 requires the following reports on Iraq:
• Section 1227 requires a report within 90 days of enactment or by December 31,
2009 that estimates within the following 90 days: personnel levels in Iraq, DOD
equipment remaining in the country, and the likelihood of completing transfer or
removal of equipment by the December 31, 2011 deadline, along with an
assessment of U.S. detainee operations, and a listing of factors used by DOD to
assess risks associated with the drawdown and any decisions to modify the pace;
38 S.Rept. 111-35, p. 191 and 210 and H.Rept. 111-166, p. 415ff.
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• Section 1230 requires a report within 180 days of enactment on the feasibility
and desirability of establishing uniform procedures to provide monetary
assistance to civilian foreign nationals for losses, injuries, or death related to U.S.
combat activities, as well as the types of guidelines that could be established and
the total amount disbursed thus far.
Reports on Both Wars
The bill also requires the following reports concerning Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan:
• Section 1226 requires within 180 days of enactment a report by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) assessing DOD’s campaign plans, which is to be
updated periodically through December 2011 for Iraq and through September 30,
2012 for Afghanistan;
• Section 1234 requires notification 15 days in advance of transferring U.S.
equipment to Iraq and Afghanistan, and a quarterly report describing the
equipment, requirement, and any potential impact on U.S. forces; the section also
limits to $750 million the total value of the equipment that can be transferred,
House-Passed and Senate-Passed Appropriations Action
The House and Senate are negotiating differences between their respective versions of H.R. 3326.
The House-passed and Senate-reported versions of H.R. 3326 both provide $129.6 billion for war
in FY2010, some $400 million below the DOD’s request.39 Each chamber , however, took
somewhat different actions on portions of the request.
Assessing Uncertainties In Operations Funding
Concerned that the services “cannot accurately budget for Operations Enduring Freedom and
Operations Iraqi Freedom,” in light of the fact that the nature of military operations is likely to
change significantly,40 the House-passed version of H.R. 3326 puts aside some $14.6 billion or
20% of DOD’s requested Operation and Maintenance funds in the Overseas Contingency
Operations Transfer Fund and requires that DOD inform the four congressional defense
committees 15 days in advance of any transfers from the fund.41 The Senate version of H.R. 3326
does not transfer any funds to this account.
Funding for Force Protection Vehicles
The House and the Senate versions of H.R. 3326 also differ in their treatment of funding for
vehicles designed to improve force protection. The House cuts $1.9 billion from DOD’s $5.44
39 This includes funding provided in both H.R. 3326, DOD appropriations, and in H.R. 3082 and S. 1407 for military
construction.
40 H.Rept. 111-230, p. 327; House Rules Committee, http://www.rules.house.gov/111/CommJurRpt/
111_defenseapprops_rpt.pdf.
41 Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, H.R. 3326 as reported; House Rules Committee,
http://www.rules.house.gov/111/CommJurRpt/111_defenseapprops_rpt.pdf.
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billion request for a Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Fund arguing that the FY2009
Supplemental included advance funding for MRAP vehicles. In the Senate version of H.R. 3326,
an additional $1.2 billion is added to cover purchase of additional Mine All-Terrain vehicles (M-
TV) for Afghanistan based on a recently identified “urgent unfunded need.”42
In other actions, the Senate version reduces funding in other procurement accounts (e.g., Army
Aircraft Procurement, Army, Other Procurement, and Marine Corps Procurement) for items
considered excess to needs or premature requests. At the same time, the Senate bill adds $1.3
billion to purchase nine F/A-18 E/F aircraft because of concerns about the aging of the Navy
aircraft fleet, which may not be considered a war-related requirement.43 With the exception of the
decrease in MRAP funding, the House makes smaller adjustments to DOD’s war procurement
request.
Transfers from Funding in the Base Budget
Both the House and Senate versions of the bill transfer funds from the base budget to Title IX’s
war funding. In the case of the House, there is a largely undistributed transfer of $2.6 billion from
military personnel funding in DOD’s base budget to Title IX’s war funding to reflect the
“significant Military Personnel costs of U.S. Overseas Contingency Operations.”44
The Senate version, on the other hand, transfers about $250 million in O&M funds from activities
for supporting soldiers and their families (e.g., Wounded Warrior, childcare centers, family
services) and from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Fund (JIEDDF) into Title IX, which
would reverse DOD’s proposal to transfer funds to the base budget for activities expected to be
long-term.
Coalition Support and Commanders Emergency Response Program Funding
The House version of H.R. 3326, endorses DOD’s proposed cap of $1.5 billion for coalition
support as well as broadening the range of purposes for which coalition support funds could be
used, as requested, to include specialized training, supplies and the loaning and buying of
equipment.45 The Senate did not expand the purposes for coalition support funding and included
Sec. 9011, a general provision permitting coalition support funding but did not set a cap on the
amount that could be spent for that purpose from the Operation and Maintenance, Defense wide,
account, as has been done in the past.
Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committee reports cited concerns about management
and oversight of the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), from which
commanding officers can distribute funds for small reconstruction projects. Both versions of the
42 S.Rept. 111-74, p.253, p. 264.
43 S.Rept. 111-74, p. 257.
44 H.Rept. 111-230, p. 328; House Rules Committee, http://www.rules.house.gov/111/CommJurRpt/
111_defenseapprops_rpt.pdf.
45 Title IX, Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide, H.R. 3326 as reported; House Rules Committee,
http://www.rules.house.gov/111/CommJurRpt/111_defenseapprops_rpt.pdf.
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bill cut DOD’s $1.5 billion CERP request. The House cut the request by $200 million and the
Senate by $300 million. Both houses also require additional reporting on the use of the funds.46
Like the defense authorizing committees, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees did
not provide funds for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, assuming this program
would be funded in the State Department.
Funding for Training Afghan Security Forces and for Guantanamo Bay
While the House version of H.R. 3326 approved the Administration’s request for an additional
$7.5 billion to train Afghan Security Forces, the Senate version cuts that request by $900 million,
transferring the funds to purchase additional MRAP All Terrain vehicles. The Senate argued that
these funds are not needed now because they would not be spent in FY2010.47
Both the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees denied the request for funding to
transfer detainees from Guantanamo Bay on the grounds that the Administration has not
identified a plan for the future of the detention facility. DOD included these funds in the Iraq
Freedom Fund.48
War Funding
For congressional action on the Administration’s FY2009 supplemental appropriations request for war costs, see CRS
Report R40531, FY2009 Spring Supplemental Appropriations for Overseas Contingency Operations, coordinated by Stephen
Daggett and Susan B. Epstein. Congressional action on authorization of the FY2009 supplemental funds and on both
authorization and appropriation of the FY2010 war cost request is covered in this report. For an analysis of the
relationship between war costs and troop levels, see CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars,
FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, by Amy Belasco. For further information on war costs, see CRS Report
RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
Base Budget: Comparison and Context49
In recent years, some senior military officers50, as well as research groups and advocacy
organizations, have argued that defense spending needs to be substantially higher in the next few
years to avoid drastic cuts in major weapons programs or in the size of the force. Many have
called for a baseline defense budget, not including war-related costs, pegged to about 4% of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—an amount that would be anywhere from $62 to $169 billion
per year higher over the next few years than the Administration plan.
46 H.Rept. 111-230, p. 348 and S.Rept. 111-74, p. 244.
47 H.Rept. 111-230, p. 346, and S.Rept. 111-74, p. 252.
48 H.Rept. 111-230, p. 349 and S.Rept. 111-74, p. 251.
49 Prepared by Stephen Daggett, Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget.
50 During a Pentagon press briefing on November 17, 2008, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen
said he thought that spending 4% of GDP on defense was, “about right.” See DOD News Transcript, “Department of
Defense News Briefing with Admiral Michael Mullen at the Pentagon, Arlington, VA,” November 17, 2008,
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4318.
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Table 5. Actual and Projected DOD Base Budgets Compared with
4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
(amounts in billions of dollars)
FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014
actual/projected DOD base
budget
513.3 533.7 541.8 550.7 561.1 574.5
Gross
Domestic
Product 14,291 14,902 15,728 16,731 17,739 18,588
DOD base budget as
percentage of GDP
3.59% 3.58% 3.44% 3.29% 3.16% 3.09%
4%
of
GDP
571.6 596.1 629.1 669.2 709.6 743.5
amount by which 4% of GDP
exceeds actual/projected
58,3 62.4 87.3 118.5 148.5 169.0
DOD base budget
Source: Actual/projected DOD base budget figures from Office of Management and Budget, A New Era of
Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise, February 26, 2009, Table S-7. “Funding Levels for Appropriated
(‘Discretionary’) Programs by Agency,” p. 130; Gross Domestic Product estimates from Ibid., Table S-8,
“Comparison of Economic Assumptions,” p. 132.
Senator James M. Inhofe and Representative Trent Franks—members, respectively, of the Senate
and House Armed Services committees—summarized the case for such an increase in identical
joint resolutions (S.J.Res. 10 and H.J.Res. 3) introduced on Feb. 12, 2009 which call for a base
defense budget equal to at least 4% of GDP. The fundamental case for meeting the 4% target is
that, since the end of the Cold War, DOD’s budget and force structure have declined significantly
while the tempo of operations has increased—to include sustained combat operations—and the
geographic scope of operations has broadened.51
These arguments for a substantial increase in the defense budget, however, come at a time when,
by historical standards, military spending seems very robust. Between FY1998, when the post-
Cold War decline in defense spending hit bottom, and FY2009, the baseline Department of
Defense budget, not including war costs, increased by almost 40% above inflation (see Table 5).
Adjusting for inflation, the FY2009 baseline DOD budget was more than $100 billion, or about
20%, greater than the average during the Cold War (measured from the end of the Korean War in
FY1954 through FY1990). Funding for weapons acquisition (procurement plus R&D) in FY2009
was more than $45 billion—or about one-third—higher than the annual Cold War average.
Table 6. DOD Discretionary Budget Authority, FY1998-FY2009
(amounts in billions of current year and constant FY2009 dollars)
Current Year Dollars
Constant FY2009 Dollars
Total DOD
Base DOD
Supplemental
Total DOD
Base DOD
Supplemental
FY1998
260 257 3 359 355 4
FY1999
275 266 9 370 358 12
FY2000
287 279 9 377 366 11
51 Senator Inhofe elaborated on this argument in a Senate floor speech on February 12, 2009. See Congressional
Record, February 12, 2009, pp. S-2246-48.
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Current Year Dollars
Constant FY2009 Dollars
FY2001
316 297 19 403 379 24
FY2002
345 328 17 428 407 21
FY2003
437 365 72 526 439 87
FY2004
468 377 91 544 438 106
FY2005
479 400 79 535 447 88
FY2006
535 411 124 579 445 134
FY2007
601 432 169 633 455 178
FY2008
667 480 187 683 491 191
FY2009
662 510 152 662 510 152
Source: FY2001-FY2009 current year dol ar figures from Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Supplemental
Request: Summary Justification, April 2009, Figure 1, p. 1. FY1998-FY2000 total DOD from Office of Management,
Budget Public Budget Database, supplemental amounts by CRS. Deflators from Department of Defense, National
Defense Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2009, March 2008; Data thru FY2007 are actual amounts. Figures for FY2009
include requested additional FY2009 supplemental appropriations and rescissions.
The apparent disconnect between the size of the budget and the appeals for more money appears
even more striking when amounts that have been appropriated for war costs are added to the
equation. On top of a baseline DOD budget that grew from $255 billion in FY1998, in FY2009
prices not adjusted for inflation, to $528 billion in FY2009, supplemental appropriations for war-
related costs climbed from $19.4 billion in FY2001, as an initial response to the 9/11 attacks, to
$63 billion in FY2003, the year of the Iraq invasion, to an estimated $189 billion in FY2008.
While large portions of the supplementals have been consumed by war-related operating costs,
substantial amounts have also been devoted to buying new equipment, particularly for the Army
and the Marine Corps. Although the bulk of this acquisition has been for force protection,
communications, and transportation, the effect has been to modernize much of the basic
equipment stock of both services, in effect augmenting their baseline budgets. The fact that so
large a level of spending appears to the military services to be so inadequate has several
explanations—and the policy implications are, accordingly, matters of varying interpretation.
Following are some of the contributing factors.52
• Future baseline budgets are widely expected to decline: The Administration plan
to cut the deficit in half by the end of President Obama’s first term includes limits
on defense as well as non-defense spending. White House budget projections
accommodate an increase of about 5% above inflation in the FY2009 DOD
budget, but project a cumulative decline of about 3% between FY2009 and
FY2012. Many unofficial projections of the deficit situation are less sanguine
than the Administration’s, so many analysts expect, at best, a flat baseline
defense budget for the foreseeable future. Increased costs in part of the budget,
52 These issues were discussed in testimony before the House Budget Committee by Stephen A. Daggett, CRS
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget, on February 4, 2009. See prepared testimony on the House Budget
Committee website at http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2009/02.04.2009_Daggett_Testimony.pdf with supporting
charts at http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2009/02.04.2009_Daggett_charts.pdf. Daggett’s analysis was summarized in
the April 2009 edition of Air Force magazine, “The Cost of the Force,” Air Force, April 2009, pp. 37-39,
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2009/April%202009/0409cost.pdf.
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therefore, will necessarily come at the expense of resources available in other
areas.
• Supplemental appropriations are expected to decline: Although plans to withdraw
from Iraq are uncertain, the military services expect that supplemental
appropriations will come down within a few years. Costs for training and
equipment maintenance that have been covered in supplementals would, then,
migrate back into the baseline budget at the expense of other programs, and
money to further upgrade ground forces would have to be found elsewhere.
• Costs of military personnel have grown dramatically in recent years: Since the
end of the 1990s, Congress has approved substantial increases in military pay and
benefits, including pay increases of ½ percent above civilian pay indices in seven
of the past eight years, three rounds of “pay table reform” that gave larger raises
to personnel in the middle grades, increased housing allowances to eliminate on
base and off-base disparities, DOD-provided health insurance for Medicare-
eligible military retirees (known as Tricare for Life), concurrent receipt of
military retired pay and veterans disability benefits that had earlier been offset,
elimination of a reduction in retiree survivor benefits that had occurred at age 62,
and large increases in enlistment and reenlistment bonuses and special pays.
Although bonuses and some other payments may decline in the future, most of
the past increases in pay and benefits have been built into the basic cost of
personnel. CRS calculates that uniformed personnel now cost 40% more, per
capita, after adjusting for inflation, than in FY1999.
• Operating costs continue to grow above base inflation: Historically, military
operation and maintenance budgets, which pay for everything from personnel
training, to weapons repairs, to facility operations, to health care, have increased
relative to the size of the force by about 2.7% per year above inflation. These
increases are not as large as in some areas of the civilian economy, such as health
care, but they do not reflect gains in productivity that are common in other
sectors of the economy. Continued growth in operating costs, which is now
widely seen as a fact of life in defense planning, erodes the availability of
resources for weapons modernization and other priorities.
• Increasing generational cost growth in major weapons programs: It is generally
expected that new generations of weapons will be more expensive than the
systems they replace as weapons technology advances. The rate of generational
cost growth, however, is becoming a matter of increasing concern within the
Defense Department. New stealthy aircraft, multi-mission ships, advanced space
systems, and networked missiles, guns, and vehicles appear to be getting more
expensive than their predecessors at a greater rate than in the past. Unless
budgets increase more rapidly than costs, trade-offs between the costs of new
weapons and the size of the force may be required.
• Poor cost estimates: The difficulties engendered by accelerating intergenerational
weapons cost growth are exacerbated by poor cost estimation. The Government
Accountability Office has documented frequent, substantial increases in costs of
major defense systems compared to original development estimates. A side-effect
of inaccurate cost projections is an increased instability in the overall defense
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budget, which entails inefficient production rates for major weapons programs
and increased costs due to changing production plans.53
• New requirements based on the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan: The wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan have led to very large increases in equipment requirements for
ground forces, particularly for force protection, communications, and
transportation. National Guard combat units that earlier were equipped with older
systems cascaded from active units are now seen as part of the rotation base that
require equally modern equipment. Full sets of current equipment are expected to
be available not only for next-to-deploy units, but also for units as they begin to
reset from overseas rotations. A key lesson of the war is that what used to be
called “minor procurement” for ground forces was substantially undercapitalized.
• A broader range of national security challenges: A common presumption before
9/11 was that forces trained and equipped for traditional conflicts between
national armies would be able to cope with what were seen as less demanding
other challenges such as stability operations. Now Secretary Gates and other
prominent defense leaders maintain that forces must be designed not only for
traditional conflicts, but for insurgencies and other irregular wars, support of
allies, threats of catastrophic attacks by non-state actors with weapons of mass
destruction, and entirely new kinds of disruptive attacks on specific U.S. and
allied vulnerabilities. The effect has been to broaden requirements without,
necessarily, an attendant offsetting reduction in older force goals. When these
factors are taken as a whole, it is not so surprising that military planners discover
some shortfalls.
For Congress, it may not be so certain that the principal answer to all these problems is to provide
more money for defense. More money is one alternative. Other alternatives may include backing
away from plans to add 92,000 active duty troops to the Army and Marine Corps; shifting
resources among the military services to reflect new challenges rather than allocating them
roughly the same proportions every year; reviewing requirements for expensive new technologies
in view of the presence or absence of technologically peer or near peer competitors; and shifting
resources from military responses to global threats toward non-military means of prevention.
Defense Priorities: Budget and Strategy
Secretary Gates stated that the budget decisions that he announced on April 6, 2009, were
intended to “reshape the priorities of America’s defense establishment.”54 Those decisions
focused almost exclusively on “means,” rather than on desired “ends” based on policy decisions,
or “ways” designed to utilize given means to achieve desired ends. That emphasis on resources,
together with the relatively broad scope of the announced programmatic decisions, raises key
questions about the relative weight of strategy and budget in driving defense priorities.
53 For GAO’s more recent annual overview of defense acquisition cost growth, see U.S. Government Accountability
Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-326SP, March 30, 2009.
54 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.
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Background: Strategic Direction
Secretary Gates stressed that the April 6 announcement reflected a line of strategic thinking
dating back 18 months, and captured in the June 2008 National Defense Strategy, other
Department of Defense official documents, and speeches and statements.55 This continuum of
strategic thought appears to be based on several major premises:
• The “wars we’re in”—Iraq and Afghanistan—are broadly indicative of the kinds
of challenges that the United States is most likely to face in the future. Those
challenges include preparing for “hybrid warfare,” in which both state and non-
state actors blend cutting-edge technologies (usually associated with state-based
militaries) with irregular approaches and/or non-conventional approaches usually
associated with guerrilla groups. Recent examples of hybrid warfare cited by
DOD officials include Hezbollah’s operations against Israel in 2006 and the use
of sophisticated Explosively-Formed Penetrators by insurgents in Iraq.56
• DOD should enhance and better institutionalize the capabilities required to meet
these sorts of challenges by adjusting investments and by rebalancing the force
accordingly.57
• While conventional challenges persist, the nation’s current and projected
advantages allow room for assuming greater risk in that area. On April 6,
Secretary Gates echoed the 2008 National Defense Strategy: “Although U.S.
predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for
the medium term given current trends.”58
• DOD is operating in a resource-constrained environment, in which “running up
the score” in one area—maintaining unnecessary redundancy—requires a
decision not to do something else.
55 See for example Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Gen. James
Cartwright with Internet Security Writers, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4398. Key sources include Department of Defense, National
Defense Strategy, June 2008; Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare (IW),” December 1, 2008;
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, speech at Kansas State University, “Landon Lecture,” November 26, 2007,
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199; Secretary of
Defense Robert M. Gates, remarks to U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, July 15, 2008, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262; Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced
Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs, January 2009, pp. 28-40.
56 See for example Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4399. On “hybrid warfare,” see for example Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st
Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007.
57 For example, see Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6,
2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=134: “We must rebalance this
department’s programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the
scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead…”
58 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009,
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341; and DoD, National Defense
Strategy, June 2008, p.21.
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• Partnerships—with other U.S. Government agencies and with international
friends and allies—will play an increasingly important role in the preparation for,
and execution of, future operations.
Strategic Processes
The decisions Secretary Gates announced April 6, timed to inform the FY 2010 budget request,
were somewhat off cycle with Congressionally-mandated defense strategic review processes. This
lack of synchronization raises some questions about the extent to which the decisions were
strategically informed.
In theory, national security strategy issued by the White House sets the parameters for the
national defense strategy issued by DOD as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
process, and defense strategy in turn shapes budget choices. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
established the permanent requirement for the President to submit a national security strategy
report to Congress annually. That report is ordinarily due on the date the President submits the
budget for the following fiscal year, but in the first year of a new Administration, it is due 150
days after the President takes office.59 The due date this year fell on June 19, 2009. In turn,
legislation requires that DOD conduct a QDR during the first year of every Administration, with a
requirement to submit a report based on that review to Congress in the year following the year in
which the review is conducted, but not later than the President submits the budget for the next
fiscal year.60 The due date for this QDR would fall in early February 2010. The QDR is intended
to be a rigorous, inclusive review process that weighs assessments of the strategic environment,
requirements, and gaps and overlaps in current capabilities. Further, by law, the QDR report must
include “a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the United States.” That
defense strategy, in turn, is required to be “consistent with the most recent national security
strategy.”61
In practice, the Obama Administration appears to be broadly on track with the prescribed strategy
cycle. However, that cycle may not be well-adapted for informing budget priorities in the first
year of a new Administration. The most recent National Security Strategy (NSS) was issued by the
Bush Administration in March 2006. Senior Administration officials have noted that the Obama
Administration is unlikely to publish a new NSS in time to help shape the 2010 QDR. However,
officials have indicated that an ongoing national security review process—led by the National
Security Council and intended to establish priorities and produce classified, internal guidance to
departments and agencies—would likely set parameters for the QDR process.62 DOD issued the
most recent National Defense Strategy in June 2008, under the signature of Secretary Gates, as a
stand-alone document, separately from a QDR process.63 Secretary Gates has stressed repeatedly
59 See Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, P.L. 99-433, §603.
60 The permanent requirement to conduct a QDR was introduced by the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2000, October 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, which amended Title 10 of U.S. Code. See Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part
I, Chapter 2, §118. Subsequent legislation amended parts of the mandate, see the NDAA for FY2002, December 28,
2001, P.L. 107-107, §921; and the Bob Stump NDAA for FY2003, December 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314, §922 and 923.
61 See Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 2, §118 (b) (1).
62 See Christopher J. Castelli, “Senior Official: QDR Will Take Cues from NSC Review,” Inside Defense, April 23,
2009; and Christopher J. Castelli, “NSC Crafting Classified, National Security Planning Guidance, Inside Defense,
March 19, 2009.
63 DOD had established a precedent for such separation by issuing the previous NDS in 2005, at the beginning of the
QDR process that yielded the February 2006 QDR Report.
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that the 2008 NDS will undergird the 2010 QDR process, the findings of which would be used to
inform budget decision-making for FY2011.64
DOD officials have stated that, despite the absence of a concurrent QDR or NDS process, the
budget decisions announced on April 6 were developed over the course of three months, in a
rigorous, inclusive way that included “not only the chiefs and secretaries of the Services, but also
the [Combatant] Commanders.”65 DOD has reportedly continued the practice launched under the
previous Administration, following the 2006 QDR, of holding frequent, inclusive sessions with
senior DOD civilian and military leaders, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider strategic priorities, specific programs and
initiatives, and Departmental processes.
Senior DOD leaders have also stated that the scope of the April 6 decisions was not
comprehensive, and that several categories of issues were deferred to the forthcoming QDR
process. Secretary Gates indicated that he had deferred consideration of some specific issues—
including amphibious capabilities, a follow-on bomber, and strategic (nuclear) requirements—for
which sufficient “analysis and understanding” had not yet been available. Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright added that some broader and more fundamental
issues had also been deferred to the QDR—including “how to shift and manage risk,” including,
for example, how to think about potential trade-offs between very different sets of capabilities.”66
Issues for Congress: Secretary Gates’s Proposals
On April 6, 2009, roughly a month before the details of the FY2010 budget were released,
Secretary Gates announced several key recommendations all of which were incorporated into the
Administration’s FY2010 budget request released May 7. Gates said this “unorthodox” procedure
was warranted by the scope and significance of the decisions and by his desire to publicize them
as elements of his effort to change DOD’s strategic direction.
Quality of Life Issues
To improve the quality of life for military personnel and their families, Gates announced four
recommendations which, in sum, required $13 billion in the FY2010 base budget for activities
that previously had been funded in supplemental appropriations bills.
64 Christopher J. Castelli, “Gates Poised to Sign Key Guidance for QDR, NPR,” Inside Defense, April 23, 2009.
65 See Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Gen. James Cartwright
with Internet Security Writers, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=4398; Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=4399; and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6,
2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.
66 See Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
4399.
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End-Strength Increase67
Secretary Gates recommended that the FY2010 budget complete the ongoing expansion of the
Army and Marine Corps, halt further personnel reductions in the Air Force and Navy (possibly at
end-strength levels of 330,000 and 329,000 respectively), and fund these end strength levels at a
cost of $11 billion.
Until recently, the Army had a permanent active component end strength of 482,400 while the
active component Marine Corps had a permanent end strength of 175,000. As recently as the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), DOD maintained that these strengths were adequate.
However, the reality of fighting a multi-front war for more than five years with an all volunteer
force eventually compelled the administration to reexamine its end strength position. Having
resisted previous congressional calls to permanently increase the end strength for the Army and
the Marine Corps, on January 19, 2007 DOD announced that it would seek approval to increase
the permanent end strength of both services.
As reflected in both the FY2008 President’s budget request and the FY2008 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), the Army’s revised authorization cap is 547,400 by 2012, an increase
of 65,000 over the previous baseline of 482,400. The Marine Corps’ revised authorization cap is
202,000 by 2011, an increase of 27,000 over the previous baseline of 175,000. It was anticipated
that both services might achieve their higher authorization levels by the end of FY2009, three
years earlier than required for the Army and two years earlier than required for the Marine Corps.
The Air Force has been drawing down personnel for the past several years to fund equipment
modernization programs. At the end of FY2004, the Air Force had a personnel strength of
376,600 with a plan to reduce by 60,000 personnel and achieve an end strength of 316,600 by the
end of FY2009. However, on June 8, 2008, the Secretary of Defense announced the end of the Air
Force drawdown. While the FY2009 NDAA authorized and funded the Air Force at 317,050,
DOD is committed to stabilizing the Service at a strength of approximately 330,000.68
The Navy, on the other hand, has been downsizing by 8,000 to 10,000 personnel a year for the
past six to seven years, attempting to reach a goal of 329,000, the number required to sustain 313
ships and approximately 3,800 aircraft. The Navy ended FY2008 with a personnel strength of
332,228 and projects achieving the goal of 329,000 by the end of FY2009.69
Health Care and Family Support70
Secretary Gates stated his intention to provide increased funding for troops and their families by
requesting increases of:
• $400 million above the FY2009 level for medical research and development;
67 Prepared by Charles A. Henning, Specialist in Military Manpower Policy.
68 Lt. Gen. Richard Y. Newton, III, Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Personnel, United States Air Force,
“Presentation to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, United States House of
Representatives,” March 3, 2009.
69 Gary J. Gilmore, “Navy Stabilizes Force as it Nears End-Strength Goal,” Armed Forces Press Service, March 20,
2009.
70 Prepared by Don J. Jansen, Analyst in Military Health Care Policy.
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• $300 million above the FY2009 level for programs addressing the wounded, ill
and injured, traumatic brain injury, and psychological health; and
• $200 million above the FY2009 level for improvements in child care, spousal
support, lodging, and education.
Existing programs that previously had been funded through supplementals would be funded in the
base defense budget in FY2010. Secretary Gates stated that the department would spend over $47
billion on healthcare in FY2010.
In his April 6 statement, Secretary Gates did not mention any proposals to include cost saving
proposals in the FY10 budget submission. The earlier pre-decisional budget document released
by the White House on March 6, 2009 did not reference any such proposal either. However, in an
April 7 press conference, Secretary Gates stated that the Defense Health Program request would
be fully funded in the FY2010 budget request, unlike previous years in which legislative
proposals for cost savings had been included in the budget as offsets to budgetary needs.
Secretary Gates further stated his intention to work with Congress to enact legislation to better
control health care spending.
In its FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009 budget submissions, the DOD proposed increases in Tricare
enrollment fees, deductibles, and pharmacy co-payments for retired beneficiaries not yet eligible
for Medicare. These actions were justified by DOD as necessary to constrain the growth of health
care spending as an increasing proportion of the overall defense budget in the next decade.
Congress has passed legislation each year to prohibit the proposed fee increases.71
Study Groups Recommend Various Benefit Reforms
Congress sought advice on how to constrain military health care cost growth in crafting the FY
2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act. The FY2007 national defense
authorization72 required the establishment of a DOD Task Force on the Future of Military Health
Care, composed of military and civilian officials with experience in health-care budget issues, to
examine and report on efforts to improve and sustain defense health care over the long term
including the “beneficiary and Government cost sharing structure required to sustain military
health benefits.” Another provision of the same act (section 713) required the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) in cooperation with the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to
prepare an audit of the costs of health care to both DOD and beneficiaries between 1995 and
2005.
The Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care submitted its final report in December
2007.73 It found that existing cost-sharing provisions jeopardize long-term taxpayer support and
recommended phased-in changes in enrollment fees and deductibles that would restore cost-
sharing relationships that existed when Tricare was created. For instance, this would mean that
71 For additional information, see CRS Report RS 22402, Increases in Tricare Costs: Background and Options for
Congress, by Don J. Jansen.
72 Section 711 of P.L. 109-364.
73 Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care Final Report, December 2007 (available at
http://www.dodfuturehealthcare.net/images/103-06-2-Home-Task_Force_FINAL_REPORT_122007.pdf).
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average enrollment fees for the average under-65 retiree family would gradually rise from $460
per year to $1,100 per year.
In July, 2008, the Presidentially directed Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
(QRMC) issued its report on deferred and noncash compensation for members of the uniformed
services. The QRMC recommended that Tricare Prime74 premiums for single retirees under age
65 be set at 40% of Medicare Part B premiums (which vary by the enrollee’s adjusted gross
income). Tricare Standard/Extra75 premiums for single retirees would be set at 15% of Part B
premiums. Family rates would be set at twice the single rate regardless of family size. Tricare
deductibles would be linked to Medicare rates with copayments waived for preventative care and
prescription drug payments limited to no more than two thirds of the average copayment faced by
civilians at retail pharmacies. In addition, the QRMC recommended that health care for retirees
under age 65 be financed through accrual accounting in order to illuminate how current staffing
decisions will affect future costs.
In January, 2009, DOD’s Military Health System Senior Oversight Committee (SOC) issued a
report responding to the recommendations of the Task Force on the Future of Military Health
Care. The SOC response rejected some of the Task Force’s specific cost-sharing
recommendations, but did state that “DOD will continue to ask for congressional authority to
charge fees and copays in an effort to maintain both a generous health care benefit and a fair and
reasonable cost-sharing arrangement between beneficiaries and DOD.”76 If the Obama
Administration decides to pursue this option, details might be included in the official budget
submission expected in May or in the DOD’s national defense authorization legislative package.
Preparing for “The Wars We’re In”
Asserting that DOD is culturally conditioned to focus on preparation for conventional combat
against forces similar to those fielded by the United States, Secretary Gates said a second set of
his recommendations were intended to institutionalize within the defense establishment
capabilities that are vital to waging irregular warfare, as U.S. forces currently are doing in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR)77
Secretary Gates, himself a former Director of Central Intelligence, has indicated his intention to
increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support to the warfighter by some $2
billion within the base budget. This initiative reflects the expanding use of ISR systems,
especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in Iraq and Afghanistan to locate targets that can be
attacked with minimal damage to innocent civilians or property. DOD notes that “the number of
deployed UAS [unmanned aerial systems] has increased from approximately 167 aircraft in 2002
74 Tricare Prime is DOD’s HMO-like health plan option.
75 Tricare Standard and Tricare Extra are DOD’s fee-for-service and preferred provider type health plan options.
76 Department of Defense Military Health System Senior Oversight Committee, “Response to the Recommendations of
the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care,” January 2009, p. 103.
77 Prepared by Richard A. Best Jr., Specialist in National Defense, Christopher Bolkcom, Specialist in Military
Aviation, and Allan Hess, National Defense Fellow.
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to over 6,000 in 2008, while defense investment in UAS capabilities has dramatically grown from
$284 million in Fiscal Year 2000 to $2.5 billion in Fiscal Year 2008.”78
Gates recommended funding to field and sustain 50 continuous orbits of Predator-class and the
more capable Reaper-class UAVs, along with manned ISR platforms, such as the turbo-prop
aircraft used by Army brigade-level commanders in Iraq (as part of Task Force Odin), to provide
situational awareness—locating adversaries and even IEDs. The Gates initiative is designed to
include the acquisition of key tactical ISR systems in the base budget rather than in
supplementals. Reliance on supplemental funding is seen as resulting in insufficient ISR
resources to meet ongoing operational demands in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Gates also announced plans for more extensive R&D on ISR systems, with emphasis on systems
that provide links between warfighters and national systems. No details were provided.
The day after Gates set forth his ISR recommendations, the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), Dennis Blair, announced that his office and DOD have agreed on a plan to deploy new
imagery satellites whose design will evolve from current satellites and increase the use of
commercially available imagery. Current satellites are approaching the end of their operational
lifespan; a previous replacement approach (known as Future Imagery Architecture) was cancelled
in 2005 as a result of technical difficulties and cost-overruns and thus new systems are required.
Media reports indicate, however, that some Members favor an alternative approach to the one
approved by the DNI, one based on new systems that the Administration currently judges to be
technologically immature. Although Blair’s announcement did not mention the cost of the
satellite program (which will be funded in the classified National Intelligence Program (NIP)),
some media accounts suggest that costs of the new systems will approach $10 billion.79
Developing Partner Capacity (Section 1206)80
In his April 6 statement, Secretary Gates said he was recommending an increase of $500 million
“to boost global capacity efforts.... training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counter
terrorism and stability operations.” Such an increase in funding for building global partnership
capacity under “Section 1206” of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L.
109-163, as amended, would require Congress to once again raise the authorized limit. The
current authorized amount is $350 million. Some expect that DOD may also propose extending
Section 1206 authority to allow support of a wider array of partner nation security forces than
currently is permitted.
Both the proposed increase in the Section 1206 authorized funding level and an expansion of the
types of foreign security personnel eligible for Section 1206 assistance would be consistent with
DOD’s original proposal for building global partnership capacity legislation in 2005. At that time,
DOD requested authority, beginning in FY2006, to spend up to $750 million per fiscal year to
assist foreign military and security forces, including armies, guard, border security, civil defense,
infrastructure protection, and police forces.
78Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, January 2009, p. 25.
79 Andy Pasztor and Siobhan Gorman, “Satellite Proposals Gain Traction After North Korea’s Launch,” Wall Street
Journal, April 5, 2009.
80 Prepared by Nina Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs.
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From the start, Section 1206 authority has been highly controversial, with some policymakers
judging that the Secretary of State should retain authority over foreign military and security force
training. As a result of disagreements over bestowing a new, global “train and equip” authority on
DOD, Congress substantially scaled back DOD’s request in 2005 action. As originally enacted in
P.L. 109-163, Section 1206 spending authority was limited to $200 million per year and only
foreign military forces were eligible for assistance. The new Section 1206 authority also
contained several restrictions, making it subject to existing human rights and other restrictions
elsewhere in law.
Congress has amended Section 1206 authority twice. In the FY2007 NDAA (P.L. 109-364),
Congress raised the authorized spending limit to $300 million. P.L. 109-364 also amended
Section 1206 to require the concurrence of the Secretary of State for all expenditures.81 In action
on the FY2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-417), Congress
extended Section 1206 authority through FY2011, raised the spending limit to $350 million, and
made those funds available across fiscal years, and included maritime security forces among
those eligible to receive assistance. It rejected the Bush Administration’s proposal to make
Section 1206 authority permanent, to extend eligibility to broad array of foreign police and other
security forces, and to increase the funding cap to $750 million.82
Army Brigade Combat Teams83
Secretary Gates proposed reducing from 48 to 45 the number of active duty Brigade Combat
Teams the Army will create as it reorganizes its combat force from 10 divisions (each numbering
between 10,000 and 18,000 soldiers) to a larger number of brigades, each comprising between
3,000 and 5,000 troops. Unlike older brigades, which typically have to borrow various specialists
from other units in order to deploy overseas, the new Brigade Combat Teams are intended to be
organizationally independent, including on their rosters all the personnel they would need for
deployment. By reorganizing its force into a larger number of smaller units, the Army hoped to
give soldiers more time at their home bases between deployments (called “dwell time”).
Moreover, since the new units are self-sufficient, the Army also hoped to eliminate the use of
Stop Loss orders, which require personnel to remain on active duty after the end of their
enlistment when their particular skills are needed.
The Army began restructuring from a division-centric organization to brigade-centric units
shortly after September 11, 2001. The original concept, as outlined in the FY2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) was to transform the active Army into 42 Brigade Combat Teams and 75
Modular Support Brigades. In 2007, when a decision was made to add 65,000 soldiers to the
Army’s force structure (increasing active duty end strength from 482,400 to 547,400), six Brigade
Combat Teams and eight Modular Support Brigades were added to the planned brigade-centric
reorganization. At that point, the plan was to create 48 Brigade Combat Teams and 83 Modular
Support Brigades by 2013.
81The original legislation called only for the Secretaries of Defense and State to jointly formulate any Section 1206
program and for the Secretary of Defense to coordinate program implementation with the Secretary of State. This
provision remains in current law.
82 For further information, see CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and
Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
83 Prepared by Charles A. Henning, Specialist in Military Manpower Policy.
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Special Operations Forces84
Secretary Gates recommended increasing by 2,800 or 5% the number of personnel assigned to
Special Operations Forces, which are units trained to perform small-scale, often clandestine
military operations. How the proposed personnel increase will be spread among the Services and
a target date for completing the expansion were not announced. Gates also recommended
unspecified increases in the purchase of transport and aerial refueling aircraft that are adapted to
special operations missions.85
The FY2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) increased the number of active duty Special
Forces Battalions by one-third and established a 2,600-strong Marine Corps Special Operations
Command, a capability that did not previously exist in the Marine Corps.
The qualification and training requirements for special operations personnel are lengthy and have
a high failure rate. As a result, manning an enlarged force structure for special operations
personnel takes more time than manning conventional combat units.
Helicopter Crew Training
Secretary Gates recommended adding to the base budget $500 million to increase the number of
helicopters that could be deployed, with most of the funds intended to increase the number of
Army helicopter pilots recruited and trained.
Gen. Martin Dempsey, USA, chief of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is
reported to have said the additional funds would address the complaints of U.S. commanders in
Afghanistan, who say they have the helicopters they need but not enough trained personnel to fly
and maintain them. Currently, the Army trains about 1,200 helicopter pilots annually, but it needs
nearly 1,500, Dempsey reportedly said, adding that an additional $500 million would allow him
to close the gap in two years.86
Shipbuilding—Request87
Navy shipbuilding plans have emerged in recent years as a matter of particular congressional
concern. The ship-procurement rate for the last 17 years has been well below the average annual
rate that would be needed over the long term to achieve and maintain the Navy’s planned 313-
ship fleet. Many observers believe the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan is unaffordable.
Certain Navy shipbuilding programs in recent years have experienced significant cost growth,
construction delays, and construction deficiencies. Some Members of Congress who track Navy
shipbuilding have expressed growing concern and frustration about the situation.
Secretary Gates linked various shipbuilding proposals to different aspects of his overall strategic
vision, justifying some of them in terms of conventional force modernization requirements, others
84 Prepared by Charles A. Henning, Specialist in Military Manpower Policy.
85 For additional information, see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and
Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
86 Amy Butler, “Army Shifts Focus to Helo Pilot Training,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 20, 2009.
87 Prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs.
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in terms of acquisition reform, and still others in terms of his effort to institutionalize within DOD
thinking a higher priority for irregular warfare. His proposed actions concerning Navy ships did
not go as far as some observers had expected or speculated in terms of proposed reductions or
cutbacks. In particular, Secretary Gates did not propose a near-term and permanent reduction in
the size of the Navy’s aircraft carrier force from 11 ships to 10, and he did not propose the
cancellation of second and third Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. Some of Secretary
Gates’s proposed actions simply confirmed existing Navy plans for certain shipbuilding
programs, or were consistent with recent press reports about emerging Navy plans for those
programs.
The following section discuss in more detail Secretary Gates’s recommendations concerning
various classes of vessels under development or under construction.
Aircraft Carriers
Instead of proposing a near-term and permanent reduction in the size of the carrier force from 11
ships to 10, Secretary Gates proposed that the schedule for procuring new carriers be stretched
out somewhat, to a rate of one carrier every five years. The previous schedule called for procuring
one carrier approximately every 4.5 years (a combination of four- and five-year intervals). The
stretching out of the carrier procurement schedule, Secretary Gates said, would place carrier
procurement “on a more fiscally sustainable path.” He stated that his proposed schedule would
permit the Navy to maintain an 11-carrier force through about 2040, after which the force would
decrease to 10 ships.88
In announcing the proposal to stretch out the carrier procurement schedule (and his proposals
regarding the CG(X) cruiser, the 11th LPD-17 amphibious ship, and the Mobile Landing Platform
ship), Secretary Gates stated, “The healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America’s
existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several major surface
combatants and other maritime programs.”89
Although the Navy under Secretary Gates’s proposed carrier-procurement schedule is generally to
maintain an 11-carrier force through 2040, the force is projected to temporarily drop to ten ships
for a 33-month period in 2012-2015. This temporary drop has been projected for years and is not
a result of Secretary Gates’s proposed carrier-procurement schedule. The drop would occur
because the aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) is scheduled to retire in 2012 at age 51, and its
replacement, the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), is not scheduled to enter service until 2015.
Secretary Gates’s proposal for shifting carrier procurement to one ship every five years would
defer the procurement of the next aircraft carrier, CVN-79, by one year, from FY2012 to FY2013.
Such a one-year deferral could increase the cost of both CVN-79 and Virginia-class submarines
under construction at that shipyard. A one-year deferral in the procurement date of CVN-79 could
88Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341. Reducing the carrier force in the near term and
permanently from 11 ships to 10 could have involved cancelling the mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul scheduled in
FY2013 for the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), and retiring the Lincoln in 2015, at about age 26, instead
of keeping the ship in operation to about age 50.
89 Ibid.
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also reduce the amount of advance procurement funding that is to be requested for the ship in
FY2010.90
DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyers
The FY2010 budget request included funds to complete the third destroyer of the DDG-1000
class, which was authorized but only partially funded in FY2009, as well as funds to purchase an
additional destroyer of the DDG-51 class. In his April 6 press conference, Secretary Gates stated
that that the plan to fund both ships in FY2010 depended on, “being able to work out contracts to
allow the Navy to efficiently build all three DDG-1000 class ships at Bath Iron Works in Maine
and to smoothly restart the DDG-51 Aegis Destroyer program at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls
shipyard in Mississippi. Even if these arrangements work out, the DDG-1000 program would end
with the third ship and the DDG-51 would continue to be built in both yards.” He added that “If
our efforts with industry are unsuccessful, the department will likely build only a single prototype
DDG-1000 at Bath and then review our options for restarting production of the DDG-51. If the
department is left to pursue this alternative, it would unfortunately reduce our overall
procurement of ships and cut workload in both shipyards.”91
Secretary Gates’s proposal regarding destroyer procurement was one of several program actions
that he cited after saying, of DOD’s acquisition and contracting processes: “The perennial
procurement and contracting cycle—going back many decades—of adding layer upon layer of
cost and complexity onto fewer and fewer platforms that take longer and longer to build must
come to an end,” he told reporters April 6. “There is broad agreement on the need for acquisition
and contracting reform in the Department of Defense. There have been enough studies. Enough
hand-wringing. Enough rhetoric. Now is the time for action.”92
Soon after Secretary Gates’s April 6 news conference, it was reported that the Navy had reached
an agreement with Bath Iron Works and Northrop to have Bath build all three DDG-1000s. Under
the agreement, Northrop would build the first two DDG-51s to be procured under the DDG-51
restart, and Bath would build the third DDG-51.93
CG(X) Cruiser
Secretary Gates proposed a delay in the start of the CG(X) cruiser program “to revisit both the
requirements and acquisition strategy” for the program. The Navy wants to procure CG(X)s to
replace its 22 Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruisers, which are projected to reach their retirement age
of 35 years between 2021 and 2029. In announcing this proposal (and his proposals on the aircraft
carrier procurement schedule and on delaying procurement of the 11th LPD-17 amphibious ship
and the Mobile Landing Platform ship), Secretary Gates said, “The healthy margin of dominance
90 Aircraft carrier procurement is discussed further in CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft
Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
91 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.
92 Ibid.
93 Procurement of DDG-1000 and DDG-51 destroyers is discussed further in CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and
DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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at sea provided by America’s existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow
production of several major surface combatants and other maritime programs.”94
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
Secretary Gates recommended continuation of the planned procurement of Littoral Combat Ships
(LCSs) which he described as, “a key capability for presence, stability, and counterinsurgency
operations in coastal regions.” This was one of several recommendations he made after stating:
“Our contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and a bureaucratic
constituency similar to conventional modernization programs. I intend to use the FY10 budget to
begin this process.”95
The FY2010 budget requested funding for three more LCSs, consistent with prior Navy planning
and represent no change to the program: The LCS program was scheduled to increase from two
ships in FY2009 to three ships in FY2010 as part of a plan to ramp up the annual LCS
procurement rate to an eventual level of five or more ships per year, and the Navy has planned a
total of 55 LCSs since 2006.
The LCS program was restructured in 2007 following revelations of significant cost growth and
construction problems. The program continues to be a program of particular oversight focus for
Congress. The Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee, for example, held a hearing on March 10, 2009, to review the status of the program.96
On September 16, 2009, the Navy announced another restructuring of the LCS program,
cancelling its plan to build several ships to each of two competing designs before selecting one of
the two for further production. Under the Navy’s new plan, it would choose between the two
designs during FY2010 and would procure two LCS ships in FY2010 (instead of the three
included in the FY2010 budget request).97
LPD-17, Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), and Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
Laying the groundwork for a potentially dramatic change in DOD planning, Secretary Gates
proposed deferring from FY2010 to FY2011 the procurement of two ships intended to support
amphibious landings, saying he wanted to, “assess costs and analyze the amount of these
capabilities the nation needs.”98
Secretary Gates drew the point more sharply during a speech to the Naval War College on April
17, citing amphibious landings as one example of areas in which he wanted the QDR to be
“realistic about the scenarios where direct U.S. military action would be needed.” As recently as
94 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.
95 Ibid.
96 The LCS program is discussed further in CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
97 Department of Defense, News Release, “Littoral Combat Ship Down Select Accounced,” No. 722-09, September 16,
2009.
98 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.
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1991, he acknowledged, the threat of a large-scale amphibious assault by U.S. Marines on the
coast of Kuwait played a useful role in tying down Iraqi forces while the actual U.S.-led attack
came overland from Saudi Arabia. But he added: “We have to take a hard look at where it would
be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious action again. In the 21st century,
how much amphibious capability do we need?”99
Pending analysis of that issue by the QDR, Secretary Gates recommended deferring the planned
funding in FY2010 of an 11th San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship and the first Mobile
Landing Platform—a ship intended to function as a pier on which cargo ships could transfer their
loads to amphibious landing craft. Procurement of LPD-17s has been a topic of congressional
interest in recent years. Secretary Gates’s proposal could increase the cost of the 11th LPD-17 and
the MLP in then-year dollars, if not also in real (inflation-adjusted) dollars.100
Secretary Gates did not recommend any change in planned procurement of Joint High Speed
Vessels (JHSVs), high-speed sealift ships the production of which is just beginning. He
announced that, “to improve our inter-theater lift capability,” pending delivery of the first JHSV,
DOD would charter two existing ships of this kind, in addition to two it currently has under
charter.101 The chartered ships of this type all have been foreign-built.
Aircraft—Request
As with his shipbuilding recommendations, Secretary Gates cited different rationales for his
various recommendations about aircraft programs, justifying some of them in terms of the need to
affordably modernize U.S. conventional forces and citing others as necessary steps toward
acquisition reform.
Tactical Combat Aircraft (F-35, F-22, F/A-18)
Secretary Gates basically reaffirmed the existing plan for fighter procurement, except for a slight
reduction in the number of F/A-18-type planes for the Navy to be funded in FY2010. He thus
rejected a vigorous campaign by proponents of the Air Force’s F-22 to continue production of that
aircraft which supporters maintain has a uniquely potent blend of speed and stealthiness. Instead,
Secretary Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Gen. James E. Cartwright, called for a
force made up of the planned 187 F-22s, plus thousands of the cheaper and less stealthy F-35s,
and several hundred missile-armed Reaper and Predator UAVs. The UAVs would replace many
of the 250 older fighters, mostly F-16s, that Secretary Gates plans to retire.102 This marks the first
time that senior DOD officials have identified UAVs as major components of the U.S. combat
force rather than as support equipment.
99 DOD News transcript: “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode
Island,” April 17, 2009 accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4405.
100 LPD-17 procurement is discussed further in CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
101 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.
102 DOD News Transcript, “Media Roundtable of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and General James Cartwright,
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Selected Reporters, April 7, 2009, accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4399.
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
Secretary Gates recommended buying 30 F-35s in FY2010, an increase from the 14 funded in
FY2009, with an increase in funding from $6.9 billion to $11.2 billion. He called for buying 523
F-35s in FY2010-14 and a total of 2,443 of the aircraft over the program’s life. This procurement
profile matches the current F-35 program of record for FY09 and FY10, although $11.2 billion is
higher than the $8.4 billion originally planned for FY2010. Purchasing 513 aircraft over the five
year defense plan is a slight increase (28 aircraft) over the current program, but the projected total
purchase of 2,443 remains the same as previously planned.103
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in March that DOD sought to increase
the five-year purchase plan by 169, and criticized the $33 billion effort as creating “very
significant financial risk” in part due to a lack of flight testing prior to procuring large numbers of
the aircraft.104
F-22 Raptor
Secretary Gates recommended no further procurement of F-22s, thus ending the program at 187
planes—the 183 funded thus far plus four planes requested in the FY2009 supplemental
appropriation.
Ending production at 183 matches the program of record for the F-22 Raptor; the four additional
aircraft requested are intended to replace combat aircraft losses. In follow-on comments,
Secretary Gates stated that advice from Combatant Commanders and the Air Force indicated “no
military requirement for F-22s beyond.... 187.”105 Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton
Schwartz, stated during his confirmation hearings in 2008, that his personal position was that the
right number of F-22 aircraft was greater than 183 but less than the 381 that the Air Force had
been arguing for. However, he subsequently avoided public statements on the matter.106 Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, said in December 2008 that the Air Force had
discussed with him a plan to purchase 60 additional aircraft, but deferred further discussions to
the new Presidential administration.107
On April 13, 2009 the Air Force’s civilian and military leadership, acknowledging the difficult
budget environment and new risk assessments by DOD, formally endorsed Secretary Gates’s
proposal to complete F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft.108 Congress has generally supported the F-
22 in the past. In FY2009, Congress added to the budget request $523 million that could be used
103 For further analysis on the F-35, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
104 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating Procurement before Completing
Development Increases the Government’s Financial Risk, GAO-09-303, March 12, 2009, http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09303.pdf.
105 DOD news transcript, DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates from the Pentagon, April 6, 2009, accessed at
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4396.
106 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Nomination Hearing, US Air Force Chief of Staff, 110th
Cong., 2nd sess., July 22, 2008.
107 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Adm. Mullen From the Pentagon,” press release, December
10, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4330.
108 Michael Donley and Norton Schwartz. “Moving Beyond the F-22.” Washington Post. April 13, 2009.
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for advanced procurement of an additional lot of F-22s should the administration choose to do
so.109
F/A-18s
Secretary Gates recommended buying 31 F/A-18 Super Hornets for the Navy in FY2010, without
specifying the mix of models. FY2009 Navy budget documents indicate a planned FY2010
request for 18 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and 22 EA-18G Growlers—a version of the plane
modified for electronic warfare—in all, a total of 40 aircraft. If, as most observers believe,
Secretary Gates includes EA-18Gs in his recommendation for a revised FY-10 purchase, then 31
aircraft represent a reduction of nine Super Hornets and Growlers from the previous DOD
budget.110
Congress has generally funded the F/A-18 as requested, with some modification to the mix of
“E,” “F,” and “G” models to be procured.
Air Mobility (KC-X, C-17)
Secretary Gates recommended that the Air Force remain on its current schedule to develop a new
aerial refueling tanker (KC-X) to replace the KC-135, which is the Air Force’s top acquisition
priority. A contract to develop and build the KC-X was awarded to Northrop Grumman in
February 2008, but after the GAO upheld a formal protest by competitor Boeing, Secretary Gates
cancelled the competition and called for a “cooling off” period, deferring all program decisions to
a new presidential administration.111 The new competition began September 24, 2009, with the
issuance of a draft Request for Proposals, the final version of which is expected in January, 2010.
While some in Congress support a “split” buy, i.e., having both companies build new tankers,
Secretary Gates remains opposed, citing high costs and potential problems the Air Force might
encounter by maintaining two separate training programs and logistics operations for the tanker
fleet.112
Congress has expressed strong support for replacing the aging KC-135 fleet, but has disagreed
with DOD on how this might best be accomplished. Over the past three legislative sessions,
Congress urged DOD to increase the proposed rate of KC-X production and has created a Tanker
Replacement Transfer Fund to give DOD flexibility in using procurement, O&M, and R&D funds
to support KC-X acquisition.113
109For further analysis on the F-22, see CRS Report RL31673, Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler, and CRS Report RS22684, Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan, by
Christopher Bolkcom and Emma Chanlett-Avery.
110 For further analysis on these aircraft, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement
and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
111 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Announces Termination of KC-X Tanker Solicitation,” press release,
September 10, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12195.
112 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates From the Pentagon,” press release, March
18, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4381.
113 For further analysis of this issue see CRS Report RL34398, Air Force KC-X Tanker Aircraft Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
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Secretary Gates recommended ending procurement of the C-17 Globemaster III long-range cargo
jet after production of the 205 planes already in service or funded. Ending production at 205
aircraft matches the program of record for the C-17 Globemaster III. Potential questions may
arise over what analysis was used for this conclusion. In 2008, the incoming commander of
United States Transportation Command, General Duncan McNabb, stated that the strategic airlift
requirement (33.95 million ton miles/day (MTM/D)) set by mobility studies in 2005 could be met
with 205 C-17s, 52 modernized C-5Bs, and 59 C-5As.114
Acquisition Reform (VH-71, CSAR-X)
Secretary Gates recommended termination of two high-profile helicopter programs, justifying
both proposals as part of his effort to reform DOD’s acquisition process.
He recommended terminating the VH-71 helicopter, intended to transport the President and other
senior officials, on the basis of its troubled acquisition history and large cost overruns. While
post-9/11 security concerns gave the program a certain “urgency,” the long timelines for delivery
of fully capable helicopters (slated for initial deployment in 2017) work against that argument, he
said. He also decided against purchasing the first lot of less capable “Increment 1” aircraft, stating
they would only last five to ten years, although it is unclear why their useful life would be so
much less than other models of helicopters.115
Over the past three legislative sessions, Congress has expressed concern over noteworthy cost
increases, schedule delays, and foreign influence on the program. Over this time period, Congress
cut approximately $300 million of the $2 billion from the Navy’s R&D accounts for the VH-
71.116
Secretary Gates also recommended terminating the Air Force Combat Search and Rescue
helicopter (CSAR-X) and called for reviewing the requirement the aircraft was designed to meet.
His rationale for terminating the CSAR-X helicopter program jibes with a commonly held belief
that the process by which DOD defines the requirements a new weapon is supposed to meet does
not adequately force the military services to make hard decisions or trade off capabilities among
themselves. The debate over whether search and rescue (SAR) missions require a specialized
aircraft has been in progress for several years and was most recently raised by former Pentagon
Acquisition Chief John Young.117 In an interview in November 2008, Mr. Young stated that DOD
“... [has] a lot of assets that can be used in rescue missions with planning, so I don’t necessarily
just automatically rubber-stamp the CSAR-X requirement.” The Air Force countered that it has
twice won approval for a dedicated CSAR aircraft from the Joint Requirements Oversight
114 “Modernized” C-5s are those modified under the Reliability Enhancement Re-engining Program (RERP). For a
discussion of the RERP, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Advance Questions for General
McNabb, US Transportation Command, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., July 22, 2008. For further analysis of this program see
CRS Report RS22763, Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah
Gertler.
115U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates From the Pentagon,” press release, March
18, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4381.
116For background, see CRS Report RS22103, VH-71/VXX Presidential Helicopter Program: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
117 All references in this paragraph come from an investigation by the reporting staff of Aviation Week and Space
Technology, an aerospace trade journal. See Michael Fabey, “Young Opinion on CSAR Questioned,” Aerospace Daily
& Defense Report, January 28-30, 2009.
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Council (JROC), the high-level DOD panel that approves the requirements a new weapons
program is supposed to meet. The service argued that CSAR was a critical shortfall at the
beginning of combat operations in Afghanistan in 2001, that specially-trained CSAR forces were
used far more often than recognized, and that using non-specialized forces for CSAR missions
would result in increased U.S. casualties. Further statements by Secretary Gates indicate that
DOD might also consider making CSAR a joint capability, thereby changing the organization and
acquisition process for any dedicated assets.
Missile Defense—Request118
Secretary Gates recommended in his April 6 statement that DOD restructure the ballistic missile
defense (BMD) program to focus more on rogue-state and theater ballistic missile threats and
maintain and improve existing long-range BMD capabilities.119
These recommendations seem to align with Secretary Gates’s broader strategic thinking about the
types of foreign threats the United States is most likely to face (e.g., “hybrid warfare,” where U.S.
troops could be threatened by state and non-state actors armed with short-range ballistic missiles).
Additionally, Secretary Gates’s stated objective is to adjust DOD investments and rebalance the
overall force, especially in the resource constrained era he acknowledges. This seems to reflect
his argument that the United States should focus more attention on shorter range BMD
investments. He also wants to improve our existing U.S. long-range BMD system without
necessarily acquiring more of that same capability pending DOD review of the need for
additional interceptors and whether more future-oriented programs could better supplement the
overall BMD capability.120
Theater Defenses (THAAD, SM-3, Aegis)
To accelerate deployment of defenses against theater ballistic missiles—those without
intercontinental range—Secretary Gates recommended adding to the FY2010 budget $700
million to field more SM-3 (Standard Missile 3) and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense) BMD interceptors, and about $200 million more to convert six additional Aegis ships to
provide BMD capabilities. He added that this would basically fund the maximum production
capacity of the production lines for the SM-3 and THAAD, which are coming out of the testing
phase and moving into full-rate production. The SM-3 is the anti-missile interceptor used by
Navy cruisers and destroyers equipped with the powerful Aegis radar and missile control
system.121
118 Prepared by Stephen A. Hildreth, Specialist in Missile Defense.
119 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates From the Pentagon,” press release, March
18, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4381.
120 For additional analysis of the missile defense issue see CRS Report RS22120, Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical
Overview, by Steven A. Hildreth and CRS Report RL33240, Kinetic Energy Kill for Ballistic Missile Defense: A Status
Overview, by Steven A. Hildreth.
121 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates From the Pentagon,” press release, March
18, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4381.
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Ground-Based National Missile Defense
Secretary Gates recommended not increasing the current number of long-range ground-based
interceptors deployed in Alaska, as had been planned. Currently, there are slightly more than two
dozen of these interceptors deployed in Alaska and California in the event of missile attacks
against the United States from North Korea or Iran. Secretary Gates said it was important “to
robustly fund continued research and development to improve the capability we already have to
defend against long-range missile threats.” In response to questions about plans to construct a
third missile defense site in Europe, Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Gen. James Cartwright,
USMC, said there are “sufficient funds in ’09 that can be carried forward to do all of the work
that we need to do at a pace that we’ll determine as we go through the program review, the
quadrennial defense review, and negotiations with those countries.”122 Further details were not
offered at that time.123
Secretary Gates also recommended cancelling the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program124
because of its significant technical challenges and the fresh need to look at the requirements for
that system. The MKV is seen by some as enhancing the capability of long-range interceptors for
mid-course BMD in the future.
On September 17, 2009, President Obama cancelled the plan to deploy a long-range missile
defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Instead, DOD plans to acquire a network of
mobile radars and interceptor missiles, including the SM-3 intended to defend Europe against
Iranian missiles of short and medium range. The President said U.S. intelligence agencies had
concluded that Iran’s effort to develop long-range ballistic missiles was taking longer than had
been assumed while it was moving more quickly than had been forecast to develop missiles that
could fly far enough to hit Europe, but not far enough to hit U.S. territory.125
Boost-Phase Defenses (Airborne Laser and KEI)
Secretary Gates recommended on April 6 various program changes regarding boost-phase defense
(i.e., efforts aimed at destroying attacking ballistic missiles shortly after they launch). He
recommended cancelling the second ABL (Airborne Laser) prototype aircraft and shifting the
focus of that program to further research and development. He said the ABL program was not
ready for production, that it had “significant affordability and technology problems, and the
program’s proposed operational role is highly questionable.” Also, in response to a question about
whether there might be changes in the BMD acquisition process, Gen. Cartwright, said that “what
will change is we’re going to start to shift and understand in that first phase what the leverage and
potential opportunities are in the boost-phase, focus on the threats.... and start to reassess what it
is and what we can do in the boost-phase for long-range.”126
122 DOD transcript, “News Briefing With Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, April 6, 2009,
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396.
123 For further analysis of this issue, see CRS Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by
Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek.
124 The MKV program is an effort to equip a single interceptor missile to destroy several incoming warheads.
125 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy; A “Phased, Adaptive
Approach” for Missile Defense in Europe.,” September 17, 2009.
126 DOD transcript, “News Briefing With Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, April 6, 2009,
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396.
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Congressional Perspectives
In response to Secretary Gates’s recommendations, several senators wrote to the Secretary
expressing their approval of the increases to THAAD and SM-3, but voicing concern about the
proposed cut to missile defense funding, stating that it could “undermine our emerging missile
defense capabilities to protect the United States against a growing threat.”127 At a media
roundtable on April 7, 2009, Secretary Gates said “perhaps we can persuade them that all is not as
bad as they seem to think” if he could show them the proposed changes to THAAD and SM-3,
the sustained work on long-range systems for mid-course BMD, and the continued funding of
R&D for boost-phase interception.
Ground Combat Systems (FCS and EFV)—Request128
On April 6, 2009, Secretary Gates announced that he intended to significantly restructure the
Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, the Army’s plan to modernize its entire suite of
combat equipment. Specifically, he said, DOD would accelerate the process of “spinning out” to
all brigade combat teams (BCTs) technologies developed in the FCS program that were ready for
deployment. However he said he would cancel the manned ground vehicle (MGV) component of
FCS, which was intended to field eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on a
common chassis that would eventually replace several existing combat vehicles, including the M-
1 Abrams tank, the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the M-109 Paladin self-propelled
artillery system.129
Secretary Gates said he was concerned that there were significant unanswered questions in the
FCS vehicle design strategy and that despite some adjustments to the MGVs, that they did not
adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Secretary Gates was also critical that the FCS program did not include a role for
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles that have been used successfully in current
conflicts.130
There are a number of policy implications flowing from Secretary of Defense Gate’s decision to
restructure the FCS program. In essence, the Army was told to “go back to the drawing board” on
this almost decade-old program once described as the “centerpiece” of Army modernization.
Because the Army has focused exclusively on FCS for well over a decade, there has probably
been little thought given to alternatives to the eight MGVs that were to be developed under the
FCS program. DOD officials expressed misgivings that the Army had neither taken into account
“the lessons learned of the operational realities in Iraq and Afghanistan” in the design of FCS
MGVs nor carefully considered whether “one class of vehicles could in fact cover the range of
operations that we envision are going to be the reality of the future.”131 Another point of
127 The April 6 letter, signed by Senators Joseph Lieberman, John Kyl, Lisa Murkowski, Mark Begich, Jeff Sessions,
and James Inhofe, can be viewed at http://lieberman.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=311225&&.
128 Prepared by Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces.
129 For further analysis of FCS see CRS Report RL32888, Army Future Combat System (FCS) “Spin-Outs” and
Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert and Nathan Jacob Lucas.
130DOD transcript, “News Briefing With Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, April 6, 2009,
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396.
131 U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates and Gen. James Cartwright with Military Bloggers,” April 7, 2009.
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contention is that the FCS program did not adequately address the role of MRAPs—a vehicle that
the Army considers interim protection for soldiers in combat. MRAPs, while providing excellent
protection to soldiers, are transport vehicles and are not fighting vehicles like the Abrams,
Bradleys, Strykers, or the proposed FCS MGVs, so determining a more permanent role for these
vehicles may prove challenging. Another implication will likely be developmental timelines.
Should a decision eventually be made to develop and procure new non-MGV-based variants to
replace the Abrams, Bradley, and Paladins, there will likely be questions raised about a decade
long or greater development and procurement cycle, as was the case of the FCS program. There
might also be resistance to an all-encompassing “systems of systems” FCS-like developmental
effort for Army vehicle modernization, although commonality between platforms to reduce costs
and improve maintainability and support could likely be viewed favorably.
Secretary Gates left unchanged the current plan to continue development and production of the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), an amphibious armored combat vehicle for the Marine
Corps. But he said a decision on the future of that program, like the future of planned amphibious
landing ships, would await the results of the QDR.132
Congressional Perspectives
Congress has generally viewed the FCS program with a degree of skepticism due to its ambitious
scope, significant price tag, and heavy reliance on theoretical and unproven technologies. In
addition, the FCS program’s reliance on defense industry lead systems integrators (LSIs) to
develop and manage much of the program has also come under significant congressional
scrutiny.133 Congress has been supportive of the Army’s recent decision to focus the FCS program
on “spinning out” sensor and unmanned aerial and ground systems, and networking technology to
its Infantry Brigade Combat Teams and might be expected to support DOD’s decision to
accelerate these efforts. Congress has also been concerned about the development of the FCS
Network, including complimentary programs to develop new software-programmable radios and
satellites to accommodate the vast amounts of information needed by FCS-equipped units. In this
regard, Congress has legislated a number of studies and testing requirements to insure that the
FCS Network will be fully functional and not vulnerable to either attack or disruption. Secretary
Gates did not mention restructuring the FCS Network, so it is possible that work on the network
not related to FCS manned ground vehicles will continue with a commensurate level of
congressional oversight.
The decision to not fund the development of FCS MGVs could be a more contentious issue in
Congress. One combat vehicle in the FCS MGV family—the Non-Line-of- Sight Cannon
(NLOS-C)—is a congressionally-mandated program,134 requiring the Army to produce a total of
18 NLOS-C Initial Production Platforms by the end of 2011. One possible point of contention
could be the necessity to build all 18 of these NLOS-Cs if DOD does not intend to procure
additional NLOS-Cs. Other potential issues include the possible resumption and continuation of
the M-1 Abrams and M-2 Bradley lines if the Army does not indentify successors during the re-
132 The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle is discussed further in CRS Report RS22947, The Marines’ Expeditionary
Fighting Vehicle (EFV): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
133 For further analysis of the LSI issue see CRS Report RS22631, Defense Acquisition: Use of Lead System Integrators
(LSIs)—Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Valerie Bailey Grasso.
134 See Section 216 of the FY 2003 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314) and Section 8121 of the FY
2003 Department of Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-248).
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evaluation of its vehicle modernization program. In regards to the Army’s re-evaluation of its
vehicle modernization program, Congress might be expected to play a significant role in this
process, as it not only may provide them with an opportunity to shape Army capabilities and force
structure, but could also ensure that the eventual acquisition of any new ground combat systems is
in line with proposed acquisition reform measures.
Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to
Date
FY2010 Congressional Budget Resolution
The conference report on the annual congressional budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 13) includes a
recommended ceiling on FY2010 budget authority and outlays for the “national defense” function
of the federal budget that matches President Obama’s request. The budget resolution’s ceilings on
budget authority and outlays for national defense and other broad categories (or functions) of
federal expenditure are not binding on the Appropriations committees, nor do they formally
constrain the authorizing committees in any way.
However, the budget resolution’s ceilings on the so-called “050 function”—the budget accounts
funding the military activities of DOD and the defense-related activities of the Department of
Energy and other agencies—have in the past indicated the general level of support in the House
and Senate for the President’s overall defense budget proposal.
The House version of the budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 85 ), adopted April 2, set the FY2010
budget authority ceiling for the 050 “national defense” function at $562.0 billion and provided a
separate allowance of $130.0 billion—the amount requested for war costs—under function 970
(“overseas deployments and other activities”). Those two ceilings add up to $692.0 billion. The
Senate version of the budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 13 ), also adopted April 2, set the budget
authority ceiling for the 050 national defense function at $691.7 billion and did not set a separate
ceiling for overseas deployments. In the reports accompanying their respective resolutions, the
House and Senate Budget committees each indicated that the ceilings recommended were
intended to accommodate President Obama’s FY2010 DOD budget request.
The conference report on the final version of the budget resolution (H.Rept. 111-89) follows the
House version’s pattern of setting separate ceilings for a national defense base budget and for
overseas deployments. The House adopted the joint resolution April 29 by a vote of 233-193. The
Senate adopted it the same day by a vote of 53-43.
National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647, S. 1390)
The conference report on the defense authorization bill (H.Rept. 111-288) was filed on October 7,
2009 and was adopted by the House on October 8 by a vote of 281-146. The Senate adopted the
conference report October 22 by a vote of 68-29 and the President signed it into law (P.L. 111-84)
on October 28.
The conference report authorizes a total of $680.2 billion for military activities of the Department
of Defense (DOD) and defense-related activities of other federal agencies. The total
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authorization, which is $14.9 million higher than the Obama Administration requested, includes
$550.2 billion for the so-called “base budget”—all DOD activities other than combat operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan—and $130.0 billion for “overseas contingency operations,” including
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The House version of the FY2010 defense authorization bill, H.R. 2647, was reported by the
House Armed Services Committee on June 18, 2009 (H.Rept. 111-166) and passed by the House
June 25 with relatively few changes. It would have authorized $550.5 billion for the DOD base
and defense-related programs of the Energy Department, which is $348.0 million more than the
President requested. For war costs, the House bill would have authorized $130 billion, as
requested, but would redistribute some funds within that total bringing the total authorized by the
House-passed bill to $680.5 billion.
On July 2, 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the FY2010
defense authorization bill, S. 1390 (S.Rept. 111-35), which would have authorized $551.1 billion
for the DOD base budget and related Energy Department programs, $864.8 million more than the
President requested. The Senate bill would have authorized $129.3 billion, for war costs, which is
$740 million less than the request, bringing the total authorized by S. 1390 to $680.3 billion. The
Senate bill also would require the Administration to cut a total of $500 million (to reflect
unspecified “management efficiencies”) from the total DOD authorization, thus reducing the
bill’s total authorization to $679.8 billion. The Senate passed the bill July 23.
Funding levels authorized by H.R. 2647 as passed by the House, by S. 1390 as passed by the
Senate, and by the conference report on H.R. 2647 are presented in Table 7. Funding levels
authorized for selected programs by each version of the authorization bill are summarized in
Appendix.
Following are highlights of the versions of the FY2010 defense authorization bill passed by the
House and Senate as well as the conference report:
Ballistic Missile Defense—Authorization135
Both the House and Senate versions of the authorization bill supported most elements of the
Obama Administration’s plan to shift the focus of anti-missile defense efforts by slowing or
terminating work on some technologically advanced systems while increasing the planned
procurement of Aegis and THAAD interceptors designed to cope with near-term missile threats.
During House action on H.R. 2647, the $9.3 billion missile defense program was the component
of the DOD budget request that was most extensively debated, both in the Armed Services
Committee and on the House floor. Several Republican-sponsored amendments that would have
increased funding for various missile defense programs were rejected in both venues.
The Senate bill also supported the Administration’s principal missile defense decisions.
135 For additional background on the Administration request, see above, “Missile Defense—Request.” For
appropriations action, see below, “Ballistic Missile Defense—Appropriation.”
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Ground-Based Interceptors.
Like both House and Senate versions of the bill, the conference report supports Secretary Gates’s
proposals to cap the number of Ground-based Interceptors (GBI) deployed in Alaska and
California at 30, instead of deploying a total of 44. Secretary Gates, Missile Defense Agency
chief Lt. Gen. Patrick J. O’Reilly and other military commanders have said that 30 operationally
effective GBIs are sufficient given the current and prospective threat over the next five years or
so from Iran and North Korea. Secretary Gates has said that the cap at 30 would be revised
upward if the threat assessment changes. Others, however, believe the threat of long-range
ballistic missile attack from Iran and North Korea is more imminent and question whether 30
deployed GBIs are sufficient.
However, the conference report would add to the budget request authorization for $20 million to
sustain the vendor base for components that could be used to manufacture additional GBIs. The
conferees said a GBI test plan adopted by DOD late in the summer of 2009 would require
purchase of seven additional GBIs. The conference report also would require the Secretary of
Defense not to allow a break in the GBI production line until DOD completes a detailed review of
the ground-based missile defense system, including an assessment of the number of GBI’s needed
to sustain it over 20 years of service (Sections 232-233).
Boost-phase Interception.
Like both House and Senate versions of the bill, the conference report supports the
Administration’s proposal to cancel the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) and Kinetic Energy
Interceptor (KEI) programs and construction of a second Airborne Laser (ABL) prototype aircraft
(although the existing ABL plane would be retained for research). The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has faulted each of these programs for significant technical, cost
and operational challenges. Some missile defense supporters contend that cancelling the KEI and
relegating the ABL to a research program will leave the country without an active program to
destroy attacking ballistic missiles in their boost-phase or shortly after their launch. Secretary
Gates has said that the requirement for a boost-phase BMD program is being looked at as part of
the current BMD Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), expected to be completed
later this year.
Meanwhile, the Administration has said it wants to pursue an Ascent Phase BMD program
designed to destroy attacking missiles shortly after their rocket motors burn out in the boost-
phase. Because this effort is new, few details are available. Like the House version of the bill, the
conference report on H.R. 2647 would require the Defense Secretary to report to Congress the
details and strategy behind the Ascent Phase effort (Section 238).
European Missile Defense Site
When the Obama Administration released its FY2010 defense budget request, it still was
reviewing the Bush Administration’s plan to deploy in Europe a radar in the Czech Republic and
interceptor missiles in Poland that are intended to intercept missiles launched from Iran at Europe
or the United States. According to Secretary Gates, unspent funds appropriated in FY2009 for the
so-called “third site” (the other two being the GBI sites in Alaska and California) plus an
additional $50.5 million requested in the FY2010 budget would allow the project to go forward if
the Polish and Czech parliaments ratify basing agreements reached with the United States in
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2008. But the Administration also said that the proposed third site is one of several options on the
table for dealing with potential missile attacks from Iran.
The House and Senate bills both would authorize a total of $353.1 million from funds available
for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to develop missile defenses in Europe either to continue with
research, development, test and evaluation of the proposed radar and interceptor site in Poland
and the Czech Republic pending Czech and Polish ratification of the agreements, or to develop an
alternative integrated missile defense system to protect Europe from threats posed by all types of
ballistic missiles, subject to certain conditions.
On September 17, 2009, President Obama cancelled the plan to deploy a long-range missile
defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Instead, DOD plans to rely on a network of
mobile radars and interceptor missiles, including cruisers and destroyers equipped with the Aegis
radars and SM-3 missiles to defend Europe against Iranian missiles of short and medium range.
The President said U.S. intelligence agencies had concluded that Iran’s effort to develop long-
range ballistic missiles was taking longer than had been assumed while it was moving more
quickly than had been forecast to develop missiles that could fly far enough to hit Europe, but not
far enough to hit U.S. territory.136
The conference report authorizes DOD to use a total of $309.0 million from funds available in
fiscal years 2009 and 2010 for the European defense system proposed by the President in
September, except for any required military construction. The conference report also would
require an independent assessment of the cost and effectiveness of the new plan. As for military
construction for the European defense system, the conference report would rescind $151.2 million
authorized in FY2009 for construction in Poland and Czech Republic associated with the old
plan. Construction projects required by the new European missile defense plan would have to be
requested and authorized by Congress in the year the work was expected to begin, the conferees
said.
The conference report also adds $23.2 million to the $168.7 million requested for procurement of
SM-3 missiles. It also requires from the Navy (as one part of a broader, long-term plan for
shipbuilding) a report on the number of additional Aegis warships required by the new European
defense plan based on the SM-3 missile.
Shipbuilding—Authorization137
Both House and Senate versions of the authorization bill supported the Administration’s budget
proposal for major shipbuilding programs. However, the Senate Armed Services committee was
more critical than its House counterpart of the Navy’s management of its shipbuilding program
for surface combatant ships. The Senate version, which was debated as S. 1390, included a
provision that would require the Navy to prepare an detailed acquisition strategy for purchasing
surface combatants, supported by a battery of analyses. The conference report expanded the scope
of the required report.
136 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy; A “Phased, Adaptive
Approach” for Missile Defense in Europe,” September 17, 2009.
137 For additional background on the Administration request, see above, “Shipbuilding—Request,” p. 31. For
appropriations action, see below, “Shipbuilding—Appropriation,” p. 70.
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The Senate bill also would have repealed a provision of the FY2008 national defense
authorization act (P.L. 110-181) that would require that future cruisers, destroyers and large
amphibious landing ships be nuclear-powered.138 The conference report did not include that
provision.
Surface Combatants: DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyers, CG(X) Cruiser
Both versions of the bill accepted the decision, recommended by senior Navy leaders in 2008 and
embraced by the Obama Administration, to buy only three guided missile destroyers of the DDG-
1000-class, instead of the seven ships that had been planned, and to resume procurement of DDG-
51 class destroyers, 62 of which are in service or under construction. Accordingly, the House and
Senate versions each would have authorized, as requested, $1.08 billion to complete the third
DDG-1000, $539 million to continue development of that class and $1.91 billion for one DDG-
51. The House bill would have added $100 million to the $329.0 million requested for
components to be used in DDG-51s to be funded in future budgets, but this was dropped from the
conference report.
Both versions of the bill authorized, as requested, $340.0 million to continue development of the
CG(X) class of cruisers to replace existing Aegis cruisers which are slated for retirement
beginning in the early 2020s. However, the conference report retains a Senate provision that
would allow the Navy to spend only half those funds until the service produces the surface
combatant acquisition plan (and supporting analyses) that the bill requires. The conference report
would add $15 million to the portion of the CG(X)-related R&D budget that funds development
of the very powerful radar planned for the ship (instead of adding $50 million as the Senate bill
did).
Aircraft Carriers
As requested, both bills temporarily waived a law requiring the Navy to keep 11 carriers in
service, thus allowing the number of flattops to drop to 10 between 2013, when the Enterprise is
slated for retirement after 48 years of service, and 2015, when the Gerald R. Ford is scheduled to
enter the fleet. The older ship would have required a very expensive overhaul if it had to be kept
in service during those two years.
The House Armed Services Committee questioned Secretary Gates’s recommendation to slow the
rate at which future carriers are built to replace those being retired, a policy that would
permanently reduce the carrier force from 11 ships to 10 after 2040. The House committee added
to H.R. 2647 a provision (Section 122) requiring the Navy to submit a report on the effects of
funding a new carrier at the proposed slower rate of one ship every five years instead of the
previous plan under which some future carriers would have been funded only four years apart.
The House provision also bars the Navy from spending funds authorized by the bill in a way that
would make it impossible to fund the next two carriers four years apart, as had been planned.
The conference report requires the report on the effect of slowing the rate of carrier construction,
as described in the House bill. The conference report did not include the associated House
138 For background, see CRS Report RL33946, Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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provision restricting the use of funds, but conferees included report language saying they
“expect” the Navy not to take any action that would preclude building the next two carriers at
four-year intervals until it completes the required report.
Littoral Combat Ships
Both versions of the bill authorized construction of three additional Littoral Combat Ships, as
requested. H.R. 2647 also included a provision, requested by the Administration, that would
liberalize the cost-cap of $460 million per LCS set by existing law, by allowing the cap to be
adjusted for inflation and by excluding certain costs. However, the House committee also added
to that bill a provision (Section 121) authorizing the Navy to compile a technical data package
that would allow it to put the contracts for these ships up for bid by other contractors if the two
shipyards currently building LCS ships would not contract to build the FY2010 ships within the
limits of the revised cost cap.
On September 16, 2009, the Navy announced a restructuring of the LCS program, cancelling its
plan to build several ships to each of two competing designs before selecting one of the two for
further production. Under the Navy’s new plan, it would choose between the two designs during
FY2010. In addition, the Navy announced that, instead of buying three LCS ships in FY2010 (as
provided for in the budget request), it would contract with the winning contractor to buy two
ships in FY2010 as part of a so-called “block buy” of up to 10 ships to be funded through
FY2014.139
The conference report authorizes the revised program, including two ships to be funded in
FY2010 for which it authorizes the same amount as had been requested for three LCS vessels
($1.38 billion). It also would raise the cost-cap on the ships (while giving the Secretary of the
Navy significant discretion to waive the cap) and it would require the competing shipyards’ bids
to include delivery to the Navy of a technical data package that would allow it to put the contracts
for these ships up for bid by other contractors.
Combat Aircraft—Authorization
The House and Senate versions of the bill both concurred in Secretary Gates’s recommendations
to terminate development of the CSAR-X combat rescue helicopter and the VH-71 presidential
139 Department of Defense, News Release, “Littoral Combat Ship Down Select Accounced,” No. 722-09, September
16, 2009.
A block buy contract is similar to a multi-year procurement (MYP) arrangement in that the U.S. government uses a
single contract (rather than a series of annual contracts) to procure several units of a given weapon system that are
planned for procurement over a period of up to five years. As with an MYP arrangement, the use in a block-buy
arrangement of a single contract covering up to five years of procurement gives the contractor the confidence about
future business that is needed for the contractor to make investments to optimize its workforce and capital plant that
can result in a lower unit price for the weapons being procured. Unlike an MYP arrangement, a block buy contract does
not include a large termination penalty to be paid in the event that the government breaks the contract because it has
changed its mind about procuring all the items covered under the contract. Since the termination liability is part of what
gives contractors confidence that the government will not change its mind and break the contract, the lack of such a
penalty in a block buy contract means that the contractor does not have as much confidence about future business as it
would under an MYP arrangement. A block buy contract, however, can be used on acquisition programs that do not
meet the strict qualification tests for an MYP arrangement that are set forth in the statute governing MYP arrangements
(10 USC 2306b). The first block buy contract was used to procure the first four Virginia (SSN-774) attack submarines
during the five-year period FY1998-FY2002.
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helicopter and to end procurement of C-17 wide-body cargo jets. Each bill rejected several of
Gates’s recommendations concerning combat aircraft.
F-22 Raptor
Neither the House nor Senate version of the bill authorized funds for procurement in FY2009 of
additional F-22 fighters—funding for which was adamantly opposed by the President.
By a vote of 31-30, the House Armed Services Committee had added to the Administration’s
request an authorization of $368 million to buy long lead-time components that would allow
procurement in FY2011 of 12 additional F-22 fighters. H.R. 2647 would have funded the F-22
add-on without increasing the total amount authorized by cutting $368.8 million from the $5.5
billion requested for environmental cleanup of Energy Department sites associated with the
nuclear weapons program.
The Senate Armed Services Committee voted 13-11 to include in S. 1390 authorization of $1.75
billion to purchase seven additional F-22s in FY2010. Of that total, $32.3 million was money
appropriated for F-22 procurement in FY2009 but not spent by the Obama Administration. In
floor action, however, by a vote of 58-40, the Senate adopted an amendment to the bill that would
reverse the committee’s action, stripping the $1.75 billion from the F-22 program and reallocating
it to the budget accounts the Armed Services Committee had reduced to cover the cost of the F-22
addition. The Senate acted after President Obama said unequivocally that he would veto any bill
that would fund additional F-22s.
The conference report dropped the $368 million for long lead-time procurement the House bill
would have authorized. However, it retained in modified form a House provision that would
require the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure the preservation of unique tooling that would be
needed to resume F-22 production in the future.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
Rejecting a position taken by both the Bush and Obama Administrations, the conference report
added to the budget request authorization of funds ($560 million) to continue developing an
alternate engine for the single-engine F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
H.R. 2647 would have added a total of $603 million to continue developing the alternate engine
and prepare for its production. The bill would have offset that increase by cutting from the request
two of the 30 F-35s requested (a $308 million reduction) and approving only two-thirds of a
proposed management reserve fund for the program (a further reduction of $156 million).
The Senate Armed Services Committee included in S. 1390 an increase of $438.9 million to
continue development of the alternate engine, offsetting that addition by cutting the proposed
management reserve by $156 million, the same amount the House bill cut from that request.
Facing an Administration threat to veto any defense bill that funded continuation of the alternate
engine project,140 the Senate adopted by voice vote an amendment to S. 1390 eliminating
140In the Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) regarding versions of the defense authorization bill drafted by the
House Armed Services Committee and by the Senate Armed Services Committee, OMB said the President’s senior
advisors would recommend that he veto any bill that would “seriously disrupt” the F-35 program. This was less
(continued...)
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authorization to continue work on the alternate engine. This came after it rejected by a vote of 38-
59 an amendment that would have reaffirmed the Armed Services Committee’s action.
Retirement and Continued Production of Older Jets
The House bill would have delayed Secretary Gates’s plan to retire 249 older combat jets, most of
which are assigned to Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units. It would have shifted from
other parts of the Air Force budget request a total of $344.6 million to continue operating those
planes. The bill (Section 1047) also would have prohibited their retirement until 90 days after the
Secretary of the Air Force submits to the Senate and House Armed Services committees a report
detailing how the Air Force will fill the gaps left by the retirement of those planes and what
missions it will assign to the bases and personnel associated with the aircraft.
The conference report retains the requirement for a report, but would bar retirement of the planes
for 30 days after the report (rather than 90) and does not fund continued operation of the planes in
the interim.
The House version of the bill also would have required (Section 133) the Secretary of Defense to
report on alternative plans to prevent a prospective shortfall in Air Force fighters (as the service
retires old planes more quickly than it fields new F-35s) by purchasing so-called “4.5 generation”
fighters, that is, types currently in service, such as F-15s, F-16s and F/A-18s, that are equipped
with improved radars and other upgrades. The conference report retains that provision with
modifications (Section 131).
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
The House and Senate versions of the bill each included provisions designed to put pressure on
DOD to sign a multi-year contract for additional F/A-18E/F fighters, in order to reduce a
prospective shortfall in carrier-based fighters.
The House bill would have authorized a multi-year contract to buy additional F/A-18 variants
(including the single-seat “E” model, the dual-seat “F” model and the EF-18G, which is a version
of the plane equipped to jam enemy radars). It also would have increased from $51.4 million to
$159.4 million the amount authorized in FY2010 for long lead-time components to be used in
planes that could be funded in FY2011. The House bill directed the Congressional Budget Office
to compare, in terms of cost and effectiveness, the purchase of new F/A-18E/Fs with the
refurbishing of older model F/A-18s. It also added to the bill a provision (Section 1051)
expressing the sense of Congress that the Navy should field at least 10 carrier air wings, each
equipped with at least 44 strike fighters.
The Senate Armed Services Committee, predicting that ongoing DOD studies would make the
case for a signing a multi-year contract to buy new F/A-18E/Fs rather than refurbishing older
planes, argued that the Navy should buy 18 of the “E” and “F” model planes in FY2010 – as it
earlier had planned to do – rather than reducing the production run to nine planes, as the
(...continued)
unequivocal than the President’s flat assertion that he would veto any bill that funded continued production of the F-22
fighter.
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Administration’s budget proposed. Accordingly, S. 1390 would have authorized $1.57 billion for
18 F/A-18E/Fs, an increase of $560 million over the request.
The conference report authorizes a multi-year contract for F/A-18 type aircraft and authorizes
funding in FY2010 for 18 of the planes, rather than the 9 requested, adding $512.3 million to the
amount requested.
Ground Combat Systems—Authorization141
Future Combat Systems (FCS)
The House and Senate Armed Services committees both endorsed Secretary Gates’s
recommendation to terminate development within the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS)
program of several new kinds of manned ground combat vehicles, including a self-propelled
howitzer. However, both panels proposed reductions in the amounts authorized for the payments
required to cancel existing contracts on those projects.
The House version of the bill authorized $100 million of the $426.8 million requested to
terminate those parts of the program, arguing that unspent FCS funds appropriated for FY2009
would cover the balance of the termination costs. The Senate committee cut $381.8 million of the
FCS termination request and authorized the remaining $45 million to continue developing “active
protection systems”—small weapons mounted on combat vehicles to intercept approaching
missiles.
The conference report made smaller reductions in the proposed FCS termination costs than either
the House or Senate bill, authorizing $215.8 million of the $426.8 million requested to terminate
the ground combat vehicles projects. Like the House and Senate versions of the bill, the
conference report authorizes the $2.12 billion requested to continue developing other components
of FCS.
The conference report incorporates a Senate provision (which was very similar to a House
provision) requiring the Army to create two new programs—one to develop a new self-propelled
cannon and one to develop a family of other ground combat vehicles – and to report on its plans
to acquire those new systems. Like the Senate bill, the conference report also would require DOD
to contract with a non-governmental organization to assess the research needed to develop
technologies that would be required by a new generation of ground combat vehicles.
In its report on H.R. 2647, the House Armed Services Committee offered specific
recommendations for how the Army should modernize its combat vehicle fleet in the absence of
FCS, taking into account the large amounts spent to modernize existing vehicles in recent years.
The committee recommended that current fleet of M-1 tanks, Paladin cannons and Stryker
armored combat vehicles should be given upgrades—including some technologies developed as
part of FCS, such as the “active defense system” intended to shoot down approaching anti-tank
missiles. Two other types of armored carriers—Bradleys and the older M-113s—should be
candidates for replacement by new vehicles, the committee said.
141 For additional background on the Administration request, see above, “Ground Combat Systems (FCS and EFV)—
Request.” For appropriations action, see below “Ground Combat Systems—Appropriation.”
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The conference report directed the Army to give priority to upgrading the existing Paladin
howitzer.
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
As authorized by both the House and Senate versions of the bill, the conference report authorizes,
as requested, $293.5 million to continue development of the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary
Fighting Vehicle (EFV), an armored amphibious troop carrier designed to carry Marines ashore
from transport ships more than 20 miles offshore.
The House Armed Services Committee, which has criticized the EFV design as being too
vulnerable to so-called improvised explosive devices (IEDs), insisted that the Marines explore
various modifications that would give troops inside an EFV at least the same level of protection
against IEDs as they would have riding in the heaviest Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected
(MRAP) vehicles. The committee directed the Secretary of the Navy to give the congressional
defense committees a report on EFV survivability options.
Military Personnel Policy: End-Strength, Pay Raise
Like the House and Senate bills, the conference report authorizes, as requested, a total end-
strength of 1.41 million personnel for active-duty members of the four armed forces, an increase
of 40,227 over the FY2009 level. This total includes limits of 547,400 for the Army and 202,100
for the Marine Corps, which mark the achievement by those two services three years earlier than
planned of a decision to increase their combined end-strengths by a total of 92,000 personnel over
their FY2007 levels.
The conference report, like the House and Senate bills, also authorizes the Army to increase its
end-strength by an additional 30,000 active-duty personnel through FY2012.
Like the House and Senate versions, the conference report also authorizes a 3.4% increase in
basic pay for military personnel, which is one-half of a percentage point above the
Administration’s request. This would be the eleventh consecutive year that legislation has given
the military a pay raise that equals or exceeds the Labor Department’s Employment Cost Index
(ECI), a measure of private sector wage growth.
DOD Civilian Employees: NSPS, A-76
The House bill would freeze implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS)
and the parallel Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS), both of which are pay-
for-performance systems affording managers more flexibility in hiring and determining
compensation for employees than the federal government’s General Schedule.
The Senate version of the bill, was silent on the DCIPS but would have eliminated NSPS unless
the Secretary of Defense certified that its termination would not be in the best interest of DOD
and provided a schedule for making changes “to improve the fairness, credibility and
transparency” of NSPS.
The conference report terminated NSPS and required that all employees currently covered by that
system transition by January 1, 2012 back to their previous personnel system.
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The House bill would have terminated all on-going “A-76” competitions to determine whether
jobs currently performed by federal employees should be out-sourced to private contractors. The
Senate bill would have terminated A-76 competitions that had exceeded certain time limits. The
conference report terminates no on-going competitions, but imposes a moratorium on beginning
new A-76 competitions until DOD complies with certain existing legal requirements, a
contingency which, in effect, would bar new competitions through October 15, 2010, according
to the conferees.
Military Personnel Policy Issues
For additional analysis of selected military personnel policy issues in the FY2010 defense authorization bills, see CRS
Report R40711, FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues, coordinated by Don
J. Jansen.
Concurrent Receipt
The House version of the bill would have funded an initial increment of an initiative, proposed by
President Obama, to expand the number of disabled military retirees entitled to “concurrent
receipt” of both their military retired pay and disability-based stipends from the Department of
Veterans Affairs. Since 2001, Congress has taken several steps to liberalize a general policy (the
roots of which date from 1891) requiring disabled military retirees to forego an amount of their
retired pay equal to the amount of any veterans disability stipend.
Under congressional budget rules, the cost of the Administration proposal would have to be offset
by a either a reduction in already-mandated expenditures or an increase in revenue. A funding
offset large enough to cover the cost of the President’s concurrent receipt proposal through
FY2010 was provided by a bill (H.R. 2990) the House passed June 24 by a vote of 404-0. The
text of H.R. 2990 was incorporated into the defense authorization bill by H.Res. 572, the rule
governing floor action on the defense bill, which the House adopted June 24 by a vote of 222-
202.
Neither the Senate version of the bill nor the conference report acted on the concurrent receipt
issue.
Military Commissions, Detainees and Guantanamo Bay142
The conference report includes, in modified form, several provisions in the Senate version of the
bill that amend the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-366), which codified rules
under which military tribunals could try non-U.S. citizens detained in the course of the war
against terrorism (Sections 1801-07).
Regarding military commissions, some key provisions of the final version of H.R. 2647 include
the following:
142 Prepared by Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney and Michael John Garcia, Legislative Attorney, Courts and
International Section, American Law Division, Congressional Research Service. For additional background on military
commissions, see CRS Report R40752, The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA): Background and Proposed
Amendments, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
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• Military commissions would have jurisdiction over “alien unprivileged enemy
belligerents,” a class of persons defined somewhat differently from “alien
unlawful enemy combatants,” the class of persons subject to military
commissions under current law. Under the provision in the conference report,
membership in al Qaeda at the time an offense occurred would be sufficient to
meet the definition, even if the person did not engage in or support hostilities
against the United States.
• Confessions allegedly elicited through cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,
would be inadmissible even if they were made prior to the enactment of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. § 2000dd), which bars the use of
such confessions only if they were made after its enactment. The conference
report also bars the admission of any other statement of the accused unless the
military judge finds it reliable and voluntarily given. The requirement that the
statement be voluntary would be waived if it were taken in a combat
circumstances.
• In the case of hearsay evidence, the party offering the evidence would have the
burden of demonstrating that it is reliable, whereas under current law, the
opponent has the burden of proving that it is unreliable. The conference report
includes a requirement that the judge consider wither the declarant’s will was
overborne.
• The prosecutors’ obligation to disclose exculpatory information would include
mitigating evidence, and the obligation would extend to all information that is
known or reasonably should be known to any government officials who
participated in the investigation and prosecution of the case.
• The conference report provides for additional counsel for those charged with
capital crimes, and recommends that the defense be fully resourced, particularly
in capital cases.
• The conference report retained the Court of Military Commission Review,
created by the 2006 Military Commissions Act to review any judgment rendered
by a military commission. The Senate bill would have assigned that role to the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
• The conference report contains a detailed provision governing the use of
classified information, establishing procedures for military commissions that are
similar to the procedures used in federal courts and courts-martial.
Detainees and Guantanamo Bay
The conference report on H.R. 2647 retained, with modifications, a provision of the Senate bill
that would prohibit the use of contract employees to conduct interrogations of individuals
detained during hostilities (Section 1038). Unlike the Senate version of the bill, in which the
prohibition was absolute, the conference report would allow the Secretary of Defense to waive
the ban, with the proviso that he notify Congress within five days of issuing such a waiver.
The conference report would prohibit the President (thru December 31, 2010) from releasing in
the United States, its territories or possessions any non-U.S. citizen detainee held at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. It also would prohibit, for the same time period, transfer of any
Guantanamo detainee to those areas until 45 days after the President has submitted to the
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congressional defense committees a plan for the disposition of such person, including an
assessment of the risks entailed by the proposed action and a plan for mitigating those risks (with
an estimate of the associated costs), and the location or locations to which the detainee would be
transferred. The House version of the bill included a prohibition that was similar except that it
was open-ended (i.e., did not lapse on December 31, 2010) and it would have required 120 days’
prior notice to Congress.
The conference report also incorporated several provisions of the House-passed version of the bill
(some of them with modifications) that deal with the treatment of detainees. These provisions
would:
• Prohibit of reading Miranda rights to any foreign belligerent, privileged or
unprivileged, captured outside the United States, unless a court rules otherwise;
and require a report on how the reading to detainees of their “Miranda rights”
may affect military operations in Afghanistan, including any effects on
intelligence collection through interrogations (Section 1040);
• Require DOD to videotape or otherwise electronically record strategic
intelligence interrogations of persons in its custody, under its effective control, or
under detention at a DOD theater-level detention facility, with the proviso that
the Secretary of Defense could waive the requirment and notify Congress
(Section 1080);
• Require that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) be notified
whenever a detainee comes into U.S. custody or under U.S. control at the
detention facility at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. The ICRC would have
access to such detainees “as soon as practicable” after submitting a request to
visit a detainee. The House version of the bill had required notification of the
ICRC within 24 hours of the detainee’s coming into U.S. custody (Section 1039).
Hate Crimes (Title XLVII)143
The conference report included, with modifications, provisions of the Senate-passed bill relating
to so-called hate crimes. The Senate provisions, in turn, largely mirrored the provisions of H.R.
1913, passed by the House April 29, 2009.
Current law defines hate crime as any crime against either person or property in which the
offender intentionally selects the victim because of the victim’s actual or perceived race, color,
religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation. Hate crimes are not
separate and distinct offenses. Rather, hate crimes are traditional crimes, during which the
offender is motivated by one or more biases that are considered to be particularly reprehensible
and damaging to society as a whole. Federal jurisdiction over hate crime, however, is limited to
certain civil rights offenses, which are considered to be “hate crimes” when it is determined that
the offender was motivated by a bias against race, color, religion, national origin, and, in limited
instances, disability.
During Senate debate on the defense authorization bill, it adopted by voice vote an amendment –
similar to H.R. 1913—that would broaden federal jurisdiction over hate crimes by authorizing the
143 Prepared by William J. Krouse, Specialist in Domestic Security and Crime Policy.
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Attorney General to provide assistance (technical, forensic, prosecutorial, or other), when
requested by a state, local, or tribal official, for crimes that (1) would constitute a violent crime
under federal law or a felony under state or tribal law, and (2) are motivated by the victim’s actual
or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or
disability.
The Senate also adopted, by a vote of 78-13, an amendment to the hate crimes amendment that
would prohibit the implementation of any provision of the amendment in a manner that would
violate or burden the exercise of an individual or group’s First Amendment rights to free speech
and association provided the actions in question were not intended to plan or incite violence
against another individual.
Although supporters of the amendment argued that greater federal involvement would ensure that
hate crimes are systematically addressed, some opponents contended that additional federal
penalties for hate crimes would be redundant and largely symbolic, as penalties for those crimes
already exist under state law. The Senate rejected by a vote of 29-62 an alternative amendment
that would have required a report on state-level hate crimes investigations, prosecutions, and
sentencing.
The conference report on H.R. 2647 dropped a Senate provision authorizing the death penalty for
certain hate crimes, but retained a Senate provision prohibiting assault and battery against a
person on account of their military service or status as a member of the U.S. Armed Forces. The
conference report also added to the Senate-passed language provisions that would (1) define the
term “state” to include the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and any other territory or
possession of the United States, (2) establish a seven-year statute of limitations for hate crimes
that did not result in death, and (3) require the U.S. Sentencing Commission to produce a report
on mandatory minimum sentencing provisions under federal law.
Economic Development Conveyance of Surplus Real Property (BRAC)
Current statute (Section 2905 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990) requires
the Secretary of Defense to seek fair market value prior to conveying real property (land or
permanent structures) declared surplus during the current round of military base closures to local
authorities. Section 2705 of the conference report eliminated this requirement on condition that
the authority to which the property is transferred adhere to certain restrictions in its
redevelopment. The bill also allows the Secretary to accept, as consideration for the property’s
value, a portion of the third-party sale or lease revenues collected by the property’s
redevelopment authority, payment in kind (in the form of goods and services), other real property
or property improvements, or other considerations the Secretary considers to be appropriate.144
Guam Realignment
Sections 2831 through 2837 contain provisions related to military force realignment on Guam,
which includes the movement of forces forward from domestic bases and the redeployment of
144 For a discussion of economic redevelopment conveyances, see CRS Report R40620, Military Installation Real
Property and Services: Proposed Legislation in the 111th Congress, coordinated by Daniel H. Else.
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Marine units from their garrisons in the Japanese Prefecture of Okinawa to new locations in the
Territory.
The bill appoints the Deputy Secretary of Defense as leader of the interagency Guam Executive
Council. It also labels any corporation, agency, etc., able to build military family housing or
provide utilities to military installations on Guam as “special purpose entities” (SPE) and requires
the Secretary of Defense to report on how he intends to employ SPEs in support of the
redeployment. The bill requires the use of DOD’s “unified facilities criteria” (UFC) as the
minimum construction standard for all projects funded by contributions made by the Government
of Japan for the relocation.145
Local wage rates would apply to construction workers employed on relocation projects, and the
bill stipulates a number of measures that would emphasize the recruitment of the US construction
workers before H2B visa waivers could be issued to foreign laborers. The bill also creates an
Interagency Coordination Group for Guam Realignment, chaired by the DOD Inspector General
(IG) that includes the IGs of other federal agencies. The Group would report annually to the
congressional defense committees on realignment activities.146
Other Senate Provisions
Following are among the other issues on which the Senate took action during debate on the
FY2010 defense authorization bill. None of them were dealt with in the conference report on H.R.
2647.
“Concealed Carry” Permits
The Senate rejected an amendment that would allow citizens who have obtained permits from
their home states to carry concealed firearms to carry concealed firearms in any other state that
issues such permits. The amendment garnered 58 “aye” votes and 39 “nays”; however, it was
debated under an agreement stipulating that the amendment would be agreed to only if it obtained
60 or more “yeas.”
Strategic Arms Treaty
By voice vote, the Senate adopted an amendment expressing the sense of the Senate that the
follow-on agreement to the expiring Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) should not
include limitations on ballistic missile defense, military capabilities in space or advanced
conventional weapons. The amendment also requires a presidential report on plans to improve the
safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons and to modernize the Energy Department’s nuclear
weapons complex.
145 UFC is a series of documents that delineates all technical criteria and standards pertaining to planning, design,
construction, and operation and maintenance of real property facilities within DOD. These may be downloaded from
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Protective Design Center library https://pdc.usace.army.mil/library/ufc and
reviewed.
146 Additional discussion on the Guam realignment may be found in CRS Report R40731, Military Construction,
Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2010 Appropriations, coordinated by Daniel H. Else.
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The version of the amendment that was adopted supplanted an earlier version which would have
barred the use of funds to implement a START follow-on agreement unless (1) the treaty placed
no limits on missile defenses, space capabilities or advanced conventional weapons and (2) the
Administration’s FY2011 budget provides sufficient funding for the Energy Department’s nuclear
complex to maintain the reliability and safety of remaining U.S. nuclear forces and to modernize
the weapons complex.
North Korean Sanctions
The Senate rejected by a vote of 43-54 an amendment expressing the sense of the Senate that
North Korea should be officially designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. North Korea had been
so-designated by the State Department, but that designation was rescinded in October 2008.
Subsequently, the Senate adopted, by a vote of 66-31, an amendment requiring a review of North
Korea’s conduct to determine whether it should be re-listed as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Table 7. FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, House and Senate Action by
Title, H.R. 2647, S. 1390
(amounts in millions of dollars)
House-
Senate-
Conference
Administration
Passed
Passed
Report
Request
H.R. 2647
S. 1390
H.R. 2647
National Defense Authorization – Base Budget
Procurement 105,819.3
105,198.2
105,749.7
105,029.4
Research,
78,634.3 79,654.5 79,617.8 79,251.6
Development,
Test & Evaluation
Operation and
156,444.2 157,276.6 156,393.0 156,179.9
Maintenance
Military Personnel
136,016.3 135,723.8 136,016.3 136,016.3
Other
33,915.1 33,011.9 33,552.6 34,033.9
Authorizations
Subtotal, DOD
510,829.2 510,865.0 511,329.4 510,511.1
(non-MilCon) –
Base Budget
Military
13,111.1 13,635.3 12,733.8 13,692.1
Construction
Family Housing
1,958.7
1,958.7
2,308.7
2,235.5
Base Realignment
7,876.3 7,666.3 7,876.3 7,952.3
and Closure
(BRAC)
Prior year savings
—
-85.3
-112.5
-175.8
General
— — — -529.1
Reduction
Subtotal, MilCon,
22,946.0 23,175.0 22,806.3 23,175.0
Family Housing,
BRAC – Base
Budget
Total, DOD –
533,775.3 534,040.0 534,135.7 533,686.1
Base Budget
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House-
Senate-
Conference
Administration
Passed
Passed
Report
Request
H.R. 2647
S. 1390
H.R. 2647
Atomic Energy
16,424.0 16,507.3 16,424.0 16,512.5
Defense
Programs
Total Base
550,199.3 550,547.3 550,559.7 550,198.5
Budget, National
Defense
Authorization
(Budget Function
050)
Overseas Contingency Operations
Procurement 23,741.2
24,416.0
24,370.1
23,878.6
Research,
310.3 410.3 310.3 293.3
Development,
Test & Evaluation
Operation and
80,793.5 80,718.7 80,239.2a 80,794.7
Maintenance
Military Personnel
13,586.3 13,586.3 13,586.3 14,146.3
Other
10,163.7 9,463.7 9,351.5 9,481.9
Authorizationsa
Military
1,405.0 1,405.0 1,405.0 1,399.0
Construction
Total, DOD
130,000.0 129,325.0 129,260.0 129,993.7
Overseas
Contingency
Operations
Error correction
-120.0
Grand Total,
680,177.3 679,752.3 679,819.7 680,192.2
National Defense
Authorization
Sources: CRS calculations based on House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 2647, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-166, June 18, 2009; Senate Armed
Services Committee, Report to Accompany S. 1390, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010, S.Rept. 111-35, July 2, 2009.
a. The Senate Armed Services Committee includes in this line $7.46 billion requested by the administration
and authorized by both bills for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. This table, like the House Armed
Services Committee’s summary chart, includes that program in the line entitled, “Other Authorizations.”
FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bill
The FY2010 defense appropriations bill which the House passed July 30 by a vote of 400-30
(H.R. 3326) would challenge the Obama Administration’s proposals to terminate or reduce
funding for three major weapons programs. The bill would continue development of an alternate
engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter ($560 million), continue production of the C-17 cargo
plane ($674 million), and spend an additional $400 million on the VH-71 executive helicopter
program, all of which actions the Administration opposed and two of which – the alternate engine
and the VH-71 – drew threats that the President might veto a bill that funded them.
The bill also would add to the budget request nine F/A-18E/F fighters ($495 million) one Littoral
Combat Ship ($540 million) plus $240 million to fully fund the three LCS ships requested, and a
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third high-speed transport ship ($180 million) in addition to the two requested (one apiece for the
Army and Navy).
As reported by the House Appropriations Committee, H.R. 3326 also would have added to the
budget request funds to continue production of the F-22 fighter, which the Obama
Administration—like the preceding Bush Administration—had decided to terminate. President
Obama also had said, in unusually explicit terms, that he would veto any defense bill that
provided funding for continued F-22 production. Before the House passed the bill, it adopted by a
vote of 269-165 an amendment deleting the additional F-22 procurement funds.
In its report, the House committee noted that the Administration had not submitted to Congress
the annual Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs), which provide cost and schedule data on major
equipment purchases. Noting that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) relied on data
from these reports to perform its annual assessment of major weapons programs, the committee
directed the Secretary of Defense to provide “SAR-like” data—including future budget
projections—to GAO in time for that agency to present Congress with its annual program review
in March 2010.
Like the House-passed version of H.R. 3326, the version of the FY2010 defense appropriations
bill passed by the Senate on October 6 (which the Senate Appropriations Committee had reported
September 10; S.Rept. 111-74), concurred with most of the Obama Administration’s proposals to
terminate or reduce funding for several high-profile weapons programs including production of
the VH-71 White House helicopter and F-22 fighter. However, the Senate’s version of the bill
also concurred in the Administration’s decision to terminate development of an alternate engine
for the F-35 fighter, whereas the House version of the bill added funding to continue that effort.
Like the House-passed bill, the Senate version also would add funds to buy 18 F/A-18E/F Navy
fighters, instead of the nine planes requested by the Administration. The Senate version would
fund these aircraft ($512.3 million) in the section of the bill that funds war costs. It also would
sustain the production line for the C-17 cargo plane, which is slated to shut down, by adding to
the budget request funds for 10 C-17s ($2.50 billion). The House bill added funds for three C-17s.
The Senate bill would cut $900 million from the $7.5 billion requested for training and equipping
Afghan security forces, and $300 million from the $1.5 billion requested the Commanders
Emergency Response Fund (CERP), from which U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan pay for local
security and economic development projects. The committee used those cuts to fund its $1.2
billion addition to the Administration’s request for Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP)
vehicles.
The Senate bill also would add to the budget request $1.5 billion for equipment for National
Guard and reserve forces.
Funding levels appropriated by H.R. 3326 as enacted by the House and Senate are summarized in
Table 8, below. Funding levels authorized and appropriated for selected programs are
summarized in the Appendix.
Following are highlights of the versions of H.R. 3326, which the House passed July 30 by a vote
of 400-30 (H.Rept. 111-230) and which the Senate passed October 6 by a vote of 93-7 (S.Rept.
111-74):
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Ballistic Missile Defense—Appropriation147
Both versions of the bill generally supported the Administration’s decisions to slow or terminate
some technologically advanced anti-missile systems while increasing the procurement of Aegis
and THAAD interceptor missiles designed to cope with near-term missile threats. However, there
were some important differences between the two bills. (For additional background on the
Administration request, see “Missile Defense—Request,” above.)
Theater Defenses (THAAD, SM-3, Aegis)
The Senate bill adds a total of $133.6 million to the amounts requested for THAAD and Aegis,
including:
• $57.6 million (in addition to $168.7 million requested) for SM-3 interceptor
missiles used by the Navy’s shipborne Aegis system;
• $35 million (in addition to $222.4 million requested) for development of
improved variants of the SM-3; and
• $41 million for the radar component of the land-based THAAD system (for
which no funds were requested).
In OMB’s September 25 Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) regarding the Senate
bill, the Administration opposed the additional funding for the THAAD radar, saying it
was premature.
The House bill provided the amounts requested for those programs.
Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)
One program on which the House-passed appropriation bill H.R. 3326 differed from the budget
request and from the Senate version of H.R. 3326 (and from the two authorization bills) was the
Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)—a very fast missile intended to intercept enemy missiles early
in their flight. Defense Secretary Gates had recommended cancelling the program on cost and
technical grounds. The House-passed version of H.R. 3326 adds to the budget request $80 million
so that some KEI technologies could be adapted to other missile defense programs.
The House rejected by a vote of 124-307 an amendment that would have dropped the KEI
funding from the bill.
European Missile Defense Site
According to the Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) on H.R. 3326 issued by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) on July 29, the Administration “strongly objects” to a provision
of the House bill that would rescind $114.7 million that had been appropriated in FY2009 for
work on a European missile defense site and $40.2 million that had been appropriated for the
projected Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) which is intended to be a network of
147For additional background on the Administration request, see “Missile Defense—Request.” For authorization action,
see “Ballistic Missile Defense—Authorization.”
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missile tracking satellites.148 These were among rescissions of prior appropriations included in the
H.R. 3326 with a total value of $1.39 billion which reduced the budgetary impact of the bill by
that amount.
The Senate bill does not include the European site or STSS among the programs from which it
rescinds a total of $1.28 billion in prior-year appropriations.
On September 17, 2009, President Obama cancelled the plan to deploy a missile defense system
in Poland and the Czech Republic, designed to intercept long-range missiles launched from Iran
at U.S. territory. The system would have used a two-stage version of the three-stage “ground-
based interceptor” (GBI), 30 of which currently are deployed in Alaska and California. In place of
that system, the Administration announced plans to acquire a network of mobile radars and
interceptor missiles, including the SM-3 intended to defend Europe against Iranian missiles of
short and medium range. The President said U.S. intelligence agencies had concluded that Iran’s
effort to develop long-range ballistic missiles was taking longer than had been assumed while it
was moving more quickly than had been forecast to develop missiles that could fly far enough to
hit Europe, but not far enough to hit U.S. territory.149
Although the Administration cancelled the plan to deploy in Europe a two-stage version of the
GBI, it planned to continue developing that weapon. The Senate Appropriations Committee added
to the appropriations bill $50 million to sustain a production capacity for those weapons. By voice
vote, the Senate adopted an amendment by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman that would require DOD
to spend on development of the two-stage GBI at least $50 million (and would give DOD
discretion to spend as much as $151 million) of the funds appropriated for missile defense in
Europe by H.R.3326 and by the FY2009 DOD appropriations bill.
Shipbuilding—Appropriation150
The House committee warned that the FY2010 request for Navy ships would continue a
pattern of buying too few ships annually to sustain a fleet of 313 vessels, which is the
DOD goal. While the 313-ship fleet would require buying an average of 10 ships per year
to replace vessels as they reach the end of their service-life, the Obama Administration’s
$13.8 billion shipbuilding request would buy eight ships, slightly above the average for
the past decade.151
The House bill adds two ships and a total of $944.7 million to the Administration’s
shipbuilding request.
The Senate bill cuts two ships but adds one for a total increase in shipbuilding funds of
$1.2 billion.
148 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, “Statement of Administration Policy: H.R.
3326 – Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010,” July 28, 2009.
149 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy; A “Phased, Adaptive
Approach” for Missile Defense in Europe.,” September 17, 2009. For additional background, see CRS Report
RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek.
150 For additional background on the Administration request, see “Shipbuilding—Request.” For authorization action,
see “Shipbuilding—Authorization.”
151 For additional background, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Surface Combatants (DDG-1000, DDG-51, CG(X), LCS)
Both the House-passed bill and the Senate version basically approved the $1.07 billion
requested for a third destroyer of the DDG-1000-class, which is the last ship of this type
the Navy plans to acquire. The House bill would trim the request by $11 million while the
Senate bill would shift into the DDG-1000 funding line $320.6 million the budget request
includes in a separate line to cover costs associated with building this class of ships that
are not allocated to any one vessel.
The Senate bill also adds to the request $1.74 billion for a second DDG-51 destroyer, in
addition to providing the $1.91 billion requested for one ship of this class.
The House version of the bill cuts $40 million from the $150.0 million requested for
development of a new class of cruisers, designated CG(X), intended to replace existing
Aegis cruisers. The Senate version cuts $64 million from the request.152
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees agreed that the three Littoral Combat Ships
the Administration plans to purchase are not fully funded by the accompanying $1.38 billion
budget request. But, whereas the House committee added to the bill passed by the House $240
million to fully fund the three ships requested plus an additional $540 million for a fourth LCS,
the Senate committee cut $300 million from the request in the Senate bill and directed the Navy
to buy only two of the ships.
On September 16, 2009, the Navy announced a restructuring of the LCS program, cancelling its
plan to build several ships to each of two competing designs before selecting one of the two for
further production. Under the Navy’s new plan, it would choose between the two designs during
FY2010 and would procure two LCS ships in FY2010 (instead of the three included in the
FY2010 budget request).153
Other Ships (LHA, Joint High Speed Vessel, T-AKE)
The House bill adds to the budget request $180 million for a third Joint High Speed Vessel, in
addition to the one requested in the Navy budget ($178.0 million) and another in the Army budget
($183.7 million). These are small ships based on the design of high-speed ferries intended to haul
cargo and combat units over distances of up to several hundred miles.
The Senate bill provides $400 million for one T-AKE type supply ship rather than, as requested,
$800 million for two ships. It also adds to the amount requested $170 million for advance work
on a helicopter carrier (LHA) for which the Navy plans to request most of the funding in FY2011.
152 For additional background, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program:
Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
153 Department of Defense, News Release, “Littoral Combat Ship Down Select Announced,” No. 722-09, September
16, 2009. For additional background, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Aircraft—Appropriation154
Most of the Administration’s proposals to terminate certain major aircraft programs are
incorporated into both the version of H.R. 3326 passed by the House and the version before the
Senate. However, both versions of the bill also add to the budget funds to continue production of
the C-17 cargo jets and to buy other aircraft not funded by the budget request.
F-22
As reported by the House Appropriations Committee, the bill included $368.8 million for long
lead-time components that would permit the funding of 12 more F-22 fighters in FY2011.
However the House adopted by a vote of 269-165 an amendment by Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee Chairman John P. Murtha to reallocate that money, in light of President Obama’s
insistence that he would veto a bill that included funds to continue F-22 production.
Subsequently, the House reaffirmed that position, rejecting by a vote of 169-261 a procedural
motion that was, in effect, an amendment to restore the F-22 procurement funds.155
The House bill also includes a provision barring the use of funds to approve or license the sale of
F-22s to any other country, a provision that has been included in the defense appropriations bill
for every year since FY1998.
The Senate version includes no funds to continue F-22 production. But, while retaining the ban
on approving any foreign sale of the plane, it would explicitly allow DOD to “conduct or
participate in studies, research design and other activities,” to develop an “export” version of the
plane, in which the use of appropriated funds to develop an “export” version of the plane,
modified to protect classified information (Section 8056).
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Alternate Engine
The House-passed bill includes $560 million to continue development of an alternate engine for
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The House Appropriations Committee largely offset the cost of the
alternate engine project by cutting from the budget two of the 30 F-35s requested ($300 million)
and $232 million requested for one-time costs associated with the program because, the
committee said, the program had not yet expended more than $200 million appropriated in prior
years for these costs.
In a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) issued before the House passed H.R. 3326, the
Office of Management and Budget said the Administration “strongly objects” to any action that
would delay the F-35 program, as administration officials have insisted the alternative engine
project would do, and that the President’s advisers would recommend that he veto the defense
bill, if it includes funding for the alternate engine. Concerning additional F-22 production funds,
154 For additional background on the Administration’s request, see “Aircraft—Request.” For authorization action, see
“Combat Aircraft—Authorization.”
155 For additional background, see CRS Report RL31673, Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
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the SAP was more unequivocal, stating that the President “will veto” the defense bill if it includes
such funds.156
F/A-18E/F and E/F-18G
Both versions of the bill would add nine F/A-18E/F Navy fighters to the nine planes requested
($1.0 billion). The House-passed version would add $495 million for the additional planes plus
$108 million for long lead-time components that would allow the Navy to sign a five-year contact
for 150 additional F/A-18E/Fs beginning in FY2011. The Senate bill would add $512.3 million
for nine additional F/A-18E/Fs to the section of the bill that funds war costs.
The stated rationale in both cases is that additional F/A-18E/Fs are needed to mitigate a shortfall
in the Navy’s force of carrier-based fighters that otherwise would occur because repeated combat
deployments are wearing out the F/A-18s currently in service earlier than had been projected,
plans to extend the life of those aircraft are more problematic than had been assumed, and
production of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters intended to replace the older F/A-18s has been
delayed.157
Both versions of the bill provide, as requested, $1.61 billion for 22 radar-jammer versions of the
F/A-18E/F, which are designated E/F-18Gs.
“Light Attack” Plane
In its report on the bill, the Senate Appropriations Committee noted that the Navy and Air Force
are exploring the possibility of acquiring so-called “light attack” planes, which could be any of
several types of off-the-shelf aircraft—some of them armed versions of training planes—that are
less expensive than front-line fighters and which are designed for combat against relatively
lightly armed insurgent forces.
The Committee directed the services to treat this project as a “new start” acquisition program,
going through established procedures to fund the effort and to solicit proposals from contractors.
C-17
The House-passed bill adds to the budget request $674.1 million for three C-17 wide-body,
intercontinental cargo planes, whereas the Senate bill adds $2.50 billion for 10 of the planes.
During Senate consideration of the bill, it – in effect—killed by a vote of 34-64 an amendment by
Senator McCain that would have eliminated funding for the 10 C-17 cargo planes the
Appropriations Committee had added to its version of H.R. 3326. The amendment would have
reallocated the added funds ($2.5 billion) to operations and maintenance (O&M) accounts in the
bill. The amendment would have violated the Senate’s budget rules by increasing budget outlays
resulting from the bill during FY2010, thus exceeding a cap on outlays established pursuant to the
156 For additional background, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
157 For additional background, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement and
Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
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congressional budget resolution. The reason the amendment would have increased FY2010
outlays is that funds appropriated for O&M accounts are spent more quickly than funds
appropriated for aircraft procurement accounts.
The vote that killed Senator McCain’s amendment came on a motion to exempt the C-17
amendment from those budget rules. After that motion—which would have required 60 votes for
adoption—was rejected, the amendment was ruled out of order.
On October 6, the Senate rejected by a vote of 30-68 a second McCain amendment that would
simply have dropped from the bill the $1.5 billion added to the budget to buy C-17s.158
In the Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) released by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) concerning both the House and Senate versions of the defense bill, OMB said the
Administration “strongly objected” to funding additional C-17s, but did not specifically say that
the bill might be vetoed if it were not brought into line with the Administration’s request.
President Obama had made such an explicit veto threat to back up his objection to congressional
initiatives to fund production of additional F-22s.159
Replacement Tanker
The Senate bill cuts $30 million from the $439.6 million requested to begin acquiring a new fleet
of mid-air refueling tankers from one or both of the companies that had competed for the contract
in 2008-2009. The Air Force had selected Europe-based EADS as the winner of that competition,
but GAO nullified that decision, upholding a protest by Boeing—the other competitor—who
argued that the service had not adhered to the announced criteria for selecting the winner.
The House-passed bill provides the requested amount for the tanker competition but requires that
any tankers bought for the Air Force be assembled in the United States. The House bill also
provides that, if the tanker contract is awarded to a single source on the basis of a second
competition, that the criterion for selection “should” include a calculation of the life-cycle cost of
each type of plane over a 40-year service life.
The Administration opposes the House requirement that newly acquired tankers be assembled in
the United States.160
Executive Transports (C-37. C-40)
The budget requests $294.8 million for five long-range executive transport planes161, including:
158 For additional background, see CRS Report RS22763, Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
159 Office of Management and Budget, “Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 3326, Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2010,” September 25, 2009, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/sap_111/
saphr3326s_20090925.pdf.
160 For additional background, see CRS Report RL34398, Air Force KC-X Tanker Aircraft Program: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
161 The C-37s and C-40s in the FY2010 DOD budget request all are funded in the Air Force’s aircraft procurement
account, except for one C-40, which is in the Navy’s aircraft procurement account.
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• $66.4 million for one C-37 (based on the commercial Gulfstream V); and
• $228.4 million for four C-40s (based on the commercial Boeing 737).
The House bill would add to that request $132.8 million for two additional C-37s and $200.0
million for two additional C-40s.
The Senate bill provides $294.8 million, as requested, for one C-37 and four C-40s.
White House Helicopter (VH-71)
Pursuant to the Administration’s decision to cancel development of a new fleet of helicopters,
designated VH-71s, for the White House, the budget request includes $85.2 million to wind down
the program. The Senate bill cuts $30 million from that request, but the House-passed bill adds
$400 million to the budget request to continue testing and outfitting five VH-71s already built as
the first stage of a program that had been intended to produce a fleet of 27 helicopters, most of
which were to have been much more capable than the first five.
The House Appropriations Committee said that the added funding would allow DOD to harvest
useful aircraft from the $3.2 billion already spent on the program. In its SAP on the House bill,
OMB said the Administration “strongly objects” to this funding and that, if it were included in the
final version of the bill, the President’s advisers would recommend a veto.162
Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter (CSAR-X, HH-60M)
Both versions of the bill accept the Administration’s decision to cancel the CSAR-X program,
intended to develop a new search and rescue helicopter to replace the HH-60Ms currently used
for that mission. Both also would add to the budget request funds to buy additional HH-60Ms and
to upgrade those already in service.
The House bill cuts $80 million from the $90 million requested for CSAR-X development costs
and adds $140 million to buy five HH-60Ms to replace aircraft lost in combat since 2001 plus an
additional $100.2 million to upgrade older HH-60G rescue helicopters.
The Senate bill includes none of the $90.0 million in the budget request for CSAR-X. Acting at
the request of the Air Force, the committee said in its report, the bill allocates $90 million,
instead, to buy two new HH-60Ms ($75.0 million) and to begin development of a replacement for
the HH-60M ($15.0 million).
Ground Combat Systems—Appropriation163
Both versions of the bill basically support the Administration’s decision to substantially
restructure the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, starting over the effort to develop
a new family of ground combat vehicles.
162 For additional background, see CRS Report RS22103, VH-71/VXX Presidential Helicopter Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
163 For additional background on the Administration request, see “Ground Combat Systems (FCS and EFV)—Request.”
For authorization action, see “Ground Combat Systems—Authorization.”
Congressional Research Service
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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
Future Combat System (FCS)
The House-passed bill provides $2.67 billion of the $2.88 billion requested for FCS, eliminating
$211 million requested for termination costs the committee said could be covered by unspent
funds previously appropriated for now-cancelled elements of the program. The Senate bill would
cut $368 million from the amounts requested for FCS programs.164
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
The House-passed bill would cut $50 million from the $293 million requested to continue
development of the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), a troop carrier intended
to carry a squad of Marines from ship to shore at nearly 30 mph and then function as an armored
troop carrier on land. Citing delays and cost increases in the program, the House committee said it
had “serious reservations” as to whether the EFV development program would succeed.
The Senate bill funds the request.165
Other Provisions
Following are other provisions dealt with in the Senate version of the bill.
Afghanistan Policy Hearings
In a vote that fell largely along party lines, the Senate rejected October 1, by a vote of 40-59, an
amendment by Senator McCain that would have required by November 15 testimony to the
relevant congressional committees by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, commander of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan. The subject of the required hearings would have been McChrystal’s
recommendations to the Obama Administration for additional troops and funding to carry out a
revised U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.166 Reportedly, McChrystal has recommended that additional
U.S. troops be deployed to Afghanistan and that they be used in a new strategy that would place
more emphasis on protecting Afghan civilians from insurgents.167`
By a vote of 60-39, the Senate adopted an alternative amendment by Senator Levin providing that
the appropriate committees will hold hearings on U.S. strategy and policy concerning Afghanistan
and Iraq after the President announces his decisions about those matters.
The McCain and Levin amendments differed as to the timing and scope of hearings. Senator
McCain and other Republicans said Congress was entitled to hear McChrystal’s assessment of
164 For additional background, see CRS Report RL32888, Army Future Combat System (FCS) “Spin-Outs” and
Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert and Nathan Jacob Lucas.
165 For additional background, see CRS Report RS22947, The Marines’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
166Neither Gen. McChrystal’s review of the situation in Afghanistan nor his reported recommendation to increase the
number of U.S. troops in that country has been made public. An edited version of his strategic review is available on
the web-site of the Washington Post at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/
Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf.
167 See, for example, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23policy.html?_r=2&hp.
Congressional Research Service
68
Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
what would be needed for the United States to prevail in Afghanistan using his proposed strategy.
They also said the Administration was delaying a decision to support McChrystal’s widely
reported, though still unpublished, request for additional troops. McCain’s amendment would
have required testimony by November 15 by four officials: McChrystal, the commanders of U.S.
forces in Europe and the Central Command region, and the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan.
Senator Levin, who has called for a U.S. strategy that focuses on training Afghan security forces
to protect Afghan civilians—rather than using U.S. troops for that purpose—objected, along with
other Democrats, that McCain’s amendment would force the President’s hand before he decided
whether to adopt the strategy McChrystal was proposing. In addition to including no deadline for
hearings, it would expand the list of officials to be heard to include, in addition to the four listed
in McCain’s amendment, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan.
Earmarks
By a vote of 77-21, the Senate adopted October 6 an amendment by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
requiring that funding for congressional earmarks added to the bill be awarded on the basis of
“full and open competition” subject to certain exceptions. Senator Inouye said the amendment’s
exceptions to the “full and open competition” principle mirrored those observed by the
Administration. The Senate rejected by voice vote an amendment by Senator McCain that would
have required (without exception) full and open competition for earmarks.
Fighter Jet Retirements
By a vote of 91-7, the Senate adopted October 6 an amendment by Senators Christopher S. Bond
and Patrick J. Leahy that would bar DOD from carrying out a plan to retire 249 older combat jets,
most of which are assigned to Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units. The prohibition
would be lifted when DOD submits to the Senate and House Armed Services committees a report
detailing how the Air Force will fill the gaps left by the retirement of those planes and what
missions it will assign to the bases and personnel associated with the aircraft.
Contractor Employee Rights
By a vote of 68-30, the Senate adopted an amendment by Senator Al Franken prohibiting the
payment of funds appropriated by the bill to any contractor that requires its employees, as a
condition of employment, to accept the result of binding arbitration in case of any claim arising
from sexual assault or harassment.
Congressional Research Service
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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
Table 8. FY2010 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326)
Summary by Title
Amounts in millions of dollars
House-
Senate
Administration
Passed
Reported
Request
H.R. 3326
H.R. 3326
Military Personnel
125,264.9
122,378.0
124,817.2
Operations and Maintenance
156,444.2
154,126.7
154,005.8
Procurement 105,213.4
104,837.8
108,016.1
Research, Development, Test &
78,634.3 80,238.0 78,450.4
Evaluation
Revolving and Management Funds
3,119.8
3,147.8
2,697.8
Other DOD Programs
31,439.5
33,342.2
31,242.2
Related Agencies
963.7
901.9
1,041.7
General Provisions (net)
11.0
-1,381.5
-2,677.2
Subtotal, DOD Base Budget
501,090.9
497,590.9
497,593.9
Overseas Deployments and Other
128,595.0 128,247.0 128,221.4
Activities
Total, FY2010 DOD
629,685.9 625,837.9 625,815.3
mandatory 290.9
290.9
290.9
discretionary 629,395.0
625,547.0
625,524.4
Sources: CRS calculations based on House Appropriations Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 3326,
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010 (H.Rept. 111-230), p. 2., July 24, 2009; and Senate
Appropriations Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 3326, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010
(S.Rept. 111-74), pp. 5-6.
Note: Totals do not include $10.7 billion in accrual payments for Tricare-for-life, funding which is provided by a
permanent appropriation.
Congressional Research Service
70
Appendix. Program Funding Tables
Table A-1. Congressional Action on FY2010 Missile Defense Funding: Authorization
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Program Element
FY2009
FY2010
House-
Senate-
Conference
PE Number
Title
Estimate
Request
Passed
Passed
Agreement
Comments
RDT&E Missile Defense Agency
0603175C Ballistic
Missile
119.3 109.8 109.8 109.8 104.8
Conference
makes $5 million general
Defense Technology
reduction.
0603881C Ballistic
Missile
956.7 719.5 719.5 719.5 719.5
Defense Terminal
Defense Segment
0603882C Ballistic
Missile
1,507.5 982.9 982.9 982.9
1,002.9
Al
concur
in
Administration
proposal
Defense Midcourse
to deploy 30 interceptor missiles in
Defense Segment
Alaska and California rather than 44 as
earlier planned. Conference adds $25
million for vendor base support.
0603883C Ballistic
Missile
400.8 186.7 186.7 186.7 186.7
Al
concur
in
Administration
proposal
Defense Boost
to reorganize Airborne Laser as an
Defense Segment
R&D program rather than one aimed at
deployment.
0603884C Ballistic
Missile
767.6 636.9 636.9 641.9 636.9
Senate
adds
$5 million for airborne
Defense Sensors
infrared technology
0603886C Ballistic
Missile
385.5
–
–
–
–
Al concur in Administration proposal
Defense System
to cancel Kinetic Energy Interceptor.
Interceptor
0603888C Ballistic
Missile
911.7 966.8 966.8 966.8 940.8
Conference
cuts $26 million to
Defense Test &
synchronize with test schedule.
Targets
0603890C Ballistic
Missile
402.8 369.1 344.1 369.1 354.1
Conference cuts $15 million.
Defense Enabling
Programs
0603891C
Special Programs -
175.7 301.6 301.6 301.6 286.6
Conference
cuts $15 million due to
MDA
excessive growth.
CRS-71
Program Element
FY2009
FY2010
House-
Senate-
Conference
PE Number
Title
Estimate
Request
Passed
Passed
Agreement
Comments
0603892C AEGIS
BMD
1,113.7
1,690.8 1,690.8 1,660.8 1,690.8
Senate
cuts
$30 million as excess to
execution
0603893C
Space Tracking &
208.9
180.0
180.0
180.0
173.2
Conference cuts $6.8 mn from
Surveillance System
demonstration satellites.
0603894C
Multiple Kill Vehicle
283.5
–
–
–
–
All concur in Administration proposal
to cancel Multiple Kill Vehicle,
0603895C Ballistic
Missile
24.7 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
Defense System Space
Programs
0603896C Ballistic
Missile
288.3 340.0 340.0 340.0 340.0
Defense Command
and Control, Battle
Management and
Communications
0603897C Ballistic
Missile
55.8 48.2 48.2 48.2 48.2
Defense Hercules
0603898C Ballistic
Missile
69.7 60.9 61.4 60.9 61.4
House
and
conference
add
$500
Defense Joint
million for advisory group on training
Warfighter Support
needs.
0603904C Missile
Defense
106.0 86.9 91.9 86.9 86.9
Integration &
Operations Center
(MDIOC)
0603906C
Regarding
Trench 3.0 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2
0603907C Sea-Based
X-Band
146.7 174.6 174.6 174.6 174.6
Radar (SBX)
0603908C BMD
European
362.0
–
–
–
–
The House authorized $50 million, as
Interceptor Site
requested, for a missile defense site in
(Poland)
Europe and also stipulated (Sec. 226)
that a total of $343.1 million made
0603909C BMD
European
Mid-
76.5
–
–
–
–
available in FY1009 appropriations
Course Radar (Czech
could be spent either on the currently
Republic)
planned system – with a radar in the
0603911C BMD
European
— 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.5
Czech Republic and interceptor
Capability
missiles in Poland – or on an alternative
CRS-72
Program Element
FY2009
FY2010
House-
Senate-
Conference
PE Number
Title
Estimate
Request
Passed
Passed
Agreement
Comments
0603912C BMD
European
27.0
–
–
–
–
system that would be at least as cost-
Communications
effective and technically reliable as the
Support
planned system.
0603913C Israeli
Cooperative
—
119.6
140.1
144.6
144.6
House adds $20.5 mn; Senate adds $25
Programs
mn. Conference adds $25 mn. for
short-range defense.
0901585C
Pentagon
Reservation
19,7 19.7 19.7 19.7 19.7
0901598C Management
HQ
-
81.2 57.4 57.4 57.4 57.4
MDA
Subtotal RDT&E, Missile Defense
8,474.6 7,120.5 7,121.6 7,120.5 7,098.2
Agency
Military Construction, Missile Defense Agency
Aegis BMD Facility Expansion
–
24.5
24.5
24.5
24.5
BMDS European Interceptor Site
42.6
–
–
–
–
(Poland)
BMDS European Mid-Course Radar
108.6
–
–
–
–
(Czech Republic)
Minor
Construction
3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7
Planning
&
Design
14.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Subtotal Military Construction,
169.5 30.2 30.2 30.2 30.2
Missile Defense Agency
Base Realignment and Closure
160.0 86.6 86.6 86.6 86.6
The House approved the BRAC
(BRAC), Missile Defense Agency
funding request for MDA, but it also
made an unallocated reduction of $350
million to the total $2.39 billion BRAC
request for Defense Agencies (of which
MDA is one).
Procurement, Missile Defense Agency
THAAD, Block 5 Fielding
104.8
420.3
420.3
420.3
420.3
Aegis, Block 5 Fielding
56.8
168.7
168.7
168.7
191.9
Conference adds $23 mn for additional
SM-3 missiles.
CRS-73
Program Element
FY2009
FY2010
House-
Senate-
Conference
PE Number
Title
Estimate
Request
Passed
Passed
Agreement
Comments
Subtotal Procurement, Missile
161.6 589.0 589.0 589.0 612.2
Defense Agency
Total, Missile Defense Agency
8,965.7
7,826.3
7,827.4
7,826.4
7,827.3
RDT&E, Army and Joint Staff
0604869A Patriot/MEADS
429.8 569.2 568.2 569.2 569.2
The
House
approved
the
BRAC
Combined Aggregate
funding request for MDA, but it also
Program (CAP)
made an unallocated reduction of $350
milion to the total $2.39 billion BRAC
request for Defense Agencies (of which
MDA is one).
0203801A Missile/Air
Defense
37.7 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3
Product Improvement
Program
0102419A Aerostat
Joint
355.3
360.1
238.1
340.1
340.1
House cuts $122 mn, Senate and
Program Office
Conference cut $20 mn due to
(JLENS)
program delay.
0605126J
Joint Theater Air and
55.3 96.9 75.9 96.9 96.9
House
cuts
$21
mn.
Missile Defense
Organization
Subtotal RDT&E, Army, Joint Staff
878.1
1,065.4
921.5
1,045.4
1,045.4
Procurement, Army
C49100
Patriot/PAC-3
1,026.0
393.1
393.1
398.1
393.1
Senate adds $5 mn for C2 mods
C50001
Patriot/MEADS
31.0 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4
Subtotal, Procurement, Army
1,057.0
409.5
409.5
414.5
409.5
Total Missile Defense R&D, MilCon,
10,900.8 9,301.3 9,158.4 9,286.3 9,282.2
Procurement, All Agencies
Sources: House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 2647, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-166, June 18,
2009; Senate Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany S. 1390, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, S.Rept. 111-35, July 2, 2009;
Conference Report, Report to Accompany H.R. 2647, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-288, October 7, 2009.
Notes: The defense authorization act generally does not determine the final amount provided for a program or project. The authorization bill authorizes the appropriation
of funds, but the amount available is determined by the appropriations. An appropriations bill may provide more than or less than the amount authorized, may provide
funds for a program for which no funds are authorized, and may provide funds for a “new start” for which funding has never been authorized.
CRS-74
Table A-2. Congressional Action on FY2010 Missile Defense Funding: Appropriations
(amounts in millions of dollars)
FY2009
FY2010
House-
Senate-
PE Number
Program Element Title
Estimate
Request
Passed
Passed Comments
Missile Defense Agency RDT&E
0603175C
Ballistic Missile Defense Technology
119.3 109.8 109.8
104.8
Senate trims $10 million to fund near-term
programs, adds $5 million for MOST.
0603881C Ballistic Missile Defense Terminal
956.7 719.5 719.5 719.5
–
Defense Segment
0603882C
Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse
1,507.5 982.9 982.9
1,032.9
Senate adds $50 million for interceptor vendor base
Defense Segment
sustainment.
0603883C Ballistic
Missile
Defense Boost Defense
400.8 186.7 186.7 186.7
–
Segment
0603884C
Ballistic Missile Defense Sensors
767.6 636.9 636.9
626.9
Senate trims $10 million to fund near-term
programs.
0603886C Ballistic Missile Defense System
385.5
–
80.0
–
House adds $80 million for Kinetic Energy
Interceptor
Interceptor that Administration proposed to
terminate.
0603888C
Ballistic Missile Defense Test & Targets 911.7 966.8 940.8 778.7
House
cuts
$26 million to synchronize with test
schedule. Senate cuts $151 million as premature,
cuts $37 million for SSTS targets.
0603890C Ballistic Missile Defense Enabling
402.8 369.1 358.6 358.1
House
makes
general
reduction of $25 million
Programs
offset by adds for specified projects. Senate cuts
$15 million to fund near-term programs, adds $4
million
0603891C
Special Programs - MDA
175.7
301.6 286.6 251.6
House cuts $15 million due to excessive growth in
funding. Senate cuts $50 million to fund near-term
programs.
0603892C AEGIS
BMD
1,113.7 1,690.8 1,670.8 1,579.4
House
cuts
$50 million as CG-X requirements not
determined, adds $30 million for signal processor
open architecture. Senate transfers $257 million to
new line for AEGIS SM-3 co-development, adds $35
million for SM-3,.
—
AEGIS SM-3 Block IIA Co-
–
–
–
257.4
Senate transfers $257 million from Aegis BMD to a
Development
new program element for missile co-development.
0603893C
Space Tracking & Surveillance System
208.9 180.0 160.0 173.2
House cuts $20 million for demonstration satellites.
Senate cuts $6.8 million for tests.
0603894C Multiple Kill Vehicle
283.5
– – –
–
0603895C Ballistic
Missile
Defense System Space
24.7 12.5 12.5 12.5
–
Programs
CRS-75
FY2009
FY2010
House-
Senate-
PE Number
Program Element Title
Estimate
Request
Passed
Passed
Comments
0603896C
Ballistic Missile Defense Command and
288.3 340.0 340.0 340.0
–
Control, Battle Management and
Communications
0603897C
Ballistic Missile Defense Hercules 55.8
48.2 48.2 48.2
–
0603898C Ballistic Missile Defense Joint
69.7
60.9
61.4
60.9
House adds $500 thousand for advisory group on
Warfighter Support
BMD training needs.
0603904C
Missile Defense Integration &
106.0 86.9 86.9 86.9
–
Operations Center (MDIOC)
0603906C
Regarding
Trench
3.0 6.2 6.2 6.2
–
0603907C
Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX)
146.7 174.6 161.6 174.6
House cuts $13 million as general reduction.
0603908C
BMD European Interceptor Site
362.0
–
–
–
–
(Poland)
0603909C
BMD European Mid-Course Radar
76.5
–
–
–
–
(Czech Republic)
0603911C BMD
European
Capability —
50.5 50.5 50.5 –
0603912C BMD
European
Communications
27.0
–
–
–
–
Support
0603913C
Israeli Cooperative Programs
— 119.6 202.4 202.4
House and Senate add $82 million for short-range
missile defense and Arrow co-development.
0901585C
Pentagon Reservation
19,7
19.7
–
19.7
–
0901598C
Management
HQ
-
MDA
81.2 57.4 52.4 57.4
–
Subtotal R&D, Missile Defense Agency RDT&E
8,474.6
7,120.5
7,154.6
7,128.4
–
Military Construction, Missile Defense Agency
Aegis BMD Facility Expansion
–
24.5
24.5
NA
In military construction appropriations bill.
BMDS European Interceptor Site (Poland)
42.6
–
NA
NA
In military construction appropriations bill.
BMDS European Mid-Course Radar (Czech Republic)
108.6
–
NA
NA
In military construction appropriations bill.
Minor Construction
3.5
3.7
3.7
NA
In military construction appropriations bill.
Planning & Design
14.9
2.0
2.0
NA
In military construction appropriations bill.
Subtotal Military Construction, Missile Defense
169.5 30.2 30.2 –
In military construction appropriations bill.
Agency
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), Missile
160.0 86.6 86.6 NA
In military construction appropriations bill.
Defense Agency
Procurement, Missile Defense Agency
THAAD,
Block
5
Fielding
104.8 420.3 420.3 420.3
–
THAAD TPY-2 Radar Advance Procurement
–
–
–
41.0
Senate adds $41 million in new line for radars to
support additional THAAD batteries.
CRS-76
FY2009
FY2010
House-
Senate-
PE Number
Program Element Title
Estimate
Request
Passed
Passed
Comments
Aegis, Block 5 Fielding
56.8 168.7 168.7
226.3
Senate adds $57.6 million for 6 additional SM-3
missiles.
Subtotal Procurement, Missile Defense Agency
161.6
589.0
589.0
646.6
–
Total,
Missile
Defense
Agency
8,965.7 7,826.4 7,773.9 7,775.1
Semate total excludes military construction.
Army and Joint Staff R&D
0604869A
Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate
429.8 569.2 569.2 569.2
–
Program (CAP)
0203801A Missile/Air
Defense
Product
37.7 39.3 39.3 39.3
–
Improvement Program
0102419A
Aerostat Joint Program Office (JLENS) 355.3 360.1 288.1 360.1
House cuts $72 million for funding ahead of need.
0605126J
Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense
55.3 96.9 96.9 96.9
–
Organization
Subtotal R&D, Army, Joint Staff
878.1
1,065.4
993.4
1,065.4
–
Army Procurement
C49100 Patriot/PAC-3
1,026.0 393.1 383.6 393.1
House
cuts
$9.5
million for unjustified cost growth.
C50001
Patriot/MEADS
31.0
16.4
16.4
–
Senate deletes funds as ahead of need.
Subtotal,
Procurement,
Army
1,057.0 409.5 400.0 393.1
–
Total Missile Defense R&D, Military Construction,
10,900.8 9,301.3 9,167.3 9,233.6
Senate total excludes military construction.
Procurement
Source: House Appropriations Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 3326, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, H.Rept. 111-230, July 24, 2009; Senate
Appropriations Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 3326, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, S.Rept. 111-74, September 10, 2009.
CRS-77
Table A-3. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Army and Marine Corps Programs: Authorization
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Request
House-Passed
Senate-Passed
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ #
$
$
Comments
Army Aircraft
Light Utility
54 326.0 9.4 54 326.0 9.4 54 326.0 9.4
54 326.0 9.4
Helicopter
UH-60 Blackhawk
79 1,357.1 33.5 79 1,357.1 33.5 79 1,357.1 33.5
79 1,357.1
33.5
Helicopter (Base
Budget)
UH-60 Blackhawk
4 74.3 — 4 74.3 — 4 74.3 —
4 74.3 –
Helicopter (OCO)
CH-47 Chinook
35 860.1 10.8 35 882.1 10.8 35 882.1 10.8
35 932.8 10.8
Conference
transfers
Helicopter (Base
$22 mn in
Budget)
procurement from
mods.
CH-47 Chinook
4 141.2 — 4 141.2 — 4 141.2 —
4 141.2 –
Helicopter (OCO)
CH-47 Helicopter
—
102.9 — — 86.9 — 80.9 —
–
85.9
–
Conference transfers
Mods
$22 mn to regular
procurement, adds
$5 mn for specific
projects.
AH-64 Apache Helo
— 426.4 164.1 — 428.4
164.1 — 431.9 164.1
–
427.4
164.1
Mods (Base Budget)
AH-64 Apache Helo
— 315.3 — — 315.3 — — 315.3 —
4 315.3 –
Mods (OCO)
Army and USMC Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles
M-2 Bradley Mods
— 526.4 88.6 — 526.4 88.6 — 526.4 88.6
–
526.4
88.6
(Base Budget)
M-2 Bradley Mods
— 243.6 — — 243.6 — — 243.6 —
–
243.6
–
(OCO)
M-1 Abrams tank
— 369.4 101.7 — 369.4
101.7 — 369.4 101.7
22 369.4 101.7
Mods
CRS-78
Request
House-Passed
Senate-Passed
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ #
$
$
Comments
Stryker Armored
— 388.6 90.3 — 334.6 90.3 — 388.6 140.3
–
364.2
90.3 House cuts $54 mn,
Vehicle
conference cuts $24
mn. In procurement.
House adds $50 mn
in R&D. Senate adds
$50 mn in R&D
Future Combat
— 327.9
2,553.0 — 327.9 2,226.0 — 327.9
2,171.3
–
327.9
2,342.0 House denied $326.8
System
million requested to
terminate
development of FCS
manned ground
vehicles and N-LOS
cannon, on grounds
that previously
appropriated funds
could cover
termination costs.
Conference cuts
$211 mn in R&D for
excess termination
liability amounts.
USMC Expeditionary
— — 293.5
— — 293.5
— — 293.5
–
–
293.5
Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
Army and USMC Wheeled Vehicles
HMMWV, Army and
1,824 290.9 — 1,824 295.9 —
290.9 —
1,824
293.8
–
USMC (Base Budget)
1,824
HMMWV,
Army
(OCO) 8,444
1,456.1 — 8,444 1,456.1 — 8,444
1,456.1 —
8,444
1,080.8
–
Conference cuts
$375 million
Family of Medium
3,889 1,158.5 5.7 3,889 1,158.5 5.7 3,889 1,158.5 15.7
3,889 1,033.5
5.7
Conference
cuts
Tactical Vehicles
$125 million
(Base Budget)
Family of Medium
1,643
461.7 — 1,643
261.7 — 1,643
461.7 —
1,643 286.3 –
Conference cuts $175
Tactical Vehicles (OCO)
million
CRS-79
Request
House-Passed
Senate-Passed
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ #
$
$
Comments
Family of Heavy
— 812.9 7.5 — 812.9 7.5 — 812.9 17.5
–
812.9
9.5
Tactical Vehicles
(Base Budget)
Family of Heavy
— 623.2 — — 623.2 — — 623.2 —
–
623.2
–
Tactical Vehicles (OCO)
MRAP
Vehicle
(OCO)
1,080 5,456.0 — 1,080 5,456.0 — 1,080 5,456.0 —
1,080 6,056.0
–
Conference adds $600
million
Radios and Other Tactical Electronic Devices
Joint Tactical Radio
— — 876.4
— —
876.4
—
— 867.4
–
35.0
876.4 Conference cuts $55
System (JTRS)
mn in procurement.
SINCGARS Family
—
135.0 — — — — — 60.0 —
–
53.2
–
HASC denied funds
(Base Budget and
for SINCGARS
OCO)
radios on grounds
that they would not
be compatible with
the JTRS radios
planned for future
procurement. Senate
cut $75 million in
OCO for unjustified
program growth.
Conference cut $82
million.
WIN-T Ground
— 557.7 180.6 — 555.7
165.6 — 557.7 180.6
–
557.7
180.7
Forces Tactical
Network (Base
Budget and OCO)
FBCB2 digital combat
— 515.0 — — 693.9 — — 336.0 —
–
515.0
–
Senate cut $179
Information network
million in OCO as
(Base Budget and
unjustified program
OCO)
growth.
CRS-80
Request
House-Passed
Senate-Passed
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ #
$
$
Comments
Night vision
— 733.2 122.6 122.6 691.1 122.6 — 633.2 122.6
–
557.5
134.6 House
cut
$52
equipment—various
million. Senate cut
(Base Budget and
$100 million in Army
OCO)
base procurement
due to contractor
delays. Conference
cuts $176 million in
procurement from
various accounts,
adds $12 million in
R&D.
Sources: House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 2647, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-166, June 18,
2009; Senate Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany S. 1390, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, S.Rept. 111-35, July 2, 2009 and text
of S. 1390, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2647,
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-288, October 7, 2009.
Note: The defense authorization act general y does not determine the final amount provided for a program or project. The authorization bill authorizes the appropriation
of funds, but the amount available is determined by the appropriations. An appropriations bill may provide more than or less than the amount authorized, may provide
funds for a program for which no funds are authorized, and may provide funds for a “new start” for which funding has never been authorized.
CRS-81
Table A-4. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Army and Marine Corps Programs: Appropriations
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed
Conference
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Syste
m
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
Army Aircraft
Light
54 326.0
–
54 326.0
– 54 326.0
–
–
–
– –
Utility
Helicop
ter
UH-60
79 1,357.
33.5 79
1,357.
33.5 79
1,357.
39.9
–
–
– –
Blackha
1
1
1
wk
Helicop
ter
(Base
Budget)
UH-60
4
74.3
–
4
74.3
–
2
37.2
–
–
–
– Senate cuts $37 million for 2 fewer aircraft losses.
Blackha
wk
Helicopt
er
(OCO)
CH-47
35 910.8 10.8 34 897.8 10.8 35 932.8 10.8
–
–
– House cuts $13 million and 1 aircraft. Senate
Chinoo
transfers $22 million from mods.
k
Helicop
ter
(Base
Budget)
CH-47
4 141.2
–
4 141.2
–
2 70.6 – – –
–
Senate
cuts $71 million for 2 fewer aircraft losses.
Chinook
Helicopt
er
(OCO)
CH-47
– 102.9
–
–
83.9
–
–
87.3 – – –
–
Senate
transfers
$22 million to procurement, adds
Helicop
$6.4 million for asset management and avionics.
ter
Mods
CRS-82
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed
Conference
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Syste
m
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
AH-64
– 426.4
164.1
– 429.4
164.1
–
426.4
164.1
–
–
– –
Apache
Helo
Mods
(Base
Budget)
AH-64
4 315.3
–
4 315.3
–
2 161.1
–
–
–
– Senate cuts $69 million for fewer battle losses and
Apache
$85 million ahead of need.
Helo
Mods
(OCO)
Army and USMC Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles
M-2
– 526.4
88.6
– 526.4 88.6 – 500.7 88.6
–
–
– Senate cuts $26 million from procurement for
Bradley
excessive support costs.
Mods
(Base
Budget)
M-2
– 243.6
–
– 243.6
–
–
–
–
–
–
– Senate deletes funds as financed in FY2009.
Bradley
Mods
(OCO)
M-1
22 369.4 101.7 22 369.4 101.7 22 369.4 101.7
–
–
– –
Abrams
tank
Mods
Stryker
– 388.6
90.3
– 613.6 90.3 – 364.2 90.3
–
–
– Senate cuts $24 million from procurement for
Armor
excessive management costs.
ed
Vehicle
Future
– 327.9
2,553.
– 327.9
2,342.
– 327.9 2,188.
–
–
– House cuts $211 million in R&D for unjustified
Comba
0
0
8
termination costs. In R&D, Senate cuts $199 million
t
for contractor fees, cuts $182 million as program
System
adjustment, adds $17 million for specific projects.
CRS-83
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed
Conference
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Syste
m
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
USMC
–
– 293.5
–
–
243.5
–
–
293.5
–
–
– House cuts $50 million in R&D due to delay.
Expedit
ionary
Fighting
Vehicle
(EFV)
Army and USMC Wheeled Vehicles
HMM
1,824 293.8
–
1,824 293.8
– 1,824 295.0
–
–
–
– –
WV,
Army
and
USMC
(Base
Budget)
HMM
8,444 1,456.
– 8,444
1,456.
– 8,444 1,278.
–
–
–
– Senate cuts $177 million in Marine Corps OCO
WV,
1
1
9
directing use of previously appropriated funds.
Army
(OCO)
Family
3,889 1,158.
5.7 3,241 965.5
5.7 3,889 1,033.
5.7
–
–
– House cuts $193 million due to schedule slip. Senate
of
5
5
cuts $125 million.
Mediu
m
Tactical
Vehicle
s (Base
Budget)
Family
1,643 461.7
–
1,643 461.7
– 1,643 461.7
–
–
–
– –
of
Mediu
m
Tactical
Vehicle
s
(OCO)
CRS-84
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed
Conference
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Syste
m
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
Family
– 812.9
7.5
– 786.6 10.5 – 812.9
13.5
–
–
– House cuts $26 million for funding ahead of need.
of
Heavy
Tactical
Vehicle
s (Base
Budget)
Family
– 623.2
–
– 623.2
–
–
623.2
–
–
–
– –
of
Heavy
Tactical
Vehicle
s
(OCO)
MRAP
1,080 5,456.
– 1,080
5,456.
– 1,080 6,656.
–
–
–
– Senate adds $1.2 billion for additional M-ATVs.
Vehicle
0
0
0
(OCO)
Radios and Other Tactical Electronic Devices
Joint
–
90.2
876.4
–
35.0 880.9
– 35.0 876.4
–
-55.2
– House and Senate cut $55 million for delay in ground
Tactical
mobile radios.
Radio
System
(JTRS)
SINCG
– 135.0
–
– 131.2
–
–
56.7 – –
-78.3 – Senate cuts $75 million in OCO as ahead of need.
ARS
Family
(Base
Budget
and
OCO)
CRS-85
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed
Conference
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Procuremen
R&D
Syste
m
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
WIN-T
– 557.7
180.7
– 557.7
165.7
–
557.7
180.7
–
–
– –
Groun
d
Forces
Tactical
Netwo
rk
(Base
Budget
and
OCO)
FBCB2
– 515.0
–
– 515.0
–
–
515.0
–
–
–
– –
digital
combat
Informa
tion
networ
k (Base
Budget
and
OCO)
Night
– 733.2
122.6
– 543.0 171.6
– 532.3 148.6
– -200.9
26.0 House cuts $175.5 million in Army procurement for
vision
funding ahead of need, adds $49 million in R&D.
equipm
Senate cuts $186.4 million in Army procurement and
ent—
$14.5 million in AF OCO procurement for funding in
various
excess of need, adds $26 million in R&D.
(Base
Budget
and
OCO)
Sources: House Appropriations Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 3326, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, H.Rept. 111-230, July 24, 2009; Senate
Appropriations Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 3326, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, S.Rept. 111-74, September 10, 2009.
CRS-86
Table A-5. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Shipbuilding Programs: Authorization
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Comments
# $ $ #
$
$
#
$
$
#
$
$
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
CVN-21 Carrier
— 739.3 173.6 — 739.3 173.6 — 739.3 173.6 – 739.3 173.6
CVN-21 Carrier (long-lead
— 484.4 — — 484.4 — — 484.4 — – 484.4 –
components)
Virginia Class Submarine
1
1,964.3
154.8
1
1,964.3
165.8
1
1,964.3
165.8
1
1,964.3
162.8 House and Senate add $121
million, conference adds $8
million for R&D projects.
Virginia Class Submarine
— 1,959.7 — — 1,959.7 — — 1,959.7 —
–
1,959.7
–
(long-lead components)
Carrier Refueling Overhaul
— 1,775.4 — — 1,775.4 — — 1,775.4 —
–
1,775.4
–
CG(X) missile defense
— — 150.0 — — 150.0 — — 150.0 – –
110.0
Conference
cuts $40 million in
cruiser
R&D due to program delay.
DD(X)/DDG-1000
— 1,084.2 539.1 — 1,084.2 539.1 — 1,084.2 539.1
– 1,084.2 539.1
Destroyer
DDG-51 Destroyer
1 1,912.3 — 1 1,912.3 — 1 1,912.3 —
1
1,912.3
–
DDG-51 Destroyer (long-
— 329.0 — — 429.0 — — 329.0 — – 329.0 –
lead components)
LCS Littoral Combat Ship
3 1,380.0 360.5 3 1,380.0 360.5 3 1,380.0 360.5
2 1,380.0 360.5
Conference
reduces
buy
from
3
ships to 2 to ensure full funding.
LPD-17 Amphibious Ship
— 872.4 — — 872.4 — — 872.4 — – 872.4 –
LPD-17 (long-lead
— 184.6 — — 244.6 — — 184.6 — – 184.6 –
components)
Intratheater Connector,
1 178.0 8.4 1 178.0 8.4 1 178.0 8.4 1 178.0 8.4
Navy
Outfitting
— 391.2 — — 391.2 — — 391.2 — – 391.2 –
Service Craft
— 3.7 — — 3.7 — — 3.7 — – 3.7 –
LCAC Service Life Extension
3 63.9 — 3 63.9 — 3 63.9 — 3 63.9 –
CRS-87
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Comments
# $ $ #
$
$
#
$
$
#
$
$
Completion of Prior Year
— 454.6 — — 304.6 — — 454.6 — – 454.6 –
Shipbuilding
National Defense Sealift Fund
T-AKE Cargo Ship
2 940.1 — 2 940.1 — 1 540.1 — 2 940.1 –
Senate
cuts $400 million to delay
2nd ship pending outcome of QDR
Army
Joint High Speed Vessel,
1 183.7 3.1 1 183.7 3.1 1 183.7 3.1 1 183.7 3.1
Army
Sources: House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 2647, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-166, June 18,
2009; Senate Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany S. 1390, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, S.Rept. 111-35, July 2, 2009 and text
of S. 1390, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2647,
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-288, October 7, 2009.
Note: The defense authorization act general y does not determine the final amount provided for a program or project. The authorization bill authorizes the appropriation
of funds, but the amount available is determined by the appropriations. An appropriations bill may provide more than or less than the amount authorized, may provide
funds for a program for which no funds are authorized, and may provide funds for a “new start” for which funding has never been authorized.
CRS-88
Table A-6. Congressional Action on FY2010 Shipbuilding Programs: Appropriations
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed
Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ #
$
$
Comments
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
CVN-21
–
739.3
173.6
–
739.3
173.6
–
739.3
176.8
–
–
–
Carrier
CVN-21
–
484.4
–
–
484.4
–
–
484.4
–
–
–
–
Carrier (long-
lead
components)
Virginia Class
1 1,964.3 154.8
1 1,964.3 195.3
1 1,964.3 162.8
–
–
–
Submarine
Virginia Class
–
1,959.7
–
–
1,959.7
–
–
1,959.7
–
–
–
–
Submarine
(long-lead
components)
Carrier
–
1,775.4
–
–
1,775.4
–
–
1,775.4
–
–
–
–
Refueling
Overhaul
CG(X)
–
–
150.0
–
–
110.0
–
–
86.0
–
–
– Senate cuts
missile
$64 million
defense
in R&D for
cruiser
premature
funding and
unjustified
request.
CRS-89
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed
Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ #
$
$
Comments
DD(X)/DDG-
–
1,084.2
539.1
–
1,073.2
539.1
–
1,393.8
526.5
–
–
– Senate shifts
1000
$309.6
Destroyer
million from
prior year
shipbuilding
costs to the
current line,
cuts $12.6
million in
R&D for
FSST
alternative.
DDG-51
1
1,912.3 –
1
1,912.3 –
2
3,650.0 –
– – –
Senate
adds
Destroyer
$1.7 billion
for 2nd ship
for efficient
restart of
production.
DDG-51
–
329.0
–
–
329.0
–
–
329.0
–
–
–
–
Destroyer
(long-lead
components)
CRS-90
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed
Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ #
$
$
Comments
LCS Littoral
3 1,380.0 360.5
4 2,160.0 366.9
2 1,080.0 360.5
–
–
–
House
adds
Combat Ship
$240 million
to properly
price ships,
at $540
million each.
Senate
provides
$1.08 billion
for two ful y
priced ships,
cutting $300
million from
request.
LPD-17
–
872.4
5.3
–
872.4
5.3
–
872.4
5.3
–
–
–
Amphibious
Ship
LPD-17 (long-
–
184.6
–
–
184.6
–
–
184.6
–
–
–
–
lead
components)
LHA
–
–
–
–
170.0
–
–
–
– Senate adds
Replacement
$170 million
(advance
in long-lead
procurement)
funds for
LHA-7.
Intratheater
1
178.0 8.4 2
358.0 8.4 1
178.0 8.4 – – –
House
adds
Connector,
$180 million
Navy
for one
additional
ship.
Outfitting
–
391.2
–
–
391.2
–
–
391.2
–
–
–
–
Service Craft
–
3.7
–
–
3.7
–
–
3.7
–
–
–
–
CRS-91
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed
Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ #
$
$
Comments
LCAC
3 63.9 –
3 63.9 –
3 63.9 –
– – –
Service Life
Extension
Completion
–
454.6
–
–
454.6
–
–
145.0
–
–
–
– Senate shifts
of Prior Year
$309.6
Shipbuilding
million from
prior year
shipbuilding
to DDG-
1000 line.
National Defense Sealift Fund
T-AKE Cargo
2
940.1 –
2
940.1 –
2
940.1 –
– – –
Ship
Army
Joint High
1
183.7 3.1 1
183.7 3.1 1
183.7 3.1 – – –
Speed Vessel,
Army
Sources: House Appropriations Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 3326, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, H.Rept. 111-230, July 24, 2009; Senate
Appropriations Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 3326, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, S.Rept. 111-74, September 10, 2009.
CRS-92
Table A-7. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force Aircraft Programs: Authorization
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
F-35 Joint
10 2,048.8 1,858.1
9 2,115.8 2,011.6
10 2,048.8 1,858.1
10 2,178.8 2,073.1
To fund
Strike
continued
Fighter, AF
development of
an alternative
F-35 Joint
20 3,997.1 1,741.3
19 3,873.1 1,894.8
20 3,997.1 1,741.3
20 3,997.0 1,956.3
engine for the
Strike
Joint Strike
Fighter, Navy
CRS-93
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
F-35 Joint
–
781.6
–
–
799.6
–
–
781.6
–
–
759.6
–
Strike
Fighter, long-
lead
components
(AF and
Navy
CRS-94
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
F-22 Fighter,
–
95.1
569.3
–
95.1
569.3
–
95.1
569.3
–
95.2
569.3 The House
AF
added funds for
components
F-22 Fighter
–
–
–
–
368.8
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
that would
(long-lead
allow
components)
procurement of
F-22 Fighter
–
350.7
–
–
12.7
–
–
–
–
–
192.3
–
12 F-22s in
Mods
FY2011; but it
largely offset
the cost by
cutting the
amount
requested to
modify existing
F-22s, which
reduction
HASC said
could be made
up for by
unspent
FY2009. funds
for F-22. The
Senate added
funds for 7
aircraft in
FY2010, cut
$350.7 million
for mods and
directed that
FY2009 mod
funds be used
for FY2010
requirements.
The conference
cut $358 million
from mods as
not yet needed.
CRS-95
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
EA-18G
22 1,632.4
55.4
22 1,688.4
55.4
22 1,632.4
55.4
22 1,632.4
55.4
The House
Aircraft,
added $108
Navy
million for
components
F/A-18E/F
9 1,060.9 127.7
9 1,168.9 127.7
18 2,129.5 127.7
18 1,681.2 127.7
that would
Fighter, Navy
support a
multiyear
contract to
purchase
additional F/A-
18E/F and EA-
18G aircraft
beginning in
FY2011. The
Senate added
$560 million for
9 additional
F/A-18s.
Conference
added $512
million for 9
aircraft and
$108 million for
multi-year
procurement.
F/A-18
–
484.1
–
–
484.1
–
–
484.1
–
–
480.7
–
Aircraft
variant Mods
F-15 Fighter
–
92.9
311.2
–
143.4
313.2
–
92.9
311.2
–
143.4
312.2 House and
Mods
conference add
$50.5 million
for 5 AESA
radars.
A-10 Attack
–
262.5
9.7
–
319.6
9.7
–
262.5
9.7
–
252.5
9.7
Plane Mods
CRS-96
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
B-1B
–
128.1
148.0
–
128.1
148.0
–
128.1
130.1
–
82.5
177.0 Conference
Bomber
shifts $29
Mods
million from
procurement to
R&D.
B-2A
–
284.0
415.4
–
284.0
415.4
–
284.0
415.4
–
264.2
415.4
Bomber
Mods
C-130 Cargo
12
1,410.2 231.3 12
1,348.2 231.3 12
1,410.2 231.3
5 906.2 231.3
Conference
Aircraft
cuts $504
variants AF
million for 7
aircraft as
funded in
FY2009
supplemental.
C-130 Cargo
–
368.0
–
–
167.9
–
–
144.9
–
–
147.8
–
House and
Aircraft
Senate cut
variant
$209.5 million
Mods, AF
as excess to
need or as
available from
prior years.
Conference
cuts $228.5
million as
excess to need.
House adds
$9.4 million for
specific mods,
of which
Conference
allows 8.3
million.
CRS-97
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
C-5 Cargo
–
715.3
95.3
–
715.3
95.3
–
715.3
95.3
–
687.3
95.3 Conference
Aircraft
cuts $28 million
Mods, AF
for the
Reliability
Enhancement
and Re-engining
Program
(RERP).
C-17 Cargo
–
88.5
161..9
–
88.5
161.9
–
88.5
161.9
–
88.5
161.9
Aircraft
C-17 Cargo
–
561.1
–
–
561.1
–
–
561.1
–
–
424.4
–
Conference
Aircraft
eliminates $91
Mods.
million for post-
Support
production
Equipment
support and
$45 million for
mods as ahead
of need.
Joint Cargo
8 319.1 –
8 319.1 –
8 319.1 –
8 319.1 –
Aircraft
KC-X
–
–
439.6
–
–
439.6
–
–
439.6
–
–
439.6
Tanker
Replacement,
AF
C-37 Aircraft
1
66.4
–
1
66.4
–
1
66.4
–
1
66.4
–
C-40 Aircraft
4
228.4
–
5
333.6
–
4
228.4
–
5
342.8
–
House and
conference add
$105 million for
1 aircraft.
V-22 Osprey,
30
2,300.2 89.5 30
2,300.2 92.5 30
2,300.2 89.5 30
2,300.2 89.5
Navy
V-22 Osprey
–
53.5
–
–
53.5
–
–
53.5
–
–
53.5
–
Mods, Navy
OCO
CRS-98
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
CV-22
5 451.1 19.6
5 451.1 19.6 5 451.1 19.6 5 451.1 19.6
Osprey, AF
CV-22
5 114.6 12.7
5 114.6 12.7 5 114.6 12.7 5 114.6 12.7
Special Ops
Mods, SOF
CH-53K
–
–
554.8
–
–
554.8
–
–
554.8
–
–
554.8
Helicopter
VH-71A
–
–
85.2
–
–
85.2
–
–
85.2
–
–
85.2
Executive
Helicopter
Combat
–
–
89.0
–
–
15.0
–
–
–
–
–
–
DOD
Search &
terminated
Rescue
program, R&D
Helicopter
for a follow-on.
(CSAR-X)
House cut all
but $15 million,
Senate
eliminated
funds, and
mandated use
of prior year
funds for R&D.
Conference
eliminated
funds.
UH-1Y/AH-
28 780.4 32.8 18 497.5 32.8 28 780.4 32.8 24 680.4 32.8
House
cut
1Z
$282.9 million
for 10 aircraft
to maintain
production at
FY2009 level.
Conference cut
$100 million for
4 aircraft.
CRS-99
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
MH-
42 1,436.2 131.1
42 1,436.2 131.1
42 1,436.2 131.1
42 1,436.3 135.4
60R/MH-60S
Helicopter,
Navy
P-8A
6 1,825.0 1,162.4
6 1,825.0 1,162.4
6 1,825.0 1,162.4
6 1,814.2 1,162.4
Poseidon
Multi-Mission
Maritime
Aircraft
E-2D
2 606.1 364.6
2 511.2 606.1 2 606.1 364.6 2 606.2 364.6
Hawkeye
Aircraft,
Navy
P-3/EP-3
–
652.6
12.0
–
652.6
12.0
–
652.6
12.0
–
613.0
12.0 House cut $50
Aircraft
million,
Mods
conference cut
$40 million for
mods.
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), Base Budget and OCO
MQ-4 Global
5 802.7 783.1
5 802.7 783.1 5 752.7 783.1 5 802.7 783.2
Hawk
CRS-100
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
MQ-1
36 955.0 21.6 24 791.6 21.6 24 755.0 25.6 24 754.9 24.2
The
House
Predator
shifted all
Predator
funding into the
part of the
budget funding
war costs.
Senate cut $200
million for 12
aircraft to avoid
forward
funding.
Conference
also cut $200
million.
MQ-9
24 650.2 45.0 24 650.2 45.0 24 590.3 45.0 24 630.3 53.6
Reaper
RQ-7
11 666.2 1.0 11 668.7 1.0 11 666.2 1.0 11 666.2 1.0
Shadow,
Base & OCO
RQ-11
1221 135.1 0.6 1221 135.1 0.6 1221 135.1 0.6 1221 135.1 0.6
Raven, Base
& OCO
MQ-8 Fire
5 77.6 25.6 5 77.6 26.5 5 77.6 25.6 5 77.6 25.6
Scout, Base
& OCO
Future
–
–
68.7
–
–
68.7
–
–
68.7
–
–
68.7
Combat
System UAS
UCAS
–
–
311.2
–
–
311.2
–
–
311.2
–
–
311.2
Unmanned
Combat
Aerial
System
(Navy)
CRS-101
Request House-Passed
Senate-Passed Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
Tactical
–
–
202.5
–
–
202.5
–
–
288.5
–
–
202.5 The Senate
Unmanned
added $86
Aerial
million to
Vehicles
deploy in
(Army)
Afghanistan
Hummingbird
drone
helicopters
carrying radars
designed to
detect individual
humans walking.
Sources: House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 2647, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-166, June 18,
2009; Senate Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany S. 1390, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, S.Rept. 111-35, July 2, 2009 and text
of S. 1390, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2647,
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-288, October 7, 2009.
Notes: The defense authorization act general y does not determine the final amount provided for a program or project. The authorization bill authorizes the appropriation
of funds, but the amount available is determined by the appropriations. An appropriations bill may provide more than or less than the amount authorized, may provide
funds for a program for which no funds are authorized, and may provide funds for a “new start” for which funding has never been authorized.
CRS-102
Table A-8. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Aircraft Programs: Appropriations
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Request House-Passed
Senate
Committee
Final
Bill
Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $ Comments
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter,
10 2,048.8 1,858.1
10 2,067.4 2,073.1
10 2,048.8 1,780.1
–
–
– House
cuts
$111
AF
million for recurring
equipment purchases,
adds $130 million in
procurement and $215
million in R&D for
alternate engine.
Senate cuts $78 million
in R&D as excess to
need.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter,
20 3,997.0 1,741.3
18 3,576.4 1,956.3
20 3,997.0 1,663.3
–
–
– House
cuts
$300
Navy
million for 2 aircraft
that could not be built
until FY2011 and $121
million for equipment
purchases; adds $215
million in R&D for
alternative engine.
Senate cuts $78 million
in R&D as excess to
need.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter,
–
781.6
–
–
759.6
–
–
759.6
–
–
–
– House and Senate cut
long-lead components
$22 million due to 2
(AF and Navy)
fewer aircraft funded in
FY2009.
F-22 Fighter, AF
–
95.2
569.3 –
31.2
569.3 –
95.2
569.3 – – –
House cuts $64 million
due to program
reduction.
F-22 Fighter (long-lead
–
–
–
–
368.8
–
–
–
–
–
–
– House adds $368.8
components)
million in advance
procurement for 12
aircraft.
CRS-103
Request House-Passed
Senate
Committee
Final
Bill
Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $ Comments
F-22 Fighter Mods
–
350.7
–
–
187.3
–
–
177.3
–
–
–
– House cuts $163
million and Senate cuts
$158 million as prior
to need and $15
million from specific
projects.
EA-18G Aircraft, Navy
22 1,632.4
55.4
22
1,632.4
57.4
22
1,632.4
55.4
–
–
–
EA-18G Aircraft, Navy
–
–
–
9
512.3
–
–
–
– Senate adds $512
(OCO)
million for 9 aircraft.
F/A-18E/F
Fighter,
Navy
9 1,061.0 127.7
18 1,664.0 127.7
9 1,061.0 122.3
–
–
– House
adds
$603
million for 9 additional
aircraft and multi-year
procurement
F/A-18 Aircraft variant
–
484.1
–
–
396.9
–
– 463.7
– –
– –
House cuts $87 million
Mods
for radar upgrades
ahead of need. Senate
cuts $20 million for
delays and excess
growth.
F-15 Fighter Mods
–
92.9
311.2
–
132.3
320.2
–
92.9
323.2
–
–
–
A-10 Attack Plane Mods
–
252.5
9.7
–
252.5
9.7
–
252.5
12.2
–
–
–
B-1B Bomber Mods
–
111.5
148.0
–
111.5
178.0
–
82.5
179.0
–
–
– Senate cuts $29
million.
B-2A Bomber Mods
–
284.0
415.4 –
255.0
436.7
– 247.9 397.4 –
– –
Senate cuts $36 million
C-130 Cargo Aircraft
12
1,410.2 231.3
6 906.2 231.3
5 906.2 212.3 –
– –
House
and
Senate
cut
variants AF
$504 million as funded
in FY2009
supplemental.
CRS-104
Request House-Passed
Senate
Committee
Final
Bill
Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $ Comments
C-130 Cargo Aircraft
–
368.0
–
–
113.6
–
–
154.7
–
–
–
– House cuts total of
variant Mods, AF
$254.5 million due to
delays and funding in
advance of need.
Senate cuts $213
million.
C-5 Cargo Aircraft
–
715.3 95.3
– 658.7 95.3
– 670.2 85.3 –
– –
Senate
cuts
$45
Mods, AF
million.
C-17 Cargo Aircraft
–
88.5
161.9 3
762.6
161.9 10
2,588.5
161.9 – – –
Senate
adds $2.5 billion
for 10 aircraft.
C-17 Cargo Aircraft
–
561.1
–
–
317.2
–
–
424.4
–
–
–
– House cuts total of
Mods/Support
$152.6 million, mainly
Equipment
for excess funding for
installation of mods.
Senate cuts $45 million
for mods and $91
million for support
equipment as in
advance of need.
Joint
Cargo
Aircraft
8 319.1
–
8 319.1
–
8 319.1
– –
– –
KC-X Tanker
–
–
439.6
–
–
439.6
–
–
409.6
–
–
– House shifts funding
Replacement, AF
from R&D to a general
provision and allows
either a single supplier
or dual sourcing.
C-37 Aircraft
1
66.4
_
3
199.2
_
1
66.4
C-40
Aircraft
4 228.4
–
6 428.4
–
4 228.4
– –
– –
House
adds
$200
million for 2 aircraft.
V-22
Osprey,
Navy
30 2,300.2 89.5
30 2,300.2
89.5
30 2,300.2
64.5
–
–
–
V-22 Osprey Mods,
–
53.5
–
–
23.5
–
–
–
– Senate cuts $30 million
Navy OCO
for interim gun as
ahead of need.
CRS-105
Request House-Passed
Senate
Committee
Final
Bill
Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $ Comments
CV-22 Osprey, AF
5
451.1
19.6
5
451.1
19.6
5
451.1
19.6
–
–
–
CV-22 Special Ops
5 114.6 12.7
5 114.6 12.7
5 114.6 12.7 –
– –
Mods, SOF
CH-53K Helicopter
–
–
554.8
–
–
524.4
–
–
554.8
–
–
–
VH-71A Executive
–
–
85.2
–
–
485.2
–
–
30.0
–
–
– House adds $400
Helicopter
million to resume
development.
Combat Search &
–
–
90.0
–
–
10.0
–
–
–
–
–
– Senate eliminates R&D
Rescue Helicopter
funds and transfers
(CSAR-X)
amounts to HH-60
program.
UH-1Y/AH-1Z
28 780.4 32.8 24 645.4 25.8 22 615.4 32.8 –
– –
House
cuts
$100
million for 4 aircraft
and $35 million for
excess advance
procurement. Senate
cuts $165 million for 6
aircraft.
MH-60R/MH-60S
42 1,436.3 130.7 42
1,442.8
133.7 42
1,383.1
125.3 – – –
Senate
cuts $53 million
Helicopter, Navy
for funding in excess of
need.
HH-60M Helicopter, AF
–
–
–
–
–
–
5
140.0
15.0
–
–
– House adds $140
million for 5 aircraft to
replace combat losses.
Senate shifts $90
million from CSAR
R&D and provides $75
million in procurement
for 2 aircraft and $15
million in R&D.
CRS-106
Request House-Passed
Senate
Committee
Final
Bill
Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $ Comments
P-8A Poseidon Multi-
6 1,825.1 1,162.4
6 1,803.0 1,182.4
6 1,814.2 1,162.4
–
–
– House
trims
$22
Mission Maritime
million for production
Aircraft
related matters. Senate
cuts $11 million for
unjustified growth.
E-2D Hawkeye Aircraft,
2 606.2 364.6
3 744.4 362.6
2 568.8 364.6 –
– –
House
adds
$138
Navy
million for 1 additional
aircraft. Senate cuts
$37 million as
unjustified growth.
P-3/EP-3 Aircraft Mods,
–
652.6 12.0
– 595.8 12.0
– 613.0 12.0 –
– –
House
cuts
$56.8
Base and OCO
million for excess cost
growth. Senate cuts
$40 million in OCO as
ahead of need.
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), Base Budget and OCO
MQ-4 Global Hawk,
5 802.7 783.2
5 473.0 698.2
5 802.7 783.2 –
– –
House
cuts
$279.7
Base and OCO
million due to Block 40
delay, cuts $50 million
in advance
procurement, cuts $85
million in R&D due to
slow program
execution.
MQ-1 Predator, Base
36 954.9 21.6 24 812.9 27.8 36 898.5 24.2 –
– –
House
cuts
$163
and OCO
million for 12 aircraft
for funding ahead of
need. Senate shifts
funds for 12 aircraft
from OCO to base
budget, cuts $56
million.
CRS-107
Request House-Passed
Senate
Committee
Final
Bill
Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $ Comments
MQ-9 Reaper, Base and
24 650.2 45.0 24 655.4 113.6 24 578.6 55.0 – – –
House
adds $70 million
OCO
in R&D. Senate cuts
$72 million in OCO
procurement, transfers
$10 million to OCO
R&D.
RQ-7 Shadow, Base and
11
666.2 1.0 11
661.0 1.0 11
663.2 1.0 – – –
OCO
RQ-11 Raven, Base and
1,221 135.1 0.6 1,221 135.1 0.6 1,221 135.1 0.6 –
– –
OCO
MQ-8 Fire Scout, Base
5 77.6 25.6 5 64.3 25.6 5 77.6 25.6 – – –
and OCO
Future Combat System
–
–
68.7
–
–
68.7
–
–
81.7
–
–
– Senate adds $13
UAS
million in R&D.
UCAS Unmanned
–
–
311.2
–
–
306.2
–
–
311.2
–
–
–
Combat Aerial System,
Navy
Tactical Unmanned
–
–
202.5
–
–
172.5
– –
170.1
– –
–
House cuts $30 million
Aerial Vehicles, Army
in R&D. Senate cuts
$32 million.
Sources: House Appropriations Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 3326, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, H.Rept. 111-230, July 24, 2009; Senate
Appropriations Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 3326, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, S.Rept. 111-74, September 10, 2009.
CRS-108
Table A-9. Congressional Action on FY2010 DOD War Funding Request (Defense Appropriations and Military Construction
Appropriations Bills)
amounts in millions of dollars
Total
Amended
House-
Senate-
Enacted
House-passed
SAC Markup, DOD
Title/Service/
Enacted
FY2010
passed
passed
FY2010
Appropriations
Approps, H.R. 3326, &
Category
FY2009
DOD
FY2010
FY2010
Authorization
H.R. 3326,
Military Construction,
Bridge/Supp.
Request,
Authoriz.
Authoriz.
H.R. 2647
H.R. 3082, 7-30-
S. 1407, 9-10-09
8-13-09
H.R. 2647
S. 1390
(P.L. 111-84)
09
Army 12,589.7
9,606.3
NA
NA
NA
10,492.7
9,597.3
Navy 1,702.3
1,175.6
NA
NA
NA
1,622.7
1,175.0
Marine Corps
1,579.9
670.7
NA
NA
NA
997.5
670.7
Air Force
1,575.7
1,445.4
NA
NA
NA
1,855.3
1,446.4
Army Reserve
418.2
294.6
NA
NA
NA
302.6
293.6
Navy Reserve
39.5
39.0
NA
NA
NA
39.0
37.0
Marine Corps Reserve
29.2
31.3
NA
NA
NA
31.3
31.3
Air Force Reserve
14.9
24.8
NA
NA
NA
24.8
19.8
Army National Guard
1,925.7
840.0
NA
NA
NA
840.0
825.0
Air National Guard
45.0
18.5
NA
NA
NA
18.5
9.5
Total, Military
19,920.2
14,146.3
13,586.3
13,586.3
13,586.3
16,224.5
14,105.7
Personnel
Army
51,069.4 52,366.8 51,970.7 52,070.7 52,166.8
41,836.0
51,928.2
Navy
5,774.9 6,219.6 6,219.6 5,650.7 6,219.6
4,975.7
5,899.6
Marine
Corps
3,934.4 3,701.6 3,701.6 3,701.6 3,701.6
2,961.3
3,775.3
Air
Force
10,980.4 10,026.9 10,152.1 10,026.9 10,026.9
7,858.9
9,929.9
Defense-Wide
7,750.3 7,583.4 7,578.3 7,578.3 7,583.4
7,397.8
7,550.9
Army
Reserve
189.3 204.3 204.3 204.3 204.3
163.5
234.9
Navy
Reserve
68.1 68.1 68.1 68.1 68.1
54.4
68.1
Marine Corps Reserve
77.9
86.7
86.7
86.7
86.7
69.3
86.7
Air Force Reserve
47.0
125.9
125.9
125.9
125.9
100.7
125.9
Army
National
Guard 511.9 321.6 321.6 321.6 321.6
257.3
450.2
Air
National
Guard
52.7 289.9 289.9 289.9 289.9
231.9
289.9
CRS-109
Total
Amended
House-
Senate-
Enacted
House-passed
SAC Markup, DOD
Title/Service/
Enacted
FY2010
passed
passed
FY2010
Appropriations
Approps, H.R. 3326, &
Category
FY2009
DOD
FY2010
FY2010
Authorization
H.R. 3326,
Military Construction,
Bridge/Supp.
Request,
Authoriz.
Authoriz.
H.R. 2647
H.R. 3082, 7-30-
S. 1407, 9-10-09
8-13-09
H.R. 2647
S. 1390
(P.L. 111-84)
09
Overseas Contingency
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14,636.9
0.0
Operations Transfer
Fundb
Total, Operation
80,456.2
80,994.7
80,718.7
80,124.6
80,794.8
80,543.8
80,339.5
and Maintenance
Joint IED Defeat Fund
3,116.7
1,535.0
1,435.0
2,099.9
2,099.9
1,490.0
2,033.6
Iraq Freedom Fundd 0.0
115.3
115.3
115.3
0.0 0.0
0.0
Afghanistan Security
5,606.9 7,462.8 7,462.8 7,462.8 7,462.8
7,462.8
6,562.8
Forces Fund
Iraq Security Forces
1,000.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
Fund
Pakistan
0.0 700.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
Counterinsurgency
Capability Funde
Pakistan
400.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
Counterinsurgency
Funde
Commanders
[1.453]
[1,500.0] [1,300.0] [1,400.0] [1,300.0]
[1,300.0]
[1,200.0]
Emergency Response
Fund (funded within
Army O&M)
Total, Special Funds
10,123.7
9,813.1
9,013.1
9,677.9
9,677.9
8,952.8
8,596.3
Army
Aircraft
1,276.7 1,636.2 1,976.5 1,636.2 1,636.2
1,636.2
1,119.3
Missile
704.0 531.6 531.6 531.6 481.6
469.5
476.0
Weapons &
2,806.7 759.5 874.5 759.5 759.5
1,219.5
Tracked Combat
875.9
Vehicles
Ammunition
276.6 370.6 370.6 370.6 370.6
370.6
365.6
Other Procurement
8,122.8 5,675.3 6,021.8 6,330.0 5,600.3
5,635.3
4,874.2
Army
Navy
Aircraft
636.7 916.6 916.6 916.6 903.2
889.1
1,342.6
CRS-110
Total
Amended
House-
Senate-
Enacted
House-passed
SAC Markup, DOD
Title/Service/
Enacted
FY2010
passed
passed
FY2010
Appropriations
Approps, H.R. 3326, &
Category
FY2009
DOD
FY2010
FY2010
Authorization
H.R. 3326,
Military Construction,
Bridge/Supp.
Request,
Authoriz.
Authoriz.
H.R. 2647
H.R. 3082, 7-30-
S. 1407, 9-10-09
8-13-09
H.R. 2647
S. 1390
(P.L. 111-84)
09
Missile
29.5 50.7 73.7 73.7 50.7
73.7
50.7
Ammunition Navy
348.9 682.0 710.8 710.8 682.0
698.8
682.0
& Marine Corps
Other Procurement
225.1 318.0 318.0 318.0 293.0
260.8
260.1
Navy
Marine
Corps
2,091.8 1,060.3 1,164.4 1,164.4 1,060.3
1,100.3
868.2
Air Force
Aircraft
4,793.9 780.4
1,151.8 896.4 780.4
825.7
736.5
Missile
49.7 36.6 36.6 36.6 36.6
36.6
36.6
Ammunition
158.7 256.8 256.8 256.8 256.8
256.8
256.8
Other Procurement
3,302.7 2,321.5 2,321.5 2,321.5 2,321.5
2,275.2
3,138.0
Air Force
Defense-Wideh
415.1 491.4 799.8 491.4 490.0
490.0
480.8
National Guard and
500.0 0.0
[600.0]
0.0
0.0 500.0
0.0
Reserve Equipmenth
Rapid Acquisition Fundh 0.0 79.3 55.0 [79.3] [79.3]
40.0
0.0
MRAP Fund
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
(Continuing Resolution)
MRAP Fund (Defense
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
Appropriations Act)
MRAP (FY2008-2009
6,243.0 5,456.0 5,456.0 5,456.0 6,056.0
3,606.0
6,656.0
Supplemental & FY2010
Request)h
Total, Procurement
31,981.9
21,422.9
22,981.0
22,270.2
21,778.9
20,384.1
22,219.2
Army
52.9 58.0 58.0 58.0 58.0
58.0
58.0
Navy 250.0
107.2
107.2
107.2
90.2
38.3
84.2
Air
Force
232.5 29.3 29.3 29.3 29.3
29.3
39.3
Defense-Wide
685.9 115.8 215.8 115.8 115.8
115.8
112.2
Total, RDT& E
1,221.3
310.3
410.3
310.3
293.3
241.4
293.6
Defense Working
861.7 395.9 396.9 396.9 396.9
412.2
Capital Funds
412.2
National
Defense
Sealift
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
CRS-111
Total
Amended
House-
Senate-
Enacted
House-passed
SAC Markup, DOD
Title/Service/
Enacted
FY2010
passed
passed
FY2010
Appropriations
Approps, H.R. 3326, &
Category
FY2009
DOD
FY2010
FY2010
Authorization
H.R. 3326,
Military Construction,
Bridge/Supp.
Request,
Authoriz.
Authoriz.
H.R. 2647
H.R. 3082, 7-30-
S. 1407, 9-10-09
8-13-09
H.R. 2647
S. 1390
(P.L. 111-84)
09
Total, Revolving and
861.7
395.9
396.9
396.9
396.9
412.2
Management Funds
412.2
Defense Health
2,155.3 1,256.7 1,155.2 1,155.2 1,256.7
1,115.2
Program
1,563.7
i
Drug Interdiction and
308.4 324.3 324.6 324.6 356.6
317.6
Counter-Drug
353.6
Activities, Defense
Office of the Inspector
9.6 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9
8.9
8.9
General
Total, Other
2,473.2
1,589.9
1,488.7
1,488.7
1,622.2
1,481.7
1,926.2
Department of
Defense Programs
Military construction,
1,183.0 923.9 930.5 930.5 924.5
924.5
924.5
Army
Military construction,
235.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
Navy and Marine Corps
Military construction,
281.6 474.5 474.5 474.5 474.5
474.5
474.5
Air Force
Military construction,
661.6 6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
Defense-Wide
Family Housing, Navy &
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
Marine Corps
Base realignment and
263.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
closure account, 2005
NATO Security
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
Investment Program
General Provisions,
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
Military Construction,
Barracks Improvements
Total Military
2,725.3
1,405.0
1,399.0
1,405.0
1,399.0
1,399.0
1,399.0
Construction
Transfer from Defense
6.5 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Cooperation Account
0.0
Rescissions -3,961.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
CRS-112
Total
Amended
House-
Senate-
Enacted
House-passed
SAC Markup, DOD
Title/Service/
Enacted
FY2010
passed
passed
FY2010
Appropriations
Approps, H.R. 3326, &
Category
FY2009
DOD
FY2010
FY2010
Authorization
H.R. 3326,
Military Construction,
Bridge/Supp.
Request,
Authoriz.
Authoriz.
H.R. 2647
H.R. 3082, 7-30-
S. 1407, 9-10-09
8-13-09
H.R. 2647
S. 1390
(P.L. 111-84)
09
Reappropriation
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
Reduction Army
0.0
Rescission to O&M,
-181.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
Defensewide
Rescission,
-354.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
Procurement, Army
Stop Loss Transfer
534.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
Fund
Sec. 9011 Fuel Purchase
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
329.0
Transfer Capj [6.500]
[4,000.0]
[4.000]
[4.500]
[4,000]
[3.000]
[4,000.0]
Total, General
-3,955.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
329.0
Provisions
Total, Department
of Defense
145,807.8
130.078
130,000.0
129,260.0
129,549.3
129,639.5
129,620.8
Source: CRS calculations for FY2010 based on H.R. 2647 as passed by the House, S. 1390 as reported by the Senate, H.Rept. 111-166, S.Rept. 111-35, H.Rept. 111-230,
H.R. 3326, H.R. 3082/H.R. 188, S. 1407/ S.Rept. 111-40 and for FY2009 from House Appropriations Committee Table, Congressional Record, June 16, 2009, p. H6871.
Notes: NS=Not Specified; NA= Not Applicable.
a. Operations and Maintenance total excludes the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund, and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund,
which are included under Special Funds.
b. House bill transfers 20% of DOD’s O&M request to this new transfer fund because of uncertainty of war funding and required 15-day advance notification from DOD
of transfers.
c. Special Funds includes Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund, Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, Iraq
Freedom Fund and Joint Improvised Explosive Device Fund
d. DOD requested $100 million for Guantanamo Bay detainee relocation in FY2010 in the Iraq Freedom Fund.
e. DOD received funds in the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund in the FY2009 Supplemental; the Administration requested funds for DOD in the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund in FY2010 but later agreed that the State Department would administer these funds in FY2010.
f.
Administration requested broadening the language to reimburse nations supporting U.S. operations for not only logistical support but also to train and equip their
forces. The Senate authorization and House appropriations bill broadened the language and the House authorization bill did not.
g. Procurement total includes Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Transfer Fund and excludes Joint Improvised Explosive Device Fund , which is included under Special
Funds.
CRS-113
h. Funding for National Guard and Reserve was moved to DOD’s base budget by the HASC this year but continued to be provided as Title IX war funding by the HAC.
DOD requested funding the Rapid Acquisition Fund, a fund originated to get war-critical items to the field quickly, in its base budget where the Senate authorizers and
the authorization conferees approved it. The HASC and the HAC continued to treat it as war funding. DOD requested MRAP funding in both its base budget and war
funding; the authorizers approved the war request while the House appropriators reduced the request to reflect additional funding provided in the FY2009
Supplemental.
i.
DOD transferred about $1 billion in defense health costs for Traumatic Brain Injury/psychological health treatment, Post- Deployment Health Reassessments, and
Casualty Care; see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptrol er, DOD, Defense Health Program, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates. Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO), Budget Activity 1, Operation and Maintenance; http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/budget_justification/pdfs/
09_Defense_Health_Program/VOL_2/Vol%20II_Sec4-B_Overseas-Contingency_Operations_Detail_wErrata_10PB_DHP.pdf
j.
Congress sets annual caps on the total amount that DOD can transfer between accounts after enactment.
CRS-114
Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
Author Contact Information
Pat Towell, Coordinator
Charles A. Henning
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
Specialist in Military Manpower Policy
ptowell@crs.loc.gov, 7-2122
chenning@crs.loc.gov, 7-8866
Stephen Daggett
Steven A. Hildreth
Specialist in Defense Policy and Budgets
Specialist in Missile Defense
sdaggett@crs.loc.gov, 7-7642
shildreth@crs.loc.gov, 7-7635
Amy Belasco
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
Specialist in Naval Affairs
abelasco@crs.loc.gov, 7-7627
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
Richard A. Best Jr.
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in National Defense
Specialist in International Security Affairs
rbest@crs.loc.gov, 7-7607
nserafino@crs.loc.gov, 7-7667
Valerie Bailey Grasso
Don J. Jansen
Specialist in Defense Acquisition
Analyst in Defense Health Care Policy
vgrasso@crs.loc.gov, 7-7617
djansen@crs.loc.gov, 7-4769
Key Policy Staff
Area of Expertise
Name
Phone
E-mail
Valerie Grasso
7-7617
vgrasso@crs.loc.gov
Acquisition
Moshe Schwartz
7-1463
mschwartz@crs.loc.gov
Ronald O’Rourke
7-7610
rorourke@crs.loc.gov
Aviation Forces
Jeremiah Gertler
7-5107
jgertler@crs.loc.gov
Arms Control
Amy Woolf
7-2379
awoolf@crs.loc.gov
Arms Sales
Richard Grimmett
7-7675
rgrimmett@crs.loc.gov
Base Closure
Daniel Else
7-4996
delse@crs.loc.gov
Pat Towell
7-2122
ptowell@crs.loc.gov
Defense Budget
Stephen Daggett
7-7642
sdaggett@crs.loc.gov
Amy Belasco
7-7627
abelasco@crs.loc.gov
Gary Pagliano
7-1750
gpagliano@crs.loc.gov
Defense Industry
Daniel Else
7-4996
delse@crs.loc.gov
Defense R&D
John Moteff
7-1435
jmoteff@crs.loc.gov
Ground Forces
Edward Bruner
7-2775
ebruner@crs.loc.gov
Congressional Research Service
115
Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
Area of Expertise
Name
Phone
E-mail
Steve Bowman
7-5841
sbowman@crs.loc.gov
Health Care; Military
Richard Best 7-7607
rbest@crs.loc.gov
Richard Best
7-7607
rbest@crs.loc.gov
Intelligence
Al Cumming
7-7739
acumming@crs.loc.gov
Military Construction
Daniel Else 7-4996
delse@crs.loc.gov
David Burrelli
7-8033
dburrelli@crs.loc.gov
Military Personnel
Charles Henning
7-8866
chenning@crs.loc.gov
Lawrence Kapp
7-7609
lkapp@crs.loc.gov
National Guard & Reserves
Lawrence Kapp
7-7609
lkapp@crs.loc.gov
Missile Defense
Steven Hildreth
7-7635
shildreth@crs.loc.gov
Naval Forces
Ronald O’Rourke
7-7610
rorourke@crs.loc.gov
Nuclear Weapons
Jonathan Medalia
7-7632
jmedalia@crs.loc.gov
Peace Operations
Nina Serafino
7-7667
nserafino@crs.loc.gov
Readiness Amy
Belasco
7-7627
abelasco@crs.loc.gov
Space, Military
Steven Hildreth 7-2508 shildreth@crs.loc.gov
War Powers
Richard Grimmett
7-7675
rgrimmett@crs.loc.gov
Congressional Research Service
116