Guinea’s 2008 Military Coup and Relations
with the United States

Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
November 5, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40703
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

Guinea's 2008 Military Coup and Relations with the United States

Summary
Guinea is a Francophone West African country on the Atlantic coast, with a population of about
10 million. It is rich in natural resources but characterized by widespread poverty and limited
socioeconomic growth and development. While Guinea has experienced regular episodes of
internal political turmoil, it was considered a locus of relative stability over the past two decades,
a period during which each of its six neighbors suffered one or more armed internal conflicts.
Guinea entered a new period of political uncertainty on December 23, 2008, when a group of
junior and mid-level military officers seized power, hours after the death of longtime president
and former military leader Lansana Conté. The junta, calling itself the National Council for
Democracy and Development (CNDD, after its French acronym), named as the interim national
president a previously relatively unknown figure, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara.
Some fear that rivalries within the CNDD, tension between Dadis Camara’s supporters and those
who oppose his candidacy, and substantial economic challenges could pose threats to Guinea’s
future stability. Guinea has never undergone a democratic or constitutional transfer of power
since gaining independence in 1958, and Dadis Camara is one of only three persons to occupy the
presidency since that time. After taking power, the junta dissolved the constitution and legislature,
appointed a civilian prime minister, and promised to hold presidential and legislative elections. In
August 2009, however, elections were postponed from late 2009 to early 2010 and Dadis Camara
publicly suggested that he may run for president, contradicting his repeated previous pledges that
neither he nor any other CNDD member would run for office. On September 28, 2009, Guinean
security forces opened fire on some 50,000 civilian demonstrators in Conakry who were
protesting the CNDD and Dadis Camara’s perceived presidential ambitions. The death toll is
thought to exceed 150, and dozens of women were reportedly raped and molested by soldiers.
The protest sparked wide international condemnation and led many countries to suspend or
further restrict cooperation with the junta. Following the coup in December 2008, the United
States suspended some bilateral development aid and all security assistance to Guinea, in line
with congressional directives, signaling a hiatus in what had been a cordial bilateral relationship
during much of the Conté period. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s
governance and humanitarian assistance programs, which comprised a substantial portion of the
U.S. aid budget in Guinea before the coup, were not affected by the suspension; nor were U.S.
pledged contributions toward Guinea’s electoral process. After the September 28 crackdown, the
United States called for Dadis Camara to step down, and announced visa sanctions against CNDD
members and certain associates. The African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), and European Union (EU) have imposed an arms embargo, with the AU and
EU further instituting targeted sanctions on CNDD members and associates.
This report analyzes developments since the military’s seizure of power in December 2008,
Guinea’s relations with the United States, and U.S. policy in the wake of the coup. It also
provides background on Guinean history and politics.

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Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
Investigations into the Violence............................................................................................. 1
Targeted Sanctions ................................................................................................................ 2
Regional Mediation............................................................................................................... 3
China Minerals and Infrastructure Agreement........................................................................ 4
Outlook and Regional Implications ....................................................................................... 4
Background ................................................................................................................................ 6
U.S. Interests in Guinea......................................................................................................... 7
The Conté Regime: Final Years ............................................................................................. 9
The December 2008 Coup......................................................................................................... 10
International Reactions to the Coup..................................................................................... 11
Regional Relations ........................................................................................................ 11
Donor Relations ............................................................................................................ 11
U.S. Responses ............................................................................................................. 12
Multilateral Assistance .................................................................................................. 13
The CNDD ............................................................................................................................... 13
Centralization of Power....................................................................................................... 14
Intra-Military Friction ......................................................................................................... 14
Counter-Narcotics Efforts.................................................................................................... 15
Chemical Precursors Found........................................................................................... 15
Anti-Corruption Efforts....................................................................................................... 16
Mining Sector Reform................................................................................................... 16
Human Rights and Rule of Law .......................................................................................... 17
Alleged Abuses by CNDD Members Under Conté’s Presidency .................................... 18
Press Freedom............................................................................................................... 19
Transition Process ..................................................................................................................... 20
Election Administration....................................................................................................... 20
Funding .............................................................................................................................. 21
Potential Dadis Candidacy .................................................................................................. 21
Reactions ...................................................................................................................... 22
September 28 Protests ............................................................................................................... 22
Opposition Leaders Injured, Arrested .................................................................................. 24
CNDD Statements............................................................................................................... 24
International Reactions........................................................................................................ 25
U.S. Reactions .............................................................................................................. 26
Economic Issues ....................................................................................................................... 27
Socioeconomic Conditions .................................................................................................. 27
Issues for U.S. Policy ................................................................................................................ 28
Foreign Aid......................................................................................................................... 29
Elections and Democracy Promotion............................................................................. 29
Security Assistance and Counter-Narcotics Cooperation ................................................ 30

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Figures
Figure 1. Map of Guinea ............................................................................................................. 6

Appendixes
Appendix A. Profiles of Selected Guinean Political Party Leaders ............................................. 31
Appendix B. Touré and Conté Regimes: Historical Background ................................................ 33

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 40

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Recent Developments
In response to a violent military crackdown on unarmed civilian demonstrators on September 28,
2009 (see section below), regional organizations and donors have sought to further isolate the
National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD), the military junta that has led
Guinea since seizing power in a bloodless coup in December 2008. The death toll during the
protests continues to be disputed, as most observers believe over 150 died, while the CNDD has
acknowledged 57.1 Dozens of individuals were reportedly detained during the crackdown, and the
CNDD has reportedly blocked international access to detention sites.2 Four civilian ministers in
the Guinean government have resigned in protest of the September 28 events. A recent
communiqué by the Forces Vives (“Active Forces”), a coalition of Guinean political parties, trade
unions, and civil society groups which has served as the primary civilian entity negotiating with
the CNDD over the transition to civilian rule, accused elements within the junta of seeking to
“eliminate” opponents or “force them through terror into exile.”3
The International Contact Group on Guinea, of which the United States is a member, has called
for a “new transitional authority” to lead toward elections.4 Senior U.S. officials have also called
for CNDD leader Captain Moussa Dadis Camara to step down, and have expressed support for an
international commission of inquiry and a transitional government led jointly by military and
civilian officials.5 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Fitzgerald traveled to Conakry in
early October and met in person with Dadis Camara. Fitzgerald said he told the junta leader that
he was responsible for the violence and that he should not run in planned presidential elections.6
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to the September 28 crackdown as “criminality of the
greatest degree,” and stated that Guinea’s military leaders must recognize “that they cannot
remain in power, that they must turn back to the people the right to choose their own leaders.”7
The United States evacuated all non-essential personnel and Political Affairs staff from the
Embassy in Conakry during the weeks following the protest. Newly appointed Ambassador
Patricia N. Moller, however, was posted to Guinea in early November.
Investigations into the Violence
A Human Rights Watch investigation published in late October found that the violence of
September 28 was “both organized and pre-planned” by forces reporting to Dadis Camara,

1 Seconding numerous other reports, Human Rights Watch (HRW) contends that “the armed forces attempted to hide
evidence of the crimes by seizing bodies from the stadium and the city’s morgues and burying them in mass graves”
(HRW, “Guinea: September 28 Massacre Was Premeditated,” October 27, 2009).
2 HRW, “Guinea: Free or Charge Detainees,” October 4, 2009; Amnesty International, “Guinée: Quel sort pour les
civils et militaries dont on est sans nouvelles?” October 15, 2009; U.N. OCHA, “Guinea Victims of Security Forces
Crackdown: Situation Report No. 3,” October 18, 2009.
3 The Forces Vives also stated that human rights activists who have assisted victims of the crackdown “are daily
threatened with reprisals,” while “women raped during the events of September 28 do not dare go to hospitals, fearing
for their life.” Le Forum des Forces Vives de Guinée, Communiqué No. 11, October 24, 2009.
4 AFP, “Guinea Junta Must Step Aside: Contact Group,” October 13, 2009.
5 Comments by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Fitzgerald at the U.S. Institute of Peace, October 28, 2009.
6 Adam Nossiter, “U.S. Envoy Protests Violence in Guinea,” The New York Times, October 7, 2009.
7 U.S. Fed News, “Guinea Violence ‘Vile Violation’ of Human Rights, Clinton Says,” October 9, 2009.
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including members of his personal guard, potentially amounting to a crime against humanity.
Human Rights Watch also found that some attacks were characterized by the targeting of
members of the Peuhl ethnic group (also known as Fulbe) by members of southeastern family of
ethnic groups known as Forestiers, to which CNDD leader Captain Moussa Dadis Camara
belongs.8 The International Crisis Group reported that “junta members are recruiting militias from
their own ethnic groups, or from pools of young men who have previously been involved in
militia activity,” warning that while divisions in the military are multi-faceted, ethnic tensions
“could potentially act as an instability multiplier in the event of further breakdown.”9
The CNDD has promised an investigation into the violence; however, opposition groups and civil
society have rejected such an effort as biased.10 The United States, France, and other donors have
expressed support for an international commission of inquiry into the events of September 28. On
October 30, the U.N. Secretary-General appointed three prominent African former officials and
lawyers to lead such a commission.11 The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights is also
gathering information on the violence, including the looting of homes of opposition leaders who
were arrested during the protest.12 While the African Union has supported international efforts to
mediate an end to the political crisis, AU head and Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi reportedly
criticized a U.N. inquiry as “interference in the internal affairs of an independent country.”13 The
CNDD has promised to cooperate with the U.N. inquiry.14 Separately, the chief prosecutor for the
International Criminal Court (ICC) has announced he will investigate the September 28 violence.
Guinea is a state party to the Court.
Targeted Sanctions
Effective October 23, 2009, the United States imposed travel restrictions on “certain members of
the military junta and the government, as well as other individuals who support policies or actions
that undermine the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in Guinea.”15 The United States
is also reportedly considering the imposition of an asset freeze on CNDD members.16
The European Union (EU), African Union (AU), and Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) have announced an arms embargo.17 The EU also imposed a visa ban on 42

8 HRW, “Guinea: September 28 Massacre Was Premeditated,” October 27, 2009. Others dispute this interpretation of
the crackdown, stating that it was primarily aimed at suppressing opposition to CNDD rule, regardless of ethnicity
(CRS interviews).
9 International Crisis Group, Guinea: Military Rule Must End, October 16, 2009. See also U.N. IRIN, “Caravans and
Kola Nuts—Keeping a Lid on Communal Tensions,” October 30, 2009.
10 AFP, “Guinea Junta Names Team to Probe Massacre: Decree,” October 17, 2009.
11 The three members of the commission are Mohamed Bedjaoui of Algeria, a diplomat, jurist, and former government
minister; Françoise Ngendahyo Kayiramirwa of Burundi, a former government minister and advisor to the International
Criminal Court; and Pramila Patten of Mauritius, a legal scholar and expert on violence against women. U.N. News
Service, “Statement Attributable to Spokesperson for Secretary-General on Establishment of International Commission
of Inquiry on Guinea,” October 30, 2009.
12 U.N. News, “Guinea: UN Official Fears for Witnesses’ Safety in Probe into Killing of Protesters,” October 9, 2009.
13 AFP, “African Union Criticizes UN ‘Interference’ in Guinea,” October 19, 2009.
14 AFP, “Guinea Pledges to Cooperate with UN Inquiry,” October 19, 2009.
15 U.S. Department of State, “Guinea: Travel Restrictions,” October 29, 2009.
16 Comments by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Fitzgerald at the U.S. Institute of Peace, October 28, 2009.
17 Prior to the announcement of an embargo, Amnesty International reported that equipment used in the September 28
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members of the CNDD and “individuals associated with them, responsible for the violent
repression of 28 September 2009 or the political stalemate in the country,” and the European
Parliament rejected an EU-Guinea fishing agreement in a non-binding vote designed to give “a
strong signal to the Guinean dictatorship.”18 African Union sanctions include denial of visas,
travel restrictions, and asset freezes targeting “the president and members of the CNDD, members
of the government, and any other individuals, civilian or military, whose activities are aimed at
maintaining the anti-constitutional status quo in Guinea.”19
France, which had declined to cut off aid to Guinea following the December 2008 coup,
announced it would cut military aid and suspend most official cooperation with the CNDD,
including roughly 10 technical advisors to civilian government institutions.20 French Foreign
Minister Bernard Kouchner reportedly said that France “can no longer work with Dadis Camara,”
and that “there has to be an international intervention.”21 The French and British embassies in
Conakry have urged citizens to leave Guinea and defer travel to the country.
Regional Mediation
ECOWAS has appointed Burkina Faso’s president, Blaise Compaoré, to mediate between the
CNDD and the Forces Vives. Compaoré traveled to Conakry in early October, and more recently
has invited opposition party leaders to meet with him in Burkina Faso. The International Contact
Group on Guinea, which includes representatives of regional organizations and the permanent
and African members of the U.N. Security Council—including the United States—has endorsed
Compaoré’s mediation efforts.22 Some observers and Guineans, however, have expressed concern
that Compaoré’s background makes him an inappropriate appointee. He himself came to power in
a military coup and later legitimized his rule by running for president, and he has reportedly
militarily or politically interfered in conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire.23

(...continued)
crackdown was made by French and South Africa-based British companies (Amnesty International, “Guinea: Military
and Police Weapons Transfers Must Be Suspended,” October 8, 2009). The idea of an arms embargo was supported by
the International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G). ICG-G, “Communiqué Final,” October 12, 2009, via Guineenews;
Reuters, “West African Leaders Impose Arms Embargo on Guinea,” October 17, 2009; Voice of America (VOA),
“African Union Backs Arms Embargo on Guinea,” October 18, 2009; Official Journal of the European Union,
“Council Common Position 2009/788/CFSP of 27 October 2009 concerning restrictive measures against the Republic
of Guinea,” October 28, 2009.
18 Europolitique, “UE/Guinée: L’UE Adopte des Sanctions Contre la Guinée,” October 28, 2009; Official Journal of
the European Union
, “Council Common Position 2009/788/CFSP of 27 October 2009 concerning restrictive measures
against the Republic of Guinea,” October 28, 2009; AFP, “Violences en Guinée: Des eurodéputés rejettent un accord de
pêche UE-Guinée,” October 1, 2009.
19 AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué, October 29, 2009 (CRS translation from French).
20 Reuters, “France Steps Up Guinea Sanctions,” October 30, 2009.
21 The CNDD strongly rejected French criticism as neo-colonial and a “political lynching.” AFP, “France Turns
Against Guinea Leader After Bloodbath,” October 4, 2009; Radio France Internationale via BBC Monitoring, “Guinea
Protests Against ‘Political Lynching’ by French Government,” October 17, 2009.
22 International Contact Group on Guinea, Final Communiqué, October 12, 2009, via Guineenews.
23 E.g., AllAfrica.com, “Guinea: ‘Another Strategy’ Required to Deal with the Deteriorating Situation—Challenor,”
October 13, 2009; Oxford Analytica, “Burkina Faso: Compaoré Cements Regional Role,” October 16, 2009; U.N.
News, “Parties Continuing to Rearm Despite Embargo, Says UN Report” [about Burkina Faso’s alleged continuing
involvement in Côte d’Ivoire arms flows], October 28, 2009.
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China Minerals and Infrastructure Agreement
In October, the Guinean government announced the signing of a new $7 billion minerals and
infrastructure agreement with a Hong Kong-based firm, the China International Fund (CIF).24
Previously, following the December 2008 coup, China had appeared poised to abandon prior
plans to invest in major infrastructure projects in Guinea in return for mineral rights, due to
perceived political instability and weak global commodity markets.25 While the CIF, which has
been linked to multi-billion dollar deals in Angola and other African countries, is ostensibly a
privately owned company, an investigative report released in July 2009 by the U.S.-China
Economic & Security Review Commission found that “key personnel have ties to Chinese state-
owned enterprises and government agencies.”26 Chinese officials maintain that the company’s
“actions have no connection with the Chinese government”; a Chinese Foreign Ministry
statement nevertheless maintained that Chinese-Guinean cooperation “always obeys the rules of
the market and of international practice.”27 Negotiations over the agreement are thought to have
been initiated prior to former President Lansana Conté’s death in late 2008.28 The deal has come
under international criticism at a time when traditional donors are attempting to isolate the
CNDD; it has also been criticized by the Guinean opposition.29 A State Department spokesman
said, “We have expressed concerns about this kind of activity… We think it’s important that as
you do business with countries, that you also have respect for human rights.”30
Outlook and Regional Implications
Credible reports of rising ethnic tensions and CNDD recruitment of irregular fighters, former
combatants in neighboring civil wars, have potential significant implications for Guinea’s future
stability and that of the sub-region.31 In early November, a news report stated that millions of
dollars worth of weaponry had been imported into Guinea in recent weeks; others have reported
that foreign mercenaries are working for CNDD members.32 Moreover, reports suggest the

24 E.g., Adam Nossiter, “Guinea Boasts of Deal with Chinese Comopany,” The New York Times, October 14, 2009.
25 Lydia Polgreen, “As Chinese Investment in Africa Drops, Hope Sinks,” The New York Times, March 25, 2009.
26 U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, The 88 Queensway Group: A Case Study in Chinese
Investors’ Operations in Angola and Beyond
, by Lee Levkowitz, Marta McLellan Ross, and J.R. Warner, July 10,
2009. See also Africa-Asia Confidential, “Blood and Money in the Streets: China’s Business Ties to the Loathed
Camara Junta Could Quickly Backfire,” October 20, 2009; Christopher Bodeen, “China-Guinea Deal Highlihgts Africa
Business Ties,” The Associated Press (AP), October 24, 2009.
27 Reuters, “China Says Guinea Investment Not Government-Linked,” October 16, 2009; Xinhua, “La Coopération
Entre la Chine et la Guinée Correspond aux Intérêts des Peuples des Deux Pays,” October 15, 2009.
28 Adam Nossiter, “Guinea Boasts of Deal with Chinese Company,” The New York Times, October 14, 2009; CRS
interviews.
29 Voice of America, “Guinea Opposition Calls China Deal Illegal,” October 14, 2009.
30 Congressional Quarterly Transcript, “State Department Holds Regular News Briefing,” October 14, 2009.
31 Several witnesses, including opposition spokesman Jean-Marie Doré, have alleged that Liberian nationals
participated in the September 28 violence. Human Rights Watch reported the existence of a Guinean military-trained
“commando unit dominated by people from ethnic groups from the forest region.” Human Rights Watch (HRW),
“Guinea: September 28 Massacre Was Premeditated,” October 27, 2009. See also Richard Moncrieff, “Repression and
Violence Are a Danger to the Whole Region,” September 30, 2009; Reuters, “Foreign Gunmen Helped Guinea
Crackdown—Witnesses,” October 3, 2009; Radio France Internationale, “Violences Imputées aux Milices
Libériennes,” October 6, 2009; HIS Global Insight, “Liberian Authorities Boost Border Control in Response to
Guinean Refugee Crisis,” October 21, 2009.
32 Beeld (South Africa), “Secretive Mails Sent to Recruits,” October 18, 2009; BBC, “‘Big Guns’ Herald Guinea’s
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security situation and political atmosphere in the capital have grown increasingly tense in recent
weeks. Several city-wide strikes have been observed in protest of the September violence and
subsequent degradation in public safety. Some dozen targeted killings have been reported in
Conakry since September 28, with at least one government official murdered.33 Amid
international concern over a perceived breakdown in the military chain of command in Guinea
and potential spillover effects to Guinea’s fragile neighbors, opposition parties and some
observers have called for an international force to protect civilians.34 Some believe security sector
reform is necessary to prevent further crises.35

(...continued)
Crisis,” October 31, 2009; Ed Butler, “Guinea’s Military Junta Imports Millions of Dollars Worth of Arms Despite
Embargo,” The Guardian, November 3, 2009.
33 Reuters, “Guinea Sees New Violence After Protest Crackdown,” October 23, 2009; Radio France Internationale via
BBC Monitoring, “Twelve Opposition Supporters Said Killed in Guinea’s ‘Targeted Killings,’” October 23, 2009.
34 See e.g., AFP, “Guinée: L’Opposition demande l’intervention d’une ‘force de paix,’” October 1, 2009; Africa
Confidential
, “Gunning Down Democracy,” October 9, 2009; International Crisis Group, Guinea: Military Rule Must
End
, October 16, 2009; Reuters, “Guinea Leader Says Will Cooperate With Inquiry—UN,” October 21, 2009; AFP,
“Guinée: Un banquier brièvement enlevé et dévalisé par des militaires,” October 27, 2009.
35 CRS interviews. See also Reuters, “Out-Of-Control Soldiers Seen Stoking Guinea Turmoil,” October 13, 2009.
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Background
Figure 1. Map of Guinea

Guinea is a socioeconomically impoverished but mineral-rich West African country, about the
size of Oregon, which has experienced regular episodes of political turmoil. Over the past two
decades, Guinea was considered a locus of relative stability in a sub-region that has witnessed
multiple armed conflicts. Until December 2008, Guinea was ruled by President Lansana Conté,
who came to power in a military coup in 1984. Conté oversaw some economic and political
reforms, but his critics accused him of stifling Guinea’s democratic development while allowing
corruption and nepotism to flourish.
The final years of Conté’s rule were marked by a decline in average living standards, the co-
option of power by members of Conté’s inner circle of businessmen and politicians, and
increasing signs of public dissatisfaction. Guinea’s health sector and national infrastructure are
very poor, even by regional standards, and Guinean standards of living are among the worst in the
world.36 Conté’s supporters, however, argued that his leadership prevented Guinea from

36 See e.g., U.N. Development Program (UNDP), “Guinea: 2007/2008 Human Development Report,” at
http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_GIN.html.
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experiencing the kind of armed civil conflict and political instability that have afflicted its
neighbors. While Guinea held several general elections under Conté, democratic gains under his
leadership were limited, and power remained concentrated in his hands. For several years prior to
his death, Conté reportedly suffered from a combination of diabetes, heart problems, and possibly
leukemia, and rarely appeared in public. His critics contended that his illness and increasing
reclusiveness rendered him incompetent for the presidency. Further aspects of Conté’s rule are
discussed in Appendix B, which provides historical background on Guinea.
U.S. Interests in Guinea
U.S. interests and associated policy challenges in Guinea center on democratization and good
governance; counternarcotics; bilateral economic interests and relations; regional peace and
security; and socioeconomic and institutional development.37 Ensuring a transition to a
democratically elected, civilian-led government is now a focus of U.S. governance concerns.
Issues of interest to Congress may include stability and governance in West Africa; counter-
narcotics; Guinea’s natural resource wealth and extractive industries; and maritime security in the
Gulf of Guinea.38
Counternarcotics issues are a relatively recent area of engagement, as Guinea, among other
countries in the region, has emerged as a reported transshipment point for cocaine en route from
South America to Europe.39 This development has implications for U.S. security interests, as
some of the beneficiaries of this trade are believed by analysts to include South American drug
syndicates that are the target of U.S. military or law enforcement counternarcotics operations.
Such organizations may include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a U.S.-
designated terrorist entity. Drug trafficking also threatens to undermine U.S. foreign policy goals
in Africa, such as the promotion of good governance and the rule of law, legitimate economic
growth, state institution-building, and other foreign aid program goals set out in the U.S. Foreign
Assistance Framework.
Guinea’s extractive industry sector is of financial and strategic interest to the United States. In
addition to gold, diamonds, uranium, and potential oil and gas reserves, Guinea possesses an
estimated 27% or more of global reserves of bauxite, a key component of aluminum. 40 Guinea
provided 16% of U.S. bauxite and alumina imports between 2004 and 2007,41 and several U.S.-
based resource firms operate in Guinea. The large U.S.-based multinational aluminum firm Alcoa,
for instance, is a major shareholder in the Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, a bauxite mining
and export partnership with the Guinean state, while the much smaller U.S energy firm
Hyperdynamics holds the largest single license for offshore oil exploration.42

37 In 2007, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on Guinea, focusing on governance, stability, and then-
recent political protests.
38 In 2007, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on Guinea, focusing on governance, stability, and the
general strike that took place earlier that year.
39 See CRS Report R40838, Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas
Cook.
40 U.S. Geological Survey, 2009 Bauxite and Alumina Survey.
41 Ibid.
42 Further information on Alcoa is available at http://www.alcoa.com/guinea/en/home.asp; see Thomas Pearmain,
“Hyperdynamics Divests of U.S. Oil Assets to Fund Guinea Operations,” Global Insight, May 5, 2009. In September
2009, Hyperdynamics signed a memorandum of understanding with the Guinean government that reaffirmed the
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A broader U.S. interest in Guinea is the maintenance of political stability and peace, both in
Guinea itself and in the surrounding sub-region. In contrast to Guinea, each of its six neighbors—
most notably Sierra Leone and Liberia—have suffered armed civil conflicts over the past two
decades. These conflicts were sparked by such factors as adverse socioeconomic development
conditions; often volatile ethnic, regional, and leadership rivalries; and corruption and other
abuses of state power and resources. While the Guinean state faces similar challenges, it has
survived multiple threats to its institutional authority and integrity, contrary to the predictions of
some analysts. Reflecting Guinea’s perceived role in regional stability, U.S. security assistance
prior to the coup included military training for participation in peacekeeping missions as well as
programs aimed at bolstering maritime security.
Guinea’s relative stability has had several key implications for the United States. First, Guinea
has not, to date, been the source of a significant challenge to U.S. international peace and security
policies. This is notable in a region where U.S. diplomatic efforts and substantial humanitarian
assistance have at times been devoted to ending or mitigating the effects of conflict. Second,
Guinea has been able to act as a humanitarian partner to the United States by hosting hundreds of
thousands of refugees fleeing conflicts in neighboring states. Guinea was also able to help prevent
a regional spillover of the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia by repelling attacks on its territory
by factions from Sierra Leone and Liberia backed by former President Charles Taylor of Liberia.
Following these attacks, which took place in 2000 and 2001, the U.S. military trained an 800-
person Guinean Ranger unit to shore up border security. At the same time, Guinean government
policy has presented both confluences with and challenges to U.S. objectives in the region, in the
form of Guinean intervention in the civil wars in Liberia and in Guinea-Bissau.43
Guinean socioeconomic and state institutional development are also long-term U.S. policy
objectives. Prior to the December 2008 coup, Guinea was a recipient of U.S. bilateral aid, notably
humanitarian assistance and funding for the promotion of democracy and good governance. In
response to the coup, the United States suspended all bilateral assistance that did not fall into
either of these latter categories, including military and counternarcotics assistance.

(...continued)
validity of a portion of Hyperdynamics’ concession and its right to carry out exploration on 36% of its acreage. Much
of the relinquished concession was reportedly subsequently acquired by China Sonangol. Scandinavian Oil & Gas
Magazine
, “Hyperdynamics Signs MoU With Guinea Government,” September 15, 2009; Africa Energy Intelligence,
“Hyperdynamics Wins at Last,” September 23, 2009; Africa Energy Intelligence, “China Sonangol in Offshore Grab,”
October 21, 2009.
43 Former President Conté’s government hosted former Sierra Leonean President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah after he was
deposed by a junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, in 1997. The Conté government also reportedly
permitted the Liberian anti-Taylor rebel group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) to maintain
rear bases in southern Guinea, supplied LURD with arms, and periodically provided tactical military assistance to it,
such as cross-border mortar and helicopter air fire support. Guinea also intervened militarily in Guinea-Bissau’s civil
war in 1998 on behalf of the late former president, Joao Bernado “Nino” Vieira. On Guinea’s involvement in regional
warfare, see Alexis Arieff, “Still Standing: neighbourhood wars and political stability in Guinea,” Journal of Modern
African Studies
, 47, 3 (September 2009): 331-348. On LURD, see CRS Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace,
by Nicolas Cook.
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The Conté Regime: Final Years44
Conté maintained a careful balance between political and military factions, never publicly
cultivated a designated successor, and generally brooked little public opposition to his rule. The
president typically co-opted political opponents and suppressed protests by force or deflated them
with pledges of food and fuel subsidies or limited policy reforms, which were often only partially
fulfilled. Conté’s final years were beset by growing public discontent with economic stagnation
and high inflation; the slow pace of promised democratic reforms; extensive corruption; and
Conté’s semi-autocratic leadership. This spurred a growing number of formerly rare strikes and
protests, some violent, culminating in a mass general strike in early 2007 that spiraled into
nationwide anti-government demonstrations. Legislative elections were due to take place in 2007,
but were repeatedly delayed, leaving the National Assembly with an expired mandate. The
disintegration of state institutions, together with Conté’s ill health and reclusiveness, also led to
power struggles within the cabinet and Conté’s inner circle. Divisions and restiveness within the
military, often over pay and slow rates of promotion, also grew.
Particularly notable was a May 2008 uprising led by junior army officers at Camp Alpha Yaya,
the largest military base in Conakry and the headquarters of the army’s elite commando
parachutist unit (known as the BATA). Mutinous troops exchanged fire with members of the
presidential guard, and several people were reportedly killed, and dozens wounded, by stray
bullets.45 After a week of unrest, Conté met with mutiny leaders, and the government agreed to
pay salary arrears of $1,100 to each soldier, sack the defense minister, and grant promotions to
junior officers, ending the uprising.46 In mid-June 2008, military troops crushed an attempted
mutiny by police officers in Conakry over alleged non-payment of back-wages and a failure to
implement pledged promotions. This culminated in a bloody shoot-out at a police headquarters
that left at least four police officers dead, according to an official tally. Key members of the
CNDD junta have claimed to have played key roles in the 2008 mutiny.47
From 2005 onwards, many analysts were concerned about the risk of ethnic or intra-military
violence and instability should Conté die in office, and the potential impact on Guinea’s fragile
neighbors. Others, however, argued that Guineans’ historically strong sense of national identity
and social cohesion meant that such a scenario was unlikely.48 Despite such differences in
perspective, it was widely agreed that the National Assembly, judiciary, and opposition parties
lacked sufficient cohesion, political power, or popular legitimacy to ensure a constitutional
succession.49 A post-Conté military coup was predicted by many observers, but it was unclear
what military faction, if any, might prevail, as the armed forces were reportedly divided along
ethnic and generational fault lines. It was also unclear whether a military seizure of power would

44 See Appendix B for further analysis of recent Guinean history.
45 Kissy Agyeman, “Tension Mounts in Guinea in Wake of Army Revolt,” Global Insight, May 29, 2008.
46 Saliou Samb, “Guinea Settles Army Pay Dispute With Mass Promotion,” Reuters, June 14, 2008.
47 Claude Pivi, a CNDD member and low-ranking officer who was promoted to Minister of Presidential Security in
January 2009, styled himself the leader of the Camp Alpha Yaya mutiny. Pivi also led the crackdown on the police
uprising, according to witnesses. After he became president, Dadis Camara stated he had played a key role in the
mutiny and in the negotiations that ended it.
48 Social Science Research Council (SSRC), Policy Approaches to the Current Situation in Guinea, March 2009: 2.
49 On the other hand, the National Assembly had arguably played the role of a vital check on executive power in
February 2007, when legislators refused to extend a military state of siege that had provided cover for a massive
crackdown on anti-government demonstrators.
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permit a return to civilian rule and constitutional governance. International concerns over
potential instability heightened with reports that trafficking activities were being facilitated or
directly undertaken by government officials, members of the military, and Conté associates.
The December 2008 Coup
In the early hours of December 23, 2008, President Conté’s death, following a long illness, was
announced on national television. Under Guinea’s constitution, National Assembly Speaker
Aboubacar Somparé was mandated to assume power as head of state, with presidential elections
organized within 60 days. Instead, within hours, a military junta calling itself the National
Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) announced that it had taken power in a coup.
The junta dissolved the constitution and the National Assembly, banned political and union
activity, and promised elections within two years.
The coup leaders justified their decision to overthrow the government on the basis that Guinea’s
ruling elite had provided poor leadership. In the broadcast announcing the coup, CNDD
spokesman Captain Moussa Dadis Camara stated that the incumbent regime had permitted the
systematic “embezzlement of public funds, general corruption, impunity established as method of
government, and anarchy in the management of state affairs” leading to “a catastrophic economic
situation.” He also cited as justification a pattern of national poverty, despite the existence of
abundant natural resources, the rise of drug trafficking, and diverse other crimes and patterns of
poor governance.50
It was initially unclear what the composition of the CNDD was and whether the junta represented
the military as a whole, or merely a faction.51 On the afternoon of December 24, reportedly
following tense internal negotiations, the CNDD announced that spokesman Dadis Camara had
been chosen as president.52 Dadis Camara paraded into downtown Conakry, where he was greeted
by cheering crowds. Guineans’ positive response to the CNDD appeared to be due to widespread
dissatisfaction with Somparé, senior military staff, and other figures seen as representing the
Conté era, along with relief that the coup had been carried out without bloodshed.53 Many
Guineans also viewed the incumbent government as lacking legitimacy.54 In a television

50“Guinea: Army Dissolves Cabinet.... ” via Open Source.
51 Witnesses suggested that the CNDD controlled Camp Alpha Yaya (Conakry’s largest military base) and the main
Radio-Télévision Guinéenne (RTG) offices, while “loyalist” soldiers who did not support the coup initially retained
control of Camp Almamy Samory Touré (where the senior military leadership was based) and a subsidiary RTG
station. On December 24, the CNDD accused the former government of importing mercenaries in a bid to regain
power. (The claim did not appear to be borne out by events.)
52 RFI, “Guinean Putchists Said Still Debating Choice of Leader,” December 23, 2008 and AFP, “Guinea: Analysts Say
Divisions Within Military Explain Attempted Coup,” December 23, 2008, via Open Source.
53 Arieff interviews, Conakry, December 24-26, 2008. While there is little public opinion data available, reports suggest
Assembly Speaker Somparé, Conté’s constitutional successor, was deeply unpopular. In 2005, the International Crisis
Group reported that “Not one person consulted by Crisis Group expressed the desire for Somparé to take over. Once an
ardent member of Sékou Touré’s PDG party, he is often described as a Touré-era holdover, useful to the PUP primarily
because of his tendency toward demagoguery and authoritarianism.” (Stopping Guinea’s Slide, 2005: 8.)
54 In explaining their aversion to a constitutional succession led by Somparé, many pointed out that the National
Assembly’s five-year mandate had expired in late 2007, and that the constitution had been amended in 2001 in a
disputed referendum. For a critical analysis of this argument, see SSRC, Policy Approaches to the Current Situation in
Guinea
, March 2009: 2-3.
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broadcast on December 25, Prime Minister Souaré and members of his cabinet, along with the
military chief of staff, pledged to support the junta.
International Reactions to the Coup
Regional organizations and donors, including the European Union (EU), the United Nations,
France, and the United States, condemned the coup and called for elections and a return to
civilian-led government. An International Contact Group on Guinea was formed in January 2009;
members include the ECOWAS Commission and Chair, the AU Commission and Chair of its
Peace and Security Council, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the European
Union, the Mano River Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Organization of
Francophonie, the U.N. Secretariat, and the permanent and African members of the U.N. Security
Council (including the United States).55 The International Contact Group has held several
meetings in Conakry with the junta, civil society groups, and political parties. It has focused on
overseeing the electoral calendar, and on urging Dadis Camara to refrain from running for
president.
Regional Relations
ECOWAS and the AU, both of which have policies against accepting non-constitutional changes
of power, condemned the coup and suspended Guinea’s membership in their organizations.56
Neighboring governments were cautious in responding to the coup, particularly as some fear that
instability in Guinea could destabilize their own countries. At the same time, Libyan leader
Muammar al Qadhafi—who currently chairs the AU—and Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade
initially publicly argued that the CNDD should be recognized and supported by the international
community.57
Donor Relations
Major donors include the United States, France, and the EU. Many donors declined to recognize
the CNDD, and some, including the United States and the EU, suspended selected assistance to
the Guinean government pending democratic elections.58 In February 2009, the European
Commission stated of its assistance programs to Guinea that “[n]ew contracts are, in principle,
only signed for humanitarian aid, aid benefiting directly the population and measures in support
of the transition process,” and initiated consultations with Guinea under the framework of Article

55 Commissions of the AU and ECOWAS, Statement of the Consultative Meeting on the Situation in the Republic of
Guinea
, January 30, 2009.
56 ECOWAS Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance, December 2001, Article 1(b) and (c); and
Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4(p).
57 Qadhafi was appointed head of the AU for 2009. Wade praised the “bloodless” nature of the CNDD coup, and called
on the junta to organize democratic elections. However, Wade has been more critical of the CNDD in recent
statements. AFP, “Guinée: Le Président Wade réaffirme, depuis Conakry, son soutien à la junte,” January 7, 2009;
Africa Energy Intelligence, “Kadhafi Soutient les Putschistes,” January 28, 2009; RFI, “Senegalese Leader Warns
International Community Over Guinea,” September 20, 2009, via BBC Monitoring. See also WANEP, Transitional
Crisis in Guinea; Coup d’Etat: Its Inevitability, Legitimizing Factors & Lessons for Africa
, December 28, 2008: 5-8.
58 EU Business, “EU Imposes Aid Conditions on Guinea Junta,” March 16, 2009. The EU initially stated it would not
suspend aid; see U.N. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), “Guinea: Regional, international
condemnation spreads,” January 12, 2009.
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96 of the Cotonou Agreement to “determine the appropriate measures to be taken as far as
cooperation is concerned.”59 In July 2009, the EU concluded consultations with Conakry,
deciding to place Guinea under “surveillance” for two years and to maintain the suspension of
development aid pending concrete steps toward a transition to democracy. An EU statement
concluded that despite Guinean authorities’ commitments, EU authorities remained “preoccupied
by the slow pace in implementing the road-map” toward elections.60
France, Guinea’s former colonial power, continued bilateral aid to the Guinean government
following the December 2008 coup, while calling for elections to be held as soon as possible.
French aid included a 2006-2010 bilateral development assistance program worth €100 million
($140.7 million) and a military cooperation program worth €400,000 ($563,000) over the same
period, in addition to programs related to agriculture and food security, education, water and
sanitation, and governance.61
As of early July 2009, the United States, Japan, the EU, France, Germany, and Spain had pledged
financial support for Guinea’s post-coup elections (see below).
U.S. Responses
The United States condemned the coup and called for “a return to civilian rule and the holding of
free, fair, and transparent elections as soon as possible.”62 The Bush Administration announced in
early January 2009 that the United States would suspend bilateral aid to Guinea, with the
exception of humanitarian and democracy-promotion assistance, in line with congressional
directives.63 In practice, all security assistance was suspended, while most development assistance
and other non-military aid was unaffected. The United States also signaled its opposition to the
junta by prohibiting the U.S. Embassy’s acting Ambassador from meeting personally with junta
members. The restriction does not apply to other Embassy officials. In a digital video press
conference in Conakry in late January 2009, Phillip Carter, then the State Department’s Acting
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and a previous U.S. ambassador to Guinea,
warned that a failure to hold elections and restore civilian rule by year’s end would “jeopardize
the United States’ long-term bilateral relationship with Guinea.”64

59 European Commission, “Answer given by Mr Michel on behalf of the Commission,” E-0219/09EN, February 2,
2009.The Cotonou Partnerships Agreement, which governs relations between the EU and African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States (ACP), requires that signatories respect human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law,
and thus places political conditions on development cooperation. Article 96 of the Agreement provides for a process of
consultations between signatories when one party asserts that these requirements are not being met.
60AFP, “L’UE Met la Guinée Sous Surveillance Pour 2 Ans, Maintient le Gel de l’Aide,” July 27, 2009; Agence
Europe, “EU/Guinea: EU is Ready to Gradually Resume Cooperation Subject to Tangible Progress in Transition to
Democracy,” July 31, 2009; AFP, “Sous Pression, la Junte Guinéenne Accepte une Présidentielle en Janvier,” August
18, 2009, CRS translation.
61 A French government official who spoke to CRS stated that bilateral disbursements to the Guinean government had
not been disrupted, but that France was closely monitoring how funds were spent.
62 AFP, “After Coup, U.S. Halts Aid to Guinea,” January 7, 2009.
63 The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8, Division H, Title VII, section 7008) bars direct assistance “to
the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree,” with the
exception of democracy promotion and humanitarian assistance. The provision is commonly referred to as “Section
508,” a reference to previous appropriations legislation.
64 U.S. Embassy News Digest, January 29, 2009.
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Multilateral Assistance
Development assistance and anti-poverty programs administered by multilateral organizations
have been affected by the coup. Following the December 2008 coup, the World Bank stopped
disbursing loans designated for programs related to health, transportation, education, and other
sectors, leaving $200 million in outstanding loans, while awaiting further assessment of whether
disbursements may continue.65 The International Monetary Fund-led Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) initiative, which was due to provide additional government financing in 2009,
has not advanced since Conté’s death.66 On the other hand, in May 2009, the United Nations
Peacebuilding Fund allocated a first tranche of $6 million in support of programs in Guinea.67
The CNDD
Moussa Dadis Camara: Profile
Moussa Dadis Camara, Guinea’s military leader, was born in 1964 near the southeastern city of Nzerekoré, in the
Forest Region of Guinea near the border with Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. He is a member of the Guerzé (also known
as Kpel e) ethnic group, which accounts for under 10% of Guinea’s population and since independence has held little
influence over Guinean politics. He is also Christian in a country that is over 85% Muslim. Dadis Camara graduated
from Guinea’s national university and entered the Army in 1990, spending time in Germany in the 1990s in the course
of both civilian and military training courses. As a military officer, he joined the elite BATA airborne commando unit,
serving in the logistics wing. Shortly before Conté’s death, he was promoted to director of fuel supplies for the Army,
a reportedly powerful position that helped him build a base of support among the rank-and-file. He is believed to have
played a role in the May 2008 junior officer mutiny.
As of early 2009, the CNDD had 33 members, including six civilians. Military members were
drawn mainly from the Army. The CNDD’s composition is ostensibly multi-ethnic, but key posts
appear split between ethnic Malinké and Forestiers, a collective term for members of several
small ethnic groups based in southeast Guinea.68 Many believe that several military factions had
envisioned carrying out a coup upon Conté’s death, and that CNDD leaders were able to unite
these factions through negotiation and promises of patronage. Many believe the junta could thus
be susceptible to factionalization or a countercoup.69 The junta’s stability appears to rest on a
precarious balance of power among its key members. In particular, the relationship between
Dadis Camara and Defense Minister Sékouba Konaté—a powerful military officer at the time of

65 The World Bank classifies Guinea as one of the world’s 78 poorest countries, which qualifies Guinea for loans
through the Bank’s International Development Association (IDA). IDA lends money (credits) on concessional terms,
meaning that credits have no interest charge and repayments are stretched over 35 to 40 years, including a 10-year
grace period. IDA also provides grants to countries at risk of debt distress.
66 The HIPC Initiative is a comprehensive approach to debt reduction for heavily indebted poor countries pursuing
IMF- and World Bank-supported adjustment and reform programs. At the time of the coup, the program was on track.
Reaching the HIPC “completion point” would grant Guinea an estimated relief of $2.2 billion and reduce debt service
by approximately $100 million the first year (Arieff interview with IMF official, May 2009). Part of the reason the
program has been halted is that it relies heavily on funds from donors (EIU, Guinea Country Report, June 2009: 18).
67 The Peacebuilding Fund generally provides support to countries emerging from conflict. Most recipients to date have
been African countries, including Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone. More
information is at http://www.unpbf.org/index.shtml. The United States does not contribute to the Peacebuilding Fund.
68 SSRC, Policy Approaches to the Current Situation in Guinea, March 2009: 4.
69 E.g., International Crisis Group, Guinea: The Transition Has Only Just Begun, March 2009: 11; SSRC, Policy
Approaches to the Current Situation in Guinea
, March 2009: 4; La Lettre du Continent, “Un Chef, Une Armée, Des
Clans!” October 8, 2009.
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the coup, as commander of the elite BATA unit—has been a source of frequent speculation among
Guineans and members of the diplomatic community.70
Centralization of Power
Upon taking power, the CNDD immediately took steps to assert its authority, for instance by
suspending civilian regional administrators and replacing them with military commanders. As the
main public face of the CNDD, Dadis Camara has further sought to centralize power and
neutralize potential opposition, both to the CNDD and to his dominant leadership within it. The
CNDD-appointed civilian prime minister, Kabiné Komara, is viewed as having little decision-
making power, and CNDD members directly control key government functions. Komara’s cabinet
was named in January 2009 by presidential decree, with 10 of 29 cabinet posts held by military
officers—most of them CNDD members, and many lacking experience in public affairs.71 The
CNDD also created several new ministerial-level positions and appointed members of the military
or close civilian associates to fill them. Several key ministries, including security, defense, and
finance, and the governor of the Central Bank, have been attached to the presidency.
Intra-Military Friction
Signs of internal dissent within the military have emerged since the CNDD takeover. After being
named president, Dadis Camara ordered 22 generals—nearly the entire senior military leadership
under Conté—into retirement. Many were later arrested, according to news reports, primarily
based on accusations of plotting against the CNDD. In January 2009, two CNDD officers were
sacked for unclear reasons, and in April, as many 20 military officers, including a CNDD
member, were reportedly arrested in a crackdown on an alleged counter-coup attempt. In July
2009, General Mamadouba “Toto” Camara, who is Security Minister and the most senior CNDD
member in terms of military rank, was assaulted by members of the presidential guard. While
Dadis Camara apologized and ordered presidential guard members to beg for forgiveness, the
incident heightened fears among some observers that the CNDD may be vulnerable to internal
fractures that could lead to intra-military violence on a large scale.72
In August, reports surfaced in the media that 11 military officers detained since the December
2008 coup had been secretly transferred to a penal colony on an island offshore from Conakry,
and that some may have been tortured. A regional human rights organization reported that “arrests
in the ranks of the Army and the practice of torture in the sinister detention camp on the Island of
Kassa are intensifying”; the group additionally raised concerns that benefits accrued by those
close to the junta leader were creating “frustration” among other military factions, and that
“heavy distrust” persisted between members of the police and the army.73

70 E.g., Cheikh Yérim Seck, “Jusqu’où Ira Sékouba Konaté?,” Jeune Afrique, March 8-14, 2009; Reuters, “Tensions in
Guinea Junta as Isolation Grows,” October 8, 2009.
71 Guineenews, “La Liste Complète des Membres du Gouvernement de Kabiné Komara,” January 14, 2009. Cabinet
membership has shifted since January, but military officers and close associates of CNDD members continue to control
key posts.
72 BBC News Online, “Troops Crawl After Guinea Attack,” July 24, 2009; United Nations, Contingency Plan Conakry,
August 2009.
73 AFP, “Guinée: Une ONG Redoute une ‘Dérive Dictatoriale,’ Dénonce la Torture,” August 12, 2009.
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Counter-Narcotics Efforts
Soon after taking power, the CNDD initiated populist moves to crack down on corruption and
drug trafficking. These measures appeared designed to signal a break with the Conté regime,
enhance the junta’s popularity, and respond to international and domestic concerns that Guinea,
among other countries in the region, had become a transshipment hub for cocaine en route from
Latin America to Europe during the final years of the Conté regime. To date, CNDD actions have
relied on the “naming and shaming” of alleged wrongdoers, rather than advancing institutional
reform. Over 20 high-profile individuals, including top Conté officials, senior police officers, the
former chief of the armed forces, and a son and brother-in-law of the late president have been
arrested since February on drug trafficking allegations.74 Dadis Camara personally interrogated
alleged traffickers on national television, in some cases eliciting detailed “confessions.”
Many have welcomed the attempt to pursue powerful figures in the former regime. However,
concerns have arisen over a lack of due process in these cases, and some of the arrests appear to
have been politically selective. Dadis Camara has promised that accused drug traffickers will
receive a fair trial. This may prove difficult, however, given corruption and a lack of capacity
among the Guinean judiciary, and the fact that many of the accused have already been prompted
to confess to crimes on television.
CNDD anti-drug efforts additionally concentrated power in the presidency and sidelined civilian-
led anti-drug agencies in favor of the military.75 The CNDD created a new presidentially
controlled agency, the State Secretariat for Special Services, to curb drug and human trafficking,
money laundering, and organized crime. It is headed by an active-duty military officer, Capt.
Moussa Tiegboro Camara (no relation to Dadis Camara). The agency’s legal mandate and
authorities have not been clearly defined, and the CNDD has not publicly outlined how the
agency is meant to interact with the judiciary or police.76 Tiegboro Camara reportedly relies on a
corps of gendarmes and soldiers for enforcement.77 This has raised due process and human rights
concerns, and some military elements participating in anti-drug efforts have been accused of
abuses of power.78
Chemical Precursors Found
In late July, the CNDD announced the discovery in Conakry of hundreds of pounds of chemicals
that it said could be used for making drugs or bombs. A fact-finding mission sent by the U.N.
Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) concluded that some of the chemicals were precursors used

74 Conté’s son Ousmane, a military officer, admitted to involvement in trafficking, but denied being a “kingpin.” See
Rukmini Callimachi, “In TV confessions, curtain lifted on a narcostate,” Associated Press (AP), March 14, 2009; AFP,
“Son of Guinea’s late president confesses to drugs trafficking,” February 26, 2009; Amadou Toure, “Society: ‘Biggest’
drug trafficker’s presence in Conakry: Police DG gives ‘orders’,” Guineenews, May 5, 2007 via BBC Monitoring
Africa; AP, “20 Indicted on Drug Charges in Guinea,” June 13, 2009, among others.
75 The police anti-narcotics bureau, known as OCAD, was criticized in the past for being allegedly infiltrated by drug
traffickers. However, the agency’s track record reportedly improved after a new director was appointed in late 2008.
76 In June, Tiegboro Camara reportedly called on the Guinean population to “burn all armed bandits who are caught
red-handed,” noting that prisons were already overcrowded. Reuters, “Burn Armed Robbers, Says Guinea Crime
Chief,” June 2, 2009.
77 Arieff interview with security specialist, Conakry, February 2009.
78 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Rein in Soldiers,” April 27, 2009.
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in making drugs such as ecstasy while others were “solvents commonly used in the processing of
cocaine and heroin.” The UNODC called the seizure “the best evidence yet for clandestine
laboratory activity” in West Africa.79 At the same time, no drugs were seized at the sites were
chemicals were found. The CNDD agency charged with counter-narcotics announced it had
arrested 11 people in connection with the chemicals and other drug seizures.
Anti-Corruption Efforts
The CNDD also initially announced it would review the mining code and all current mining and
prospecting licenses, conduct an audit of the Conté government and all foreign companies
operating in Guinea, and initiate the privatization of water, energy, and telecommunications
firms.80 The judiciary has not played a lead role in anti-corruption initiatives under the CNDD,
which has so far emphasized making an example of high profile figures from Conté’s
administration rather than initiating institutional reform. In January 2009, the CNDD established
a committee to audit firms and individuals accused of having embezzled public funds, dodged tax
payments, or entered into corrupt government contracts under Conté. The committee questioned
mining and telecommunications executives, government contractors, businessmen, and former
government officials.81 Many Guineans welcomed the audits as an attempt to reign in corruption.
At the same time, some have expressed concern that the audits are extra-judicial and could be
politically motivated or extortion-related.82
Mining Sector Reform
Soon after seizing power, the CNDD said it would revise the mining code, renegotiate mining
contracts, and crack down in corruption in the mining sector.83 Guinea’s economy relies heavily
on primary commodity exports, notably bauxite (used to produce aluminum), gold, diamonds,
uranium, and iron ore. Guinea is thought to have the world’s largest bauxite reserves, and joint-
venture bauxite mining and alumina operations have historically provided about 80% of Guinea’s
foreign exchange.84

79 UNODC, “Evidence of Clandestine Laboratory Activity in West Africa,” July 31, 2009.
80 Oxford Analytica, “Guinea: Junta under conflicting transition pressures,” April 9, 2009. In Transparency
International’s 2008 Corruption Perception Index, Guinea placed 173 out of 180 countries.
81 Some of the accused were publicly interrogated on national television, including by Dadis Camara himself. Several
had previously been cited during audits of public institutions carried out by former Prime Minister Lansana Kouyaté,
who headed the government between February 2007 and May 2008 (see Appendix B).
82 See e.g., Aminata.com, “Les Audits à la Guinéenne: De la parade tout trouvée aux inquiétantes maladresses,”
February 2, 2009. The International Crisis Group expressed concern that “the process is more about getting hard cash
for the new regime than re-introducing the rule of law.” The Transition Has Only Just Begun, March 2009: 6.
83 A revision of mining contracts had been initiated shortly before Conté’s death with the help of international financial
institutions, though no results were publicly announced. In March, the CNDD auditing committee detained four former
mining ministers of embezzling millions of dollars from the Guinean state, releasing them after they agreed to repay
allegedly stolen funds. The African Union expressed concern over the apparently extra-judicial nature of the arrests.
Saliou Samb, “Guinea Ex-Ministers Freed, Say Will Repay Cash,” Reuters, April 1, 2009; AFP, “African Union
Expresses Concern Over Arrests,” March 26, 2009.
84 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Guinea.” The Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea (CBG) is a joint
venture in which 49% of the shares are owned by the Guinean Government and 51% by an international consortium led
by Alcoa and Rio Tinto-Alcan.
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Dadis Camara has appeared at times to take unpredictable actions related to mining oversight,
such as publicly threatening to close or take over various mining projects. He has also forced
several mining projects to close down for days or weeks at a time. In August 2009, the
multinational mining company Rio Tinto announced it would pull its equipment from an iron ore
project in Simandou earlier valued at $6 billion, reportedly after the CNDD indicated it would
uphold a decision made under Conté to unilaterally award half of Rio Tinto’s concession to
another company, BSG Resources Guinea, a subsidiary of Israeli businessman Benny Steinmetz’s
BSG Resources.85 In September, a Guinean court canceled the 2006 sale of an alumina refinery to
Russia’s RUSAL company, following which the Guinean government asserted it now fully owned
the refinery. The decision followed months of allegations by the CNDD that the original sale was
made by corrupt officials at far less than market value.86 RUSAL contested the court’s decision,
and the Russian government accused Guinean authorities of attempting to “expropriate UC
RUSAL’s property.”87
These actions have reportedly sparked fears among international investors concerned for the
security of their assets.88 Analysts contend that a global fall in primary commodity prices and a
decrease in funding available for foreign direct investment have weakened the junta’s bargaining
position, causing some firms to consider withdrawing entirely from Guinea.89 These concerns
reportedly heightened following the September 28 protests and military crackdown.90
Human Rights and Rule of Law
Upon Conté’s death, one observer noted that “the army that General Conté has bequeathed his
country knows little of the role and methods that it would need to employ in a democratic state
respectful of its citizens’ most basic rights.”91 Since the coup, human rights advocates and
members of the international community have expressed growing concern over violations of
human rights and the rule of law, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.92 Security forces have
been accused of looting private homes and businesses in Conakry, as well as other abuses of

85 Robert Guy Matthews, “Mining Giants Are Forced to Lessen Global Ambitions,” The Wall Street Journal, July 17,
2009. See also Neil Ford, “Junta Uncertainty Clouds Guinea Mining Sector,” African Business, February 1, 2009;
Andrea Hotter, “Guinea Mulls Independent Simandou Inquiry: Rio,” Dow Jones Newswires, March 5, 2009; David
Robertson, “Guinea Accuses Rio Tinto of Threat to Civil Peace,” The Times (London), July 23, 2009.
86 Reuters, “Guinea Court Reclaims Friguia from RUSAL,” September 10, 2009.
87 Reuters, “Guinea Court Reclaims Friguia from RUSAL,” September 10, 2009, “RUSAL Lays Claim to Seized
Guinea Alumina Refinery,” September 11, 2009, and “Russia Says Guinea Alumina Ruling Could Damage Ties,
September 11, 2009. A Guinean government delegation was said to be planning to travel to Moscow in October to
decide the fate of the refinery. AFP, “Russia May Back Guinean Junta in Return for Business Ties: Report,” September
29, 2009.
88 EIU, Guinea: Country Report, March 2009: 16; Andrea Hotter, “Guinea Ruler Worries Miners,” The Wall Street
Journal
, April 16, 2009; Reuters, “Analysis-Guinea RUSAL Dispute Sends Warning Sign to Miners,” September 16,
2009.
89 Saliou Samb, “Aluminium Slump Adds to Guinea Woes After Coup,” Reuters, February 20, 2009; Ougna Camara,
“La Révision des Conventions Pourrait Nuire au Secteur Minier Guinéen,” Les Afriques, March 4, 2009.
90 Reuters, “Expat Mining Execs Flee Guinea on Security Concern,” October 25, 2009; Dow Jones, “Guinea’s CBG to
Evacuate 20 Expatriate Staff—Rio Tinto,” October 26, 2009.
91 Gilles Yabi, “Le Pire Cadeau Empoisonné de Conté à Son Pays: Une armée à la fois dangereuse et incontournable,”
AllAfrica.com, January 7, 2009.
92 E.g., International Contact Group on Guinea, “Communiqué,” June 19, 2009.
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power.93 In September, defense lawyers for individuals detained in connection with cocaine
trafficking contended their clients were suffering “degrading and humane” treatment in prison.94
In separate incidents, soldiers raided the homes of a political party leader, Cellou Dalein Diallo
(in January 2009) and a prominent trade union activist, Rabiatou Sera Diallo (in March). In the
former case, the CNDD claimed that the raid was carried out by rogue soldiers; in the second, the
CNDD contended that the raid was carried out during a routine anti-drug operation.95 In August
2009, Human Rights Watch reported that opposition politicians and a human rights activist who
had criticized Dadis Camara had been the target of threats and intimidation.96
The CNDD has created several new agencies with undefined legal mandates, and has appeared to
sideline the role of the judiciary in upholding the rule of law. The formation of a State Secretariat
in Charge of Disputes sparked protests by human rights advocates and a strike by members of the
Guinean bar association, which contended that “citizens and lawyers are regularly summoned to
the military base … where they appear before the Secretariat or before the president in person as
part of ostensibly judicial procedures.” Bar members termed these proceedings “pseudo-trials.”97
The Secretariat was abolished in June, in apparent response to such criticisms. Advocates have
also raised concerns over an apparent rise in vigilante attacks, particularly after the head of the
newly created State Secretariat for Special Services called on the Guinean population to “burn all
armed bandits who are caught red-handed,” noting that prisons were already overcrowded.98
Alleged Abuses by CNDD Members Under Conté’s Presidency
Guinean and international advocates believe some CNDD members may have been responsible
for human rights abuses under Conté. These include individuals who were in a position of
command responsibility during nationwide anti-government protests in January and February
2007, when Guinean security forces allegedly opened fire on demonstrators and committed other
serious abuses against civilians.99 Dadis Camara promised to revive an official inquiry into
alleged abuses by security forces during the protests, which stagnated under Conté; however, little
progress appears to have been made.
The inclusion of Claude Pivi in the CNDD, and his promotion in January to Minister for
Presidential Security, has provoked particular concern. Pivi rose to national prominence in May
2008, when he portrayed himself as the leader of a mutiny by junior army officers. He is a widely

93 HRW, “Guinea: Rein in Soldiers,” April 27, 2009.
94 AFP, “Guinea Prisoners Suffer ‘Inhumane’ Treatment: Lawyers,” September 13, 2009.
95 Guineeactu.com, “Perquisition Chez la SG de la CNTG : Le Capitaine Tiègboro et Raby s'expliquent,” March 5,
2009.
96 Human Rights Watch, “Guinea: Respect Rights of Opposition,” August 31, 2009.
97 AFP, “Guinée: ‘Graves violations des droits de l'Homme’ (ordre des avocats),” May 15, 2009.
98 Reuters, “Burn Armed Robbers, Says Guinea Crime Chief,” June 2, 2009.
99 See HRW, “Guinea: Plan Elections and Hold Rights Abusers Accountable,” January 21, 2009. An investigation by a
coalition of local human rights organizations concluded that 186 people were killed and over a thousand injured during
the protests. In addition, human rights activists allege that security forces engaged in arbitrary arrests, mistreatment of
detainees, and rape. See Coalition Pour la Défense des Victimes des Evénements de Janvier et Février 2007 en
République de Guinée, Rapport sur les Violations Commises en République de Guinée Pendant les Evénements de
Janvier et Février 2007
, November 2007; and HRW, Dying for Change: Brutality and Repression by Guinean Security
Forces in Response to a Nationwide Strike
, April 24, 2007.
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feared figure in Conakry, and is believed by many to have personally overseen the reported
killing of police officers in June 2008 (during a military-led crackdown on a police mutiny in
Conakry) and the torture of a group of civilians the following November.100 Pivi is also believed
by some Guineans and members of the diplomatic community to have had ties to the drug trade.
Press Freedom
Guinea’s media are relatively diverse, and represent a variety of views. However, local media
outlets are largely concentrated in Conakry: newspapers rarely circulate outside the capital, most
private FM radio stations have a small broadcast radius, and Internet access is confined to urban
centers. Adult literacy is under 30%.101 Nonetheless, much of the population has access to
shortwave radio, including international news broadcasts focusing on Africa. The CNDD tightly
controls the national television station—the only locally broadcast channel—which often airs
hours of footage of Dadis Camara at a time. State-owned media have reportedly been barred from
covering political party activities.102
Local journalists report widespread self-censorship and a lack of access to official information.
Dadis Camara has appealed to local journalists to “support” the CNDD, and is said to have
offered money in exchange for favorable coverage. Many journalists fear Presidential Security
Minister Claude Pivi, who reportedly harassed and threatened several local journalists prior to
Conté’s death for coverage that was allegedly critical of the late president’s regime.103 Events
throughout 2009 appear to bear out such fears. The CNDD reportedly has detained journalists on
multiple occasions for reasons that have not been publicly explained or that relate to alleged press
criticisms of the CNDD.104
In August and September 2009, there was an uptick in such incidents. The CNDD reportedly
undertook a series of overt actions aimed curtailing the free exchange of information and press
coverage relating to politics and, in particular, rising opposition to a possible Dadis Camara
presidential candidacy:105 These actions included a temporary block on critical cell phone text
messages; the arrest and interrogation of a local journalist who had taken photos at a
demonstration by an anti-Dadis Camara youth group; and a ban on call-in shows and other
programs of a “political” nature on private radio stations.106 Additionally, following the violent

100 In November 2008, Pivi reportedly ordered the torture of several Cameroonian nationals whom he claimed had
damaged his car; the incident was reported in the Guinean press and by members of the diplomatic community.
101 CIA World Factbook.
102 AFP, “Guinée: Un meeting d’un parti d’opposition empêché dans l’Est,” June 18, 2009.
103 Interview with Guinean media analyst, June 2009.
104 The Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), among other international human rights and press freedom
organizations, has been particularly active in calling international attention to alleged press abuses in Guinea. MFWA is
a regional association of journalists and human rights advocates that promotes freedom of expression. See, for instance,
MFWA, “Guinea Alert: Soldiers Brutalise Journalist, Briefly Detain Him,” March 20, 2009; MFWA, “Guinea Alert:
Journalist and Family Held Incommunicado,” June 5, 2009; MFWA, “Guinea Alert: Journalist Arrested, Detained
Incommunicado,” August 13, 2009; MFWA, “Guinea Alert: Cameraman Detained Briefly and His Film Destroyed,”
January 14, 2009; MFWA, “Guinea Alert: TV Journalist Suspended Indefinitely,” April 8, 2009; and MFWA, “Guinea
Alert: Two National Radio Journalists Unfairly Suspended,” February 20, 2009.
105 See International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), “IFJ Condemns Threats on Freedom of Expression in Guinea,”
September 4, 2009; and HRW, “Guinea: Respect Rights of Opposition,” August 31, 2009
106 HRW, “Guinea: Respect Rights of Opposition,” August 31, 2009; Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA),
“Guinea Alert: Military Authorities Censor Telecom Operators,” August 31, 2009; MFWA, “Guinea Alert: Another
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repression of anti-CNDD protests on September 28, 2009 (see below), two local correspondents
who had reported on the protests for international media, including Agence France-Presse, Radio
France Internationale, and the BBC, were reportedly assaulted and threatened by soldiers.107
Transition Process
The CNDD committed to overseeing “transparent elections” and a “peaceful transition” to a
civilian-led government.108 Dadis Camara also promised that neither he nor any CNDD member
would run for office.109 In March 2009, the CNDD agreed to an elections timetable proposed by a
broad coalition of political parties, trade unions, and civil society groups known as the Forces
Vives
(“Active Forces”), in which both legislative and presidential elections would take place
before year’s end.110 However, in August 2009, the CNDD postponed presidential and legislative
elections until January and March 2010, respectively.
Some believe the junta’s centralization of power, statements by Dadis Camara that he might run
for president, and limited progress in electoral preparations could indicate an unwillingness by
junta members to leave power. These fears intensified after security forces brutally suppressed
mass civilian protests on September 28, 2009, as Dadis Camara claimed that he had little control
over the military and was unable to step down.
Election Administration
The organization of elections is being overseen by the Ministry for Territorial Administration and
Political Affairs (MATAP) and the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI).
However, these agencies’ mandates remain unclear.111 Voter registration has reportedly been
completed, though the finalization of voting lists was reportedly ongoing at the time of writing.

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Journalist Detained By The Military, Released Without Charge,” August 31, 2009; URTELGUI, “Déclaration de
l'Union des Radiodiffusions et Télévisions Libres de Guinée,” August 31, 2009 via http://www.guineepresse.info;
MFWA, “Guinea Alert: Media Regulator Censors Private Radio Stations,” September 4, 2009; and Guineenews, “Une
Union des Radios et Télévisions Libres Créée en Guinée,” March 24, 2009.
107 Reporters Without Borders, “Two Reporters for Foreign Media Go Into Hiding After Getting Death Threats,”
September 30, 2009.
108 The CNDD initially promised to hold elections in 2010, but it later agreed to organize the vote by the end of 2009,
following pressure from domestic opposition and civil society groups as well as donor countries. Conakry Radio
Guinee Internationale, “Guinea: Army Dissolves Cabinet, Suspends Constitution After President’s Death [Statement by
the Guinean Army following President Conte’s death, in Conakry on 23 December],” December 23, 2008, via Open
Source Center; Guineenews, “ ‘Le Pouvoir Sera Remis A Un Civil Qui A Les Mains Propres,’ Dixit Dadis Camara,”
February 10, 2009.
109 Reuters, “Guinea Coup Chief Says Will Not Stand in Vote,” December 25, 2008; AFP, “Junta in Guinea Moots Late
2009 Elections,” February 7, 2009; Jeune Afrique, “Moussa Dadis Camara: ‘Je Suis un Incompris, et J’en Souffre,’”
July 26, 2009.
110 The Forces Vives coalition has served as the main domestic civilian entity engaged in negotiations with the junta
over Guinea’s transition from military rule. While the Forces Vives have been the main domestic civilian entity
engaged in negotiating with the CNDD over Guinea’s transition to military rule, the coalition’s components—which
include political parties expected to compete against each other in elections—do not necessarily share a single political
perspective.
111 Arieff interview with NGO expert on Guinea elections, May 2009.
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Voter ID cards have not yet been issued.112 International concerns over a possible Dadis
candidacy were preceded by earlier international warnings that electoral preparations by the
CNDD were not on track.113 Many observers agree that the longer the CNDD remains in power,
the more vulnerable it may become to violent public opposition, factionalization, or a counter-
coup.114
Funding
The total budget for completing a national voter registry and holding legislative and presidential
elections is projected to be over $38 million dollars.115 As of early July 2009, the United States
had pledged $5.3 million, the largest single contribution. Other pledges have come from the
European Union, France, Japan, Germany, and Spain. In late June, after the International Contact
Group on Guinea criticized the CNDD for failing to provide promised funds, the Guinean
government disbursed the equivalent of $3 million toward the electoral process. Additional
Guinean government funds that were designated by Conté’s administration for use in legislative
elections are also expected to be applied. A significant funding shortfall nevertheless continues to
exist.116 The Obama Administration has expressed support for elections in Guinea, stating in its
FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations that “for the first time ever,
Guinea has the opportunity to hold credible elections,” and that “despite deteriorating political
conditions, the United States sees reason for hope.”
Potential Dadis Candidacy
In August and September 2009, Dadis Camara indicated on several occasions that he may run for
president. His statements contradicted his own repeated previous pledges not to remain in power
and a prior CNDD ban on the candidacy of any CNDD member.117 While Dadis Camara has not
officially announced that he will run—stating, instead, that he “might or might not stand”—he
has repeatedly asserted his right to stand for election, stating that “no one can stop me” from
entering the presidential race and that his potential candidacy is “in the hands of God.”118 In mid-
September, a new political party, the Rally for the Defense of the Republic (RDR), was formed to
support Dadis Camara’s candidacy.119

112 CRS interview with NGO expert on Guinea elections, October 2009.
113 Statement by African Union Peace and Security Council, July 10, 2009; 5ème Réunion du Groupe de International
de Contact sur la Guinée
(GIC-G),” Final Communiqué, July 16-17, 2009; AFP, “France Ready to Help Guinea Stage
Post-Coup Polls,” August 4, 2009.
114 SSRC, Policy Approaches to the Current Situation in Guinea, March 2009: 1.
115 Funding for elections is expected to come from previous budgeting for delayed legislative elections as well as newly
committed funds. As of early September, the budget for remaining activities was estimated at roughly $28.5 million
($11.5 million to complete the voter registry and $17 million for the elections). USAID responses to CRS queries, July-
September 2009.
116 As of early July, donor pledges of new funds totaled just over $12.76 million. USAID, July 6, 2009.
117 Radio France Internationale (RFI), “Guinea Junta Leader Says May Run for Presidency in 2010 Poll,” via BBC
Monitoring, August 20, 2009; Reuters, “Guinea Rejects U.S. Call for Junta-Free Election,” August 23, 2009.
118 AFP, “Guinée/Présidentielle: la Candidature de Camara ‘Entre les Mains de Dieu,’” August 20, 2009; AFP, “Guinea
Junta Chief Says He May Run in Polls,” August 24, 2009; Reuters, “Guinea Bans Political Debates on Radio and TV,”
September 3, 2009.
119 AFP, “Guinea Party Backs Junta Leader for President Despite Sanctions,” September 19, 2009.
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Reactions
Dadis Camara’s indications that he may enter the presidential race and the CNDD’s decision to
postpone the elections have provoked concern and criticisms among many Guineans, African
leaders, and donors. The Forces Vives coalition called on Guineans to reject any attempt by the
junta leader to run for president, and announced that they would boycott a meeting convened on
August 31 by the junta due to their “categorical opposition” to Dadis Camara’s candidacy.120 The
U.S. government, France, the African Union, ECOWAS, and the International Contact Group also
condemned Dadis Camara’s statements, while the AU threatened sanctions.121 Dadis rejected such
criticisms, while the CNDD accused the United States of “a blatant act of interference in the
internal affairs of the Republic of Guinea.”122
Several pro-Dadis youth groups, such as Dadis Doit Rester (“Dadis Must Stay”), were formed
after the CNDD took power and have held demonstrations calling for Dadis to remain in office.
These groups are seen by some as part of a CNDD strategy to retain power by cultivating a youth
constituency and marginalizing traditional political parties. Simultaneously, youths opposed to
Dadis have organized a group called Dadis Doit Partir (“Dadis Must Go”) and staged
demonstrations in early September in Conakry’s impoverished suburbs—the site of frequent anti-
government protests under former President Lansana Conté—including a protest in front of the
U.S. Embassy.123
September 28 Protests
The postponement of elections and Dadis Camara’s statements that he might run for president
occurred amid indications of strong public dissatisfaction with the CNDD’s leadership and
increased economic hardship.124 On September 28, 2009, security forces opened fire with live
ammunition on a crowd of some 50,000 civilian protesters who had gathered in and around an
outdoor stadium near the center of Conakry.125 Several major political leaders were in the stadium
and planned to address the crowd. Demonstrators reportedly chanted, “We want true democracy”
and held signs reading “Down with the Army in Power.”126 CNDD authorities had earlier

120 AFP, “Guinée: Les ‘Forces Vives’ Boycotteront une Réunion Convoquée par la Junte,” August 29, 2009.
121 State Department [U.S. Embassy-Conakry], “Delay of Guinean Elections,” August 20, 2009; AllAfrica.com, “U.S.
Calls on Malagasy, Guinea Leaders to Step Down,” September 24, 2009; AFP, “Paris Appelle Dadis et Sa Junte A Ne
Pas Se Présenter A la Présidentielle,” August 24, 2009; AFP, “Guinée/Présidentielle: Le Groupe de Contact Appelle
Camara A Ne Pas Se Présenter,” September 3, 2009; AU, “Communiqué of the 204th Meeting of the Peace and
Security Council,” September 17, 2009; AFP, “Guinée: l’Opposition Approuve les Sanctions Prônées par l’Union
Africaine,” September 19, 2009; AFP, “Guinea Opposition Calls on Junta Chief Not to Run for President,” August 23,
2009.
122 Government of Guinea, “Communiqué de la Direction de la Communication du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
de la République de Guinée,” August 22, 2009, via Guineenews.
123 Guineenews, via BBC Monitoring, “One Gendarme Killed in Demo Against Junta Chief’s Candidacy in 2010 Poll,”
September 1, 2009.
124 IRIN, “Guinea: ‘Yesterday Was Better Than Today,’” August 24, 2009.
125 September 28 is a national holiday in Guinea, commemorating Guinea’s decision in 1958 to declare independence
from France.
126 Associated Press (AP), “Guinea Soldiers Shoot Dead at Least 10 Protesters,” September 28, 2009; Adam Nossiter,
“Over 100 Protesters Killed in Guinea,” The New York Times, September 29, 2009. Four days earlier, tens of thousands
of protesters had reportedly demonstrated against Camara when he traveled to Labe, the main city in central Guinea
and an opposition stronghold, though no violent confrontations were reported. AFP, “20,000 in Guinea Demo Against
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attempted to ban the protest from taking place. The military crackdown in response to the
September 28 protest was the deadliest since nationwide anti-government protests in early 2007.
While state authorities reported 57 mortalities as a result of the confrontations, the Guinean
Organization for Human Rights (OGDH) reported that at least 157 people were killed, many by
bullets, while over 1,000 were wounded. The OGDH toll is based on a survey of hospitals, and
many believe the death toll to be significantly higher.127 Human Rights Watch reported that
soldiers and gendarmes—including members of the Presidential Guard and of the CNDD’s anti-
drug and anti-crime unit, both of which answer directly to the presidency—directly fired on the
stadium crowd and stabbed those fleeing with knives and bayonets. Military and police officers
also carried out lootings and rapes in residential areas of Conakry during the melee. Several local
journalists were reportedly assaulted and threatened by soldiers.128 Protesters set fire to a police
station during the crackdown.129 In the days following the protests, looting by soldiers continued
and sporadic confrontations were reported in several opposition strongholds in Conakry.
Witnesses said at least three civilians were killed in such confrontations.130 Several dozen
protesters detained on September 28 were held in military and police facilities, where they were
reportedly denied access by international monitors such as the International Red Cross.131
The deliberate infliction of violence against women protesters has provoked widespread outrage
among Guineans and the international community. According to numerous reports, soldiers
molested and raped women openly in public, many in full view of their commanders.132 A U.N.
humanitarian report stated that “dozens” of women had been victims of such attacks, though “the
exact number is not known due to a lack of cross-referencing in the collection of data, and to the
fear of social stigma and possible repercussions on the part of victims.”133 Some women were
also reportedly detained for days and tortured in police stations and military camps. While sexual
violence by the military against civilians has been documented in the past—notably during anti-
government protests in 2007—the public and large-scale nature of the attacks appeared to be a
new tactic. Secretary of State Clinton stated at a press conference, “It will not surprise you to hear
that I was particularly appalled by the violence against women.”134

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Coup Leader,” September 24, 2009.
127 Many reports contend that CNDD commanders ordered bodies to be taken to military camps rather than the morgue.
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Guinea Victims of Security Forces Crackdown: Situation
Report No. 3,” October 18, 2009; HRW, “Guinea: September 28 Massacre Was Premeditated,” October 27, 2009.
128 Reporters Without Borders, “ ‘We Know You, We’ll Make You Pay,’ Soldiers Tell Journalists,” October 8, 2009.
129 Agence France Presse (AFP), “‘Dozens Killed’ in Guinea Anti-Junta Demonstration,” September 28, 2009.
130 CRS interviews with Conakry residents, September 29, 2009; Radio France Internationale (RFI), “Calme Tendu
Après la Sanglante Répression,” September 29, 2009.
131 Human Rights Watch, “Guinea: Free or Charge Detainees,” October 4, 2009; U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, “Guinea Victims of Security Forces Crackdown: Situation Report No. 3,” October 18, 2009.
132 HRW, “Guinea: September 28 Massacre Was Premeditated,” October 27, 2009; AFP, “Guinée: J’ai Vu les Soldats
Mettre le Fusil dans le Sexe des Femmes,’” October 5, 2009; BBC, “African View: Guinea’s Lingering Military
Legacy,” October 5, 2009; Adam Nossiter, “In a Guinea Seized by Violence, Women Are Prey,” The New York Times,
October 6, 2009; U.N. IRIN, “Guinea: In the aftermath of rape,” October 9, 2009; National Public Radio, “Guinea
Shaken by Wave of Rapes During Crackdown,” October 20, 2009.
133 U.N. OCHA, Bulletin Humanitaire Mensuel, October 31, 2009.
134 Congressional Quarterly Transcript, “Secretary of State Clinton Holds Press Conference with Pakistani Foreign
Minister Qureshi,” October 6, 2009.
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In response to the attacks, human rights organizations condemned the Guinean military and Dadis
Camara. Corinne Dufka, a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, said the killings were
“shocking even by the abusive standards of Guinea’s coup government.”135 Human Rights Watch
subsequently found that the military response to the protests had been planned and
“premeditated,” and could amount to a crime against humanity.136 Alioune Tine, head of the
regional human rights organization RADDHO, stated, “If Camara maintains his desire to be
president, we are heading to an open conflict in this country.”137 Gilles Yabi, a former Guinea
analyst with the International Crisis Group, warned that the protest could be “only the beginning
of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations we can expect in the next few months.”138
Opposition Leaders Injured, Arrested
At least six opposition leaders—Cellou Dalein Diallo and his deputy Amadou Bah Oury, François
Lonsény Fall, Sidya Touré, Jean-Marie Doré, and Mouctar Diallo—were reportedly injured, and
three were beaten by soldiers. Diallo, Touré, and Fall were reportedly arrested before eventually
being taken to a hospital, where they were temporarily barred from communicating with the
media.139 The leaders’ homes were reportedly looted by soldiers in their absence, and at least one
was sprayed with machine gun fire.140 According to statements later made to the international
press, Diallo said he was beaten by soldiers who threatened to kill him. (Diallo was later
evacuated from Guinea to receive medical treatment.) Touré said he had witnessed “complete
disorder and total anarchy,” while Fall accused the military of crimes against humanity.141 (See
Appendix A for profiles of selected Guinean political party leaders.)
CNDD Statements
Dadis Camara has stated that he was “disgusted” by the violence of September 28 and that
“innocent people lost their lives.”142 At the same time, in remarks to the press, the junta leader has
denied any responsibility for the killings and abuses, contending that he is not in command of the
armed forces and suggesting that military disorder under Conté caused a breakdown in the chain
of command.143 These statements are contradicted by numerous witness reports and a Human
Rights Watch investigation, which indicate that commanders of the Presidential Guard and of the
State Secretariat for Special Services–both of which answer directly to the president—
orchestrated the crackdown.144 Dadis Camara also contended that “the army have taken me

135 Human Rights Watch, “Security Forces Unlawfully Kill Dozens of Protesters,” September 29, 2009.
136 Human Rights Watch, “Guinea: September 28 Massacre Was Premeditated,” October 27, 2009.
137 Reuters, “Guinea Forces Kill 14 in Crackdown-Group,” September 28, 2009.
138 BBC, “Guinea Army ‘Bayoneted Victims,’” September 29, 2009.
139 AFP, “Guinée: Trois Opposants Ayant Eté Hospitalisés ont Regagné Leur Domicile,” September 29, 2009; RFI,
“Calme Tendu Après la Sanglante Répression,” September 29, 2009.
140 AFP, “Guinée: Les maisons de deux opposants pillées par des militaires (témoins),” September 28, 2009.
141 RFI, “Calme Tendu Après la Sanglante Répression,” September 29, 2009.
142 AFP, “Guinea Under Fire After Scores Killed in Opposition Crackdown,” September 28, 2009; Agence Guinéenne
de Presse, “Discours A La Nation du Chef de l’Etat,” November 3, 2009.
143 Jeune Afrique, “Massacres du 28 Septembre: Dadis a-t-il été l’instigateur?” September 30, 2009; AFP, “Massacre en
Guinée: Dadis Camara Ne Se Reconnaît ‘Aucune Responsabilité,’” October 4, 2009.
144 E.g., Adam Nossiter, “In Guinean Hospital, Wounded Attest to Military Attack,” The New York Times, October 1,
2009; Radio France Internationale, “Un Militaire Témoigne,” October 1, 2009; Jeune Afrique, “Lundi Sanglant A
(continued...)
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hostage. They tell me ‘if you step down then we’ll take over.’”145 At the same time, Dadis Camara
has maintained that he cannot step down because he is the only one capable of controlling the
military.146
Dadis Camara has also accused the opposition of being at fault for the September 28 violence and
for seeking to overthrow the government.147 A CNDD statement, released September 29,
contended that security forces had been deployed “to prevent public unrest and to guarantee the
security of individuals and belongings,” while opposition leaders had “unilaterally” organized a
protest that risked “compromising public order” despite CNDD orders. It also maintained that the
majority of those who died had been killed by asphyxiation in the stampede, not by bullets.148
Dadis Camara separately declared two days of national mourning and a prohibition on “any
gathering from whatever side and nature and with subversive character,” which was later lifted.149
The CNDD has promised to organize its own investigation, but the opposition has rejected any
junta attempt to investigate as biased.150
International Reactions
The United States, European governments, and African regional organizations condemned the
military crackdown of September 28 and apparent attempts by the CNDD to prolong its hold on
power. The U.S. government, European Union (EU), and AU announced targeted sanctions
against CNDD members and certain associates; ECOWAS, the EU, and the AU have additionally
announced an arms embargo.151 France condemned the violence and announced the suspension of
military aid; previously, France had been one of the only donors to continue such aid to the
CNDD.152

(...continued)
Conakry: L’Enquête-Vérité,” October 4-10, 2009; AFP, “En Banlieue de Conakry, la Terreur ‘Quand les Bérets
Rouges Sont Venus,” October 1, 2009; Human Rights Watch, “Guinea: September 28 Massacre Was Premeditated,”
October 27, 2009.
145 Reuters, “Guinea Opposition Rejects Junta Unity Call,” October 1, 2009.
146 France 24, “Our Army Has Never Been Disciplined,” Warns Camara,” October 1, 2009.
147 Adam Nossiter, “Guinea Seethes as a Captain Rules at Gunpoint,” The New York Times, October 3, 2009.
148 Guineenews, “Massacre du 28 Septembre. Déclaration du CNDD et du Gouvernement,” September 29, 2009.
149 AP, “Guinée: Camara Décrète Deux Jours de Deuil National,” September 30, 2009; BBC, “Guinea Bans
‘Subversive’ Meetings,” September 30, 2009.
150 Reuters, “Tensions in Guinea Junta As Isolation Grows,” October 8, 2009.
151 The United States has imposed travel restrictions on “certain members of the military junta and the government, as
well as other individuals who support policies or actions that undermine the restoration of democracy and the rule of
law in Guinea.” The EU adopted sanctions against members of the junta and “associated individuals responsible for the
violent repression or the political impasse in the country.” African Union sanctions were announced on October 29 and
include denial of visas, travel restrictions, and asset freezes targeting “the president and members of the CNDD,
members of the government, and any other individuals, civilian or military, whose activities are aimed at maintaining
the anti-constitutional status quo in Guinea” (CRS translation of French-language communiqué). Reuters, “West
African Leaders Impose Arms Embargo on Guinea,” October 17, 2009; Voice of America, “EU Arms Embargo
Imposed on Guinea,” October 27, 2009; Europolitique, “UE/Guinée: L’UE Adopte des Sanctions Contre la Guinée”;
U.S. Department of State, “Guinea: Travel Restrictions,” October 29, 2009; AU Peace and Security Council
Communiqué, October 29, 2009. African Union, “AU Commission Expresses Grave Concern Over Situation in
Guinea,” September 29, 2009.
152 AFP, “France Condemns ‘Violent Repression’ in Guinea,” September 28, 2009; Reuters, “Clash Toll in Guinea
Soars, France Cuts Aid,” September 29, 2009.
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On September 30, the U.N. Security Council, chaired by U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice, urged
Guinean authorities to “put an end to the violence, bring the perpetrators to justice [and] release
all political prisoners, opposition leaders and individuals who are being denied due process under
the law.”153 U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has announced the formation of an
international commission of inquiry, with which the CNDD has agreed to cooperate.154
U.S. Reactions
Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, stated that the United States is
deeply concerned about the general breakdown ... of security in Conakry, and we encourage
the Guinean Government to exercise restraint and ensure the safety and security of all
Guineans and foreign nationals. We’re very concerned about violations of basic human rights
and call upon the regime to release all political prisoners.155
The State Department said the United States would monitor “the extralegal actions of the military
and government.”156 The Obama Administration announced travel restrictions against members of
the CNDD as well as “other individuals who support policies or actions that undermine the
restoration of democracy and the rule of law in Guinea,” effective October 23, 2009.157 The
United States has evacuated all non-essential personnel from the Conakry embassy, including
Political Affairs officers and USAID personnel.
Congressional Reactions
The violent crackdown of September 28 provoked criticism by several Members of Congress.
Senator Russ Feingold released a statement condemning “this blatant and violent repression” and
urging Dadis Camara “to abide by his pledge not to run in the elections scheduled for January.”158
Congressman Howard Berman, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, condemned
the CNDD and stated that, “In the eyes of the world the Guinean military leadership’s credibility
has been destroyed.”159 Congresswoman Yvette Clarke, in a statement on the House floor,
criticized the use of violence against civilian protesters and praised diaspora organizations for
bringing attention to “the atrocities that continue to take place in Guinea.”160 A group of 14
Senators additionally addressed a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praising the Obama
Administration for its “strong public stand” and urging the Administration to continue “actively
addressing the situation in Guinea, in coordination with our European partners, the African Union
and the Economic Community of West African State” and to consider “measures that can be taken

153 VOA News, “UN Security Council Concerned About Guinea,” September 30, 2009.
154 Reuters, “Guinea Leader Says Will Cooperate With Inquiry-UN,” October 21, 2009; United Nations, “Statement
Attributable to Spokesperson for Secretary-General on Establishment of International Commission of Inquiry on
Guinea,” October 30, 2009.
155 State Department, “Daily Press Briefing,” September 29, 2009.
156 Reuters, “U.S. Condemns ‘Brazen’ Guinea Crackdown,” September 29, 2009.
157 State Department, “Guinea: Travel Restrictions,” October 29, 2009.
158 “Statement of Senator Russ Feingold on Guinean Soldiers Firing Into an Opposition Rally,” September 29, 2009
159 Office of Congressman Howard Berman, “Guinea’s Military Leaders, Tarnished by Violence, Should Allow for
Free and Fair Elections, Berman Says,” October 8, 2009
160 Yvette D. Clarke, “Movement of Guinean Women in the United States,” October 28, 2009, Congressional Record,
Page E2648.
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against senior Guinean officials found to be complicit in this violence or other gross human rights
violations.”161
Economic Issues
Guinea has significant mineral resources, including gold, diamonds, uranium, and an estimated
27% or more of global bauxite (aluminum ore) reserves. Guinea may also have oil and gas
reserves, and has significant hydro-electric and agricultural potential. Prior to the coup, Guinea’s
natural resources sector was set to expand, partly in response to increasing global commodity
prices. In early December 2008, the African Development Bank announced the approval of a
$200 million loan to partly finance a $6.3 billion bauxite mining and alumina refinery project in
Guinea. The project was reportedly expected to be the largest ever investment in the country.162
However, the global economic crisis, perceived political instability, and populist threats by the
junta to close or seize corporate mining projects are reportedly causing mining investment
projects to be delayed or canceled.163 Many observers believe the Guinean government is facing
severe fiscal challenges due to corruption, mismanagement, and the scaling back of international
investment. Reports suggest government finances have been depleted due to corruption and
mismanagement, a drop in the collection of import duties, the recent fall in mineral commodity
prices, and the freezing of some foreign aid.164 Guinean officials acknowledged in September
2009 that government revenues from the largest bauxite consortium, CBG, would likely fall by
60% in 2010 due to lower prices and export volumes.165
Socioeconomic Conditions
Despite its resources, living standards in Guinea are among the worst in the world.166 Poor living
conditions helped spark nationwide anti-government protests in 2007, and some analysts fear that
the perception of continued economic decline could lead to further unrest. Access to running
water and electricity is rare, even in Conakry and other urban centers. The World Health
Organization lists Guinea as a “country under surveillance” with respect to possible complex
humanitarian emergency needs.167 According to figures released by the United Nations in May
2009, the rate of chronic malnutrition increased over the last two years, from 34.8% to 36.2%;

161 Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, signed by Senators Russ Feingold, Richard G. Lugar, Jeanne Shaheen,
Johnny Isakson, Barbara Boxer, James M. Inhofe, Patrick J. Leahy, Sam Brownback, Robert P. Casey Jr., Benjamin
Cardin, Mary L. Landrieu, Sheldon Whitehouse, Bill Nelson, and Roland W. Burris, October 15, 2009.
162 EIU, Guinea: Country Report, March 2009: 17.
163 EIU, Country Report: Guinea, June 2009; Lydia Polgreen, “As Chinese Investment in Africa Drops, Hope Sinks,”
The New York Times, March 25, 2009.
164 EIU, “Guinea Economy: Government faces fiscal crisis,” June 1, 2009. The EIU has elsewhere noted that “the poor
quality of fiscal reporting in Guinea makes it difficult to estimate the size of the fiscal deficit” (EIU, Guinea: Country
Report
, March 2009: 8).
165 Reuters, “Guinea Bauxite Income Seen Down 60 Pct in 2010,” September 28, 2009, and “Factbox-Guinea’s Major
Mining Operations,” September 16, 2009. CBG is thought to account for some 80% of Guinea’s mining income.
166 U.N. Development Program statistics at http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_GIN.html.
167 World Health Organization, Africa Weekly Emergency Situation Update, March 23, 2009.
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8.3% of Guinean children are thought to suffer from serious malnutrition.168 The adult prevalence
rate of HIV/AIDS is estimated at 1.6%.169
Issues for U.S. Policy
The United States has taken various steps to isolate the CNDD since the violent military
crackdown on protesters on September 28, 2009. These steps followed the suspension of certain
foreign assistance programs in Guinea as the result of the 2008 military coup. Non-essential
personnel were evacuated from the U.S. Embassy days after the crackdown for security reasons,
while additional personnel—including the Political Affairs Section—were evacuated several
weeks later. The Peace Corps program was also evacuated and suspended, as were public
diplomacy programs such as educational and cultural exchanges. Newly appointed Ambassador
Patricia N. Moller, however, was posted to Guinea several weeks after the crackdown. Effective
October 23, 2009, the United States imposed targeted visa restrictions against “certain members
of the military junta and the government, as well as other individuals who support policies or
actions that undermine the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in Guinea.”170
Potential issues for U.S. policy may include
• Monitoring of the timeline for and progress toward the conduct of elections, and
contingency policy planning with respect to the appropriate U.S. response to
potential related developments, such as a further deterioration in security, a
possible presidential election bid by Dadis Camara or other CNDD members, or
a change in the sequencing of presidential and parliamentary elections;
• The status of Guinean or international investigations into the September 28
violence and consideration of potential support for international emergency
assistance to victims of the September 28 crackdown;
• The resumption, continuation, or further restriction of certain foreign assistance
programs, including support to Guinea’s electoral process and medium to long
term democratization and governance reform efforts;
• The enforcement and possible expansion of targeted sanctions against CNDD
members and associates;
• Support to, and coordination with, multilateral policies toward Guinea, including
a planned international commission of inquiry, consideration of a possible
deployment of a regional peacekeeping or observation force, and an arms
embargo announced by ECOWAS, the AU, and the European Union;
• Guinean security sector reform;
• The status of U.S. Embassy personnel.

168 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Information Bulletin May 2009.
169 CIA World Factbook.
170 U.S. Department of State, “Guinea: Travel Restrictions,” October 29, 2009.
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Foreign Aid
In response to the coup, the United States suspended bilateral assistance to Guinea, with the
exception of humanitarian and democracy-promotion assistance, in line with congressional
directives.171 U.S. officials have indicated that free and fair elections must take place in order for
the aid suspension, which affects some development and all security assistance, to be lifted. At
the same time, the majority of programs administered by USAID have been categorized as either
humanitarian or democracy and governance assistance, and as such have not been affected by the
suspension. Health and education programs have been classified as humanitarian assistance and
therefore generally exempted from suspension, even when they involve working directly with
national government counterparts. In practice, suspended programs mainly include those related
to the environment and natural resource sector.172
While most programs that require working directly with central government agencies are subject
to the suspension, a few are not; exceptions include some health and education projects. Programs
that involve working with district and municipal administrators who were elected in 2005 local
elections are likewise exempt; the United States held that these elections, “though flawed, were
Guinea’s best-conducted elections ever.”173 Funding for suspended assistance programs has been
cut in some cases, while in others, it has been reprogrammed toward non-suspended activities.
It is likely that many of the same goals that defined U.S. aid priorities prior to the coup would
continue to be pursued if democratic elections were to occur. In its Congressional Budget
Justification for Foreign Operations
, the Obama Administration stated that “U.S. assistance to
Guinea can play an important role in supporting popular calls for greater democracy, good
governance, better social services, and improved economic opportunity, all of which should
bolster stability.”
Elections and Democracy Promotion
U.S. democracy and governance assistance is expected to increase in the lead-up to elections;
programs supporting the electoral process are not currently affected by the suspension in U.S. aid.
(U.S. democracy and governance programs in Guinea are funded through development assistance,
other aspects of which will be discussed below.) The Obama Administration’s FY2010 request for
democracy and governance funding represented a significant increase over FY2009: $7.14
million compared to $2.57 million.174 The United States is the largest single donor to the electoral
process, having pledged $5.3 million as of July 2009 toward a total electoral budget of over $38
million dollars.175 U.S. electoral assistance is expected to fund training and technical assistance to

171 The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8, Division H, Title VII, section 7008) bars direct assistance “to
the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree,” with the
exception of democracy promotion and humanitarian assistance. The provision is commonly referred to as “Section
508,” a reference to previous appropriations legislation.
172 USAID communications with CRS, May-July 2009.
173 FY2008 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.
174 2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, May 2009.
175 U.S. electoral assistance is expected to be funded from several accounts, including FY2008 carryover Development
Assistance, FY2009 Development Assistance, and Elections and Political Processes funds, according to USAID. Other
donors that have pledged support for Guinea’s elections are the European Union, France, Japan, Germany, and Spain.
As discussed above, in late June, the Guinean government provided the equivalent of $3 million toward the electoral
process. A significant shortfall in donor funds nonetheless continues to exist.
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Guinea’s National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), training for electoral agents
including poll workers, training for political parties and candidates, voter education, civil society
and media election monitoring and oversight, and the provision of electoral materials.176 U.S.
officials have not publicly outlined what, if any, criteria might be required with respect to the
continuation or suspension of electoral assistance or democracy and governance programs.
Security Assistance and Counter-Narcotics Cooperation
U.S. security assistance to Guinea prior to the coup focused on ensuring Guinea’s continued
stability in a region scarred by armed conflict, and on Guinea’s reported role as an international
drug trafficking transit hub. In 2002, the U.S. military trained an 800-person Guinean Ranger
battalion following incursions from fighters backed by then-Liberian president Charles Taylor. At
the same time, concerns over alleged human rights abuses by the Guinean military have, at times,
restricted military training programs. In appropriations legislation passed in 2008 and 2009,
Congress restricted International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance in Guinea to
“Expanded” IMET, which emphasizes human rights and civilian control of the military.177
All security assistance to Guinea is currently suspended, including military training programs,
counter-narcotics programs, and the provision of maritime security equipment. Prior to the coup,
Defense Department and State Department officials had informally planned a potential security
assistance budget totaling over $100 million over three years, starting in FY2009. The bulk of this
funding would have supported maritime and air space security and monitoring capacity-building
programs and regional peacekeeping training under the African Contingency Operations Training
and Assistance Program (ACOTA) and through the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program. The State Department had additionally requested $100,000 for International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) counter-narcotics programs in FY2009, the
first time such funding had been requested for Guinea; the FY2010 budget request is for
$110,000. The Obama Administration has stated that Guinea’s military is “an important element
in ensuring regional stability,” and indicated that if the aid suspension is lifted, U.S. military
assistance will work “to promote maritime safety and security in West Africa” and “will also
focus on counter-narcotics activities.”178


176 Information provided by USAID.
177 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8, Division H, Title VII, section 7070).
178 FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification for International Operations, May 2009.
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Appendix A. Profiles of Selected Guinean Political
Party Leaders179

There are over 60 registered political parties in Guinea, according to the website of the national
electoral commission.180 Conté’s political party, the Party for Unity and Progress (PUP), fractured
following the president’s death, and it is not expected to garner significant support in a popular
vote. Parties expected to compete in elections include a handful of former opposition parties as
well as dozens of new parties formed after Conté’s death. Many parties are generally perceived as
having an ethnic or regional base, and as having little organizational capacity. Leaders’ electoral
potential is difficult to assess, particularly as Conté ran essentially unopposed in Guinea’s most
recent presidential election, in 2003, amid an opposition boycott.
Alpha Condé, Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen (Rally of the Guinean People, RPG)
The RPG is believed to be Guinea’s largest political party, and Condé is a potential front-runner
for the presidency. At the same time, he has been criticized for living overseas during much of
Guinea’s recent history. Condé’s base is thought to be the Malinké ethnic group, concentrated in
Guinea’s northeast, though he is believed to draw some cross-ethnic support. A former exiled
opponent of founding president Ahmed Sékou Touré during Guinea’s first republic, Condé
challenged Lansana Conté in presidential elections in 1993 (Guinea’s first multiparty election)
and 1998. He received 19% and 16% of the vote, respectively, in these elections; both were
marred by reports of irregularities and fraud. Following the 1998 election, Condé was arrested for
trying to leave the country “illegally” and attempting to overthrow the government. He was
sentenced to five years in prison in 2000, but released in 2001 on a presidential pardon. Condé
and the RPG boycotted the 2002 legislative election and the 2003 presidential election.
Sidya Touré, Union des Forces Républicaines (Union of Republican Forces, UFR)
Touré served as prime minister from 1996 to 1999. Many Guineans credit him with initiating
government reforms as head of a relatively technocratic government appointed by Conté amid a
faltering economy. A member of the tiny Diakhanké ethnic group, Touré is believed to benefit
from significant cross-ethnic appeal. However, his personal popularity is thought to far outshine
his party’s ability to garner votes in a legislative contest. Touré’s base is in Conakry, both because
he is from the coast and because his time as prime minister is remembered as a period in which
government services in the capital, such as running water and electricity, noticeably improved. In
2004, Touré was accused of plotting a coup; many believe the charges were politically motivated.
Cellou Dalein Diallo, Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (Union of Democratic Forces
of Guinea, UFDG)
Diallo held several ministerial portfolios starting in the 1990s, and served as prime minister from
late 2004 until mid-2006. He was appointed to head the UFDG in 2007, succeeding founder
Mamadou Bâ (who had garnered over 24% of the vote in the 1998 presidential election); Bâ had
earlier led a split from the Union pour le Progrès et le Renouveau (Union for Progress and

179 The following profiles are drawn from Arieff interviews, news reports, and International Crisis Group publications.
180 Available at www.ceniguinee.org/index.php.
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Renewal, UPR).181 In January 2009, members of the military raided Diallo’s Conakry home and
accused him of hiding weapons and recruiting “mercenaries.” The junta later denounced the raid
and claimed it was the work of rogue soldiers. Diallo is credited by the international community
with overseeing local council elections in December 2005, which were thought to be Guinea’s
most free and fair (despite some flaws), but he has also been dogged by corruption allegations
and the perception that he was too close to Conté. Diallo and the UFDG are seen as relying
primarily on an ethno-regional base among Guinea’s Peuhl (Fulbe) community of the northern
Fouta Djallon region.
Jean-Marie Doré, Union pour le Progrès de la Guinée (Union for Guinean Progress, UPG)
A longtime opponent of Conté and former close associate of Sékou Touré, Doré ran for president
in 1998 but garnered less than 2% of the vote. Since the coup, he has served as spokesman of the
“Forces Vives” coalition of political parties and civil society groups, which is the primary civilian
entity negotiating with the CNDD over the transition to civilian rule. Doré is a member of the
Guerzé ethnic group, to which Dadis Camara also belongs; like Dadis Camara, he is a Christian.
The UPG won three seats in the National Assembly in 2002 legislative elections.
Mamadou Mouctar Diallo, Nouvelles Forces Démocratiques (New Democratic Forces, NFD)
Diallo, head of the newly formed NFD party, is a relatively young newcomer to Guinean politics
who has taken an active role in opposing the CNDD. Diallo was reportedly threatened with arrest
in August, and he was one of several opposition leaders to be targeted by the military during the
protests of September 28, 2009.
François Lonsény Fall
A career diplomat and former Guinean representative to the United Nations, Fall served as
foreign minister for two years and prime minister for two months in 2004. He was praised by
some Guineans for choosing to resign as prime minister because, he said, he could no longer
work with Conté. Fall remained abroad after his resignation and worked for the United Nations as
the Secretary-General’s special envoy for Somalia, Burundi, and the Central African Republic; his
time in exile is thought to detract from his popularity. He returned to Guinea in March 2009 to
launch a presidential campaign.
Lansana Kouyaté, Parti de l’Espoir pour le Développement National (Party for Hope and National
Development, PEDN)
A career diplomat, Kouyaté was appointed to serve as a “consensus” prime minister in early 2007
amid attempts to end nationwide anti-government protests. Kouyaté’s appointment was initially
met with widespread optimism, and he reportedly benefited from enormous popularity during his
first months in office. However, despite some successes, such as an audit of government
institutions and the renegotiation of international debt-relief agreements, his attempts to initiate
sweeping institutional reforms stalled. In May 2008, Conté’s decision to sack Kouyaté via
presidential decree met with little organized protest. Kouyaté left the country, but returned in
early 2009 and founded his own party in April.

181 Led by Ousmane Bah, the UPR was the largest opposition bloc in the National Assembly, with 20 seats, before the
legislature was dissolved by the CNDD. However, the last legislative elections were boycotted by the RPG. The UPR’s
electoral appeal is untested following its fragmentation.
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Appendix B. Touré and Conté Regimes: Historical
Background

Ahmed Sékou Touré and the Guinean “Revolution” (1958-1984)
Alone among France’s African colonies, Guinea gained independence in 1958 after Guineans
overwhelmingly voted for immediate sovereignty rather than membership in the self-governing
but neocolonial French Community. Ahmed Sékou Touré, a trade unionist and militant anti-
colonialist, spearheaded the movement for independence, which caused France to precipitously
withdraw all aid and remove many physical assets, such as port equipment. After the break with
France, Guinea’s fledgling government received significant technical and economic assistance
from the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries. While adopting a radical anti-Western
public stance, Guinea nevertheless also accepted aid from the United States which, seeking to
counter Soviet influence, sponsored a Peace Corps program and provided other assistance. U.S.
companies also maintained investments in Guinea, notably in the mining sector.
Touré’s Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG)—Guinea’s sole political party at the time—
centralized control over all aspects of political, economic, and cultural life. The economic system
and national educational program were ostensibly designed to eradicate all traces of Western
colonial and neo-colonial influence. External travel for Guineans was restricted, while foreigners’
entry and movements within Guinean territory were strictly monitored. Touré allowed foreign
multinational firms to form joint ventures with the government to mine and process Guinea’s
large bauxite reserves through the use of industrial enclaves largely unlinked to the local
economy. Nonetheless, enormous economic hardship was the norm for nearly all Guineans,
especially after Touré attempted to ban all private trade in the mid-1970s. Broad opposition to
such policies, which was catalyzed by the 1977 “Market Women’s Revolt,” led to an easing of
economic control and other reforms during the late 1970s. After this point, Guinea turned
increasingly toward the West for financial and technical aid.
Touré’s government was strongly nationalist and espoused a non-ethnic, unified Guinean identity.
The Bureau Politique National, the country’s highest decision-making body, included members of
each of Guinea’s major ethnic groupings. At the same time, members of the president’s extended
family held key state positions and reportedly wielded significant power behind the scenes.
Additionally, some government programs disproportionately affected certain regions. For
example, the “demystification” campaign of the mid-1960, which sought to eradicate
“backwards” cultural practices, mainly targeted the diverse ethnic groups of Guinea’s
southeastern Forest region,182 while in 1976 the regime specifically targeted members of the
Fulbe (Peulh) ethnic group after Touré announced that he had discovered a Fulbe “plot” to
destabilize the country. Overall, state-sponsored repression affected Guineans of all ethnicities,
including members of Touré’s own Malinké ethnic group.
The first two decades of Touré’s presidency were marked by increasingly repressive practices as
Touré claimed that France and other neo-colonial powers were engaged in a “permanent plot” to
undermine the Guinean “Revolution.” The government regularly denounced various anti-

182 The many ethnic groups who predominantly reside in the Forest region, of which the largest are Kissi, Guerzé (also
known as Kpelle), and Toma (Loma), have acquired an ethno-regional identity, known in Guinea as Forestier.
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government schemes purportedly led by counter-revolutionary Guineans and conducted regular
purges of the civilian and military bureaucracies. The PDG also instilled a pervasive culture of
surveillance and secrecy. A civilian militia was created for public security and to check the power
of the military. Several thousand Guineans are believed to have disappeared in government
detention under Touré, though precise figures are not available.183 As many as a third of Guinea’s
population (some two million people) fled the country during the Touré era, though many left for
predominantly economic, rather than explicitly political, reasons.184 Many long-time observers
suggest that Guineans, even those born after Touré’s death in 1984, remain deeply influenced by
the PDG regime, similar to the populations of post-socialist states in eastern Europe.185
Guinea under Lansana Conté
Sékou Touré died during heart surgery in the United States in March 1984, leaving no clear
successor and a government with little popular support. In early April, a military junta calling
itself the Military Committee of National Recovery (Conseil Militaire de Redressement National,
CMRN) took power in a bloodless coup. Colonel (later General) Lansana Conté, a senior officer
and former member of the French colonial military, soon emerged as the leader of the CMRN.
The coup leaders suspended the constitution, disbanded Touré’s ruling party (executing several of
its formerly most powerful members), banned all political activity, and ruled by decree. However,
the CMRN also relaxed the level of repression and initiated a few improvements in human rights,
including shuttering the prison block at Camp Boiro, a notorious military base in Conakry that
served as a detention center for Guineans accused by Touré of anti-government activities.
In July 1985, while attending a regional conference, Conté faced a coup attempt by a rival CMRN
member, Diarra Traoré, an ethnic Malinké who had served as Vice President following the coup
but who had later been demoted. The putsch was suppressed by pro-Conté troops. Purges of
putative anti-Conté military elements, including military trials and executions of accused coup
participants, followed, as did vigilante attacks on ordinary Malinkés and looting of their
businesses. Such acts were publicly praised by Conté. These events were seen as lessening the
influence of Malinkés within the military and state institutions, but they also highlighted ethnic
divisions in Guinea and politicized ethnic identity among the President’s fellow Soussou people.

183 There has never been a comprehensive independent investigation into the PDG’s detention practices. The
Association of Camp Boiro Victims, a Conakry-based organization that seeks the rehabilitation of former detainees and
the disappeared, believes as many as fifty thousand Guineans may have died in detention, though international
researchers generally cite a lower number. Amnesty International estimated that 2,900 prisoners had disappeared in
Guinea between 1958 and 1982 (Amnesty International, Emprisonnement, ‘Disparitions’ et Assassinats Politiques en
République Populaire et Révolutionnaire de Guinée
, Paris: Editions Francophones d’Amnesty International). One
historian estimates 2,500 disappeared during Touré’s presidency (Maligui Soumah, Guinée de Sékou Touré à Lansana
Conté
, Paris: L’Harmattan, p. 21).
184 A. O. Bah et al., “Les Guinéens de l’Extérieur: Rentrer au pays?” Politique Africaine 36 (December 1989): 22.
185 For example, the anthropologist and Guinea expert Mike McGovern has written that “remnants [of Touré’s regime]
persist in bureaucratic habits such as the strict surveillance of foreigners on Guinean territory… and citizens’ habits
such as that of looking to the State to solve all problems, in lowering for example the price of merchandise such as
gasoline and rice, or further in omnipresent rhetoric… considering merchants as greedy saboteurs rather than as
entrepreneurs “naturally” seeking to conserve their operating margins amid market fluctuations. A certain nostalgia for
the Touré era is equally perceptible, even if that period was one of suffering and privations.” “Sékou Touré Est Mort,”
Politique Africaine 107 (October 2007): 134-5.
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As president, Conté steadily consolidated power. In seeking to resurrect the devastated economy,
Conté pursued a pragmatic program of economic liberalization and reforms, including, for
example, currency devaluation, a floating foreign exchange system, allowances for the creation of
agricultural markets, and the privatization of state firms. Though Guinea remained somewhat
economically isolated and strongly nationalist, Conté’s reforms led to improvements in foreign
relations and aid cooperation with donors. This included a moderate rise in U.S. assistance. In
2006, the government authorized Guinea’s first private radio stations, making the country the last
in West Africa to allow private broadcasting. The move ended a state radio monopoly in place
since 1958, and was seen as complying with government agreements to relax regulation of
political expression.
Tenuous Democratization
The ostensible need to ensure state security in the wake of the 1984 coup gave Conté latitude to
extend his control over the state administrative and security apparatus. The president ruled by
decree for nearly a decade. In December 1990, a new constitution, drafted by a transitional
CMRN legislative body, was approved by popular referendum. Though it foresaw a five-year
transition to elections, the constitution gave the president wide-ranging decision-making and
governance powers. It also created the basis for a highly personalized regime based around the
presidency, manned by officials drawn from across Guinea’s ethnic groups but drawing heavily
from the President’s Soussou ethnicity. In 1991, Conté dissolved the CMRN, replacing it with a
Transitional National Recovery Commission, which promulgated laws based on the constitution
and was charged with overseeing a transition to electoral democracy.
In 1992, Conté legalized multi-party politics, but political activity was placed under strict state
regulation. While donor countries, including the United States, provided technical assistance in
support of this process, they did not extensively financially back the transformation or subsequent
elections, due to apprehensions about limitations on popular participation under the system being
created. Guinea’s first presidential election, held in December 1993, was won by Conté, who
garnered 52% of the vote. Conté won re-election in December 1998 and 2003. Guinea has held
two multi-party legislative elections, in 1995 and in 2002. Conté’s ruling Party of Unity and
Progress (PUP) won both, taking 76 and 91 of the 114 seats in each respective election.
Legislative elections were due to take place again in 2007, but were repeatedly delayed, leaving
the National Assembly with an expired mandate.
Most of these elections were characterized by credible reports of irregularities and manipulation
favorable to Conté and the PUP. Varying, though often extensive, levels of political unrest,
election violence, state harassment and detention of opposition leaders, and coercive suppression
of opposition political activities, were common threads. In 1998, the main opposition leader,
Alpha Condé, was imprisoned following the vote. In 2001, a PUP-sponsored referendum aimed at
extending Conté’s time in office was passed by a putative 98% vote margin, amid low turnout and
an opposition boycott, anti-referendum protests, a crackdown by security forces on opposition
parties, and strong international criticism of the effort. It extended the presidential term from five
to seven years and removed term and presidential candidate age limits, among other measures,
extending Conté tenure.
In December 2003, Conté, who did not campaign because of his ill health, was re-elected with a
reported 96.63% of the vote with only nominal opposition, following the Guinean Supreme
Court’s disqualification of six presidential candidates from the race on technical grounds and in
the face of an election boycott by key opposition parties. The European Union reportedly refused
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to support the conduct of the election or deploy election observers because of doubts over the
transparency of the election.186 In 2004, the Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH, in
French) issued a report, titled “Guinea: A Virtual Democracy with an Uncertain Future,” that
sharply criticized the government’s regular suppression of political freedoms and targeting of
opposition groups.187
Regional Instability
Starting in the late 1980s, each of Guinea’s neighbors experienced one or more internal
conflicts—notably Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d’Ivoire. Conté’s government
was an active participant in many of these conflicts, supporting various government and non-
government actors in neighboring countries and reportedly serving as a conduit for arms. For
example, Conté sent troops to neighboring Guinea-Bissau in 1998 to shore up his ally President
Bernardo “Nino” Vieira amid a military uprising, while throughout Liberia’s successive conflicts
(1989-2003), Conté provided backing for groups opposed to his regional nemesis, Charles
Taylor.188
In September 2000, Conté’s support for anti-Taylor rebels, along with ethnic tensions, played into
a series of armed attacks along Guinea’s borders with Sierra Leone and Liberia. These attacks
lasted several months, and terrorized residents of the southeastern Forest region in particular. A
self-described Guinean rebel spokesman whose identity remains unknown claimed responsibility
for the attacks and said they were aimed at forcing Conté to step down. Most observers believe
the attacks were instigated by Liberia’s then-president, Charles Taylor, and carried out by
members of Sierra Leone’s RUF rebel movement, Liberian militias, and some Guinean fighters.
The Guinean military eventually quashed the assailants, using extensive aerial bombardment of
villages suspected of harboring the rebels and the help of hastily formed village militias and
Liberian rebel fighters opposed to Taylor.
Conté meanwhile presided over a weakening of central state structures. In its waning years,
Conté’s government was reportedly divided into factions controlling different areas of the
government, economy, military, and even nominal opposition and civil society groups. NGOs and
international media portrayed a country whose leader was unable “to control the day-to-day
operations of government.”189 Concerns over factionalization in the administration and military
heightened with reports that President Conté, who declined to institutionalize his succession and
who did not often appear in public, was terminally ill. Starting in 2003, the International Crisis
Group warned that Guinea was at serious risk of a civil war or military coup.190

186 IFES, “Of Interest,” Election Profile (Guinea), at http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=402.
187 IRIN, “Guinea: Rights Group Slams ‘Caricature of Democracy,’” April 14, 2004. See also Maligui Soumah,
Guinée: La démocratie sans le peuple, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006.
188 In particular, Conté reportedly provided logistical support and a rear base on Guinean territory for the United
Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO) in the late 1990s, and later supported Liberians United For
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), a rebel faction that proved instrumental in unseating Taylor in 2003.
189 International Crisis Group, Stopping Guinea’s Slide, 2005: 10.
190 International Crisis Group, Guinée: incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne, 2003: i.
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Relations with the Military
Although he arrived in power via a military coup, Conté had a complex relationship with
Guinea’s armed forces. The military benefited from significant socioeconomic privileges, but
served as the target of purges and surveillance from a president who feared a military uprising.
Conté faced many coup attempts, notably in 1996, when dissident officers shelled the presidential
palace and briefly detained the president himself. The stand-off was reportedly diffused when the
mutinous troops failed to agree on who should take over power upon Conté’s dismissal. In 2005,
an armed attack on the president’s motorcade was followed by mass arrests.
The Conté era was also marked by repeated military mutinies spurred by demands for higher pay,
more frequent promotions, and an end to the perceived monopolization of military patronage
networks by a small handful of high-ranking officers. In response to these challenges, Conté
cultivated the Presidential Guard (also known as the Bataillon Autonome de Sécurité
Présidentielle
, or BASP), an elite force based in Conakry and commanded directly by the
presidency.191 Conté also expended significant state resources on military salaries and benefits
such as subsidized rice for Guinean troops. Numerous officers were forced to retire in late 2005
following the mass promotion of about 1,000 non-commissioned and commissioned officers. In
2007, the government more than doubled army salaries after soldiers rioted in dissatisfaction at
their low salaries following their role in quelling nationwide strikes. These moves were generally
seen as decreasing resources available to such public goods as education and infrastructure. The
International Crisis Group noted that “pay increases, along with waves of recruitment in 2007-
2008, ate into the state’s fragile finances. But far from satisfying the troops, they generated an
expectation that violent protests would bear fruit.”192
Conté’s administration generally refrained from enforcing military discipline in connection with
alleged abuses of civilians, fostering what many Guineans and international observers see as a
culture of impunity. In 2006, Human Rights Watch issued reported that Guinea’s security forces
routinely employed arbitrary arrest, torture, assault and occasionally murder to fight crime and
perceived government opponents.193 An official commission of inquiry into security forces’
killings of demonstrators in 2006 and 2007 had stagnated at the time of Conté’s death in 2008.
The last wave of protests in Conakry before Conté’s death took place in November 2008; at least
four people reportedly died when security forces opened fire with live ammunition.
Growing Pressure for Reform
Popular anger at Conté’s regime grew in the later years of his regime. In mid-2006 and again in
early 2007, a coalition of trade unions organized a series of general strikes in response to long-
standing and widespread public dissatisfaction with economic stagnation, inflation of about 30%,
the slow pace of promised political reform and democratization, and Conté’s semi-autocratic
presidential exercise of power. In January and February 2007, a general strike spiraled into

191 Conté’s personal guard also reportedly included a portion of the roughly 800 elite commandos known as the
Rangers who were trained in border protection by a United States military cooperation program in 2001-2002
(International Crisis Group, Guinée: incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne, 2003: 12; Arieff interview with security
specialist, Conakry, February 2009).
192 International Crisis Group, Guinea: The transition has only just begun, March 2009: 4.
193 HRW, The Perverse Side of Things: Torture, Inadequate Detention Conditions, and Excessive Use of Force by
Guinean Security Forces
, April 22, 2006.
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unprecedented nationwide anti-government protests. These protests, which were supported by
major political opposition parties and civil society groups, caused significant political unrest in
urban centers. In response, the military opened fire on protesters and launched a harsh
crackdown, particularly in urban centers and notably in Conakry, the capital. Confrontations
between troops and largely unarmed demonstrators resulted in 186 civilian deaths, while
hundreds were injured, beaten, or extra-judicially detained, and dozens tortured or raped,
according to an investigation by local human rights groups.194 Martial law was imposed in
February, during which time Human Rights Watch reported that security forces in Conakry “went
house-to-house, breaking down doors, and looting everything of value inside, including cell
phones, cameras, and money.”195
In late February, the strikes were brought to an end in talks mediated by Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS). The unions agreed to call off strikes in exchange for several
concessions from Conté, including the appointment of a Prime Minister with some executive
powers from a list of candidates pre-approved by unions and civil society groups. Conté’s
selection of Lansana Kouyaté, a former diplomat, was widely welcomed.
Kouyaté managed a few significant successes, such as an audit of some government institutions
and the renegotiation of a debt-relief agreement with the IMF. His attempts to initiate sweeping
reforms of public institutions, however, stalled. Many attributed his failures to machinations by
Conté’s inner circle, Conté’s refusal to accord to Kouyaté the power to make real changes, and
public’s disillusionment with the prime minister’s perceived pursuit of his own political
agenda.196 Quality of life across Guinea continued to decline, and a promised official probe into
abuses by security forces during the strikes stagnated. The unions, which had enjoyed broad
public support during the strikes, waned in influence due to Kouyaté’s lackluster performance and
rumors of internal splits and corruption among union leaders.197 A presidential decree in May
2008 sacking Kouyaté and replacing him with a close Conté ally and businessman, Ahmed
Tidiane Souaré, met with little protest.
Military Divisions and Restiveness
Conté, a former general, depended on the military to enforce his rule, and closely controlled the
Ministry of Defense and other security agencies. Nevertheless, he faced several alleged putsches,
some attributed to military officers. In 1996, a military mutiny spawned a coup attempt that
reportedly nearly overthrew the president, and in 2005 the president’s motorcade came under fire
as he drove through Conakry. In addition, as his tenure waned, the military became increasingly
divided along ethnic and generational lines, and in recent years there were several military
protests ― some violent ― mostly over pay, working conditions, and military rank promotions.

194 Coalition pour la Défense des Victimes des Evénements de Janvier et Février 2007 en République de Guinée,
Rapport sur les violations commises en République de Guinée pendant les événements de Janvier et Février 2007
(November 2007): 4. See also HRW, Dying for Change: Brutality and Repression by Guinean Security Forces in
Response to a Nationwide Strike
, April 24, 2007.
195 HRW, “Guinea: Security Forces Abuse Population Under Martial Law” [press release], February 15, 2007.
196 E.g., International Crisis Group, Guinée: Garantir la poursuite des réformes démocratiques, 2008; Kissy Agyeman,
“President Replaces Consensus Prime Minister in Guinea,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, May 21, 2008; and Michelle
Engeler, “Guinea in 2008: The Unfinished Revolution,” Politique Africaine 112 (December 2008).
197 Arieff interviews, Conakry, February 2009.
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The 2008 Junior Officer Mutiny
Particularly notable was a May 2008 uprising led by junior army officers at Camp Alpha Yaya,
the largest military base in Conakry and the headquarters of the army’s elite commando
parachutist unit (known as the BATA). Mutinous troops demanding back wage payments and rice
subsidy increases took control of Alpha Yaya, took the army chief of staff hostage, and pillaged
shops and private homes in Conakry. They demanded that the chief army quartermaster and the
defense minister be fired and that Guinea’s generals, who were reportedly seen by the mutineers
as blocking opportunities for promotion and monopolizing lucrative patronage networks, be
retired.198 Mutiny leader Claude “Coplan” Pivi also told local media that the mutineers sought the
rehabilitation of soldiers who were punished for abuses during the 2007 strikes.199 Mutiny leaders
exchanged fire with members of the presidential guard, and several people were reportedly killed,
and dozens wounded, by stray bullets.200 After a week of unrest, Conté met in person with the
mutineers’ leaders, and the government agreed to pay salary arrears of $1,100 to each soldier,
sack the defense minister, and grant promotions to junior officers, ending the uprising.201 Much
of the top military hierarchy, however, remained in place until Conté’s death, but were
subsequently dismissed by the CNDD, key members of which have claimed to have played key
roles in the May 2008 mutiny.202
In mid-June 2008, police officers in Conakry attempted to launch their own mutiny over alleged
non-payment of back-wages and a failure to implement pledged promotions. Military troops led
by Pivi crushed the police uprising, culminating in a bloody shoot-out at a police headquarters in
the upscale Camayenne neighborhood that left at least four police officers dead, according to an
official tally. Pivi’s troops also reportedly laid siege to and looted police facilities throughout
Conakry, and the police counter-narcotics unit was also ransacked and its records destroyed.203
The confrontations reportedly left a rift in relations between the police and the army, and
established Pivi’s reputation as a well-known and much-feared figure in Conakry.204 These events
reportedly allowed junior officers to gain control of substantial portions of state armaments and,
given past incidents of violent military indiscipline, placed in question security conditions in
Conakry. There were also reports that some military elements employed these weapons in
common crimes targeting civilians.205


198 Saliou Samb, “Guinea Meets Soldiers’ Demands To End 2-Day Mutiny,” Reuters, May 27, 2008; RFI, “Guinean
Soldiers Demand Retirement Of Army Generals,” May 29, 2008 via BBC Monitoring.
199 BBC Monitoring, “Guinea: Mutiny leader explains reasons behind action [from Guinéenews]” June 8, 2008.
200 Kissy Agyeman, “Tension Mounts in Guinea in Wake of Army Revolt,” Global Insight, May 29, 2008.
201 Saliou Samb, “Guinea Settles Army Pay Dispute With Mass Promotion,” Reuters, June 14, 2008.
202 Claude Pivi, a CNDD member and junior officer who was promoted to Minister of Presidential Security in January
2009, styled himself the leader of the Camp Alpha Yaya mutiny. Pivi also led the crackdown on the police uprising,
according to witnesses. After he became president, Dadis Camara stated he had played a key role in the mutiny and in
the negotiations that ended it.
203 E.g., Aminata.com, “Affrontements Entre Policiers Et Militaires—La Bande De Pivi Et Des Gardes Présidentielles,”
June 17, 2008; and Pascal Fletcher, “Bauxite-Exporter Guinea Faces Drugs Trade Threat-UN,” Reuters, July 12, 2008.
204 Many Conakry residents believe that Pivi possesses powers that make him bulletproof. Anxiety over Pivi’s activities
peaked in November, when Pivi reportedly ordered the arrest and torture of a group of Cameroonian nationals he
suspected of having damaged his car. (E.g., La Lance newspaper, November 26, 2008.)
205 International Crisis Group, Guinea: The Transition Has Only Just Begun, March 2009: 16.
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Author Contact Information

Alexis Arieff
Nicolas Cook
Analyst in African Affairs
Specialist in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
ncook@crs.loc.gov, 7-0429




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