Nuclear Energy Policy
Mark Holt
Specialist in Energy Policy
December 10, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33558
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Nuclear Energy Policy
Summary
Nuclear energy issues facing Congress include federal incentives for new commercial reactors,
radioactive waste management policy, research and development priorities, power plant safety
and regulation, nuclear weapons proliferation, and security against terrorist attacks.
Significant incentives for new commercial reactors were included in the Energy Policy Act of
2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58). These include production tax credits, loan guarantees, insurance
against regulatory delays, and extension of the Price-Anderson Act nuclear liability system.
Together with higher fossil fuel prices and the possibility of greenhouse gas controls, the federal
incentives for nuclear power have helped spur renewed interest by utilities and other potential
reactor developers. Plans for as many as 31 reactor license applications have been announced,
although it is unclear how many of those projects will move forward.
The EPACT05 Title XVII loan guarantees, administered by the Department of Energy (DOE), are
widely considered crucial by the nuclear industry to obtain financing for new reactors. However,
opponents contend that nuclear loan guarantees would provide an unjustifiable subsidy to a
mature industry and shift investment away from environmentally preferable energy technologies.
The total amount of loan guarantees to be provided to nuclear power projects has been a
continuing congressional issue. Nuclear power plants are currently allocated $18.5 billion in loan
guarantees, enough for two or three reactors.
DOE’s nuclear energy research and development program includes advanced reactors, fuel cycle
technology and facilities, and infrastructure support. The FY2010 Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8) provides $786.6 million for those activities, $10 million above
the Obama Administration request and about $5 million below the FY2009 level.
Disposal of highly radioactive waste has been one of the most controversial aspects of nuclear
power. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-425), as amended in 1987, requires DOE
to conduct a detailed physical characterization of Yucca Mountain in Nevada as a permanent
underground repository for high-level waste. DOE submitted a license application for the Yucca
Mountain repository to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 3, 2008, with the
repository to open by 2020 at the earliest.
The Obama Administration has decided to “terminate the Yucca Mountain program while
developing nuclear waste disposal alternatives,” according to the DOE FY2010 budget
justification. Alternatives to Yucca Mountain are to be evaluated by a “blue ribbon” panel of
experts convened by the Administration.
The FY2010 budget request of $198.6 million for DOE’s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management provides only enough funding to continue the Yucca Mountain licensing process
and to evaluate alternative policies, according to DOE. The request is about $90 million below
the FY2009 funding level, which was nearly $100 million below the FY2008 level. All work
related solely to preparing for construction and operation of the Yucca Mountain repository is
being halted, according to the DOE budget justification. The FY2010 Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Act includes the requested cuts in the waste program and provides
$5 million for the blue ribbon panel. A draft of the DOE FY2011 budget request indicates that
Yucca Mountain licensing is to be halted by the end of 2010.
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Nuclear Energy Policy
Contents
Most Recent Developments......................................................................................................... 1
Nuclear Power Status and Outlook .............................................................................................. 1
Possible New Reactors ..........................................................................................................3
Federal Support..................................................................................................................... 5
Nuclear Production Tax Credit ........................................................................................ 5
Standby Support.............................................................................................................. 6
Loan Guarantees ............................................................................................................. 7
Global Climate Change ......................................................................................................... 9
Nuclear Power Research and Development ................................................................................. 9
Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation............................................................................... 13
Safety ................................................................................................................................. 13
Domestic Reactor Safety ............................................................................................... 13
Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc ...................................................................... 14
Licensing and Regulation.................................................................................................... 14
Reactor Security.................................................................................................................. 16
Decommissioning ............................................................................................................... 17
Nuclear Accident Liability .................................................................................................. 17
Nuclear Waste Management ...................................................................................................... 19
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation .................................................................................................. 22
Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs .......................................................................... 23
Legislation in the 111th Congress ............................................................................................... 24
H.R. 513 (Forbes) ......................................................................................................... 24
H.R. 1698 (Van Hollen)................................................................................................. 24
H.R. 1812 (Bachmann) ................................................................................................. 24
H.R. 1936 (Lowey) ....................................................................................................... 24
H.R. 1937 (Lowey) ....................................................................................................... 24
H.R. 2454 (Waxman) .................................................................................................... 25
H.R. 2768 (Wamp) ........................................................................................................ 25
H.R. 2828 (Bishop) ....................................................................................................... 25
H.R. 2846 (Boehner) ..................................................................................................... 25
H.R. 3009 (Ross) .......................................................................................................... 25
H.R. 3183 (Pastor) ........................................................................................................ 25
H.R. 3385 (Barton) ....................................................................................................... 26
H.R. 3448 (Pitts) ........................................................................................................... 26
H.R. 3505 (Gary Miller)................................................................................................ 26
S. 591 (Reid)................................................................................................................. 26
S. 807 (Nelson) ............................................................................................................. 26
S. 861 (Graham)............................................................................................................ 26
S. 1333 (Barrasso)......................................................................................................... 27
S. 1462 (Bingaman) ...................................................................................................... 27
S. 1733 (Kerry) ............................................................................................................. 27
S. 2052 (Mark Udall) .................................................................................................... 27
S. 2776 (Alexander) ...................................................................................................... 27
S. 2812 (Bingaman) ...................................................................................................... 27
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Tables
Table 1. Announced Nuclear Plant License Applications.............................................................. 3
Table 2. Funding for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ......................................................... 23
Table 3. DOE Funding for Nuclear Activities ............................................................................ 23
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 28
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Nuclear Energy Policy
Most Recent Developments
Funding for Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear energy research and development activities is
included in the FY2010 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-85), signed
by President Obama on October 28, 2009. DOE’s nuclear R&D program includes advanced
reactors, fuel cycle technology and facilities, and infrastructure support. P.L. 111-85 provides
$786.6 million for those activities, $10 million above the Obama Administration request and
about $5 million below the FY2009 level.
The Obama Administration’s FY2010 budget request called for termination of DOE’s proposed
nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, and for a “blue ribbon” panel of experts to
develop alternative waste strategies. The FY2010 budget request of $198.6 million for DOE’s
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management provides only enough funding to continue the
Yucca Mountain licensing process before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). All work
related solely to preparing for construction and operation of the Yucca Mountain repository is
being halted, according to the DOE budget justification. The FY2010 Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Act includes the requested cuts in the waste program and provides
$5 million for the blue ribbon panel. A draft of the DOE FY2011 budget request indicates that
Yucca Mountain licensing is to be halted by the end of 2010.
Seventeen applications for combined construction permits and operating licenses (COLs) for 26
new nuclear power units have been submitted to NRC, although two applications were suspended
by Entergy on January 9, 2009 (see Table 1). NRC is anticipating COL applications for as many
as 31 new reactors through 2009. None of the applicants has yet committed to actual plant
construction, although some preliminary contracts have been signed.
Nuclear Power Status and Outlook
The outlook for the U.S. nuclear power industry appears to have brightened after decades of
uncertainty. No nuclear power plants have been ordered in the United States since 1978, and more
than 100 reactors have been canceled, including all ordered after 1973. The most recent U.S.
nuclear unit to be completed was TVA’s Watts Bar 1 reactor, ordered in 1970 and licensed to
operate in 1996. But nuclear power is now receiving renewed interest, prompted by volatile fossil
fuel prices, possible carbon dioxide controls, and new federal subsidies and incentives.
The U.S. nuclear power industry currently comprises 104 licensed reactors at 65 plant sites in 31
states and generates about 20% of the nation’s electricity.1 That number includes TVA’s Browns
Ferry 1, which restarted May 22, 2007, after a 22-year shutdown and $1.8 billion refurbishment.
TVA’s board of directors voted August 1, 2007, to resume construction on Watts Bar 2, which had
been suspended in 1985; the project is to cost about $2.5 billion and be completed in 2013. At
TVA’s request, NRC in March 2009 reinstated the construction authorization for the two-unit
Bellefonte (AL) nuclear plant, which had been deferred in 1988 and canceled in 2006.2
1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Digest 2008-2009, NUREG-1350, Vol. 20, August 2008, p. 32,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/v20/sr1350v20.pdf.
2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority (Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and
2),” 74 Federal Register 10969, March 13, 2009.
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Annual electricity production from U.S. nuclear power plants is greater than that from oil and
hydropower, and slightly below natural gas, although it remains well behind coal, which accounts
for about half of U.S. electricity generation. Nuclear plants generate more than half the electricity
in six states. The near-record 842 billion kilowatt-hours of nuclear electricity generated in the
United States during 20083 was more than the nation’s entire electrical output in the early 1960s,
when the oldest of today’s operating U.S. commercial reactors were ordered.4
Reasons for the 30-year halt in U.S. nuclear plant orders include high capital costs, public
concern about nuclear safety and waste disposal, and regulatory compliance costs.
High construction costs may pose the most serious obstacle to nuclear power expansion.
Construction costs for reactors completed since the mid-1980s ranged from $2 to $6 billion,
averaging more than $3,700 per kilowatt of electric generating capacity (in 2007 dollars). The
nuclear industry predicts that new plant designs could be built for less than that if many identical
plants were built in a series, but current estimates for new reactors show little if any reduction in
cost.5
Average U.S. nuclear plant operating costs, however, dropped substantially since 1990, and costly
downtime has been steadily reduced. Licensed commercial reactors generated electricity at an
average of 90% of their total capacity in 2008, according to industry statistics.6
Fifty-seven commercial reactors have received 20-year license extensions from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), giving them up to a total of 60 years of operation. License
extensions for 20 additional reactors are currently under review, and more are anticipated,
according to NRC.7 The FY2010 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act provides
$10 million for DOE to study further reactor life extension to 80 years.
Existing nuclear power plants appear to hold a strong position in electricity wholesale markets. In
most cases, nuclear utilities have received favorable regulatory treatment of past construction
costs, and average nuclear operating costs are estimated to be competitive with those of fossil fuel
technologies.8 Although eight U.S. nuclear reactors were permanently shut down during the
1990s, none has been closed since 1998. Despite the shutdowns, annual U.S. nuclear electrical
output increased by more than one-third from 1990 to 2006, according to the Energy Information
Administration and industry statistics. The increase resulted primarily from reduced downtime at
the remaining plants, the startup of five new units (most recently Watts Bar 1 in 1996), and
reactor modifications to boost capacity.
3 “World Nuclear Performance in 2008 Close to Output in 2007,” Nucleonics Week, March 5, 2009, p. 1.
4 All of today’s 104 operating U.S. commercial reactors were ordered from 1963 through 1973; see “Historical Profile
of U.S. Nuclear Power Development,” U.S. Council for Energy Awareness, 1992.
5 CRS Report RL34746, Power Plants: Characteristics and Costs, by Stan Mark Kaplan
6 “World Nuclear Performance in 2008 Close to Output in 2007,” Nucleonics Week, March 5, 2009, p. 1.
7 http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html
8 Energy Information Administration, Nuclear Power: 12 percent of America’s Generating Capacity, 20 percent of the
Electricity, July 17, 2003, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/analysis/nuclearpower.html.
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Possible New Reactors
The improved performance of existing reactors, the possibility of carbon dioxide controls that
could affect coal plants, and volatile prices for natural gas—the favored fuel for new power plants
for most of the past 15 years—have prompted renewed electric industry consideration of the
feasibility of building new reactors. Electric utilities and other firms have announced plans to
apply for combined construction permits and operating licenses (COLs) for about 30 reactors (see
Table 1).9
No firm commitments have been made to build the proposed plants if the COLs are issued, but
the sponsors of four nuclear projects have signed preliminary engineering, procurement, and
construction (EPC) contracts. However, Entergy suspended further license review of its planned
GE ESBWR reactors at River Bend, LA, and Grand Gulf, MS, and Dominion is seeking other
potential vendors for its planned ESBWR at North Anna, VA, although it is continuing with the
licensing process. AmerenUE suspended review of a COL for its proposed new Callaway unit in
Missouri, and Exelon announced June 30, 2009, that it would no longer pursue a COL for a
proposed two-unit plant in Victoria County, TX, but would seek an early site permit instead,
laying the groundwork for possible future licensing. TVA announced August 7, 2009, that it
would consider building one of the two new reactors it had proposed for the Bellefonte site in
Alabama, or completing one of two partially built reactors at the site. The Department of Energy
(DOE) is assisting Dominion’s COL application as part of a program to encourage new
commercial reactor orders by 2010, a program discussed in more detail below.
Table 1. Announced Nuclear Plant License Applications
Announced
Planned
Applicant
Site
Application
Reactor Type Units
Status
Alternate Energy
Hammett (ID)
2009
Areva EPR
1
AmerenUE
Cal away (MO)
Submitted 7/24/08 Areva EPR
1
Construction plans
suspended 4/23/09;
NRC license review
suspended 6/23/09
Amarillo Power
Near Amarillo
2009 Areva
EPR
2
(TX)
Dominion
North Anna (VA) Submitted
GE ESBWR
1
Other reactor
11/27/07
vendors being
considered 1/9/09
DTE Energy
Fermi (MI)
Submitted 9/18/08
GE ESBWR
1
Duke Energy
Cherokee (SC)
Submitted
Westing.house
2
12/13/07
AP1000
Entergy
River Bend (LA)
Submitted 9/25/08
Not specified
1
Licensing suspended
1/9/09
Luminant Power
Comanche Peak
Submitted 9/19/08
Mitsubishi US-
2
(formerly TXU)
(TX)
APWR
FPL
Turkey Point (FL) Submitted 6/30/09
Westinghouse
2
AP1000
9 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, New Reactors, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors.html
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Announced
Planned
Applicant
Site
Application
Reactor Type Units
Status
NRG Energy
South Texas
Submitted 9/20/07
GE ABWR
2
EPC contract signed
Project
with Toshiba 2/12/09
NuStart
Grand Gulf (MS), Submitted 2/27/08
Not specified
1
Licensing suspended
Entergy
Jan. 9, 2009
Bellefonte (AL),
Submitted
Westinghouse
2 NuStart
announced
TVA
10/30/07
AP1000
shift of lead unit to
Vogtle 4/30/09
PPL
Bel Bend (PA)
Submitted
Areva EPR
1
10/10/08
Progress Energy
Harris (NC)
Submitted 2/19/08
Westinghouse
2 EPC
contract
signed
AP1000
1/5/09
Levy County (FL) Submitted 7/30/08 Westinghouse
2
AP1000
SCE&G
Summer (SC)
Submitted 3/31/08
Westinghouse
2 EPC
contract
signed
AP1000
5/27/08
Southern
Vogtle (GA)
Submitted 3/31/08
Westinghouse
2 EPC
contract
signed
AP1000
4/8/08; Vogtle to be
NuStart lead unit
UniStar
Calvert Cliffs
Submitted 7/13/07
Areva EPR
1
(Constel ation
(MD)
(Part 1), 3/13/08
Energy and EDF)
(Part 2)
Nine Mile Point
Submitted 9/30/08
Areva EPR
1
(NY)
Total Units
29
Sources: NRC, Nucleonics Week, Nuclear News, Nuclear Energy Institute, company news releases.
NRC’s current schedules indicate that the first COLs could be issued by 2011 or 2012, depending
on the time required for hearings and other factors.10 Issuance of a COL allows construction to
begin and also is a prerequisite for federal loan guarantees and “regulatory risk insurance” as
described below. If full-scale construction were to begin soon after receipt of the COLs, the first
new reactors could begin operating before 2020. Southern Company is projecting that its planned
two new reactors at the Vogtle site, currently scheduled to get the first COLs, will begin
commercial operation by 2016 and 2017.11
How many of the reactors listed above are likely to move toward construction after receiving
COLs remains highly uncertain. Major variables include construction costs, the availability of
financing, construction capacity, fossil fuel prices, and federal incentives and carbon control
policy. Recent projections of U.S. electric generating capacity show a wide variation in the
amount of new nuclear generation that could be built by 2030—from none to 100 gigawatts
(approximately double current capacity). (See Table 9 of CRS Report R40809, Climate Change:
10 http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html
11 http://www.southerncompany.com/nuclearenergy/timeline.aspx
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Costs and Benefits of the Cap-and-Trade Provisions of H.R. 2454, by Larry Parker and Brent D.
Yacobucci.)
Federal Support
The nuclear power industry contends that support from the federal government would be needed
for “a major expansion of nuclear energy generation.”12 Significant incentives for building new
nuclear power plants were included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58),
signed by President Bush on August 8, 2005. These include production tax credits, loan
guarantees, insurance against regulatory delays, and extension of the Price-Anderson Act nuclear
liability system (discussed in the “Nuclear Accident Liability” section of this report). Relatively
low prices for natural gas—nuclear power’s chief competitor—and rising estimated nuclear plant
construction costs have decreased the likelihood that new reactors would be built without federal
support. As a result, many draft proposals are currently circulating in Congress to strengthen or
add to the EPACT incentives, possibly as part of climate change legislation. Nuclear power critics
have denounced the federal support programs as a “bailout” of the nuclear industry, contending
that federal efforts should focus instead on renewable energy and energy efficiency.13
Nuclear Production Tax Credit
EPACT05 provides a 1.8-cents/kilowatt-hour tax credit for up to 6,000 megawatts of new nuclear
capacity for the first eight years of operation, up to $125 million annually per 1,000 megawatts.
The Treasury Department published interim guidance for the nuclear production tax credit on
May 1, 2006.14 Under the guidance, the 6,000 megawatts of eligible capacity (enough for about
four or five reactors) are to be allocated among reactors that filed license applications by the end
of 2008. If more than 6,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity ultimately qualify for the production
tax credit, then the credit is to be allocated proportionally among any of the qualifying reactors
that begin operating before 2021.
By the end of 2008, license applications had been submitted to NRC for more than 34,000
megawatts of nuclear generating capacity,15 so if all those reactors were built before 2021 they
would receive less than 20% of the maximum tax credit. However, the Energy Information
Administration estimates that 8,000 megawatts of new nuclear capacity will ultimately qualify for
the credit;16 in this case the credit amount drops to 1.35 cents per kilowatt-hour once all the
qualifying plants are on line. The credit is not adjusted for inflation.
12 Nuclear Energy Institute, “NEI Unveils Package of Policy Initiatives Needed to Achieve Climate Change Goals,”
press release, October 26, 2009, http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/nei-unveils-package-of-policy-
initiatives-needed-to-achieve-climate-change-goals/.
13 Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Senate Appropriators Lard President Obama’s Stimulus Package with
up to $50 Billion in Nuclear Reactor Pork,” press release, January 30, 2009, http://www.nirs.org/press/01-30-2009/1.
14 Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Bulletin, No. 2006-18, “Credit for
Production From Advanced Nuclear Facilities,” Notice 2006-40, May 1, 2006, p. 855.
15 Energy Information Administration, Status of Potential New Commercial Nuclear Reactors in the United States,
February 19, 2009.
16 For a discussion of the operation of the credit, see EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2007, p. 21. For the forecast of 8,000
MW of nuclear capacity on-line before 2021, see the Annual Energy Outlook 2008, p. 70.
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The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is urging Congress to remove the 6,000 megawatt capacity
limit for the production tax credit, index it for inflation, and extend the deadline for plants to
begin operation to the start of 2025. NEI is also proposing that a 30% investment tax credit be
available for new nuclear construction as an alternative to the production credit.17
Standby Support
Because the nuclear industry has often blamed licensing delays for past nuclear reactor
construction cost overruns, EPACT05 authorizes the Secretary of Energy to provide “standby
support,” or regulatory risk insurance, to help pay the cost of regulatory delays at up to six new
commercial nuclear reactors, subject to funding availability. For the first two reactors that begin
construction, the DOE payments could cover all the eligible delay-related costs, such as
additional interest, up to $500 million each. For the next four reactors, half of the eligible costs
could be paid by DOE, with a payment cap of $250 million per reactor. Delays caused by the
failure of a reactor owner to comply with laws or regulations would not be covered. Project
sponsors will be required to pay the “subsidy cost” of the program, consisting of the estimated
present value of likely future government payments.
DOE published a final rule for the “standby support” program August 11, 2006.18 According to a
DOE description of the final rule:
Events that would be covered by the risk insurance include delays associated with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s reviews of inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance
criteria or other licensing schedule delays as well as certain delays associated with litigation
in federal, state or tribal courts. Insurance coverage is not available for normal business risks
such as employment strikes and weather delays. Covered losses would include principal and
interest on debt and losses resulting from the purchase of replacement power to satisfy
contractual obligations.19
Under the program’s regulations, a project sponsor may enter into a conditional agreement for
standby support before NRC issues a combined operating license. The first six conditional
agreements to meet all the program requirements, including the issuance of a COL and payment
of the estimated subsidy costs, can be converted to standby support contracts. No conditional
agreements have yet been reached, according to DOE, primarily because the subsidy cost
estimates have not been approved by the Office of Management and Budget.20
The Nuclear Energy Institute has called for expanding the Standby Support program to $500
million for all six covered plants, rather than just the first two. In addition, NEI proposed that if a
plant begins operating without any delay payments, that plant’s Standby Support coverage,
17 Nuclear Energy Institute, Legislative Proposal to Help Meet Climate Change Goals by Expanding U.S. Nuclear
Energy Production, Washington, DC, October 28, 2009, p. 4, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/
newplants/policybrief/2009-nuclear-policy-initiative.
18 Department of Energy, “Standby Support for Certain Nuclear Plant Delays,” Federal Register, August 11, 2006, p.
46306.
19 DOE press release, August 4, 2006 http://nuclear.gov/home/08-04-06.html.
20 Meeting with Rebecca F. Smith-Kevern, Director, DOE Office of Light Water Reactor Deployment, October 7,
2009.
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instead of expiring unused, be allowed to “roll over” to the next plant with a conditional
agreement.21
Loan Guarantees
Title XVII of EPACT05 authorizes federal loan guarantees for up to 80% of construction costs for
advanced energy projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including new nuclear power
plants. The Title XVII loan guarantees are widely considered crucial by the nuclear industry to
obtain financing for new reactors. However, opponents contend that nuclear loan guarantees
would provide an unjustifiable subsidy to a mature industry and shift investment away from
environmentally preferable energy technologies.22
The FY2007 continuing resolution (P.L. 110-5) established an initial cap of $4 billion in loan
guarantees under the program. DOE issued final rules for the program October 4, 2007,23 and
finalized the first loan guarantee on September 4, 2009, totaling $535 million for a plant to
produce photovoltaic panels.24
DOE’s proposed loan guarantee rules, published May 16, 2007, had been sharply criticized by the
nuclear industry for limiting the guarantees to 90% of a project’s debt. The industry contended
that EPACT05 allows all of a project’s debt to be covered, as long as debt does not exceed 80% of
total construction costs. In its explanation of the proposed rules, DOE expressed concern that
guaranteeing 100% of a project’s debt could reduce lenders’ incentive to perform adequate due
diligence and therefore increase default risks. In the final rule, however, DOE agreed to guarantee
up to 100% of debt, but only for loans issued by the Federal Financing Bank.
Title XVII requires that estimated future government costs resulting from defaults on guaranteed
loans be covered up-front by appropriations or by payments from project sponsors. These
“subsidy costs” are calculated as the present value of probable future net costs to the government
for each loan guarantee. If those calculations are accurate, the subsidy cost payments for all the
guaranteed projects together should cover the future costs of the program. However, the
Congressional Budget Office has predicted that the up-front subsidy cost payments will prove too
low by at least 1% and is scoring bills accordingly.25 For example, appropriations bills that
provide loan guarantee authorizations include an adjustment totaling 1% of the loan guarantee
ceiling.
DOE loan guarantees for renewable energy and electricity transmission projects under EPACT05
section 1705, added by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), do
not require payments by project sponsors, because potential losses are covered by advance
21 Nuclear Energy Institute, op. cit.
22 Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, Statement on Nuclear Developments Before the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Natural Resources Defense Council, March 18, 2009,
http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=f25ddd10-c1f5-9e2e-528e-
c4321cca4c1b&Witness_ID=9f14a78d-58d0-43fb-bf5b-21426d1d888e.
23 Published October 23, 2007 (72 Federal Register 60116).
24 Department of Energy, “Vice President Biden Announces Finalized $535 Million Loan Guarantee,” press release,
September 4, 2009, http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/press/090409.pdf.
25 Congressional Budget Office, S. 1321, Energy Savings Act of 2007, CBO Cost Estimate, Washington, DC, June 11,
2007, pp. 7-9, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8206/s1321.pdf.
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appropriations in the act. No such appropriations are currently available for nuclear power
projects, so it is anticipated that nuclear loan guarantee subsidy costs would be paid by the project
sponsors. As a result, the level of the subsidy costs could have a powerful effect on the viability
of nuclear power projects, which are currently expected to cost between $5 billion and $10 billion
per reactor. For example, a 10% subsidy cost for a $7 billion loan guarantee would require an up-
front payment of $700 million.
The amount of loan guarantees to be available for nuclear power has been the subject of
considerable congressional debate. Under the Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA), federal loan
guarantees cannot be provided without an authorized level in an appropriations act. The Senate-
passed version of omnibus energy legislation in the 110th Congress (H.R. 6) would have explicitly
eliminated FCRA’s applicability to DOE’s planned loan guarantees under EPACT05 (Section
124(b)). That provision would have given DOE essentially unlimited loan guarantee authority for
guarantees whose subsidy costs were paid by project sponsors, but it was dropped from the final
legislation (P.L. 110-140). Similar language has been included in subsequent legislative
proposals, such as energy legislation reported by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources July 16, 2009 (S. 1462).
The explanatory statement for the FY2008 omnibus funding act (P.L. 110-161) directed DOE to
limit the loan guarantees for nuclear power plants to $18.5 billion through FY2009—enough for
about two or three large reactors under current cost estimates. An additional $2 billion in loan
guarantee authority was provided for uranium enrichment plants, and $18 billion in authority was
provided for non-nuclear energy technologies, such as renewable energy.26
The FY2009 omnibus funding act increased DOE’s total loan guarantee authority to $47 billion,
in addition to the previously authorized $4 billion. Of the $47 billion, $18.5 billion continued to
be reserved for nuclear power, $18.5 was for energy efficiency and renewables, $6 billion was for
coal, $2 billion was for carbon capture and sequestration, and $2 billion was for uranium
enrichment. The time limits on the loan guarantee authority were eliminated. The loan guarantee
ceilings remain the same for FY2010.
DOE issued a solicitation for up to $20.5 billion in nuclear power and uranium enrichment plant
loan guarantees on June 30, 2008.27 According to the nuclear industry, 10 nuclear power projects
are currently seeking $93.2 billion in loan guarantees, and two uranium enrichment projects are
asking for $4.8 billion in guarantees, several times the amount available.28 Several of the
proposed projects listed in Table 1 have been reported to be finalists for the first conditional
nuclear loan guarantee commitments, including the South Texas Project, Calvert Cliffs, Summer,
and Vogtle.29 Under the program’s regulations, a conditional loan guarantee commitment cannot
become a binding loan guarantee agreement until the project receives a COL and all other
regulatory requirements are met; as noted above, the first COLs are not expected until late 2011 at
the earliest.
26 Congressional Record, December 17, 2007, p. H15585.
27 http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/keydocs.html
28 Marvin S. Fertel, Statement for the Record to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Nuclear
Energy Institute, March 18, 2009, p. 9, http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&
Hearing_ID=f25ddd10-c1f5-9e2e-528e-c4321cca4c1b&Witness_ID=4de5e2df-53fe-49ba-906e-9b69d3674e41.
29 Eileen O'Grady, “DOE Drops Luminant Texas from Nuclear Loan Talks,” Reuters, May 7, 2009.
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Global Climate Change
Global climate change that may be caused by carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions
is cited by nuclear power supporters as an important reason to develop a new generation of
reactors. Nuclear power plants emit relatively little carbon dioxide, mostly from nuclear fuel
production and auxiliary plant equipment. This “green” nuclear power argument has received
growing attention in think tanks and academia. As stated by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in its major study The Future of Nuclear Power: “Our position is that the prospect of
global climate change from greenhouse gas emissions and the adverse consequences that flow
from these emissions is the principal justification for government support of the nuclear energy
option.”30
However, environmental groups have contended that nuclear power’s potential greenhouse gas
benefits are modest and must be weighed against the technology’s safety risks, its potential for
nuclear weapons proliferation, and the hazards of radioactive waste.31 They also contend that
energy efficiency and renewable energy would be far more productive investments for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.32
Congressional proposals to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, either through taxation or a cap-
and-trade system, could significantly increase the cost of generating electricity with fossil fuels
and improve the competitive position of nuclear power. Utilities that have applied for nuclear
power plant licenses have often cited the possibility of federal greenhouse gas controls as one of
the reasons for pursuing new reactors. (For more on federal incentives and the economics of
nuclear power and other electricity generation technologies, see CRS Report RL34746, Power
Plants: Characteristics and Costs, by Stan Mark Kaplan.)
Nuclear Power Research and Development
DOE’s nuclear energy research and development program includes advanced reactors, fuel cycle
technology and facilities, and infrastructure support. The Obama Administration’s initial FY2010
funding request for nuclear energy R&D activities totaled $761.3 million—about $30 million
below the comparable FY2009 level. The FY2010 Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-85), signed on October 28, 2009, provides $786.6 million.
According to DOE’s FY2010 budget justification, the nuclear energy R&D program includes
“generation, safety, waste storage and management, and security technologies, to help meet
energy and climate goals.” However, opponents have criticized DOE’s nuclear research program
as providing wasteful subsidies to an industry that they believe should be phased out as
unacceptably hazardous and economically uncompetitive.
30 Interdisciplinary MIT Study, The Future of Nuclear Power, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003, p. 79.
31 Gronlund, Lisbeth, David Lochbaum, and Edwin Lyman, Nuclear Power in a Warming World, Union of Concerned
Scientists, December 2007.
32 Travis Madsen, Tony Dutzik, and Bernadette Del Chiaro, et al., Generating Failure: How Building Nuclear Power
Plants Would Set America Back in the Race Against Global Warming, Environment America Research and Policy
Center, November 2009, http://www.environmentamerica.org/uploads/39/62/3962c378b66c4552624d09cbd8ebba02/
Generating-Failure—Environment-America—Web.pdf.
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Although total funding in the FY2010 nuclear energy request was similar to levels in previous
years, the Obama Administration proposed significant priority changes. Funding for the Nuclear
Power 2010 Program, which assists the near-term design and licensing of new nuclear power
plants, was to be closed out during the fiscal year. The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI),
which had been the primary research component of the Bush Administration’s Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership (GNEP), has been renamed Fuel Cycle Research and Development and
shifted away from the design and construction of nuclear fuel recycling facilities toward an
emphasis on longer-term research.
Nuclear Power 2010
Under President Bush, DOE’s initial efforts to encourage near-term construction of new
commercial reactors—for which there have been no new U.S. orders since 1978—focused on the
Nuclear Power 2010 Program. The program provided up to half the costs of licensing lead plant
sites and reactors and preparing detailed reactor designs. Nuclear Power 2010 also includes the
Standby Support Program, authorized by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) to pay for
regulatory delays that might be experienced by new reactors.
The Obama Administration proposed to cut the Nuclear Power 2010 Program’s funding from
$177.5 million in FY2009 to $20 million in FY2010 and then terminate the program.
Administration of the Standby Support Program was to continue under the Office of Nuclear
Energy’s program direction account.
DOE’s budget justification contended that industry interest in new nuclear power plants has now
been demonstrated to the extent that federal funding is no longer needed. The $20 million
requested for FY2010 was to provide the final assistance to an industry consortium called NuStart
for licensing a new reactor at the Vogtle plant in Georgia. No further funding was to be provided
for a second industry consortium led by Dominion Resources, or for the design of General
Electric-Hitachi’s ESBWR reactor or the Westinghouse AP-1000 reactor. “By FY 2010 sufficient
momentum will have been created by the cost-shared programs that the vendors (GEH and
Westinghouse) and other partners will have adequate incentive to complete any additional work
through private funding,” according to the DOE justification.
The House approved a funding level of $71.0 million for the program, to “complete the
Department’s commitment to this effort.” The Senate voted to provide $120 million for the
program, with no mention of program termination. The conference agreement provides $105.0
million “as the final installment” for the Nuclear Power 2010 program.
Generation IV
Advanced commercial reactor technologies that are not yet close to deployment are the focus of
Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems, for which $191.0 million was requested for FY2010, $11
million above the FY2009 appropriation. The budget request would have cut $24 million from
activities previously conducted by the program, a reduction that “reflects the emphasis shifting
from near-term R&D activities to those R&D activities aimed at long-term technology advances,”
according to the DOE justification. The request included $35 million to establish the Energy
Innovation Hub for Modeling and Simulation, which would focus on computer assistance for the
development, implementation, and management of nuclear power and radioactive waste. The
House provided no funding for the Modeling and Simulation Hub, while boosting total
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Generation IV funding to $272.4 million. The Senate approved a funding level of $143 million,
including the Modeling and Simulation Hub. The conference agreement provides $220.1 million,
including $22.0 million for the Modeling and Simulation Hub.
The focus in the budget request on “long-term technology advances” differed sharply from the
program’s previous emphasis on developing the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP). Most of
the FY2009 appropriation—$169.0 million—was for NGNP research and development. NGNP is
currently planned to use Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR) technology, which features
helium as a coolant and coated-particle fuel that can withstand temperatures up to 1,600 degrees
Celsius. Phase I research on the NGNP was to continue until 2011, when a decision was to be
made on moving to the Phase II design and construction stage, according to the FY2009 DOE
budget justification. In its recommendation on the FY2009 budget, the House Appropriations
Committee had provided additional funding “to accelerate work” on NGNP.
DOE’s proposed FY2010 nuclear research program did not mention NGNP, although it included
several research activities related to the development of VHTR technology, including fuel testing,
graphite experiments, and development of VHTR simulation software. Fundamental research on
other advanced reactor concepts, such as sodium-cooled fast reactors and molten salt reactors,
were also to continue. For FY2010, the House Appropriations Committee report noted that NGNP
had been one of its priorities and specified that at least $245.0 million of the Generation IV
funding be devoted to the project. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s FY2010 report did not
specifically mention NGNP, but it called for DOE to select two advanced reactor technologies as
the focus of future research and potential deployment.
The conference agreement provides $169.0 million for NGNP and directs DOE within 90 days to
prepare a detailed plan for moving forward with the NGNP project. The conference agreement
also provides $17.8 million for other Generation IV reactor concepts and $10.0 million for
research on extending the lives of existing light water reactors. No funding is provided for gas
centrifuge enrichment technology.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized $1.25 billion through FY2015 for NGNP development
and construction (Title VI, Subtitle C). The authorization requires that NGNP be based on
research conducted by the Generation IV program and be capable of producing electricity,
hydrogen, or both. The act’s target date for operation of the demonstration reactor is September
30, 2021. The FY2010 budget request anticipated that Generation IV reactors “could be available
in the 2030 timeframe.”
Fuel Cycle Research and Development
Formerly called the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, DOE’s Fuel Cycle Research and
Development program is to be redirected from the development of engineering-scale and
prototype reprocessing facilities toward smaller-scale “long-term, science-based research.” The
FY2010 budget request for the program was $192.0 million, nearly $50 million above the
FY2009 level, although $35 million of that amount was to go toward establishing an Energy
Innovation Hub for Extreme Materials. The House provided no funding for the Extreme Materials
Hub and an overall reduction in the request to $129.2 million, citing “the lack of specificity in
terms of the direction of the research in this area.” The Senate provided $145.0 million, the same
as FY2009, and no funding for the Extreme Materials Hub. The conference agreement provides
$136.0 million, with nothing for the Extreme Materials Hub.
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According to the DOE budget justification, Fuel Cycle R&D will continue previous research on
technology that could reduce the long-term hazard of spent nuclear fuel. Such technologies would
involve separation of plutonium, uranium, and other long-lived radioactive materials from spent
fuel for reuse in a nuclear reactor or for transmutation in a particle accelerator. DOE plans to
broaden the program to include waste storage technologies, security systems, and alternative
disposal options such as salt formations and deep boreholes. R&D will also focus on needs
identified by a planned DOE nuclear waste strategy panel, according to the justification.
In previous years, AFCI had been the primary technology component of the Bush
Administration’s GNEP program, including R&D on reprocessing technology and fast reactors
that could use reprocessed plutonium. Funding for GNEP was eliminated by Congress in FY2009,
and GNEP was not mentioned in the FY2010 budget request, although, as noted above, much of
the related R&D work is to continue at a smaller scale.
The Energy Innovation Hub for Extreme Materials was intended to support fundamental research
on advanced materials for use in high-radiation and high-temperature environments. Such
materials could improve the performance of nuclear waste packages, allow advances in nuclear
reactor designs, and improve the safety and operation of existing commercial reactors, according
to the budget justification.
(For more information about nuclear reprocessing, see CRS Report RL34579, Advanced Nuclear
Power and Fuel Cycle Technologies: Outlook and Policy Options, by Mark Holt.)
Small Modular Reactors
Rising cost estimates for large conventional nuclear power plants—widely projected to be $6
billion or more—have contributed to growing interest in proposals for smaller, modular reactors.
Ranging from about 40 to 350 megawatts of electrical capacity, such reactors would be only a
fraction of the size of current commercial reactors. Several modular reactors would be installed
together to make up a power block with a single control room, under most concepts.
Modular reactor concepts would use a variety of technologies, including high-temperature gas
technology in the NGNP program and the light water (LWR) technology used by today’s
commercial reactors. According to media reports, DOE plans to request funding for FY2012 to
provide licensing and engineering assistance to small reactor designs, in a program that would be
similar to Nuclear Power 2010. Priority would be given to designs closest to commercialization,
which DOE anticipates to be the small LWR concepts.33 Legislation to authorize such a program
(S. 2812) was introduced by Senator Bingaman November 20, 2009.
The Senate Appropriations Committee included instructions in its report on the FY2010 Energy
and Water Appropriations Act that NRC use carryover funds to “support license application
reviews of any new reactor designs, including modular reactors.” NRC held a two-day workshop
on small modular reactor licensing in early October 2009.
Small modular reactors would go against the overall trend in nuclear power technology toward
ever-larger reactors intended to spread construction costs over a greater output of electricity.
33 Randy Woods and Steven Dolley, “DOE to Seek Funds in FY-11 for Small Modular Reactors,” Nucleonics Week,
October 1, 2009.
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Proponents of small reactors contend that they would be economically viable despite their far
lower electrical output because modules could be assembled in factories and shipped to plant
sites, and because their smaller size would allow for simpler safety systems. In addition, although
modular plants might have similar or higher costs per kilowatt-hour than large conventional
reactors, their ability to be constructed in smaller increments could reduce the financial
commitment and risk to electric utilities.
Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation
Safety
Controversy over safety has dogged nuclear power throughout its development, particularly
following the March 1979 Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania and the April 1986
Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet Union. In the United States, safety-related shortcomings
have been identified in the construction quality of some plants, plant operation and maintenance,
equipment reliability, emergency planning, and other areas. In one serious case, it was discovered
in March 2002 that leaking boric acid had eaten a large cavity in the top of the reactor vessel in
Ohio’s Davis-Besse nuclear plant. The corrosion left only the vessel’s quarter-inch-thick stainless
steel inner liner to prevent a potentially catastrophic loss of reactor cooling water. Davis-Besse
remained closed for repairs and other safety improvements until NRC allowed the reactor to
restart in March 2004.
NRC’s oversight of the nuclear industry is an ongoing issue; nuclear utilities often complain that
they are subject to overly rigorous and inflexible regulation, but nuclear critics charge that NRC
frequently relaxes safety standards when compliance may prove difficult or costly to the industry.
Domestic Reactor Safety
In terms of public health consequences, the safety record of the U.S. nuclear power industry in
comparison with other major commercial energy technologies has been excellent. During
approximately 3,000 reactor-years of operation in the United States,34 the only incident at a
commercial nuclear power plant that might lead to any deaths or injuries to the public has been
the Three Mile Island accident, in which more than half the reactor core melted. A study of
32,000 people living within 5 miles of the reactor when the accident occurred found no
significant increase in cancer rates through 1998, although the authors noted that some potential
health effects “cannot be definitively excluded.”35
The relatively small amounts of radioactivity released by nuclear plants during normal operation
are not generally believed to pose significant hazards, although some groups contend that routine
emissions are unacceptably risky. There is substantial scientific uncertainty about the level of risk
posed by low levels of radiation exposure; as with many carcinogens and other hazardous
substances, health effects can be clearly measured only at relatively high exposure levels. In the
34 Nuclear Engineering International, “Country Averages to the End of December 2008,” April 2009, p. 38.
35 Evelyn O. Talbott et al., “Long Term Follow-Up of the Residents of the Three Mile Island Accident Area: 1979-
1998,” Environmental Health Perspectives, published online October 30, 2002, at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/docs/2003/
5662/abstract.html.
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case of radiation, the assumed risk of low-level exposure has been extrapolated mostly from
health effects documented among persons exposed to high levels of radiation, particularly
Japanese survivors of nuclear bombing in World War II.
NRC’s safety regulations are designed to keep the probability of accidental core damage (fuel
melting) below one in 10,000 per year for each reactor. The regulations also are intended to
ensure that reactor containments would be successful at least 90% of the time in preventing major
radioactive releases during a core-damage accident. Therefore, the probability of a major release
at any given reactor is intended to be below one in 100,000 per year.36 (For the current U.S. fleet
of about 100 reactors, that rate would yield an average of one core-damage accident every 100
years and a major release every 1,000 years.) On the other hand, some groups challenge the
complex calculations that go into predicting such accident frequencies, contending that accidents
with serious public health consequences may be more frequent.37
Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc
The Chernobyl accident was by far the worst nuclear power plant accident to have occurred
anywhere in the world. At least 31 persons died quickly from acute radiation exposure or other
injuries, and thousands of additional cancer deaths among the tens of millions of people exposed
to radiation from the accident may occur during the next several decades.
According to a 2006 report by the Chernobyl Forum organized by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the primary observable health consequence of the accident was a dramatic
increase in childhood thyroid cancer. The Chernobyl Forum estimated that about 4,000 cases of
thyroid cancer have occurred in children who after the accident drank milk contaminated with
high levels of radioactive iodine, which concentrates in the thyroid. Although the Chernobyl
Forum found only 15 deaths from those thyroid cancers, it estimated that about 4,000 other
cancer deaths may have occurred among the 600,000 people with the highest radiation exposures,
plus an estimated 1% increase in cancer deaths among persons with less exposure. The report
estimated that about 77,000 square miles were significantly contaminated by radioactive
cesium.38 Greenpeace issued a report in 2006 estimating that 200,000 deaths in Belarus, Russia,
and Ukraine resulted from the Chernobyl accident between 1990 and 2004.39
Licensing and Regulation
For many years, a top priority of the nuclear industry was to modify the process for licensing new
nuclear plants. No electric utility would consider ordering a nuclear power plant, according to the
industry, unless licensing became quicker and more predictable, and designs were less subject to
mid-construction safety-related changes required by NRC. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L.
102-486) largely implemented the industry’s licensing goals.
36 U.S. NRC, Regulatory Guide 1.174, “An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed
Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,” July 1998.
37 Public Citizen Energy Program, “The Myth of Nuclear Safety” http://www.citizen.org/cmep/energy_enviro_nuclear/
nuclear_power_plants/reactor_safety/articles.cfm?ID=4454
38 The Chernobyl Forum: 2003-2005, Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts,
International Atomic Energy Agency, April 2006.
39 Greenpeace. The Chernobyl Catastrophe: Consequences on Human Health, April 2006, p. 10.
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Nuclear plant licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703; U.S.C. 2011-2282)
had historically been a two-stage process. NRC first issued a construction permit to build a plant
and then, after construction was finished, an operating license to run it. Each stage of the
licensing process involved complicated proceedings. Environmental impact statements also are
required under the National Environmental Policy Act.
Over the vehement objections of nuclear opponents, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 provided a
clear statutory basis for one-step nuclear licenses, which would combine the construction permits
and operating licenses and allow completed plants to operate without delay if they met all
construction requirements—called “inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria,” or
ITAAC. NRC would hold preoperational hearings on the adequacy of plant construction only in
specified circumstances.
DOE’s Nuclear Power 2010 initiative (discussed above) has been paying up to half the cost of
combined construction and operating licenses for two advanced reactors to demonstrate the
process. However, the new licensing process cannot be fully tested until construction of new
reactors is completed. At that point, it could be seen whether completed plants will be able to
operate without delays or whether adjudicable disputes over construction adequacy may arise. As
discussed above, Section 638 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorizes federal payments to the
owner of a completed reactor whose operation is delayed by regulatory action. The nuclear
industry is asking Congress to require NRC to use informal procedures in determining whether
ITAAC have been met, eliminate mandatory hearings for COLs on uncontested issues, and make
other changes in the licensing process.40
A fundamental concern in the nuclear regulatory debate is the performance of NRC in issuing and
enforcing nuclear safety regulations. The nuclear industry and its supporters have regularly
complained that unnecessarily stringent and inflexibly enforced nuclear safety regulations have
burdened nuclear utilities and their customers with excessive costs. But many environmentalists,
nuclear opponents, and other groups charge NRC with being too close to the nuclear industry, a
situation that they say has resulted in lax oversight of nuclear power plants and routine
exemptions from safety requirements.
Primary responsibility for nuclear safety compliance lies with nuclear plant owners, who are
required to find any problems with their plants and report them to NRC. Compliance is also
monitored directly by NRC, which maintains at least two resident inspectors at each nuclear
power plant. The resident inspectors routinely examine plant systems, observe the performance of
reactor personnel, and prepare regular inspection reports. For serious safety violations, NRC often
dispatches special inspection teams to plant sites.
In response to congressional criticism, NRC has reorganized and overhauled many of its
procedures. The Commission has moved toward “risk-informed regulation,” in which safety
enforcement is guided by the relative risks identified by detailed individual plant studies. NRC’s
risk-informed reactor oversight system, inaugurated April 2, 2000, relies on a series of
performance indicators to determine the level of scrutiny that each reactor should receive.41
40 Nuclear Energy Institute, Legislative Proposal to Help Meet Climate Change Goals by Expanding U.S. Nuclear
Energy Production, Washington, DC, October 28, 2009, p. 5, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/
newplants/policybrief/2009-nuclear-policy-initiative.
41 For more information about the NRC reactor oversight process, see http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/
(continued...)
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Reactor Security
Nuclear power plants have long been recognized as potential targets of terrorist attacks, and
critics have long questioned the adequacy of the measures required of nuclear plant operators to
defend against such attacks. All commercial nuclear power plants licensed by NRC have a series
of physical barriers against access to vital reactor areas and are required to maintain a trained
security force to protect them.
A key element in protecting nuclear plants is the requirement that simulated terrorist attacks,
monitored by NRC, be carried out to test the ability of the plant operator to defend against them.
The severity of attacks to be prepared for is specified in the form of a “design basis threat”
(DBT).
EPACT05 required NRC to revise the DBT based on an assessment of terrorist threats, the
potential for multiple coordinated attacks, possible suicide attacks, and other criteria. NRC
approved the DBT revision based on those requirements on January 29, 2007. The revised DBT
does not require nuclear power plants to defend against deliberate aircraft attacks. NRC
contended that nuclear facilities were already required to mitigate the effects of large fires and
explosions, no matter what the cause, and that active protection against airborne threats was being
addressed by U.S. military and other agencies.42 After much consideration, NRC voted February
17, 2009, to require all new nuclear power plants to incorporate design features that would ensure
that, in the event of a crash by a large commercial aircraft, the reactor core would remain cooled
or the reactor containment would remain intact, and radioactive releases would not occur from
spent fuel storage pools.43
NRC rejected proposals that existing reactors also be required to protect against aircraft crashes,
such as by adding large external steel barriers. However, NRC did impose some additional
requirements related to aircraft crashes on all reactors, both new and existing, after the 9/11
terrorist attacks of 2001. In 2002, as noted above, NRC ordered all nuclear power plants to
develop strategies to mitigate the effects of large fires and explosions that could result from
aircraft crashes or other causes. An NRC regulation on fire mitigation strategies, along with
requirements that reactors establish procedures for responding to specific aircraft threats, was
approved December 17, 2008.44
Other ongoing nuclear plant security issues include the vulnerability of spent fuel pools, which
hold highly radioactive nuclear fuel after its removal from the reactor, standards for nuclear plant
security personnel, and nuclear plant emergency planning. NRC’s December 2008 security
regulations addressed some of those concerns and included a number of other security
enhancements.
(...continued)
ASSESS/index.html.
42 NRC Office of Public Affairs, NRC Approves Final Rule Amending Security Requirements, News Release No. 07-
012, January 29, 2007.
43 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Rule—Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors,
Commission Voting Record, SECY-08-0152, February 17, 2009.
44 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Approves Final Rule Expanding Security Requirements for Nuclear Power
Plants,” press release, December 17, 2008, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2008/08-227.html.
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EPACT05 required NRC to conduct force-on-force security exercises at nuclear power plants
every three years (which was NRC’s previous policy), authorized firearms use by nuclear security
personnel (preempting some state restrictions), established federal security coordinators, and
required fingerprinting of nuclear facility workers.
(For background on security issues, see CRS Report RL34331, Nuclear Power Plant Security and
Vulnerabilities, by Mark Holt and Anthony Andrews.)
Decommissioning
When nuclear power plants reach the end of their useful lives, they must be safely removed from
service, a process called decommissioning. NRC requires nuclear utilities to make regular
contributions to special trust funds to ensure that money is available to remove radioactive
material and contamination from reactor sites after they are closed.
The first full-sized U.S. commercial reactors to be decommissioned were the Trojan plant in
Oregon, whose decommissioning completion received NRC approval on May 23, 2005, and the
Maine Yankee plant, for which NRC approved most of the site cleanup on October 3, 2005. The
Trojan decommissioning cost $429 million, according to reactor owner Portland General Electric,
and the Maine Yankee decommissioning cost about $500 million.45 Decommissioning of the
Connecticut Yankee plant cost $790 million and was approved by NRC on November 26, 2007.46
NRC approved the cleanup of the decommissioned Rancho Seco reactor site in California on
October 7, 2009.47 The decommissioning of Rancho Seco was estimated to cost $500 million,
excluding future demolition of the cooling towers and other remaining plant structures.48 Spent
nuclear fuel remains stored in dry casks at the decommissioned plant sites.
The tax treatment of decommissioning funds has been a continuing issue. EPACT05 provided
favorable tax treatment to nuclear decommissioning funds, subject to certain restrictions.
Nuclear Accident Liability
Liability for damages to the general public from nuclear incidents is addressed by the Price-
Anderson Act (primarily Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2210).
EPACT05 extended the availability of Price-Anderson coverage for new reactors and new DOE
nuclear contracts through the end of 2025. (Existing reactors and contracts were already covered.)
Under Price-Anderson, the owners of commercial reactors must assume all liability for nuclear
damages awarded to the public by the court system, and they must waive most of their legal
defenses following a severe radioactive release (“extraordinary nuclear occurrence”). To pay any
such damages, each licensed reactor with at least 100 megawatts of electric generating capacity
must carry the maximum liability insurance reasonably available, currently $300 million. Any
45 Sharp, David, “NRC Signs Off on Maine Yankee’s Decommissioning,” Associated Press, October 3, 2005.
46 E-mail communication from Bob Capstick, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, August 28, 2008.
47 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Releases Rancho Seco Nuclear Plant for Unconditional Use,” press release,
October 7, 2009, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2009/09-165.html.
48 “20 Years Later, Rancho Seco Ready for Final Shutdown,” Sacramento County Herald, June 9, 2009,
http://m.news10.net/news.jsp?key=190656.
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damages exceeding that amount are to be assessed equally against all 100-megawatt-and-above
power reactors, up to $111.9 million per reactor. Those assessments—called “retrospective
premiums”—would be paid at an annual rate of no more than $17.5 million per reactor, to limit
the potential financial burden on reactor owners following a major accident. According to NRC,
all 104 commercial reactors are currently covered by the Price-Anderson retrospective premium
requirement.49
For each nuclear incident, the Price-Anderson liability system currently would provide up to
$12.5 billion in public compensation. That total includes the $300 million in insurance coverage
carried by the reactor that suffered the incident, plus the $111.9 million in retrospective premiums
from each of the 104 currently covered reactors, totaling $11.9 billion. On top of those payments,
a 5% surcharge may also be imposed, raising the total per-reactor retrospective premium to
$117.5 million and the total available compensation to about $12.5 billion. Under Price-
Anderson, the nuclear industry’s liability for an incident is capped at that amount, which varies
depending on the number of covered reactors, the amount of available insurance, and an inflation
adjustment. Payment of any damages above that liability limit would require congressional
approval under special procedures in the act.
EPACT05 increased the limit on per-reactor annual payments to $15 million from the previous
$10 million, and required the annual limit to be adjusted for inflation every five years. As under
previous law, the total retrospective premium limit is adjusted every five years as well. Both the
annual and total limits were most recently adjusted October 29, 2008.50 For the purposes of those
payment limits, a nuclear plant consisting of multiple small reactors (100-300 megawatts, up to a
total of 1,300 megawatts) would be considered a single reactor. Therefore, a power plant with six
120-megawatt pebble-bed modular reactors would be liable for retrospective premiums of up to
$111.9 million, rather than $671.4 million (excluding the 5% surcharge).
The Price-Anderson Act also covers contractors who operate hazardous DOE nuclear facilities.
EPACT05 set the liability limit on DOE contractors at $10 billion per accident, to be adjusted for
inflation every five years. The first adjustment under EPACT, raising the liability limit to $11.961
billion, took effect October 14, 2009.51 The liability limit for DOE contractors previously had
been the same as for commercial reactors, excluding the 5% surcharge, except when the limit for
commercial reactors dropped because of a decline in the number of covered reactors. Price-
Anderson authorizes DOE to indemnify its contractors for the entire amount of their liability, so
that damage payments for nuclear incidents at DOE facilities would ultimately come from the
Treasury. However, the law also allows DOE to fine its contractors for safety violations, and
contractor employees and directors can face criminal penalties for “knowingly and willfully”
violating nuclear safety rules.
EPACT05 limited the civil penalties against a nonprofit contractor to the amount of management
fees paid under that contract. Previously, Atomic Energy Act §234A specifically exempted seven
nonprofit DOE contractors and their subcontractors from civil penalties and authorized DOE to
49 Reactors smaller than 100 megawatts must purchase an amount of liability coverage determined by NRC but are not
subject to retrospective premiums. Total liability for those reactors is limited to $560 million, with the federal
government indemnifying reactor operators for the difference between that amount and their liability coverage (Atomic
Energy Act sec. 170 b. and c.).
50 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Inflation Adjustment to the Price-Anderson Act Financial Protection
Regulations,” 73 Federal Register 56451, September 29, 2008.
51 Department of Energy, “Adjusted Indemnification Amount,” 74 Federal Register 52793, October 14, 2009.
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automatically remit any civil penalties imposed on nonprofit educational institutions serving as
DOE contractors. EPACT05 eliminated the civil penalty exemption for future contracts by the
seven listed nonprofit contractors and DOE’s authority to automatically remit penalties on
nonprofit educational institutions.
The Price-Anderson Act’s limits on liability were crucial in establishing the commercial nuclear
power industry in the 1950s. Supporters of the Price-Anderson system contend that it has worked
well since that time in ensuring that nuclear accident victims would have a secure source of
compensation, at little cost to the taxpayer. Extension of the act was widely considered a
prerequisite for new nuclear reactor construction in the United States. Opponents contend that
Price-Anderson inappropriately subsidizes the nuclear power industry by reducing its insurance
costs and protecting it from some of the financial consequences of the most severe conceivable
accidents.
The United States is supporting the establishment of an international liability system that, among
other purposes, would cover U.S. nuclear equipment suppliers conducting foreign business. The
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) will not enter into force
until at least five countries with a specified level of installed nuclear capacity have enacted
implementing legislation. Such implementing language was included in the Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140, section 934), signed by President Bush December 19,
2007. Supporters of the Convention hope that more countries will join now that the United States
has acted. Aside from the United States, three countries have submitted the necessary instruments
of ratification, but the remaining nine countries that so far have signed the convention do not have
the required nuclear capacity for it to take effect. Ratification by a large nuclear energy producer
such as Japan would allow the treaty to take effect, as would ratification by two significant but
smaller producers such as South Korea, Canada, Russia, or Ukraine.
Under the U.S. implementing legislation, the CSC would not change the liability and payment
levels already established by the Price-Anderson Act. Each party to the convention would be
required to establish a nuclear damage compensation system within its borders analogous to
Price-Anderson. For any damages not covered by those national compensation systems, the
convention would establish a supplemental tier of damage compensation to be paid by all parties.
P.L. 110-140 requires the U.S. contribution to the supplemental tier to be paid by suppliers of
nuclear equipment and services, under a formula to be developed by DOE. Supporters of the
convention contend that it will help U.S. exporters of nuclear technology by establishing a
predictable international liability system. For example, U.S. reactor sales to the growing
economies of China and India would be facilitated by those countries’ participation in the CSC
liability regime.
Nuclear Waste Management
One of the most controversial aspects of nuclear power is the disposal of radioactive waste, which
can remain hazardous for thousands of years. Each nuclear reactor produces an annual average of
about 20 metric tons of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel, for a nationwide total of about 2,000
metric tons per year. U.S. reactors also generate about 40,000 cubic meters of low-level
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radioactive waste per year, including contaminated components and materials resulting from
reactor decommissioning.52
The federal government is responsible for permanent disposal of commercial spent fuel (paid for
with a fee on nuclear power production) and federally generated radioactive waste, whereas states
have the authority to develop disposal facilities for most commercial low-level waste. Under the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 10101, et seq.), spent fuel and other highly radioactive
waste is to be isolated in a deep underground repository, consisting of a large network of tunnels
carved from rock that has remained geologically undisturbed for hundreds of thousands of years.
The program is run by DOE’s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM). As
amended in 1987, NWPA designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the only candidate site for the
national repository. The act required DOE to begin taking waste from nuclear plant sites by
1998—a deadline that even under the most optimistic scenarios will be missed by more than 20
years.
The Obama Administration has decided to “terminate the Yucca Mountain program while
developing nuclear waste disposal alternatives,” according to the DOE FY2010 budget
justification. Alternatives to Yucca Mountain are to be evaluated by a “blue ribbon” panel of
experts convened by the Administration. At the same time, according to the justification, the NRC
licensing process for the Yucca Mountain repository is to continue, “consistent with the
provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.” However, draft proposals for the FY2011 budget
request indicate that DOE will seek only enough funding to terminate all program activities and
that repository licensing will end in December 2009.53
The FY2010 OCRWM budget request of $198.6 million sought only enough funding to continue
the Yucca Mountain licensing process and to evaluate alternative policies, according to DOE. The
request was about $90 million below the FY2009 funding level, which was nearly $100 million
below the FY2008 level. More than 2,000 waste program contract employees were to be
terminated during FY2009, according to the budget justification. Most of the program’s
remaining work is to be taken over by federal staff.
All work related solely to preparing for construction and operation of the Yucca Mountain
repository is being halted, according to the DOE budget justification. Such activities include
development of repository infrastructure, waste transportation preparations, and system
engineering and analysis.
The House agreed with the Administration’s plans to provide funding solely for Yucca Mountain
licensing activities and for a blue-ribbon panel to review waste management options. The House
approved the Administration budget request, including $5 million for the blue-ribbon review.
However, the House-passed bill specified that the review must include Yucca Mountain as one of
the alternatives, despite the Administration’s contention that the site should no longer be
considered. According to the House Appropriations Committee report, “It might well be the case
that an alternative to Yucca Mountain better meets the requirements of the future strategy, but the
review does not have scientific integrity without considering Yucca Mountain.” The House panel
52 DOE, Manifest Information Management System http://mims.apps.em.doe.gov. Average annual utility disposal from
2002 through 2007.
53 Letter from Joe Barton, Ranking Member, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Greg Walden, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, to Steven Chu, Secretary of Energy, November 18, 2009,
http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/Media/file/News/111809_Letter_to_Chu_Yucca.pdf.
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also recommended that at least $70 million of the program’s funding be devoted to maintaining
expertise by the Yucca Mountain Project management contractor to support the licensing effort,
rather than relying entirely on federal staff. The Senate also recommended approval of the
Administration request, but without any restrictions on the blue-ribbon panel.
Funding for the nuclear waste program is provided under two appropriations accounts. The
Administration’s FY2010 request is divided evenly between an appropriation from the Nuclear
Waste Fund, which holds fees paid by nuclear utilities, and the Defense Nuclear Waste Disposal
account, which pays for disposal of high-level waste from the nuclear weapons program. The
Senate Appropriations Committee report called for the Secretary of Energy to suspend fee
collections, “given the Administration’s decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository
program while developing disposal alternatives.”
The conference agreement provides the reduced funding requested by the Administration and
includes bill language that states, “$5,000,000 shall be provided to create a Blue Ribbon
Commission to consider all alternatives for nuclear waste disposal.” That is the same language
that appeared in the House-passed bill, along with House Appropriations Committee instructions
that the Blue Ribbon panel include Yucca Mountain as a disposal option. However, the
Conference Committee Joint Explanatory Statement states that “all guidance provided by the
House and Senate reports is superseded by the conference agreement.”
Additional funding from the Nuclear Waste Fund for the Yucca Mountain licensing process was
included in the NRC budget request. The House provided the full $56 million requested, while
the Senate voted to cut the request to $29 million. The conference agreement includes the Senate
reduction.
The Yucca Mountain project faces regulatory uncertainty, in addition to the Obama
Administration’s policy review. A ruling on July 9, 2004, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit overturned a key aspect of the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA’s) regulations for the planned repository.54 The three-judge panel ruled that EPA’s 10,000-
year compliance period was too short, but it rejected several other challenges to the rules. EPA
published new standards on October 15, 2008, that would allow radiation exposure from the
repository to increase after 10,000 years.55 The State of Nevada has filed a federal Appeals Court
challenge to the EPA standards. (For more information on the EPA standards, see CRS Report
RL34698, EPA’s Final Health and Safety Standard for Yucca Mountain, by Bonnie C. Gitlin.)
NWPA required DOE to begin taking waste from nuclear plant sites by January 31, 1998. Nuclear
utilities, upset over DOE’s failure to meet that deadline, have won two federal court decisions
upholding the department’s obligation to meet the deadline and to compensate utilities for any
resulting damages. Utilities have also won several cases in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
DOE estimates that liability payments would eventually total $11 billion if DOE were to begin
removing waste from reactor sites by 2020, the previous target for opening Yucca Mountain.56
(For more information, see CRS Report R40202, Nuclear Waste Disposal: Alternatives to Yucca
54 Nuclear Energy Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, no. 01-1258, July 9, 2004.
55 Environmental Protection Agency, “Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca
Mountain, Nevada,” 73 Federal Register 61256, October 15, 2008.
56 Statement of Edward F. Sproat III, Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Before the
House Budget Committee, October 4, 2007.
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Mountain, by Mark Holt, and CRS Report RL33461, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal, by Mark
Holt.)
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Renewed interest in nuclear power throughout the world has led to increased concern about
nuclear weapons proliferation, because technology for making nuclear fuel can also be used to
produce nuclear weapons material. Of particular concern are uranium enrichment, a process to
separate and concentrate the fissile isotope uranium-235, and nuclear spent fuel reprocessing,
which can produce weapons-useable plutonium.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts a safeguards program that is intended
to prevent civilian nuclear fuel facilities from being used for weapons purposes, but not all
potential weapons proliferators belong to the system, and there are ongoing questions about its
effectiveness. Several proposals have been developed to guarantee nations without fuel cycle
facilities a supply of nuclear fuel in exchange for commitments to forgo enrichment and
reprocessing, which was one of the original goals of the Bush Administration’s GNEP program
(discussed above under “Nuclear Power Research and Development”).
Several situations have arisen throughout the world in which ostensibly commercial uranium
enrichment and reprocessing technologies have been subverted for military purposes. In 2003 and
2004, it became evident that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan had sold sensitive technology
and equipment related to uranium enrichment to states such as Libya, Iran, and North Korea.
Although Pakistan’s leaders maintain they did not acquiesce in or abet Khan’s activities, Pakistan
remains outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG). Iran has been a direct recipient of Pakistani enrichment technology.
IAEA’s Board of Governors found in 2005 that Iran’s breach of its safeguards obligations
constituted noncompliance with its safeguards agreement, and referred the case to the U.N.
Security Council in February 2006. Despite repeated calls by the U.N. Security Council for Iran
to halt enrichment and reprocessing-related activities, and imposition of sanctions, Iran continues
to develop enrichment capability at Natanz and at a site near Qom disclosed in September 2009.
Iran insists on its inalienable right to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, pursuant to
Article IV of the NPT. Interpretations of this right have varied over time. Former IAEA Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei did not dispute this inalienable right and, by and large, neither have
U.S. government officials. However, the case of Iran raises perhaps the most critical question in
this decade for strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime: How can access to sensitive
fuel cycle activities (which could be used to produce fissile material for weapons) be
circumscribed without further alienating non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT?
Leaders of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime have suggested ways of reining in
the diffusion of such inherently dual-use technology, primarily through the creation of incentives
not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel. The international community is in the process of
evaluating those proposals and may decide upon a mix of approaches. At the same time, there is
debate on how to improve the IAEA safeguards system and its means of detecting diversion of
nuclear material to a weapons program in the face of expanded nuclear power facilities
worldwide.
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(For more information, see CRS Report RL34234, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy
Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power, coordinated by Mary Beth Nikitin.)
Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs
The following tables summarize current funding for DOE nuclear energy programs and NRC.
The sources for the funding figures are Administration budget requests and committee reports on
the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts, which fund DOE and NRC. FY2009
funding for energy and water programs was included in the Omnibus Appropriations Act for
FY2009 (P.L. 111-8), signed March 11, 2009. Detailed funding tables for the act are provided by
the Committee Print of the House Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 1105. FY2010 funding
is included in the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010
(P.L. 111-85, H.Rept. 111-278), signed October 28, 2009.
Table 2. Funding for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(budget authority in millions of current dollars)
FY2009
FY2010
FY2010
FY2020
FY2010
Approp.
Request
House
Senate
Approp.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Reactor Safety
788.3
799.8
—a
—a
—a
Nuclear Materials and Waste
197.3
205.2
—a
—a
—a
Yucca Mountain Licensing
49.0
56.0
56.0
29.0
29.0
Inspector General
10.9
10.1
10.1
10.9
10.9
Total NRC budget authority
1,045.5 1,071.1
1,071.1
1,071.9
1,066.9
—Offsetting fees
-870.6 887.2
-887.2
-912.2
-912.2
Net appropriation
174.9
183.9
183.9
159.7
154.7
a. Subcategories not specified.
Table 3. DOE Funding for Nuclear Activities
(budget authority in millions of current dollars)
FY2009
FY2010
FY2010
FY2010
FY2010
Approp.
Request
House
Senate
Approp.
Nuclear Energy (selected programs)
Integrated University Program
5.0
0
0
5.0
5.0
Nuclear Power 2010
177.5
20.0
71.0
120.0
105.0
Generation IV Nuclear Systems
180.0
206.0
272.4
143.0
220.1
Nuclear
Hydrogen
Initiative
7.5 0 0 0
0
Fuel
Cycle
R&D
145.0 192.0 129.2 145.0
136.0
Radiological Facilities Management
66.1
77.0
67.0
62.0
72.0
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FY2009
FY2010
FY2010
FY2010
FY2010
Approp.
Request
House
Senate
Approp.
Idaho National Laboratory
Infrastructure
218.8 286.8 277.4 356.7
173.0
Program
Direction
73.0 77.9 77.9 73.0
73.0
Total, Nuclear Energya
792.0 776.6 812.0 761.3
786.6
Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposalb
288.4 196.8 196.8 196.8
196.8
a. Excludes funding provided under other accounts.
b. Funded by a 1-mill-per-kilowatt-hour fee on nuclear power, plus appropriations for defense waste disposal
and homeland security.
Legislation in the 111th Congress
H.R. 513 (Forbes)
New Manhattan Project for Energy Independence. Establishes program to develop new energy-
related technologies, including treatment of nuclear waste. Introduced January 14, 2009; referred
to Committee on Science and Technology.
H.R. 1698 (Van Hollen)
Establishes a Green Bank to finance qualified clean energy projects. Nuclear power projects
could receive financing only after exhausting all other existing federal financial support.
Introduced March 24, 2009; referred to Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and
Commerce.
H.R. 1812 (Bachmann)
Promoting New American Energy Act of 2009. Provides tax benefits for investments in nuclear
power plants and other energy investments. Introduced March 31, 2009; referred to Committee on
Ways and Means.
H.R. 1936 (Lowey)
Nuclear Power Licensing Reform Act of 2009. Expands requirements for nuclear plant
evacuation plans from a 10-mile radius to a 50-mile radius and makes reactor license renewals
subject to the same criteria as a new plant. Introduced April 2, 2009; referred to Committee on
Energy and Commerce.
H.R. 1937 (Lowey)
Requires NRC to distribute safety-related fines imposed on a nuclear plant to surrounding
counties to help pay for emergency planning. Introduced April 2, 2009; referred to Committee on
Energy and Commerce.
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H.R. 2454 (Waxman)
American Clean Energy and Security Act. Modifies DOE loan guarantee program and establishes
Clean Energy Deployment Administration to administer DOE assistance, including loan
guarantees, for nuclear energy and other energy technologies. Establishes cap-and-trade program
for carbon dioxide emissions. Introduced May 15, 2009, referred to multiple committees.
Reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce June 5, 2009 (H.Rept. 111-137, part I). Passed
by House June 26, 2009, by vote of 219-212.
H.R. 2768 (Wamp)
Declares that any reference to clean energy in federal law shall be considered to include nuclear
energy. Introduced June 9, 2009; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
H.R. 2828 (Bishop)
American Energy Innovation Act. Amends EPACT Title XVII loan guarantee provisions,
modifies DOE standby support program for new reactors, reauthorizes the Nuclear Power 2010
program, establishes a tax credit for investments in manufacturing capacity for nuclear plant
components, allows the Nuclear Waste Fund to be used for spent fuel reprocessing, modifies
reactor licensing requirements, establishes an investment tax credit for nuclear power plants,
authorizes temporary spent fuel storage agreements, requires DOE to offer to settle lawsuits for
nuclear waste disposal delays, prohibits NRC from considering nuclear waste storage when
licensing new nuclear facilities, and prohibits new waste facilities authorized under the act from
being located in Nevada. Introduced June 11, 2009; referred to multiple committees.
H.R. 2846 (Boehner)
American Energy Act. Requires expedited procedures for nuclear plant licensing, establishes goal
of licensing 100 new reactors by 2030, establishes uranium reserve, requires continued
development of the Yucca Mountain repository unless it is found scientifically unsuitable,
removes the statutory limit on Yucca Mountain disposal capacity, allows the Nuclear Waste Fund
to be used for reprocessing, requires NRC to determine that sufficient waste disposal capacity
will be available for proposed new reactors, establishes a National Nuclear Energy Council to
advise the Secretary of Energy, and provides investment tax credit for nuclear power plants.
Introduced June 12, 2009; referred to multiple committees.
H.R. 3009 (Ross)
American-Made Energy Act of 2009. Establishes American-Made Energy Trust Fund and
includes nuclear power among technologies eligible for expenditures from the fund. Introduced
June 23, 2009; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
H.R. 3183 (Pastor)
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for FY2010. Includes funding for DOE
nuclear energy programs. Introduced July 13, 2009; signed into law October 28, 2009 (see CRS
FY2010 Status Table of Appropriations, http://www.crs.gov/Pages/appover.aspx).
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H.R. 3385 (Barton)
Authorizes DOE to use the Nuclear Waste Fund to pay for grants or long-term contracts for spent
nuclear fuel recycling or reprocessing and places the Waste Fund off-budget. Introduced July 29,
2009; referred to committees on Energy and Commerce and the Budget.
H.R. 3448 (Pitts)
Streamline America’s Future Energy Nuclear Act. Requires NRC to establish expedited nuclear
plant licensing procedures, requires NRC to reduce the time required to certify new reactor
designs by half, requires NRC to develop technology-neutral guidelines for nuclear plant
licensing, establishes a National Nuclear Energy Council to advise the Secretary of Energy,
authorizes a final year of appropriations for the Nuclear Power 2010 program, requires DOE to
prepare a schedule for accelerating completion of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant from 2021
to 2015, and limits fees and procedural restrictions on uranium mining on federal lands.
Introduced July 31, 2009; referred to Committees on Energy and Commerce and Natural
Resources.
H.R. 3505 (Gary Miller)
American Energy Production and Price Reduction Act. Prohibits NRC from considering nuclear
waste storage when licensing new nuclear facilities and establishes investment tax credit for the
costs of obtaining a nuclear manufacturing certification from the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers. Introduced July 31, 2009; referred to multiple committees.
S. 591 (Reid)
National Commission on High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel Establishment
Act of 2009. Establishes a commission to recommend alternative nuclear waste management
options in the event that the proposed Yucca Mountain, NV, repository does not become
operational. Introduced March 12, 2009; referred to Committee on Environment and Public
Works.
S. 807 (Nelson)
SMART Energy Act. Authorizes funds for NRC to expedite nuclear plant license applications,
authorizes nuclear workforce training program, establishes interagency working group to increase
U.S. nuclear plant component manufacturing base, authorizes construction of a spent nuclear fuel
recycling development facility, modifies the Standby Support program for new reactors, modifies
the EPACT loan guarantee program, expands the nuclear power production tax credit, and
provides accelerated depreciation for new reactors. Introduced April 2, 2009; referred to
Committee on Finance.
S. 861 (Graham)
Rebating America’s Deposits Act. Requires the President to certify that the Yucca Mountain site
continues to be the designated location for a nuclear waste repository under the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act. If such a certification is not made within 30 days after enactment or is subsequently
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revoked, the Treasury is to refund all payments, plus interest, made by nuclear reactor owners to
the Nuclear Waste Fund. DOE is to begin shipping defense-related high-level radioactive waste to
Yucca Mountain by 2017 or pay $1 million per day to each state in which such waste is located.
Introduced April 22, 2009; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 1333 (Barrasso)
Clean, Affordable, and Reliable Energy Act of 2009. Includes provisions to take the Nuclear
Waste Fund off-budget, authorize DOE to use the Nuclear Waste Fund to pay for grants or long-
term contracts for spent nuclear fuel recycling or reprocessing, and prohibit NRC from denying
licenses for new nuclear facilities because of a lack of waste disposal capacity. Introduced June
24, 2009; referred to Committee on Finance.
S. 1462 (Bingaman)
American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009. Establishes Clean Energy Deployment
Administration to administer DOE assistance, including loan guarantees, for nuclear energy and
other energy technologies. Bill would also establish a national commission to study nuclear waste
management alternatives and requirements for nuclear fuel cycle research. Introduced and
reported as an original measure from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources July 16,
2009 (S.Rept. 111-48).
S. 1733 (Kerry)
Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act. Authorizes programs for nuclear worker training,
nuclear safety, and nuclear waste research. Establishes a carbon dioxide cap-and-trade program.
Introduced September 30, 2009; referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works.
Ordered reported November 5, 2009.
S. 2052 (Mark Udall)
Nuclear Energy Research Initiative Improvement Act of 2009. Authorizes DOE research to
reduce nuclear reactor manufacturing and construction costs. Introduced October 29, 2009;
referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 2776 (Alexander)
Clean Energy Act of 2009. Revises DOE loan guarantee program, authorizes DOE assistance for
small modular reactors, requires NRC to consider waste disposal to be adequate for potential new
reactors, and authorizes funding for nuclear workforce development and research. Introduced
November 16, 2009; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 2812 (Bingaman)
Nuclear Power 2021 Act. Establishes a cost-shared program between DOE and the nuclear
industry to develop and license standard designs for two reactors below 300 megawatts of electric
generating capacity. Introduced November 20, 2009; referred to Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources.
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Author Contact Information
Mark Holt
Specialist in Energy Policy
mholt@crs.loc.gov, 7-1704
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