Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement:
Background and Issues for Congress
Jeremiah J. Gertler
Specialist in Military Aviation
November 27, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22763
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
A total of 213 C-17s have been procured through FY2009, including eight that were procured in
the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32 of June 24, 2009). The
Administration’s proposed FY2010 defense budget proposed to end C-17 procurement and did
not request any funding for the procurement of additional C-17s. The Administration argues that
enough C-17s have now been procured to meet future operational needs. Supporters of procuring
additional C-17s in FY2010 believe additional C-17s will be needed to meet future operational
needs. The issue of how much airlift capability will be needed in the future is currently being
examined in a congressionally mandated study being done by the Institute for Defense Analyses
(IDA) and in a separate Department of Defense (DOD) study called the Mobility Capabilities and
Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which is due to be completed by the end of 2009.
FY2010 defense authorization bill: The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009)
on the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) authorizes
no funding for the procurement of additional C-17s. Section 137 of the act prohibits the Secretary
of the Air Force from proceeding with a decision to retire C-5As in any number that would reduce
the active inventory of C-5s below 111 until certain conditions are met, and require the Secretary
of the Air Force to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the issue of C-5
retirement. Section 138 requires the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Director
of the Air National Guard, to submit to the congressional defense committees, at least 90 days
before a C-5 airlift aircraft is retired, a report on the proposed force structure and basing of C-5
and C-17 aircraft. Section 139 amends 10 USC 8062(g)(1) to state that the Secretary of the Air
Force shall maintain a total inventory of not less than 316 C-5s and C-17s. If the current force of
111 C-5s were retained, this provision would support a C-17 force of not less than 205 C-7s—the
number procured through FY2008.
FY2010 DOD appropriations bill: The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept.
111-230 of July 24, 2009) on H.R. 3326, recommended $762.6 million in procurement funding
for the C-17 program, including $674.1 million for the procurement of three C-17s. The
paragraph in the bill that makes funding available for the procurement of Air Force aircraft states
that the funds are made available, “Provided, That no funds provided in this Act for the
procurement or modernization of C-17 aircraft may be obligated until all C-17 contracts funded
with prior year ‘Aircraft Procurement, Air Force’ appropriated funds are definitized.”
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-74 of September 10, 2009) on
H.R. 3326, recommended $2,588.5 million in procurement funding for the C-17 program,
including $2,500.0 million for the procurement of 10 C-17s. S.Amdt. 2558, proposed on
September 29, 2009, would strike from H.R. 3326 funding for C-17 procurement in excess of the
amount requested by administration (i.e., it would strike the $2.5 billion in the bill for the
procurement of 10 C-17s) and make that funding available instead for operation and maintenance
in accordance with amounts requested by the administration, and for the Operation and
Maintenance, Army account for overseas contingency operations. On September 30, the Senate
considered S.Amdt. 2558. A point of order was raised with respect to the amendment. The Senate,
by a vote of 34 to 64 (Record Vote Number 303), rejected a motion to waive the Budget Act with
respect to the amendment, and the amendment was ruled out of order. On October 6, a new
amendment—S.Amdt. 2580—was proposed to strike from H.R. 3326 funding for C-17
procurement in excess of the amount requested by the administration. This amendment was
structured to avoid the point of order that was raised with respect to S.Amdt. 2558. On October 6,
the Senate rejected S.Amdt. 2580 by a vote of 30 to 68 (Record Vote Number 312).
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Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
C-17 Program ....................................................................................................................... 1
C-17 in Brief................................................................................................................... 1
Comparison with C-5 ...................................................................................................... 2
Program Origin and Milestones ....................................................................................... 2
Procurement Quantities ................................................................................................... 3
Contractors, Employment, and Production Line Shutdown .............................................. 4
International Sales........................................................................................................... 5
FY2010 Procurement Funding Request ........................................................................... 7
C-5 Modernization Program.................................................................................................. 8
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP).................................................................. 8
C-5 Reliability and Re-engining Program (RERP)........................................................... 8
Requirements for Strategic Airlift........................................................................................ 11
Mobility Capabilities Study 2005 (MCS-05).................................................................. 12
Congressionally Mandated Study of 2007...................................................................... 13
Evolution in Planned Mix of Airlift Aircraft, 2005-2009................................................ 13
Congressionally Mandated IDA Study of 2009 .............................................................. 13
Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16) .................................. 17
Prior-Year Legislation Relating to Airlift Force Structure..................................................... 18
Section 132 of FY2004 Defense Authorization Act........................................................ 18
Section 132 of FY2006 Defense Authorization Act........................................................ 19
Section 311 of FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act ............................................. 19
Issues for Congress ................................................................................................................... 19
Procuring C-17s and Legislating on Airlift Force Structure.................................................. 19
Requirements for Airlift Capability ............................................................................... 20
Cost-Effectiveness of C-5 Modernization Compared to C-17 Procurement .................... 23
Legislative Activity in 2009 ...................................................................................................... 26
FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84) ............................................... 26
House ........................................................................................................................... 26
Senate ........................................................................................................................... 28
Conference.................................................................................................................... 30
FY2009 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326).................................................................... 33
House ........................................................................................................................... 33
Senate (Committee Report) ........................................................................................... 35
Senate (Floor Consideration)......................................................................................... 36
FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32)..................................... 36
House ........................................................................................................................... 36
Senate ........................................................................................................................... 37
Conference.................................................................................................................... 37
Tables
Table 1. C-17 and C-5 Characteristics ......................................................................................... 2
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Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 2. C-17 Procurement Quantities ......................................................................................... 3
Table 3. Planned Mix of Strategic Airlift Aircraft, 2005-2009 .................................................... 13
Table 4. [Table 3 in GAO report] Comparison of a Modernized C-5 and C-17 Equivalent
Aircraft Capabilities ............................................................................................................... 24
Appendixes
Appendix A. Section 1046 of FY2008 Defense Authorization Act ............................................. 38
Appendix B. Lockheed Point Paper Commenting on November 2008 GAO Report ................... 42
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 48
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Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
Procurement of C-17 airlift aircraft began in FY1988, and a total of 213 have been procured
through FY2009, including eight that were procured in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations
act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32 of June 24, 2009).
The Administration’s proposed FY2010 defense budget proposed to end C-17 procurement and
did not request any funding for the procurement of additional C-17s.1 The Administration argues
that enough C-17s have now been procured to meet future operational needs. Supporters of
procuring additional C-17s in FY2010 believe additional C-17s will be needed to meet future
operational needs. The issue of how much airlift capability will be needed in the future is
currently being examined in a congressionally mandated study being done by the Institute for
Defense Analyses (IDA) and in a separate Department of Defense (DOD) study called the
Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which is due to be completed
by the end of 2009.
The primary issue for Congress in FY2010 is whether to procure additional C-17s. An additional
issue is whether to pass legislation relating to the airlift aircraft force structure. Congress’s
decisions on these issues could affect DOD capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S.
military aircraft industrial base.
Background
C-17 Program
C-17 in Brief
The Air Force C-17, also known as the Globemaster III or simply the Globemaster, can transport
equipment, supplies, and personnel over long distances, from one theater of operations to another,
and can also land on more austere airfields with shorter runways. The C-17 complements the Air
Force’s larger and older C-5 Galaxy airlift aircraft in the strategic (i.e., inter-theater) airlift role,
and smaller C-130 Hercules airlift aircraft in the tactical (i.e., intra-theater) airlift role. DOD
states that
The C-17 can perform the entire spectrum of airlift missions and is specifically designed to
operate effectively and efficiently in both strategic and theater environments. Airlift provides
essential flexibility when responding to contingencies on short notice anywhere in the world.
It is a major element of America’s National Military Strategy and constitutes the most
responsive means of meeting U.S. mobility requirements. Specific tasks associated with the
airlift mission include deployment, employment (airland and airdrop), sustaining support,
retrograde, and combat redeployment. Not only can the C-17 deliver outsize cargo to austere
1 The budget submission refers to ending C-17 procurement at 205 aircraft, because the budget was submitted in May,
prior to the enactment of the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act that funded eight additional C-17s.
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Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
tactical environments, but it also reduces ground time during airland operations. The C-17
will perform the airlift mission well into this century.2
Comparison with C-5
The C-5 and the C-17 can carry outsized (i.e., large-dimension) cargo items,3 such as M-1 tanks.
The C-5 can carry more cargo than the C-17 and has a longer unrefueled range than the C-17.
Certain DOD cargo items, such as the Army’s 74-ton mobile scissors bridge, are so large that they
can be carried only by a C-5. The C-17, however, can deploy cargo and personnel directly into
more austere airfields with shorter runways.4 The C-17 also costs less to operate per flight hour
than the C-5 and has a higher mission capable rate (MCR), which is a measure of aircraft
reliability. Table 1, adapted from a November 2009 GAO report, compares some characteristics
of the C-17 and C-5.
Table 1. C-17 and C-5 Characteristics
Characteristic C-17
C-5
Cargo
170,900 pounds
270,000 pounds
Troops 102
81
Unrefueled range
2,700 miles
6,320 miles
Minimum runway length
3,500 feet
6,000 feet
Speed 572
mph
518
Crew 3
7
Mission capable rate (2008)
86%
52%
Cost per flying hour (2008)
$12,014
$20,947
Source: Information taken from Figure 2 (page 27) of Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:]
Strategic Airlift Gap Has Been Addressed, but Tactical Airlift Plans Are Evolving as Key Issues Have Not Been Resolved,
GAO-10-67, November 2009. GAO states that Figure 2 is based on GAO analysis of DOD data.
Program Origin and Milestones
The C-17 program began in the early 1980s.5 Procurement of C-17s began in FY1988.6 The first
C-17 was delivered to the Air Force in June 1993. The C-17 achieved Initial Operational
2 United States Air Force, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates,
Aircraft Procureent, Air Force, Volume 1, May 2009, page 2-1 (Exhibit P-40, Budget Item Justification, C-17 [MYP],
page 1 of 10).
3 Outsize cargo items have dimensions that exceed 1,090 inches in length, 117 inches in width, or 105 inches in height.
Somewhat smaller cargo items that exceed 96 inches in height but do not exceed 1,090 inches in length, 117 inches in
width, or 105 in height are referred to as oversize cargo. Oversize cargo can be carried not only by the C-5 and C-17,
but by other DOD airlift aircraft as well, such as the C-130.
4 In addition to being able to land on shorter runways, the C-17 is more maneuverable on the ground than the C-5,
which permits a larger number of C-17s to use an airfield simultaneously for loading and offloading equipment.
5 The source selection decision for the program was announced in August 1981. A contract for the program was
awarded in July 1982. The program was given Milestone II approval, and Full Scale Engineering Development (FSED)
(continued...)
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Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
Capability (IOC), with the delivery of 12 aircraft to a C-17 squadron, in January 1995. A full-rate
production contract was awarded in February 1996. The C-17 program experienced development
challenges and cost growth in its earlier years that were the subject of congressional oversight at
the time.
Procurement Quantities
Table 2 shows annual C-17 procurement quantities, along with changes over time in the planned
total number of C-17s to be procured. C-17s were procured under overlapping multiyear
procurement (MYP) arrangements in FY1997-FY2003 and FY2003-FY2007.
Table 2. C-17 Procurement Quantities
Planned total
number to be
procured
Annual
Annual
Cumulative
under that
quantity
quantity
quantity
year’s budget
Fiscal Year
requested
procured
procured
submission
1988
2 2 2 210
1989
4 4 6 210
1990 4 4 10 120
1991 6 0 10 120
1992 4 4 14 120
1993 6 6 20 40
1994 6 6 26 40
1995 6 6 32 40
1996 8 8 40 120
1997 8 8 48 120
1998 9 9 57 120
(...continued)
began, in February 1985.
The C-17 program had a difficult time winning congressional support in the late 1970s, and C-17 development was
delayed until initial funding was finally approved in FY1981. By 1982, DOD was concerned its airlift shortfall was too
urgent to await development of a new plane and decided to purchase aircraft readily available for production. Congress
approved funds in the FY1983 budget to purchase 50 additional C-5B cargo planes and 44 new KC-10 Extender aerial
refueling aircraft to quickly bridge the airlift gap. Because DOD wanted to develop the C-17 and buy additional C-5s,
Congress directed DOD to develop a comprehensive description of its future acquisition plans. The result was the
Airlift Master Plan of September 1983, which compared several alternatives for modernizing the airlift fleet and
concluded that the C-17 was the most cost-effective.
6 The program was granted Milestone III approval, and low-rate initial production (LRIP) began, in January 1989. The
first flight of a C-17 occurred in September 1991. Developmental test and evaluation began in September 1991 and was
completed in December 1994; initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) began in December 1994 and was
completed in June 1995.
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Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
Planned total
number to be
procured
Annual
Annual
Cumulative
under that
quantity
quantity
quantity
year’s budget
Fiscal Year
requested
procured
procured
submission
1999
13 13 70 120
2000
15 15 85 120
2001
12 12 97 134
2002 15 15 112 137
2003 12 15 127 180
2004 11 11 138 180
2005 14 15 153 180
2006 15 15 168 180
2007 12 22a 190 180
2008 0 15b 205 190
2009 0 8c 213 190
2010 0 TBD TBD 205d
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD data.
Notes: n/a = figures not available from online DOD budget data, and have been requested from the Air Force.
a. Ten of these 22 aircraft were funded in Title IX of the FY2007 DOD appropriations act (H.R. 5631/P.L.
109-289 of September 29, 2006)—the title that provided additional appropriations associated with wartime
operations.
b. Procured in the FY2008 supplemental appropriations act (H.R. 2642/P.L. 110-252 of June 30, 2008).
c. Procured in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32 of June 24, 2009).
d. The FY2009 budget was submitted in May 2009, prior to the enactment of the FY2009 supplemental
appropriations act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32 of June 24, 2009), and consequently reflects only the 2005 aircraft
procured through FY2008.
Contractors, Employment, and Production Line Shutdown
The prime contractor for the C-17 is Boeing Airlift and Tankers of Long Beach, CA. C-17s are
the only aircraft made at Boeing’s Long Beach production plant.7 A May 2009 press report states
that the C-17 program, including supplier firms, employs a total of about 30,000 people in 43
states.8
7 Amy Butler, “New C-17s Not Needed, DOD Analysis Shows,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, May 18, 2009: 3.
8 John M. Doyle, “Senators Push Panel For 15 More C-17 Cargo Aircraft,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, May
13, 2009: 3.
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As of July 2009, 190 C-17s had been delivered to the Air Force. The 213th C-17 is scheduled to
be delivered to the Air Force in March 2011.9 As the final C-17 moves down the production line,
the parts of the production line behind that aircraft will begin to shut down. Thus, if C-17
procurement ends at 213 aircraft, parts of the C-17 production line will begin to shut down prior
to March 2011. Suppliers who provide materials or make long leadtime items for the C-17 would
be among the first parts of the line to shut down.
An August 28, 2009, press report states:
Boeing needs the lawmakers on Capitol Hill to insert 15 C-17 Globemaster IIIs in the
Pentagon’s fiscal year 2010 defense budget in order to prevent the company from beginning
to shut down its cargo hauler production facility, according to a senior company official....
Lawmakers in the House and Senate did not insert funding in the FY-10 defense
authorization bill for more C-17s, but they did include another eight aircraft in the FY-09
warfighting supplemental, which was signed by the president earlier this year.
Still, Boeing claims it needs an order of 15 airlifters in FY-10 to keep production humming
along. Steve Gress, Boeing’s vice president of Air Force systems, said the company has
looked at ways to reduce cost and improve productivity on the C-17 production line—not
just at the assembly facility in Long Beach, CA, but throughout the entire supply chain.
“The effort there is to try and reduce the sensitivity of the cost of C-17s to the rate that your
producing” them, he said during an Aug. 21 interview in Arlington, VA. “Any change
though, you may be able to hold the cost, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that you can keep
that whole team together.
“Any change in the quantity is going to probably produce some sort of impact to the
workforce,” Gress continued....
At the same time, Gress said Boeing is “aggressively” looking at potential international sales
of the Globemaster III, however there is no predictability when those orders will come.
“We have a number of different pursuits out there that take us into the international market,”
he said. “The challenge ... is you still need an open, ongoing production line to maintain an
affordable product for many of the countries because, although they’re very interested in the
C-17, the numbers [purchased] are small.”10
International Sales
The C-17 is available to countries other than the United States. The United Kingdom (6 aircraft),
Canada (4), Australia (6), Qatar (2), and a 10-nation NATO consortium (3 aircraft) have acquired
9 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Strategic Airlift Gap Has Been Addressed, but Tactical
Airlift Plans Are Evolving as Key Issues Have Not Been Resolved, GAO-10-67, November 2009, p. 4.
10 Marcus Weisgerber, “Boeing Claims It Needs Order For 15 C-17s to Prevent Shutdown,” Inside the Air Force,
August 28, 2009.
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C-17s to date,11 and the UK is reportedly interested in a seventh.12 A November 17, 2009, press
report adds that India is in negotiations to buy 10 C-17s:
India is negotiating the purchase of Boeing’s C-17 Globemaster Heavy-Lift aircraft in a
deal with the United States that is estimated at about $1.7 billion.
India already possesses a fleet of 40 Russian-made Ilyushin-76 Garjaj transporters.
But experts and several Indian defense officials say that the inclusion of an entirely new
bird to its transport fleet would boost the country’s air force capabilities.
No details of the deal have been disclosed by India’s Ministry of Defense. But local and
international media experts say the negotiation centers on the purchase of 10 C-17
aircraft made by the U.S.-based Boeing, the world’s second-largest plane maker.
While reports pegged the deal price at $1.7 million, analysts question the size of the
discount that the United States could be offering to India.
Specifically, each aircraft costs $250 million and the U.S. Congress has authorized $2.5
billion for 10 of the heavy-lift transport planes for the country’s air force. The plane,
though, is an aircraft that the U.S. Department of Defense does not want to retain for
domestic use.
In a joint-lift exercise, the U.S Air Force flew the Globemaster in India last month. The
joint maneuver, in Agra, was intended to allow Indian defense experts to familiarize
themselves with the plane…
Compared to the IL-76, the Globemaster is known for its ability to land in remote, lesser
developed forward air bases.
“The C-17s advantages include its easier handling,” Defense News reported.
The American-made transport aircraft, however, is three times costlier than its Russian
counterpart.
Still, should the deal be finalized it would mark Boeing’s second-largest deal with India
after a $2.1 billion agreement for the purchase of eight P-81 maritime patrol aircraft for
the Indian navy. That deal was clinched in January 2009…
India has already placed orders for six C-130 aircraft from the United States, the
deliveries of which are due to begin in 2011.13
A September 4, 2009, news report states:
A lack of international C-17 cargo hauler purchases in fiscal year 2010, the same year the Air
Force is planning to end production of the aircraft, has placed defense giant Boeing in a near-
term bind, Inside the Air Force has learned.
11 Totals from Boeing press releases as of November 27, 2009.
12 Andrew Chuter, “Britain In Talks With Boeing For Another C-17,” DefenseNews.com, November 27, 2009.
13 “India eyeing 10 C-17s”, UPI wire report of November 17, 2009, obtained from UPI.com.
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The shortage of overseas sales in FY-10, combined with only a smattering of secured
Globemaster III foreign sales over the next five years, would leave 36 aircraft unaccounted
for, according to internal Pentagon documents reviewed by ITAF. Boeing’s C-17 economic
order quantity estimates show the need for 12 purchases in FY-11; 10 in FY-12; and eight in
FY-13 and FY-14 based on the anticipated timing of international purchases.
India is expected to purchase 10 C-17s between FY-11 and FY 14. While New Delhi could
purchase all 10 aircraft at once, the documents show it would likely purchase three planes
per year in FY-11 through FY-13 and the remaining aircraft in FY-14. Qatar, which is in the
process of receiving its first two C-17s, is expected to buy two more in FY-12, and the
United Arab Emirates is expected to buy four aircraft in FY-11.
In addition to these countries, a number of other nations are interested in the C-17, according
to Air Force and industry sources. International buys could increase even more if the Airbus
A400M cargo transport program is further delayed or canceled.
While there are nine more potential C-17 customers, they are not solid, according to industry
and military sources.
Boeing’s projections show its Long Beach, CA, production facility churning out C-17s
through FY-16, according to the documents. The aircraft orders would be submitted in FY-
14.
The Chicago-based defense giant claims it needs lawmakers on Capitol Hill to insert 15 Air
Force C-17s in the Pentagon’s FY-10 defense budget in order to prevent the company from
beginning to shut down its cargo hauler production facility (ITAF, Aug. 28, p5). However,
the documents show the potential for one C-17 purchase by the United Kingdom in FY-10,
meaning the company still needs a customer for 14 aircraft.
Boeing spokesman Jerry Drelling said the company has not officially projected production
through 2014 and is focusing its efforts on securing 15 C-17 buys in FY-10. The company is
expecting UAE to sign four its aircraft in the coming months.
“Certainly there is a lot of optimism that the U.K. will step up and fill its needs with
additional C-17s,” Drelling said of the potential Royal Air Force sales.
To maintain Boeing’s projected schedule detailed in the documents, a customer would need
to buy 36 more C-17s between FY-10 and FY-14. The company currently needs orders for
14 aircraft in FY-10, five in FY-11 through FY-13 and another seven in FY-14.
Based on current orders, the production line will remain open until July 2011, Drelling
said.14
FY2010 Procurement Funding Request
Consistent with the Administration’s proposal to end C-17 procurement, the proposed FY2010
defense budget did not request funding for the procurement of additional C-17s, and instead
14 Marcus Weisgerber, “Lack of Foreign C-17 Sales Putting Boeing Production in A Bind,” Inside the Air Force,
September 4, 2009.
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requested funding to shut down the C-17 production line. The budget requested $88.5 million in
procurement funding for the C-17 program, but the requested funding is for C-17 support
equipment, spares, data, and training equipment, not for procurement of additional C-17s.
C-5 Modernization Program
The Air Force currently operates 111 C-5s, including C-5As procured between 1969 and 1974,
and C-5Bs and Cs procured in the 1980s.15 Decisions on how many C-17s to procure can be
affected by decisions on how many C-5s are retained in the strategic airlift fleet, and by decisions
on efforts to modernize C-5s.
The Air Force is implementing a two-phase program for modernizing its fleet of 111 C-5s. The
modernization effort is intended to improve C-5 operational capability, flight safety, reliability,
and maintainability. The prime contractor for both phases of the modernization effort is Lockheed
Martin of Marietta, GA.
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP)
The first phase of the modernization effort, the C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP),
began in 1999. The first flight of an AMP-modified C-5 occurred in December 2002. Operational
test and evaluation of AMP began in September 2005 and was completed in July 2006. AMP-
modified C-5s achieved initial operational capability (IOC) in February 2007.16 As of July 2009,
55 C-5s had received the AMP modifications.17 Modernization of all 111 C-5s with AMP is
scheduled for completion in 2015.
C-5 Reliability and Re-engining Program (RERP)
The second phase of the C-5 modernization effort, the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-
engining Program (RERP), began in 2000. The RERP phase includes the installation of new
engines and the modification of more than 70 electrical, fuel, and other subsystems. C-5s that
receive RERP modification do so after receiving AMP modification, and are redesignated C-5Ms.
Three C-5s received RERP during the RERP program’s system development and demonstration
(SDD) phase; the first production aircraft to receive RERP was scheduled to enter modification in
August 2009.18 DOD states that:
RERP is a comprehensive modernization effort that will improve aircraft reliability,
maintainability, and availability. RERP will enable the C-5M to achieve wartime mission
requirements by increasing fleet availability (mission capable rates and departure reliability),
reducing Total Ownership Costs (TOC), and improving aircraft performance. This effort
15 A total of 126 C-5s were produced. Fourteen C-5As have been retired, and one C-5B has crashed.
16 Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), C-5 AMP, December 31, 2007, p. 6.
17 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Strategic Airlift Gap Has Been Addressed, but Tactical
Airlift Plans Are Evolving as Key Issues Have Not Been Resolved, GAO-10-67, November 2009, p. 30.
18 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Strategic Airlift Gap Has Been Addressed, but Tactical
Airlift Plans Are Evolving as Key Issues Have Not Been Resolved, GAO-10-67, November 2009, p. 30.
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centers on replacing the current TF-39 engine with a more reliable, Commercial Off-the-
Shelf (COTS) General Electric (GE) CF6-80C2 (F138-GE-100 military designation)
turbofan engine with increased takeoff thrust, stage-3 noise compliance, and Federal
Aviation Regulation pollution compliance. In addition to new engines/pylons, C-5 RERP
will provide upgrades to wing attachment fittings; new thrust reversers and Auxiliary Power
Units (APUs); upgrades to the electrical, hydraulic, fuel, fire suppression, landing gear, and
pressurization/air conditioning systems; and airframe structural modifications. These aircraft
improvements increase payload capability and access to Communication, Navigation,
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) airspace. C-5 RERP also decreases
aircraft time to climb, increases engine-out climb gradient for takeoff, improves
transportation system throughput, and decreases engine removals.19
The RERP phase was originally intended for all 111 C-5s, like the AMP phase, but cost growth in
2007 that was sufficient to trigger a Nunn-McCurdy breach led to a DOD restructuring of the
RERP phase in 2008 that limited RERP modifications to 52 C-5s.20 The first flight of a RERP-
modified C-5 occurred in June 2006. Test and evaluation of RERP-modified C-5s began in June
2006 and, as of June 2008, was scheduled to be completed in April 2010. Initial operational
capability of RERP-modified C-5s is scheduled for June 2013.21
The U.S. Transportation Command testified in February 2009 that:
the C-5’s outsized and oversized cargo capability is essential to meeting our global mobility
requirements. Unfortunately, low departure reliability and mission capable rates continue to
plague the C-5 fleet. Modernizing all the C-5s with avionics upgrades is essential to allow
access to international airspace and foreign airfields. New engines and other reliability
enhancements for our C-5Bs and two C-5Cs are necessary to increase aircraft availability,
reduce fuel consumption and significantly improve performance throughout their projected
service life. We will modernize the C-5 fleet while closely managing the costs.22
The Air Force testified in May 2009 that:
The Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) provides modern, sustainable aircraft avionics,
allowing the aircraft to efficiently access international airspace. This will allow the Air Force
to more efficiently conduct peacetime operations and meet closure times for our Nation’s
war plans. All C-5B/Cs have entered or completed AMP modification and the first C-5A
completed modification on 16 Feb 2009 and is assigned to Lackland ARB, Texas. Currently,
19 Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), C-5 RERP, June 30, 2008, pp. 3-4.
20 DOD states:
After notifying Congress of a Nunn-McCurdy breach on September 27, 2007, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) certified a restructured C-5
Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP) on February 14, 2008. On March 14,
2008, the USD (AT&L) conducted a successful MS [Milestone] C Defense Acquisition Board
(DAB) [review]. The USD (AT&L) signed the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) reflecting the
Nunn-McCurdy certification and the MS C approval on June 24, 2008.
(Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), C-5 RERP, June 30, 2008, p. 4.)
21 Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), C-5 RERP, June 30, 2008, p. 6.
22 Statement of General Duncan J. McNabb, USAF Commander, United States Transportation Command, Before the
House Armed Services Air & Land Forces and Seapower & Expeditionary Forces Subcommittees [Hearing] On the
State of the Command, February 25, 2009, p. 7.
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the C-5 AMP effort continues at two modification centers at Dover AFB, Delaware and
Travis AFB, California and will modify all 111 C-5 aircraft by 2015.
The Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) builds upon the C-5 AMP
modification. C-5 RERP replaces the propulsion system and improves the reliability of over
70 systems and components. Following a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach, the Defense
Acquisition Executive (DAE) certified a restructured C-5 RERP modernization of the entire
C-5B/C fleet. Since the certification, the program has completed a Milestone C Defense
Acquisition Board as well as an Interim Program Review in January 2009, earning DAE
approval to continue low rate initial production (LRIP).
The restructured program successfully completed developmental test and evaluation, meeting
or exceeding all of its KPPs. As part of this testing, the fully modernized aircraft, known as
the C-5M, accomplished a non-stop flight from Travis AFB, California to Mildenhall AB,
United Kingdom via the polar route, without aerial refueling. The flight began at a gross
weight of 807,000 pounds, well above the normal maximum of 769,000 pounds, established
a continuous climb to an initial altitude of 33,000 feet, carried 120,000 pounds of cargo, and
flew 4,770 nautical miles in approximately 11 hours. This is a vast improvement over legacy
C-5A/B fleets, which would require aerial refueling to carry the same amount of cargo over
the same distance.
The Air Force delivered the first C-5M to an operational unit on 9 February 2009, piloted by
General Arthur Lichte (Commander, Air Mobility Command) with former Secretary John
Young (USD (AT&L)) and former Secretary Sue Payton (Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Acquisition) as proud passengers. The production program is delivering on cost
and on schedule. These efforts will fully modernize 52 C-5s that meet the warfighters’
requirements.23
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in November 2008 that:
The Air Force has cut the number of C-5s it plans to fully modernize by more than half
because of substantial cost increases in the modernization effort.... All 111 C-5s will receive
the avionics upgrade, while only 52 will receive the reliability enhancement and reengining
upgrade. This mix may change again, based on the results of DOD’s new mobility
capabilities studies, possible C-5 retirements, and a revised cost estimate for C-5
modernization....
The costs to modernize C-5 aircraft have not been fully identified and are likely to increase.
While the Air Force now estimates it will spend $9.1 billion to modernize C-5s, the costs
may be underestimated because DOD did not apply risk or uncertainty analysis to its
reliability enhancement and reengining program major cost drivers. Moreover, that particular
effort is underfunded by almost $300 million and costs may escalate if the Air Force has to
stretch the program schedule to stay within funding targets. At the same time, the Air Force
has not fully priced or budgeted for a new C-5 upgrade program it plans to begin in fiscal
23 Department of the Air Force, Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, United States House of Representatives, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant General Daniel J. Darnell, Air
Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And Requirements (AF/A3/5)
Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition (SAF/AQ) Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans
And Programs (AF/A8), May 20, 2009, pp. 18-19.
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year 2010 to address current avionics deficiencies and to add new capabilities. Some future
costs, however, may be avoided should the Air Force justify retirement of some older C-5s
and forego planned modifications.24
Requirements for Strategic Airlift
DOD’s requirements for airlift capability have evolved over the years. The discussion below
summarizes developments in the situation since 2005.
24 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and
Requirements Are Needed to Define Optimal Future Strategic Airlift Mix, GAO-09-50, November 2008, p. 3. The
report also stated on page 6 that:
Together, [the AMP and RERP] upgrades were expected to improve the fleet’s mission capable rate
to at least 75 percent, thereby increasing payload capability and transportation throughput, and to
reduce total ownership costs over the life cycle by about $14 billion in 2008 dollars.
DOD initially expected to spend about $12 billion on the C-5 AMP and RERP efforts. However,
both modernization efforts experienced cost problems. AMP development costs increased by
approximately 20 percent and would have been higher had the Air Force not reduced requirements
and deferred some development activities to other programs. Officials waived 14 operational
requirements and deferred the correction of 250 deficiencies identified during testing, many of
which will be addressed and funded in RERP or future efforts. In 2007, DOD reported that RERP
average procurement unit costs grew more than 50 percent from the original baseline estimate.
The report also stated on pages 8-9 that:
C-5 modernization cost increases caused DOD to change its approach for meeting its strategic
airlift requirements. DOD had planned to meet the requirements with 112 fully modernized C-5s—
i.e., those receiving both the AMP and RERP modifications—and 180 C-17 aircraft. The cost for
the C-5 modernization efforts was estimated to be approximately $12 billion—about $900 million
for the AMP program and $11.1 billion for the RERP program.
However, just prior to the RERP production decision in February 2007, the prime contractor,
Lockheed Martin, indicated that RERP costs related to labor and supplier parts had significantly
increased, prompting new cost estimates. The Air Force’s estimate of $17.5 billion was $4.2 billion
more than Lockheed Martin’s estimate of $13.3 billion at that time. The new estimate increased
projected average procurement unit costs by more than 50 percent compared to the original baseline
and triggered a statutory requirement for review and certification of the program.
Following notification to Congress of the cost increase, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics requested that the CAIG estimate the cost of various options
for DOD to meet its strategic airlift mission. The CAIG analyzed 14 options covering a range of
scenarios for the RERP program in three broad categories: modifying all C-5 aircraft, partially
modifying the C-5 fleet, and canceling the C-5 RERP program. Each option also assumed that the
department would have at least 203 C-17 aircraft, 14 more than the program planned to acquire at
that time. The CAIG estimated the cost of providing the RERP modification to all 111 aircraft to be
$15.4 billion, halfway between the contractor’s and the Air Force’s estimates. Based on this
analysis, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics concluded that
the cost to RERP all C-5 aircraft was unaffordable and opted to limit full modification to 52
aircraft—47 C-5 Bs, both C-5 Cs, and 3 system development and demonstration aircraft. While the
Air Force is expected to spend $3.4 billion less under the restructured program, ultimately less than
one-half of the 111 aircraft will be modernized and at a much higher unit cost than originally
estimated.
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Mobility Capabilities Study 2005 (MCS-05)
DOD’s Mobility Requirements Study of 2005 (MCS-05) identified a requirement for between 292
and 383 strategic airlift aircraft. The bottom end of this range coincided with the Air Force’s
program of record at the time, which included a force of 292 aircraft—180 C-17s and 112 fully
modernized C-5s.25 MCS-05 recommended a strategic airlift force structure of 292 aircraft, which
the study said would meet national military strategy requirements with “acceptable risk.”26 The
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) subsequently stated a DOD goal of maintaining 292
strategic airlifters, including 180 C-17s and 112 fully modernized C-5s.27
The unclassified executive summary of MCS-05 noted that unlike past mobility studies, MCS-05
did not recommend an airlift requirement expressed in millions of ton-miles per day (MTM/D) of
airlift capacity.28
A previous DOD study of strategic airlift requirements, called the Mobility Requirements Study
2005 (MRS-05), was completed in 2000. The study established a requirement of 54.5 MTM/D.29
Some observers expected that MCS-05 would identify a new requirement closer to 60 MTM/D,
while others speculated that MCS-05 would not increase the 54.5 MTM/D requirement because
of DOD concerns about being able to afford a larger airlift fleet.30
In September 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) criticized the methodology
that was being used for MCS-05.31 A more detailed GAO criticism followed in September 2006,
as MCS-05 was nearing completion.32 Other observers criticized MCS-05 for not adequately
addressing DOD intra-theater airlift needs, and for focusing on near-term capabilities rather than
taking a longer view.33 The criticism regarding intra-theater airlift needs was particularly germane
because the C-17 can be used in for intra-theater airlift operations.
In September 2006, it was reported that the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command was again
studying DOD airlift needs. Some observers might have interpreted the Air Force’s initiation of
25 One C-5 was destroyed in a crash on April 3, 2006, leaving 111 in the inventory.
26 “Headquarters Air Mobility Command White Paper, KC-X: The Next Mobility Platform, The Need For A Flexible
Tanker,” p. 4.
27 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and
Requirements Are Needed to Define Optimal Future Strategic Airlift Mix, GAO-09-50, November 2008, p. 1.
28 A ton-mile is one ton of cargo transported one mile. Transporting 50 tons (112,000 pounds) of cargo over a distance
of 2,000 miles equates to 100,000 ton miles.
29 Marc Selinger, “DoD Launching New Review of Transportation Needs,” Aerospace Daily, March 11, 2004.
30 John Tirpak, “Air Mobility in the Doldrums,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 88, issue 8, August 2005, available online at
http://www.afa.org/magazine/aug2005/0805mobility.html.
31 Government Accountability Office, Defense Transportation: Opportunities Exist to Enhance the Credibility of the
Current and Future Mobility Capabilities Studies, GAO-05-659R, September, 2005.
32 Government Accountability Office, Defense Transportation: Study Limitations Raise Questions About the Adequacy
and Completeness of the Mobility Capabilities Study and Report, GAO-06-938, September 2006.
33 John T. Bennett, “Influential DoD Mobility Study’s Focus on Intratheater Needs Questioned,” Inside the Air Force,
April 7, 2006.
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another airlift study so soon after the completion of MCS-05 as tacit acknowledgment of flaws in
the MCS and an attempt to ameliorate them.34
Congressionally Mandated Study of 2007
To provide Congress with greater clarity into airlift requirements, Section 1034 of the FY2007
Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 October 17, 2006) required DOD to submit a
report to Congress defining airlift requirements in terms of million-ton-miles per day. DOD
delivered the report in classified form to the congressional defense committees on February 27,
2007.
Evolution in Planned Mix of Airlift Aircraft, 2005-2009
As shown in Table 3, which is taken from a November 2009 GAO report, the planned mix of C-
17s and C-5s evolved between December 2005 and June 2009 due to various events, including
continued procurement of C-17s, the restructuring of the C-5 modernization program to limit the
RERP phase to 52 aircraft, and the crash in 2006 of one C-5 (which reduced the C-5 inventory
from 112 to 111).
Table 3. Planned Mix of Strategic Airlift Aircraft, 2005-2009
September
Aircraft type
December 2005
2006
February 2008
June 2008
June 2009
Event Mobility
Capability
Congressional
C-5 RERP
Congressional
Congressional
Study released
appropriation for
program
appropriation for
appropriation for
additional C-17s
restructured
additional C-17s
additional C-17s
C-17s
180 190 190 205 213
C-5s (fully modernized – both
112 112 52 52 52
AMP and RERP)
C-5s (AMP modernization only)
0
0
59
59
59
Estimated
MTM/D
33.09 33.95 32.17 34.79 34.79
Source: Information taken from Table 5 (page 12) of Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:]
Strategic Airlift Gap Has Been Addressed, but Tactical Airlift Plans Are Evolving as Key Issues Have Not Been Resolved,
GAO-10-67, November 2009. GAO states that Table 5 is based on GAO analysis of DOD budget and program
data.
Notes: Fully modernized C-5s are those that have received both AMP and RERP.
Congressionally Mandated IDA Study of 2009
Section 1046 of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28,
2008—see Appendix A for the text of this provision) required the Secretary of Defense “to
conduct a requirements-based study on alternatives for the proper size and mix of fixed-wing
34 Michael Fabey, “AF Formulating Mobility Plan,” Aerospace Daily, September 28, 2006.
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intratheater and intertheater airlift assets to meet the National Military Strategy for each of the
following timeframes: fiscal year 2012, 2018, and 2024.” The study was conducted by the
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and completed in February 2009. The study summarized its
findings as follows:
What are the airlift requirements?
The requirements for single or two concurrent MCO demands were based on those used in
the Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) from 2005. For the non-MCO demands, however,
this study was able to take advantage of early versions of the more current Steady State
Security Posture scenarios in order to derive demands outside the major theaters of war.
Together, these constituted the requirements assumed for airlift.
Does the currently programmed fleet meet the requirements?
We found that the POR fleet is adequate in meeting the benchmark requirements identified in
the MCS for moderate acceptable risk. Three different computer models used in this study
produced somewhat different results for deliveries. The most pessimistic results matched
MCS benchmark results, and with the other models, lower force levels than programmed
also met the MCS benchmark level.
What programmatic alternatives might also be considered and how well do they meet these
requirements? What are the life-cycle costs of these alternatives?
The study considered 36 alternative mixes and sizes and compared them both in cost and
effectiveness with the POR. Figure ES-1 illustrates the relative capabilities of several
alternative fleets that differ only in numbers or types of strategic lift aircraft (i.e., numbers
and types of C-5s and C-17s). Results are shown relative to the capabilities that met the MCS
moderate risk delivery demands for cargo. Similar analyses were performed for alternative
fleets that differ in the numbers and types of intratheater airlift aircraft.
The study identified several relatively inexpensive ways of generating higher capability from
existing forces, without procuring additional strategic airlifters beyond those already
programmed. These include the following: use C-5s at Emergency Wartime Planning levels
(adds 2-4 percent, depending on whether the extra weight carried is fuel or cargo); transport
with CRAF35 whatever oversize cargo that CRAF can carry, in addition to bulk cargo on
pallets, in order to free up organic airlifters for the larger and heavier cargo (adds 10
percent); use host nation airlifters to the maximum extent possible (4 or 5 percent); and make
use of tankers not involved in tanking missions to carry cargo in theater (adds about 4
percent). Use of these capabilities could also allow for a smaller strategic fleet that still meets
MCS benchmark delivery requirements. Thus, our analyses using the MCR moderate risk
benchmark suggest that an upper bound on the number of required strategic airlifters is 316,
indicated by the two yellow boxes in Figure ES-1.
35 This is a reference to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, a group of commercial aircraft that U.S. airlines are committed by
contract to make available to DOD to augment DOD’s military airlift capability in emergencies.
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A small amount of additional capability could be achieved if all C-5s are converted through
Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) to C-5Ms. This alternative is at
comparable life-cycle cost to that of the POR; near-term acquisition costs are almost repaid
over time in later years by reduced operating and support (O&S) costs.
Traditionally, airlift and other force requirements are set by wartime demands (i.e., MCOs),
not steady-state peacetime demands. Airlift is heavily used in both. If the appropriate
acquisition planning scenarios are not MCOs but are high tempo non-MCO operations such
as in Iraq and Afghanistan today, we find that some C-5As could be retired to save O&S
costs with no loss in capability for those missions. This is illustrated in Figure ES-2.
Moreover, a more cost-effective fleet than the POR is one that, in addition to having fewer
C-5As, uses the smaller C-27Js instead of the larger C-130Js. These observations are driven
by the need for numerous, geographically separated, but small loads during non-MCO
operations, as currently anticipated in DoD planning scenarios.
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Our assessment of the C-17 line shutdown and restart is that continued production, even at
low rates, is expensive relative to restart costs. Moreover, under the scenarios and other
assumptions considered in this study, additional C-17s were not needed to meet the MCS
moderate-acceptable-risk delivery rates used as a benchmark by the analyses conducted here.
We also found that retiring C-5As to release funds to buy and operate more C-17s is not
cost-effective.
How do the alternatives differ in service life?
We projected aircraft service lifetimes based on planned flying hour and flying severity
conditions. Excursions to the planned operating conditions were also examined. Our findings
are that all airlifters except the C-130E have structural lifetimes that are beyond 2030.
Virtually all the C-5s and C-17s have lifetimes beyond 2040. The C-130E is near its
structural life limit and extensions to that life are not cost-effective by our analyses.
How well do CRAF aircraft contribute to wartime deliveries? At what specific organic fleet
inventory would it impede the ability of CRAF participants to remain a viable augmentation
option?
We included CRAF in the simulated airlift deliveries and find them to be useful for
passenger and cargo delivery, especially in MCOs if CRAF aircraft are allowed to carry
some oversize cargo. Nonetheless, fewer than half of the CRAF aircraft available for Stage
III (during two MCOs) are actually used, so current incentives provide more than enough
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CRAF for wartime demands. We also note that restructuring airline fleets should not
significantly influence CRAF availability but may reduce numbers of charter passenger
aircraft. A larger organic military fleet of airlift aircraft does not challenge passenger CRAF
viability but could influence cargo CRAF because the organic fleet would be expected to
shoulder a larger amount of the cargo movement required in peacetime. However, the cargo
CRAF participates in a strong economic sector, does not strongly depend on CRAF in
contrast to other commercial revenues, and is not likely to be significantly hurt by likely
changes in DoD force levels.36
Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16)
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the U.S. Transportation Command are
currently examining future requirements for airlift capability in a study called Mobility Capability
and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which is expected to be completed by the end of
2009.37 The U.S. Transportation Command testified in February 2009 that MCRS-16 and the
congressionally mandated IDA study discussed in the previous paragraph “will aid decision
makers in determining the mobility requirements necessary to defend the homeland, prevail in the
war on terror, conduct irregular warfare and win conventional campaigns in the 2016
timeframe.”38
GAO reported in November 2008 that
According to Air Force officials, [MCRS-16] will take into account a variety of changes that
have occurred since the last mobility study was completed in 2005, including the following:
• Addition of over 92,000 Marines and Army soldiers and their equipment that will need to
be transported to locations across the United States and around the world.
• Establishment of a new African Command that will require the movement of troops and
equipment to a variety of locations around the second largest continent in the world.
• Introduction of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, which are being used in Iraq to
provide enhanced protection for U.S. troops.
• Increase in weight of the Army’s Future Combat System vehicles, which makes it no longer
possible to transport some vehicles with C-130 aircraft (DOD’s primary tactical airlifter).
36 W. L. Greer, G. M. Koretsky, and J. P. Woolsey, Study on Size and Mix of Airlift Force, Unclassified Synopsis,
Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Paper P-4428, February 2009, pp. ES-1 to ES-4. A copy of this document was
provided to CRS by Lockheed on October 2, 2009.
37 Department of the Air Force, Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, United States House of Representatives, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant General Daniel J. Darnell, Air
Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And Requirements (AF/A3/5)
Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition (SAF/AQ) Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans
And Programs (AF/A8), May 20, 2009, p. 19.
38 38 Statement of General Duncan J. McNabb, USAF Commander, United States Transportation Command, Before the
House Armed Services Air & Land Forces and Seapower & Expeditionary Forces Subcommittees [Hearing] On the
State of the Command, February 25, 2009, p. 6.
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The GAO report also stated:
Some expect the [congressionally mandated IDA study and MCRS-16] will identify
increased demands on airlift, particularly for the C-17 since it can perform both a strategic
and tactical role. As Army equipment becomes heavier and/or bulkier, the C-17 may be the
only aircraft capable of delivering major weapon systems to the front lines and to more
austere bases in the theater of combat. The results of both studies, if done accurately and
comprehensively, should provide the analytical foundation for the future airlift force
structure.39
A May 2009 press report stated:
Early indications from the Pentagon’s Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study suggest no
need for additional strategic airlift beyond the funded procurements of re-engined C-5s and
205 C-17s already planned, says U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz.
The 2005 Mobility Capabilities Study had suggested a requirement of roughly 300 strategic
airlifters, and Schwartz says he sees “no major shift in the demand signal.” The 2005 study,
however, was discredited in much of Washington as a budget-driven formality under former
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and a new study has been eagerly awaited.
The new study is now under way, although official results are not expected until the fall.
Unlike previous reviews, this study will take into account the requirements associated with
increases in Army and Marine Corps end-strength, as well as the new U.S. Africa Command.
Even if more strategic airlift is ultimately needed, Air Force Secretary Michael Donley says
an independent study40 presents several options before considering a buy of additional C-17s,
the only aircraft made at Boeing’s Long Beach, Calif., plant.
These include leasing additional Civil Reserve Air Fleet capacity, as well as re-engining all
111 C-5s.41
Prior-Year Legislation Relating to Airlift Force Structure
Section 132 of FY2004 Defense Authorization Act
Section 132 of the FY2004 defense authorization act (H.R. 1588/P.L. 108-136 of November 24,
2003) prohibited the Secretary of the Air Force from proceeding with a decision to retire C-5As
from the active inventory of the Air Force in any number that would reduce the total number of
C-5As in the active inventory below 112 (effectively now 111, following the crash in 2006 of a C-
5 in 2006) until the Air Force modified a C-5A aircraft to RERP configuration and DOD’s
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation conducted an operational evaluation of that aircraft
and provided to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees an
39 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and
Requirements Are Needed to Define Optimal Future Strategic Airlift Mix, GAO-09-50, November 2008, p. 10.
40 This may be a reference to the congressionally mandated IDA study.
41 Amy Butler, “New C-17s Not Needed, DOD Analysis Shows,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, May 18, 2009: 3.
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operational assessment. This provision was repealed by Section 311 of the FY2009 supplemental
appropriations act (see below).
Section 132 of FY2006 Defense Authorization Act
Section 132 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17,
2006) amended 10 USC 8062 to create a new subsection (g)(1) stating that, effective October 1,
2008, the Secretary of the Air Force shall maintain a total aircraft inventory of strategic airlift
aircraft of not less than 299 aircraft. The provision defines strategic airlift aircraft as those with a
cargo capacity of at least 150,000 pounds and a capability to transport outsized cargo over an
unrefueled range of at least 2,400 nautical miles. The aircraft types that meet this definition are
the C-5 and C-17.
Section 311 of FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act
Section 311 of the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32 of June 24,
2009) repealed Section 132 of the FY2004 defense authorization act (see above) and permits the
Secretary of the Air Force to retire C-5As 15 days after certifying to the congressional defense
committees that retiring the aircraft will not significantly increase operational risk of not meeting
the national defense strategy, and provided that such retirements may not reduce total strategic
airlift force structure inventory below the 292 strategic airlift aircraft level identified in the
Mobility Capability Study 2005 (MCS-05) unless otherwise addressed in the FY2010 defense
authorization act.
Issues for Congress
Procuring C-17s and Legislating on Airlift Force Structure
The primary issue for Congress in FY2010 is whether to procure additional C-17s. An additional
issue is whether to pass additional legislation relating to the airlift aircraft force structure.
The Administration argues that enough C-17s have now been procured to meet future operational
needs. Supporters of procuring additional C-17s in FY2010 believe additional will be needed to
meet future operational needs.
In considering whether to procure additional C-17s in FY2010, Congress may consider a number
of factors, including the total requirement for airlift capability and the cost-effectiveness of C-5
modernization compared to procuring additional C-17s. Additional factors to consider are
constraints on total defense spending and the potential affect that procuring additional C-17s may
have on reducing funding for other defense programs.
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Requirements for Airlift Capability
Awaiting Results of IDA Study and MCRS-16
Observers are now awaiting the results of the two current studies on the total requirement for
airlift capability—the congressionally mandated IDA study and MCRS-16.
September 2009 Letter from Secretary of Defense
A September 29, 2009 letter from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the chairmen of the
House and Senate Armed Services Committee states:
I am writing as a follow up to our discussion last week regarding the retirement of strategic
airlift aircraft.
The Department [of Defense] fully supports the language in Section 311 of the Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-32) which requires a minimum of 292 strategic airlift
aircraft as reflected in the Department’s 2005 Mobility Capability Study.
Since the release of MCS-05, Congress has funded an additional 33 C-17s the Department
did not request. The addition of these C-17 aircraft influenced our decision to upgrade only
52 of 111 C-5s with the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP).
Congress is now considering adding another 10 C-17s in the FY2010 budget.
The Department’s current fleet of 324 aircraft (213 C-17/111 C-5) is in excess of strategic
airlift needs, driving increased operating costs at the expense of other priorities. Each C-5A
costs over $13 million in annual operating expenses. Since we are over our current
requirement by eight aircraft, as determined by the analysis conducted during the C-5 RERP
Nunn-McCurdy recertification, it costs the Department over $100 million a year in excess
expenditures. These costs will only grow if we receive additional C-17s and/or delay the
ability for the Department to retire excess aircraft.
Initial indications from Mobility Capability Requirements Study 2016 show the strategic
balance will not fundamentally change. This leads me to believe: 1) the Department does not
need additional C-17s to meet strategic needs; 2) the Department needs to begin shedding
excess strategic airlift inventory by retiring a portion of the C-5A fleet now. The Department
requests your support and authority to allow the proper management of the strategic airlift
fleet to meet the Nation’s requirements.
Thank you for your strong interest and continued support of the Department.42
November 2009 GAO Report
GAO reported in November 2009 that:
42 Letters dated September 29, 2009, from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the Honorable Carl Levin and
(separately) the Honorable Ike Skelton, posted on InsideDefense.com (subscription required).
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Additional funds provided by Congress for C-17 procurement more than offset the strategic
airlift gaps associated with reduced C-5 modernization plans. However, there is a potential
future gap in tactical airlift capabilities for transporting medium weight Army equipment that
cannot fit on C-130 aircraft. The C-17 fleet, in its dual role of providing both strategic and
tactical airlift, currently provides this capability and is anticipated to continue to do so for
many years. The JFTL [Joint Future Theater Lift aircraft] is envisioned to eventually replace
the C-130H and perform this and other roles, but will not be available for 15 years or more
under the current acquisition strategy. While the various mobility studies acknowledge the
C-17s’ significant dual role, they did not comprehensively evaluate an expanded future use
of the C-17 for the transport of medium weight equipment and how this could affect the
force structure, the C-17s’ service life, and when to shut down the C-17 production line. For
example, the studies do not quantify current and anticipated future use of the C-17 for
tactical airlift. This is because DOD officials do not consider the C-17 to be a suitable
substitute for the JFTL....
A potential future capability gap exists in the deployment and redeployment of Army
medium weight weapon systems within a theater of combat. The C-17 is the only aircraft
currently capable of transporting heavier equipment, such as combat configured armored
Strykers and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, within a theater of operations as
these are too large and bulky for C-130s to carry. However, the C-17 cannot transport this
equipment into austere, short, or unimproved landing areas. DOD’s long-term plan is to use
the JFTL, the planned C-130H replacement, to transport these vehicles in theater, including
to such access-challenged locations. However, it will not be available for at least 15 years as
currently planned. While the various mobility studies acknowledge the C-17 can perform
both strategic and tactical airlift missions, none of the three recently completed or ongoing
studies comprehensively considered the C-17 in the tactical force structure, even though
about 20 percent of the tactical sorties flown by the C-17 fleet in fiscal year 2007 were for
missions where loads were too large for C-130s. As such, DOD has not evaluated the impact
the increasing tactical heavy lift mission will have on future tactical airlift requirements, the
C-17’s service life, its availability to perform strategic airlift and other tactical airlift
missions, and the impact it could have on C-17 production shutdown plans.
DOD officials do not believe that the C-17 is a suitable substitute for the JFTL mission. A
DOD official stated that preliminary results of the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements
Study 2016 show that in the worst case planning scenario there would be enough C-17s to
perform its primary role as a strategic airlifter, as well as some tactical missions through
2016. This is because the study analysis shows the peak demand for the C-17 and the C-130
occurs at different times and the C-17 is aging as planned. However, officials indicated that
none of the current mobility studies analyzed the need for the C-17 to perform additional
tactical heavy lift missions for the 8-year period between 2016 and 2024, when the JFTL is
expected to be fielded. Furthermore, because we were not granted access to the preliminary
study information, we could not ascertain the extent to which the C-17’s heavy lift mission
had been considered in DOD’s analysis through 2016. C-17 production is scheduled to end
in March 2011. As we previously reported a well-reasoned, near-term decision on the final
C-17 fleet size could help DOD avoid substantial future costs from ending production
prematurely and later restarting production. For example, the Air Force has estimated that
restoring the production line could cost $2 billion. Costs and challenges associated with such
a course include hiring and training a workforce of nearly 3,100 people, reinstalling and
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restoring production tooling, and identifying suppliers and qualifying their parts and
processes.43
November 2008 GAO Report
GAO reported in November 2008 that:
We previously reported on shortcomings in the Institute for Defense Analysis’ study plan
that could make it difficult for decision makers to know how much strategic airlift is needed.
For example, the study plan did not provide details on assumptions and the measures of
effectiveness, or metrics, the command officials would be using in their evaluation.
Measures of effectiveness are considered to be especially important when evaluating
alternatives, such as comparing the results of two analyses that measure different airlift force
mixes. We recommended in April 2008 that DOD take action to ensure that the final study
plan included sufficient details to address all the elements specified in the law and needed to
inform decision makers on airlift issues.44 DOD concurred with our recommendation.
We also identified shortcomings in DOD’s 2005 mobility capabilities study approach that, if
not addressed, could be repeated again in the current study. Unlike prior studies, the 2005
study did not recommend a specific airlift requirement expressed in million ton-miles per
day—a common metric integral to prior capability studies that defines and quantifies airlift
requirements as a basis for computing the size and optimal mix of airlift forces. Instead,
DOD officials stated that it expressed its airlift requirement in terms of specific numbers and
types of aircraft needed to meet the national defense strategy to take into account real-world
operating parameters that may cause aircraft payloads to vary significantly from standard
planning factors. Later, in response to congressional direction, DOD translated the
requirements into a million ton-mile requirement. We also found the study did not identify
the operational impact of increased or decreased strategic airlift on achieving warfighting
objectives that would be associated with different mixes of C-5 and C-17 aircraft. As a
result, we could not determine how the study concluded that the mix of C-5s and C-17s at
that time was adequate for meeting mobility requirements and for supporting strategic airlift
portfolio investment decisions. In 2006, we recommended that DOD include mobility
metrics, along with warfighting metrics to determine air superiority, when completing future
mobility capabilities studies. DOD concurred with this recommendation.45
Although DOD concurred with the recommendation, a Transportation Command official
stated that a decision has not yet been made on what specific metrics will be used to
determine the number and mix of strategic airlifters in the current mobility capabilities study.
At the time of this writing, the study plan had not been finalized and it is unclear whether a
million ton-miles metric will be used, though it is being considered. DOD often uses the
million ton-mile metric as an easy way to compare the capacity of different fleet mixes. For
43 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:]Strategic Airlift Gap Has Been Addressed, but Tactical
Airlift Plans Are Evolving as Key Issues Have Not Been Resolved, GAO-10-67, November 2009, pp. 11 and 13-14.
44 The passage at this point contains a footnote citing the following GAO report: Government Accountability Office,
Defense Transportation[:] DOD Should Ensure that the Final Size and Mix of Airlift Force Study Plan Includes
Sufficient Detail to Meet the Terms of the Law and Inform Decision Makers, GAO-08-704R, April 28, 2008.
45 The passage at this point contains a footnote citing the following GAO report: Government Accountability Office,
Defense Transportation: Study Limitations Raise Questions about the Adequacy and Completeness of the Mobility
Capability Study and Report, GAO-06-938, September 2006.
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example, according to a DOD official, since C-130s, C-130Js, C-17s, C-5As, C-5Bs, and C-
5Ms all have different capabilities when it comes to payload and range, it is difficult to
compare different mixes of them without using this metric.46
The report also stated:
The C-5 and C-17 provide complementary capabilities. However, DOD continues to struggle
with identifying the specific quantities and determining the optimal mix of aircraft needed.
Clarity is needed before committing additional billions of dollars to C-5 modernization
programs, establishing C-5 retirement schedules, and/or acquiring additional C-17 aircraft.
Careful planning is also important to avoid the costs of shutting down the C-17 line
prematurely and later deciding to restart the production. The new mobility studies, if done
correctly, could bring clarity to strategic airlift capabilities needed to support the future force
and changed threats, as well as inform future tactical airlift requirements because of the C-
17’s dual role. Important metrics left out of the 2005 capabilities study—such as specific
ton-mile mobility requirements and relative reliability rates—are considered critical factors
in quantifying and analyzing cost-effective force mixes. DOD concurred with our prior
recommendation to use mobility metrics to inform future mobility capabilities studies.
However, at this writing, it is unclear whether DOD will use a million ton-mile metric in its
current analysis to determine the cost-effective mix of aircraft and guide important
investment decisions related to the expenditure of billions of dollars. Until comprehensive
requirements—supported by appropriate, quantifiable metrics—and the full costs for
alternate courses of action are identified, DOD decision making on the future size and mix of
strategic airlift is hampered, thus increasing the risk of incurring unnecessary costs and
establishing a less than optimal mix of strategic and tactical airlift forces.47
Cost-Effectiveness of C-5 Modernization Compared to C-17 Procurement
November 2008 GAO Report
GAO reported in November 2008 that:
if the cost for C-5 modernization continues to increase, Air Force officials may have to
reconsider the mix within its airlift portfolio or request additional funding. Additional
investments in C-17 aircraft may become more attractive. Currently, a new C-17 would cost
about $276 million compared to $132 million to fully modernize a C-5. Each new C-17
potentially adds 100 percent of its cargo capacity toward meeting the total airlift
requirement. Because the C-5s are already part of the operational force, each aircraft’s
current capacity is already counted toward the total requirement. Consequently, according to
DOD data, the C-5 modernization programs only provide a marginal increase of 14 percent
in capability over nonmodernized aircraft. Using DOD’s million ton-mile per day planning
factors, we, working in collaboration with DOD, calculated that DOD would need to fully
modernize 7 C-5s to attain the equivalent capability achieved from acquiring 1 additional C-
17 and the costs would be over 3 times more (see table 3).
46 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and
Requirements Are Needed to Define Optimal Future Strategic Airlift Mix, GAO-09-50, November 2008, pp. 10-11.
47 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and
Requirements Are Needed to Define Optimal Future Strategic Airlift Mix, GAO-09-50, November 2008, pp. 19-20.
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Table 4. [Table 3 in GAO report] Comparison of a Modernized C-5 and C-17
Equivalent Aircraft Capabilities
Aircraft needed to
Total Cost of
provide equivalent
equivalent
Unit
costa
capabilities
capability
C-5 fully
$ 132 million
7
$924 million
modernized
C-17
new $276
million 1 $276
million
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
a. Unit costs reflect procurement costs only. Data are rounded for presentation purposes.
The analysis does not include the life-cycle costs of adding more C-17s to DOD’s airlift
portfolio. However, previous DOD analysis indicated that the life-cycle costs would be
approximately the same if DOD replaced 30 C-5s with 30 C-17s.
The Air Force has not fully identified the funding needed to modernize the C-5 aircraft, and
costs are likely to increase. The current cost estimate is $9.1 billion to AMP the entire fleet
of 111 aircraft and RERP 52 aircraft. However, we believe this is understated. The current
budget does not fully fund the revised RERP program and the CAIG’s [the DOD Cost
Analysis Improvement Group’s] cost estimate does not adequately address risk and
uncertainty. Further, the cost estimate does not include the costs for a new modernization
upgrade program slated to begin in fiscal year 2010 that would fix AMP deficiencies and add
new capabilities. Alternatively, some future modification costs may be avoided should the
Air Force justify retirement of some older C-5s.
The current budget does not sufficiently fund the revised RERP program. According to the
CAIG’s analysis, the C-5 RERP is underfunded by about $294 million across the Future
Years Defense Plan for fiscal years 2009- 2013. Approximately $250 million less is needed
in fiscal years 2009 through 2011, and $544 million more is needed in fiscal years 2012 and
2013. According to program officials, the Air Force is committed to fully funding the CAIG
RERP cost estimate in the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget yet to be submitted. However,
program officials could not identify sources for the additional funding needed in fiscal years
2012 and 2013....
While our review of the CAIG’s cost-estimating methodology found it generally well
documented, comprehensive, and accurate, we found some weaknesses that impair the
credibility and overall reliability of the C-5 cost estimate. Specifically, the CAIG did not take
risk or uncertainty into account for some major cost drivers, in particular the propulsion
system and labor. Because cost estimates predict future program costs, uncertainty is always
associated with them. For example, there is always a chance that the actual cost will differ
from the estimate because of a lack of knowledge about the future as well as errors resulting
from historical data inconsistencies, assumptions, cost-estimating equations, and factors that
are typically used to develop an estimate. Quantifying that risk and uncertainty is considered
to be a cost estimating best practice because it captures the cumulative effect of risks and
recognizes the potential for error.
In a memo documenting its independent cost estimate, the CAIG stated that the biggest risk
to the cost estimate was the purchase agreement between Lockheed Martin and General
Electric for the propulsion system that is conditioned on specific annual procurement
quantities. The CAIG had estimated that the Air Force could save 18 percent by meeting the
quantity and schedule identified in the revised RERP. However, CAIG officials stated that if
the budget is not sufficient to meet these agreed-to quantities, then anticipated price breaks
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would not occur, resulting in increased costs of the C-5 RERP to the government. Despite
this significant risk, the CAIG did not perform a risk/uncertainty analysis to determine the
extent to which costs would increase should the buy quantity be cut. CAIG officials stated
that they believe propulsion system procurement risk has been mitigated because they have
identified the quantities necessary to meet the conditions of the purchase agreement and the
Air Force plans to fully fund to this estimate. Despite these assurances, however, we have
found that DOD often changes procurement quantities and there is a risk that quantities for
the C-5 RERP program may change. For example, DOD’s Selected Acquisition Report
summary shows that of the 56 programs currently in production, 38 (or 68 percent), have
experienced a quantity change since their production decisions.
In addition, the CAIG did not quantify or address uncertainty with its $2.1 billion labor cost
estimate associated with the installation of the RERP on C-5 production aircraft. The RERP
program experienced a 29-month break in production between the last system development
and demonstration unit and the first production unit. As such, the CAIG had to estimate
inefficiencies due to loss of learning and how it would affect the costs of future production.
The CAIG’s assumptions differed from those used by the Air Force and Lockheed Martin,
which caused the CAIG estimate to be about $200 million more than Lockheed Martin’s
estimate and about $400 million less than the Air Force’s labor estimate. As a result of the
weaknesses discussed above, the Air Force’s basis for making strategic airlift portfolio
investment decisions is impaired, and the RERP program is at increased risk of experiencing
cost overruns.
Additional modernization efforts not yet budgeted will add to future C-5 costs. Air Force
officials stated that a new C-5 upgrade program is slated to begin in fiscal year 2010. The
initial funding requirement is $65 million—$40 million in research, development, test, and
evaluation funds and $25 million in procurement funds—to migrate all C-5s toward a
standard software configuration, based on changes made in the AMP and RERP programs.
Requirements previous waived on the AMP may also be addressed in the initial block of this
program. Additional funding will be requested in 2012 and beyond to provide additional
capabilities. According to a program official, the total requirements and funding needs for
this modernization program have not been finalized. However, at this time it is not expected
to be as costly as the C-5 AMP or RERP.
The eventual costs for modernizing C-5 aircraft hinge upon the decisions DOD officials
make about the number and mix of strategic airlifters DOD needs in the future. If additional
C-5 capability is needed, more C-5 aircraft may need to receive the RERP modification and
costs will increase. On the other hand, if decision makers believe additional C-17 capability
is needed in lieu of the C-5, the Air Force may be able to reduce the number of aircraft that
need the AMP modification and additional modifications slated to begin in fiscal year
2010.48
Lockheed Comment on November 2008 GAO Report
Lockheed, the maker of the C-5, found fault with the November 2008 GAO report, stating in a
seven-page point paper that:
48 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and
Requirements Are Needed to Define Optimal Future Strategic Airlift Mix, GAO-09-50, November 2008, pp. 12-16.
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The GAO report adequately addresses some elements surrounding past C-5 modernization
debate and C-17 alternatives, yet falls fall short of presenting a balanced discussion that
advances a better public understanding of the complex strategic airlift debate. The GAO
report selectively applies facts that detract from the merits of C-5 modernization while
omitting current and relevant analysis that highlights the value of the program. Lockheed
Martin concurs with the DoD’s characterization that the GAO report contains misleading
information and illustrations....
The GAO report does not represent a balanced discussion, but instead presents a rather one-
dimensional perspective which leans toward C-17 advocacy while failing to acknowledge
virtually any of the benefits of C-5 modernization. In its 2008 RERP recertification, the DoD
reviewed 14 different airlift options and concluded that no other alternative provided greater
or equal military capability at less cost than C-5 modernization. RERP delivers significant
operational capabilities, meets all requirements, and pays for itself.49
For the full text of this point paper, see Appendix B.
Legislative Activity in 2009
FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on H.R.
2647, recommends no funding for the procurement of additional C-17s in FY2010, and instead
recommends approving the Administration’s request for $88.5 million in procurement funding for
other C-17 program expenses. (Page 93)
Section 134 of H.R. 2647 would require the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the
Director of the Air National Guard, to submit to the congressional defense committees, at least
120 days before a C-5 is retired, a report on the proposed force structure and basing of C-5 and C-
17 aircraft. The text of Section 134 is as follows:
SEC. 134. REPORTS ON STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT.
At least 120 days before the date on which a C-5 aircraft is retired, the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Director of the Air National Guard, shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report on the proposed force structure and basing of
strategic airlift aircraft (as defined in section 8062(g)(2) of title 10, United States Code).
Each report shall include the following:
(1) A list of each aircraft in the inventory of strategic airlift aircraft, including for each such
aircraft—
49 Lockheed point paper entitled “White Paper On Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report ‘Defense
Acquisitions: Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and Requirements Are Needed to Define Optimal Future
Strategic Airlift Mix’ (November 2008),” provided to CRS by Lockheed on October 2, 2009.
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(A) the type;
(B) the variant; and
(C) the military installation where such aircraft is based.
(2) A list of each strategic airlift aircraft proposed for retirement, including for each such
aircraft—
(A) the type;
(B) the variant; and
(C) the military installation where such aircraft is based.
(3) A list of each unit affected by a proposed retirement listed under paragraph (2) and how
such unit is affected.
(4) For each military installation listed under paragraph (2)(C), any changes to the mission of
the installation as a result of a proposed retirement.
(5) Any anticipated reductions in manpower as a result of a proposed retirement listed under
paragraph (2).
(6) Any anticipated increases in manpower or military construction at a military installation
as a result of an increase in force structure related to a proposed retirement listed under
paragraph (2).
Section 135 of H.R. 2647 would amend 10 USC 8062(g)(1)—the subsection of 10 USC 8062 that
was created by Section 132 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of
October 17, 2006)—to state that, effective October 1, 2009 (rather than October 1, 2008), the
Secretary of the Air Force shall maintain a total strategic airlift aircraft (i.e., C-5 and C-17)
inventory of not less than 316 (rather than 299) aircraft. Assuming the retention of the current
force of 111 C-5s, this provision would appear to support a C-17 force of 205 C-7s—the number
procured through FY2008.
The committee’s report states:
Strategic airlift force structure
The committee notes that the current Mobility Capabilities Study 2005 (MCS–05) identified
a range of 292–383 strategic airlift aircraft to meet global mobility requirements with
moderate risk. In testimony before the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces and the
Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces on February 25, 2009, the commander
of the United States Transportation Command testified that a force structure of 205 C–17s,
52 [fully modernized] C–5Ms, and 59 C–5As modified with the avionics modernization
program [AMP], a total of 316 strategic airlift aircraft, meets the requirement to transport
33.95 million ton-miles per day. Additionally, the committee notes that the previous
commander of the United States Transportation Command and now current Air Force Chief
of Staff, in his letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on
November 6, 2007, also identified 316 strategic airlift aircraft as the ‘‘sweet spot’’ to meet
global mobility requirements.
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The committee further notes that MCS–05 did not consider the combined Army and Marine
Corps increase of 92,000 soldiers and Marines, a potential increase in strategic airlift
necessary to transport the Army’s future combat systems, or the prospect that future strategic
mobility aircraft would be utilized to conduct intra-theater airlift missions to move outsized
and oversized equipment as they are now being used in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and
believes that the results of MCRS–16 should more accurately identify the inventory of
strategic airlift aircraft necessary to meet future strategic airlift mobility requirements.
Accordingly, the committee believes that the long-term strategic airlift force structure
inventory required to meet global mobility requirements may be subject to future adjustment
based on the results of the Mobility Capability Requirement Study 2016 (MCRS–16)
scheduled for completion in December 2009, and encourages a continued dialogue between
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, senior uniformed military officials, and the
congressional defense committees. The committee also recommends a provision elsewhere in
this title [Section 135] that would amend subsection (g)(1) of section 8062, United States
Code, by striking ‘‘299’’ and inserting ‘‘316.’’ (Pages 101-102)
Section 1032 would require a report on the force structure findings of the 2009 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR). The committee’s report states:
The committee expects that the analyses submitted will include details on all elements of the
force structure discussed in the QDR report, and particularly the following:...
(2) A description of the factors that informed decisions regarding strategic and tactical airlift
force structure, including: the modeling, simulations, and analyses used to determine the
number and type of airlift aircraft necessary to meet the national defense strategy; the
number and type of airlift aircraft necessary to meet the national defense strategy; the
changes made, and supporting rationale for the changes made, to the airlift force structure
from that proposed in Mobility Capabilities Study 2005 (MCS–05), including numbers of
airlift aircraft necessary to meet additional demands for increased Army and Marine Corps
personnel, airlift necessary to transport the Army’s future combat systems, and the use of
airlift aircraft in intra-theater airlift missions; the force sizing constructs used, including peak
demand as measured in millions of ton-miles per day and force structure necessary to meet
peak demand including the number of C–17s, C–5s, C–130s, C–27s, and civil reserve air
fleet; and the operational risks associated with the planned strategic and tactical airlift
aircraft fleet, based on requirements of combatant commanders, and measures planned to
address those risks; ... (Pages 387-388)
Senate
Division D of the FY2010 defense authorization bill (S. 1390) as reported by the Senate Armed
Services Committee (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) presents the detailed line-item funding
tables that in previous years have been included in the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report
on the defense authorization bill. Division D recommends no funding for the procurement of
additional C-17s in FY2010, and instead recommends approving the Administration’s request for
$88.5 million in procurement funding for other C-17 program expenses. (Page 630 of the printed
bill.)
Section 121 of S. 1390 would prohibit the Secretary of the Air Force from proceeding with a
decision to retire C-5As until certain conditions are met, and require the Secretary of the Air
Force to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the issue of C-5 retirement.
The text of Section 121 is as follows:
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SEC. 121. LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT OF C-5 AIRCRAFT.
(a) Limitation- The Secretary of the Air Force may not proceed with a decision to retire C-
5A aircraft from the active inventory of the Air Force in any number that would reduce the
total number of such aircraft in the active inventory below 111 until—
(1) the Air Force has modified a C-5A aircraft to the configuration referred to as the
Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP) configuration, as planned under
the C-5 System Development and Demonstration program as of May 1, 2003; and
(2) the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense—
(A) conducts an operational evaluation of that aircraft, as so modified; and
(B) provides to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees an
operational assessment.
(b) Operational Evaluation- An operational evaluation for purposes of paragraph (2)(A) of
subsection (a) is an evaluation, conducted during operational testing and evaluation of the
aircraft, as so modified, of the performance of the aircraft with respect to reliability,
maintainability, and availability and with respect to critical operational issues.
(c) Operational Assessment- An operational assessment for purposes of paragraph (2)(B) of
subsection (a) is an operational assessment of the program to modify C-5A aircraft to the
configuration referred to in subsection (a)(1) regarding both overall suitability and
deficiencies of the program to improve performance of the C-5A aircraft relative to
requirements and specifications for reliability, maintainability, and availability of that
aircraft as in effect on May 1, 2003.
(d) Additional Limitations on Retirement of Aircraft- The Secretary of the Air Force may not
retire C-5 aircraft from the active inventory as of the date of this Act until the later of the
following:
(1) The date that is 150 days after the date on which the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation submits the report referred to in subsection (a)(2)(B).
(2) The date that is 120 days after the date on which the Secretary submits the report required
under subsection (e).
(3) The date that is 30 days after the date on which the Secretary certifies to the
congressional defense committees that—
(A) the retirement of such aircraft will not increase the operational risk of meeting the
National Defense Strategy; and
(B) the retirement of such aircraft will not reduce the total strategic airlift force structure
below 324 strategic airlift aircraft.
(e) Report on Retirement of Aircraft- The Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report setting forth the following:
(1) The rationale for the retirement of existing C-5 aircraft and a cost/benefit analysis of
alternative strategic airlift force structures, including the force structure that would result
from the retirement of such aircraft.
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(2) An assessment of the costs and benefits of applying the Reliability Enhancement and Re-
engining Program (RERP) modification to the entire the C-5A aircraft fleet.
(3) An assessment of the implications for the Air Force, the Air National Guard, and the Air
Force Reserve of operating a mix of C-5A aircraft and C-5M aircraft.
(4) An assessment of the costs and benefits of increasing the number of C-5 aircraft in Back-
up Aircraft Inventory (BAI) status as a hedge against future requirements of such aircraft.
(5) An assessment of the costs, benefits, and implications of transferring C-5 aircraft to
United States flag carriers operating in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program or to
coalition partners in lieu of the retirement of such aircraft.
(6) Such other matters relating to the retirement of C-5 aircraft as the Secretary considers
appropriate.
(f) Maintenance of Aircraft Upon Retirement- The Secretary of the Air Force shall maintain
any C-5 aircraft retired after the date of the enactment of this Act in Type 1000 storage until
opportunities for the transfer of such aircraft as described in subsection (e)(5) have been fully
exhausted.
Conference
The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization
act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) authorizes no funding for the procurement of
additional C-17s. (Page 948)
Section 137 of the act prohibits the Secretary of the Air Force from proceeding with a decision to
retire C-5As in any number that would reduce the active inventory of C-5s below 111 until certain
conditions are met, and require the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees on the issue of C-5 retirement.
Section 138 requires the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Director of the Air
National Guard, to submit to the congressional defense committees, at least 90 days before a C-5
airlift aircraft is retired, a report on the proposed force structure and basing of C-5 and C-17
aircraft.
Section 139 amends 10 USC 8062(g)(1) to state that the Secretary of the Air Force shall maintain
a total inventory of not less than 316 C-5s and C-17s. If the current force of 111 C-5s were
retained, this provision would support a C-17 force of not less than 205 C-7s—the number
procured through FY2008.
Section 1052 requires a report on the force structure findings of the 2009 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). The House report on H.R. 2647 (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009 – see
discussion above), stated that this report is to include, among other things, a discussion of
description of the factors that informed decisions regarding strategic and tactical airlift force
structure.
Section 137 states:
SEC. 137. LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT OF C–5 AIRCRAFT.
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(a) LIMITATION.—The Secretary of the Air Force may not proceed with a decision to retire
C–5A aircraft from the active inventory of the Air Force in any number that would reduce
the total number of such aircraft in the active inventory below 111 until—
(1) the Air Force has modified a C–5A aircraft to the configuration referred to as the
Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP) configuration, as planned under
the C–5 System Development and Demonstration program as of May 1, 2003; and
(2) the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense—
(A) conducts an operational evaluation of that aircraft, as so modified; and
(B) provides to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees an
operational assessment.
(b) OPERATIONAL EVALUATION.—An operational evaluation for purposes of paragraph
(2)(A) of subsection (a) is an evaluation, conducted during operational testing and evaluation
of the aircraft, as so modified, of the performance of the aircraft with respect to reliability,
maintainability, and availability and with respect to critical operational issues.
(c) OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT.—An operational assessment for purposes of
paragraph (2)(B) of subsection (a) is an operational assessment of the program to modify C–
5A aircraft to the configuration referred to in subsection (a)(1) regarding both overall
suitability and deficiencies of the program to improve performance of the C–5A aircraft
relative to requirements and specifications for reliability, maintainability, and availability of
that aircraft as in effect on May 1, 2003.
(d) ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON RETIREMENT OF AIRCRAFT.—
The Secretary of the Air Force may not retire C–5 aircraft from the active inventory as of the
date of the enactment of this Act until the later of the following:
(1) The date that is 90 days after the date on which the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation submits the report referred to in subsection (a)(2)(B).
(2) The date that is 90 days after the date on which the Secretary submits the report required
under subsection (e).
(3) The date that is 30 days after the date on which the Secretary certifies to the
congressional defense committees that—
(A) the retirement of such aircraft will not increase the operational risk of meeting the
National Defense Strategy; and
(B) the retirement of such aircraft will not reduce the total strategic airlift force structure
below 316 strategic airlift aircraft.
(e) REPORT ON RETIREMENT OF AIRCRAFT.—The Secretary of the Air Force shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth the following:
(1) The rationale for the retirement of existing C–5 aircraft and a cost-benefit analysis of
alternative strategic airlift force structures, including the force structure that would result
from the retirement of such aircraft.
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(2) An updated assessment to the assessment of the Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics certified on February 14, 2008, concerning the costs and benefits
of applying the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) modification to
the entire the C–5A aircraft fleet.
(3) An assessment of the implications for the Air Force, the Air National Guard, and the Air
Force Reserve of operating a mix of C–5A aircraft and C–5M aircraft.
(4) An assessment of the costs and benefits of increasing the number of C–5 aircraft in Back-
up Aircraft Inventory (BAI) status as a hedge against future requirements of such aircraft.
(5) An assessment of the costs, benefits, and implications of transferring C–5 aircraft to
United States flag carriers operating in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program or to
coalition partners in lieu of the retirement of such aircraft.
(6) Such other matters relating to the retirement of C–5 aircraft as the Secretary considers
appropriate.
Section 138 states:
SEC. 138. REPORTS ON STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT.
At least 90 days before the date on which a C–5 aircraft is retired, the Secretary of the Air
Force, in consultation with the Director of the Air National Guard, shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report on the proposed force structure and basing of
strategic airlift aircraft (as defined in section 8062(g)(2) of title 10, United States Code).
Each report shall include the following:
(1) A list of each aircraft in the inventory of strategic airlift aircraft, including for each such
aircraft—
(A) the type;
(B) the variant; and
(C) the military installation where such aircraft is based.
(2) A list of each strategic airlift aircraft proposed for retirement, including for each such
aircraft—
(A) the type;
(B) the variant; and
(C) the military installation where such aircraft is based.
(3) A list of each unit affected by a proposed retirement listed under paragraph (2) and how
such unit is affected.
(4) For each military installation listed under paragraph (2)(C), changes, if any, to the
mission of the installation as a result of a proposed retirement.
(5) Any anticipated reductions in manpower as a result of a proposed retirement listed under
paragraph (2).
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Section 139 states:
SEC. 139. STRATEGIC AIRLIFT FORCE STRUCTURE.
Subsection (g)(1) of section 8062 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) by striking ‘‘2008’’ and inserting ‘‘2009’’; and
(2) by striking ‘‘299’’ and inserting ‘‘316’’.
FY2009 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-230 of July 24, 2009) on H.R.
3326, recommended $762.6 million in procurement funding for the C-17 program, including
$674.1 million for the procurement of three C-17s. (Page 187)
The report recommends a $152.6 million reduction in the amount of procurement funding
requested for the modification of in-service C-17s, mostly for “Excess Install[ation] funding” for
certain pieces of equipment, and a $91.4 million reduction (a 100% reduction) in the amount of
procurement funding requested for C-17 post-production support for “Program Reduction.”
(Pages 188 and 189).
The paragraph in the bill that makes funding available for the procurement of Air Force aircraft
states that the funds are made available, “Provided, That no funds provided in this Act for the
procurement or modernization of C-17 aircraft may be obligated until all C-17 contracts funded
with prior year `Aircraft Procurement, Air Force’ appropriated funds are definitized.”
The report recommends approving the requests in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
part of the budget for $132.3 million in procurement funding for the modification of in-service C-
17s50 and for $11 million in procurement funding for C-17 post-production support. (Page 358)
The committee’s report states:
C–17 AIRCRAFT
The C–17 Globemaster III aircraft has been the supply and logistics workhorse of the
ongoing overseas conflicts. This platform has been responsible for the airlift of more cargo
and personnel than any other platform. In recognition of the platforms contributions to the
Nation’s security, the Committee provides an additional $674,100,000 for the procurement
of three C–17 aircraft. The Committee recognizes that this is well below the minimum
sustaining rate required for the production line. In an effort to avoid the extremely high costs
associated with small production lots, the Committee’s intent is that these aircraft be
50 The report of the Senate Appropriations Committee on H.R. 3326 (see discussion below) states that the requested
figure was $120.7 million.
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absorbed into the fiscal year 2009 production run that was funded from the Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2009, to create a full production run funded over a two year period. The
Committee intends that the pricing for these aircraft be consistent with the 2009 aircraft,
using methods such as a fixed price option to the fiscal year 2009 production contract. (Page
191)
The report also states:
UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACT ACTIONS
The Committee has become aware of the excessive use of undefinitized contract actions
(UCA’s) by the Air Force. Based on information obtained by the Committee, it is apparent
that the Air Force has not provided the proper oversight of contracting activities within
various programs. Specifically, the C–17 aircraft program has billions of dollars in
undefinitized contracts. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFAR) very clearly
stipulate in subpart 217.74 that UCA’s are to be used as the exception not as the rule for
urgent needs. It is common practice for the C–17 program to place all of its funding on a
UCA and then immediately obligate up to 50 percent of the not-to-exceed price at the award
which is a disincentive to definitize the contract. Further, the DFAR requires that the contract
must be definitized within 180 days after the issuance of initial undefinitized action unless it
is extended by another 180 days after the contractor submits a qualifying proposal. The C–17
program has numerous contracts well in excess of these timelines with proposal times for
fiscal year 2007 funds ranging from 373 to 975 days and on average 688 days to definitize.
This use of UCA’s places the taxpayer at a severe disadvantage when negotiating contracts
since the contractor has little incentive to control costs while performing work under a UCA.
Even more concerning to the Committee, is that this excessive use of UCA’s is not just
isolated to procurement and modernization programs but has migrated to operation and
maintenance programs. Based on information supplied by the Air Force, a Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Contracting memorandum dated 28 November 2001
authorized the waiver of the limitations in the DFAR for definitization schedule and
obligations for UCAs that support overseas operations. With this memorandum as
justification, the Air Force has placed the fiscal year 2009 C–17 depot funding on a UCA
which is still not definitized in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year even though the Air Force
has obligated 89.7 percent of the $1,118,679,167 not-to-exceed price. This rationale for the
use of a undefinitized contracts for routine activities is abusive. The Committee directs the
Secretary of the Air Force to address this situation within 30 days of enactment of this Act to
include the cancellation of the November 2001 memorandum. The Committee further directs
the Air Force to provide a detailed report to the congressional defense committees of all
undefinitized UCA’s in excess of $50,000,000 within 30 days of enactment of this Act. The
report shall include the date the UCA was initiated, the not-to-exceed price, the amount
obligated on the UCA, and the planned date for definitization.
While the Committee understands the need at times for programs to use this type of
contracting mechanism, it appears that the Air Force has grossly abused it with respect to
volume, value, and time to definitize. The Committee insists that the Air Force finalize all
existing undefinitized contract actions in an expedited manner and to minimize the use of
UCA’s the future. To encourage a sense of urgency, the Committee has included a new
proviso in the Aircraft Procurement, Air Force appropriating paragraph which specifies that
for C–17 procurement and modernization efforts funded with Aircraft Procurement, Air
Force the obligation of fiscal year 2010 procurement funds is prohibited until the existing
UCA’s are definitized. The Committee further directs the Undersecretary of Defense,
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) to review contracting procedures
within the Air Force and provide a report to the congressional defense committees within 90
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days of enactment of this Act detailing a strategy to reduce current and minimize future
undefinitized contracts in the Air Force. (Pages 190-191)
Section 8041 of the bill as reported would rescind certain FY2009 appropriations for DOD
programs. The committee’s report states that the funds that would be rescinded include $70
million in FY2009 research and development funding for the C-17 program. (Page 324)
A July 28, 2009, statement of administration policy on H.R. 3326 as reported in the House states:
C-17 Transport Aircraft. The Administration strongly objects to the addition of $674 million
in funding for three unrequested C-17 airlift aircraft. Analyses by DOD have shown that the
205 C-17s in the force and on order, together with the existing fleet of C-5 aircraft, are
sufficient to meet the Department’s future airlift needs, even under the most stressing
situations.51
Senate (Committee Report)
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-74 of September 10, 2009) on
H.R. 3326, recommends $2,588.5 million in procurement funding for the C-17 program,
including $2,500.0 million for the procurement of 10 C-17s. (Page 133)
The report recommends a $45.3 million reduction in the amount of procurement funding
requested for the modification of in-service C-17s for “Funding requested ahead of need,” and a
$91.4 million reduction (a 100% reduction) in the amount of procurement funding requested for
C-17 post-production support for “Funding requested ahead of need.” (Page 133)
The report recommends approving the requests in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
part of the budget for $120.7 million in procurement funding for the modification of in-service C-
17s52 and for $11 million in procurement funding for C-17 post-production support. (Page 261)
Section 8040 of the bill as reported would rescind certain FY2008 and FY2009 appropriations for
DOD programs. The committee’s report states that the funds that would be rescinded include
$22.4 million in FY2009 research and development funding for the C-17 program. (Page 230)
The report “directs that the National Guard and Reserve Equipment program shall be executed by
the heads of the Guard and Reserve components with priority consideration given to” several
items, including Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) systems for C-17s. (Page
151)
A September 25, 2009, statement of administration policy on H.R. 3326 as reported in the Senate
states:
51 Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 3326—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, July 28, 2009
(House), available online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=86466.
52 The report of the House Appropriations Committee on H.R. 3326 (see discussion above) states that the requested
figure was $132.3 million.
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C-17 Transport Aircraft. The Administration strongly objects to the addition of $2.5 billion
in funding for 10 unrequested C-17 airlift aircraft. Analyses by DOD have shown that the
205 C-17s in the force and on order, together with the fleet of C-5 aircraft, are sufficient to
meet the Department’s future airlift needs, even under the most stressing situations.53
Senate (Floor Consideration)
Senate Amendment 2558
S.Amdt. 2558, proposed on September 29, 2009, would strike from H.R. 3326 funding for C-17
procurement in excess of the amount requested by administration (i.e., it would strike the $2.5
billion in the bill for the procurement of 10 C-17s) and make that funding available instead for
operation and maintenance in accordance with amounts requested by the administration, and for
the Operation and Maintenance, Army account for overseas contingency operations.
On September 30, the Senate considered S.Amdt. 2558. A point of order was raised with respect
to the amendment. The Senate, by a vote of 34 to 64 (Record Vote Number 303), rejected a
motion to waive the Budget Act with respect to the amendment, and the amendment was ruled out
of order.
Senate Amendment 2580
On October 6, a new amendment—S.Amdt. 2580—was proposed to strike from H.R. 3326
funding for C-17 procurement in excess of the amount requested by the administration. This
amendment was structured to avoid the point of order that was raised with respect to S.Amdt.
2558. On October 6, the Senate rejected S.Amdt. 2580 by a vote of 30 to 68 (Record Vote
Number 312).
FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-105 of May 12, 2009) on the
FY2009 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 2346), recommended $2.2452 billion for the
procurement of eight additional C-17s. (Page 21) The report stated:
C–17 GLOBEMASTER III
The Committee recommendation includes $2,245,200,000 for the procurement of eight C–17
Globemaster III aircraft. The C–17 is the workhorse of the theater, flying fifty percent of all
sorties for the United States Transportation Command over the last 24 months. These
missions range from airdrops for troops in forward locations to aeromedical evacuation of
servicemembers from theater back to the United States. While the aircraft is designed to fly
53 Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 3326—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, September 25,
2009 (Senate), available online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=86689.
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1,000 hours per year over 30 years, over the last ten years the C–17 fleet has averaged 1,250
hours per aircraft with some aircraft flying in excess of 2,400 hours in a single year. This
heavy usage is reducing the expected service life of the aircraft. The aircraft included in the
recommendation will alleviate some of these issues by introducing new aircraft into the
inventory.
Further, the Committee is concerned that a decision on the continuation of the C–17 program
was announced prior to the completion of the Mobility Capability and Requirements Study
(MCRS), which will address the needs of the Department of Defense in 2016. Since the last
MCRS in 2005, several changes have occurred that would change previous requirements to
include the growth of ground forces, the increased size and use of Special Operations Forces,
additional use of the C–17 in an intra-theater role, and the stand up of a new combatant
command—United States Africa Command. It seems more prudent to continue the C–17
program until the results of the study are announced later this year.
Additionally, the Air Force is encouraged to work with Congress and the reserve component
to replace aging C–5A aircraft with C–17 aircraft. While there are concerns that reserve
component aircraft are not utilized at the same rate as aircraft assigned to Air Mobility
Command, the Committee believes that the Air Force can develop plans to work with the
reserve component to address some of these issues (i.e. active association with Guard units).
(Pages 24-25)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-20 of May 14, 2009) on the
FY2009 supplemental appropriations bill (S. 1054), recommended no funding for the
procurement of additional C-17s, and instead recommended rejecting a request that the
Administration had made for $230.2 million in FY2009 supplemental funding to cover other C-17
program expenses. (Page 43)
Conference
The conference report (H.Rept. 111-151 of June 12, 2009) on H.R. 2346 (P.L. 111-32 of June 24,
2009) provided $2.172 billion for the procurement of eight additional C-17s. (Page 93)
Section 311 of the act repealed Section 132 of the FY2004 defense authorization act (H.R.
1588/P.L. 108-136 of November 24, 2003)54 and permits the Secretary of the Air Force to retire
C-5As 15 days after certifying to the congressional defense committees that retiring the aircraft
will not significantly increase operational risk of not meeting the national defense strategy, and
provided that such retirements may not reduce total strategic airlift force structure inventory
below the 292 strategic airlift aircraft level identified in the Mobility Capability Study 2005
(MCS-05) unless otherwise addressed in the FY2010 defense authorization act.
54 Section 132 of the H.R. 1588/P.L. 108-136 prohibited the Secretary of the Air Force from proceeding with a decision
to retire C-5As from the active inventory of the Air Force in any number that would reduce the total number of C-5As
in the active inventory below 112 (effectively now 111, following the crash in 2006 of a C-5 in 2006) until the Air
Force modified a C-5A aircraft to RERP configuration and DOD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
conducted an operational evaluation of that aircraft and provided to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional
defense committees an operational assessment.
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Appendix A. Section 1046 of FY2008 Defense
Authorization Act
The text of Section 1046 of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of
January 28, 2008) is as follows:
SEC. 1046. STUDY ON SIZE AND MIX OF AIRLIFT FORCE.
(a) Study Required- The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a requirements-based study on
alternatives for the proper size and mix of fixed-wing intratheater and intertheater airlift
assets to meet the National Military Strategy for each of the following timeframes: fiscal
year 2012, 2018, and 2024. The study shall—
(1) focus on organic and commercially programmed airlift capabilities;
(2) analyze the full-spectrum lifecycle costs of the various alternatives for organic models of
each of the following aircraft: C-5A/B/C/M, C-17A, KC-X, KC-10, KC-135R, C-130E/H/J,
Joint Cargo Aircraft; and
(3) incorporate the augmentation capability, viability, and feasibility of the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet during activation stages I, II, and III.
(b) Use of Ffrdc- The Secretary shall select, to carry out the study required by subsection (a),
a federally funded research and development center that has experience and expertise in
conducting similar studies.
(c) Study Plan- The study required by subsection (a) shall be carried out under a study plan.
The study plan shall be developed as follows:
(1) The center selected under subsection (b) shall develop the study plan and shall, not later
than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, submit the study plan to the
congressional defense committees, the Secretary, and the Comptroller General of the United
States.
(2) The Comptroller General shall review the study plan to determine whether it is complete
and objective, and whether it has any flaws or weaknesses in scope or methodology, and
shall, not later than 30 days after receiving the study plan, submit to the Secretary and the
center a report that contains the results of that review and provides any recommendations
that the Comptroller General considers appropriate for improvements to the study plan.
(3) The center shall modify the study plan to incorporate the recommendations under
paragraph (2) and shall, not later than 45 days after receiving that report, submit to the
Secretary and the congressional defense committees a report on those modifications. The
report shall describe each modification and, if the modifications do not incorporate one or
more of the recommendations, shall explain the reasons for not doing so.
(d) Elements of Study Plan- The study plan required by subsection (c) shall address, at
minimum, the following:
(1) A description of lift requirements and operating profiles for airlift aircraft required to
meet the National Military Strategy, including assumptions regarding the following:
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(A) Current and future military combat and support missions.
(B) The planned force structure growth of the military services.
(C) Potential changes in lift requirements, including the deployment of the Future Combat
Systems by the Army.
(D) New capability in airlift to be provided by the KC(X) aircraft and the expected utilization
of such capability, including its use in intratheater lift.
(E) The utilization of intertheater lift aircraft in intratheater combat mission support roles.
(F) The availability and application of Civil Reserve Air Fleet assets in future military
scenarios.
(G) Air mobility requirements associated with the Global Rebasing Initiative of the
Department of Defense.
(H) Air mobility requirements in support of worldwide peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions.
(I) Air mobility requirements in support of homeland defense and national emergencies.
(J) The viability and capability of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to augment organic forces in
both friendly and hostile environments.
(K) An assessment of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to adequately augment the organic fleet as
it relates to commercial inventory management restructuring in response to future
commercial markets, streamlining of operations, efficiency measures, or downsizing of the
participant.
(2) An evaluation of the state of the current airlift fleet of the Air Force, including
assessments of the following:
(A) The extent to which the increased use of airlift aircraft in on-going operations is affecting
the programmed service life of the aircraft of that fleet.
(B) The adequacy of the current airlift force, including whether or not a minimum of 299
strategic airlift aircraft for the Air Force is sufficient to support future expeditionary combat
and non-combat missions, as well as domestic and training mission demands consistent with
the requirements of meeting the National Military Strategy.
(C) The optimal mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft for the strategic airlift fleet of the Air Force, to
include the following:
(i) The cost-effectiveness of modernizing various iterations of the C-5A and C-5B/C aircraft
fleet versus procuring additional C-17 aircraft.
(ii) The military capability, operational availability, usefulness, and service life of the C-
5A/B/C/M aircraft and the C-17 aircraft. Such an assessment shall examine appropriate
metrics, such as aircraft availability rates, departure rates, and mission capable rates, in each
of the following cases:
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(I) Completion of the Avionics Modernization Program and the Reliability Enhancement and
Re-engining Program.
(II) Partial completion of the Avionics Modernization Program and the Reliability
Enhancement and Re-engining Program, with partial completion of either such program
being considered the point at which the continued execution of each program is no longer
supported by the cost-effectiveness analysis.
(iii) At what specific fleet inventory for each organic aircraft, to include air refueling aircraft
used in the airlift role, would it impede the ability of Civil Reserve Air Fleet participants to
remain a viable augmentation option.
(D) An analysis and assessment of the lessons that may be learned from the experience of the
Air Force in restarting the production line for the C-5 aircraft after having closed the line for
several years, and recommendations for the actions that the Department of Defense should
take to ensure that the production line for the C-17 aircraft could be restarted if necessary,
including—
(i) an analysis of the methods that were used and costs that were incurred in closing and re-
opening the production line for the C-5 aircraft;
(ii) an assessment of the methods and actions that should be employed and the expected costs
and risks of closing and re-opening the production line for the C-17 aircraft in view of that
experience.
Such analysis and assessment should deal with issues such as production work force,
production facilities, tooling, industrial base suppliers, contractor logistics support versus
organic maintenance, and diminished manufacturing sources.
(E) Assessing the military capability, operational availability, usefulness, service life and
optimal mix of intra-theater airlift aircraft, to include—
(i) the cost-effectiveness of procuring the Joint Cargo Aircraft versus procuring additional C-
130J or refurbishing C-130E/H platforms to meet intra-theater airlift requirements of the
combatant commander and component commands; and
(ii) the cost-effectiveness of procuring additional C-17 aircraft versus procuring additional C-
130J platforms or refurbishing C-130E/H platforms to meet intra-theater airlift requirements
of the combatant commander and component commands.
(3) Each analysis required by paragraph (2) shall include—
(A) a description of the assumptions and sensitivity analysis utilized in the study regarding
aircraft performances and cargo loading factors; and
(B) a comprehensive statement of the data and assumptions utilized in making the program
life cycle cost estimates and a comparison of cost and risk associated with the optimally
mixed fleet of airlift aircraft versus the program of record airlift aircraft fleet.
(e) Utilization of Other Studies- The study required by subsection (a) shall build upon the
results of the 2005 Mobility Capabilities Studies, the on-going Intra-theater Airlift Fleet Mix
Analysis, the Intra-theater Lift Capabilities Study, the Joint Future Theater Airlift
Capabilities Analysis, and other appropriate studies and analyses, such as Fleet Viability
Board Reports or special aircraft assessments. The study shall also include any testing data
collected on modernization, recapitalization, and upgrade efforts of current organic aircraft.
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(f) Collaboration With United States Transportation Command- In conducting the study
required by subsection (a) and preparing the report required by subsection (c)(3), the center
shall collaborate with the commander of the United States Transportation Command.
(g) Collaboration With Cost Analysis Improvement Group- In conducting the study required
by subsection (a) and constructing the analysis required by subsection (a)(2), the center shall
collaborate with the Cost Analysis Improvement Group of the Department of Defense.
(h) Report- Not later than January 10, 2009, the center selected under subsection (b) shall
submit to the Secretary and the congressional defense committees a report on the study
required by subsection (a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but shall
include a classified annex.
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Appendix B. Lockheed Point Paper Commenting on
November 2008 GAO Report
This appendix presents the text of a Lockheed point paper that comments on the November 2008
GAO report, quoted elsewhere in this CRS report, on the strategic airlift mix.55 The text of the
Lockheed white paper is reprinted below.
[Lockheed] White Paper On
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report
“Defense Acquisitions: Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and Requirements Are
Needed to Define Optimal Future Strategic Airlift Mix” (November 2008)
Background: At the request of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Subcommittee on Air and
Land Forces, the GAO was asked to identify the impact C-5 modernization cost increases have had on the
mix of aircraft; assess the current C-5 modernization cost estimate; and identify C-17 production plans and
issues related to production line shutdown.
Discussion: The GAO report adequately addresses some elements surrounding past C-5
modernization debate and C-17 alternatives, yet falls fall short of presenting a balanced
discussion that advances a better public understanding of the complex strategic airlift debate. The
GAO report selectively applies facts that detract from the merits of C-5 modernization while
omitting current and relevant analysis that highlights the value of the program. Lockheed Martin
concurs with the DoD’s characterization that the GAO report contains misleading information and
illustrations. The full report can be found at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0950.pdf.
Below are examples of GAO report shortcomings.
Item
GAO Report Comment
Lockheed Martin Response
1
p.1: “…determining current and future airlift
Determining future airlift requirements has not
requirements—and the specific numbers and
necessarily become more challenging. While
optimal mix of aircraft needed to meet those
there are legitimate fiscal concerns, funding
requirements—has become increasingly
constraints to support identified requirements,
challenging given affordability concerns and
and emerging force structure considerations,
changes in threats, missions, and future force
the core debate tends to center around how to
structure.”
extend the C-17 production line. Multiple
studies have repeatedly failed to identify the
need for additional C-17s. Consequently,
proponents for additional C-17 production
either challenge the credibility of those studies
or disparage other platforms to create a need
55 Lockheed point paper entitled “White Paper On Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report ‘Defense
Acquisitions: Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and Requirements Are Needed to Define Optimal Future
Strategic Airlift Mix’ (November 2008),” provided to CRS by Lockheed on October 2, 2009. Emphasis as in original.
Congressional Research Service
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Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
for replacement of existing capability.
2
p.2: “….the Department of Defense (DOD) is
Report fails to attribute or cite a source for this
currently rethinking its strategic airlift plans,
comment. DoD’s strategic airlift program of
due in part to significant cost growth for
record is clear: 205 C-17s + 52 fully
modernizing C-5 aircraft and a subsequent
modernized C-5s (AMP+RERP) + 59 partially
scaling back of modernization efforts.”
modernized C-5s (AMP only). Based on GAO
report (table 2), this fleet mix appears to
generate more organic national airlift
capability (as measured in MTMs) than any
time in history. This capability exceeds MCS,
QDR, and JROC established requirements to
meet national security requirements at
“acceptable” risk.
3
p.3: “The Air Force has cut the number of C-5s This is only partially true and an over
it plans to fully modernize by more than half
simplification. As a result of the AF’s RERP
because of substantial cost increases in the
Service Cost Position estimate, a Nunn
modernization effort…”
McCurdy breach was declared on Sep 27, 2007
(notably the same day Senators’
Carper/Coburn hosted a hearing on Cost
Effective Airlift for the 21st Century). LM
Aero had previously submitted the Air Force a
firm fixed price proposal that was executable
within the FYDP with a total program value
that would not trigger a Nunn-McCurdy
notification. While the AF’s Nunn McCurdy
declaration triggered the need to recertify the
program, it was the determination by OSD
AT&L that “…..re-engining of the C-5A
aircraft is not necessary to meet projected
airlift requirements” (Feb 14, C-5 RERP
ADM). Consequently, while cost increases
triggered the need for RERP recertification, it
was not simply the GAO’s noted “substantial
cost increases” that resulted in C-5As being
removed from RERP. The JROC established a
minimum organic strategic airlift capability of
33.95 MTMs which could be met without the
operational benefits derived from C-5A RERP.
C-5As were removed from RERP because
there was no additional MTM requirement. It
is also important to note that AT&L
determined that there was no need for
additional C-17s either (a fact omitted by the
GAO in their report)
4
p. 3: “The costs to modernize C-5 aircraft have
Speculation. The GAO report fails to
not been fully identified and are likely to
acknowledge that LM already has signed
increase. While the Air Force now estimates it
purchases orders in place to protect propulsion
will spend $9.1 billion to modernize C-5s, the
system pricing and that the contracting
costs may be underestimated because DOD did
mechanism is firm/fixed price for all
not apply risk or uncertainty analysis to its
production lots. LM bears the preponderance
reliability enhancement and reengining program of risk, not the DoD. While the GAO raises
major cost drivers”
concerns about C-5 modernization costs, it
fails to note the very substantial costs (beyond
simple acquisition) for the C-17 fleet
(including past/future mod and sustainment
Congressional Research Service
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Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
program investments).
5
p. 3: Regarding RERP “…..is underfunded by
GAO fails to note that this is purely an
almost $300 million and costs may escalate if
administrative issue which was already
the Air Force has to stretch the program
addressed in AT&L’s Acquisition Decision
schedule to stay within funding targets”
Memorandum. It is our understanding that the
AF intends to support the production profiles
and funding requirements as directed by OSD.
6
p. 3: “At the same time, the Air Force has not
LM is unaware of any “new” C-5 upgrade
fully priced or budgeted for a new C-5 upgrade
program”. See p.28 DoD comments. GAO
program it plans to begin in fiscal year 2010 to
appears to confuse this initiative with
address current avionics deficiencies and to add
AMP/RERP software improvements being
new capabilities”
contemplated for the future.
7
p.3: “Some future costs, however, may be
Speculation and illogical. Program of record
avoided should the Air Force justify retirement
does not call for any C-5A retirements. If the
of some older C-5s and forego planned
AF were to retire any C-5A, the inherent
modifications.
capability of the jet (MTMs) would have to be
recovered through acquisition of additional C-
17s. Consequently, future net costs to the AF
would significantly rise. If is also important to
note that C-5A AMP is based on legitimate
CNS/ATM requirements for future GATM
access. All strategic airlifters require these
capabilities for global operations. Without
AMP, the AF could potentially be faced with
having to procure $275M+ C-17s to replace
the capability provided by a $5M C-5 AMP
installation in order to fly in global airspace.
This is a false dilemma and a poor investment
choice.
8
p.3 “….potential C-5 retirements could lead to
Speculation. Any C-5A retirement requires
decisions to extend C-17 production…”
acquisition of C-17s on ~1:1 basis to replace
comparable capability. What business case
analysis suggests this is a desirable course of
action? The unit cost for installing RERP on a
C-5A is approximately 1/3 the cost of
acquiring a new C-17. The modernized C-5
will carry almost 2x the cargo of a C-17, carry
it farther, faster, and with less air refueling
tanker dependency. Modernized C-5As have
decades of service life remaining (2040+)
9
p. 6 “ …two upgrades were expected to
To clarify – C-5 RERP generates $15B
improve the fleet’s mission capable rate to at
(BY00$s) in savings and a Reduced Total
least 75 percent, thereby increasing payload
Ownership Cost of $8.9B (BY00$s). RERP
capability and transportation throughput, and to
pays for itself. The RERP R-TOC is even
reduce total ownership costs over the life cycle
sufficient to pay for C-5A RERP at no net cost
by about $14 billion in 2008 dollars
to the AF if they should chose to do so in the
future. Additionally, fleet RERP generates the
equivalent of 2.73 MTMs (22 C-17 equivalent,
$6.072B) at no additional cost to the AF.
10
p.6 “In 2007, DOD reported that RERP average
In the interest of balanced reporting, it is
procurement unit costs grew more than 50
appropriate to note that C-17 program
percent from the original baseline estimate.”
acquisition costs (SAR summary, Dec 07) have
grown 55 percent after adjustments for
quantity.
11
p.7 “C-5 modernization cost increases
See LM item #3 response
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Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
prompted DOD to reduce the number of C-5s it
plans to fully modernize.”
12
p.7 “Subsequently, Congress provided
Source for this remark? 10 C-17s were
additional funding that the Air Force is using to
congressional added in 2007 to compensate for
procure more C-17s, which would offset the
excessive OIF/OEF utilization rates. These
loss in capability of modernizing fewer C-5s.”
aircraft were added prior to any decision
having been made regarding fewer modernized
C-5s. An additional 15 C-17s were
congressionally added in 2008. LM is unaware
that any added C-17s were justified as “offset
for loss in capability of fewer” modernized C-
5s. See AT&L C-5 ADM for rationalization for
C-5 modernization decision.
13
p.8 “….just prior to the RERP production
GAO report fails to note that there were many
decision in February 2007, the prime
shared reasons (LM, DoD, unforeseen
contractor, Lockheed Martin, indicated that
commodity price increases, etc) for program
RERP costs related to labor and supplier parts
cost growth including material cost growth
had significantly increased, prompting new cost
(18.2%), estimation errors (16.5%), labor cost
estimates.”
growth (12.3%), and production rate changes
(5.7%). It was not just LM labor and supplier
parts that were in play.
14
p.8 “Based on this analysis, the Under
GAO report fails to note that AT&L also
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
rejected procuring additional C-17 aircraft as
Technology and Logistics concluded that the
not meeting requirements, more costly to the
cost to RERP all C-5 aircraft was unaffordable
taxpayer, and unaffordable in the FYDP.
and opted to limit full modification to 52
aircraft…”
15
p.9 Table 2
It is worth noting that the current program of
record projects MTM capabilities above
national requirements identified by MCS
(2005), QDR (2006), or JROC (2008)
recommendations. The GAO report fails to
acknowledge C-5 modernization meets all
requirements without the need for additional
C-17s.
16
p.10 “The fiscal year 2009 National Defense
While the FY09 NDAA did authorize 6
Authorization Act authorizes procurement of 6
additional C-17s, there were no corresponding
more C-17s, which will bring the total number
appropriations provided. It remains to be seen
to 211 aircraft.”
it C-17 total numbers grow to 211.
17
p.10 “…DOD’s ability to make sound strategic
This is recurring theme in the report. GAO
airlift portfolio decisions, including the number
repeatedly brings up the notion of C-5
of C-5s to retire and the number of additional
retirements (without citing sources) while
C-17s that should be procured…”
suggesting the need for additional C-17s to
replace the lost capability those C-5
retirements would generate.
18
p.10 “As Army equipment becomes heavier
Speculation. C-5s are exceptional aircraft in
and/or bulkier, the C-17 may be the only
the heavy long-haul equipment role and have a
aircraft capable of delivering major weapon
lighter foot print (LCN, CBRs, etc) than C-17s.
systems to the front lines and to more austere
C-5s have an inherent tactical capability not
bases in the theater of combat”
exploited by the AF to include airdrop, special
operations, austere runway ops, intra-theater
distribution, etc. The primary concern
regarding C-5s is reliability, not inherent
capability. RERP is designed to restore aircraft
reliability to mitigate employment
Congressional Research Service
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Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
risks/concerns of the warfighter.
19
p.11 “…according to a DOD official, since C-
Regarding C-5As and Bs, this statement is
130s, C-130Js, C-17s, C-5As, C-5Bs, and C-
incorrect. Both aircraft have the same payload
5Ms all have different capabilities when it
and range capability.
comes to payload and range,…”
20
p.11-12 “Congressional legislation would allow
This is not LM’s understanding of the
the Air Force to begin to retire some C-5s , if
language. NDAA 2007 section 132 merely
appropriate, beginning October 1, 2008, as long
states “(g)(1) Effective October 1, 2008, the
as the Air Force maintains a strategic airlift
Secretary of the Air Force shall maintain a
fleet of 299 aircraft”
total aircraft inventory of strategic airlift
aircraft of not less than 299 aircraft.” This
section provides no authority to retire any C-
5s. NDAA FY04 section 132 details conditions
for any future C-5A retirement considerations.
21
p. 12 “…the Air Mobility Command will
It this is correct, why would a fiscally
consider retiring C-5s, as the law and
responsible congress appropriate additional C-
requirements allow, on a one-for-one basis after 17s that would force the AF to retire C-5A on a
205 C-17s have been procured to ensure the
1:1 basis? C-5A are structurally sound and can
right combination of aircraft and capability is
serve for decades without replacement (AF
balanced against cost and risk.”
Fleet Viability Board). OSD has already
certified the current program of record as most
cost effective and dismissed the need for
additional C-17s as unnecessary and
unaffordable.
22
p. 12 “Currently, a new C-17 would cost about
Basis for price – flyaway, APUC, PAUC,
$276 million compared to $132 million to fully
TY$s, BY$s, etc? Also, the discussion of cost
modernize a C-5.”
should be more appropriately focused on
RERP vs C-17s and not include AMP.
23
p. 12 “Consequently, according to DOD data,
Misleading remark. Based solely on AMC
the C-5 modernization programs only provide a
MTM factors, RERP (C-5M) delivers a 35%
marginal increase of 14 percent in capability
MTM improvement over C-5As, a 14% MTM
over non-modernized aircraft.”
improvement over C-5Bs and 11% MTM
improvement over C-17s. The report omits AF
analysis which confirmed that C-5 RERP
generates $15B (BY00$s) in savings and a
Reduced Total Ownership Cost of $8.9B
(BY00$s). The fact that C-5 RERP pays for
itself is omitted by the report while it tries to
characterize acquiring additional strategic
airlift capability via C-17 acquisitions as more
cost effective. This is simply incorrect.
24
p. 12 “Using DOD’s million ton-mile per day
Misleading remark and an oversimplification.
planning factors, we, working in collaboration
The GAO comparison chart only reflects
with DOD, calculated that DOD would need to
procurement costs and selectively excludes the
fully modernize 7 C-5s to attain the equivalent
life cycle O&S implications of a decision. Had
capability achieved from acquiring 1 additional
the GAO based its chart on Reduced Total
C-17 and the costs would be over 3 times more
Ownership Costs (i.e. the net effect of a
(see table 3).”
decision) it would have shown C-5 unit cost to
have been -$170M per aircraft (or more
appropriately -$1.2B for 7 C-5Ms) compared
to a C-17 of +$276M per aircraft acquisition
cost (+ an undefined life cycle O&S cost).
Lockheed Martin traditionally views C-5
modernization ~1/3 the cost of acquiring a C-
17. The C-5M will also carry almost 2x the
Congressional Research Service
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Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
amount of cargo, over farther distances, at
higher speed, and with less air refueling tanker
dependency. The GAO report also fails to
acknowledge that fleet C-5 modernization
would generate 2.73 MTMs (22 C-17
equivalents, ~$6B) at no additional expense.
The reduced total ownership from the current
program of record (~$9B) is sufficient to pay
for fleet RERP program if desired.
25
p. 13, Table 3 (and p9, Table 2)
Many factors go into how MTMs are
calculated, including aircraft average payload,
utilization rate, blockspeed, productivity
factors, and whether an aircraft is designated as
a primary mission assigned aircraft (PMAI) or
is part of backup aircraft inventory (BAI).
PMAI aircraft generate MTMs while BAIs do
not. Were the 10 congressionally added C-17s
(~$2.4B) in 2007 PMAI or BAI aircraft?
Similarly, will the 15 C-17s ($3.6B) added in
2008 become PMAI or BAI. If the aircraft are
PMAI, then they add MTM capability. If they
are BAI, they do not.
26
p. 13, “….previous DOD analysis indicated that The “30/30” proposal (retire 30 C-5As and
the life-cycle costs would be approximately the
replace with 30 C-17s) was not been publically
same if DOD replaced 30 C-5s with 30 C-17s”
released by the AF and is believed to have
deficiencies. Based on LM analysis conducted
in 2007, the “30/30” option results in
additional financial burdens for the USAF and
loss of operational capability. It is also
important to note that the “30/30” option has it
genesis in an AF assertion that there are “30
bad actors” in the C-5 fleet that need to be
replaced. LM does not subscribe to that theory.
See Congressional Research Service studies
(Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of
C-5 Modernization and C-17 Acquisition
Issues) for more details. OSD also examined
the 30/30 option as part of the RERP
recertification program and rejected it.
27
p. 13 “The current budget does not sufficiently
GAO report fails to note that this is purely an
fund the revised RERP program. According to
administrative issue which was already
the CAIG’s analysis, the C-5 RERP is
addressed in AT&L’s Acquisition Decision
underfunded by about $294 million across the
Memorandum. The GAO report correctly notes
Future Years Defense Plan for fiscal years
AF commitment to fully support CAIG
2009- 2013.”
directed funding and production profiles.
28
p. 14 “ … the CAIG did not take risk or
GAO report fails to acknowledge that LM
uncertainty into account for some major cost
already has signed purchases orders in place to
drivers, in particular the propulsion system and
protect propulsion system pricing and that the
labor.”
contracting mechanism is firm/fixed price for
all production lots. LM bears the risk, not the
DoD
29
p. 15 “Additional modernization efforts not yet
See LM response #6.
budgeted will add to future C-5 costs. Air Force
officials stated that a new C-5 upgrade program
is slated to begin in fiscal year 2010”
Congressional Research Service
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Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
30
p. 16 “The eventual costs for modernizing C-5
This is an oversimplification of a complex
aircraft hinge upon the decisions DOD officials
issue and draws incorrect conclusions. If
make about the number and mix of strategic
decision makers believe that additional C-5
airlifters DOD needs in the future. If additional
capability is desired, it is most likely that the
C-5 capability is needed, more C-5 aircraft may
O&S savings (and improved MTM
need to receive the RERP modification and
productivity measured against C-17
costs will increase. On the other hand, if
equivalents) of those modernized C-5s will
decision makers believe additional C-17
more than offset the investment required. If C-
capability is needed in lieu of the C-5, the Air
17 capability is needed in lieu of C-5s (i.e.
Force may be able to reduce the number of
replacement), there is no possible way such a
aircraft that need the AMP modification and
scenario could be revenue neutral. See OSD’s
additional modifications slated to begin in fiscal analysis of the 14 different airlift options
year 2010”
reviewed during the course of C-5 RERP
recertification.
Conclusion: The GAO report does not represent a balanced discussion, but instead presents a rather one-
dimensional perspective which leans toward C-17 advocacy while failing to acknowledge virtually any of
the benefits of C-5 modernization. In its 2008 RERP recertification, the DoD reviewed 14 different airlift
options and concluded that no other alternative provided greater or equal military capability at less cost
than C-5 modernization. RERP delivers significant operational capabilities, meets all requirements, and
pays for itself.
Author Contact Information
Jeremiah J. Gertler
Specialist in Military Aviation
jgertler@crs.loc.gov, 7-5107
Congressional Research Service
48