The European Union’s Reform Process: The
Lisbon Treaty
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
Derek E. Mix
Analyst in European Affairs
October 21, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21618
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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The European Union’s Reform Process: The Lisbon Treaty

Summary
In December 2007, leaders of the European Union (EU) signed the Lisbon Treaty. The treaty aims
to reform the EU’s governing institutions and decision-making process to enable the 27-member
EU to operate more effectively. This new treaty grew out of the proposed “constitutional treaty”
that foundered after French and Dutch voters rejected it in referendums in 2005.
The Lisbon Treaty seeks to give the EU a stronger and more coherent voice with the creation of a
new position, President of the European Council. This individual would chair the activities of the
27 EU heads of state or government to help ensure policy continuity, guide the strategic direction
of policy-making, and give the EU greater visibility on the world stage. The President would also
coordinate relations between EU institutions. Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty would create the
new position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a de
facto EU foreign minister who would be supported by a new EU diplomatic service.
The Lisbon Treaty would make changes to the EU’s internal decision-making mechanisms. These
changes have been designed to streamline the process and make it less susceptible to gridlock or
blockage by a single member state. The treaty attempts to address concerns about democratic
accountability and transparency in EU policy-making by granting a greater role to the directly
elected European parliament, national parliaments, and citizens’ initiatives.
The treaty must be ratified by all 27 member countries before it can come into force. The Czech
Republic is the only member that has not completed ratification. The treaty overcame a major
hurdle when Ireland overwhelmingly approved it in a referendum on October 2, 2009. The vote
was Ireland’s second attempt to ratify—Irish voters initially rejected the document in a June 2008
referendum. The Czech parliament has approved the treaty, but full ratification is still pending the
signature of the president. It is unclear how long the delay might last.
Nevertheless, the EU has now begun to prepare for the treaty to take effect in early 2010. The
Swedish Presidency of the EU is hoping to use a Summit scheduled for late October 2009 to
resolve remaining institutional questions about the treaty’s implementation. Such a Summit would
likely feature vigorous debate about appointments to the new President and “foreign minister”
positions. Should the issue of Czech ratification not be resolved, these decisions may be pushed
back to mid-December 2009.
Experts assert that the Lisbon Treaty would have positive implications for U.S.-EU relations.
While the treaty is unlikely to have major effects on U.S.-EU trade and economic relations, some
believe that it could allow the EU to move past its recent preoccupation with distracting internal
questions and take on a more active and effective role as a U.S. partner in tackling global
challenges. There are indications that adoption of the Lisbon Treaty would make the EU more
amenable to future enlargement, including to the Balkans and perhaps Turkey, which the United
States strongly supports. Others maintain that a stronger EU poses a potentially detrimental rival
to NATO and the United States. This report provides information on the Lisbon Treaty and
possible U.S.-EU implications that may be of interest to the 111th Congress. Also see CRS Report
RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by Kristin Archick and Derek E. Mix.

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The European Union’s Reform Process: The Lisbon Treaty

Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
The Constitutional Treaty...................................................................................................... 2
The Lisbon Treaty................................................................................................................. 2
Key Reforms................................................................................................................... 3
State of Ratification ........................................................................................................ 5
Plan A: Debate and Implementation ................................................................................ 5
Plan B: The Nice Treaty .................................................................................................. 6
Implications for the United States................................................................................................ 7

Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 8

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The European Union’s Reform Process: The Lisbon Treaty

Background
The European Union (EU) is an economic and
political partnership that is unique in history.
EU Institutions
Built upon a series of treaties and embodied in
The European Commission is essentially the EU’s
a set of governing institutions, the EU
executive and has the exclusive right of legislative
represents a voluntary pooling of sovereignty
initiative. It ensures that the provisions of EU Treaties
are carried out by the member states. The 27
among 27 countries.1 These countries have
Commissioners, including a President, are appointed by
committed to a process of integration by
agreement among the governments of the member states
harmonizing laws and adopting common
for five-year terms. Each Commissioner holds a distinct
policies on an extensive range of issues.
portfolio (e.g., agriculture). The President of the
Commission sets its policy priorities, organizes its work,
Notable areas of shared sovereignty include a
and represents the Commission internationally.
customs union; a common trade policy; a
single market in which goods, people, and
The Council of the European Union (Council of
Ministers) is comprised of ministers from the national
capital move freely; a common currency (the
governments. As the main decision-making body, it
euro) that is used by 16 member states; and
enacts legislation based on proposals put forward by the
many aspects of social and environmental
Commission. Different ministers participate depending
policy. EU member states have also taken
on the subject under consideration (e.g., economics
significant steps in the development of a
ministers could convene to discuss unemployment
policy). The presidency of the Council currently rotates
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
among the member states every six months.
and closer police and judicial cooperation.2
The European Parliament consists of 736 members.
Since 1979, they have been directly elected in each
A group of leaders from six countries—
member state for five-year terms. The Parliament cannot
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
enact laws like national parliaments, but it shares “co-
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—began the
decision” power in many areas with the Council of
process of integration after World War II in an
Ministers, can amend or reject the EU’s budget, and must
effort to ensure peace and promote economic
approve each new European Commission.
prosperity in Europe. As cooperation between
The European Council brings together the Heads of
these countries deepened, new members were
State or Government of the member states and the
President of the Commission at least twice a year. It acts
added to the group: Denmark, Ireland, the
principally as a guide and driving force for EU policy.
United Kingdom joined in 1973, Greece in
1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986, and Austria,
The Court of Justice interprets EU law and its rulings
are binding; a Court of Auditors monitors the Union’s
Finland, and Sweden in 1995. In 2004, eight
financial management. Additional y, a number of advisory
formerly Communist countries of central and
bodies represent economic, social, and regional interests.
eastern Europe—the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia,
and Slovenia—plus Cyprus and Malta joined the EU. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007,
bringing the number of member countries to 27.
With enlargement and a progressively wider policy scope came the need to reform the EU’s
institutional arrangements and procedures to reflect the heightened complexity of decision-
making. The landmark Maastricht Treaty of 1993 set out the blueprint for an EU of 12 members

1 The member countries of the EU are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
2 See CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by Kristin Archick and Derek E. Mix.
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and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) refined arrangements for a Union at 15. The Treaty of Nice
(2003) further amended the workings of the EU to prepare for eastward enlargement.3 Although
the Treaty of Nice was intended to enable an enlarged Union to function effectively, skeptics have
argued that the treaty set up an overly complex and inefficient decision-making process. In
addition to being slow and cumbersome, critics have long charged that EU institutions and
decision-making lack transparency and are unintelligible to the average European citizen.
As the scope of EU policy continues to grow, future enlargement beyond 27 members is likely:
Iceland, Turkey, and the countries of the Western Balkans are in line for admission. In this
context, as well as in the context of currently perceived institutional shortcomings, many leaders
and analysts have advocated the adoption of a new EU treaty that enacts what they consider to be
necessary internal reforms. The proposed Lisbon Treaty is the latest attempt to achieve such
reforms.
The Constitutional Treaty
The Lisbon Treaty grew out of the so-called constitutional treaty, an earlier failed attempt to
merge the EU’s existing treaties into a single document while enacting institutional reforms.
Already in December 2001—before ratification of the Treaty of Nice and the EU’s eastward
enlargement—EU leaders announced they would convene a Convention on the Future of Europe
to examine the EU’s institutional arrangements and make proposals that would increase
democratic legitimacy and encourage the development of the EU as a stronger global actor.
The Convention began work in March 2002 under the leadership of former French President
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and finalized a 240-page “Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe” in July 2003.4 After a period of discussion and negotiation among the member state
governments, EU leaders signed the treaty in October 2004 and set November 2006 as the target
date for its adoption.
However, in order to come into effect the treaty had to be ratified individually by all 27 member
states through either parliamentary approval or public referendums. In May 2005, French voters
rejected the document in a national referendum, and in June 2005 Dutch voters followed suit.
Although a number of EU members had already approved the treaty by this point, these setbacks
effectively ended its prospects. In both France and the Netherlands, some arguments against the
constitutional treaty reflected concerns that it would entrench liberal economic ideas that could
undermine social protections. In addition, many French and Dutch voters viewed a “no” vote as a
way to express dissatisfaction with their unpopular national governments, EU bureaucracy, and
Turkey’s prospective EU membership.
The Lisbon Treaty
In January 2007, as Germany took over the six-month EU presidency, Europe remained in what
some analysts called a “period of reflection”—a condition of stasis born in the uncertainty that
followed the rejection of the constitutional treaty. German Chancellor Angela Merkel made

3 For summaries of these three treaties, see
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/index_en.htm.
4 The document can be downloaded at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf.
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reviving the stalled reform process one of her key priorities, seeking a new treaty deal that would
institute crucial reforms. Analysts say that Merkel received a key assist with the May 2007
election of Nicolas Sarkozy as President of France: Sarkozy shared Merkel’s goal of reviving the
constitutional treaty in some form, at least in part to restore France’s role as a leader in Europe
following its 2005 “No” vote.
Germany and others that had ratified the constitutional treaty wanted to preserve as much of the
original document as possible. However, some changes were considered necessary in order to
address concerns raised by French and Dutch voters, as well as to satisfy countries such as the
UK, which sought to protect its national sovereignty in some areas, and Poland, which wanted
more voting weight in the Council of Ministers.
After contentious negotiations at the June 2007 EU Summit, EU leaders announced the outlines
of a new “reform treaty” that would amend, rather than replace, the existing EU treaties. EU
leaders also dropped the term “constitution,” given that it had become negatively associated in
some countries with creating an EU “superstate.” As an amendment to existing treaties, EU
leaders sought to present the new document as one that would be ratified by parliaments, thereby
avoiding the risks of public referendums. However, alone among the member states, Ireland was
still required by its national law to hold a public vote on any major change to the existing body of
EU rules.
After working out the text at a July 2007 Intergovernmental Conference, EU leaders signed the
new treaty—now called the Lisbon Treaty—in December 2007.5 Analysts assessed that over 90%
of the substance of the constitutional treaty had been preserved in the Lisbon Treaty. EU officials
initially hoped that the Lisbon Treaty would be ratified by all 27 member states and enter into
force before the June 2009 European Parliament elections. However, rejection of the treaty in
Ireland’s June 2008 referendum threw the timetable for adoption into disarray. Ireland has now
approved the treaty, but the Czech Republic still has yet to complete ratification (see State of
Ratification below). EU leaders hope that the Lisbon Treaty will come into effect at the start of
2010.
Key Reforms
Major changes under the Lisbon Treaty aim to achieve three broad goals:
1) A stronger and more coherent EU voice. The Lisbon Treaty would create the new position of
President of the European Council to help ensure policy continuity and raise the EU’s profile on
the world stage. This individual would chair the meetings of the 27 EU heads of state or
government (the European Council, whose meetings are commonly termed EU Summits) and
guide their activities in providing strategic direction to EU policy. The President of the European
Council would be elected by member states for a term of two and one-half years, renewable once.
Internally, creation of this position would also address concerns about the personnel and financial
burdens, especially for smaller members, of the rotating six-month presidency system. A modified
system of rotation would remain, under the presidency country, together with the previous and
following presidency countries (the troika), to help coordinate and chair meetings of the Council

5 For a summary or full text of the treaty, see http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm.
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of Ministers, other than in the area of foreign policy. The President would have overall
responsibility for coordinating relations between the EU’s institutions.
The Lisbon Treaty would also create another important new position to boost the EU’s
international visibility: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy. The position was originally called the EU “foreign minister” in the constitutional
treaty, but this term was dropped due to British objections. Nevertheless, this individual
will be the EU’s chief diplomat, exercising the current responsibilities of both the Council
of Minister’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Javier
Solana) and the Commissioner for External Relations (Benita Ferrero-Waldner). The
High Representative will therefore be an agent of the Council of Ministers (representing
the member states) and hold the title of a Vice-President of the European Commission.
The High Representative would have extensive staff support with the creation of a
European External Action Service, in effect a new EU diplomatic corps.
The Lisbon Treaty would also promote steps toward building a stronger common EU
defense policy. As proposed in the constitution, the Lisbon Treaty asserts that the EU
shall seek “the progressive framing of a common Union defense policy,” which “will lead
to a common defense.” It will establish a “mutual assistance clause” permitting a member
state that is the victim of armed aggression to ask for military assistance from the other
members. Member states may also engage in “structured cooperation,” which would
allow a smaller group of members to cooperate more closely on military issues.
2) More streamlined decision-making. After a contentious debate with Poland, EU leaders
agreed on a simplified formula (ultimately similar to that proposed in the constitutional
treaty) for the Council of Ministers’ Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) system. Decisions
made by QMV would pass if supported by 55% of member states, representing 65% of
the EU’s population. As a concession to Poland, this new “double majority” system
would be introduced in 2014 (instead of 2009-2010), and would be gradually phased in
over three years and not fully implemented until 2017.
The use of QMV is also expanded to policy areas previously subject to unanimity,
especially in matters related to police and judicial cooperation (the UK, however, has
been granted an opt-out in this area). Unanimity will continue to be required (any
member state may veto a common policy) in sensitive areas such as taxation and most
aspects of foreign and defense policy.
The Lisbon Treaty had initially planned to slim down the size of the European
Commission starting in 2014. To help decrease gridlock, EU leaders had proposed
reducing the number of Commissioners from one per member state to correspond to two-
thirds of the number of member states. However, concessions related to Ireland’s attempt
to ratify the treaty shelved this idea, and the Commission is set to remain at one
Commissioner per member state.
3) Increased transparency and democratic accountability. In many policy areas, the
directly elected European Parliament holds the right of “co-decision” with the Council of
Ministers: both institutions must approve a piece of legislation for it to become law. The
Lisbon Treaty would extend the European Parliament’s “co-decision” powers to include
many additional policy areas, including agriculture and “home affairs” issues.
The treaty would also give national parliaments a greater role in EU policy-making and
more authority to challenge draft EU legislation. The treaty would introduce the concept
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of citizens’ initiatives, whereby European citizens may petition the European
Commission with legislative suggestions.
Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty would make the Charter of Fundamental Rights—a
declaration of citizens’ basic political, economic, and social rights—legally binding for
all EU institutions and member states. Poland and the United Kingdom negotiated “opt-
outs” from applying the Charter.
State of Ratification
Twenty-six of the 27 EU member states have ratified the Lisbon Treaty. The treaty overcame a
major hurdle when Ireland approved it in a referendum on October 2, 2009, by a vote of 67.1% to
32.9%. This vote was Ireland’s second attempt to ratify—the future of the treaty had been cast
into doubt when Irish voters rejected it in a June 2008 referendum. Following the rejection, the
EU and Ireland negotiated a number of “Irish-specific” concessions—including guarantees about
Irish neutrality in security affairs and guarantees on tax and social policy—to address some of the
concerns that had fueled opposition to the treaty.
The Czech Republic has yet to complete ratification. The Czech parliament approved the treaty,
but it awaits the signature of President Vaclav Klaus. Klaus has long been a prominent “Euro-
skeptic” who opposes what some perceive as an increasing centralization of power in EU
institutions. Klaus is now under considerable political pressure from his fellow EU leaders, and
most observers assume that he will concede to signing the treaty. However, some analysts caution
that he could also be a relatively unpredictable wild card in this matter. Klaus recently angered his
fellow EU leaders by stating that he would sign the Lisbon Treaty if the Czech Republic is
granted an opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The EU is anxious to avoid opening
the door to treaty renegotiations at this stage. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty now faces a legal
challenge in the Czech Constitutional Court, an issue that could further delay the process.
Plan A: Debate and Implementation
Following Ireland’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty on October 2, Sweden, which holds the six-
month EU presidency for the second half of 2009, is hoping to use the EU Summit scheduled for
late October to debate and try to settle lingering institutional questions about how the Lisbon
Treaty will be implemented. EU leaders hope that the treaty will enter into force on January 1,
2010. A delay in Czech ratification could push this timetable back, however—if ratification is not
settled, key questions about the treaty’s implementation may have to wait until mid-December
2009.
These key questions concern the appointment of the new President of the European Council and
the new EU “foreign minister.” Considerable debate and political maneuvering are expected
surrounding these appointments. There is disagreement within the EU as to the type of role these
positions should play, and many observers assert that the first appointees are likely to define the
job descriptions in each case.
Some view the President of the European Council as someone that would actively assert
leadership and guidance, likely a highly visible, “heavyweight” former national head of state or
government. Others view the position as more of a coordinator and manager, who would build
consensus and reflect the group decision. Such a President would still likely be a former senior
leader, but not necessarily one with “A-list” stature. In any case, a number of candidates have
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already been floated in media reports, including former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Dutch
Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, former
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, and current Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude
Juncker.
Conclusions regarding the nature of the President will relate to two other issues that the meeting
would be expected to discuss: how exactly the system of rotating national presidencies will
function under the Lisbon Treaty in managing the day-to-day business of the Council of
Ministers; and how the President and the presidency countries will interact.
The desired nature of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy will likely produce similar debate—whether the position should act as a strong,
independent-minded leader who both drives and oversees EU foreign policy, or as more of a
facilitator who advances the members’ consensus. Names including Swedish Foreign Minister
Carl Bildt, European Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn (Finland), Greek Foreign Minister
Dora Bakoyannis, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, former French Foreign Ministers
Hubert Védrine and Michel Barnier, and German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble have been
reported in speculation about the position. Leaders also need to reach agreement on how the new
EU diplomatic corps will be organized.
The ratification timetable is causing institutional complications regarding the new European
Commission. The current Commission’s five-year term expires at the end of October—regardless
of whether leaders move ahead now or wait until later to have the full debate on implementing the
Lisbon Treaty, the October EU Summit will need to appoint the members of the new European
Commission. European Parliament confirmation hearings are expected for mid-November.
However, pending Czech ratification, the appointment will take place under the existing Nice
Treaty, which calls for reducing the size of the Commission to less than 27. Under the Lisbon
Treaty, the Commission would remain at 27. Some analysts believe that a new Commission
appointed under the Nice rules might be dissolved and reappointed under the Lisbon rules if
ratification can be completed this year. However, it remains unclear how EU leaders will decide
to deal with this issue.
Plan B: The Nice Treaty
If the Lisbon Treaty is not fully ratified—at this point, most likely due to a serious blockage by
the Czech Republic, or by some other unforeseen development—a political crisis would probably
ensue in the EU. Lacking a new reform treaty, Europeans may, as was the case following the
failure of the constitutional treaty, be drawn into another period of institutional introspection and
regrouping that eventually leads to the next reform effort. In the meantime, many observers
would likely again perceive a lack of clarity and direction regarding the future of integration and
the EU’s role in the world.
In the case of rejection by any of the remaining countries, some observers have advocated simply
moving ahead, with the Lisbon Treaty coming into force among those EU members that have
ratified it—meaning that those who reject the treaty would be relegated to some form of “second-
tier” or associate membership.
However, in the increasingly improbable event that the Lisbon Treaty fails, the more likely
scenario is that the EU would decide to move ahead under the terms of the existing Treaty of
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Nice. Although observers assert that the Treaty of Nice has significant shortcomings for an EU of
27 members, many note that the EU could at least continue to function under the current rules.
Implications for the United States
Critics contend that the Lisbon Treaty will do little to simplify the EU, and assert that many
difficult issues that are often the source of gridlock—such as foreign policy and taxation—will
remain subject to national vetoes. However, most argue that the treaty’s reforms are necessary and
helpful and will at any rate allow the EU to move past this decade’s preoccupation with process
and internal questions to focus more time and energy on “doing things.”
Many experts assert that passage of the Lisbon Treaty would have positive implications for the
U.S.-EU relationship because elements such as the new President and “foreign minister” positions
are designed to promote an EU able to “speak with one voice” on foreign policy issues. Such an
EU could take on a more active and assertive global role and be a more credible and effective
partner for the United States in tackling common global challenges. Others note that the
prominence of these new positions—and their resonance in the United States—will depend
largely on the individuals appointed to fill them. They wonder, for example, how much of a
difference U.S. officials might discern between the new “foreign minister” and the current High
Representative position.
U.S. supporters of the Lisbon Treaty also note that efforts to encourage a common EU defense
policy and the proposal for “structured cooperation” seek to improve European defense
capabilities. A more militarily capable Europe, they argue, could shoulder a greater degree of the
security burden with the United States.
Analysts assert that the Lisbon Treaty would remove obstacles to further EU enlargement to the
Balkans and perhaps eventually Turkey, which the United States strongly supports: some
European leaders have asserted that the streamlining reforms of the Lisbon Treaty would make
the political atmosphere more amenable to additional enlargement, and some have called for a
freeze on enlargement until the treaty is passed.
Some in the United States contend that a larger and potentially more united EU may seek to rival
the United States and had been more sanguine about the Lisbon Treaty’s potential demise. They
maintain that a more unified EU would likely lessen Washington’s leverage on individual
members and could complicate U.S. efforts to rally support for its initiatives in institutions such
as the United Nations or NATO. These skeptics remain concerned that parts of the Lisbon Treaty
that promote greater EU defense coordination could lead to the eventual development of EU
military structures that would duplicate those of NATO and weaken the transatlantic link.
U.S.-EU trade relations are unlikely to be significantly affected by the new treaty, which does not
alter the roles of the European Commission or Council of Ministers in formulating or approving
the EU’s common external trade policy. Although EU rules allow the Council to approve or reject
trade agreements negotiated by the Commission with QMV, in practice, the Council tends to
employ consensus and will probably continue to do so regardless of the changes in EU voting
procedures.

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Author Contact Information

Kristin Archick
Derek E. Mix
Specialist in European Affairs
Analyst in European Affairs
karchick@crs.loc.gov, 7-2668
dmix@crs.loc.gov, 7-9116


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