Zimbabwe: The Power Sharing Agreement
and Implications for U.S. Policy
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
October 27, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34509
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Zimbabwe: The Power Sharing Agreement and Implications for U.S. Policy

Summary
After almost a year of uncertainty following Zimbabwe’s March 2008 elections, opposition leader
Morgan Tsvangirai was sworn as Prime Minister of a new coalition government on February 11,
2009. The new government’s establishment came five months after a power-sharing agreement
was signed in an effort to resolve the political standoff resulting from the flawed 2008 elections.
For the first time since independence, the ruling party has lost its majority in the National
Assembly. The results of the presidential race, belatedly announced in May 2008 amid rising
tensions, indicated that Tsvangirai had received more votes than the incumbent, President Robert
Mugabe, but had failed to garner the 50% needed to avoid a runoff. Days before that runoff was
scheduled to take place, in late June 2008, Tsvangirai pulled out of the race, citing widespread
political violence and the absence of conditions for a free and fair election. Mugabe was declared
the winner in the runoff, but many observer missions suggest the poll did not reflect the will of
the people. On September 15, 2008, after weeks of negotiations, Tsvangirai and Mugabe reached
an agreement to form a unity government. As part of the deal, Mugabe remains head of state, with
Tsvangirai as Prime Minister and cabinet and gubernatorial positions divided among the parties.
Disputes over the allocation of key ministries delayed implementation of the agreement. As
mediation efforts continued, the United States, the European Union, and several African leaders
called for Mugabe’s resignation. A final agreement was reached in January 2009, and the new
coalition government was established in early February.
The parties to the agreement now face significant challenges in working together to promote
political reconciliation and to address serious economic and humanitarian needs. Politically
motivated violence and repression followed the March elections, which were held amidst a
deepening economic crisis. Zimbabwe’s gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased over 50%
in the last decade, the inflation rate rose to over 200 million percent in 2008, and the official
unemployment rate is over 90%. The adult HIV prevalence rate of 15% has contributed to a sharp
drop in life expectancy, and almost three quarters of the population reportedly required food aid
in early 2009. Over 4,300 died between August 2008 and July 2009 from a widespread cholera
outbreak that infected almost 100,000. Experts suggest a similar outbreak is likely to occur as the
rains return this year. Deteriorating conditions in the country have led many Zimbabweans to
immigrate to neighboring countries in recent years, creating a substantial burden on the region. In
South Africa, immigrants have been the target of xenophobic attacks. International donors
welcomed the January 2009 agreement and have begun a cautious process of re-engagement with
the transitional government, but a resumption of significant assistance is expected to be
predicated on more substantial political reforms. Many remain skeptical that true power sharing
exists within the coalition government. Several officials from the previous administration, which
had a poor human rights record and was seen as autocratic and repressive by its critics, remain in
the new government. Harassment of opposition and civil society activists continues, and many
question the ruling party’s commitment to reform.
In 2005, former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice labeled Zimbabwe an “outpost of
tyranny,” and Bush Administration officials accused Mugabe's party of rigging the 2008 election
and orchestrating political violence. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton have been similarly critical of Mugabe’s rule. The United States has enforced targeted
sanctions against top Zimbabwe officials and associates since 2002 and Congress has expressed
its opposition to the government’s undemocratic policies in the Zimbabwe Democracy and
Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (ZDERA; P.L. 107-99) and subsequent legislation. Also see
CRS Report RL32723, Zimbabwe, by Lauren Ploch.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
March 2008 Elections ........................................................................................................... 2
Was ZANU-PF Planning for a Coalition Government? .......................................................... 4
Post-Election Violence .......................................................................................................... 4
The Power-Sharing Agreement.................................................................................................... 6
The Transitional Government ...................................................................................................... 7
Economic Reforms Made, but Challenges Remain ................................................................ 8
Humanitarian ‘Plus’ Assistance ....................................................................................... 9
Reserve Bank Reforms.................................................................................................... 9
Efforts to Revive the Economy...................................................................................... 10
Calls for Political Reforms Continue ................................................................................... 12
Human Rights Abuses ................................................................................................... 13
Justice Sector Reforms .................................................................................................. 14
Farm Invasions ............................................................................................................. 15
“Blood Diamonds”? ...................................................................................................... 16
The Security Sector and Possible Internal Struggles within ZANU-PF........................... 16
Cholera Outbreak...................................................................................................................... 17
International Reactions.............................................................................................................. 17
The Southern African Development Community (SADC).................................................... 18
The African Union (AU) ..................................................................................................... 19
South Africa........................................................................................................................ 20
Xenophobic Attacks Against Immigrants....................................................................... 22
The United Nations ............................................................................................................. 22
The United Kingdom and the European Union .................................................................... 23
U.S. Policy on Zimbabwe.......................................................................................................... 24
Congressional Interest ......................................................................................................... 25
U.S. Assistance ................................................................................................................... 25
Current Restrictions on U.S. Assistance......................................................................... 26
Policy Options .......................................................................................................................... 28
Diplomatic Pressure ............................................................................................................ 29
Humanitarian Assistance ..................................................................................................... 30
Economic Recovery ............................................................................................................ 30
Accountability and Reform ................................................................................................. 33

Appendixes
Appendix. Members of Zimbabwe’s Inclusive Government....................................................... 35

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 36
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Zimbabwe: The Power Sharing Agreement and Implications for U.S. Policy

Introduction
President Robert Mugabe, 85, and his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF), have ruled Zimbabwe since its independence in 1980. Rising inflation and
unemployment rates contributed in the late 1990s to the creation of the opposition Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC). The MDC enjoyed initial success, campaigning against a
referendum in 2000 that would have expanded the president’s powers, made government officials
immune from prosecution, and allowed the uncompensated seizure of white-owned land for
redistribution to black farmers. The referendum failed, and the MDC won nearly half the
parliamentary seats in that year’s election. ZANU-PF has since taken numerous, often
undemocratic actions to maintain power. After months of uncertainty following a power-sharing
agreement, known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA), negotiated in September 2008
between ZANU-PF and the opposition, the parties reached a final accord in January 2009 that has
led to the creation of a coalition government with senior positions divided among the parties.
Given longstanding tensions between ZANU-PF and the MDC, many observers have expressed
skepticism that the parties can now truly share power. Initial reforms by the new government
stemmed Zimbabwe’s runaway inflation rate, but significant challenges to the country’s recovery
remain. In October 2009, citing “blatant” violations of the GPA by ZANU-PF, the MDC
announced that it was suspending cooperation with ZANU-PF, but would remain in the coalition
government while party leaders worked to address outstanding issues (see “Calls for Political
Reforms Continue”).1
Background
In January 2009, prior to the new government’s formation, Zimbabwe was considered by some
analysts to be a failed state.2 Dubbed “the world’s fastest shrinking economy,” Zimbabwe’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) had declined over 50% since 2000.3 After several years of
hyperinflation, the country’s official inflation rate had risen to a level at which prices doubled in
less than 24 hours. Zimbabwe’s economy had effectively collapsed.
Today, Zimbabwe continues to face serious political and economic challenges that critics suggest
stem from years of poor governance and mismanagement. Life expectancy for Zimbabweans fell
from an estimated 56 years in 1990 to 44 in 2008.4 Almost 95% of the population lack formal
employment. Some seven million Zimbabweans reportedly required food aid in the first months
of 2009, and almost three million are expected to be food insecure through the end of the year.5

1 October 20, 2009 Interview with Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai available on
http://www.zimbabweprimeminister.com.
2 Foreign Policy magazine ranked Zimbabwe third on its list of failed states in 2008, behind Somalia and Sudan. The
magazine uses 12 economic, social, political, and military indicators to rank countries in order of their “vulnerability to
violent internal conflict and social dysfunction.” Zimbabwe’s rank on the index dropped 14 points from 2005 to 2006,
and two points since then, suggesting that the country’s situation deteriorated. “The Failed States Index,” Foreign
Policy, July August 2008.
3 Annual GDP growth has fallen on average by -5.9% since 2000. According to the IMF, it fell 40% from 2000-2007,
and a further 14% in 2008.
4 UNAIDS, Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, and CIA, CIA World Factbook.
5 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Program, Special Report: Crop and
Food Security Assessment Mission to Zimbabwe, June 22, 2009.
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The breakdown of the country’s dilapidated water and sewage systems contributed to an outbreak
of cholera that, from August 2008 to July 2009, resulted in several thousand deaths and infected
almost 100,000.6 An estimated six million people, over half the population, still have little or no
access to safe drinking water or sanitation. An estimated three to four million Zimbabweans have
emigrated in the last decade, including up to half of the country’s doctors and nurses. Hospitals
and clinics lack basic medicines, supplies, and functioning equipment. The country’s public
education system has suffered a major decline in recent years; most public schools closed in late
2008 as teachers went on strike over unpaid salaries. Today, many schools have reopened, but
teachers receive wages that are a fraction of those received by their regional counterparts.
Flawed elections in 2008 and subsequent months of widespread political violence left the country
bitterly divided in early 2009. At that time, the Government of Zimbabwe, considered to be
authoritarian by the U.S. State Department and others, found few allies in the international
community; several countries, including neighboring Botswana, refused to recognize the
government’s legitimacy.
March 2008 Elections7
Following years of political tensions and a violent March 2007 assault by police on government
critics that drew widespread international criticism, then-South African President Thabo Mbeki
initiated a mediation effort between the Government of Zimbabwe and the opposition in 2007.
The main objective of the mediation, as described by Mbeki, was to create political conditions for
free and fair elections, the results of which would be accepted by all parties. Although the
negotiations resulted in the amendment of some laws seen to restrict press freedom and political
activity, the talks were abandoned after Mugabe announced that elections would be held on
March 29, 2008.8 Human rights activists argue that the legislative changes were cosmetic and that
the talks failed to create a level playing field prior to the elections.9
The two factions of the main opposition party, the MDC, which split in 2005, remained divided
prior to the elections.10 Despite rumors of dissatisfaction with Mugabe’s continued rule from
within his own party, the party’s central committee nominated Mugabe to be their presidential
candidate in March 2007. The committee also supported a resolution to hold all elections
(presidential, parliamentary, and local council) at the same time, and to reduce the terms for all
public offices from six to five years. In addition, they voted to back efforts to increase the number
of parliamentarians from 150 to 210 and the number of senators from 66 to 84.11 Critics contend

6 Between August 2008 and July 2009, Zimbabwe’s cholera epidemic infected over 98,500 and killed almost 4,300,
according to UN sources. The last known case was reported in July.
7 For more details on the 2008 elections, see CRS Report RL32723, Zimbabwe, by Lauren Ploch.
8 The Electoral Laws Amendment Act, which came into effect in January 2008, eliminated one of the two electoral
administration bodies and required polling places to be located in areas readily accessible to the public. It also
established a continual voter registration process and explicitly prohibited intimidation during the campaign period.
9 See, for example, Human Rights Watch (HRW), All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral
Conditions in Zimbabwe’s Coming General Elections, Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008, and International Crisis Group
(ICG), Africa Report No. 138, Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election, March 20, 2008.
10 The MDC split in 2005 due to internal struggles; one faction, known as MDC-T, is led by Tsvangirai while the other,
MDC-M, is led by Arthur Mutambara.
11 Text of report on Zimbabwean Radio, “Zimbabwe Ruling Party Endorses Mugabe Candidacy for 2008 Elections,”
BBC Monitoring, April 1, 2007.
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that these proposals were an effort to manipulate the electoral process through gerrymandering,
with the new constituencies created in rural areas where the ruling party had stronger support.12
The proposals were included in a controversial Constitutional Amendment Bill, which, to the
surprise of many observers, was passed by the parliament in September 2007 with the support of
MDC Members of Parliament (MPs). The final version of the legislation, did, however, include
some changes seen as concessions to the opposition, and reports suggest that the MDC supported
the legislation because of progress in the South Africa negotiations.
In February 2008, a senior member of ZANU-PF, Simba Makoni, announced his intention to run
against President Mugabe in the upcoming elections. He was subsequently expelled from the
party and ran as an independent, although he was rumored to have the support of several
unnamed senior party officials. Makoni, 57, served as Finance Minister from 2000 to 2002 and
was reportedly dismissed after criticizing the administration’s economic policies. Makoni also
previously served as the executive secretary of SADC. Opposition leader Tsvangirai dismissed
Makoni as “old wine in a new bottle,” but rival MDC leader Arthur Mutambara withdrew as a
presidential candidate and expressed his support for Makoni.
In the pre-election period, civic activists reported significant pre-election irregularities. The
Zimbabwean government invited election observers from over 40 countries and regional
organizations, including SADC, but allegedly barred observers from countries considered to be
critical of its policies.13 Western media organizations and journalists were also reportedly denied
permission to cover the elections.14
Zimbabwe’s first “harmonized” elections were held on March 29, 2008.15 The Zimbabwe
Electoral Commission (ZEC), widely criticized for its delayed release of the electoral results,
announced the National Assembly results four days after the election. For the first time since
independence, ZANU-PF lost its majority in the National Assembly. The MDC factions, known
as MDC-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and MDC-Mutambara (MDC-M) for their respective leaders,
which reunited on April 28, won 109 seats in the 220-seat National Assembly, over ZANU-PF’s
97. After a month of rising tensions, the results of the presidential race were belatedly announced
on May 2. They indicated that Morgan Tsvangirai had received more votes than Mugabe, but had
failed to garner the 50% needed to avoid a runoff.16
Although the opposition accused the government of manipulating the results and initially objected
to participating in a runoff, Morgan Tsvangirai agreed to stand against President Mugabe in a
second round of voting. While electoral law requires the government to hold a runoff election
within 21 days of announcing the initial results, the ZEC declared that the runoff would not be
held until June 27, three months after the first round. During the following weeks, reports of
political violence increased dramatically, in what many critics contend was a government-
orchestrated attempt to punish opposition supporters and ensure a Mugabe victory in the runoff.
Several of the country’s security service chiefs, including the heads of the army and the police,

12 “Zimbabwe Ruling Party Accused of Manipulating Electoral Process,” Voice of America, April 18, 2007.
13 See “First Poll Observers in Zimbabwe,” BBC, March 11, 2008.
14 “CNN Denied Permission to Cover Elections in Zimbabwe,” CNN, March 25, 2008.
15 The 2008 “harmonized” elections were held for all levels of government (local, National Assembly, Senate, and
presidential) simultaneously.
16 The ZEC declared that Tsvangirai received 47.9% of the votes, Mugabe 43.2% and Makoni 8.3%. Some independent
tallies, including the MDC’s, suggest that Tsvangirai may have actually received over 50% of the votes.
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publicly announced that they would not recognize an electoral victory by anyone other that
Mugabe.17 Citing the high number of attacks against MDC supporters and the lack of a level
playing field, Tsvangirai withdrew from the race days before the election. Despite public
comments from African observer missions and a presidential statement from the United Nations
Security Council arguing that conditions for a free and fair election did not exist, the government
held the runoff as scheduled. Mugabe was declared the winner with over 85% of the vote and
inaugurated on June 29, 2008. His electoral victory in the runoff election was declared
illegitimate by several countries, including the United States and Botswana.
Was ZANU-PF Planning for a Coalition Government?
Prior to the runoff, Zimbabwe’s state-controlled media sent mixed signals about the regime’s
post-election plans. On April 23, the government-owned Herald newspaper printed an editorial
that suggested SADC should mediate between the parties to create a transitional coalition
government, led by President Mugabe, that would organize new elections.18 The following day
the paper announced on its website that a unity government was “not feasible.” According to a
May 2008 International Crisis Group report, some senior ZANU-PF members, including Vice
President Joyce Mujuru and Reserve Bank governor Gideon Gono, tried to convince the president
to accept a unity government, but were overruled by senior security officials.19 Central to the
concerns of ZANU-PF hardliners, critics assert, are questions regarding immunity for serious
human rights abuses committed since independence. Both parties issued public statements after
the elections indicating a willingness to negotiate, but ZANU-PF declared that Tsvangirai must
acknowledge Mugabe's victory as a prerequisite. Tsvangirai refused to do so. Some believe
ZANU-PF had planned to negotiate even before the runoff, but wanted to enter the talks from a
position of power, with Mugabe having won the second round.
Post-Election Violence
As noted above, although observers suggest that the March 29 election day was largely peaceful,
reports of politically-motivated violence subsequently increased to a level not seen in two
decades, according to advocacy groups. In May 2008, the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for
Human Rights reported that its doctors had treated hundreds of victims with injuries consistent
with assault and torture since the election date, and that “the violence is now on such a scale that
it is impossible to properly document all cases.”20 The MDC has alleged that over 500 of its
supporters were killed in the months after the election.21 U.S. Ambassador James McGee
implicated the ruling party in orchestrating the attacks (see “U.S. Policy on Zimbabwe” below).22
ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwean army have denied involvement with the violence, although the
army, police; intelligence service; “war veterans;”23 and Zimbabwe’s National Youth Service, also

17 “Zim Prisons Chief Orders Officers to Vote Mugabe,” Reuters, February 29, 2008.
18 “West Should Stop Blocking Zimbabwe’s Way Forward,” The Herald (Harare), April 23, 2008.
19 International Crisis Group, “Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election,” Africa Report No. 138, March 20, 2008.
20By May 9, 2008 the group reported treating 900 people. “Mbeki Meets Mugabe for Talks,” Al Jazeera, May 9, 2008.
21 “Zimbabwe’s Former Opposition MDC Says 500 Died in 2008 Political Violence,” VOA, August 9, 2009.
22Statement by Ambassador James McGee, “Breaking the Silence on Political Violence in Zimbabwe,” May 8, 2008.
23Among those calling themselves “war veterans,” some have questionable credentials, and some are too young to have
participated in the liberation struggle. Some other veterans disagree with ZANU-PF’s policies.
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known as the “Green Bombers,” have all been implicated. One week after the elections, self-
styled war veteran leader Jabuli Sibanda warned, “It has come to our realization that the elections
were used as another war front to prepare for the re-invasion of our country.... As freedom
fighters, we feel compelled to repel the invasion,” echoing a frequent Mugabe refrain that an
opposition victory would be tantamount to the British reinstating colonial rule. The state-owned
Herald newspaper, contributed to fears of a white takeover in the wake of the election, reporting,
“an increasing number of white former commercial farmers are reportedly threatening resettled
black farmers throughout the country with eviction from their farms or face the wrath of an
anticipated ‘incoming MDC government.’”24 These pronouncements coincided with farm
invasions throughout the country, and by April 16, 2008 the Commercial Farmers Union reported
that over 100 of the estimated remaining 400 white farmers had been forced off their lands.
Since independence, Mugabe’s regime has employed terminology associated with military-style
campaigns for government programs ranging from the implementation of price controls, known
as Operation Reduce Prices, to the demolition of informal urban settlements, or Operation
Murambatsvina (translated as “Clean Out the Filth”).25 Reports suggest that the recent round of
violence may have had its own campaign name, Operation Mavhoterapapi (“Who did you vote
for?”).26 Critics note the government’s historic use of violent tactics against political opponents,
pointing to the infamous Operation Gukurahundi (“The rain that washes away the chaff before
the spring rains”), the violent “pacification” campaign by a North Korean-trained military unit,
the 5th Brigade, in the 1980s against alleged dissidents and supporters of ZANU-PF’s political
rival, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). Gukurahundi is referred to by some as the
Matabeleland Massacres, which resulted in the deaths of as many as 20,000 civilians, mostly
from the Ndebele ethnic group in the southwest.27 That 5th Brigade was led by then-Lt. Col.
Perence Shire, now commander of Zimbabwe’s Air Force. Other security officials involved in the
campaign were elevated to senior government posts, including Sydney Sekeremayi and Emerson
Mnangagwa. Both continue to hold senior security posts in the new coalition government.28
Mnangagwa, then Minister of State Security in charge of intelligence, once reportedly warned
that the government would burn down “all the villages infested with dissidents.” He has been
considered a possible successor to Mugabe within the party and is rumored to be in charge of the
Joint Operations Command (JOC), a secretive group of the country’s security chiefs and top
commanders that some allege exert significant control over the government.29
Zimbabwe’s rural areas appear to have been the hardest hit by the post-election violence; the U.S.
Embassy in Harare documented thousands who fled the countryside for urban areas in the months
after the March elections. Most Harare medical clinics were at full capacity during the height of
the violence, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).30
Zimbabwe’s largest farmers’ union reported that militias displaced over 40,000 farm workers, and

24 “White Former Farmers Threaten Blacks with Eviction,” The Herald, May 7, 2008.
25For more information, see CRS Report RL32723, Zimbabwe, by Lauren Ploch.
26 “Zimbabwe: Operation Glossary - A Guide to Zimbabwe’s Internal Campaigns,” IRIN, May 1, 2008.
27For further information on Operation Gukurahundi, see the report by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
and the Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the Silence - Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in
Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980-1988, April 1999, available at http://www.sokwanele.com/pdfs/BTS.pdf.
28 Sekeremayi is Minister of State for National Security in the President’s Office; Mnangagwa is Minister of Defense.
29See, for example, “The Opposition Goes for Broke,” The Economist, May 17, 2008, and “Zimbabwe Under Military
Rule, Former Minister Claims,” Pretoria News, May 12, 2008.
30USAID, Zimbabwe: Complex Emergency and Drought, Situation Report 1, May 16, 2008.
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there were widespread reports of burned homes, granaries, and livestock.31 Human Rights Watch
detailed the “re-education” and torture of more than 70 MDC supporters, seven of whom
reportedly died from their injuries, in Mashonaland province on May 5.32 Amnesty International
reported that victims were often denied medical access and that humanitarian organizations were
targeted by militias for providing assistance.33 The United Nations’ resident representative in
Zimbabwe stated at the time, “there is an emerging pattern of political violence inflicted mainly,
but not exclusively, on suspected followers of the MDC.” The level of violence was confirmed by
an 8-person SADC mission, who declared, “we have seen it, there are people in hospital who said
they have been tortured, you have seen pictures, you have seen pictures of houses that have been
destroyed and so on.”34
Some who fled to the cities faced further intimidation.35 Police repeatedly raided the offices of
both the MDC and ZESN. Hundreds were arrested in the MDC raids, many of whom had
reportedly already suffered attacks in their rural homes and fled to the MDC offices for refuge. In
these raids, the police, allegedly looking for subversive documents, took computers and files.
Some Zimbabwean officials, including the police chief, have accused the MDC of rigging and
inciting violence. More than ten newly elected MDC legislators were arrested in the wake of the
March elections. Sixteen other MDC officials and human rights activists were charged with
terrorism and sabotage. Over 100 election officers were arrested on charges of committing fraud
and abusing public office in favor of the MDC. Independent reports suggest that teachers, who
held many of the election officer positions, were specifically targeted by government supporters.
The Power-Sharing Agreement
Questions surrounding the legitimacy of the Zimbabwe government in the wake of the March and
June 2008 elections left the country mired in political uncertainty for much of 2008. President
Mugabe delayed the swearing in of the new parliament and the naming of a new cabinet as Mbeki
and other international leaders pressed for talks between the parties. When the parliament was
sworn in on August 25, 2008, Lovemore Moyo, an MP from the MDC Tsvangirai faction, was
elected as Speaker. He received 110 votes, beating MDC-M MP Paul Themba-Nyathi, who had
received 98 votes, including those of most ZANU-PF members of parliament. Two MDC-T MPs
were arrested prior to the swearing in, but were later released.
On September 15, after several weeks of negotiations overseen by Mbeki, Mugabe and Tsvangirai
signed a power-sharing arrangement aimed at resolving the political standoff. The agreement,
known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA), outlined a time frame for the drafting and
adoption of a new constitution.36 As part of the deal, Tsvangirai would become Prime Minister in

31 “Hunger Drives Post-Election Violence, Deepens Poverty,” IRIN, May 9, 2008.
32 “Zimbabwe: End Violence Before June Runoff,” HRW Press Release, May 16, 2008.
33 Amnesty International, “Zimbabwe Violence Reaches Crisis Levels,” May 16, 2008.
34 “Call for State of Emergency Over Zim Violence,” Mail & Guardian, May 14, 2008.
35 On May 9, 2008, police arrested the leaders of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) based on speeches
made at a worker’s day rally. The head of the Progressive Teacher’s Union was also arrested. On May 5, 2008, more
than 50 people were reportedly beaten by riot police during a public protest against the ongoing violence in the city of
Bulawayo; eleven members of a women’s advocacy group were arrested.
36 The text of the agreement is available online at http://www.nimd.org/document/807/zimbabwe-agreement.
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a new unity government, and cabinet positions would be divided among the parties. The MDC
factions would take 16 ministerial positions, three of which would come from the MDC-M
faction, and ZANU-PF would take 15 positions. Mugabe, who remains head of state under the
arrangement, would lead the cabinet, but Tsvangirai, who would chair a Council of Ministers,
would be responsible for the day-to-day management of government affairs.37 Early reports
claimed that Tsvangirai would gain control of the police force, while Mugabe would retain
control of the armed forces. The text of the agreement, however, left the oversight of the police,
which falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs, undetermined, and ZANU-PF refused to
relinquish the position.
In the months after the agreement was signed, the MDC accused the government of abducting and
torturing over forty opposition and civil society leaders, including human rights activist Jestina
Mukuko. Mukuko’s whereabouts were unknown for three weeks before she was presented in
court on charges of treason (see “Human Rights Abuses” below).38 Southern African leaders
continued to call on the parties to implement the agreement, and for the parties to share the Home
Affairs ministry, but Tsvangirai, citing the continued harassment of his colleagues, declared the
deal to be unworkable. After Mugabe announced plans to name a new cabinet with or without
Tsvangirai’s participation, SADC leaders renewed efforts to bring the parties together, and on
January 31, amid reports of significant internal debate among the MDC leadership, Morgan
Tsvangirai announced that he would join Mugabe in a transitional coalition government.
The Transitional Government
On February 11, 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe.
Arthur Mutambara was sworn in as a Deputy Prime Minister, as was MDC vice-president
Thokozani Khupe. The positions were created as part of a constitutional amendment approved
unanimously by the legislature on February 5 that formalized the coalition government and the
GPA.39 The new ministers were sworn in on February 13 (see Appendix for a list of cabinet
members). The controversial Ministry of Home Affairs is co-chaired by an MDC and a ZANU-PF
Minister, but the MDC’s ability to affect change within the police service, still led by a ZANU-PF
loyalist, remains in question. The MDC factions gained control of several other key ministries,
including Finance, Public Service, Water, Energy and Power Development, Public Works, Health,
Education, Commerce, and State Enterprises, which oversees parastatals. The party aims to use
the Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs to press for its goal of constitutional
reform. The GPA, now enshrined in Zimbabwe’s constitution, outlines a time frame of eighteen
months for the drafting of a new constitution and a nationwide referendum on the document.
Some expect elections to be held several months after the referendum, but a timeline for elections
is not provided in the GPA.
Despite the MDC’s new role in government, many observers remain skeptical that the parties can
work together effectively to implement reforms deemed necessary by international donors. Critics
of the previous regime suggest that Mugabe and his allies have not entered into this new
government in good faith, and some suggest that Zimbabwe now has, in fact, two parallel

37“Zimbabwe Rivals Sign Power-Sharing Deal,” Reuters, September 15, 2008.
38 Mukoko was reportedly abducted from her home at night and was beaten and forced to kneel on gravel while
unknown individuals tried to force her to act as a state witness to an alleged MDC terrorist plot or be killed.
39 The GPA was incorporated into Zimbabwe’s constitution through constitutional amendment no. 19.
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governments.40 International donors, including the United States, have repeatedly stated that a
resumption of significant aid will depend on both economic and democratic reforms, the
restoration of the rule of law, and a demonstrated respect for human rights. Without an influx of
considerable foreign funds, economic and social indicators are expected to continue their
downward slide.
Economic Reforms Made, but Challenges Remain
Zimbabwe’s new Finance Minister, MDC Secretary-General Tendai Biti, who was arrested in
June 2008 on charges of treason and incarcerated for several weeks, has been credited with
initiating a series of critical economic reforms that have brought a renewed sense of optimism to
many Zimbabweans. Initial reports by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and others suggest
that reforms made by the new government on the macroeconomic front are encouraging, but the
situation remains fragile. The adoption of hard currencies (the U.S. dollar and the South African
rand) has stabilized prices and stemmed Zimbabwe’s rampant inflation rate, which fell by 3.1% in
February and by 3% in March. The local currency has become effectively worthless. The
“dollarization” of the economy, combined with the elimination of price controls, has allowed
shopkeepers to restock their shelves with basic goods, although the cost of living remains high.
Some retailers are again offering credit facilities, suspended since 2007. The Zimbabwe Stock
Exchange began trading again, in U.S. dollars, on February 18, after months of inactivity.
In late September 2008, Zimbabwe began officially trading in foreign currency in an attempt to
lower prices, and, in early February 2009, Zimbabwe adopted hard currencies for transactions.
Later that month, under the direction of Minister Biti, the government began issuing government
“salaries” in vouchers good for $100 U.S. dollars, regardless of seniority. Biti and Prime Minister
Tsvangirai pledged to pay these allowances in foreign currency in an effort to get Zimbabweans
to return to work. Absenteeism within the civil service reportedly reached 50% in the latter half of
2008. The allowances encouraged many civil servants to return, including, notably, the country’s
teachers, who had been on strike for months. The allowances are low by regional salary
standards, however, and the country’s unions have repeatedly pressed the government for salary
increases.41 Teachers threatened to strike again when the new school term began in May 2009, but
Education Minister David Coltart (MDC-M) reportedly persuaded them to stay on with a pledge
to cut school fees and to secure additional funds for salaries through an appeal to donors by
UNICEF. In July, the Finance Ministry announced a 20% increase in the public service wage bill,
some of which will be used to introduce some progression into the salary structure. Monthly civil
service allowances have reportedly been increased to $150.
The cash budgeting policy implemented by Finance Minister Tendai Biti has restored fiscal
discipline, although revenue shortfalls are expected to continue into 2010. Biti initially cut the
government’s 2009 budget almost in half, from $1.9 billion to $1 billion, and he has allowed the
government to spend only what it collects in revenue.42 In June, revenues were estimated at $30

40 Interviews by the author in Zimbabwe in April 2009.
41 In May 2009, the monthly cost for an urban family in Zimbabwe was estimated at over $400. See “After a Brief
Respite, the Cost of Living is Rising Again for Zimbabweans,” VOA News, May 8, 2009.
42 According to Minister Biti, income and other direct taxes composed almost 56% of the country’s tax revenue
between 1996 and 2004. In January 2009, direct taxes composed less than 18% of tax revenue, reflecting the high level
of unemployment and informal business.
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million per month, which barely covered the $100 allowances for an estimated 250,000
government employees and allowed almost nothing for public services or infrastructure repairs.43
Revenue generation continues to improve, but officials have warned that without a significant
influx of foreign currency, they will be unable to meet basic needs or address demands for wage
increases.44 Aid pledges, estimated by the Ministry at $500 million as of August, have provided
Minister Biti with the flexibility to increase anticipated government spending for the year from
his initial estimate of $1 billion to $1.4 billion.
Humanitarian ‘Plus’ Assistance
Given restrictions by many international donors against direct budget support to the Government
of Zimbabwe, the Finance Ministry has struggled to find other sources of revenue to pay salaries
and provide public services. Some donors have promoted the concept of “humanitarian plus”
assistance, through which donors could provide assistance for certain sectors without fear of
contributing to the country’s entrenched patronage system. The Finance Ministry is coordinating
with these donors to identify certain budget lines (water, education, sanitation, etc.) for which
donors might assume payouts. Such a strategy requires strong donor coordination, and to that end
the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) have developed a multi-donor trust fund in coordination with the Finance Ministry.
Many see “humanitarian plus” assistance as a short-term measure until Zimbabwe can establish
donor confidence and improve its public finance management, an area in which the World Bank
is providing technical support.
Reserve Bank Reforms
Central bank governance remains an issue of primary concern to donors. According to the IMF,
the quasi-fiscal activities of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), under the management of
RBZ Governor Gideon Gono, have been primarily responsible for the surge in the country’s
money supply in recent years. These activities included monetary operations to absorb excess
liquidity; subsidized credit; sustained foreign exchange losses through subsidized exchange rates
for selected government purchases and multiple currency practices; and financial sector
restructuring. After the government implemented its price control policy in June 2007, cutting
prices of basic commodities by 50% in an effort to stem inflation, manufacturing output fell more
than 50% within six months and many firms were forced to close. Gono’s price controls also
resulted in a shortage of basic goods and contributed to worsening social indicators. In April
2009, Gono admitted to having “borrowed” over $1 billion from private foreign exchange
accounts in the Reserve Bank to pay government expenses. Among the accounts raided was that
of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; unlike many of the private accounts
raided, the Global Fund’s money has reportedly been returned. The IMF has requested an
independent audit of the Reserve Bank. The MDC has pressed for Gono’s replacement, but, in the
interim, U.S. officials suggest that Biti’s reforms have managed to largely marginalize him.

43 With the assistance of the World Bank, the Finance Ministry has initiated a payroll audit to determine how many
“ghost workers” may be collecting salaries.
44 The Government of Zimbabwe reportedly generated approximately $1.4 billion in tax revenues in 2007, but revenues
in 2008 totalled only an estimated $300 million, due in large part to rampant hyperinflation. Finance Minister Biti
hopes to raise $1 billion in revenues in 2009, but some experts suggest this figure may be overly optimistic.
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Efforts to Revive the Economy
In March 2009, the transitional government introduced the Short Term Emergency Recovery
Program (STERP), designed to rehabilitate Zimbabwe’s economy.45 Introduced by the Finance
Ministry, the STERP identifies the following priority areas as targets for policy reforms and donor
assistance:
a) Political and Governance Issues: the constitution and constitution-making processes; the
media and media reforms; and legislative reforms aimed at strengthening governance and
accountability, promoting the rule of law, and promoting equality and fairness, including
gender equality;
b) Social Protection: food and humanitarian assistance, education, health, and strategically
targeted vulnerable sectors; and
c) Stabilization: implementation of a growth oriented recovery program; restoration of the
value of local currency and the guarantee of its stability; increased capacity utilization in all
sectors of the economy and job creation; assured availability of essential commodities such
as food, fuel, and electricity; rehabilitation of collapsed social, health, and education sectors;
and assured availability of water supply and safe sanitation.
The document also identifies key areas of the economy, including agriculture, mining,
manufacturing, and tourism, as anchors of the stabilization program and stresses the need to
promote production and increase capacity in those sectors. According to the government’s
estimates, outputs from the agriculture, manufacturing, and mining sectors declined by 7.3%,
73.3% and 53.9% respectively in 2008. Regional electricity shortages and long-overdue domestic
electricity infrastructure upgrades have compounded Zimbabwe’s economic woes, significantly
reducing the productivity of the manufacturing and mining sectors. The new MDC Minister for
Energy and Power Development asserts that Zimbabwe’s power infrastructure is in disrepair and
that up to $1 billion will be needed to fix the crumbling energy sector.46 Economists suggest
Zimbabwe will also require a combination of donor assistance, direct foreign investment, and
domestic policy reforms to restore productivity in these key sectors.
The Mining Sector
Mining accounts for almost half of Zimbabwe’s total foreign currency revenues. Zimbabwe has
the world’s second largest reserves of platinum, behind South Africa.47 In 2006, the government
announced plans to take a 51% share of all foreign-owned mines for local black investors; 25% of
that share would be acquired at no cost to the government, and mines that refused to part with
their shares would be expropriated. After industry officials cautioned that the plan would deter
foreign investment, the proposal was modified, allowing firms that invested in community
projects to keep their majority share. Parliament voted to approve similar plans to take a majority
share in all foreign-owned businesses in 2007; the legislation became law in March 2008. The
government insisted that it would not expropriate foreign-owned companies and that the law

45 The STERP is available online at http://www.zimbabweprimeminister.org/downloads/category/4-parliamentary-
affairs.html.
46 “Mudzuri Says $1 Billion Needed to Revamp Energy Sector,” SW Radio Africa, February 25, 2009.
47 The largest mining operations in the country are controlled by Impala Platinum and Anglo Platinum, respectively.
These South African-owned companies are the world’s largest platinum producers.
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would not be applied to every company, but rather “on the basis of capital (investment) and
employment levels.”48 Critics argue the law further deters much-needed foreign investment and
suggest that it be reexamined by the new government.
The coalition government has already begun to take some measures to encourage new investment
in the mining sector. Under the previous administration, gold miners were required to sell their
product to the Reserve Bank. As the Bank’s foreign currency reserves dwindled, it reportedly
ceased to pay miners for the gold, and many of the country’s gold mines closed. With current gold
prices strong, the new government is now allowing the mines to market their own gold and accept
payment in foreign currency. It has also cut the tax on gold export revenues.
The Agriculture Sector
Several Southern African countries have suffered from chronic food insecurity in recent years,
stemming from a combination of weather-related and man-made factors, including prolonged
drought, floods, poor economic performance, and the impact of HIV/AIDS. Although these
factors are partly to blame for Zimbabwe’s food shortages, analysts believe that disruptions to the
farming sector resulting from Mugabe’s land seizure program (see “Farm Invasions” below), are
the main reason for reduced food production. Nearly all of the country’s 4,500 commercial farms
have now been taken over, but the land redistribution program is reportedly plagued by
inefficiencies, with large portions of redistributed land not being actively farmed. Tractors and
other inputs to production are in short supply. Thousands of experienced farm workers were
reportedly forced to flee seized farms, and many of those who now hold farmland have no
agricultural expertise. The government’s introduction of price controls in 2007 may have further
restricted production. The country’s seed and fertilizer producers reported that the controls
created “unrealistic prices,” which in turn caused supply shortages.49 The new coalition
government has liberalized grain marketing, formerly tightly controlled by a parastatal; removed
import duties; and requested significant assistance for the agriculture sector from donors.
In the near term, the country’s agriculture industry shows little sign of recovery. The issues of
property rights and land reform will be among the most difficult for the government to address.
One of the unintended side effects of Mugabe’s land reform strategy, which resulted in the
abolition of land tenure, was that farmers were unable to use their land as collateral to obtain bank
loans to invest in their farms. As a result, few commercial farmers have been able to find the
capital to maintain productivity.50 In the STERP document, the government has pledged to
conduct a comprehensive land audit consistent with agreements made in the GPA. Many analysts
expect the land audit to be a slow and contentious process.

48 “Zimbabwe Clarifies Nationalization Legislation,” Financial Times, March 11, 2008.
49 “Zimbabwe: The Mother of All Farming Seasons,” IRIN, October 25, 2007.
50 The government began to distribute 99-year leases in November 2006. Some suggest financial institutions have been
reluctant to accept the new leases as collateral, given that the government reserves the right to cancel the lease if it
deems the farm unproductive.
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Calls for Political Reforms Continue
Despite measurable progress on economic reforms, the inclusive government has yet to meet
many of the benchmarks for political reform outlined in the Global Political Agreement. Among
the outstanding issues are:
• a halt to police harassment, continued detention, or onerous bail requirements
placed on several opposition and civic activists;
• the repeal of repressive legislation that restricts media, NGO, and opposition
activities;
• the appointment of MDC provincial governors and Deputy Agriculture Minister
Roy Bennett, and the lack of consensus among the parties on the current Reserve
Bank Governor and the Attorney General;
• a halt to ongoing invasions and seizures of commercial farms; and
• security sector reform.
These issues were cited by the MDC as areas in which ZANU-PF has “continued to frustrate the
implementation of the GPA,” when, on October 16, the party announced that it was suspending
cooperation with ZANU-PF. While the MDC remains in government, the Tsvangirai faction has
disengaged from executive branch forums, such as the Cabinet and Council of Ministers, in which
the MDC interacts with ZANU-PF. The MDC announcement followed the October 14 arrest of a
senior MDC official, Roy Bennett, but many observers also suggest that the decision reflects the
growing pressure within the party over the lack of political progress in recent months.51 Speaking
at an MDC rally in September, Prime Minister Tsvangirai noted progress in some areas of GPA
implementation, but he told supporters, “They continue to violate the law, persecute our people,
spread the language of hate, invade productive farms, ignore our international treaties and
continue to loot of our national resources.”52 Several international donors have expressed similar
concerns.53
The parties reportedly resolved their disagreements on several political appointments in June,
although several of those individuals have yet to be sworn in, and President Mugabe has refused
to replace the Reserve Bank Governor and Attorney General, despite MDC protests. Laws
restricting the freedoms of speech and association continue to be used to harass independent
media, to levy charges against political opponents, and to support police action to break up public
gatherings. A number of MDC officials have been arrested in recent months, including several
members of parliament; some suggest the arrests are part of an effort to overturn the party’s

51 Bennett, an MDC member of parliament and Deputy Minister of Agriculture nominee, was initially arrested on
terrorism charges on February 10, as the new coalition cabinet was being sworn in, and was held for over a month
before being released on bail on a Supreme Court order. He was rearrested on October 14, and held for two nights in
jail before a High Court justice ordered his release on bail, based on the original Supreme Court ruling. The Attorney
General's office initially ordered that his trial begin on October 19, but Bennett's lawyers were able to have the trial
postponed until November 9, to allow time to prepare his case. The trial has been moved from Mutare to the High
Court in Harare.
52 “Tsvangirai Accuses Zanu-PF of Law-Breaking, Hate, Land Invasions,” AllAfrica.com, September 14, 2009.
53 The MDC and ZANU-PF have differed on a number of cabinet positions. In April 2009, President Mugabe
transferred the communications technology portfolio from the Ministry of Information and Communications
Technology, held by MDC Spokesperson Nelson Chamisa, to the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure
Development, held by Nicholas Goche, a ZANU-PF official considered by many to be a hardliner.
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parliamentary majority. As of August 2009, four of the seven MDC MPs already convicted of
crimes had been suspended from parliament.54 Their seats remain vacant. Others await trial.
An executive committee composed of President Mugabe, Prime Minister Tsvangirai, the vice
presidents and the deputy prime ministers, has met on several occasions to discuss these issues.
Under the terms of the GPA, the agreement is being monitored by a Joint Monitoring and
Implementation Committee (“JOMIC”), composed of four senior members from ZANU-PF and
four senior members from each of the two MDC factions. The JOMIC can receive reports and
complaints, provide assessments, and consider steps to ensure compliance with the agreement,
but it lacks enforcement authority. As guarantors and facilitators of the agreement, SADC and the
African Union can be called upon by the parties to intervene. Following the MDC decision to
disengage from ZANU-PF, Prime Minister Tsvangirai began a tour of the region to request
intervention from SADC leaders. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security
Cooperation is scheduled to meet with Tsvangirai, Deputy Prime Minister Mutambara, and
President Robert Mugabe in Harare on October 27. Some observers question whether Jacob
Zuma, who was inaugurated on May 9 as South Africa’s new president, will place renewed
pressure on the parties to resolve their disputes and fully implement the GPA (see “South Africa”
below). Following Tsvangirai’s recent visit, Zuma publicly expressed concern with the situation,
saying “Zimbabwe should not be allowed to slide back into instability.” Botswana’s President Ian
Khama has announced that he would not recognize Robert Mugabe as President of Zimbabwe
outside the transitional government.55
Human Rights Abuses
Under the former ZANU-PF government, Zimbabwe was considered by some to be among the
world’s most repressive states.56 The State Department has repeatedly accused the government of
the pervasive and systemic abuse of human rights, including the state-sanctioned use of excessive
force, torture, and unlawful killings.57 According to the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum,
which produces a monthly report of human rights abuses, the number of monthly violations
reported decreased substantially after the coalition government was formed, although reports of
retributive violence between ZANU-PF and MDC supporters has continued, and the number of
violent incidents against MDC activists has begun to rise again.58 Some reports also suggest that
ZANU-PF supporters may continue to operate alleged “torture centers” throughout the country.59
In 2008, the Human Rights Forum recorded 723 incidents of torture; 6 politically-motivated rape
cases; 107 murders; 137 abductions/kidnappings; 1,913 cases of assault; 19 cases of
disappearance; 629 of displacements and 2,532 violations on freedoms of association and
expression. Seven MDC activists reportedly abducted in October 2008 remain missing.

54 Zimbabwe’s laws require MPs sentenced to six or more months of imprisonment to be immediately suspended.
55 “Zimbabwe PM Begins Regional Tour,” VOA News, October 20, 2009.
56 Freedom House, “Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Freedom in the World 2006: The Annual Survey of Political Rights
and Civil Liberties.
57 The U.S. Department of State, “Zimbabwe,” 2008 Human Rights Report, February 25, 2009.
58 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Monthly Political Violence Reports, at http://www.hrforumzim.com.
59 Human Rights Watch, False Dawn: The Zimbabwe Power-Sharing Government’s Failure to Deliver Human Rights
Improvements, August 2009.
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Two months after the new government’s formation, the MDC’s Tendai Biti asserted that the
biggest achievement of the new government was the restoration of peace and security.60 He
suggested that harassment of opposition supporters and civic activists had declined significantly
since February; several local human rights groups corroborated his claim.61 Nevertheless, abuses
have continued. In May, a magistrate remanded to prison thirteen activists, including Jestina
Mukoko, who had been released in March after having been jailed for three months on charges of
sabotage and terrorism; the Attorney-General reportedly consented to release them on bail again
the following day, after an emergency meeting of the President, the Prime Minister, and other
principals.62 Several have accused the government of torture during their initial incarceration.
Their lawyer was also later arrested for obstruction of justice and then released; his case was
dropped. The editor and a journalist of the Zimbabwe Independent newspaper were arrested in
May for publishing an article naming police officers and state intelligence agents implicated in
the abductions of the above activists. They were later released on bail, but their arrest highlights
restrictions on press freedom that have yet to be addressed by the government.
In a recent report, Human Rights Watch suggested that the MDC lacked effective power in the
power sharing arrangement, and charged that “the MDC has not forcefully insisted on justice and
accountability for human rights abuses, nor has it attempted to bring the perpetrators of those
abuses to book.”63 A decision by Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court on September 28, 2009, however,
indicates that victims of state abuses may begin to find recourse through the justice sector. In that
ruling, the chief justice granted Jestina Mukoko, mentioned above, and nine of her fellow
defendants a permanent stay of prosecution after Mukoko testified that their confessions had been
obtained by security forces through torture. The court found that “the state, through its agents,
violated the applicant's constitutional rights.”64 Three others still await trial.
Justice Sector Reforms
Several laws enacted under the previous ZANU-PF-dominated parliament continue to raise
concerns with respect to the protection of human rights in Zimbabwe. Laws that critics contend
have been used to quiet dissent and influence political developments include, but are not limited
to, the following: the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Public
Order and Security Act (POSA), the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, and the
Miscellaneous Offences Act (MOA).65 The ZANU-PF parliament also passed several
controversial constitutional amendments which some analysts contend breach international
human rights standards. The South African-led SADC negotiations led in January 2008 to
amendments to both AIPPA and POSA. Critics suggest the amendments did not adequately
address human rights concerns and have not been fully implemented.66

60 Comments made by Tendai Biti at an event hosted by the National Endowment for Democracy and Freedom House
in Washington, DC, on April 27, 2009.
61 Interviews with human rights groups by the author in Zimbabwe on April 8, 2009.
62 “Zimbabwe Unity Government Principals Said to Resolve Crisis Over Arrests,” VOA, May 6, 2009.
63 Human Rights Watch, False Dawn: The Zimbabwe Power-Sharing Government’s Failure to Deliver Human Rights
Improvements, August 2009.
64 “Zimbabwe Drops Activist Charges,” BBC, September 28, 2009.
65 For more information on these laws, see CRS Report RL32723, Zimbabwe, by Lauren Ploch.
66 Human Rights Watch, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions in Zimbabwe’s
Coming Elections, Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008.
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Civic activists have also called for reforms within the judiciary. The MDC Home Affairs co-
minister has ordered police to compile complaints of political violence committed since the
March 2008 election, and several thousand reports have been collected. However the government
has yet to prosecute cases of alleged violence associated with the 2008 elections, or to prosecute
those who might be responsible for crimes related to Operation Murambatsvina or subsequent
evictions. The ability of the judicial system to protect its citizens or their property, or to provide
due process to those seeking remedy or compensation, will be a critical step toward the
restoration of the rule of law in Zimbabwe.
Farm Invasions
At the time of Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, the country’s white minority, which composed
less than 5% of the population, owned the vast majority of arable land. Many observers
considered the country’s commercial farms crucial to the country’s economy, although there was
a general recognition that reforms were necessary to provide greater equity in land distribution.
Britain initially funded a “willing buyer, willing seller” program to redistribute commercial
farmland, offering compensation to white farmers amenable to leaving their lands. Dissatisfaction
with the pace of land reform grew and led in the 1990s to spontaneous and often violent farm
invasions. Facing rising political and economic challenges, the Government of Zimbabwe began
to implement aggressive land expropriation policies, leading Britain and other donors to begin
withdrawing financial support for resettlement. In 2000, the government held a referendum to
approve changes to the constitution that would allow land seizures without compensation. The
referendum was rejected by 55% of voters. Within days of the vote, however, so-called veterans
of the independence struggle and ruling party supporters moved onto an estimated 1,000 white-
owned farms, and, months later, the President invoked emergency powers to expropriate land
without compensation. There were numerous attacks against white farmers and their employees.
Farm invasions have continued sporadically since 2000, but reports suggest a renewed and
coordinated effort to remove the remaining white farmers may be underway in 2009.67 The
looting and violence associated with these invasions has affected not only the commercial
farmers, but also often black Zimbabwean farm workers and their families.68 President Mugabe,
at his 85th birthday celebration, declared that “the few remaining white farmers should quickly
vacate their farms, as they have no place there…I am still in control and hold executive
authority.”69 He and ZANU-PF ministers have dismissed a 2008 ruling by SADC regional
tribunal that found Zimbabwe’s land redistribution program to be illegal, in part because it was
based on racial discrimination.70 The invasions also have continued in spite of a pledge in the
STERP that the government would “uphold the rule of law as well as enforce law and order on
farms, including arresting any further farm invasions, which disrupt farming activities.” Prime

67 International Crisis Group, “Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government,” Africa Briefing No. 59, 20 April 2009.
68 Press Statement by the General Agriculture and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe, “Zimbabwe Farm-Workers
Bear the Brunt of Invasions,” 1 April 2009, available at http://www.citizenjournalismafrica.org/node/1406.
69 “Who’s Land?” The Economist, March 5, 2009.
70 The case was brought before the regional court by 78 white farmers. The ruling, delivered on November 28, 2008,
found that their evictions had violated the government’s obligation to the rule of law under the SADC treaty. In a
separate case, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) sitting in Paris ruled on 22
April 2009, in favor of 13 Dutch farmers against the Government of Zimbabwe. According to the ruling, the
government broke a bilateral investment agreement with the Netherlands by seizing the farms without providing just
compensation. The ICSID awarded the farmers approximately $21 million, including interest, in compensation.
Whether the ruling could lead to the seizure of government assets overseas is not yet clear.
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Minister Tsvangirai has called the evictions acts of theft and ordered police to arrest violators, but
police compliance with his order remains in question. Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara
led a ministerial fact-finding mission on the invasions in late April. He reportedly tabled a report
on the mission with the cabinet, who referred the matter to the President and Prime Minister.
Human rights activists suggest that the government has yet to take any action on the invasions.71
“Blood Diamonds”?
The World Diamond Council (WDC), a diamond industry organization that aims to prevent the
trade of conflict diamonds, raised concerns in December 2008 that rough diamonds from
Zimbabwe were being exported illegally, rather than through the Kimberly Process (KP), an
international government certification scheme designed to prevent the “blood diamond” trade.
Rough stones from Zimbabwe have reportedly been confiscated in India and Dubai. According to
civil society reports, Zimbabwean security forces in the Marange diamond fields are forcing
villagers to labor in the mines and then smuggling the stones from the country.72 By some
accounts, security forces may have executed 200 illegal miners in the Marange fields.73 The
European Union pressed for an investigation into Zimbabwe’s compliance with its Kimberly
obligations in early 2009, and a high level KP delegation visited Zimbabwe in March to express
the group’s concern with reports of violence and smuggling from the Marange area. The KP
Secretariat refrained from suspending Zimbabwe from the certification scheme at that time, but
its investigation has continued.74 An interim report by a KP review team released in July
reportedly documented “unacceptable and horrific violence against civilians by authorities in and
around Chiadzwa,” one of the diamond fields in Marange.75 The Kimberly Process had previously
investigated allegations that “blood diamonds” from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
were being smuggled along with rough stones from Zimbabwe into South Africa for export. The
Mugabe government dismissed those claims as a western attempt to promote regime change.
Zimbabwe has been previously linked to conflict diamonds; senior officials were named in a 2003
U.N. report for profiting from illicit trade during Zimbabwe’s military operations in the DRC.76
The Security Sector and Possible Internal Struggles within ZANU-PF
Reports suggest that hardline elements within ZANU-PF may be actively trying to undermine the
transitional government. Some suggest that the recent farm invasions and the detention of MDC
officials and civic activists may be part of that effort. Mugabe and ZANU-PF officials remain
largely in control of the security sector. Several of the security service chiefs, including the heads
of the army and the police, publicly announced in 2008 that they would not recognize an electoral

71 Human Rights Watch, False Dawn: The Zimbabwe Power-Sharing Government’s Failure to Deliver Human Rights
Improvements, August 2009.
72 World Diamond Council, “WDC Calls for Concerted International Action to Halt Theft of Natural Resources in
Zimbabwe,” December 10, 2008; “Soldiers are the New Illegal Diamond Miners,” IRIN, January 20, 2009.
73 Parternship Africa Canada, “Zimbabwe, Diamonds, and the Wrong Side of History,” Occasional Paper No. 18,
March 2009; Human Rights Watch, Diamonds in the Rough, June 26, 2009.
74 Zimbabwe is a signatory of the Kimberly Process. Kimberly Process Certification Scheme Secretariat, “Public
Statement on the Situation in the Marange Diamond Fields, Zimbabwe,” March 2009.
75 “Kimberly Process Team Cites “Horrific” Violence in Zimbabwe Diamond Field,” VOA, July 9, 2009.
76 For more information, see CRS Report RL30751, Diamonds and Conflict: Background, Policy, and Legislation, by
Nicolas Cook.
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victory by anyone other that Mugabe.77 According to some reports, they continue to refuse to
recognize Prime Minister Tsvangirai’s authority in the new government. Tsvangirai now sits on a
new National Security Council, as mandated by the GPA, but the new organ was not created until
August, and has to date only met once.
In view of President Mugabe’s advanced age and the death of one of his vice presidents, the
question of presidential succession has led some analysts to raise concerns over the possibility of
a violent succession struggle or a possible military coup in the event of his death in office.78
Under the constitution, the president may designate one of the country’s two vice presidents to
serve as acting president until the next election, should he leave office, but Mugabe has never
done so. In 2004, Joice Mujuru, a veteran of the liberation struggle and womens’ movement
leader, beat Emmerson Mnangagwa, then speaker of the parliament and a political veteran long
touted as Mugabe’s heir, for the position of ZANU-PF’s second vice president. Some observers
suggest that Mnangagwa, now Minister of Defense and considered to be among the party’s most
influential hardliners, may be lobbying for his allies to replace her in the next party elections.
Mnangagwa’s national popularity has been hampered by accusations that he led the purge of
alleged regime opponents in provinces of Matabeleland in the 1980s.
Cholera Outbreak
A nationwide cholera outbreak resulted in over 4,300 deaths and almost 100,000 infections
between August 2008 and July 2009, when the last case was reported, according to the U.N.
World Health Organization. During this time, several neighboring countries reported confirmed
cases in border areas. Cholera, an acute diarrhoeal infection, is spread by contaminated food and
water, and the severity of Zimbabwe’s outbreak has been attributed to the collapse of the
country’s water and sanitation infrastructure and its health system.79 In Zimbabwe, the reported
case fatality rate (CFR) reached almost 6% at its peak in January 2009, much higher than the
normal 1% CFR rate for cholera cases globally. Some health experts suggest that another
outbreak could occur when the rains return later this year, as an estimated six million continue to
lack access to clean water and sanitation.
International Reactions
The international community was divided over how to respond to Zimbabwe’s political crisis in
2008, and, in the first year of the coalition government, donors remain cautious about when, and
under what conditions, international lending should resume. Western governments like the United
States and the United Kingdom have been highly critical of ZANU-PF policies, particularly in the
wake of the 2008 elections. These governments have welcomed the reform agenda of the new
government but remain reluctant to release significant funds. African governments, particularly
those in the sub-region, have expressed support for the transitional government, and several have
offered either bilateral loans or credit lines to help Zimbabwe’s economic revival.

77 “Zim Prisons Chief Orders Officers to Vote Mugabe,” Reuters, February 29, 2008.
78 Vice President Joseph Msika died at age 85 on August 5, 2009. For more information on succession issues, see
International Crisis Group, “Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government,” Africa Briefing No. 59, April, 20 2009.
79USAID, “Zimbabwe—Cholera Outbreak,” Fact Sheet #2, Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, December 19, 2008.
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Many analysts suggest that the new coalition government will require a significant influx of
foreign donor assistance to stabilize the economy and address the many humanitarian needs of the
population. The IMF suggests that “in the absence of cash budget support, higher humanitarian
assistance, and wage restraint, the economic and social situation could deteriorate significantly in
2009.”80 However, donors appear wary to commit large-scale funding until they can assess
whether members of the previous administration will adhere to the intent of the power sharing
agreement, working with the MDC to implement reforms necessary to instill donor confidence
and move the country toward a new round of free and fair elections. The reactions of various
international organizations and foreign governments to Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections and to its new
transitional government are discussed below.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Many critics of Mugabe’s leadership in Zimbabwe have faulted the regional body SADC for
inaction in recent years as Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis worsened. However, some
within the organization advocated for a stronger position to be taken, among them Zambia’s now-
deceased President, Levy Mwanawasa, who in 2007 called Zimbabwe “a sinking Titanic whose
passengers are jumping out to save their lives.”81 Mwanawasa, who served as the head of SADC
before his death, convened an extraordinary meeting of the Southern African heads of state in
April 2008 to discuss Zimbabwe’s elections. He had convened a similar emergency summit in
late March 2007, following the beating and arrest of opposition officials earlier that month.
Although the SADC leaders reportedly chastised President Mugabe privately at that time, they
did not publicly condemn the regime’s actions and instead appointed President Mbeki to mediate
between the ZANU-PF government and the opposition.
During the April 2008 summit, attended by Tsvangirai and Makoni but not Mugabe, the SADC
leaders declined to call the situation in Zimbabwe a crisis. They did, however, publicly urge the
government to release the electoral results “expeditiously,” allow opposition representatives to be
present when vote tabulations were verified, and ensure that a runoff, if needed, would be held in
a “secure environment.” The SADC leaders also called on Mbeki to continue his role as
mediator.82 Mwanawasa reportedly asked the leaders to seek solutions that would allow “the
people’s verdict” to be heard so that Zimbabweans could “turn [over] a new leaf in their history.”
Zimbabwe civil society groups were supportive of SADC’s statements on the electoral results, but
critical of its continued support for Mbeki’s mediation. Mugabe reportedly called the meeting “a
show staged by Britain.”83
Following Tsvangirai's withdrawal from the runoff, President Mwanawasa reportedly commented
that “elections held in such an environment will not only be undemocratic but will also bring
embarrassment to the region.” President Mwanawasa suffered a stroke on the eve of the 2008
African Union summit and passed away in August 2008. After the runoff, Botswana took the
strongest stance on Zimbabwe, declaring on July 4 that it would not recognize Mugabe as
president. President Ian Khama reportedly called on other SADC leaders to do the same, and he

80 IMF, “Zimbabwe: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report,” IMF Country Report No. 09/139, April 20, 2009.
81 “Zimbabwe ‘A Sinking Titanic,’”Financial Times, March 22, 2007.
82SADC Communique, “2008 First Extra-ordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government Issued on April
13, 2008, in Lusaka, Zambia.”
83Fiona Forde, “Summit on Zim ‘Coup’ Crisis Stalls,” Sunday Independent, April 13, 2008.
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boycotted an August 2008 SADC summit attended by Mugabe.84 In November, Botswana’s
foreign minister called on the international community to isolate Mugabe and urged neighboring
countries to close their borders. Several other international leaders became increasingly critical of
the SADC response to the Zimbabwe crisis—former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan declared
in late 2008, “It’s obvious that SADC could have and should have done more.”85
Reportedly frustrated by the lack of progress on the implementation of the power sharing
agreement and amidst growing criticism from within the region, the SADC heads of state
convened in late January 2009 for another push to mediate a final settlement on Zimbabwe.86
President Khama attended, as did President Mugabe, and the MDC objected to his being seated
with the other heads of state during the deliberations. South African President Kgalema Motlanthe
announced that a deal had been reached on January 27.
On March 30, 2009, the SADC heads of state voted to support a plan to help raise $8 billion for
Zimbabwe’s economic recovery, including $2 billion in short term aid. Much of that funding is
expected to be sourced from outside the region, however. Botswana and South Africa have
publicly pledged aid and credit lines, and African banks have reportedly given Zimbabwe some
$500 million in credit lines for the mining and agriculture industries, and to provide liquidity to
the financial sector.87 According to press reports, the Government of Botswana has warned that it
may rescind its assistance offer if political detentions and farm invasions continue.88
During a SADC summit in early September, regional heads of state expressed concern over
outstanding political issues in Zimbabwe, but ignored calls for a special summit on the topic; the
SADC leaders instead determined that disputes be addressed by a smaller panel of three SADC
heads of state.89 South African President Jacob Zuma, who is among those three, is expected to
push for further reforms. During the summit he urged the parties to remove unspecified obstacles
in the implementation the GPA.
The African Union (AU)
The African Union was critical of the violence in Zimbabwe in 2008, but lacked consensus on
how to address the issue. In a communique on April 17, 2008, the African Union expressed
concern over the delayed election results, “which creates an atmosphere of tension that is not in
the least conducive to the consolidation of the democratic process that was so felicitously
launched through the organization of the elections.”90 In early May2008, Chairman of the AU
Commission Jean Ping led an AU mission to Zimbabwe, Zambia, and South Africa. He called for
Zimbabwe’s political actors to:

84“Botswana Refuses to Recognize Mugabe as President,” BBC, July 8, 2008.
85 “Barred from Zimbabwe, but Not Silent,” The New York Times, November 26, 2008.
86 “A Growing Chorus in S. Africa Urges Action on Mugabe,” Washington Post, January 26, 2009.
87 According to press reports, Botswana has pledged $70 million in bilateral credit lines, while South Africa has
pledged $30 million in agricultural inputs, $30 million in direct budget support, and a $50 million credit line for
Zimbabwe’s commercial banks.
88 “Watch Out, Botswana Tells Mugabe,” The Nation (Nairobi), May 11, 2009.
89 The panel, the SADC organ on politics, defense, and security, is composed of Mozambique, Angola, and South
Africa.
90African Union Division of Communication and Information, “Communique on the Situation in Zimbabwe,” April 17,
2008.
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conduct their activities in a free, transparent, tolerant, and non-violent manner to enable
eligible Zimbabweans [to] exercise their democratic rights. It is essential also that peace and
security be maintained, and that the will of the people be respected by all stakeholders once
the results are announced.91
At the June 29- July 1 2008 AU Summit in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, Botswana's Vice President
joined leaders from Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana in calling for punitive measures
against the Mugabe regime. The AU ultimately failed to reach agreement on sanctions, but issued
a public call for talks toward a unity government.
While the AU has traditionally deferred to sub-regional mediation efforts, reports suggest the AU
Chairman at the time, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete (who is also a member of SADC),
encouraged a greater role on Zimbabwe by the United Nations. Kenya’s prime minister, Raila
Odinga, and former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan commented that Southern African
leaders could do more to resolve the crisis. Odinga received widespread attention for his
comments on Zimbabwe, and he called on AU leaders not to allow Mugabe to attend the Sharm
el-Sheikh summit. Odinga also called for peacekeepers to be sent to Zimbabwe.
The African Union has some precedent for intervening in support of democracy within its
member countries, should it chose to do so.92 The intervention of AU leaders in the early days of
the 2007/2008 Kenyan election crisis is viewed by many as having helped move the two opposed
parties toward negotiations and an eventual post-election agreement. Both SADC and the AU are
identified as guarantors of Zimbabwe’s power sharing agreement.
South Africa
Thabo Mbeki, who resigned from his position as President of South Africa in September 2008,
drew substantial criticism at home from opposition parties, trade unions, and civil society groups
for his reaction to Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections. Tsvangirai had criticized Mbeki for his “quiet
support for the dictatorship,” and called for him to step down as mediator prior to the elections.93
According to reports, Mbeki wrote President Bush a letter in mid-2008 warning the United States
not to interfere in the Zimbabwe situation.94 In the months following Zimbabwe’s general
elections, domestic public pressure may ultimately have forced Mbeki to take a stronger position
on the violence there: Mbeki visited the country several times and in May dispatched six retired

91Statement by the Chairman of the AU Commission on the Situation in Zimbabwe on May 6, 2008, available at
http://www.africa-union.org.
92In 2005, after the death of the President of Togo, the Togolese army installed his son as president. The AU declared
the intervention to be a military coup and the AU Peace and Security Council demanded the resignation of the new
president and urged members to impose diplomatic, travel, and arms sanctions until elections were held. The president
stepped down the day after sanctions were imposed. It is notable, in the case of Togo, that the relevant regional body,
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) played an important role in denouncing the coup and
leading the campaign for sanctions. In the second instance of AU intervention, the AU suspended Mauritania from all
organizational activities after the country’s military led a successful coup against the president, in office for 21 years.
Reports suggest that most Mauritanians supported the military’s actions. Nevertheless, the AU upheld the suspension
because it opposed the unconstitutional overthrow of a civilian regime. Following an investigation, the AU decided
against sanctions, but held the suspension until elections were held in 2007. Mauritania was suspended from the AU
again in August 2008 following another coup, and the West African country of Guinea has received similar treatment
after a December 2008 coup.
93Barry Bearak, “Zimbabwe Opponent Criticizes Mbeki,” New York Times, February 14, 2008.
94Michael Gerson, “The Despots' Democracy,” Washington Post, May 28, 2008.
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generals to investigate reports of attacks on the opposition. The generals reportedly expressed
shock at the level of violence.95
Some senior officials within the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party were more
outspoken than Mbeki on Zimbabwe. “In resolving the problem of Zimbabwe, Thabo Mbeki is
not speaking on behalf of the ANC,” a spokesman for the ANC youth wing declared in April
2008.96 Baleka Mbete, then-speaker of parliament, called the delayed release of the 2008 results a
“democratic process gone wrong.” In a gathering of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, she urged
representatives of 147 countries not to remain silent on the issue.97 The ANC issued a public
statement in reaction to the June 2008 runoff noting the effect Zimbabwe's instability has had on
the SADC region and accusing the Zimbabwe government of “riding roughshod over the hard-
won democratic rights of the people.” The statement cited “compelling evidence of violence,
intimidation and outright terror; the studied harassment of the leadership of the MDC, including
its Presidential candidate, by the security organs of the Zimbabwean government.” The ANC
warned outside players not to try to impose regime change, however,and expressed continued
support for President Mbeki's mediation efforts.98 According to local press reports, Mbeki
declared in July 2008 that there was no legitimate government in Harare and that the creation of a
unity government was necessary.99
New South African President Jacob Zuma, who defeated Mbeki in December 2007 for the ANC
party presidency, was publicly critical of Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections. He openly criticized the
delayed announcement of the March results, saying, “there is a crisis in Zimbabwe. We ought to
stand up and do something about it.” While not directly charging the Mugabe administration with
rigging, he distanced himself from Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” approach. In late April 2008, he
told reporters, “Definitely there is something wrong with those elections.... I think the manner in
which the electoral commission has acted has discredited itself, and therefore that is tantamount
to sabotaging the elections.”100 Zuma did not call for Mbeki to step down as mediator, but said “I
imagine that the leaders in Africa should really move in to unlock this logjam,”101 and called for
African leaders to “assist” Mbeki as mediator, “given the gravity of the situation.”102 Many
analysts have predicted that South African policy toward Zimbabwe, and Mugabe in particular,
could change under a possible Zuma administration if the coalition government collapses or fails
to abide by the GPA.103 Zuma has criticized western governments, however, for withholding
financial assistance from the coalition government.104
President Zuma, following a meeting with Prime Minister Tsvangirai in late July and a visit to
Harare in August, has stressed the need for the parties to hasten the pace of reforms, but he has
refrained from publicly criticizing Mugabe. Other ANC officials have been more outspoken—

95 “Anxiety Grows for Kidnaped Zimbabwe Activist,” Voice of America, May 18, 2008.
96 “Zimbabwe’s Political Crisis Enters South Africa Domestic Politics,” Voice of America, April 17, 2008.
97Statement by Speaker Baleka Mbete in Cape Town, 13 April 2008, available at http://www.parliament.gov.za.
98 “South Africa: Finding a Workable Solution to the Crisis,” Press Release issued by the ANC on 27 June 2008.
99 “Mbeki Brands Mugabe's Rule Illegitimate,” Pretoria News, July 8, 2008.
100 “Zimbabwe Crisis at Critical Level, Warns Zuma,” CNN, April 24, 2008.
101 “Africa Shows Impatience on Zimbabwe Crisis,” Reuters, April 22, 2008.
102 “Zuma Ratchets Up Rhetoric Over Zimbabwe,” Financial Times, April 22, 2008.
CRS Report RL31697, South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations, by Lauren Ploch.
104 “S. Africa’s Zuma Criticizes West over Zimbabwe,” Reuters, March 26, 2009.
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ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe told reporters during Zuma’s Harare visit that President
Zuma would be critical of Mugabe’s “deviant behavior” in his meetings there.105
Xenophobic Attacks Against Immigrants
An outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa in May 2008 had some, including the South
African Communist Party, an ANC ally, calling for early elections in South Africa last year.106 In
May and June 2008, Zimbabweans and other foreign nationals were targeted by mobs in several
South African townships; at least 60 were killed and over 25,000 fled their homes. South Africa is
home to some three to five million illegal immigrants, most from Zimbabwe, and some South
Africans blame them for the country’s high crime and unemployment rates and rising food prices.
President Mbeki condemned the attacks, but the opposition criticized the government for not
addressing tensions earlier. On May 21, Mbeki deployed the army internally for the first time
since the end of apartheid to stem the violence. Under Mbeki’s successor, President Kgalema
Motlanthe, the South African government revised its immigration policy, lifting visa restrictions
for Zimbabweans in favor of a border pass for up to 90 days.107
The United Nations
In the wake of the March 2008 elections, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon joined the United
States, Great Britain, and France in calling on the U.N. Security Council to address the Zimbabwe
situation. In remarks to the Security Council on April 16, Ban expressed his deep concern with
the delayed release of the electoral results, warning that “the credibility of the democratic process
in Africa could be at stake.” The Secretary-General, who declared the runoff election illegitimate,
engaged world leaders to determine how the international community could “help the
Zimbabwean people and authorities to resolve this issue.”108 His concern was echoed by UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour, who called the runoff a “perversion of
democracy.”109
Thabo Mbeki chaired the April 16 Security Council meeting, which was originally called by
South Africa, as rotating chairman of the Council, to discuss cooperation between the United
Nations and the African Union. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad
recommended that a U.N.-AU mission visit the country. The only African representative to
address the Zimbabwe issue at the meeting was Tanzanian President Kikwete, who praised SADC
for working to “ensure that the will of the people of Zimbabwe is respected.”110
The U.N. Security Council held a special session on April 29 to discuss Zimbabwe, reportedly at
the behest of incoming Security Council chair Britain. European and Latin American members
pressed for a U.N. envoy to visit the country, while other delegations, including South Africa’s,
rejected the proposal. President Mugabe denounced the closed session as “sinister, racist, and

105 “Mugabe Faces Tougher Scrutiny, Says ANC,” Business Day (South Africa), August 27, 2009.
106 “Anti-Foreigner Violence Escalates in South Africa,” Reuters, May 19, 2008.
107 South African Department of Home Affairs, “SA Signs MOU With Zimbabwe,” Media Release on May 7, 2009.
108 “U.N. Council and AU to debate Zimbabwe,” Reuters, April 16, 2008.
109 “Elections Won't Be Delayed, Zimbabwe Insists,” International Herald Tribune, June 27, 2008.
110 “Spotlight Turned on Zimbabwe at UN Council,” Reuters, April 16, 2008.
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colonial.”111 On June 22, the Council issued a Presidential Statement condemning the violence
and acts of political repression by the Government of Zimbabwe.
On July 8, 2008, the Group of Eight (G8) nations, many of whom already have bilateral sanctions
in place, agreed to impose sanctions against the Mugabe regime due to the ongoing violence. The
G8's announcement set the stage for a U.S.-sponsored resolution in the U.N. Security Council.
The resolution (S/2008/447) called for targeted sanctions on 14 members of the Mugabe regime,
and an international arms embargo. It also requested the appointment of a U.N. Special
Representative on Zimbabwe, and the creation of a Panel of Experts to monitor and evaluate the
situation and the effects of the sanctions. On July 11, Russia and China vetoed the resolution. The
vote was 9, including Burkina Faso, in favor, and 5 against, with South Africa joining Russia,
China, Vietnam, and Libya in opposition. The United States expressed its disappointment with the
two vetos, particularly that of Russia, which had supported the G8 agreement earlier that week.112
South Africa's Ambassador to the U.N. had repeatedly expressed reservations about imposing
sanctions on Zimbabwe, arguing that the situation in Zimbabwe did not pose a threat to
international security and thus should not be considered to be a matter for the U.N. Security
Council. Some criticized South Africa's position, suggesting that the xenophobic violence against
Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa was only one of several examples of how the political
and economic crisis in Zimbabwe has affected the neighboring region. Some analysts suggest that
the African Union acknowledged the threat to regional security in a July 2 resolution issued
during its Sharm el-Sheikh summit, which noted the “urgent need to prevent further worsening of
the situation and with a view to avoid the spread of the conflict with the consequential negative
impact on the country and the subregion.” South Africa’s term as a rotating member of the
Security Council expired in January 2009.
The United Kingdom and the European Union
The European Union (EU) maintains targeted sanctions against members of Zimbabwe's former
administration, many of whom remain in office under the coalition government, and EU sanctions
prohibit member states from selling weapons to the country. Amidst the political violence that
followed the 2008 elections, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown in a speech to the House of
Commons, called for an international arms embargo against Zimbabwe, accusing the government
of rigging the elections and calling the political situation “completely unacceptable.” The United
States, which also prohibits weapons sales to Zimbabwe and maintains targeted sanctions,
expressed support for Brown's proposal, which was included in a U.S.-sponsored draft of a U.N.
Security Council resolution. Britain's Queen Elizabeth stripped Mugabe of an honorable
Knighthood he received in 1994.
In early September 2009, the EU sent its first high level delegation to Zimbabwe in seven years.
EU officials stressed that the visit was intended to renew diplomatic engagement, but that the EU
would not consider lifting its targeted sanctions until the GPA was fully implemented.

111 “Zimbabwe Dismisses U.N. Talks,” Reuters, April 30, 2008.
112Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Africa
Subcommittee on July 15, 2008.
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U.S. Policy on Zimbabwe
The U.S. government has been critical of President Mugabe and members of his former regime
for their poor human rights record and lack of respect for the rule of law. For much of the past
decade, the United States has imposed targeted sanctions against the government, including
financial and visa sanctions against select individuals;113 banned transfers of defense items and
services; and suspended non-humanitarian assistance to the government. At the same time, the
United States has remained one of the largest donors of humanitarian assistance to the people of
Zimbabwe. With the exception of defense items, the United States has not imposed trade
sanctions on the country.114
The Bush Administration was highly critical of the ZANU-PF government’s role in the 2008 post-
election violence. Prior to the runoff, then Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer accused
Mugabe of “trying to steal the election,” saying, “My preferred option would be that the will of
the people be accepted. That Mr. Mugabe does the honorable thing and steps down.”115 In May
2008, a State Department spokesman urged Mugabe to “call off his dogs,”116 and then-U.S.
Ambassador James McGee publicly condemned what he referred to as a “systematic campaign of
violence designed to block this vote for change ... orchestrated at the highest levels of the ruling
party.”117 American diplomats and officials from other foreign embassies report that they were
repeatedly harassed by elements of the Mugabe regime, in violation of the Vienna Convention.
In the months following the elections, the Bush Administration repeated its calls for African
governments to play a greater role in resolving the political impasse. During a visit by the British
Prime Minister to Washington, President Bush told the media, “The United Nations and the A.U.
must play an active role in resolving the situation in Zimbabwe.”118 Former Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice said more bluntly, “It is time for Africa to step up.”119 In December, she called
the power sharing talks a “sham.”120
In the early days of his new administration, President Barack Obama reached out to then-South
African President Kgalema Motlanthe to express his concern regarding Zimbabwe and to stress
South Africa’s role in resolving the political crisis.121 President Obama repeated his concerns to
President Jacob Zuma on the occasion of his inauguration. The Obama Administration has

113President Bush imposed these sanctions through Executive Order 13288, issued in March 2003. The Order prohibits
transactions with persons, entities, or organizations found to be undermining democratic institutions and processes in
Zimbabwe, who are included in a Specially Designated Nationals(SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
114 Zimbabwe is not eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) because of its
poor record of economic management and human rights abuses.
115News Briefing by State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack on April 15, 2008, and “Mugabe Trying to Steal
Elections, Says U.S. Official,” CNN, April 24, 2008.
116 Daily Press Briefing by State Department Spokesman Tom Casey, May 1, 2008.
117Statement by Ambassador McGee, “Breaking the Silence on Political Violence in Zimbabwe,” May 8, 2008,
available at http://harare.usembassy.gov.
118Remarks by President Bush in a press conference with Prime Minister Brown at the White House, April 17, 2008.
119On-the-Record Briefing by Secretary Rice in Washington, DC, April 17, 2008.
120Roundtable with Secretary Rice and the Associated Press on December 15, 2008.
121 Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Readout on the President’s Call to South Africa’s President
Motlanthe,” January 27, 2009.
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expressed support for the new coalition government, but officials continue to press for the full
implementation of the GPA. Both President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton met with Prime Minister Tsvangirai during a visit to Washington, DC in June 2009.
Congressional Interest
Congress has played a key role in the shaping of U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe. In 2008, several
Members of the 110th Congress issued statements highly critical of the Mugabe Administration,
the delayed release of the 2008 election results, and the political violence in Zimbabwe. Some
wrote letters to Administration officials or African leaders. In April 2008 the Senate passed S.Res.
533, introduced by Senator John Kerry, calling for the immediate release of the presidential
results, an end to the political violence and intimidation, and a peaceful transition to democratic
rule. The resolution also supported calls for an international arms embargo and other targeted
sanctions against the Mugabe regime, and encouraged the creation of a comprehensive political
and economic recovery package in the event a democratic government is installed. The House of
Representatives passed H.Res. 1230, sponsored by Representative Donald Payne and all the
House Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, among others, condemning the violence and
calling for a peaceful resolution to the political crisis. The House also passed H.Res. 1270,
sponsored by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, calling for an international arms embargo,
urging the United Nations to deploy a special envoy to Zimbabwe, and encouraging the parties to
discuss the creation of a government of national unity. Prior to the June runoff, Representative
Adam Schiff had introduced legislation calling on the Zimbabwe government to postpone the
election. Representative Tom Tancredo also introducted legislation, H.Con.Res. 387, calling for
the United States to sever diplomatic ties with Zimbabwe. In the 111th Congress, Representative
Ros-Lehtinen has introduced H.Res. 238, declaring the economic and humanitarian crisis in
Zimbabwe to be a threat to international security.
President Mugabe has frequently claimed that Western sanctions are to blame for the collapse of
the country’s economy. He and other ZANU-PF officials often cite a U.S. law, the Zimbabwe
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) (P.L. 107-99), passed by Congress in 2001.
This legislation is discussed in “Current Restrictions on U.S. Assistance” below.
U.S. Assistance
The United States is one of the largest donors of humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe, having
provided an estimated $1 billion in aid since 2002. In FY2008, U.S. assistance included $271
million in food aid and $22 million in other humanitarian assistance, as well as over $22 million
in health programs and over $10 million for democracy and governance support. During President
Obama’s June 2009 meeting with Tsvangirai, President Obama pledged $73 million in new
governance, education, and health assistance to Zimbabwe, in addition to the over $135 million in
foreign aid obligated in FY2009 and the $95.4 million requested in the FY2010 Foreign
Operations budget request.122 The U.S. government provided over $7.3 million in FY2009
specifically to address the cholera outbreak, in addition to $8.5 million for other water and
sanitation programs. The Administration has indicated that the provision of non-humanitarian
assistance directly to the government remains predicated on progress toward political reforms.

122 The FY2009 figure includes food aid, the FY2010 request does not. Congress approved $40 million in supplemental
appropriations for Zimbabwe in FY2009, and $15 million in FY2008.
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Key elements of current U.S. policy continue to include targeted sanctions against high-ranking
members of ZANU-PF and their affiliates, support for economic and democratic reforms, and the
provision of assistance intended to help the country’s poor and strengthen civil society.
According to the State Department’s FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification, “If the
transitional government demonstrates adequate progress in meeting the necessary benchmarks for
broader international re-engagement, the United States will help the transitional government build
a national consensus on the way forward in Zimbabwe and will support the implementation of a
multi-sectoral recovery and development-oriented program.”
Current Restrictions on U.S. Assistance
Due to loan defaults, Zimbabwe is subject to the Brooke-Alexander Act and Section 620(q) of the
Foreign Assistance Act, both of which prohibit direct assistance to the Government of Zimbabwe
based on past due indebtedness the United States. Sections 7088 and 7070(e) of the FY2009
Omnibus Appropriations Act also prohibit assistance to the government. In addition, the
Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (ZDERA; P.L. 107-99) prohibits
U.S. support for loans to the government by international financial institutions.
Sanctions Against Individuals
The United States has enforced targeted sanctions against top government officials and associates
since 2002; these sanctions have been annually renewed by the White House. The sanctions are
intended to punish those responsible for Zimbabwe’s difficulties without harming the population
at large. The initial sanctions, imposed in 2003, ban travel to the United States by “senior
members of the government of Robert Mugabe and others ... who formulate, implement, or
benefit from policies that undermine or injure Zimbabwe’s democratic institutions or impede the
transition to a multi-party democracy.” Persons who benefit financially from business dealings
with such individuals are also banned, as are the spouses of people in either group. In 2003,
President George W. Bush also issued an executive order freezing assets held in the United States
by 75 high-ranking Zimbabwe officials and President Mugabe’s wife, Grace.123 Nine companies
and commercial farms were added in 2004, and the list was further expanded in November 2005
to block the assets of 128 individuals and 33 entities. The executive order also allows the
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to go beyond previous
authority and block the property of additional persons who “have engaged in actions or policies to
undermine Zimbabwe’s democratic processes or institutions,” their immediate family members,
and any persons assisting them.124 President Bush added additional names to the list in 2007 and
2008. President Barack Obama renewed the sanctions on March 3, 2009. The European Union
and Britain have imposed similar targeted sanctions on over 150 persons and entities, as well an
arms embargo and an asset freeze.
Some, but not all, ZANU-PF members serving in inclusive government positions are included in
the list of individuals sanctioned by the U.S. government (see list of cabinet members in
Appendix below). MDC officials in the government have not called for the sanctions against

123 Seventy-seven individuals were named in the executive order (EO 13288), but one of these had died.
124 The text of this annex to EO 13288 can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov.
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individuals to be lifted, but some have argued that sanctions against certain entities, including
several local banks, should be reexamined.125
Multilateral Financing Restrictions
Congress expressed its opposition to the Zimbabwe government’s “economic mismanagement”
and “undemocratic policies” and called for sanctions in the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic
Recovery Act of 2001. ZDERA, which was introduced by Senator Bill Frist in March 2001,126
became public law in December of that year. This legislation, which authorized U.S. bilateral aid
for land reform and governance programs, also called for consultations with allies on economic
sanctions and a travel ban. Under ZDERA, U.S. support for financial assistance to Zimbabwe by
international financial institutions is prohibited until the President has been able to certify that
certain conditions pertaining to the rule of law, democratic elections, and legal and transparent
land reform have been met.127 At the time of ZDERA’s passage, Zimbabwe was already ineligible
to receive loans from the IMF and the World Bank’s International Development Association
(IDA) because it was in arrears to those institutions for debt payments. If a presidential
certification is made that the conditions identified in ZDERA have been met, the legislation calls
upon the Secretary of the Treasury to review the feasibility of restructuring, rescheduling, or
eliminating Zimbabwe’s sovereign debt held by the U.S. government and to propose similar
reviews by the multilateral development banks.
Administration Policy on the Easing of Sanctions
Despite its support for the new government, the Obama Administration has noted, “We will not
consider providing additional development assistance or even easing sanctions until we see
effective governance,” and the State Department has reiterated “serious concerns about the
regime of Mr. Mugabe.”128 U.S. officials and representatives of like-minded donor governments
and institutions have agreed to increase humanitarian aid to the extent possible and to support the
goals of the power-sharing agreement, but have predicated the provision of development
assistance on progress toward political and economic reforms.

125 Interviews by the author with MDC officials and U.S. embassy personnel in Harare, Zimbabwe in April 2008.
126 ZDERA cosponsors included Senators Russ Feingold, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Jesse Helms, and Joseph Biden.
127 The conditions include the following: 1) restoration of the rule of law; 2) election or pre-election conditions; 3)
commitment to equitable, legal, and transparent land reform; 4) fulfillment of agreement ending war in the Democratic
Republic of Congo; and 5) military and national police subordinate to civilian government. Under the terms of the
Global Political Agreement between ZANU-PF and the MDC, which established the inclusive government, elections
are not expected to be held for at least 18 months, during which time the agreement stipulates that a constitutional
review take place. Under ZDERA, a presidential certification may be made before a presidential election takes place if
“the Government of Zimbabwe has sufficiently improved the pre-election environment to a degree consistent with
accepted international standards for security and freedom of movement and association.” ZDERA allows for a
presidential waiver of the multilateral financing restriction if it is determined to be in the U.S. national interest.
128 Daily Press Briefing by State Department Spokesman Robert Wood, February 11, 2009, and Daily Press Briefing by
State Department Spokesman Ian Kelly, August 28, 2009
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The FY2009 Omnibus Act (P.L. 111-8) declares that no funding for bilateral economic assistance
or international security assistance shall be provided to Zimbabwe except as provided through the
regular notification procedures of the Appropriations Committees. Sec. 7070(e) of the Omnibus
further instructs that:
(1) The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director to each
international financial institution to vote against any extension by the respective institution of
any loans to the Government of Zimbabwe, except to meet basic human needs or to promote
democracy, unless the Secretary of State determines and reports in writing to the Committees
on Appropriations that the rule of law has been restored in Zimbabwe, including respect for
ownership and title to property, freedom of speech and association, and a transition
government has been established that reflects the will of the people as they voted in the
March 2008 elections.
(2) None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be made available for assistance for the
central government of Zimbabwe unless the Secretary of State makes the determination
pursuant to subsection (e)(1).
Per the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2346 (P.L. 111-32), the conditions
detailed in 7070(e) of P.L. 111-8 do not apply to FY2009 supplemental funds for macroeconomic
growth assistance provided to Zimbabwe.
Policy Options129
Following the creation of Zimbabwe’s coalition government, U.S. policymakers are reexamining
how to approach President Mugabe and his new administration. The Bush Administration, which
initially expressed support for the September 2008 power sharing agreement, withdrew support
months later for any arrangement in which Robert Mugabe would remain in office. As mentioned
above, President Obama’s Administration has taken a cautious approach and has made the return
of effective governance a prerequisite to the lifting sanctions or the provision of significant
financial support for Zimbabwe's economic recovery. Like-minded donor countries and
institutions expect certain economic and political policy changes be made prior to a resumption of
financial assistance to the government; Britain’s initial response has been similar to that of the
United States.
The international donor community has generally expressed support for the new inclusive
government, but has predicated significant assistance on improvement in the following areas:
• the release of all political prisoners;
• the end of farm disruptions;
• the cessation of politically motivated violence;

129There have been a number of studies conducted on policy options to re-engage Zimbabwe, including, Michelle D.
Gavin, Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Special Report No. 31, October
2007; Todd Moss and Stewart Patrick, The Day After Comrade Bob: Applying Post-Conflict Recovery Lessons to
Zimbabwe, Center for Global Development Working Paper no. 72, December 2005; and “After Mugabe: Applying
Post-Conflict Recovery Lessons to Zimbabwe,” Africa Policy Journal, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, vol. 1, Spring 2006.
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• the establishment of a credible and transparent Reserve Bank team;
• an end to harassment and intimidation of the media; and
• a commitment of all stakeholders to holding credible elections in a timely
manner.130
As discussed, many of the economic reform conditions set by the IMF and other donors,
including price liberalization, the elimination of quasi-fiscal activities, and cash budgeting, have
already been met. Zimbabwe’s Finance Ministry has also taken initial steps to meet other reform
conditions, such as central bank transparency and reform, by calling for an audit of the Reserve
Bank’s financial statements and by proposing legislative reforms related to Reserve Bank
governance. Credible stewardship of the Reserve Bank and a full restoration of Zimbabwe’s
relationship with the IMF and the World Bank will take time.
Obama Administration officials have been reluctant to publicly specify their own benchmarks for
renewed assistance to the Government of Zimbabwe, but Administration officials suggest that
many of the necessary conditions are already outlined in the GPA, and thus in Zimbabwe’s own
constitution. Broadly, U.S. officials expect “genuine progress on governance and democracy,” as
evidenced by continued movement toward constitutional reform and free and fair elections, but
they have also reiterated the importance of interim confidence-building measures such as those
listed above.131 If the installation of Tsvangirai and other MDC officials into government
positions does not bring about a change in governance, some in the international community may
explore other avenues for addressing the country's political and economic problems.
Diplomatic Pressure
Certain countries, including the United States, declared the Mugabe Administration illegitimate
after the 2008 elections. Prior to the September agreement, some suggested that these
governments should officially recognize Tsvangirai as President, and allow him to establish a
government in exile. The MDC and others had called for the United Nations to deploy human
rights monitors to investigate the political violence. Although South Africa and SADC have
already deployed inquiry teams, the presence of U.N. monitors could be influential, particularly if
the Zimbabwe government takes no initiative to investigate or prosecute abuses. The Mugabe
Administration has, in the past, reportedly denied similar delegations entry. In November 2008,
the government refused to provide visas to several members of the group of world leaders known
as the Elders, including Kofi Annan and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Based on interviews
in South Africa, Carter declared the crisis there to be “much greater, much worse, than anything
we had ever imagined.”132 There have been calls for members of the Mugabe government to be
referred to international justice regimes, although some observers suggest such calls for justice
should be considered carefully as long as the coalition government remains intact.

130 Remarks by the German Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Dr. Albrecht Conze, as referenced in “Getting Zimbabwe to
Work Again,” The Zimbabwe Times, March 29, 2009.
131 See the Administration’s FY2009 Supplemental Justification for the Department of State and USAID.
132 “Carter Shocked by Zimbabwe Crisis,” BBC, November 24, 2008.
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Humanitarian Assistance
The food security situation in Zimbabwe remains critical. An estimated five million people
required food assistance in 2008 and almost nine million, some three quarters of the population,
were in need of food aid in early 2009. An estimated three million are expected to be food
insecure through the end of the year. According to the United Nations, one in four children under
the age of five suffers from chronic malnutrition.133 The displacement of farm workers and
vandalism that has followed the March 2008 elections has also contributed to food insecurity. In
addition, according to U.N. reports, political violence and government interference in 2008
impeded the delivery of NGO assistance. According to the Government of Zimbabwe, the country
requires 2 million tons of maize and an estimated 500,000 tons of wheat per year to feed its
population. In recent years Zimbabwe’s farms have produced on average only 20% of these
requirements.134 The 2008 crop production deficit in much of the country was estimated at 75 to
100%, and the 2009 winter wheat crop did not meet government production targets. Both
government officials and humanitarian aid groups suggest that financing for farmers’ 2009-2010
summer crops will be critical. The U.N. has requested $320 million in food aid and $59 million in
agriculture requirements in its 2009 Consolidated Appeal Process.
Poor sanitation and water shortages pose serious health risks in Zimbabwe’s urban centers, as the
cholera epidemic highlights. Basic hygiene items, such as soap, have become too expensive for
many residents. In Harare and in the country’s second largest city, Bulawayo, service delivery,
including garbage collection, declined severely in recent years because of budget shortages, and
reports suggest ambulances and fire trucks sit unused because the city council cannot afford fuel
or spare parts. Severe water shortages have plagued Harare and other urban areas.
The Obama Administration’s FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations request included funds to
“protect the vulnerable Zimbabwean population during the process of stabilization.” This
assistance aims to support income-generating activities and employment opportunities; improve
safety-net structures; and assist returnees’ reintegration into society. In addition, this assistance
would aim to address the country’s collapsed health care system by providing emergency health
interventions. As the Administration’s FY2010 request points out, economic stabilization
programs are likely to introduce new hardships for many in the short-term, and humanitarian
assistance requested would address both food and non-food needs. The FY2010 request notes
that, “depending on events on the ground, it is possible that in 2010 relief activities will transition
to programs focused on providing economic opportunities to entrepreneurs and farmers.”
Economic Recovery
In April, the IMF estimated that in addition to increased humanitarian assistance needs,
Zimbabwe would require approximately $200 million in official budget support from donors to
achieve positive economic growth in 2009.135 The United States and other international actors
have discussed financial incentives and assistance to facilitate Zimbabwe’s economic recovery. 136

133 The United Nations, 2009 Consolidated Appeal Process, November 2008.
134 Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance, Short Term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP), March 2009.
135 IMF, “Zimbabwe: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report,” IMF Country Report No. 09/139, April 20, 2009.
136Information here draws such sources as David Coltart, “A Decade of Suffering in Zimbabwe: Economic Collapse
and Political Repression under Robert Mugabe,” CATO Institute Development Policy Analysis No. 5, 24 March 2008;
Sonia Munoz, “Central Bank Quasi-fiscal Losses and High Inflation in Zimbabwe: A Note,” IMF Working Paper,
(continued...)
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Zimbabwe’s economy has collapsed in the last decade, and every sector of the economy has been
affected. Annual outputs of wheat, maize, and tobacco, once Zimbabwe’s largest foreign
exchange earner, have plummeted. Manufacturing output declined by 73% in 2008 alone,
according to government estimates.137 Zimbabwe’s mining sector has been similarly affected,
although the platinum industry remains a major income earner for the government.138 World Bank
and IMF lending has been suspended for seven years due to nonpayment of arrears. These factors
have all contributed to increasing pressure on both the people of Zimbabwe and members of the
ruling party. In a public display of dissatisfaction among the military, shortages of cash caused
rioting and looting by army soldiers in Harare in late November 2008.
According to the IMF, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s quasi-fiscal activities were primarily
responsible for the surge in the country’s money supply in recent years. Losses from such
activities were estimated to be 75% of GDP in 2006, for example. The government’s fast track
land reform and more recent policy changes such as the Indigenization and Economic
Empowerment Act, have created significant uncertainty over property rights, deterring foreign
direct investment and lowering consumer confidence. It remains unclear how much influence the
MDC will have in countering the entrenched patronage system that currently exists.
Western donors have met periodically in recent years to explore reconstruction options, and their
representatives meet regularly in Harare to coordinate existing aid programs. Britain has
maintained its willingness to release funds to pay for parts of an orderly land redistribution
program if Mugabe retires and the rule of law is returned. With Mugabe remaining in office under
the GPA, it is unclear whether Britain will concede to release such funds. Prime Minister Gordon
Brown has indicated that political prisoners must be released and restrictive laws repealed before
the UK can engage more fully. By Government of Zimbabwe and SADC estimates, the cost of
Zimbabwe’s economic recovery may be almost $8 billion over a five-year period to cover food
support, land reform, health services and education, infrastructure, balance of payment and
budget support, and emergency aid programs.
The World Bank and the IMF have developed strategies for Zimbabwe’s economic recovery.
Given the need to cut government spending to reduce the government deficit, significant donor
assistance will be required to rebuild the public health sector, which according to reports may
have lost over 70% of its skilled workforce. The education sector faces similar challenges. Save
the Children UK estimates that attendance at public schools in Zimbabwe dropped from 85 to
20% between 2007 the end of 2008, and that some 30,000 teachers had left the public education
system.139 Reviving the country’s agriculture industry will require delicate handling to address
historical grievances against white Zimbabweans regarding land distribution and tenure.140

(...continued)
April 2007; and “Zimbabwe: Article IV Consultation - Staff Notes,” IMF Country Report No. 05/360, October 2005.
137 Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance, Short Term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP), March 2009.
138Zimbabwe has the world’s second largest reserves of platinum, behind South Africa. The largest mining operations
in the country are controlled by Impala Platinum and Anglo Platinum, respectively. These South African-owned
companies are the world’s largest platinum producers.
139 “Children and Teachers Unlikely to Return to School as Zimbabwe Term Begins,” Press Release from Save the
Children UK, January 27, 2009.
140The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has suggested that raising the yields of communal farming
areas, which compose 50% of Zimbabwe’s land, could guarantee food security. The country’s annual maize
requirement for human consumption is estimated at 1.4 million metric tons. The FAO estimates that a $50 million
investment annually for three years to train farmers and provide seeds and fertilizer would significantly increase yields
(continued...)
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Congress authorized $20 million in its ZDERA legislation for land reform assistance for FY2002,
and some analysts suggest this level of annual assistance may still be appropriate.141
Maintaining the flow of foreign currency to pay salary vouchers is particularly critical to ensuring
stability, but MDC officials have acknowledged donor concerns. Prime Minister Tsvangirai, in his
inaugural address to the parliament, warned MPs, “no donor country or institution is going to
offer any meaningful assistance unless our government projects a positive new image.”142
Australia and Sweden were among the first to offer initial aid packages, reportedly worth $10
million each, but those funds are being channeled through the United Nations and NGOs for
humanitarian assistance. To date, only Southern African governments and China have publicly
indicated a willingness to provide loans or aid directly to the government. Representatives from
the IMF, the World Bank, and the Africa Development Bank (ADB) visited the country in March
2009. The president of the ADB called Biti’s initial efforts “impressive,” and “merit[ing]
support,” but called on the country to meet its debt obligations.143 The IMF noted positive steps
toward fiscal discipline and offered to provide further policy advice, but warned that IMF funding
would not be renewed until Zimbabwe began to repay its debts and established “a track record of
sound policy implementation [and] donor support.”144
Zimbabwe owes over $1 billion to multilateral institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank,
and the African Development Bank. The government settled other outstanding arrears with the
IMF in 2005 and 2006 to avoid compulsory withdrawal from the IMF. The source of the funds
used to pay the IMF debt was a source of considerable speculation in the media.145 The ADB has
predicated the resumption of lending to Zimbabwe on the restoration of the credibility of the
sovereign state and launching a set of economic, financial, and institutional reforms. If these
conditions are met, the ADB would classify the country as a fragile state, which would permit
access to grant resources.
Following the March 2009 consultation visit, the IMF noted positive steps toward fiscal
discipline and offered to provide further policy advice, but warned that IMF funding would not be
renewed until Zimbabwe begins to repay its debts and establishes “a track record of sound policy
implementation [and] donor support.”146 Finance Minister Biti has said that Zimbabwe cannot
currently pay its remaining debts to international donors, and the IMF suggests that “Zimbabwe’s
external debt burden is unsustainable even if policies are improved and medium-term financing
gaps are filled by concessional financing.”147 In the interim, the IMF’s Executive Board met in
May to discuss the March consultation visit and to approve a “targeted lifting” of the Fund’s
suspension of technical assistance to the government.148 This resumption of assistance indicates
that the IMF has judged Zimbabwe to be cooperating with the Fund on policies and payments

(...continued)
and cost less than what Zimbabwe now pays to import food. See “Zimbabwe: Small Scale Farmers Seen as Backbone
of Food Security,” IRIN, May 15, 2008.
141Gavin, Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 31, October 2007.
142 Inaugural Address by Prime Minister Tsvangirai to the Seventh Parliament of Zimbabwe, March 4, 2009.
143 “ADB Praises Zimbabwe Recovery Plan,” Reuters, February 26,2009.
144 Tony Hawkins, “IMF Dampens Hopes of Aid to Zimbabwe,” Financial Times, March 25, 2009.
145 “A Zimbabwean Businessman, His Farms Seized, Takes on Mugabe,” Washington Post, February 24, 2006.
146 Tony Hawkins, “IMF Dampens Hopes of Aid to Zimbabwe,” Financial Times, March 25, 2009.
147 IMF, “Zimbabwe: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report,” IMF Country Report No. 09/139, April 20, 2009.
148 Interview by author with IMF officials on April 24, 2009.
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toward addressing its outstanding arrears.149 It allows IMF technical advisors to work with the
Finance Ministry to improve its revenue collection and bank payment system, particularly to
process transactions in foreign exchange, as well as on fiduciary control of the central bank.
In early September, the IMF announced that it had transferred approximately $400 million in
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) to Zimbabwe to boost its foreign currency reserves, as part of the
Fund’s effort to improve liquidity in the global economic system. Finance Minister Biti has
announced that these funds will be used to help rebuild the country’s infrastructure. A further
$100 million will reportedly be held in escrow by the IMF until Zimbabwe clears its arrears to the
Fund, currently worth an estimated $140 million. Reports suggest that the Board may consider at
a later date whether to restore Zimbabwe’s voting rights, which were suspended in 2003 after a
determination that Zimbabwe had not sufficiently strengthened its cooperation with the IMF in
areas of policy implementation and payments.150
The State Department’s FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations request, submitted in April 2009,
stated that “to be successful, Zimbabwe’s transition will require a significant infusion of capital
and program investment in both the short- and long-term.” In that request, the Administration
requested funds that could be used to support the transitional government The request also
included support for economic growth programs, including technical assistance in support of
monetary and fiscal policy reform and economic revitalization, especially for the agriculture
sector. The Supplemental request suggested that further reforms would be needed before the
international financial institutions will support a large-scale macro-economic recovery program.
The State Department’s FY2010 request would allow for an expansion of technical assistance to
the government on a range of issues, including trade policy and legal and regulatory reforms that
affect businesses, and would aim to reinforce technical assistance provided by the international
financial institutions.
Accountability and Reform
The inability of Zimbabwe’s judicial system to protect its citizens or their property, or to provide
due process to those seeking remedy or compensation, suggests a fundamental crisis in the
implementation of the rule of law in Zimbabwe. Analysts suggest that the country will require
significant judicial and security sector reforms as part of larger constitutional reforms. The State
Department’s FY2009 Supplemental Request included $9 million for democracy and governance
programs, including those aimed at institutional reforms. The people of Zimbabwe will also have
to determine what level of accountability they may seek, not only for recent political violence, but
for historical grievances and alleged official corruption under the Mugabe Administration.
Morgan Tsvangirai has, in the past, proposed the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission similar to that of South Africa, “striking a healthy balance between reconciliation
and accountability.”151 Prior to the September 2008 agreement, he offered Mugabe “an honorable
exit as... father of the nation,” but it is unlikely that the MDC would consider extending such an
offer to all senior security officials implicated in acts of violence.152 According to media reports,

149 IMF, “Request for Targeted Lifting of the Suspension of Fund Technical Assistance,” April 21, 2009.
150 Additional information on how the IMF deals with overdue financial obligations is available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/pam/pam45/contents.htm.
151Morgan Tsvangirai, “Freedom for Zimbabwe,” The Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2008.
152 “Zimbabwe Opposition Seeks Peacekeepers for Run-off,” Reuters, May 11, 2008.
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the security chiefs refused to attend Tsvangirai’s inauguration. Under the terms of the power
sharing agreement, a new constitution is expected to be developed within two years; many expect
fresh elections to be held at that point. Mugabe and other senior officials may resist a peaceful
exit from power if they fear subsequent prosecution, as occurred with the former presidents of
Liberia, Chad, and Zambia.153


153Former Liberian President Charles Taylor now faces war crimes charges before the Special Court for Sierra Leone at
the Hague; former Chadian President Hissan Habre is expected to be tried in Senegal for human rights abuses
committed by his regime; and former Zambian President Frederick Chiluba is on trial in Zambia for corruption.
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Appendix. Members of Zimbabwe’s Inclusive
Government
President – Robert Mugabe (ZANU-PF)*
Prime Minister – Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T)
Vice President – Joyce Mujuru (ZANU-PF)*
Deputy Prime Ministers – Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M); Thokozani Khupe (MDC-T)

Ministers:
Finance – Tendai Biti (MDC-T)
Information & Communications Technology – Nelson Chamisa (MDC-T)
Science and Technology – Heneri Dzinotyiwei (MDC-T)
Public Service – Elphas Mukonoweshuro (MDC-T)
Energy and Power Development – Elias Mudzuri (MDC-T)
Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs –Eric Matinenga (MDC-T)
Labour – Pauline Mpariwa (MDC-T)
Water Resources – Joel Gabuza (MDC-T)
Health – Henry Madzorera (MDC-T)
State Enterprises – Samuel Sipepa Nkomo (MDC-T)
National Housing & Social Amenities – Fidelis Mhashu (MDC-T)
Economic Planning and Development – Elton Mangoma (MDC-T)
Public Works – Theresa Makone (MDC-T)
Education, Sport and Culture – David Coltart (MDC-M)
Industry and Commerce – Welshman Ncube (MDC-M)
Regional Integration & International Cooperation – Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga (MDC-M)
Home Affairs – Co-ministers Kembo Mohadi (ZANU-PF)* and Giles Mutsekwa (MDC-T)
Defense – Emerson Mnangagwa (ZANU-PF)*
Local Government & Urban Development – Ignatius Chombo (ZANU-PF)*
Justice and Legal Affairs – Patrick Chinamasa (ZANU-PF)*
Agriculture – Joseph Mtekwese Made (ZANU-PF)*
Environment – Francis Dunstun Chenayimoyo Nhema (ZANU-PF) *
Tourism – Walter Mzembi (ZANU-PF)
Transport and Infrastructural Development – Nicholas Goche (ZANU-PF)*
Mines and Mining Development – Obert Moses Mpofu (ZANU-PF)*
Foreign Affairs – Simbarashe Simbanenduku Mumbengegwi (ZANU-PF)*
Media, Information and Publicity – Webster Kotiwa Shamu (ZANU-PF)*
Lands and Land Resettlement – Herbert Murerwa (ZANU-PF)*
Higher & Tertiary Education – Stan Gorerazvo Mudenge (ZANU-PF)*
Women's Affairs, Gender, & Community Development – Olivia Muchena (ZANU-PF)*
Youth Development, Indigenization & Empowerment – Savior Kasukuwere (ZANU-PF)*

Deputy Ministers (that have been sworn-in):
Foreign Affairs – Moses Mzila Ndlovu (MDC-M)
Higher and Tertiary Education – Lutho Addington Tapela (MDC-T)
Health and Child Welfare – Dr. Tendai Douglas Mombeshora (ZANU PF)
Labour and Social Welfare – Dr. Tracy Mutinhiri (ZANU PF)
Education, Sports, Arts and Culture – Lazarus Dokora (ZANU PF)
Economic Planning and Development – Dr. Samuel Undenge (ZANU PF)
Energy and Power Development – Hubert Nyanhongo (ZANU PF)
State Enterprises and Parastatals – Walter Chidhakwa (ZANU PF)
Industry and Commerce – Michael Bimha (ZANU PF)
Regional Integration and International Co-operation – Reuben Marumahoko (ZANU PF)*
Public Works – Aguy Georgias (ZANU PF)
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Public service – Andrew Langa (ZANU PF)*
Local Government, Urban and Rural Development – Sessil Zvidzai (MDC-T)
Transport and Infrastructural Development – Dr. Tichaona Mudzingwa (MDC-T)
Mines and Mining Development – Murisi Zwizwai (MDC-T)
Media, Information and Publicity – Jameson Timba (MDC-T)
Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment – Thamsanqa Mahlangu (MDC-T)
Women's Affairs, Gender and Community Development – Evelyn Masaiti (MDC-T)
Justice and Legal Affairs – Jessie Majome (MDC-T)

Ministers of State:
President's Office (Healing Organ) – John Nkomo (ZANU-PF)*
Prime Minister's Office (Healing Organ) – Sekai Holland (MDC-T)
Deputy Prime Minister's Office (Healing Organ) – Gibson Sibanda (MDC-M)
Vice President Mujuru's Office – Sylvester Nguni (ZANU-PF) *
National Security in the President's Office – Sydney Sekeramayi (ZANU-PF)*
Security Minister in the President's Office – Didymus Mutasa (ZANU-PF)*
Prime Minister's Office – Gordon Moyo (MDC-T)

*Denotes those included in the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Author Contact Information

Lauren Ploch

Analyst in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640




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