Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
November 30, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21922
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Summary
In the context of a review of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan during September-November 2009, the
performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government has figured prominently, by all accounts.
An assessment of the security situation furnished by the top commander in Afghanistan, General
Stanley McChrystal, warned of potential mission failure unless a fully resourced classic
counterinsurgency strategy is employed, and U.S. officials are concerned that any U.S. strategy
requires a legitimate Afghan partner for implementation.
The Afghan government’s limited writ and widespread official corruption are believed by U.S.
officials to be helping sustain a Taliban insurgency and complicating international efforts to
stabilize Afghanistan. At the same time, the re-elected President Hamid Karzai has, through
compromise with faction leaders, been able to confine ethnic disputes to political competition,
enabling his government to focus on trying to win over those members of the ethnic Pashtun
community that support Taliban and other insurgents. Despite the measurable loss of confidence
in Karzai, he still went into the August 20, 2009, presidential election as the favorite. Turnout was
lower than expected, and final but uncertified results, released September 16, 2009, showed him
at 54.6%. Amid widespread charges of fraud, many substantiated by a U.N.-backed Electoral
Complaints Commission, which investigated the charges, nearly one-third of Karzai’s votes were
invalidated and the certified result, released October 21, 2009, placed Karzai just short of the
50%+ total needed to avoid a second-round runoff. The runoff was scheduled for November 7,
2009, but, asserting that fraud was likely in the runoff, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai’s main
challenger, dropped out of the race on November 1, 2009, and Afghanistan’s Independent
Election Commission declared Karzai the winner on November 2. Appearing to welcome a
resolution of the issue, the United States congratulated Karzai and praised Abdullah for
diplomatic restraint. Karzai was inaugurated on November 19, with Secretary of State Clinton in
attendance.
Because most insurgents are, like Karzai, ethnic Pashtuns, stabilizing Afghanistan requires
winning Pashtun political support for the Afghan government. This support could be predicated,
at least in part, on the success of efforts to build effective local governing structures. New
provincial councils in each of the 34 provinces were elected on August 20 as well, although their
roles in local governance and their relationships to appointed governors remain unclear and
inconsistent across Afghanistan. The trend toward promoting local governing bodies has been
accelerated by the Obama Administration strategy announced on March 27, 2009, and is likely to
receive continued U.S. and partner focus. The core of the strategy announced in March 2009—
and which is likely to continue—is a so-called “civilian uplift” that is in the process of doubling,
to about 1,000 by the end of 2009, the number of U.S. civilian personnel helping build Afghan
governing and security institutions and the economy.
Under an FY2009 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32), the Administration developed, by
September 23, 2009, “metrics” by which to judge progress in Afghanistan, including the
performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government and its efforts to curb official corruption.
Small amounts of U.S. funds are tied to Afghanistan’s performance on such metrics.
For further information, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Contents
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape .......................................................................... 1
Overview of Afghan Politics and Governance ....................................................................... 1
Many Traditional Patterns Endure ................................................................................... 2
Karzai and His Opponents..................................................................................................... 2
The Opposition and Its Strength ...................................................................................... 3
Government Capacity and Performance....................................................................................... 5
Dealing With Regional Faction Leaders ................................................................................ 6
Official Corruption................................................................................................................ 8
Karzai Responses ............................................................................................................ 9
Expanding Local Governance/U.S. Civilian “Uplift” ........................................................... 10
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils............................................................... 10
Security Benefits of Local Governance Programs .......................................................... 11
Overall Human Rights Issues .............................................................................................. 12
Religious Freedom ........................................................................................................ 12
Human Trafficking........................................................................................................ 13
Advancement of Women ............................................................................................... 13
Democracy, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues ................................................. 15
2009 Elections .......................................................................................................................... 16
Dispute over the Election Date ............................................................................................ 16
Election Modalities and Processes....................................................................................... 17
The Political Contest ........................................................................................................... 18
The Campaign............................................................................................................... 19
The Election Results and Prospects ..................................................................................... 21
U.S. Policy and Interests in the Election .............................................................................. 23
Figures
Figure 1. Afghanistan Ethnic Groups......................................................................................... 28
Tables
Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process....................................................................... 25
Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations ........................................................................... 26
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 28
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 28
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Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape
A U.S. priority, particularly during 2001-2007, has been to extend the authority and encourage the
reform of Afghanistan’s central government. The policy is predicated on the observation that
weak and corrupt governance is causing some Afghans to acquiesce to, or even support outright,
Taliban insurgents as providers of security and impartial justice. Since 2007, the U.S. and Afghan
focus has been on expanding and strengthening governance at local levels, considered key to
winning Pashtun support for the government and blunting a popular turn toward the Taliban.
Overview of Afghan Politics and Governance
The emphasis on local governance also enables U.S. policy to reduce its dependence on the
Afghan central government, which has numerous flaws discussed subsequently. Others note that
promoting local governance is in line with the traditional Afghan governing structure in which the
central government has been weak and therefore unable to enforce significant financial or
administrative mandates on Afghanistan’s localities. About 80% of Afghans live in rural areas.
The tribal, clan, village, and district political structures have all been severely weakened, if not
eliminated, by 30 years of war that saw the rise of militia commanders, faction leaders, and others
as new authority figures in outlying areas.
Although democracy promotion has not been a major feature of the Obama Administration’s
Afghanistan policy, Afghanistan has taken significant formal steps toward democracy since the
fall of the Taliban in November 2001. Karzai’s is the first fully elected government in Afghan
history, although there were parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah (the last
were in 1969, before his reign was ended in a 1973 military coup). Presidential, parliamentary,
and provincial elections, and adoption of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban transition
roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major Afghan factions signed
in Bonn, Germany, on December 5, 2001, (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the Taliban had fallen. The
political transition process is depicted in Table 1.
Previous post-Taliban grand assemblies (loya jirgas) and factional negotiations—coupled with a
post-Taliban sense that Afghanistan is for all Afghans, regardless of ethnicity and political
ideology—have produced relative peace among Afghanistan’s many communities. However,
reflecting the sense among Pashtuns that they, as the largest single ethnicity, have the right to rule,
Karzai’s government has come to be progressively dominated by ethnic Pashtuns. Pashtuns are
about 42% of the population and, with few exceptions, have governed Afghanistan. One recent
exception was the 1992-1996 presidency of the mujahedin government of Burhanuddin Rabbani,
a Tajik. A table on major Pashtun clans is provided below (see Table 2), as is a map showing the
distribution of Afghanistan’s various ethnicities (see Figure 1).
Although other ethnicities have tended to accept the right of the Pashtun community to hold the
top position in Afghanistan, non-Pashtuns want to be included at high levels of the central
government and to have a measure of control over how government programs are implemented in
their geographic regions.
1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
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The security organs are considered an arena where Pashtuns and Tajiks have worked together
relatively well. Currently, of the major security ministries and organizations, only the National
Directorate for Security (NDS, the Intelligence directorate) is still headed by a non-Pashtun
(Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik). Attempting to maintain the fragile consensus among the various
ethnicities, the other security ministries (Defense, Interior) tend to have non-Pashtuns in key
deputy or subordinate positions. In the Defense Ministry, the chief of staff is a Tajik (Bismillah
Khan), who reports to a Pashtun Defense Minister (Abdul Rahim Wardak). Some observers take a
different view, asserting that Tajiks continue to control many of the command ranks of the Afghan
military and security services, and that Pashtuns constitute merely an upper veneer of control of
these organizations, causing Pashtun resentment.
Many Traditional Patterns Endure
Despite the formal procedures of democracy established since the fall of the Taliban, many
traditional patterns of authority remain. These patterns were evident in the 2009 presidential
campaign in Afghanistan, where some candidates, Karzai in particular, pursued campaign
strategies designed primarily to assemble blocs of ethnic and geographic votes, rather than
advance specific new ideas. Some say that Afghanistan continues to be run mostly by local
faction leaders who selectively apply, or in some cases ignore entirely, Afghan law and who
undermine internationally accepted standards of rule of law.
Some believe that traditional Afghan patterns of decision making have some democratic and
representative elements. This could be considered helpful to forging a modern democracy,
although some might see these traditional patterns as competing mechanisms that resist change
and modernization, and do not meet international standards of democratic governance. At the
national level, the loya jirga, or traditional Afghan assembly consisting of about 1,000 delegates
from all over Afghanistan, has been used to ratify some major decisions in the post-Taliban period
(Karzai’s leadership, the post-Taliban constitution, and long-term defense relations with the
United States). At the local level, shuras, or jirgas (consultative councils)2 composed of local
notables, are key mechanisms for making authoritative local decisions or dispensing justice.
Afghans turn often to these local mechanisms to adjudicate disputes rather than use the national
court system. Some estimates say that 80% of cases are decided in the informal justice system.
Karzai and His Opponents
In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the National Assembly (parliament)—particularly the 249-seat
elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People)—has become the key institution for the
non-Pashtun ethnic minorities to exert influence on Karzai. To the chagrin of many Afghans who
want to build a democratic Afghanistan governed by technocrats and newly emerging political
figures, many seats in the lower house are held by personalities and factions prominent in
Afghanistan’s recent wars, many of whom are non-Pashtuns from the north and the west. These
figures constitute about one-third of the Wolesi Jirga; the remainder of the body is divided among
pro-Karzai deputies and technocratic “independents” of varied ethnicities. The factions in the
lower house are not strictly organized according to Afghanistan’s 108 registered political parties,
and the various non-Pashtun ethnicities are not monolithic in opposition to Karzai.
2 Shura is the term used by non-Pashtuns to characterize the traditional assembly concept. Jirga is the Pashtun term.
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Karzai has not formed his own party, but his core supporters in the Wolesi Jirga are former
members of the conservative Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party (the same party as that headed by
insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar); and supporters of Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf—a prominent
Islamic conservative mujahedin party leader.3 Another base of Karzai’s support in parliament is
the contingent from Qandahar (Karzai’s home province) and Helmand provinces, including
several Karzai clan members. One clan member in the body is his cousin Jamil Karzai, and
another is relative by marriage Aref Nurzai, who was prominent in Karzai’s 2009 election
campaign. Karzai’s elder brother, Qayyum, was in the lower house representing Qandahar until
his October 2008 resignation, although Qayyum continues to represent his brother informally
domestically and abroad, including at 2008 and 2009 meetings to explore negotiated settlements
with Taliban figures.
Other pro-Karzai Pashtuns are former militia and Taliban leaders, including Hazrat Ali
(Nangarhar Province), who led the Afghan component of the failed assault on Osama bin Laden’s
purported redoubt at Tora Bora in December 2001; Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some
accounts, helped Osama bin Laden escape Tora Bora; and Mullah Abdul Salam (“Mullah
Rocketi”), from Zabol. (Salam ran for president in 2009 but garnered only about 0.5%.)
The Opposition and Its Strength
Although the political “opposition” to Karzai is fluid and often compromises with him or even
joins him on some issues, those who can be considered opposition (putting aside Taliban and
other insurgents) are mainly ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) who were in an alliance
against Taliban rule that was called the “Northern Alliance.” Leaders of these groups, and
particularly Tajiks, view as a betrayal Karzai’s firing of many of the non-Pashtuns from the
cabinet—such as former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Tajik, dismissed from that post
by Karzai in 2006, and the main challenger for President in the August 2009 election).
The main ethnic opposition grouping is called the United Front (UF). It was formed in April 2007
by Wolesi Jirga Speaker Yunus Qanooni (Karzai’s main challenger in the 2004 presidential
election) and former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani (both, like Abdullah, are prominent
ethnic Tajik Northern Alliance figures and former associates of the legendary mujahedin
commander Ahmad Shah Masood). It is broader than the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance in
that it includes some Pashtuns, such as prominent Soviet-occupation era security figures Sayed
Muhammad Gulabzoi and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, who chairs parliament’s defense committee. Both
of Karzai’s vice presidents joined the UF when it was formed, although they subsequently
continued to serve as vice presidents. The UF advocates amending the constitution to give more
power to parliament and to empower the elected provincial councils (instead of the President) to
select governors and mayors. Fearing Pashtun consolidation, the UF has been generally opposed
to Karzai’s overtures to Taliban fighters to end their fight and join government—an initiative that
is now backed by the Obama Administration as a means of combating the Taliban insurgency.
Even before the formation of the UF, the opposition bloc in the Wolesi Jirga first showed its
strength in March 2006, following the December 19, 2005, inauguration of parliament, by
requiring Karzai’s cabinet to be approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition
leverage. However, Karzai rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. In
May 2006, the opposition compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the
3 Sayyaf led the Ittihad Islami (Islamic Union) mujahedin party during the war against the Soviet occupation.
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highest judicial body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as
chief justice. The proximate justification for the ouster was Shinwari’s age, which was beyond the
official retirement age of 65. Parliament approved his new Court choices in July 2006, all of
whom are trained in modern jurisprudence.
In May 2007, the UF achieved a majority to oust Karzai ally Rangin Spanta as Foreign Minister.
Karzai refused to replace him, instead seeking a Supreme Court ruling that Spanta should remain,
on the grounds that his ouster was related to a refugee issue (Iran’s expulsion of 100,000 Afghan
refugees), not a foreign policy issue. The Court has, to date, supported Karzai, and Spanta
remains Foreign Minister.
Karzai and the UF have often competed for the support of the “independents” in the lower house.
Among them are several outspoken women, intellectuals, and business leaders, such as the 39-
year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), a leading critic of war-era faction leaders. In May 2007
the lower house voted to suspend her for this criticism for the duration of her term. Others in this
camp include Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, editor of Woman
Mirror magazine; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions
parliamentary powers and has established a “complaints tent” near the parliament building to
highlight and combat official corruption. (He ran for president in the 2009 elections on an anti-
corruption platform.) U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI) has helped train the
independents; the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has assisted the more established factions.
The Upper House of the National Assembly
Karzai has relatively fewer critics in the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga (House of Elder, upper house),
partly because of his bloc of 34 appointments (one-third of that body). He engineered the
appointment of an ally as Speaker: Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, a noted Islamic scholar and former
mujahedin party leader who headed the post-Communist mujahedin government for one month
(May 1992).4 Mojadeddi has since 2003 headed—in concert with Vice President Karim Khalili—
an effort to reconcile with Taliban figures (Peace and Reconciliation Commission, or “PTSD”
program), which has reportedly led to the reconciliation of 9,000 fighters with the government.
However, the Commission’s work has been overtaken by direct talks between Taliban figures and
Karzai representatives and by U.S. and Afghan programs to buy off fighters from the battlefield
directly. Karzai also appointed Northern Alliance military leader Muhammad Fahim to the upper
body, perhaps to compensate for his removal as Defense Minister, although he resigned after a
few months and later joined the UF. (He is Karzai’s primary running mate in the 2009 elections.)
There is one Hindu, and 23 women; 17 are Karzai appointees and 6 were selected in their own
right.
The upper house tends to be more Islamist conservative than the lower house, advocating a legal
system that accords with Islamic law, and restrictions on press and Westernized media broadcasts.
In late 2008, the body approved a resolution opposing a U.S.-Afghan plan to establish local
security organs to help keep Taliban infiltrators out of Afghan communities. The plan, now
termed the “Afghan Public Protection Program,” is being implemented in Wardak province.
On less contentious issues, the executive and the legislature have worked well. During 2008,
parliament passed a labor law that brings Afghan labor law more in line with international labor
4 The mujahedin party he headed during the anti-Soviet war was the Afghan National Liberation Front.
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laws, a mines law, a law on economic cooperatives, and a convention on tobacco control. It also
confirmed several Karzai nominees, including the final justice to fill out the Supreme Court. In
2009, as discussed further below, the National Assembly approved a Shiite Personal Status Law,
both an original version and then a revised version. Both houses of parliament, whose budgets are
controlled by the Ministry of Finance, are staffed by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a
“secretariat.” There are 18 oversight committees, a research unit and a library.
Government Capacity and Performance5
Since 2001, U.S. policy has been to help expand Afghan institutions; since 2007, U.S. policy has
been to also urge Afghan government reform. Such reforms include instituting merit-based
performance criteria, ending the practice of hiring based on kinship and ethnicity rather than
qualifications, and weeding out of rampant official corruption. Afghan ministries based in Kabul
are growing their staffs and technologically capabilities, although they still suffer from a low
resource and skill base, and corruption is fed, in part, by the fact that government workers receive
very low salaries. Central government representation in outlying provinces is expanding only
very slowly. Provincial governors are in place and have several staff persons, but only about 50%
of all district governors (there are 364 districts) have any staff or vehicles. Some of these issues
are being addressed by Afghanistan’s Civil Service Commission that is trying to standardize and
institutionalize civil service job descriptions and set pay and performance criteria.
One idea that came to the fore in 2009 was a new position to help the Karzai government’s
administrative abilities. The former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, who is
of Afghan origin (a Pashtun), was reported in May 2009 to be negotiating with Karzai about
becoming a strong chief executive officer (“chief of staff,” or “de-facto prime minister”) if Karzai
were reelected; these talks came after Khalilzad declined to run against Karzai in the August
election. The Obama Administration reportedly did not take a firm position on the Khalilzad idea
during Karzai’s May 2009 visit to the United States. Some in the Administration are said to be
backing the concept of placing more administrative experience in Karzai’s office, although not
endorsing Khalilzad specifically. In August 2009, it was reported that one of Karzai’s election
challengers, Ashaf Ghani, was negotiating to take that role if Karzai is reelected; others
mentioned have been Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar.
Some Afghan leaders argue that there is no provision in the constitution for a strong executive
post below the President. International community representatives have, as of September 2009,
focused on urging Karzai to appoint a post-election cabinet that is proficient and dedicated to
reducing corruption, rather than on a powerful “chief of staff” post. Karzai did not mention this
issue in his second term inaugural speech on November 19, 2009.6
5 Some information in this section is from the State Department reports on human rights in Afghanistan for 2008.
February 25, 2009; for text, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/sca/119131.htm and the International
Religious Freedom Report, released September 19, 2008. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/2007/90225.htm.
6 Text of unofficial translation of Karzai speech provided by the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in
Washington, DC.
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The anti-corruption and governmental performance aspect of U.S. policy was emphasized by the
Obama Administration’s strategy announced March 27, 2009, which concluded that more needed
to be done to promote the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government at both the
Kabul and local levels. The corruption issue is discussed in greater detail later. The
Administration developed metrics to assess progress in building Afghan governance and security,
as it is required to do so (by September 23, 2009) under P.L. 111-32, an FY2009 supplemental
appropriation. About 45 different metrics are to be used.7 These metrics are likely to factor into
the new Administration strategy to be announced December 1, 2009. Congressional opinion is
divided on whether there should be firm conditionality of any U.S. aid to Afghanistan on
Afghanistan’s performance on such metrics, or linkage to any timelines of progress in the U.S.
stabilization effort.
The following sections discuss major shortcomings of the Karzai government, and which have
caused substantial frictions in U.S.-Karzai relations since the Obama Administration came into
office. However, press reports in late November 2009 say the Administration is planning to try to
rebuild relations with Karzai now that he will serve another term as president, and that criticisms
of him during 2009 may have been counterproductive by reinforcing some of his tendencies that
U.S. officials oppose.8
Dealing With Regional Faction Leaders
The Obama Administration March 2009 strategy did not outline new measures to sideline
regional strongmen, who are often referred to as “warlords.” Karzai has at times indulged and at
other times moved against regional strongmen, but he has been hesitant to confront them outright
to the point where their followers go into armed rebellion. Some assert that he has been more
reliant on them in 2009 than previously as part of Karzai’s reaction to the perception that the
Obama Administration’s assessment of him is negative and that the Administration sought to
encourage opponents to him in the August 2009 election. Karzai’s choice of Muhammad Fahim,
the military chief of the Northern Alliance/UF faction, as first Vice Presidential running mate in
the August 2009 elections, might have been one manifestation of that Karzai perception. Even
before the Obama Administration came into office, Karzai argued that the faction leaders have
significant followings and that compromises with them are needed to keep the government intact
as he focuses on fighting “unrepentant” Taliban insurgents.
Some observers cite Karzai’s handling of prominent Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostam as
evidence of political weakness and reliance on leaders with questionable histories and intents.
Dostam is often referred to as a “warlord” because of his command of partisans in his redoubt in
northern Afghanistan (Jowzjan and Balkh provinces), and he is widely accused of human rights
abuses of political opponents in the north. To try to separate him from his militia, in 2005 Karzai
appointed him to the post of chief of staff of the armed forces. On February 4, 2008, Afghan
police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to reports that he attacked an ethnic
Turkmen rival, but Karzai did not order his arrest for fear of stirring unrest among Dostam’s
followers. To try to resolve the issue without stirring unrest, in early December 2008 Karzai
7 “Evaluating Progress in Afghanistan-Pakistan” Foreign Policy website. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/
09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan
8 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “U.S. Warming Ties With Karzai.” Washington Post, November 20, 2009.
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purportedly reached an agreement with Dostam under which he resigned as chief of staff and
went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the dropping any case against him.9
On July 11, 2009, the New York Times reported that allegations that Dostam had caused the death
of several hundred Taliban prisoners during the major combat phase of OEF were not investigated
by the Bush Administration, and that the State Department had dissuaded Karzai, at least
temporarily, from implementing his June 2009 reappointment of Dostam as chief military advisor.
In responding to assertions that there was no investigation of the “Dasht-e-Laili” massacre
because Dostam was a U.S. ally,10 President Obama said any allegations of violations of laws of
war need to be investigated. Dostam responded to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (which
carried the story) that only 200 Taliban prisoners died and this was due to combat and disease,
and not due to intentional actions of forces under his command.
Dostam, who returned to Afghanistan on August 16 and subsequently held a large pro-Karzai
election rally in his home city of Shebergan, purportedly seeks to weaken another strong figure in
the north, Balkh Province governor Atta Mohammad. Mohammad is a Tajik but, under a 2005
compromise with Karzai, is in control of a province that is inhabited mostly by Uzbeks—a source
of irritation for Dostam and other Uzbek leaders. Mohammad views himself as relatively
independent of Kabul’s writ, and Dostam reportedly is hoping that, by supporting Karzai in the
election, Dostam will be able to convince Karzai to remove Mohammad from Balkh if Karzai is
reelected. In July 2009, Mohammad announced his political support for the candidacy of fellow
Tajik Dr. Abdullah, which might represent a natural ethnic alignment. Dostam’s support
apparently helped Karzai carry several provinces in the north, including Jowzjan, Sar-i-Pol, and
Faryab, although Dr. Abdullah won Balkh and Samangan, according to certified results (see “The
Election Results and Prospects” below). Dostam reportedly went back into exile as of October
2009.
Another strongman that Karzai has sought to simultaneously engage and weaken is prominent
Tajik political leader and former Herat governor Ismail Khan. In 2006, Karzai appointed him
Minister of Energy and Water, taking him away from his political base in the west. However, he
remains influential there, and Karzai’s compromises with Khan have won Karzai Khan’s election
support. Khan apparently was able to deliver potentially decisive Tajik votes in Herat Province
that might otherwise have gone to Dr. Abdullah. Afghan certified results showed Karzai winning
that province, indicating that the deal with Khan was helpful to Karzai. Still, Khan is said to have
several opponents in Herat, and a bombing there on September 26, 2009, narrowly missed his car,
causing Khan to threaten to resign his ministry post. U.S. officials purportedly would prefer that
Khan not be in the new cabinet because of his checkered record, even though some U.S. officials
credit him with cooperating with the privatization of the power sector of Afghanistan.
Karzai’s relationship with another Pashtun strongman, Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh,
demonstrates the dilemmas facing Karzai in governing Afghanistan. Akhunzadeh was a close
associate of Karzai when they were in exile in Quetta, Pakistan, during Taliban rule. Karzai
appointed him governor of Helmand after the fall of the Taliban, but in 2005, Britain demanded
he be removed for his abuses and reputed involvement in drug trafficking, as a condition of
Britain taking security control of Helmand. Karzai reportedly wants to reappoint Akhundzadeh,
who Karzai believes was more successful against militants in Helmand using his local militiamen
9 CRS e-mail conversation with National Security aide to President Karzai. December 2008.
10 This is the name of the area where the Taliban prisoners purportedly died and were buried in a mass grave.
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than has Britain with its more than 9,000 troops there. Akhunzadeh said in a November 2009
interview that many of his followers joined the Taliban insurgency after Britain insisted on his
ouster. However, Britain and the United States have urged Karzai to keep the existing governor,
Ghulab Mangal, who is winning wide praise for his successes establishing effective governance
in Helmand (discussed further below under “Expanding Local Governance”) and for reducing
poppy cultivation there. Akhunzadeh attempted to deliver large numbers of votes for Karzai in
Helmand, although turnout in that province was very light partly due to Taliban intimidation of
voters.
In February 2007, both houses passed a law giving amnesty to so-called “warlords.” Karzai
altered the draft to give victims the right to seek justice for any abuses; Karzai did not sign a
modified version in May 2007, leaving the status unclear.
Official Corruption
During the Bush Administration, U.S. officials generally refrained from publicly criticizing
Karzai for his toleration of rampant official corruption. However, President Obama and his senior
aides, including the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke, have become highly critical of Karzai’s shortcomings on this issue. U.S. officials
apparently believe that the failures of the Afghan government are contributing to a souring of
Western publics on the mission. The Obama Administration March 2009 strategy highlighted the
need to reduce official corruption, and the December 1, 2009, strategy announcement is likely to
highlight the need for improvement as well, perhaps making some U.S. forces or assistance
contingent on progress. Official corruption is identified as a key problem in the August 30, 2009,
assessment of the Afghanistan situation by Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, overall
commander of U.S. and international forces there. Several of the required “metrics” of progress,
cited above, involve Afghan progress against corruption. The FY2009 supplemental appropriation
(P.L. 111-32) withholds 10% of about $90 million in State Department counter-narcotics funding
subject to a certification that the Afghan government is acting against officials who are corrupt or
committing gross human rights violations.
Partly as a result of what many Afghans view as a “predatory” central government, many Afghans
and international donors are said to have lost faith in Karzai’s leadership. Some observers, such as
former Coordinator for Counter-Narcotics and Justice Reform Thomas Schweich, in a July 27,
2008, New York Times article, have gone so far as to assert that Karzai, to build political support,
is deliberately tolerating officials in his government who are allegedly involved in the narcotics
trade. The New York Times reported allegations (October 5, 2008) that another Karzai brother,
Qandahar provincial council chief Ahmad Wali Karzai, has protected narcotics trafficking in the
province, although a subsequent piece said he is also a paid informant and helper for CIA and
Special Forces operations in the province.11 Some Afghans explain Ahmad Wali Karzai’s
activities as an effort to ensure that his constituents in Qandahar have financial means to sustain
themselves, even if through narcotics trade, before there are viable alternative sources of
livelihood. Another brother, Mahmoud Karzai, has apparently grown wealthy through real estate
and auto sales ventures in Qandahar and Kabul, purportedly by fostering the impression he can
influence his brother, President Karzai. Mahmoud Karzai held a press conference in Washington,
DC, on April 16, 2009, denying allegations of corruption.
11 Filkins, Dexter, and Mark Mazetti and James Risen. “Brother of Afghan Leader Is Said to Be on C.I.A. Payroll.”
New York Times, October 28, 2009.
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Observers who follow the issue say that most of the corruption takes place in the course of
performing mundane governmental functions, such as government processing of official
documents, in which processing services routinely require bribes in exchange for action.12 In
other cases, Afghan security officials are said to sell U.S./internationally provided vehicles, fuel,
and equipment to supplement their salaries. Other observers who have served in Afghanistan say
that Karzai has appointed some provincial governors to “reward them” and that these
appointments have gone on to “prey” economically on the populations of that province. Several
high officials, despite very low official government salaries, have acquired ornate properties in
west Kabul since 2002, according to Afghan observers. Transparency International, a German
organization that assesses governmental corruption worldwide, ranked Afghanistan in 2008 as
176th out of 180 countries ranked in terms of government corruption.
Because of the corruption, only about 10% of U.S. aid is channeled through the Afghan
government, although Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke
said in May 2009 that empowering Afghan governance requires raising that to about 40% or 50%.
Currently, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Communications qualify to have U.S. funds
channeled through them, and U.S. officials in Kabul told CRS in October 2009 that several other
ministries might soon qualify as well. These might include the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development (MRRD), headed by Ehsan Zia, which runs the widely praised National
Solidarity Program, which awards local development grants for specific projects. Zia has
developed a capability, widely praised by Britain, according to observers, to account for large
percentages of donated funds to ensure they are not siphoned off by corruption. In October 2008,
Karzai replaced the ministers of Interior, of Education, and of Agriculture with officials,
particularly the Interior Minister (former Soviet-era official Muhammad Hanif Atmar) believed to
be dedicated to reform of their ministries and weeding out of official corruption. Finance Minister
Omar Zakhiwal was named in December 2008. U.S. embassy officials suggest these cabinet
ministers are the best members of what they consider the most effective cabinet Karzai has had
since he became leader in 2001 and they hope that they are reappointed in the cabinet to be
named in December 2009.
Karzai Responses
As a first step to address the criticism, in August 2008 Karzai, with reported U.S. prodding, set up
the “High Office of Oversight for the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy” with the
power to investigate the police, courts, and the attorney general’s office, and to catalogue the
overseas assets of Afghan officials. Karzai himself declared his assets on March 27, 2009. In his
public appearances during his visit to the United States in May 2009, Karzai repeatedly stressed
what he said were efforts by him and his government to remove corrupt officials and combat
official corruption. In response to the continued criticism, in the context of the flawed August 20,
2009, presidential election, Karzai announced new steps in his November 19 inaugural address,
including upgrading the “High Office” by increasing its scope of authority and resources, and by
reforming relevant anti-corruption laws. A few days later, Attorney General Mohammad Ishaq
Aloko announced that two current ministers were under investigation for corruption, including
the Minister of Mines Mohammad Ibrahim Adel, who reportedly accepted a $30 million bribe to
award a key mining project in Lowgar Province (Aynak Copper Mine) to China.13 One proposal
12 Filkins, Dexter. “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government.” New York Times, January 2, 2009.
13 Partlow, Joshua. “Afghanistan Investigating 5 Current and Former Cabinet Members.” Washington Post, November
24, 2009.
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under consideration is to require deputy ministers and others to declare their assets, not just those
at the ministerial level. In November 2009, the Afghan government also has announced an
increase in police salaries, in part to attract recruits and reduce their inclination to demand bribes.
Secretary of State Clinton, who attended the inauguration, praised the Karzai steps as specific and
significant.
Some of Karzai’s anti-corruption steps have been recommended in studies within the State
Department, the Afghan government, and the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime which is
responsible for assisting Afghanistan on counter-narcotics. The Afghan government committed
itself to anti-corruption efforts in the so-called “Afghanistan Compact” adopted at an international
meeting in London on February 1, 2006, and it ratified the U.N. Convention Against Corruption
in August 2008. Karzai said in his November 19, 2009, inaugural speech that there would “soon”
be an Afghan-organized conference in Kabul to focus on how to combat corruption.
Expanding Local Governance/U.S. Civilian “Uplift”
In part to address the flaws of the Afghan central government, U.S. policy shifted somewhat in
2008 toward promoting local security and governance solutions. The Afghan government asserts
that it itself is promoting local governance as the next stage in Afghanistan’s political and
economic development, although some say that this was part of an effort by Karzai to improve his
reelection prospects by developing a local networks of supporters. A key indicator of this Afghan
shift came in August 2007 when Karzai placed the selection process for local leaders (provincial
governors and down) in a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)—and out
of the Interior Ministry.
The IDLG, with advice from India and other donors, is also in the process of empowering
localities to decide on development priorities by forming Community Development Councils
(CDC’s). Thus far, there are about 22,000 CDC’s established, with a goal of over 30,000, and they
are eventually to be elected. The IDLG does not envision that the local leaders being elected will
conflict with any district leaderships elected when Afghanistan finally does hold (still delayed)
district elections. Some accounts say that the efforts to expand local governance have been
hampered by corruption and limited availability of skilled Afghans.
As a consequence of the March 2009 Obama Administration review, to help build local governing
capacity, the Administration recruited about 500 U.S. civilian personnel from the State
Department, USAID, the Department of Agriculture, and several other agencies—and many
additional civilians from partner countries will join them—to advise Afghan ministries, and
provincial and district administrations. At least one-third had arrived by August 2009, according
to State Department officials, and U.S. officials in Kabul told CRS in October 2009 that the
remainder would all be in place by the end of 2009.
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils
Many believe that the key to effective local governance is the appointment of competent
governors. The UNODC report said that improving governance in some provinces had
contributed to the increase to 18 “poppy free” provinces (out of 34), from 13 in the same report in
2007. Another four provinces might move into that category by the end of 2009, according to
UNODC. In March 2008 Karzai replaced the weak and ineffective governor of Helmand
(Asadullah Wafa) with Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman Province and who the U.N. Office
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of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) praised in its September 2009 report for taking effective action to
convince farmers to grow crops other than poppy. The UNODC report said his efforts account for
the 33% reduction of cultivation in Helmand in 2009, as compared with 2008. Mangal has held a
series of meetings with local elders and government officials in newly cleared areas of Helmand
Province in the course of a U.S.-led offensive there that began July 2, 2009. Ghul Agha Shirzai
has been effective in curbing cultivation in Nangarhar, although he reportedly has also not
remitted all the customs duties collected at the Khyber Pass/Torkham crossing to the central
government.
Governing Qandahar is a sensitive issue in Kabul because of Karzai’s active interest in his home
province and his expectations of large numbers of Pashtun votes from the province (as well as
from Helmand). In Qandahar, Ahmad Wali Karzai, Karzai’s elder brother, is chair of the
provincial council. He has always been more powerful than any appointed governor of Qandahar.
Yet, because of his close interest in the province, President Karzai has frequently rotated the
governors of Qandahar. He appointed General Rahmatullah Raufi to replace Asadullah Khalid
after an August 7, 2008, Taliban assault on the Qandahar prison that led to the freeing of several
hundred Taliban fighters incarcerated there. Karzai changed that governorship again in December
2008, naming Canadian-Afghan academic Tooryalai Wesa as governor, perhaps hoping that his
ties to Canada would assuage Canadian reticence to continuing its mission in Qandahar beyond
2011. However, Canadian Prime Minister Harper reiterated on September 15, 2009, that Canada
would be taking its troops out at that time.
One problem noted by governance experts is that the role of the elected provincial councils is
unclear. The elections for the provincial councils in all 34 provinces were held on August 20,
2009, concurrent with the presidential elections. The previous provincial council elections were
held concurrent with the parliamentary elections in September 2005. In most provinces, the
provincial councils do not act as true legislatures, and they are considered weak compared to the
power and influence of the provincial governors.
Still, the provincial councils play a major role in choosing the upper house of the National
Assembly (Meshrano Jirga); in the absence of district councils (no elections held or scheduled),
the provincial councils choose two-thirds of the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga. The councils elected in
August 2009 will likely select new Meshrano Jirga representatives after the lower house elections
planned for 2010.
No elections for district councils have been held due to boundary and logistical difficulties.
However, in his November 19 inaugural speech, Karzai said the goal of the government is to hold
these elections along with the 2010 parliamentary elections. He also pledged that “mayoral”
elections would be held “for the purpose of better city management.”
Security Benefits of Local Governance Programs
The IDLG is also the chief implementer of the “Social Outreach Program” which provides
financial support (about $125—200 per month) and other benefits to tribal and local leaders in
exchange for their cooperation with U.S./NATO led forces against the Taliban insurgency. The
civilian aspects of the program are funded partly by USAID.
A more widely debated security aspect of the program is the Afghan Public Protection Program, a
pilot project to set up tribally based security organs at the local level. Afghan officials say it is not
a resurrection of the traditional tribal militias (“arbokai”) that provided local security—and often
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clashed with each other—before and during Afghanistan’s recent wars, but that the local forces
formed under the program are under the authority of the Interior Ministry. More information on
this program is provided in CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Overall Human Rights Issues
The Obama Administration strategy review announcement did not specifically delineate a new
U.S. policy on Afghanistan’s human rights practices, although this issue could be deemed
addressed implicitly by the Administration’s statement that policy is intended to make the Afghan
government more “accountable.” On human rights issues, the overall State Department judgment
is that the country’s human rights record remains poor, according to the Department’s report for
2008 (issued February 25, 2009). The security forces, and local faction leaders, are widely cited
for abuses and corruption, including torture and abuse of detainees. In October 2007, Afghanistan
resumed enforcing the death penalty after a four-year moratorium, executing 15 criminals.
There has been some backsliding in recent years on media freedoms, which were hailed during
2002-2008 as a major benefit of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. A press law was passed in
September 2008 that gives some independence to the official media outlet, but also contains a
number of content restrictions, and requires that new newspapers and electronic media be
licensed by the government. Prior to the new law, Afghanistan’s conservative Council of Ulema
(Islamic scholars) has been ascendant. With the Council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of
Information and Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that they are
too risque, although the programs were restored in August 2008 under a compromise that also
brought in some Islamic-oriented programs from Turkey. At the same time, there has been a
growing number of arrests or intimidation of journalists who criticize the central government or
local leaders.
On the other hand, freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the Taliban with
their elections to the parliament, their service at many levels of government, including a
governorship (Bamiyan Province), and their growing presence in the judiciary (67 female judges),
the press, and the private sector. Wearing the burqa (head-to-toe covering) is no longer required
but many women still wear it. Alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores,
although it is not banned.
Religious Freedom
The October 2009 International Religious Freedom report (released October 26, 2009) says the
Afghan government took limited steps during the year to increase religious freedom, but that
“serious problems remain.” Members of minority religions, including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus,
and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to be a form
of blasphemy in May 2007. Northeastern provinces have a substantial population of Islamailis, a
Shiite Muslim sect often called “Seveners” (believers in the Seventh Imam as the true Imam).
Many Ismailis follow the Agha Khan IV (Prince Qarim al-Husseini), who chairs the large Agha
Khan Foundation that has invested heavily in Afghanistan.
One major case incurring international criticism has been the January 2008 death sentence,
imposed in a quick trial, against 23-year-old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing
material critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20
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years in prison, a judgment upheld by another court in March 2009. He was pardoned by Karzai
and released on September 7, 2009.
A positive development is that Afghanistan’s Shiite minority, mostly from the Hazara tribes of
central Afghanistan (Bamiyan and Dai Kundi provinces) can celebrate their holidays openly, a
development unknown before the fall of the Taliban. Some Afghan Shiites follow Iran’s clerical
leaders politically, but Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. The Minister of Justice is a Shiite, the first of that sect to hold that post.
There was unrest among some Shiite leaders in late May 2009 when they learned that the Afghan
government had dumped 2,000 Iranian-supplied religious texts into a river when an Afghan
official complained that the books insulted the Sunni majority.
A previous religious freedom case earned congressional attention in March 2006. An Afghan
man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working for a
Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a potential death penalty trial for
apostasy—his refusal to convert back to Islam. Facing international pressure, Karzai prevailed on
Kabul court authorities to release him (March 29, 2006). His release came the same day the
House passed H.Res. 736 calling on protections for Afghan converts.
Human Trafficking
Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2 in the State Department report on human trafficking
issued in June 2009 (Trafficking in Persons Report for 2009, released June 15, 2009). The
government is assessed as not complying with minimum standards for eliminating trafficking, but
making significant efforts to do so. The says that women (reportedly from China and Central
Asia) are being trafficked into Afghanistan for sexual exploitation. Other reports say some are
brought to work in night clubs purportedly frequented by members of many international NGOs.
In an effort to also increase protections for Afghan women, in August 2008 the Interior Ministry
announced a crackdown on sexual assault—an effort to publicly air a taboo subject. The United
States has spent about $500,000 to eliminate human trafficking in Afghanistan since FY2001.
Advancement of Women
According to the State Department human rights report for 2008, the Afghan government is
promoting the advancement of women, but numerous abuses, such as denial of educational and
employment opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. A
major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the formation of a Ministry of Women’s
Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights, although numerous accounts say the ministry’s
influence is limited. It promotes the involvement of women in business ventures, and it plays a
key role in trying to protect women from domestic abuse by running a growing number of
women’s shelters across Afghanistan. Many women continue to wear the head-to-toe burqa
covering, even though wearing it has not been required since the Taliban government was ousted.
The Afghan government tried to accommodate Shiite leaders’ demands in 2009 by enacting
(passage by the National Assembly and signature by Karzai in March 2009) a “Shiite Personal
Status Law,” at the request of Shiite leaders. The law was intended to provide a legal framework
for members of the Shiite minority in family law issues. However, the issue turned controversial
when international human rights groups and governments—and Afghan women in a
demonstration in Kabul—complained about provisions that would appear to sanction marital rape
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and which would allow males to control the ability of females in their family to go outside the
home. President Obama publicly called these provisions “abhorrent.” In early April 2009, taking
into account the outcry, Karzai sent the law back to the Justice Ministry for review, saying it
would be altered if it were found to conflict with the Afghan constitution. On April 19, 2009,
Karzai said on CNN that his government’s review of specific provisions of the law, which was
long and highly detailed, had been inadequate, and Karzai reiterated during his U.S. visit in May
2009 that the controversial provisions would be removed.
The offending clauses were substantially revised by the Justice Ministry in July 2009, requiring
that wives “perform housework,” but also apparently giving the husband the right to deny a wife
food if she refuses sex. The revised law was passed by the National Assembly in late July 2009,
signed by Karzai, and published in the official gazette on July 27, 2009, although it remains
unsatisfactory to many human rights and women’s rights groups.
In September 2009, perhaps in an effort to address some of the criticisms of the Shiite law, the
Afghan government adopted a draft “Elimination of Violence Against Women” bill. Minister of
Women’s Affairs Ghazanfar told CRS in October 2009 that the bill was long contemplated and
not related to the Shiite status law.14 It awaits final passage by the National Assembly.
Three female ministers were in the 2004-2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda
Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa Balkhi (Minister for Martyrs and the Disabled), and
Amina Afzali (Minister of Youth). Karzai nominated Soraya Sobhrang as Minister of Women’s
Affairs in the 2006 cabinet, but she was voted down by Islamist conservatives in parliament. He
eventually appointed another female, Husn Banu Ghazanfar, as Minister; she is the only woman
in the cabinet at this time. In March 2005, Karzai appointed a former Minister of Women’s
Affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras. (She
hosted then First Lady Laura Bush in Bamiyan in June 2008.)
The constitution reserves for women at least 17 of the 102 seats in the upper house and 62 of the
249 seats in the lower house of parliament. There are 68 women in the lower house, meaning 6
were elected without the quota. There are 23 serving in the upper house, 6 more than Karzai’s
mandated bloc of 17 female appointees. There are also 121 women holding seats in the 420
provincial council seats nationwide, 3 fewer than the 124 that are the election law goals for the
number of females on these councils. Two women ran for president for the August 20 election,
2009, as discussed below, although preliminary results show each receiving less than ½ of 1%.
Some NGOs and other groups believe that the women elected by the quota system are not viewed
as equally legitimate parliamentarians.
More generally, women are performing jobs that were rarely held by women even before the
Taliban came to power in 1996, including in the new police force. There are 67 female judges and
447 female journalists working nationwide. The most senior Afghan woman in the police force
was assassinated in Qandahar in September 2008. Press reports say Afghan women are
increasingly learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body
covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it than was the
case a few years ago. On the other hand, women’s advancement has made women a target of
attacks by Taliban supporters or highly conservative Afghans. Attacks on girls’ schools and
14 CRS meeting with the Minister of Women’s Affairs. October 13, 2009.
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athletic facilities have increased in the most restive areas. On November 12, 2008, suspected
Taliban sprayed acid on the faces of several schoolgirls in Qandahar.
U.S. officials have had some influence in persuading the government to codify women’s rights.
After the Karzai government took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set
up a U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women.
According to the State Department, the United States has implemented several hundred projects
directly in support of Afghan women, including women’s empowerment, maternal and child
health and nutrition, funding the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and micro-finance projects. Some
donors, particularly those of Canada, have financed specific projects for Afghan women farmers.
The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per
year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Those monies are donated to the
Ministry from Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts controlled by USAID. S. 229, the
Afghan Women Empowerment Act of 2009, introduced in the 111th Congress, would authorize
$45 million per year in FY2010-FY2012 for grants to Afghan women, for the ministry of
Women’s Affairs ($5 million), and for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission ($10
million).
Democracy, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues
U.S. funding for democracy, governance, and rule of law programs is expected to grow
dramatically in line with the Obama Administration strategy for Afghanistan. During FY2002-
2008, a total of $1.8 billion was spent on democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights,
and elections support. Of these, by far the largest category was “good governance,” which, in
large part, are grant awards to provinces that make progress against narcotics.
The following is to be spent in FY2009.
• $881 million for all of democracy and governance, including:
• $283 million for good governance.
• $150 million for National Solidarity Program and direct budget support to
Afghan government.
• $174 million for election support.
• $50 million for strategic program development.
• $212 million for rule of law, funded by both USAID and State Dept. Bureau
of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).
Requested for FY2010.
• $801 million for all democracy and governance, including:
• $191 million for good governance.
• $200 million for National Solidarity Program and direct budget support to
Afghan government.
• $90 million for election support.
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• $100 million for strategic program development.
• $210 million for rule of law (USAID and INCLE).
The election support funds are being used for the election process itself as well as for voter
registration and education and election security support functions. The total cost of the Afghan
elections in 2009 were about $300 million, with other international donors contributing funds to
close the gap left by the U.S. contribution.
A substantial amount of the “good governance” funds go to support the IDLG and to fund the
Social Outreach Program and a separate “Governor’s Performance Fund.” about $95 million is
going to the IDLG to help it construct new district centers and rehabilitate fifty provincial and
district offices. For comprehensive tables on U.S. aid to Afghanistan, by fiscal year and by
category and type of aid, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
2009 Elections
As noted throughout, the 2009 presidential and provincial elections were viewed as a major step
in Afghanistan’s political development—they were the first post-Taliban elections that were run
by the Afghan government itself. Special Representative Ambassador Richard Holbrooke said at a
public forum on August 12, 2009, that the elections were key to legitimizing the Afghan
government, no matter who wins. Yet, because of the widespread fraud identified by
Afghanistan’s U.N.-appointed “Elections Complaints Commission” in the first round of the
elections, the process did not produce a fully legitimate government and might still set off some
violence between some of Afghanistan’s different ethnicities. Such inter-ethnic violence would
only compound the difficulty experienced by the United States and its international partners in
maintaining security in Afghanistan. The marred elections process was a major factor in a
September-November 2009 high-level U.S. strategy reevaluation because of the centrality of a
credible, legitimate partner Afghan government to U.S. strategy. 15
Dispute over the Election Date
Problems with the election began in late 2008 when Afghan leaders first disputed then resolved
the issue of the date of the election. On February 3, 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent Election
Commission (IEC) set August 20, 2009, as the election date (a change from a date mandated by
Article 61 of the Constitution as April 21, 2009) in order to allow at least 30 days before Karzai’s
term expires on May 22, 2009. The IEC decision on the latter date cited Article 33 of the
Constitution as mandating universal accessibility to the voting—and saying that the April 21 date
was precluded by difficulties in registering voters, printing ballots, training staff, advertising the
elections, and the dependence on international donor funding, in addition to the security
questions.16 This decision caused the UF bloc to say it would not “recognize” Karzai’s presidency
after May 22.
15 Fidler, Stephen and John W. Miller. “U.S. Allies Await Afghan Review.” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2009.
16 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat. February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
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In response to the UF criticism that he sought to prolong his term and use his incumbency to his
advantage, Karzai issued a February 28, 2009, decree directing the IEC to set the elections in
accordance with all provisions of the constitution. The IEC reaffirmed on March 4, 2009, that the
election would be held on August 20, 2009.
Karzai’s maneuvers and the official decision did not stop the UF from insisting that Karzai step
down on May 22 in favor of a caretaker government. Karzai argued that the Constitution does not
provide for any transfer of power other than in case of election or death of a President. The
Afghan Supreme Court backed that decision on March 28, 2009, and the Obama Administration
publicly backed both the IEC and the Supreme Court rulings.
Election Modalities and Processes
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public
appeared to be high in the run-up to the election. Registration, which updated 2005 voter rolls,
began in October 2008 and was completed as of the beginning of March 2009. About 4.5 million
new voters registered, and about 17 million total Afghans were registered. However, there were
widespread reports of registration fraud, with some voters registering on behalf of women who do
not, by custom, show up at registration sites. U.S. and other election observers found instances of
fraudulent registration cards and evidence that cards had been offered for sale. U.S./NATO
military operations in some areas, including in Helmand in January 2009, were conducted to
secure registration centers; however, some election observers noted that there was insufficient
international assistance to the IEC, which ran the election, to ensure a clean registration process.
With the August 20 date set, candidates filed to run during April 24-May 8, 2009. A total of 44
registered to run for President, of which three were disqualified for various reasons, leaving a
field of 41 (later reduced to 32 after several dropped out).
In the provincial elections, 3,200 persons competed for 420 seats nationwide. Those elections
were conducted on a “Single Non-Transferable Vote” (SNTV) system, in which each voter votes
for one candidate in a multi-member constituency. That system encourages many candidacies and
is considered to discourage the participation of political parties. Although about 80% of the
provincial council candidates ran as independents, some of Afghanistan’s parties, including Hezb-
i-Islam, which is a prominent grouping in the National Assembly, fielded multiple candidates in
several different provinces. Still, the provincial elections component of the election received little
attention, in part because the role of these councils is unclear. Of the seats up for election, about
200 women competed for the 124 seats reserved for women (29%) on the provincial councils,
although in two provinces (Qandahar and Uruzgan) there were fewer women candidates than
reserved seats. In Kabul Province, 524 candidates were competing for the 29 seats on its
provincial council.
As noted, the elections were run by the IEC—as such, it was the first election that is run by the
Afghans since the late 1960s. There were assertions of a lack of credibility of the IEC, because
most of its commissioners were selected by the Karzai government. There was also a U.N.-
appointed Elections Complaints Commission (ECC) that reviewed the numerous fraud
complaints—about 2,800 complaints filed of which 750 were deemed to have had a potential
material effect on the election, according to the ECC website. The body is headed by a Canadian,
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Grant Kippen. There are two other foreign nationals, and two Afghans on the ECC governing
council.17
The European Union, supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) sent a few hundred observers, and the International Republican Institute and National
Democratic Institute sent observers as well. About 8,000 Afghans assisted the observation
missions, according to the U.N. Nations Development Program. Because much of Afghanistan is
inaccessible by road, ballots were distributed (and were brought for counting) by animals in
addition to vehicles and fixed and rotary aircraft.
Security has been a major issue for all the international actors supporting the Afghan elections
process, amid open Taliban threats against Afghans who vote. In the first round, about 7,000
polling centers were to be established (with each center having multiple polling places, totaling
about 29,000), but, of those, about 800 were deemed too unsafe to open, most of them in restive
Helmand and Qandahar provinces. A total of about 6,200 polling centers opened on election day.
Still, the Taliban intimidation and voter apathy appears to have suppressed the total turnout to
about 5.8 million votes cast, or about a 35% turnout, far lower than expected. Turnout was said by
observers and U.S. and other military personnel based there to have been very low in Helmand
Province, despite the fact that Helmand was the focus of a U.S. military-led stabilization
offensive that began July 2, 2009, with the participation of about 8,000 U.S. Marines.
Some observers said that turnout among women nationwide was primarily because there were not
sufficient numbers of female poll workers recruited by the IEC to make women feel comfortable
enough to vote. In general, however, election observers reported that poll workers were generally
attentive and well trained, and the voting process appeared orderly.
In normally secure Kabul, turnout was said to be far lighter than in the 2004 presidential election.
Turnout might have been dampened by a suicide bombing on August 15, 2009, outside
NATO/ISAF military headquarters and intended to intimidate voters not to participate. In
addition, several dozen provincial council candidates, and some workers on the presidential
campaigns, were killed in election-related violence. A convoy carrying Fahim (Karzai Vice
Presidential running mate, see below) was bombed, although Fahim was unharmed.
The Political Contest
The presidential competition took shape in May 2009. In the election-related political deal-
making,18 Karzai obtained an agreement from Muhammad Fahim (a Tajik), formerly his
antagonist and a UF member, to run as his first vice presidential running mate. Karzai, Fahim,
and incumbent second Vice President Karim Khalili (a Hazara) registered their ticket on May 4,
2009, just before Karzai left to visit the United States for the latest round of three-way strategic
talks (U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan). The Fahim choice was criticized by human rights and other
groups because of Fahim’s long identity as a mujahedin commander/militia faction leader, but the
selection, and Fahim’s acceptance, was viewed as a major political coup for Karzai by splitting
off a major figure from the UF bloc. A New York Times story of August 27, 2009, said that the
Bush Administration continued to deal with Fahim when he was Defense Minister (2001-2004)
17 ECC website: http://www.ecc.org.af/en/.
18 Some of the information in this section obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide. December
2008.
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despite reports that he was involved in facilitating narcotics trafficking in northern Afghanistan.
These reports could complicate U.S. relations with Fahim—to the point of rendering him
ineligible for travel to the United States—if he becomes Vice President.
Karzai convinced several prominent Pashtuns not to run. Ghul Agha Shirzai, a member of the
powerful Barakzai clan, reportedly reached an arrangement with Karzai the week of the
registration period that headed off his candidacy. Anwar al-Haq Ahady, the former Finance
Minister and Central Bank governor, did not run. Nor did Bush Administration U.S. Ambassador
to the U.N., Afghan-born Zalmay Khalilzad run; he organized a conference of Karzai opponents
in Dubai in early March 2009 and was, up until the last minute, said to be trying to build support
for a candidacy or to unify anti-Karzai factions.
Anti-Karzai Pashtuns did not succeed in coalescing around one challenger. Former Interior
Minister Ali Jalali (who resigned in 2005 over Karzai’s compromises with faction leaders), and
former Finance Minister (2002-2004) and Karzai critic Ashraf Ghani did not reach agreement to
forge a single ticket. In the end, Ghani, the 54-year-old former World Bank official, registered his
candidacy, but without Jalali or prominent representation from other ethnicities in his vice
presidential slots.
As noted above, the UF also failed to forge a united challenge to Karzai. Burhanuddin Rabbani
(Afghanistan president during 1992-1996), the elder statesman of the UF bloc, reportedly insisted
that an ethnic Tajik (the ethnic core of the UF) head the UF ticket. Former Foreign Minister Dr.
Abdullah Abdullah, the 50-year-old former opthalmologist and foreign envoy of the legendary
Tajik mujahedin leader Ahmad Shah Masoud, registered to run with UF backing. His running
mates are Dr. Cheragh Ali Cheragh, a Hazara who did poorly in the 2004 election, and a little
known Pashtun, Homayoun Wasefi. Reports in May 2009 that Ghani and Abdullah might
ultimately forge a joint ticket were not realized. Another problem for the UF was that Ahmad Zia
Massoud (currently one of Karzai’s Vice Presidents) did not win support of the bloc to head its
ticket. Massoud is the brother of Ahmad Shah Masoud (see above), who was killed purportedly
by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks on the United States, and Ahmad Zia has
support among followers of his slain brother.
The Campaign
Karzai went into the election as a clear favorite. However, the key questions was whether he
would win in the first round (more than 50% of the vote). IRI and other preelection polls showed
him with about 45% support. Dr. Abdullah polled about 25% and emerged as the main challenger.
The conventional wisdom has always been that the two-round format favors a Pashtun candidate.
Although Karzai’s public support was harmed by perceptions of ineffectiveness and corruption,
although many Afghan voters apparently see many of Afghanistan’s problems as beyond Karzai’s
control. He used some U.S. policy setbacks to bolster his electoral prospects, for example by
railing against civilian casualties resulting from U.S./NATO operations, and by proposing new
curbs on international military operations in Afghanistan. During the campaign, Karzai
announced new measures to limit international forces’ operations in civilian areas and said he
would hold a loya jirga, if elected, including Taliban figures, to try to reach a settlement with the
insurgency. He restated that intent in his November 19, 2009, inaugural speech.
Karzai was criticized for a campaign that relied on personal ties to ethnic faction leaders rather
than a retail campaign based on public appearances. Karzai agreed to public debates with rivals,
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although he backed out of a scheduled July 23 debate with Abdullah and Ghani on the grounds
that the event was scheduled on short notice and was limited to only those three. Abdullah and
Ghani debated without Karzai, generating additional criticism of Karzai. Karzai did attend the
next debate on August 16, debating Ghani and Bashardost, but Abdullah did not participate. There
was also a radio forum in which all major candidates participated. Karzai was said to benefit from
his ready access to media attention, which focuses on his daily schedule as President, including
meetings with foreign leaders.
Dr. Abdullah stressed his background of mixed ethnicity (one parent is Pashtun and one is Tajik)
to appeal to Pashtuns, but his experience and background has been with other Tajik leaders and he
campaigned extensively in the north and west, which are populated mainly by Tajiks. However,
he also campaigned in Qandahar, in Pashtun heartland. Both Karzai and Abdullah held large
rallies in Kabul and elsewhere.
Ghani polled at about 6% just before the election, according to surveys. This indicated he might
not win enough Pashtun votes to suppress Karzai’s total in that community. Ghani appeared
frequently in U.S. and Afghan media broadcasts criticizing Karzai for failing to establish
democratic and effective institutions, but he has previously spent much time in the United States
and Europe and many average Afghans view him as a global technocrat who is not necessarily in
touch with day-to-day problems in Afghanistan. Ghani made extensive use of the Internet for
advertising and fundraising, and he hired political consultant James Carville to advise his
campaign.19 He emphasized new programs for women in the August 16 debate. He accepted his
loss and attended Karzai’s November 19, 2009, inauguration, indicating that Ghani, or his allies
and ideas, might be included in a new cabinet to be named in December.
Another candidate who polled unexpectedly well was 54-year-old anti-corruption parliamentarian
Ramazan Bashardost, an ethnic Hazara. He was polling close to 10% just before the election. He
ran a low-budget campaign with low-paid personnel and volunteers, but attracted a lot of media.
This suggests that, despite most Hazara ethnic leaders, such as Mohammad Mohaqiq, endorsing
Karzai, Bashardost would do well among Hazaras, particularly those who are the most educated.
Some believe the Shiite personal status law, discussed above, was an effort by Karzai to win
Hazara Shiite votes. According to the preliminary results, Bashardost carried several Hazara
provinces, including Ghazni and Dai Kondi, but Mohaqiq’s backing apparently helped Karzai
carry the Hazara heartland of Bamiyan province. Other significant candidates are shown in the
box below.
19 Mulrine, Anna. “Afghan Presidential Candidate Takes a Page From Obama’s Playbook.” U.S. News and World
Report, June 25, 2009.
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Other Candidates
Abd al-Salam Rocketi ("Mullah Rocketi”). A Pashtun, reconciled Taliban figure, member of the lower house of
parliament. Was expected to well if Taliban sympathizers participated, but received less than 1% (preliminary totals),
putting him in 9th place out of 32.
Hedayat Amin Arsala. A Pashtun, was a Vice President during 2001-2004. He is a prominent economist and
perceived as close to the former royal family. Finished 30th out of 32.
Abd al Jabbar Sabit. A Pashtun, was fired by Karzai in 2007 for considering run against Karzai in the election.
Finished in 19th place.
Shahnawaz Tanai. A Pashtun. Served as Defense Minister in the Communist government of Najibullah (which was
left in place after the Soviets withdrew in 1989) but led failed coup against Najibullah in April 1990. Finished an
unexpectedly strong 6th place, and did well in several Pashtun provinces.
Mirwais Yasini. Another strong Pashtun candidate, was viewed as a dark horse possible winner. 48-year-old deputy
speaker of the lower house of parliament but also without wel -known non-Pashtun running mates. Finished in fifth
place.
Frozan Fana and Shahla Ata. The two women candidates in the race. Fana is the wife of the first post-Taliban
aviation minister, who was killed during an altercation at Kabul airport in 2002. These two candidates are widely given
almost no chance of winning, but attracted substantial media attention as trail-blazers. Fana finished 7th, but Ata
finished in 14th place.
The Election Results and Prospects
As noted, the voting process was relatively orderly on August 20, election day. However, 27
Afghans, mostly security forces personnel, were killed in election-day violence. Taliban fighters
reportedly fired mortars and other weapons, particularly in Helmand, to suppress turnout. Those
efforts, as noted, appeared to keep turnout to about 35%.
Clouding the election substantially were the widespread fraud allegations coming from all sides.
Dr. Abdullah held several news conferences after the election, purporting to show evidence of
ballot stuffing in favor of Karzai, and he accused the Karzai camp of systematic election fraud.
Karzai’s camp has made similar allegations against Abdullah as applied to his presumed
strongholds in northern Afghanistan. The ECC, in statements, stated its belief that there was
substantial fraud likely committed, and mostly by Karzai supporters. However, the low turnout in
the presumed Karzai strongholds in southern Afghanistan led Karzai and many Pashtuns to
question the election’s fairness as well, on the grounds that Pashtuns were intimidated from
voting in greater proportions than were Afghans in more secure areas.
The IEC released vote results slowly. Preliminary results were to be announced by September 3,
but the final, uncertified total was released on September 16, 2009, showing Karzai at 54.6% and
Dr. Abdullah at 27.7%. Bashardost and Ghani received single-digit vote counts (9% and 3%
respectively), with trace amounts for the remainder of the field.
On September 8, 2009, the ECC ordered a recount of 10% of polling stations (accounting for as
many as 25% total votes) as part of its investigations of fraud. Polling stations were considered
“suspect” if: the total number of votes exceeded 600, which was the maximum number allotted to
each polling station; or, where any candidate received 95% or more of the total valid votes cast at
that station (assuming more than 100 votes were cast there.) However, perhaps reflecting political
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sensitivities, the recount will consist of a sampling of actual votes, and not a recount of each
actual vote from those polling stations. 20
After a two week complaints evaluation period, final, certified results were to be announced
September 17. The constitution requires that a second-round runoff, if needed, be held two weeks
after the results of the first round are certified. Throughout the investigation period (September
16-October 20), the ECC said it was not “in a rush” to complete its investigations and certify
results. A dispute within the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) over how
vigorously to press for investigation of the fraud led to the September 29, 2009, dismissal by
Secretary General Ban Ki Moon of UNAMA deputy head Peter Galbraith. He had accused
UNAMA head Kai Eide of soft-pedaling on the fraud charges and siding with Karzai.
Vote Certified/Runoff Mandated
On October 20, 2009, the ECC determined, based on its investigation, that about 1 million Karzai
votes, and about 200,000 Abdullah votes, were considered fraudulent and were deducted from
their totals. The final, certified, results of the first round were as follows: Karzai—49.67%
(according to the IEC; with a slightly lower total of about 48% according to the ECC
determination); Abdullah—30.59%; Bashardost—10.46%; Ghani—2.94%, Yasini—1.03%, and
lower figures for the remaining field.21
During October 16-20, 2009, U.S. and international officials, including visiting Senator John
Kerry, met repeatedly with Karzai to attempt to persuade him to acknowledge that his vote total
did not legitimately exceed the 50%+ threshold to claim a first-round victory. On October 21,
2009, the IEC accepted the ECC findings and Karzai conceded the need for a runoff election. A
date was set as November 7, 2009. Abdullah initially accepted as well. President Obama praised
Karzai’s decision to accept the runoff as in the “best interests of the Afghan people,” even though
Karzai’s decision appeared to be a result of substantial international pressure on him.
In an attempt to produce a clean second round, UNAMA ordered about 200 district-level election
commissioners replaced. In addition, it recommended there be fewer polling stations—about
5,800, compared to 6,200 previously—to eliminate polling stations where very few votes are
expected to be cast. Security procedures were to be similar to those of the first round.
Campaigning began October 24 and was to conclude by November 5. Still, there were concerns
that some voters may be disenfranchised because snow had set in in some locations. Insurgents
were expected to resume their campaign to intimidate voters from casting ballots. Turnout was
expected to be lighter in the second round, with many Afghans purportedly questioning the
expense and risk of a second round that Secretary of State Clinton said on October 14 was likely
to produce a Karzai victory.
During October 21-November 1, no major faction leader had switched support of either
candidate, making it difficult to envision an Abdullah victory. Dr. Abdullah told CRS at a meeting
in Kabul on October 15, 2009, that he might be willing to negotiate with Karzai on a “Joint
Program” of reforms—such as direct election of governors and reduced presidential powers—to
avoid a runoff. Abdullah told CRS he himself would not be willing to enter the cabinet, although
presumably such a deal would involve his allies doing so. However, some say the constitution
20 “Afghan Panel to Use Sampling in Recount.” USA Today, September 22, 2009.
21 See IEC website for final certified tallies. http://www.iec.org.af/results.
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does not provide for a negotiated settlement and that the runoff must proceed. Others say that a
deal between the two, in which Abdullah dropped his candidacy, could lead the third-place
finisher, Ramazan Bashardost, to assert that he must face Karzai in a runoff. Still others say the
issue could be resolved by Afghanistan’s Supreme Court if constitutional issues arise.
If a second round had proved equally flawed, it is possible that a loya jirga could have been
called to determine who would lead Afghanistan for the next five years. As the favorite in a two-
man race, Karzai presumably had an interest in avoiding this outcome because a loya jirga could
conceivably select a new figure as Afghanistan’s next president.
Election Conclusion
The various pre-runoff scenarios were mooted on November 1, 2009, when Dr. Abdullah,
addressing hundreds of supporters at Kabul University, said he would not compete in the runoff.
He asserted that the problems that plagued the first round would not be prevented because Karzai,
in negotiations during October 2009, was refusing to replace the IEC head, Azizullah Ludin, to
fire several Cabinet ministers purportedly campaigning for Karzai, or to address several other
election-related complaints. The IEC, for example, said in late October that it would not follow
the UNAMA recommendation to reduce the number of polling stations. Some believe Abdullah
pulled out because of his belief that he would not prevail in the second round.
On November 2, 2009, the IEC issued a statement saying that, by consensus, the body had
determined that Karzai, being the only candidate remaining in a two-person runoff, should be
declared the winner and the second round not held. The United States, U.N. Secretary General
Ban Ki Moon (visiting Kabul), and several governments congratulated Karzai on the victory. U.S.
officials, including Secretary of State Clinton, praised Dr. Abdullah for his relatively moderate
speech announcing his pullout, in particular his refusal to call for demonstrations or violence by
his supporters, and calling on him to remain involved in Afghan politics. Dr. Abdullah denied that
his pullout was part of any “deal” with Karzai for a role for his supporters in the next
government. U.S. and international officials publicly called on Karzai to choose his next cabinet
based on competence, merit, and dedication to curbing corruption.
U.S. Policy and Interests in the Election
Although the election issue has concluded, a major U.S. Administration concern was not
resolved—that the election would not produce a fully legitimate government. The day after the
first round of the election, President Obama called the election “an important step forward in the
Afghan people’s effort to take control of their future, even as violent extremists stand in their
way.” Some believe the statement might have been too optimistic, coming before the fraud
allegations that were revealed in subsequent days. U.S. officials expressed clear U.S. neutrality
vis-à-vis the election; Ambassador Timothy Carney was appointed to head the U.S. election
support effort at U.S. Embassy Kabul, tasked to ensure that the United States was even-handed.
In articulating its position on the vote count, complaint period, and possibility of a second round,
Obama Administration officials expressed the view that the United States was looking for a
legitimate result in line with Afghanistan’s constitution. That the complaint process played out
and Karzai accepted a runoff at least partly satisfied that interest. However, others believe the
difficult election has complicated Administration efforts to build U.S. and international support
for another force build-up. As a result, it is possible that the Obama Administration will link at
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least part of any new build-up to concrete achievements by the Karzai government in addressing
its key weaknesses.
Well before the Abdullah pullout, U.S. and international officials were leaning toward the view
that Karzai will continue as President, whether or not there is a runoff. That view was expressed
at a “Friends of Afghanistan” meeting of major donors to Afghanistan, held on September 27,
2009, on the margins of U.N.-related meetings in New York.22
There are lingering fears that Dr. Abdullah’s supporters perceive themselves as disenfranchised
and could withdraw their cooperation with U.S. and other forces in Afghanistan or even engage in
ethnic conflict against Pashtuns, causing the U.S. effort in Afghanistan to unravel. These concerns
are prevalent as U.S. strategy is being reevaluated by President Obama and his advisers during
September-November 2009, based on a battlefield assessment by top commander in Afghanistan
General Stanley McChrystal that argues for additional U.S. resources. The legitimacy of the
Afghan partner of the United States has been a factor in the Administration’s consideration of the
McChrystal report, 23 which recommends pursuing a classic counterinsurgency strategy which,
first and foremost, seeks to protect the Afghan population. If there is no legitimate Afghan partner
available, then some might argue that McChrystal’s recommended strategy might not succeed
because U.S. forces are not able, in and of themselves, to reform the Afghan government.
22 Cooper, Helene. “Obama Administration Says It Believes Karzai Will Be Reelected in Afghanistan.” New York
Times, September 28, 2009.
23 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at: http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?.
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Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim Administration
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key
security positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai
reaffirmed as leader by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional
Afghan assembly).
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong
presidency, a rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance
presidential power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men
and women equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are
not “un-Islamic”; allows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter
7, Article 15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential,
provincial, and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-
hereditary position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for 5-year term, held Oct. 9, 2004.
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia
Masud, a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud,
who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the Sept. 11 attacks, and Karim
Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter,
Northern Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female
ran, got about 1%. Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq got 11.7%; and Dostam won
10%. Funded with $90 million in international aid, including $40 million from U.S.
(FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106).
Parliamentary Elections
Elections held Sept. 18, 2005, on Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
stood as individuals, not part of party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower
house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house
(Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). Voting was for one candidate only, although
number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to
33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11
seats each. The body is 28% female (68 persons), in line with the legal minimum of 68
women - two per each of the 34 provinces. Upper house appointed by Karzai (34
seats, half of which are to be women), by the provincial councils (34 seats), and
district councils (remaining 34 seats). There are 23 women in it, above the 17
required by the constitution. Because district elections (400 district councils) were
not held, provincial councils selected 68 on interim basis. 2,815 candidates for
Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5
million registered. Funded by $160 million in international aid, including $45 million
from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 109-13).
Provincial Elections/
Provincial elections held Sept. 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections.
District Elections
Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial
council sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats
are 420, of which 121 held by women. l3,185 candidates, including 279 women. Some
criticize the provincial election system as disproportionately weighted toward large
districts within each province. District elections not held due to complexity and
potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Cabinet
Full-term 27 seat cabinet named by Karzai in December 2004. Heavily weighted
toward Pashtuns, and created new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. Rahim Wardak
named Defense Minister, replacing Northern Alliance military leader Mohammad
Fahim. Qanooni not in cabinet, subsequently was selected Wolesi Jirga Speaker.
Northern Alliance figure Dr. Abdullah replaced as Foreign Minister in March 2006.
Cabinet reshuffle in October 2008 including appointment of Muhammad Hanif Atmar
as Interior Minister.
Presidential and Provincial
Presidential and provincial elections were held Aug. 20, 2009, but required a runoff
Elections
because no candidate received over 50% in certified results issued October 20.
Second round not held because chal enger, Dr. Abdul ah, pulled out o a second-
round runoff vote. Each election costs about $300 million.
Parliamentary, District, and
To take place in 2010.
Municipal Elections
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Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations
Clan/Tribal
Location Example
Confederations
Durrani
Qandahar
Popalzai
Qandahar
Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan; Jelani Popal,
head of the Independent Directorate of Local
Governance
Alikozai Qandahar
N/A
Barakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Ghul Agha Shirzai (Governor, Nangarhar Province)
Achakzai Qandahar,
Helmand
Alizai
Helmand (Musa Qala district)
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh (former Helmand
governor)
Noorzai
Qandahar
Noorzai brothers, briefly in charge of Qandahar
after the fal of the Taliban in November 2001
Ghilzai
Paktia, Paktika and Khost
Mullah Omar
Ahmadzai
Paktia, Paktika, Khost
Mohammed Najibullah (pres. 1986-1992); Ashraf
Ghani, Finance
Finance Minister 2002-2004
Taraki
Nur Mohammed Taraki (leader 1978-1979)
Kharoti
Hafizullah Amin (leader September -
December1979)
Zadran
Paktia, Khost
Pacha Khan Zadran (see text); Insurgent leader
Jalaludin Haqqani
Kodai
Mangal
Paktia, Khost
Ghulab Mangal (Governor of Helmand Province)
Orkazai
Shinwari
Nangarhar province
Fasl Ahmed Shinwari, former Supreme Court Chief
Justice
Mandezai
Sangu Khel
Sipah
Wardak
Wardak Province
Abdul Rahim Wardak (Defense Minister)
(Pashtu-speaking
non-Pashtun)
Afridis
Tirah, Khyber Pass, Kohat
Zaka khel
Jawaki
Adam khel
Malikdin, etc
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Clan/Tribal
Location Example
Confederations
Yusufzais
Khursan, Swat, Kabul
Akozais
Malizais
Loezais
Khattaks
Kohat, Peshawar, Bangash
Akorai
Terai
Mohmands
Near Khazan, Peshawar
Baizai
Alimzai
Uthmanzais
Khawazais
Wazirs Mainly
in
Waziristan
Darwesh khel
Bannu
Source: This table was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.
Note: N/A indicates no example is available.
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Figure 1. Afghanistan Ethnic Groups
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Acknowledgments
The table of major Pashtun tribes was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.
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