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Status of the Copenhagen Climate Change
Negotiations
Jane A. Leggett
Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy
Richard K. Lattanzio
Analyst in Environmental Policy
November 30, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40910
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
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Status of the Copenhagen Climate Change Negotiations
Summary
The United States and almost 200 other countries are negotiating under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to address climate change cooperatively
beyond the year 2012. Parties agreed to complete the negotiations by the 15th meeting of the
Conference of the Parties (COP-15) from December 7-18, 2009, in Copenhagen. However, some
nations’ leaders have indicated that the Copenhagen outcome is likely to be a political agreement
providing a mandate for a later legally binding, comprehensive agreement.
The negotiations are intended to decide the next steps toward meeting the objective of the
UNFCCC, to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Most Parties conclude the
objective requires avoiding a 2oCelsius increase in global mean temperature and reducing global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 80%-95% by 2050. The UNFCCC principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities among Parties permeates debate about obligations of different
forms, levels of effort, and verifiability. Key disagreements remain among Parties:
• GHG mitigation: Some countries, including the United States, seek GHG
actions by all Parties; many developing countries argue that differentiation
should exclude them from quantified and verifiable GHG limitations. Many
vulnerable countries are alarmed that GHG targets proposed by wealthy countries
are inadequate to avoid 2oC of temperature increase and associated serious risks.
• Adaptation to climate change: Many countries, including the United States,
wish to use bilateral and existing international institutions, with incremental
financial assistance, targeted at the most vulnerable populations; many
developing countries seek a fully financed, systemic, and country-determined
effort to avoid damages of climate change, to which they have contributed little.
• Financial assistance to developing countries: Many wealthy countries,
including the United States, propose private sector mechanisms, such as GHG
trading, along with investment-friendly economies, as the main sources of
financing, with a minor share from public funds; many developing countries
argue for predictable flows of unconditioned public monies, with direct access to
an international fund under the authority of the Conference of the Parties.
• Technology: Many countries, including the United States, maintain that private
sector mechanisms are most effective at developing and deploying the needed
advanced technologies, enabled by balanced trade and intellectual property
protection; some countries seek new institutional arrangements and creative
mechanisms to share technologies to facilitate more effective technology transfer.
Negotiators face a complex array of proposals. Many delegations, including the United States,
approach Copenhagen with unresolved climate agendas at home. President Obama has announced
an intention to offer a “provisional” GHG target for the United States in the range of 17% below
2005 levels by 2020, ultimately to be brought “in line” with energy and climate legislation, if
passed. However, the U.S. delegation negotiates without clear signals as to what the Congress
would support. U.S. influence in the negotiations may also be impaired by having signed but not
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and by being almost $170 million in arrears in contributions to the
multilateral Global Environment Facility.
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Contents
Overview .................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 3
Two Tracks on the Way to Copenhagen: One Agreement or Two?................................................ 3
Key Topics Under Negotiation .................................................................................................... 5
A Shared Long-Term Vision to 2050 ..................................................................................... 5
Obligations to Mitigate GHG Emissions................................................................................ 6
Mid-Term Targets for GHG Reductions........................................................................... 6
Adapting to Impacts of Climate Change .............................................................................. 10
Financial Assistance to Low-income Countries.................................................................... 10
Amounts of Financing................................................................................................... 11
Public versus Private Financing..................................................................................... 12
Mechanisms for Financing ............................................................................................ 13
U.S. Positions on Financing .......................................................................................... 14
Technology Development and Transfer ............................................................................... 15
Enhancing Carbon Sequestration in Forests ......................................................................... 16
Measuring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) ................................................................... 17
Tables
Table 1. Summary of Proposals for GHG Reductions in 2020...................................................... 8
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 19
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Status of the Copenhagen Climate Change Negotiations
Overview
The United States and almost 200 other countries are negotiating under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to address climate change cooperatively1
beyond the year 2012. Parties agreed to complete those negotiations by the 15th meeting of the
Conference of the Parties (COP-15), held December 7-18, 2009, in Copenhagen. President
Obama and leaders of many other nations are attending, hoping to produce “a comprehensive and
operational accord.”2 Rather than a new treaty containing quantitative, legally binding GHG
obligations, some predict the outcome will be a political mandate for pursuit of a later, more
inclusive and enforceable agreement.
Pivotal discussions include:
• whether measurable commitments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
will include all major emitting countries and how deep reduction commitments
would be;
• whether countries will agree to transparency and accountability regarding their
commitments through robust measuring, reporting, and verification (MRV)
requirements;
• how much financing may be available for capacity building, GHG reductions,
avoiding deforestation and forest degradation, technology cooperation, and
adaptation to climate change in developing countries through private sector
mechanisms and public finance, and what institutions may oversee such flows;
• what means of technology cooperation would help to develop and deploy
advanced, low- or no-emitting technologies, as well as to assist adaptation to
climate impacts; and
• what mechanisms and resources would assist the most vulnerable countries to
adapt to projected climate change.
Negotiations had lagged through 2008. In December 2008, the then-incoming Obama
Administration stated its policy to reduce U.S. emissions to 14% below 2005 levels by 2020.
Optimism among many grew that the U.S. Congress would pass GHG control legislation before
the Copenhagen meeting, providing guidance to the executive branch negotiators regarding the
elements of a treaty that the Senate would ultimately consent to ratify.
The Obama 14% reduction policy and passage by the U.S. House of Representatives of H.R.
2454 (the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES), or the “Waxman-Markey” bill) have
led to reinvigorated hopes of some people that consensus among countries could be found by
December 2009 on a comprehensive Copenhagen agreement with quantified commitments. As
the Copenhagen meeting opened, the United States had formally offered neither a GHG target nor
specific amounts of financial assistance, although on the eve of the conference, the White House
announced that President Obama intends to offer a “provisional” GHG target for the United States
1 Parties to the negotiations are seeking international cooperation and workable cooperative mechanisms for the
purpose of addressing climate change. No proposals to create a “world government” are on the negotiating table.
2 White House, “Combating Climate Change at Home and Around the World,” November 25, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/11/25/combating-climate-change-home-and-around-world.
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of 17% below 2005 levels by 2020, ultimately to be brought “in line” with energy and climate
legislation, if passed.3 China also announced a voluntary, domestic goal of reducing its carbon
intensity (carbon dioxide emissions per unit of economic output) by 40%-45% below 2005 levels
by 2020, which could hold emissions approximately to current levels. Some stakeholders consider
that neither the U.S. target nor the Chinese goal is sufficiently aggressive. It also is unclear that
several major non-Annex I country emitters would agree within an international accord to
verifiable and significant GHG reduction commitments—which they have strongly resisted.
Smaller countries, concerned about the impacts of climate change on their welfare and
economies, and looking to the United States and other large, wealthy countries for leadership on
climate change, have become increasingly frustrated. Lack of strong political agreements has led
to recent demonstrations in as many as 4,500 locations in 170 countries.4 More are planned
during the Copenhagen meeting.
It has become increasingly uncertain whether it will be possible in Copenhagen to reach
comprehensive and detailed agreement to address climate change in the period beyond 2012,
when the Kyoto Protocol’s first period of GHG commitments expires (discussed in “Background”
below). Without a new detailed accord, alternative outcomes are possible. One alternative could
be a “framework” decision among high-level officials that spells out a plausible mandate for a
future treaty—an outline more likely than the current one to gain broad consensus among nations.
Another alternative could be a breakdown of negotiations. While all Parties may contribute to a
potential breakdown, many people would blame the United States. Resulting anger could spill
over into other international issues, influencing other U.S. foreign policy objectives.
The climate change issue has become politically significant internationally and domestically, with
major legislation to control greenhouse gases passed by the House (H.R. 2454) and under
development in the Senate (S. 1733 among others). Domestic legislation will interplay with any
commitments made internationally, and actions taken by other countries to address climate
change will likely have an impact on the United States.
Congress will decide whether the United States becomes a Party to any agreement. If the
President submits an agreement as a treaty, the Senate must give its consent to ratification for the
treaty to be legally binding on the United States. Alternatively, both chambers of Congress would
have to approve any agreement5 that the President submits before such agreement becomes
binding on the United States. Consequently, the U.S. Congress has taken an interest in what the
U.S. delegation may offer and oppose in Copenhagen. Members may also have interest in how
the United States and its allies handle diplomatic and public reactions coming out of the
Copenhagen meeting, whatever its outcome.
3 White House, ibid.
4 See, for example, Brad Knickerbocker, “The World Demonstrates Against Climate Change, But US Public Concern
Wanes,” Christian Science Monitor, October 24, 2009. http://features.csmonitor.com/politics/2009/10/24/the-world-
demonstrates-against-climate-change-but-us-public-concern-wanes/
5 For example, in the case of a Congressional-Executive agreement as proposed by several authors, including Nigel
Purvis, Paving the Way for U.S. Climate Leadership: The Case for Executive Agreements and Climate Protection
Authority, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 08-09, April 2008.
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Background
The UNFCCC was adopted in 1992 and has been ratified by 192 countries, including the United
States. Its objective is “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The
UNFCCC contained many commitments of all Parties, though few were quantified and there were
no sanctions for failing to meet commitments.
Most Parties conclude the UNFCCC objective requires avoiding a 2oCelsius increase in global
mean temperature and reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 80%-95% by 2050.
The UNFCCC principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” among Parties permeates
debate about obligations of different forms, levels of effort, and verifiability.
Because nations agreed the UNFCCC objective could not be met by voluntary efforts alone, the
1997 Kyoto Protocol established enforceable, quantified GHG reductions for Parties listed in
Annex I of the UNFCCC in the period 2008 to 2012.6 The United States signed the Kyoto
Protocol in 1997, but President Clinton never submitted it to the Senate for consent. President
Bush in 2001 announced that the United States would not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol,
because of (1) uncertainty of the science; (2) potentially high cost of GHG abatement; and (3)
lack of GHG commitments from non-Annex I countries. The first “commitment period” for
meeting GHG emission targets runs from 2008 to 2012. It had been envisioned that GHG
commitments for one or more subsequent periods would be made before 2008. But commitments
beyond 2012 have been delayed, in part because the United States is neither a Party to the Kyoto
Protocol nor has shown interest in engaging in future commitments under it, in part because of
difficulty in gaining a mandate for negotiations among all UNFCCC Parties. A mandate to
negotiate among all Parties was achieved in 2007 in the “Bali Action Plan.”
Two Tracks on the Way to Copenhagen: One
Agreement or Two?
The negotiations currently are running on two tracks, one under the Kyoto Protocol and the other
under the UNFCCC’s “Bali Action Plan” of 2007. The Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period
runs from 2008 to 2012, during which wealthier (“Annex I”) countries agreed to reduce their
GHG emissions to an average of 5% below 1990 levels. In 2007, Kyoto Protocol Parties (not the
United States) began negotiating under the Kyoto Protocol on what commitments would ensue
beyond 2012. This is the “Kyoto Protocol” track.
However, because neither the United States nor developing (non-Annex I) countries are bound to
measurable GHG reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, another negotiating mandate
6 Although the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Action Plan, and numerous documents involved in the
Copenhagen negotiations make a distinction between “developed” and “developing” country Parties, the definitions of
these groups are nowhere defined. The listings of countries include the “developed and other Parties included in Annex
I” of the UNFCCC, leading to the grouping of Annex I Parties and non-Annex I Parties. Thus, there seems no legal
basis under the UNFCCC to identify which countries belong to groupings other than Annex I, Annex II (a subset of
Annex I) and Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol (Parties taking on quantified GHG targets). For clarity, then, this report
will generally refer to Annex I countries.
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was established to include the United States and to address several broader commitment issues.
Under the 2007 “Bali Action Plan,” all countries seek to reach agreement in Copenhagen on (1) a
“shared long-term vision” (aggregate GHG targets for 2050); (2) GHG mitigation (GHG targets
for each major Party for 2020 or earlier); (3) adaptation to climate change; (4) financial
assistance; (5) technology cooperation; and (6) enhancing carbon sequestration in forests. This
became the “Long-Term Cooperative Agreement” track. Each issue is described in later sections.
One current dispute is whether the two negotiating tracks should result in two accords or
converge into a single treaty.
The European Union (EU) and other Annex I countries do not want to amend the Kyoto Protocol
without including U.S. commitments, though the United States is unlikely to agree to join the
Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol Parties also do not wish to abandon their agreement and the
progress they made in establishing implementing rules and procedures (e.g., reporting
requirements and compliance reviews) under the Protocol. Nonetheless, the Annex I countries
have all urged that these two tracks converge by Copenhagen into one agreement that includes
commitments of all Parties.
Most non-Annex I Parties believe certain advantages exist in maintaining the Kyoto Protocol and
a separate agreement for them. They argue that the Kyoto Protocol is for quantified, enforceable
GHG obligations for developed countries only. The G-777 and China have so far blocked even
discussion of accession of current non-Annex I Parties to quantified GHG commitments under the
Kyoto Protocol track. They maintain that non-Annex I commitments should be of a different form
and legal nature, embodied in the Bali Action Plan track, and resist any disaggregation of non-
Annex I Parties. They perceive any proposal to disaggregate “developing” countries into smaller
sub-groupings, based on magnitude of emissions or financial capacity, as an effort to pull
additional countries onto a track of quantifiable GHG commitments. The G-77 and China have,
thus far, successfully blocked any formal discussion of how this could happen; some delegations
walked out of the Bangkok negotiations in October 2009 after a proposal was articulated to merge
the negotiations onto one track.
In the UNFCCC, all Parties agreed to “common but differentiated” responsibilities, with
differentiation based on a number of implied factors, including financial and technical capacity,
and historical responsibility for climate change. The differentiation has been made primarily,
though not exclusively, between Annex I (wealthier) and non-Annex I (less wealthy) countries,
with quantified GHG reductions so far spelled out only for the Annex I Parties. The UNFCCC
also spelled out that commitments from non-Annex I Parties would depend on leadership from
the wealthiest (“Annex II”) Parties to meet GHG and financial commitments. Circumstances have
evolved since the UNFCCC was signed in 1992, especially with the growth of China and other
large emerging economies. Recognition has crystallized that the objective to halt growth of GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere requires slowing then reversing growth of GHG emissions by
all major countries. Despite these facts, most countries argue that the Annex I countries have not
fully met their UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol obligations to reduce GHG emissions and assist
developing countries (with the United States especially criticized). Although non-Annex I Parties
now discharge most of current GHG emissions, the Annex I Parties continue to be responsible for
the majority of the increase since the Industrial Revolution of atmospheric GHG concentrations
7 The G-77 or “Group of 77” was established in 1964 by 77 developing countries (now about 130 countries) to promote
their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity within the United Nations system and
more broadly.
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linked to climate change. Thus, most countries argue, the wealthiest countries continue to have
the greatest historic responsibility to cut GHG emissions.
As the Copenhagen meeting opens, it remains unclear whether the fundamental obstacle of the
number and form of agreement(s) can be surmounted. At the negotiations held in Bangkok in
early October, “substantial” progress was made in reducing text on the negotiating table and on
certain topics: adaptation, technology cooperation, and capacity building.8 Nonetheless,
negotiators in Copenhagen face many contentious issues regarding substantive commitments,
described below. Many hope that major changes in stance by key negotiators could change the
dynamic and lead to a “dominoes” chain of responses by other negotiators, permitting resolution
of remaining issues.
Key Topics Under Negotiation
On November 26, 2009, the Secretariat of the UNFCCC released a document as the foundation
for further negotiations by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperation (AWG-LCA).9
It presents the ideas of the Chair, including that possibilities of agreement are emerging on a
shared long-term vision, adaptation, technology cooperation and capacity-building, and (to a
lesser degree) on financial resources and investment. The Chair notes less “clarity” on enhanced
action on GHG mitigation. He notes in particular that connections need better articulation
between actions and support on GHG mitigation and adaptation. He also notes a need to clarify
the role of market mechanisms in this track of negotiations under the Bali Action Plan. Finally,
the Chair notes that there remains a wide range of views on the legal form that the AWG-LCA
outcomes should take, from a package of decisions by the COP to adoption of a new legally
binding instrument, and proposed that by December 15 the products be delivered to the COP as a
“comprehensive and balanced set” of COP decisions, without prejudice to the form and legal
nature of the COP outcome. Each of the topics of the Bali Action Plan is summarized below.
A Shared Long-Term Vision to 2050
The Bali Action Plan provided for negotiation of a vision (i.e., to 2050) for long-term cooperative
action (LCA) among Parties. Many countries viewed this as the setting of a long-term target for
avoiding global temperature increases, stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations, and/or
setting global GHG reduction targets relative to a base year (typically 1990 or 2005). Some
Parties have not viewed this as a major element in the negotiations, and some have opposed any
kind of quantified vision. Other Parties have viewed a quantified vision as a hook for pulling all
Parties into a common, global commitment to reduce GHG emissions.
The EU and many Parties have proposed cutting global GHG emissions to 50% below 1990
levels by 2050, to limit global warming to 2oC. Avoiding 2oC of global warming has been
estimated by some as consistent with stabilizing GHG atmospheric concentrations at 450 parts
per million (ppm). Some scientists, activists, and vulnerable countries call for a long-term target
8 See, for example, IISD Reporting Services, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Summary of the Bangkok Climate Change
Talks: 28 September-9 October 2009, Vol. 12 No. 439.
9 UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, “Scenario Note on the
Eighth Session: Note by the Chair,” November 26, 2009.
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below 350 ppm.10 Others consider the 350 ppm target to be politically, and possibly economically,
infeasible.
The EU further proposes that Annex I countries should cut their GHG emissions by 80%-95% by
2050 to meet the 450 ppm vision, and that global emissions drop by 50% from 1990 levels.
President Obama’s policy is that the United States should reduce its emissions by 80%-83% from
2005 levels by 2050 and support the 50% global emission reduction.11 These have not been
offered as legally binding commitments in the Copenhagen negotiations, however. In the recent
Barcelona negotiations, the U.S. delegation called on China to halve its GHG emissions by 2050,
which would allow modest growth for poorer countries.12 China, among others, has blocked an
explicit long-term and global target, although it recently pledged a voluntary, domestic target.
World-wide emission targets consistent with, for example, 450 ppm, would require China to
reduce its emissions strongly from past growth trajectories, as well as from current levels over
several decades.
Obligations to Mitigate GHG Emissions
Mitigation obligations remain among the most contentious topics of the negotiations. Aspects of
mitigation include the forms and depth of commitments for Annex I and non-Annex I Parties,
mechanisms to promote compliance with mitigation commitments, methods to address
deforestation emissions, options for sectoral or other sub-national targets, and GHG trading
schemes or other “cost-containment,” and financing mechanisms.
Mid-Term Targets for GHG Reductions
Common but Differentiated Commitments
All Parties to the UNFCCC agreed to the principle of “common but differentiated”
responsibilities. They also agreed that the Annex I Parties should demonstrate the lead, as most
have under the Kyoto Protocol (but not the United States or Canada). The two primary
negotiating questions regarding mitigation for Copenhagen are (1) when and how additional
countries will take on specific GHG mitigation commitments, and (2) how to “differentiate” the
commitments among Parties (“comparability”). So far, China and most other non-Annex I Parties
have blocked discussion of new commitments for them, though Mexico and South Africa have
announced their own quantitative and conditioned targets. While China has pledged a quantified
domestic target to reduce the growth of GHG emissions, its negotiating position has firmly
opposed discussing any quantitative commitment internationally. The EU proposes that
developing countries set and quantify “low carbon development strategies” as a prerequisite to
financial assistance. Such strategies would need to be measured, reported and verified (MRV).
10 Current atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are over 385 ppm; counting all GHG covered by the Kyoto
Protocol is equivalent to about 430 ppm of carbon dioxide. A target of 350 ppm suggests strong reductions from current
concentrations.
11 See, for example, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget Overview: Jumpstarting the Economy and
Investing for the Future, February 26, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Overview/.
12 As reported in Greenwire, November 5, 2009. http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2009/11/05/6/.
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Proposals for Quantified GHG Targets
Climate activists and some Parties especially vulnerable to climate change have called for Annex
I countries to reduce their GHG emissions to 25%-40% below 1990 levels by 2013-2017. The EU
has passed a law to reduce its GHG emissions by 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, or by 30% if
other countries make comparable commitments. Japan’s new president has pledged a commitment
of 25% below 2005 levels by 2020, while the Australian legislature may pass a bill to achieve as
much as 25% below 2000 levels by 2020. In late May, China called for developed country Parties
to take on targets of 40% below 1990 levels by 2020—at the most stringent level of the range it
had previously advocated—although many observers consider the Chinese statement to be
positioning in the negotiations as it comes under greater pressure to take on a quantified target.
Other countries, including Canada, continue to emphasize that the EU’s and non-Annex I
countries’ proposals are too stringent and do not consider costs or other circumstances. The
United States has also indicated that these proposals are not under consideration nationally.
The Obama Administration in November 2009 stated that it is prepared to offer to reduce U.S.
GHG emissions to around 17% below 2005 levels by 2020, to be made consistent with future
energy and climate legislation (e.g., S. 1733 and H.R. 2454). This would be equivalent to
approximately 4% below 1990 GHG emission levels. Some Obama Administration officials have
suggested that the former Obama -14% target and the EU proposals were comparable, in that both
Parties13 would reduce emissions approximately 1.4% annually through 2020.
Table 1 provides a summary of some proposals for GHG reduction targets, unilateral or for
groups of countries, by 2020. Only the EU’s target has been enacted into law. Many targets are
proposed unilateral commitments by Parties for themselves, sometimes conditioned on what other
Parties would commit. Most proposals are for 2020, although a few Parties propose a
commitment period of 2013-2017 or 2013-2020. Some commitments would be contingent on
technical issues regarding creditable GHG reductions regarding land use emissions, flexibility
mechanisms, and others.
One issue raised frequently by the European Union is the question of whether Russia and other
former Soviet and Eastern European countries would be allowed surplus “assigned amounts”
(AAUs), which are GHG targets higher than their actual emissions. These surplus AAUs were
accepted under the Kyoto Protocol as an incentive to participation by those countries, although
some in the EU have often referred to them as “hot air” and argued that they undermine the
environmental integrity and fair burden-sharing of the international framework. Russia and
several other countries seek to retain and expand their surplus of AAUs in a new agreement
beyond 2012.
13 The European Union, as a regional economic integration organization, is a Party to the UNFCCC, as are its member
countries.
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Table 1. Summary of Proposals for GHG Reductions in 2020
(as of June 15, 2009)
Annex I Party GHG Reductions
Developing Country GHG
Parties Proposing to these
by 2020
Reductions
Targets
> 30% below 1990 for Annex I as a
EU, Norway, Belarus,
whole
> 40% below 1990 levels for Annex I No quantified international
China, India, Africa Group,
as a whole
commitments
Indonesia, South Africa, Iran
> 45% below 1990 for Annex I as a
Small Island States, Brazil, Zambia
whole
20% below 1990 levels for EU
EU unilateral target, enacted into law
25%-40% below 1990
Referred to in conclusions of AWG-
KP-6c
30% below 1990 levels conditional
15%-30% below business as usual
EU proposed targets
on comparable commitments by
trajectories, or that developing
Annex I Parties
countries must “contribute
adequately” with MRV for all actions.
In the range of 17% below 2005
Recording of self-financed NAMAsa
U.S. provisional target
levels, to be made consistent with
into an international registry, with
future legislation
MRVb for all actions
5% below 2000 for Australia; 25%
All countries register national
Australia conditional target
below 2000 conditioned on global
schedules of mitigation efforts
mitigation
5%-10% below 1990 for Belarus
Belarus unilateral proposal
40% below 1990 levels by 2020;
Norway
unilateral
target
carbon neutral by 2030,
Range of 25%-40% below 1990 not
Japan
feasible. New President proposes
conditional 25% below 1990 levels
conditional on all countries’ actions.
10%-20% below 1990 levels
New Zealand
40%-45% reduction of carbon
China voluntary, domestic goal
intensity from 2005 levels by 2020
To cut 2008 emissions by about 8%
Mexico target conditioned on
by 2012, by 50% by 2050
technical and financial assistance
36%-39% reduction below projected
Brazil voluntary target
2020 levels by 2020 (with most
coming from avoided deforestation)
GHG emissions to peak by 2025
South Africa voluntary target
4% below 2005 levels by 2020
South Korea voluntary target
Source: Compiled by CRS from various sources, including records of meetings of the UNFCCC.
Note: This table is not comprehensive of al proposals made.
a. NAMAs are National y Appropriate Mitigation Actions.
b. MRV stands for measuring, reporting, and verification.
c. AWG-KP-6 means the 6th meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol.
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Annex I Parties’ Views
The United States, the EU, and many other Annex I countries insist that a Copenhagen outcome
be a comprehensive framework for action by all Parties. They propose alternate versions of
differentiated, quantified emission limits for Annex I Parties, with key issues including the form,
nature and depth (“comparability”) of GHG mitigation commitments. Furthermore, Annex I
Parties propose differentiated commitments for non-Annex I Parties to establish strategies that
would reduce their current GHG growth trajectories, as well as Nationally Appropriate Mitigation
Actions (NAMAs), to delineate specific actions that they would submit to be inscribed into an
internationally measured schedule or registry. Eligibility for countries to receive financial or
technological assistance would be incumbent upon taking and reporting such GHG mitigation
programs.
U.S. GHG Mitigation Proposals
The United States has described its positions as fol ows:
• that Annex I countries make robust and absolute emission reductions in the mid-term (i.e., around 2020) from a
base year (1990 or 2005);
• that major developing countries take actions in the mid-term that will significantly reduce their emissions
compared to business-as-usual paths;
• that least developed countries need not make any commitments to reduce emissions, only to prepare low
carbon growth plans for which they will be supported; and
• that other developing countries, likewise, need not make commitments. Rather, they should focus on developing
and implementing low carbon growth plans and implementing nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs)
to help guide them on a long-term development path.
Further, the United States outlined a proposal on measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) for all Parties, which
builds on the existing frameworks, and would introduce enhanced reporting, independent review by experts, and
public peer review. The U.S. promised financial support for countries not capable of meeting MRV costs, and said that
the “sub-elements” of the broad framework would be different, for instance, for the LDCs and for non-Annex I
countries that have more capacity and responsibility.
Source: U.S. Department of State, Telegram: “UN Climate Talks in Bangkok: Progress Slow, Intensity Grows as
Copenhagen Nears,” October 19, 2009.
Non-Annex I Parties’ Views
The Bali Action Plan included ambiguous language regarding mitigation commitments by
developing countries. Its key phrase was:
consideration of mitigation actions that would include: ... (ii) Nationally appropriate
mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development,
supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity building, in a measurable,
reportable and verifiable manner;14
14 The original version, found in the document FCCC/CP/2007/L.7, distributed early on December 15, 2007, stated:
“(ii) Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in
the context of sustainable development, supported by technology and enabled by financing and capacity-building;”
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China and many large developing countries continue to resist the idea that any non-Annex I
countries might take on quantitative and enforceable commitments. However, by mid-2009 some
non-Annex I countries favored beginning to differentiate among the non-Annex I country Parties.
Uganda, speaking for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), expressed the position that all
countries will need to take actions, including the LDCs.
Such proposals, and those of the United States and EU, are strongly opposed by many non-Annex
I countries, especially Brazil, India and China—among the non-Annex I Parties most pressured to
take on quantified GHG commitments. They contend that these proposals seek to erase the
differentiation between Annex I and developing countries embodied in the UNFCCC. These
countries also oppose “Measuring, Reporting, and Verification” (MRV) proposals that would
make all countries more accountable for their mitigation commitments.
Adapting to Impacts of Climate Change
For low-income countries, many of which have the populations most vulnerable to climate and
climate change, near-term assistance to adapt is as high a priority as mitigating long-term climate
change. Key issues include how much financial assistance might be provided; how to measure,
report and verify (MRV) whether wealthier countries meet their commitments; and through what
mechanisms financial aid would flow.
The G-77/China and Africa Groups wish to establish quantified commitments for financial
transfers by the wealthier countries. Some argue for payments as “compensation” for unavoidable
climate change impacts, though the UNFCCC mentions only “consideration” of actions (not
compensation). Non-Annex I countries voice concern over access to financing, conditions
imposed on receiving assistance, criteria to judge “vulnerability,” and the burdens of processes
and mechanisms, among additional issues.
The United States has proposed a framework for adaptation action, with the UNFCCC acting as
catalyst and the countries as key implementers, assisted by a variety of international institutions.
In this plan, adaptation action would be common among all Parties, but roles would be
differentiated among countries.
Financial Assistance to Low-income Countries
The United States and all other Parties to the UNFCCC committed to promoting adaptation,
cooperation to develop and deploy new technologies, and a host of additional but unquantified
obligations. The wealthier countries (including the United States) also committed to provide
financial and technical assistance to underpin developing countries’ efforts to meet their
obligations. In the current negotiations, developing countries are calling for financial resources
that will be “new, additional, adequate, predictable and sustained,” for mitigation, adaptation, and
development and transfer of technologies, to flow through UNFCCC specialized funds. They call
for the resources to be publicly financed (not private) and to be provided on a grant or
concessional basis.
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Financial assistance—its amount, predictability, and “conditionality”—ties into all other aspects
of the Copenhagen negotiations. Deep divisions exist among Parties over four proposals now in
the negotiating text:15
• one or more funds established under the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties
(COP), managed by one or more Trustees, with funds generated through levies on
international maritime transport and aviation; a share of proceeds from accessing
international emissions trading; assessed contributions from Parties; and
voluntary contributions from Parties and other donors; OR assessed contributions
from Annex I Parties as a percent of Gross National Product;
• a World Climate Change Fund or Green Fund under the authority and guidance
of the UNFCCC COP, administered by an existing financial institution, with
funding from assessed contributions from all Parties except the Least Developed
Countries (LDCs);
• a Global Fund for Climate (U.S. proposal) as an operating entity of the (existing)
financial mechanism (the World Bank’s Global Environment Facility), funded by
multiyear, voluntary contributions of all Parties except LDCs; and
• use of existing financial institutions, such as the Global Environment Facility
(GEF), multilateral development banks, etc., with a Facilitative Platform under
the authority and Guidance of the COP to register and link needs to support, and
to monitor and evaluate the information in the registry.
Amounts of Financing
A variety of international institutions and non-governmental organizations have tried to estimate
the costs of adaptation to developing countries and the associated needs for public funding.
Definitions and scopes of adaptation in these studies vary, accounting for some of the differences.
In particular, some studies consider “all” costs of adaptation to climate change and remaining
damages (although none are comprehensive); some include just large-scale adaptation costs (i.e.,
not most private measures taken by individuals); and some try to discern just the need for public
financing for adaptation. As a result, figures range from $4 billion to several hundreds of billions
of dollars annually by the year 2030.16 The United Nations Development Programme estimated
that an additional US$86 billion per year would be needed in 2015; the UNFCCC Secretariat
estimated that US$29 billion per year would be needed in 2030. For adaptation alone, the World
Bank updated a previous study in September 2009, now estimating the average adaptation cost
from 2010 to 2050 to be $75 billion to $100 billion annually.17 For GHG mitigation, the
15 AWG-LCA Non-paper No. 34, Revised annex IV to document FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/INF.2 (20/10/09) at
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/34fin201009v02.pdf.
16 Martin Parry et al., Assessing the Costs of Adaptation to Climate Change: A Review of the UNFCCC and Other
Recent Estimates (London: International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), August 2009),
http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache:KCCoQ47xQdMJ:www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/
11501IIED.pdf+%22Assessing+the+costs+of+adaptation%22&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a.
17 World Bank, Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change: New Methods and Estimates (Consultation Draft) (World
Bank, September 2009), http://beta.worldbank.org/climatechange/content/economics-adaptation-climate-change-study-
homepage. Concerning the problem of defining adaptation costs, this report says,
One of the biggest challenges of the study has been to operationalize the definition of adaptation
costs. The concept is intuitively understood as the costs incurred by societies to adapt to changes in
climate. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines adaptation costs as the
(continued...)
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International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 200918 concludes that, in a scenario to
stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450 ppm, “the energy sector in non-OECD19
countries would need around $200 billion of additional investment in clean energy and efficiency
in 2020—including $70 billion for nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) and a
similar amount to achieve sectoral standards in transport and industry.” The extra investments
would be more than offset in the industry, transport, and buildings sectors, says IEA, by savings
from energy efficiency improvements. Differences among scopes and methods for estimating
incremental financial needs explain part of the range among estimates; no study has been
considered definitive.
Heads of State in the European Union (the European Council) propose that 5 to 7 billion euros of
public financing, particularly for least developed countries, should be provided in each year of
2010 to 2012, as a “fast-start” in the context of a Copenhagen agreement.20 The European Council
has concluded that 100 billion euros annually by 2020 will be necessary to help developing
countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change.
Some non-Annex I countries (e.g., China) call for amounts of public financing that many view as
unrealistic—up to 1% of GDP on top of other Overseas Development Assistance.
Public versus Private Financing
Countries differ on the appropriate sources of funds. The G-77 and China argue that developed
nations’ governments should provide public funds as the main source of climate change financing
for mitigation, adaptation, technology cooperation, and capacity building. Annex I nations,
however, underscore the importance of private sector finance through GHG trading mechanisms
and other investments, with public funds as smaller and more targeted shares. The United States
and the EU agree that some public financing should be provided, in particular for capacity
building and adaptation, but seek mechanisms for most of the financing to flow from the private
sector through market incentives. (For example, GHG “offsets” that would be authorized by S.
1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, the “Kerry-Boxer” bill.)
European Union heads of state concluded that the net incremental costs of up to 100 billion euros
by 2020 in developing countries21 should be met through a combination of non-Annex I
countries’ own efforts, the international carbon market and international public finance. They
propose that the international public finance portion may be in the range of 22 to 50 billion euros
(...continued)
costs of planning, preparing for, facilitating, and implementing adaptation measures, including
transaction costs. But this definition is hard to operationalize. For one thing, “development as
usual” needs to be conceptually separated from adaptation. That requires deciding whether the costs
of development initiatives that enhance climate resilience ought to be counted as part of adaptation
costs. It also requires deciding how to incorporate in those costs the adaptation deficit, defined as
countries’ inability to deal with current and future climate variability. It requires defining how to
deal with uncertainty about climate projections and impacts. And it requires specifying how
potential benefits from climate change in some sectors and countries offset, if at all, adaptation
costs in another sector or country. (p. 19)
18 IEA, World Energy Outlook, November 2009. http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/.
19 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
20 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, 15265/09, October 29-30, 2009. pp. 5-6.
21 Council of the European Union, ibid.
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per year, but subject to a “fair burden sharing” among Parties to the UNFCCC, agreement on how
to manage the funds, and application of the funds to “specific mitigation actions and ambitious
Low Carbon Development Strategies/Low Carbon Growth Plans.” (See section on mitigation
commitments of non-Annex I countries.) They conclude that all Parties except the least developed
should contribute to the public financing, with assessments based heavily on emission levels, as
well as on Gross Domestic Product. EU leaders have stated they will provide their “fair share” of
this amount, though they have not specified a precise amount. Their contribution will be
conditioned on other countries’ offers.
Public finances have been proposed to come from a variety of levies, including charges on
maritime and aviation fuels, a percentage of GHG offsets internationally (such as exists now
under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism), contribution of a share of national
allowances to auction, etc.
To support private sector financing, proposals diverge on whether to retain and revise existing
GHG trading mechanisms as vehicles for private investment in GHG mitigation: The non-Annex
I countries seek to retain the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, while the EU and United States
press for new, more efficient mechanisms than, for example, the Clean Development Mechanism
has thus far been. Many different proposals for new mechanisms have surfaced, including
crediting for GHG reductions in Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) below
business-as-usual trajectories (Korea); NAMA-based emissions trading (New Zealand); and
sectoral crediting and trading (EU).
Mechanisms for Financing
Besides the magnitude and terms of financing available, substantial disagreement continues over
appropriate mechanisms that would manage publicly provided financing under a new agreement.
Much assistance passes through bilateral arrangements, although some countries complain that
these are difficult to verify and may represent a shift in funding, not additional funding.
Multilaterally, an array of mechanisms is available to help finance capacity building, technology
cooperation, GHG mitigation policy development and measures, and adaptation analysis,
planning, and actions. Such mechanisms include the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as the
financial mechanism of the UNFCCC; the Special Climate Change Fund; and funds for
specialized activities (e.g., the Adaptation Fund of the Kyoto Protocol) or groups of countries
(e.g., the Least Developed Countries Fund of the Kyoto Protocol). In 2008, multilateral
development banks with several governments and stakeholders established the Climate
Investment Funds (CIF) under management of the World Bank.22 Many additional sources of
funding, such as through other MDBs, are active. Their processes, terms, and responsiveness
vary.
Some countries are concerned about the plethora of funds, administrative and management costs,
and strategic provision of funds to maximize the effectiveness of the monies. Many non-Annex I
countries complain that much financing is managed bilaterally or through the Multilateral
Development Banks, particularly the World Bank, which some believe are not as responsive to
the priorities of the recipient countries. These critics prefer financing to be managed by
institutions created under the UNFCCC, in which they have “one-country, one-vote,” or at least
equal regional representation as the industrialized nations. Also, while Annex I Parties generally
22 See CRS Report RS22989, The World Bank’s Clean Technology Fund (CTF), by Martin A. Weiss.
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prefer and promote means for the private sector to finance mitigation and adaptation investment,
many non-Annex I countries prefer more “predictable” public sector flows.
The four proposals in the current negotiating text contain the main alternatives for mechanisms
for publicly provided financing: one or more funds managed by one or more Trustees of the
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP); a new fund under the authority and guidance of the
COP but managed by an existing international institution; a new fund under the authority and
guidance of the COP but managed by the existing financial mechanism of the UNFCCC (i.e., the
GEF); and the use of existing financial institutions (i.e., no new mechanisms). The issue of
mechanism may not be among the most difficult to resolve in the negotiations.
U.S. Positions on Financing
Although the U.S. delegation provided a proposal for a new financing mechanism in the October
2009 negotiations in Bangkok, it has proposed neither overall multilateral levels of funding under
a new agreement nor an amount that the United States might offer. Some Members of Congress
and U.S. constituents have pressed for provisions in climate change legislation to provide for
funding to assist adaptation in developing countries, and to support cooperation on clean
technology and capacity building.
In June 2009, the House passed H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act, with
provisions to allow up to 1 billion emissions offsets to come from international sources, which
could provide a many-billion-dollar stream of private finance for projects in developing countries.
The bill also would provide funds internationally to help tropical deforestation prevention,
capacity building, clean technology cooperation, and international adaptation. A parallel bill, S.
1733 and the Chair’s Mark, contains similar provisions. Some Members of Congress and
advocates have sought to increase allocation of allowances and/or appropriations, to $2 billion to
$38 billion for international adaptation as well.23 A new U.S. coalition of religious organizations
has called for at least $3.5 billion per year to help poor populations respond to potential floods,
natural disasters and droughts associated with warming temperatures.24
The United States participates in the financing deliberations with impaired credibility, being
almost $170 million in arrears for its assessed contribution to the Global Environment Facility
(the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC and other treaties). The Bush Administration helped
establish a new Clean Technology Fund under the World Bank, but the U.S. Congress declined to
appropriate the first payment of $400 million requested for FY2009. Treasury requested $500
million for FY2010. The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) permitted up to $10
million for the Least Developed Countries Fund, under the UNFCCC, to support grants for
climate change adaptation programs. To receive the funds, the Global Environment Facility
(GEF) must annually report on the criteria it uses to select programs and activities that receive
funds, how funded activities meet such criteria, the extent of local involvement in these activities,
the amount of funds provided, and the results achieved.
23 See, for example, http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/print/2009/10/09/10; and http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&
q=cache:I3tTCuJatQMJ:www.actionaid.org/assets/pdf/Climate%2520finance%2520briefing%2520in%
2520template%2520May%25202009%2520FINAL.pdf+Oxfam+adaptation+funding+%2412&hl=en&gl=us&sig=
AFQjCNEbYHV2hIASCbn0s3v5II56_ZBB0Q.
24 Christa Marshall, “New religious coalition joins push for adaptation funding” ClimateWire, October 9, 2009.
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2009/10/09/10.
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In the House appropriations bill for foreign operations for FY2010 (H.R. 3081, as placed on the
Senate calendar), $75 million would be appropriated for the multilateral Strategic Climate Fund,
$225 million for the Clean Technology Fund, $86.5 million for the GEF (a minor portion of
which supports the UNFCCC), $180 million for bilateral GHG mitigation programs under U.S.
Agency for International Development, as well as other monies that could be used to support
GHG mitigation and climate change adaptation.
The United States is constrained in offering a quantitative financial pledge, including the
proposed increases, without a legislated means to assure predictable private and public financing
for international assistance (e.g., by GHG trading mechanisms for private flows, and allocation of
GHG allowances for public funds). This has frustrated most other delegations, and may weaken
U.S. leverage regarding the financial mechanisms.
Technology Development and Transfer
Because achieving deep GHG reductions would require radical technological change from current
patterns, Parties generally agree to cooperate to advance and deploy new technologies. The
United States and the EU agree that some public financing for technology is needed but that the
private sector is better able to achieve the necessary advances and deployment. Many non-Annex
I countries consider private investment too unreliable and not necessarily in their developmental
interests. They want most funding to be public and managed by a new organization directed by
the UNFCCC.
After years of stalled talks regarding technology cooperation, Bangkok saw discussions open up
on a wide range of issues including enhanced action on technology, capacity building and
enabling environments; greater cooperation on research, development, demonstration, and
deployment (RDD&D); technology innovation centers and other institutional arrangements; and
financing. Divisions remain among Parties. Annex I Parties call for enhanced action among all
Parties to implement the Convention’s provisions. The European Union resists creation of any
new institutions, calling for reliance on existing financial organizations. The United States
proposes a new voluntary fund to which all Parties but the least developed would contribute, and
from which all could draw. The G-77 countries and China propose creation of new institutional
arrangements, funded by the wealthiest Parties for any of the non-Annex I Parties to use. Some
convergence may be evolving around uses for RDD&D, capacity building, policy frameworks
and enabling environments. Three components articulated as critical by some Parties are
accelerated global openness to environmentally sound technologies; increased access to
technology information and know-how; and high-quality technology roadmaps for low-carbon
economic growth.
In October 2009, the U.S. delegation proposed a “hub and spokes” framework (now “hub and
corps”) as a new mechanism to support technology cooperation. It would rely on regional centers
of excellence, linked through a professional Climate Technology Corps, to a Climate Technology
Hub. The U.S. delegation indicates this would increase availability, capacity, and information
exchange related to technology. The Hub would be staffed by full-time clean technology experts
who would develop and maintain critical analytic tools. The Corps would consist of modeling,
policy, finance, system design, and workforce training experts drawn from national development
agencies, Multilateral Development Banks, and academia, to assist country-driven programs. The
proposal seemed to straddle the competing ambitions of various Parties by directly responding to
the stated interest for new institutions while offering a possible way forward in negotiations.
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One remaining challenge is the handling of intellectual property rights (IPR). Common arguments
arise between the importance of IPR as incentives to innovate versus barriers to technology
transfer. Four options regarding IPR, covering a wide range of views, remain in the negotiating
draft:25
• Technology development, diffusion and transfer would occur cooperatively with
patent sharing and/or intellectual property free for renewable energy and energy
efficiency technologies. Financial support would be provided to buy down the
full or partial cost of technologies for developing country Parties, taking into
account the ability to pay, and provided by the financial mechanism under the
UNFCCC.
• Negotiation to constrain limits on access to technologies that help mitigation and
adaptation by establishing “global technology pools,” and using the full
flexibilities contained in the World Trade Organization’s agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), differential pricing,
limited or time restricted patents, etc.
• Compulsory licensing of specific technologies for mitigation and adaptation to
climate change, where it can be demonstrated that those patents and licenses act
as a barrier to technology transfer and prevent the deployment or diffusion of that
technology in a specified country.
• Immediate exclusion of new—and revocation of existing—patents in developing
countries on essential technologies required to address mitigation and adaptation.
Some of these options are non-negotiable for the U.S. and other delegations.
Enhancing Carbon Sequestration in Forests
Deforestation accounts for about one-fifth of global carbon dioxide emissions, and poses further
ecological risks. Until recently, most non-Annex I countries and many environmental groups
opposed addressing forests or giving credits for improving resource management: many feared it
was a distraction from abating fossil fuel emissions, while others focused on the environmental
integrity challenges of credible measurement and monitoring of GHG reductions in the forest and
resource sectors. Forested countries also feared any undermining of national sovereignty,
including their management of resources. Widespread agreement has emerged to address carbon
sequestration in forests, but with differences over how financial assistance for measures should be
provided—through public funding or through GHG trading, or both.
There is no G-77 coordinated position on how to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, as
well as improved conservation of natural resources (“REDD+”). Disagreements are apparent over
the level of safeguards and the definition of what would be considered “sustainable management
of forests.” Nevertheless, most see value in ensuring that all land use activities are recognized as
viable mitigation options for both Annex I and non-Annex I countries. The U.S. remains prepared
to press for REDD to be integrated into developing country NAMAs and low carbon strategies.26
25 From AWG Non-paper No. 29, Streamlined text and concepts contained within the reordering and consolidation of
text in the revised negotiating text FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/INF.2, annex V) (09/10/09) at http://unfccc.int/files/
kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/technology29091009v03.pdf
26 U.S. Department of State, op. cit.
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The European Union generally agrees, and emphasizes performance-based mechanisms that
recognize verified emission reductions.
Measuring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV)
Measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) responsibilities would provide transparency and
accountability for other commitments undertaken in a Copenhagen agreement. The practice of
measurement, reporting, and verification also assists Parties in building their indigenous
capacities and fulfilling their commitments. The UNFCCC included commitments from all
Parties to certain actions that would be included under effective MRV provisions, including
national GHG inventories, reporting (“national communications”) of national plans and actions
taken, modeling of GHG results, etc. Only Annex I Parties, however, have agreed to annual GHG
inventories according to UNFCCC guidance and to periodic national communications, while
some non-Annex I Parties (notably China) have resisted rules that would regularize their
reporting. Given concerns about capacities, transparency, and confidence among Parties, MRV is
arguably an essential part of the multilateral architecture under negotiation.
Under the Bali Action Plan, Parties agreed to paragraphs 1b(i) and 1b(ii):
(b) Enhanced national/international action on mitigation of climate change, including, inter
alia, consideration of:
(i) Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or
actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all developed
country Parties, while ensuring the comparability of efforts among them, taking into account
differences in their national circumstances;
(ii) Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of
sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-
building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner (UNFCCC, 2007a).
While the current negotiations include some dispute about appropriate interpretation of that
language, most Parties agree that “measurable, reportable, and verifiable” should apply to three
sets of actions:
(1) GHG actions and quantified commitments by developed country Parties;
(2) Nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) by developing country Parties; and
(3) technology, financing, and capacity building for developing country Parties (although it is
unclear whether MRV would regard the receipt of these, or the provision of these, the effects of
these or all of these options).
Additionally, MRV is part of negotiations to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation, and conservation (REDD+) in developing countries.
Most Parties agree that new commitments should build on the existing frameworks under the
UNFCCC and, when appropriate, the Kyoto Protocol. MRV proposals under negotiation toward
Copenhagen include:
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• reporting of all nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing countries,
or only those that receive international support;
• requirements for all Parties to provide comparable information and detail in their
reporting;
• mechanisms and magnitude of financial and technical assistance to countries that
are not (yet) capable of meeting the requirements;
• setting out timing, according to each Party’s circumstances, for annual GHG
inventory and regular national communications obligations to become binding;
• results-based mechanisms for distributing available resources to improve MRV in
developing countries;
• mechanisms for transparency and independent review of reports, whether through
international expert panels (as in place under the UNFCCC for Annex I Parties)
or through agreed, independent mechanisms within Parties;
• rules and procedures for MRV in Parties that allow them to take part in GHG
trading mechanisms (including project-based offsets) to protect environmental
integrity;
• linkages between the quality of MRV of a Party and crediting of GHG
reductions; and
• methods for quantifying “technology, financing, and capacity-building” provided
by Annex I countries and received by developing countries, and for reporting
outcomes and effectiveness.
Some non-Annex I Parties likely resist proposals because MRV ties them into more rigorous
compliance assurance systems under the international regime.27 There are a number of
multilateral and bilateral initiatives that have demonstrated progress in improving developing
countries’ capacities and willingness to report and have their reporting independently verified.
(As examples, the United States supported dozens of “Country Studies” aimed at this in the early
to mid-1990s; the World Bank has financed and assisted many Parties’ communications; and
Australia, for instance, has assisted Indonesia to design and begin to establish a national system
for MRV of REDD.) Most observers conclude that the efforts have yielded useful results, but that
the level and consistency of resources have constrained more widespread progress.
The U.S. delegation has indicated that its position builds on the commitments of all Parties under
the UNFCCC.28 It argues that MRV is required of all Parties. New requirements would cover (1)
enhanced reporting (annually for all but the Least Developed Countries); development,
implementation, and reporting of low carbon strategies and of actions that would be “inscribed
internationally,” (2) independent expert reviews; and (3) public peer reviews conducted in
sessions with all Parties, to promote transparency and accountability. Sub-elements of the MRV
system would, however, apply differently to countries, such as to the Least Developed Countries
versus those non-Annex I Parties with greater responsibilities and capabilities. The U.S. proposal
27 Although many observers talk about “legally binding commitments,” the bigger issue arguably is what mechanisms
for transparency and assuring compliance exist under the agreement.
28 From various sources, including U.S. Department of State, 2009, op. cit., p. 5.
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would include financial support to countries that are not capable of carrying the costs of their
MRV obligations.
Some non-Annex I Parties have protested that the U.S. proposal does not include enough
differentiation among Parties. Some of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have indicated that they
seek a stronger compliance and enforcement system, potentially retaining the procedures agreed
under the Kyoto Protocol.
Author Contact Information
Jane A. Leggett
Richard K. Lattanzio
Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy
Analyst in Environmental Policy
jaleggett@crs.loc.gov, 7-9525
rlattanzio@crs.loc.gov, 7-1754
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