Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects
for a Lasting Peace
Ted Dagne
Specialist in African Affairs
October 21, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33911
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace

Summary
In October 2002, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) launched a peace
process designed to end factional fighting in Somalia, led by the government of Kenya. In
September 2003, the parties agreed on a Transitional National Charter (TNC). In August 2004, a
275-member Transitional Parliament was inaugurated in Kenya. In October 2004, parliament
elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as the new president of Somalia. In June 2006, the forces of the
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took control of the capital, Mogadishu. During the six-month rule by
the ICU, Mogadishu became relatively peaceful, but efforts to bring peace did not lead to a major
breakthrough. On December 28, 2006, Ethiopian troops captured Mogadishu with little resistance
from the ICU. The Ethiopian intervention led to more chaos and instability in Somalia over the
past two years. Humanitarian, political, and security conditions continue to deteriorate across
south-central Somalia. In the past two years, more than 22,000 civilians have been killed, an
estimated 1.1 million people displaced, and 476,000 Somalis have fled to neighboring countries.
In 2008, fighting between insurgent groups and Ethiopian-TFG forces intensified, and by late
2008, the TFG had lost control of most of south-central Somalia to insurgent groups. In January
2009, Ethiopian forces completed their withdrawal from Somalia. In late December 2008,
President Yusuf resigned from office and left for Yemen.
In June 2008, the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), a group
dominated by members of the ICU, signed an agreement in Djibouti mediated by United Nations
Special Envoy Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah. The parties agreed to a cease-fire, the withdrawal of
Ethiopian forces, and the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force. Several towns are
now administered by the ARS, including Jowhar and Beledweyne. A number of other towns,
including the third-largest town, Kismaayo, are now under the control of the Al-Shabaab, a group
opposed to the TFG and the ARS-Djibouti faction. The next phase of the Somali conflict is likely
to occur between the ARS and the Al-Shabaab. In February 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice designated Al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In January 2009, the Somali
Parliament elected the leader of the ARS, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad, as president. In February
2009, President Ahmad appointed Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as prime minister.
Meanwhile, Somali pirates have intensified their attacks in the Gulf of Aden, carrying out attacks
on over 111 commercial ships, and successfully hijacking over 35 ships in 2008. An estimated 14-
18 ships are currently under the control of the pirates, including a Saudi-owned supertanker,
Sirius Star, and a Ukrainian-owned ship, MV Faina, with 33 T-72 tanks and other weapons. In
January-February 2009, Somali pirates released a number of the hijacked ships, including the MV
Faina. The pirates have earned more than $120 million in ransom payments, and have released a
number of the ships and crew members. The United States, Russia, India, and several other
countries have deployed warships to tackle piracy in the Horn of Africa region. Some insurgent
leaders have warned the pirates to end their illegal activities and to release crew members and
ships that they currently control. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. .
According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), piracy in the first quarter of 2009 has
surpassed that of 2008. According to IMB, “in 2008, there were 111 incidents including 42
vessels hijacked.” As of September 2009, there have been an estimated 156 attacks in the Gulf of
Aden and off the coast of Somalia.

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Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace

Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
The Leadership of Al-Shibaab and other Factions.................................................................. 2
Sheik Sharif Hassan Aweys ............................................................................................. 3
Political Developments ................................................................................................... 3
Security Conditions: Background .......................................................................................... 5
Human Rights and Humanitarian Conditions......................................................................... 5
Somali Piracy in the Horn of Africa....................................................................................... 7
Overview ........................................................................................................................ 7
Who Are the Pirates?....................................................................................................... 7
The Views from Somalia ................................................................................................. 8
Policy Options in Dealing with Piracy............................................................................. 9
Policy Options in Dealing with Political and Security Problems ............................................ 9
The Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia............................................................... 10
Background: 2006-2008............................................................................................................ 11
Peacekeeping Mission: Background .......................................................................................... 13
The Islamic Courts Union: Background..................................................................................... 14
The Leadership of the Somali Council of the Islamic Courts: Background ................................ 17
The Top Leaders of the Courts: Background.............................................................................. 17
The Executive Council (Before the Split) ............................................................................ 17
The Legislative Council or Shura (Before the Split)............................................................. 18
Ethiopia-Somalia Relations ....................................................................................................... 18
Somalia: Background (1991-2006) ............................................................................................ 20
Peace Processes .................................................................................................................. 20
National Reconciliation Conference .............................................................................. 21
Somalia: Safe Haven for Terrorist Groups?................................................................................ 21
Al-Ittihad ............................................................................................................................ 22

Figures
Figure 1. Major Somali Clans and Subclans .............................................................................. 24
Figure 2. Map of Somalia.......................................................................................................... 25

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Somalia............................................................................................. 6
Table 2. The Leadership of the Executive Council of the ARS Before the Split .......................... 10

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 26
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Recent Developments
In late September 2009, government forces seized control of Beledweyne from Hizbul al-Islam.
Beledweyne, a town near the Ethiopian border, has changed hands several times in the past six
months. Meanwhile, attacks against government forces and African Union peacekeeping troops in
Mogadishu intensified in September. An estimated 21 people, including 17 African Union
peacekeepers, were killed in a suicide attack in late September 2009. The Deputy Force
Commander was one of the victims in the attack. Al-Shibaab used two stolen United Nations
trucks to carry out the attack against the AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu. Two of the
suicide bombers are believed to be Somali-Americans.
In early August 2009, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton met with President Sheik Sharif Ahmad of
Somalia in Kenya. The Secretary expressed U.S. support for the TFG. President Sheikh Sharif
briefed the Secretary and her delegation about the challenges facing his government and asked for
U.S. support. In late September 2009, President Ahmad came to the United States to address the
U.N. General Assembly, and he is currently in Washington to meet with U.S. officials and Somali
community members. The President plans to visit several states, including Minnesota to meet
with the Somali community. In late September 2009, he expressed concern that pledges made by
some governments to the TFG have not been delivered. He made the point that every time a
pledge is made to the TFG, the insurgents also get support from their allies. He asserted that the
insurgents get the support faster and the TFG has to wait for months.1
In mid-September 2009, U.S. forces killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a senior al-Qaeda member
suspected of attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the leader of the
terrorist attack against the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002. Several other foreign
fighters were killed along with Nabhan. The killing of Nabhan has reportedly shaken the
leadership of Al-Shibaab, according to regional and Somali security sources. Of the three most
wanted al-Qaeda leaders in East Africa, the only one left is the leader of the group and the
mastermind of the U.S. embassy bombings: Harun Fazul. The killing of Nabhan is likely to
weaken the link between the Shibaab and al-Qaeda, and it may take some time for al-Qaeda to
replace Nabhan with someone familiar with that region.
In early May 2009, Somali extremist groups backed by foreign fighters launched a major
offensive against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and the African Union
Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Over the past six weeks, more than 300 people have been killed
and many more wounded. The primary objective of this offensive is to oust the TFG from power
and force AMISOM to leave Somalia. Several Al-Shibaab factions, Hizbul al-Islam, and foreign
fighters have been engaged in a series of battles against government forces. Al-Shibaab also
reportedly assassinated a number of senior TFG officials, including the police chief and the
Minister of Interior. Senior Somali officials, African Union sources, and other regional officials
estimate that more than 400 foreign fighters from Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, the United
States, Canada, United Kingdom, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia have been engaged in support of the
Al-Shibaab forces. More than 290 fighters reportedly entered Mogadishu in early May, and an
estimated 50 fighters were in Mogadishu for much longer. Some of these fighters have been
killed in battles in Mogadishu, according to senior officials in Mogadishu. The insurgents receive
support from outside and from some Somali businessmen, who are unhappy with the TFG

1 Ted Dagne met with President Ahmad and his delegation in Washington on September 29, 2009.
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leadership. Over the years, some Somali businessmen backed one faction or another to protect
business or clan interests.
In May 2009, the U.S. State Department issued a press release confirming the presence of foreign
fighters in Mogadishu, while France, the United Nations, and the African Union made similar
statements. According to senior security sources in Mogadishu and regional officials, some of the
foreign fighters are now commanding both Somali and foreign fighters in Mogadishu and other
parts of Somalia. In May 2009, a spokesman of Al-Shibaab admitted that foreign fighters have
joined the fighting. According to Sheik Husayn Fidow, “the Muslim people of Somalia have
asked for assistance from other Muslim nations worldwide.” In response to these well-
coordinated attacks, TFG President Sheik Sharif Ahmad stated that his government will respond
forcefully.
In early June 2009, Al-Shibaab and Hizbul Islam made important gains in Mogadishu and other
parts of Somalia, in large part due to defections to the insurgency and lack of resources. The TFG
forces regrouped, and by mid-June managed to regain some lost ground in Mogadishu. But the
TFG remains vulnerable and its ability to defeat the insurgents depends on resources, including
Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), mobility, and a well-organized and sustainable military
operation. The presence of the African Union force has helped prevent the takeover of
Mogadishu by the insurgents. But the African Union force does not have a Chapter 7 mandate,
requiring the force to be on the defensive rather than take offensive measures against the
insurgents. The African Union force has used its long-range artilleries against the insurgents.
These measures have weakened and forced the insurgents to remain outside the range of these
weapons. But the most serious challenge facing the TFG forces and those of the AU is that the
insurgents are highly decentralized and move in small units, and operate independently of one
another.
The Leadership of Al-Shibaab and other Factions
The leaders of the Al-Shibaab are not well known, with few exceptions. Some of the key
commanders and leaders of the Al-Shibaab come from Somaliland. Ahmed Abdi Godane, who is
on the U.S. terrorism list and who trained and fought in Afghanistan, is a key commander from
Somaliland. Mukhtar Robow, who is on the U.S. terrorism list, is considered one of the key
leaders of the Shibaab and a former spokesman, although in recent weeks he has been
marginalized and has been at odds with the other commanders, especially Godane. Another key
leader is Ibrahim Haji Jama (al-Afghani), who is on the U.S. terrorism list and also from
Somaliland, and reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan. Hassan al-Turki is a member of the
Ogaden clan from Ethiopia, who has openly called for Jihad, and works closely with foreign
fighters. In 2004, he was placed on the U.S. terrorism list. Indha Adde is another commander,
who fought against the Ethiopian occupation and worked closely with Sheik Hassan Aweys, a
former member of the ICU and later the leader of the ARS-Asmara. In February 2008, then
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al-Shibaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. The TFG was able to win over some Al-Shibaab
fighters to join the government side. However, several hundred fighters who recently joined the
government forces were sent by the extremist groups to infiltrate the government security forces.2

2 CRS interview with senior security and government officials in Mogadishu, April 2009.

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In May 2009, at the height of the recent fighting in Mogadishu, most of these fighters went back
to rejoin the militia groups they left earlier.
Sheik Sharif Hassan Aweys
In late April 2009, Sheik Sharif Hassan Aweys, who is on the U.S. terrorism list, returned to
Mogadishu from Eritrea. Sheik Aweys had remained in Eritrea and formed his own faction after
the top leadership of the ARS signed an agreement in Djibouti with other Somali parties, which
led to the formation of the current government. ARS-Asmara, under the leadership of Aweys, did
not garner significant support, although Aweys intensified his support for the extremist groups
inside Somalia. ARS-Asmara leaders were not in full agreement with Aweys and his support for
the extremist groups inside Somalia. They provided written documentation to this effect to a
visitor in April 2009. These leaders stated that they formed their own organization and would
disassociate themselves from Aweys. Sheik Aweys came under intense pressure from some of his
supporters to return to Mogadishu, and he also came to the conclusion that he was isolated and
losing support in Eritrea. Sheik Aweys seemed confused at times and routinely contradicted
himself in a recent interview in Asmara, Eritrea. When asked if he was prepared to state publicly
his support for a peaceful participation in the current political process, Aweys responded
positively.
However, when he was asked whether he would denounce terrorism and call for an end to
violence against civilians, Aweys stated that since he considers the American interpretation of
terrorism as anti-Islam, he “cannot condemn terrorism.” Doing so, he asserted, is “denouncing his
own religion.” Aweys believes that he was placed on the U.S. terrorism list because of his religion
and beliefs. When asked if he wished to be removed from the list, Aweys stated that he would not
seek to be removed because that would be going against his religion. Sheik Aweys asserted that
since there are no major differences among Somalis, if left alone, Somalis will find their own
solution. When confronted about his role in support of terrorism and violence in Somalia, he
characterized these acts as a struggle against the enemies of Somalia. Upon his return to
Mogadishu in late April 2009, Sheik Aweys discovered that the clan elders and militia who
supported him in the past now wanted him to work with the government and end the violence.
The militia group he helped create, Hizbul al-Islam, also was split and some have joined Al-
Shibaab. Some of the top leaders of the Al-Shibaab also want him to declare an alliance with
Osama Bin Laden and cut his ties with Eritrea, measures he has resisted thus far.
Political Developments
In late December 2008, President Yusuf resigned from office and left for Yemen. President Yusuf
was opposed to the Djibouti peace process and repeatedly clashed with his prime minister. In
January 2009, the Somali Transitional Parliament elected the leader of the ARS, Sheikh Sharif
Sheikh Ahmad as president. President Ahmad is seen by many Somalis as a leader with the best
chance of bringing peace and stability to Somalia and as someone who can bring those elements
outside the peace process to join the new government. In January 2009, President Ahmad went to
Ethiopia and took part in the African Union (AU) summit, where he was welcomed by member
states. In 2006, Ethiopian forces attacked and forced out Ahmad’s Islamic Courts Union from
power. However, President Ahmad was warmly welcomed by Ethiopian authorities during the AU
summit in Ethiopia.
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In February 2009, President Ahmad appointed Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as prime
minister. Sharmarke is the son of the former President of Somalia, who was killed during the
1969 military coup. Sharmarke received overwhelming support in the Transitional Parliament.
The appointment of Sharmarke provided important representation in the new government for the
Darod clan. Sharmarke belongs to the same sub-clan, the Majertain, as former president Yusuf.
Moreover, the Transitional Parliament was expanded and now includes an additional 149
members from the main opposition group, the ARS. Parliament also extended the mandate of the
Transitional Federal Government by another two years. Some observers expressed concern about
the size of the new parliament, while others argued that it was a necessary measure to make the
parliament more inclusive.
Humanitarian and security conditions continue to deteriorate in south-central Somalia, despite
some political progress and a recent peace agreement between the Somali Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), a group formed by
former members of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Somalis from different backgrounds. The
ouster from power of the ICU by Ethiopian forces in December 2006 created a security vacuum
that was soon occupied by the more radical elements of the ICU’s military factions. The moderate
leadership of the ICU became marginalized, splintered, and weakened over the past year. U.S.,
TFG, and Ethiopian officials labeled the entire leadership of the ICU as extremist and terrorist in
2006. Eighteen months later, however, the same officials supported the inclusion of some former
ICU members in a U.N.-led peace process.
In May-June, 2008, TFG and ARS officials met in Djibouti under the auspices of the United
Nations. Officials from the United States, Europe, the African Union, the Arab League, the
Organization of Islamic Conference, and regional governments took part as observers during the
talks in Djibouti. The parties agreed on a wide range of issues, including cessation of hostilities
and a commitment to find a durable peace agreement.3 The parties agreed to support the
deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force and the phased withdrawal of Ethiopian
forces from Somalia. The agreement, however, links the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces with the
deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping force, although Ethiopian forces have already withdrawn
from some areas. In addition, in November 2008, the Ethiopian government announced that its
forces would pull out of Somalia by the end of 2008. In January 2009, Ethiopian forces
completed their withdrawal from Somalia. The parties also agreed to provide unhindered
humanitarian access to civilians in need and to establish a Joint Security Committee to ensure
implementation of security arrangements and create an interim joint security force.4 The parties
established a High Level Committee, chaired by the United Nations, to deal with political, justice,
and governance issues.
The Djibouti agreement is complicated and has repeatedly been undermined by infighting within
the TFG, insecurity, the growing influence of insurgent groups, and limited support by the
international community. The TFG forces, under the leadership of President Yusuf, were weak,
ineffective, and seriously debilitated by defections. Over the past year, an estimated 40% of the
police force, trained by the United Nations, left the force due to lack of payment. Some donor
governments have withheld funds pledged to the TFG due to lack of transparency and human
rights abuses. Infighting within the TFG, especially between then-Prime Minister Nur Adde and

3 CRS interview with senior TFG officials and members of the Somali opposition in Kenya, May and August 2008.
4 United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), August 2008.
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then-President Yusuf, weakened the TFG. In November 2007, Prime Minister Nur Adde replaced
Ali M. Ghedi, a man seen by many Somalis as ineffective and highly partisan.
Prime Minister Nur Adde, who was seen by many Somalis and Somali observers as a key actor to
bridge the gap between the TFG and the opposition, often clashed with President Yusuf. In July
2008, the prime minister dismissed the mayor of Mogadishu and Governor of Benadir region,
Mohamed Dheere, because of mismanagement of funds. In protest, 10 pro-Yusuf ministers
resigned, triggering a crisis within the TFG. In August 2008, the prime minister and the president
met in Ethiopia, and later reached an agreement on a number of issues. In Mid-December 2008,
President Yusuf fired Prime Minister Nur and named Mohamed Mohamud Guled as the new
prime minister. The prime minister rejected his dismissal, arguing that President Yusuf lacked the
legal authority to dismiss him and that only Parliament has the power to dismiss the prime
minister. On December 15, 2008, a majority of the Somali Parliament voted in support of Prime
Minister Nur Adde. The government of Kenya imposed a travel ban and asset freeze against
President Yusuf.
Security Conditions: Background
In 2008, insurgent groups stepped up attacks against Ethiopian and TFG forces in south-central
Somalia. In some cases, TFG forces simply withdrew from some areas. As of May 2009,
insurgent groups were in control of most of south-central Somalia, including the third-largest
town, Kismaayo. TFG forces, as well as the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), do
not have control or presence outside Baidoa and Mogadishu. Even in the case of Mogadishu, the
insurgents control some parts of Mogadishu and some of their forces are active outside the
capital. The Al-Shabaab forces also have expanded their military operations to other parts of
Somalia and routinely assassinate opponents and government officials.
Security conditions are likely to deteriorate further in the coming months, despite the peace
agreement between the TFG and the ARS. In late October 2008, simultaneous and well-
coordinated suicide attacks in Puntland and Somaliland reportedly killed an estimated 20 people
and injured many more. The targets of the attacks were the Ethiopian Consulate, the office of the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and a security office close to the Presidential
Palace. The suicide mission was reportedly carried out by members of the Al-Shabaab, although
no organization claimed credit for the attacks. One of the suicide bombers was an American-
Somali from Minneapolis who, according to press reports, left the U.S. to take part in the suicide
attacks. Reportedly, over a dozen Somali youth from Minneapolis have left the U.S, and some
community leaders believe they went to Somalia to join the insurgency. There is no clear
evidence of how many and for what purpose these Somalis left Minneapolis.5 Over the past
decade, many Somalis have returned to Somalia to work as journalists, humanitarian workers, and
teachers. A number of these Somalis have been killed in the past two years by insurgents and
security forces.
Human Rights and Humanitarian Conditions
In 2008, humanitarian and human rights conditions worsened, according to United Nations
officials and Somali humanitarian workers. The recent fighting in Mogadishu has added more

5 “Young Somali Men Missing from Minneapolis,” International Herald Tribune, November 27, 2008.
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challenges to already poor conditions on the ground. An estimated 1.1 million people have been
displaced and more than 475,000 have fled to neighboring countries in the past two years. Human
rights groups and Somali observers estimate more than 22,000 people have been killed over the
past two years. Civilians, humanitarian workers, journalists, and human rights advocates have
been the primary targets of the insurgents, TFG, and Ethiopian security forces. According to
Amnesty International, “rape, killings and looting have become widespread. Entire
neighborhoods have been destroyed.” A number of Somali journalists covering the crisis in
Somalia have been assassinated by insurgents and security forces over the past 18 months.
Dozens of humanitarian and human rights advocates have been killed, injured, or imprisoned.
Because of these targeted attacks, many human rights advocates and journalists have fled Somalia
to neighboring countries for safety. Somalis working for international NGOs and foreign media
have also been attacked by insurgents and TFG/Ethiopian security forces. According to the May
2009 Complex Emergency report by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), an
estimated 3.2 million people are in need of emergency assistance. In FY2008, the United States
provided $318 million in assistance to Somalia. In the first two weeks of May 2009, an estimated
27,500 people have been displaced due to the recent fighting in Mogadishu. The United States has
provided an estimated $177.6 million in assistance to Somalia in FY2009. In FY2009, the United
States provided $150 million in humanitarian assistance. The Obama Administration has
requested $103 million for FY2010. The United States has also provided material support in
support of TFG forces.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Somalia
($ in thousands)
FY2008
FY2009
FY2009
FY2009
FY2010

Actual
Estimate
Supplemental
Total
Request
Total
211,602 137,690 40,000
177,690 103,310
Development Assistance
10,419




Economic Support Fund

20,250

20,250
28,270
Global Health and Child Survival-
748 1,550

1,550 6,000
USAID
International Military Education


40
and Training
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,
754


2,000
Demining and Related Programs
Peacekeeping Operations
2,281 78,600 40,000
118,600 67,000
Public Law 480 (Food Aid)
197,400
37,290

37,290

Source: Congressional Budget Justification, FY2010.
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Somali Piracy in the Horn of Africa6
Overview
Somali pirates have intensified their attacks in the Gulf of Aden, carrying out attacks on over 111
commercial ships, and successfully hijacked an estimated 40 ships in 2008. As of mid-February
2009, an estimated 11-15 ships were under the control of the pirates, including a Saudi-owned
supertanker, Sirius Star, and a Ukrainian-owned ship, MV Faina, which is carrying 33 T-72 tanks
and other weapons, according to press reports. In January-February 2009, Somali pirates released
several ships, including a Japanese-owned ship, MV Chemstar, and the MV Faina. The pirates
have reportedly earned more than $120 million in ransom payments, and have released a number
of ships and crew members. The United States, Russia, India, and several other countries have
deployed warships to tackle piracy in the Horn of Africa region. In February 2009, the U.S. Navy
arrested 16 suspected Somali pirates. In December 2008, the Indian Navy reportedly arrested 23
Somali and Yemeni pirates. Moreover, the Russian Navy also arrested a number of suspected
Somali pirates. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), piracy in the first quarter
of 2009 has surpassed that of 2008. According to IMB, “in 2008, there were 111 incidents
including 42 vessels hijacked.” As of September 2009, there have been an estimated 156 attacks
off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden.
In January 2009, the United States and Britain signed legal agreements with the Government of
Kenya to extradite suspected pirates to be prosecuted in Kenya. Some insurgent leaders have
warned the pirates to end the piracy and to release crew members and ships currently controlled
by the pirates. On December 16, 2008, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution
authorizing the use of “all necessary measures” by foreign military forces to stop piracy in
Somalia. The resolution authorizes military operations inside Somalia and in its airspace for one
year, with the consent of the TFG.
Who Are the Pirates?
The number of Somali pirates is unknown. While there are more pirates now than in previous
years, the pirates do not seem to have a unified organization with a clear command structure.
Many of these pirates are reportedly fishermen and former militia members of the Somali
warlords. The pirates primarily come from the Puntland region of Somalia and are members of
different clans. Some press reports have suggested that the pirates are being controlled and
directed by the Islamic insurgents in south-central Somalia. There is no evidence, however, to
support this assertion, and during the six months the ICU was in power, the leaders took measures
to end piracy and other criminal activities. In November 2008, one of the top leaders of the
insurgents, Sheik Hassan Aweys, called on the pirates to end their criminal activities, and other
insurgent leaders threatened to take military action against the pirates. The pirates, however, are
not operating alone, according to a number of Somali and regional sources. Some Somali
businessmen and officials in Puntland are reportedly behind the piracy. The pirates are reportedly
receiving valuable information about the types of ships, cargo, and timing from Somalis in the

6 For more on piracy in the Horn of Africa, please see CRS Report R40528, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, by Lauren
Ploch et al.
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Persian Gulf.7 They also possess sophisticated technology, including Global Position Systems
(GPS), Automatic Identification System (AIS), and satellite phones.
The Views from Somalia
Some Somalis view the piracy crisis as a
Somalia: Facts & Statistics
foreign problem with little impact on their

daily life. Some argue that the piracy problem
Population: 9.5 million (2008 est.)
will continue as long as the ship owners are
willing to pay the pirates ransom. In the face
Growth rate: 2.85% (2008 est.)
of difficult economic conditions and a
Life expectancy: 49.2 years
growing humanitarian crisis, many Somalis
Approximate size: slightly smaller than Texas
resent the fact that the piracy problem has
Capital: Mogadishu
received a great deal of international attention.
Some Somali community leaders contend that
Infant Mortality Rate: 110.97 deaths/1,000 live births
some Somalis get involved in criminal
(2008 est.)
activities in order to survive, while many
HIV/AIDS, adult prevalence rate: 1% (2001 est.)
others have made these kinds of criminal
GDP, per capita: $600 (2007 est.)
activities a lifetime profession. Since the
GDP, real growth rate: 2.6% (2007 est.)
collapse of the Siad Barre government in
1991, Somalis have been principal victims of
Ethnic groups: Somali, 85%; Bantu & other non-Somali,
criminals. Somalis had to pay “taxes” to
15% (including Arabs, 30,000)
warlords in order to pass from one
Religion: Sunni Muslim
neighborhood to another. Humanitarian
Official language: Somali
assistance convoys are routinely targeted by
criminal elements, forcing humanitarian
Source: CIA, The World Factbook
agencies to hire gunmen for protection. Many
Somalis contend that in the absence of a better
alternative, they have come to accept life with all the difficulties they face daily.8
Some Somalis argue that the fishermen have become pirates because their way of life was
destroyed by illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping that has been ignored by foreign
governments. In 2005, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) released a report
documenting the damages resulting from toxic waste dumping on Somalia’s shores. According to
a UNEP spokesman, “there’s uranium radioactive waste, there’s lead, there’s heavy metals like
cadmium and mercury, there’s industrial waste, and there’s hospital wastes, chemical wastes, you
name it.” According to the report, the primary reason for toxic dumping in Somalia is cost. The
report states that it costs $2.5 per ton to dump toxic waste in Africa compared to $250 per ton to
dump waste in Europe.9 In July 2008, United Nations Special Envoy Ould-Abdallah stated that
“because there is no (effective) government, there is so much irregular fishing from European and
Asian countries.” The Special Envoy argued that it is important to tackle these illegal activities by
some countries, and not to solely focus on the problem of piracy.10

7 CRS interviews with Somali officials, opposition leaders, and regional officials.
8 Ted Dagne interviewed many Somalis in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya in 2007-2008.
9 http://new.unep.org/tsunami/reports/TSUNAMI_SOMALIA_LAYOUT.pdf
10 Ted Dagne interview with U.N. Special Envoy in Kenya, August 2008.
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Policy Options in Dealing with Piracy
The international community has responded to the threat of piracy by deploying warships to the
Gulf of Aden. The United Nations Security Council has passed resolutions on piracy in the Horn
of Africa. Since the deployment of these warships to the region, however, the number of hijacked
ships has increased. Somali community leaders and regional analysts argue that the groups most
capable and best positioned to handle the piracy problem are the Islamic insurgents and the clan
elders. The Islamic Courts dealt with this problem effectively when they were in power,
according to senior leaders of the Islamic Courts and independent observers. The Islamic
insurgents claim that they are opposed to these kinds of criminal activities for religious reasons.
The Islamic leadership sees the piracy problem as a source of concern because they fear that they
could be erroneously or deliberately linked to the piracy phenomenon and become targets of
punitive action by the international community. Another option is to provide quick and robust
economic incentives to lure the unemployed away from piracy and other criminal activities.
Moreover, the TFG and the Government of Puntland are currently finalizing a proposal on anti-
piracy measures.
Policy Options in Dealing with Political and Security Problems
The international community may consider engagement with the Islamic insurgents and clan
elders to deal with the political and security problems facing Somalia. According to some
observers, it is pivotal to strengthen the moderate elements of the Islamic movements discretely.
Most observers believe that the Al-Shabaab can only be contained by another Islamic movement
supported by clan elders. Some of the most influential leaders in the Al-Shabaab are on the U.N.
and U.S. Terrorism Lists. Some observers argue that removing some of these individuals from the
Terrorism List in exchange for some concessions, including an end to the insurgency and
acceptance of a negotiated settlement, should be considered as an option. One of the key players
in facilitating the Djibouti talks was a Somali man on a U.N. Terrorism List. According to U.N.
officials, that man is no longer on the Terrorism List.
Some of the leaders in the Al-Shabaab are determined to continue their military campaign and are
not inclined to participate in negotiations. According to some experts, targeted measures,
including sanctions and assassination of the most extreme elements of the Al-Shabaab, could pave
the way for other moderate leaders to emerge. However, others believe that this option is likely to
backfire in the short term and increase anti-Western violence. Another option is to refer some of
these individuals to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes. The most effective
way of containing the extremists, most observers contend, is to look for a Somali-led solution,
both political and military. The TFG, Islamic Courts, Somaliland, Puntland, and other moderate
Somali forces could form a coalition to contain the advances of the most extreme elements of the
Al-Shabaab politically and militarily. Such a coalition is likely to get the support of the Somali
population rather than a peacekeeping force. The coalition can be assisted by neighboring
countries. A Somali-led initiative would take away one of the most powerful justifications used
by the Al-Shabaab to wage war, the presence of foreign forces. A unified regional approach is
pivotal, however. Most believe that Eritrea has leverage over some of the influential Islamic
leaders, some of whom are in Eritrea. The ARS was founded in Eritrea, and some of its leaders
are now engaged in the U.N.-led negotiation in Djibouti.
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The Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
In September 2007, Somalis from the Diaspora, civil society, opposition groups, and former
members of parliament met in Eritrea and formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
(ARS). More than 400 people participated at the founding conference. The Al-Shabaab, the
Youth, did not participate, and later condemned the leadership of the Alliance. The Alliance
significantly reduced the dominance of the Council of the Islamic Courts and brought into the
leadership people from civil society, women’s groups, and former members of the TFG. The
Alliance also brought into the coalition people from different regions and clans of Somalia. In
addition, individuals, such as Hassan Aweys, considered by the West as extremists or terrorists
were not given leadership positions. According to the Alliance, the main objectives of the
coalition are:
• The liberation of Somalia from Ethiopia.
• Somali solutions by Somali stakeholders through dialogue and peaceful means.
• To establish a National Government “completely devote its utmost care to the
welfare of the people, protect its rights, properties and promote its spiritual and
material development.”11
• Fighting crimes and violence targeted against civilian population, such as killing,
raping, pillaging, dislodging and displacing.
• Resettlement of displaced people.
• To organize general elections once peace and security are established.
In March 2008, the chairman of the ARS, in a letter to the President of the Security Council,
wrote “A peacekeeping mission would be possible only after the departure of the Ethiopian
troops. Experience has shown that when peacekeepers are unilaterally imposed by the Security
Council, they turn into peace enforcers. To avoid such a situation, the consent of the parties to the
conflict is essential.” In January 2008, the ARC leadership informed a congressional delegation
that the ARS will accept a humanitarian cease-fire, zones of tranquility, and negotiations with the
TFG and others once Ethiopian forces are replaced by a neutral force. This position led to a split
of the ARS. Many of the top leaders of the ARC left Eritrea for Djibouti to participate in the
U.N.-sponsored negotiations.

Table 2. The Leadership of the Executive Council of the ARS Before the Split
Name
Title
Affiliation
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed
Chairman
Somali Council of the Islamic
Courts (SCIC)
General Jama Mohmed Galib
Vice Chairman
Civil Society
Zakaria Hagi Mohamud Abdi
Vice Chairman
Parliament
Prof. Ibrahim Hassan Addou, Ph.D.
Foreign Affairs Advisor
SCIC

11 Political program of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia.
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Name
Title
Affiliation
Dr. Mohamed Ali Dahir
Administration Consultant
Somali intellectual
Prof. Abdirahman Ibrahim Ibbi
Assistant to the
Parliament
Chairman
Ambassador Yusuf H. Ibrahim
Foreign Affairs
Parliament
Secretary
Ahmed Abdul ahi Sheikh
Information Secretary
Civil Society
Col. Omar Hashi Aden
Interior Secretary
Parliament
Ahmed Abdul ahi Sheikh
Information Secretary
Civil Society
Col. Omar Hashi Aden
Interior Secretary
Parliament
Abdifitah Mohamed Ali
Finance Secretary
SCIC
Yusuf Mohamed Siad
Defense Secretary
SCIC
Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed, MD
Health Secretary
Civil Society
Dr. Mohamed Ali Ibrahim, Ph.D.
Justice Secretary
SCIC
Dr. Mohamud Abdi Ibrahim
Relief and Rehabilitation Secretary

Mrs. Fowsia Mohmed Sheikh
Human Rights Secretary
Parliament
Mohamud Ahmed Tarzan
Planning & Training Secretary
Diaspora
Abdulkadir Mohmed Dhakane
Education Secretary
Parliament
Mohmed Ibrahim Garyare
Social Affairs Secretary
Diaspora
Ahmed Abdulle Hussain
Reconciliation Secretary
SCIC
Abdullahi Sheikh
Auditing Secretary
SCIC

Background: 2006-2008
On December 24, 2006, Ethiopian and TFG forces launched a military campaign against the
forces of the ICU, a group that took over power in Mogadishu in June 2006. On December 28,
2006 Ethiopian troops captured Mogadishu with little resistance from the ICU. The ICU
leadership decided a day before the Mogadishu attack to leave the city in order to avoid
bloodshed and the destruction of Mogadishu, according to a senior official of the ICU.12 On
January 1, 2007, the ICU lost its last stronghold, Kismaayo, after its forces withdrew to an area
near the Kenyan border, although most of its fighters and leaders either simply melted into
society throughout Somalia or fled to neighboring countries. Some of the top leaders of the ICU
are in Yemen, Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia.13 In late January, the Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), formerly known as ICU, Sharif
Sheik Ahmed, traveled to Kenya. On January 24, 2007, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Michael
Ranneberger, reportedly met with Sheik Ahmed. Other leaders of the Courts have also been

12 Author interview with senior ICU official in late December 2006.
13 Author interview with senior ICU official and regional sources in the Horn of Africa.
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approached by U.S. officials as part of a new strategy to reach out to Court officials and others to
participate in proposed negotiations among Somali groups and the TFG.
The Ethiopian military intervention, while it has accomplished its military objective of ousting
the Courts from Mogadishu and other areas the Courts controlled, has been criticized by
governments and regional organizations. The African Union, the European Commission, the Arab
League, and others have called for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force.
Ethiopian officials argued that their military action is justified because the Islamic Courts posed a
serious threat to Ethiopia and regional stability, and because the Islamic Courts is an extremist,
Jihadist group. Ethiopian and U.S. officials also have accused the Courts of being influenced or
tied to well-known terrorist individuals and Al Qaeda. Islamic Courts officials have repeatedly
rejected these allegations and on a number of occasions have offered to work with U.S. officials,
according to one senior Courts official. Allegations about the presence of the three suspects
involved in the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 have been made
on many occasions over the years. However, the Islamic Courts did not exist as an organized
group when these allegations were made. Those in charge of Mogadishu and other areas in
southern Somalia were the warlords who were and in some cases still are ministers in the current
Transitional Federal Government.
On January 8, 2007, the United States Air Force, using AC-130 gun ships, attacked several
locations in southern Somalia, reportedly to kill the three terror suspects in the 1998 U.S.
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Reportedly, the United States launched another attack
the following day, although U.S. officials deny any further attacks. The British humanitarian
group, Oxfam, stated in a press release that an estimated 70 people were killed in the bombings
and vital water resources were destroyed in Afmadow district. A number of governments
criticized the U.S. attacks, including officials in Europe and the government of Djibouti, where
U.S. forces are currently stationed. Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Yusuf told the
BBC that the raid was counterproductive to achieving peace. He also stated that his government
had not been informed about the air strikes. According to a New York Times article, the United
States actively coordinated with Ethiopian forces in targeting suspected terrorists and Islamic
Union forces.14 U.S. Special Operations troops from Task Force 88 were reportedly deployed to
Ethiopia and entered Somalia. Moreover, the United States reportedly shared intelligence with the
Ethiopian military and used an airstrip in Eastern Ethiopia to launch attacks inside Somalia. A
senior Ethiopian government official denied that there was any coordination with U.S. forces.
Ethiopian troops have come under attack, and a number of Ethiopian soldiers have been killed by
snipers or in ambushes. Some Somalis and human rights advocates are concerned over what some
people refer to as a witch hunt by TFG and Ethiopian security forces. Ethiopian and TFG security
forces reportedly have been going house to house arresting Oromos (an Ethiopian ethnic group),
supporters of the Islamic Courts, and members of the TFG considered not supportive of the new
Somali government and the Ethiopian intervention. The government of Kenya has deported
dozens of Somalis and other nationals to TFG officials and Ethiopian security forces, according to
Kenyan sources. In one particular case, Kenyan officials reportedly blindfolded and handcuffed
30 individuals and returned them to Mogadishu, where these detainees were taken by Ethiopian
and TFG security personnel to unknown locations, according to Somali sources and government

14 Michael Gordon and Mark Mazzetti. “U.S. Used Base in Ethiopia to Hunt Al Qaeda,” New York Times. February 23,
2007.
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officials in the region. A number of Kenyan Muslims who were in Ethiopian detention were
released in 2008.
On January 17, 2007, the Transitional Federal Parliament ousted the Speaker of Parliament,
Sharif Hassan Sheik Adan, from his position. The former Speaker, who has been a vocal critic of
the Ethiopian intervention and the U.S. air strike, has a strong following in Mogadishu and was
active in reaching out and engaging the Islamic Courts officials when they had control over
Mogadishu. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jendayi Fraser stated in mid-January
2007 that “the no-confidence motion brought against the Parliament Speaker is likely to have a
negative impact on this process of dialogue.”15 In late January, the TFG elected Sheikh Adan
Mohamed Nur Madobe, a former warlord and an ally of President Abdullahi Yusuf, as Speaker of
Parliament.
Peacekeeping Mission: Background
On December 6, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1725, “reiterating
its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia through the
Transitional Federal Charter, and stressing the importance of broad-based and representative
institutions and of an inclusive political process, as envisaged in the Transitional Federal
Charter.” U. N. Security Council Resolution 1725 further called for “all Member States, in
particular those in the region, to refrain from any action in contravention of the arms embargo and
related measures, and should take all actions necessary to prevent such contravention.” Moreover,
the Security Council expressed its “willingness to engage with all parties in Somalia who are
committed to achieving a political settlement through peaceful and inclusive dialogue, including
the Union of Islamic Courts.” The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, authorized the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and
the African Union to establish “a protection and training mission in Somalia.” U. N. Security
Council Resolution 1725 specifically stated that countries bordering Somalia “would not deploy
troops to Somalia.”
At the African Union Summit in late January 2007, several African countries pledged to
contribute troops for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Ghana, Nigeria, Burundi, Uganda, and
Malawi have pledged troops. The African Union is facing difficulties getting governments to
make serious troop contributions for the mission. Observers contend that without a negotiated
settlement with groups still outside the TFG, it will be difficult to maintain peace and stability in
Somalia. As of June 30, 2009, there were an estimated 4,300 AU peacekeeping troops in Somalia
from Uganda and Burundi. The African Union peacekeeping mission is mandated to:
• support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders,
• provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to
enable them carry out their functions,
• assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan of
Somalia, particularly the effective reestablishment and training of all inclusive
Somali security forces, bearing in mind the programs already being implemented
by some of Somalia’s bilateral and multilateral partners,

15 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6273949.stm
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• provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the
disarmament and stabilization efforts,
• monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation,
• facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations,
including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of
IDPs, and
• protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-
defense.16
On February 20, 2007, the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 1744 reiterating its support
for the Transitional Federal Institutions and authorizing the African Union to establish a mission
in Somalia. Resolution 1744 calls for “a national reconciliation congress involving all
stakeholders, including political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders, and representatives of
civil society.” The resolution, while it welcomed the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from
Somalia, did not include a provision that restricts the participation of Somalia’s immediate
neighbors in the peacekeeping operation as resolution 1725 did.
The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1772 on August 20, 2007, authorizing the
African Union to maintain its operation in Somalia for an additional six months. The resolution
also authorized peacekeeping forces on the ground to take all necessary measures to support and
protect those involved in the Reconciliation Congress. Finally, Resolution 1772 called on all
Member States, especially those in close proximity to Somalia, to comply with the arms embargo
that was established in 1992 by Resolution 733.
The Islamic Courts Union: Background
In early 2006, factional violence in Mogadishu once again erupted, killing hundreds of civilians
and displacing many more people. The surge in violence was between militia loyal to the Islamic
Courts and a self-proclaimed anti-terrorism coalition backed by powerful local warlords. The
fighting in Mogadishu erupted when the forces loyal to a well-known warlord and then Minister
of National Security of the TFG, Mohamed Qanyare, attacked one of the Courts. The fighting
received unusual attention in Somalia and in the region due, in large part, to reports that the
warlords were backed by the United States government. The Bush Administration acknowledged
that Washington was assisting “responsible individuals” to help bring stability and fight terrorism
in Somalia. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Jendayi Fraser reportedly stated that the
United States “will work with those elements that will help us to root out Al Qaeda and prevent
Somalia becoming a safe haven for terrorists.”17 In late June 2006, Fraser stated that the United
States has three major policy goals in Somalia: counter-terrorism efforts, creation of an effective
government, and responding to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.
On February 18, 2006, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT)
was created. Very little is known about ARPCT, although the founders of the Alliance are known

16 Communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council 69th Meeting, January 19, 2007.
17 Peter Goodspeed, “Somalia Looking Like Pre-Taliban Afghanistan: U.S. Backed Warlords, Al Qaeda-Linked Thugs
Kill Dozens” National Post, with files from News Services. May 16, 2006.
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warlords who contributed to numerous armed clashes and instability in Somalia over the past
decade. Members of the Alliance reportedly include Bashir Rage, Mohammed Qanyare Afrah,
Muse Sudi Yalahow, Omar Finnish, and Abdirashid Shire Ilqyete. These actors were seen by
many Somali groups as major obstacles to the creation of central authority in Mogadishu, as
agreed to by all major Somali groups under the IGAD peace agreement in 2004. In early June
2006, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi dismissed four ministers from the Transitional Federal
Government belonging to ARPCT.
These ministers include Mohamed Qanyare (National Security Minister), Musa Sudi Yalahow
(Commerce Minister), Issa Botan Alin (Rehabilitation Minister), and Omar Finnish (Minister for
Religious Affairs). The warlords were dismissed because they reportedly ignored calls by Prime
Minister Ghedi’s government to stop the fighting in Mogadishu. The Islamic Courts leaders
argued then that the TFG did nothing to challenge these warlords and kept them in senior
positions in the TFG until the Islamic Courts defeated the warlords in Mogadishu. In late July
2006, members of the TFG parliament complained that the U.S. government bypassed the TFG
and provided support to the warlords, the same warlords who obstructed peace in Somalia. A
member of the TFG parliament told a U.S. Congressional delegation in August 2006 that “you
cannot fight terrorism by supporting warlords.”18
In early June 2006, the forces of the Islamic Courts captured Mogadishu, forcing ARPCT militia
to flee the capital. The chairman of the Islamic Courts, Sharif Shaykh Ahmed, stated that his
group would negotiate with the TFG. In response to accusations that the Islamic Courts Union
was associated with or had harbored international terrorist elements, Shaykh Ahmed stated that
“we are not terrorists and we will not allow anyone to hijack the capital. We have said hundreds
of times that America’s talk of terrorism in Somalia is fabricated and serves suspicious political
purposes.”19
The forces of the Islamic Courts Union strengthened and expanded areas under their control after
the defeat of the warlords in Mogadishu. The Islamic Courts forces captured the towns of Jowhar
and Beledweyne in mid-June 2006. Moreover, for the first time in years, Mogadishu became
relatively peaceful, and the Islamic Courts received support from the population in areas it
controlled. The level of support enjoyed by the Islamic Courts is difficult to measure, although
the group had constituencies from multiple sub-clans and had broad support among Somali
women. According to Somali sources in Mogadishu and Islamic Courts officials, the people
provided crucial support by feeding their forces and working with Islamic Courts officials in
bringing peace and stability. During the Mogadishu fighting, women supporters of ICU played
important roles. Since the Islamic Courts largely functioned as providers of social services, the
Courts did not maintain a large fighting force. The warlords maintained a robust force in different
parts of Mogadishu, with heavy weapons and “technicals” (machine-guns mounted on pickup
trucks). The Islamic Courts group had only four technicals when the fighting erupted with
Qanyare and other warlords, according to a senior Courts official. The ICU success in Mogadishu
effectively led to the collapse of the ARPCT and forced the warlords to flee.
Negotiations between the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts in Sudan did
not lead to a major breakthrough, although the talks ended speculation that the Islamic Courts

18 The author met with several Members of Parliament and the TFG Foreign Minister in Kenya in August 2006.
19 “Somali Islamic Courts Leader Comments on Domestic Situation, Future Outlook.” Al-Ashraq Al-Awsat. June 6,
2006.
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rejected negotiations. The Islamic Courts leaders stated that they would work with the Baidoa-
based transitional government, although disagreement on key issues remained. In June 2006, the
transitional parliament voted in favor of a foreign peacekeeping force. But this move was rejected
by some Islamic Courts leaders as being unnecessary and counter-productive. Earlier, in 2005, the
African Union had approved a proposal for Uganda and Sudan to deploy a peacekeeping force to
Somalia under the auspices of the IGAD. The deployment did not take place in large part because
of the refusal of the United Nations Security Council to remove a United Nations arms embargo
on Somalia. The Bush Administration did not support the lifting of the arms embargo, although
the United Nations Security Council did provide the necessary exemption in December 2006.
In mid-June, an International Somalia Contact Group, consisting of the United States, Norway,
United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, Tanzania, and the European Union, was formed and met to
discuss the unfolding Somalia crisis. The United Nations, the African Union, the Arab League,
and IGAD were also invited as observers. The Contact Group did not invite Somalia’s immediate
neighbors, in part due to Somali opposition and international concern that these countries are
engaged in activities in support of or against some groups in Somalia. In a press release after its
first meeting, the Contact Group stated that “the goal of the International Contact Group will be
to encourage positive political developments and engagement with actors inside Somali to
support the implementation of the Transitional Federal Charter and Institutions. The Contact
Group will seek to support efforts, within the framework of the Transitional Federal Institutions,
to address the humanitarian needs of the Somali people, establish effective governance and
stability, and address the international community’s concern regarding terrorism.” Meanwhile, in
early January 2007, the International Contact Group on Somalia issued another communiqué
strongly urging that it is “essential that an inclusive process of political dialogue and
reconciliation embracing representative clan, religious, business, civil society, women’s, and
other political groups who reject violence and extremism be launched without delay.”
The Islamic Courts, while well received by the people in the areas the Courts controlled, received
bad press coverage, especially in the West. The Courts’ activities were often characterized as
extremist and jihadist. The ICU was accused of shutting down cinemas and prohibiting women
from working. Some of these measures were taken by the Courts, although for different reasons
and not because of the Courts’ alleged jihadist and extremist ideology. For example, movies were
banned in the morning in response to requests from parents because Somali children were going
to movies in the morning instead of school.20 The ban on television did not take place, except for
restrictions on watching soccer games late at night, according to Islamic Courts officials and
Somali residents in Mogadishu. This measure was reportedly taken because of disturbances and
fighting late at night. There is no evidence to support the allegation that women were prohibited
from working. Islamic Courts officials point out that in the short time they were in power, they
did more than restore law and order. Properties taken by warlords were returned to the rightful
owners. For example, the family of President Yusuf reportedly returned to Mogadishu after
almost 16 years when the Courts restored order in the capital, according to an Islamic Courts
official. Most important, they argue, they gave hope to the people of Somalia that they can live in
peace after more than a decade of violence.

20 The author had over 25 conversations between July 2006 and March 2007 with senior Islamic Courts officials and
Somali residents in Mogadishu.
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The Leadership of the Somali Council of the
Islamic Courts: Background
General knowledge of the top leadership of the Somali Council of the Islamic Courts (SCIC) is
sketchy. The leadership was often referred to as jihadist, extremist, and at times terrorist by some
observers without much evidence to support the allegations. For example, the assessment of the
Islamic Courts by U.S. officials was that less than 5% of the Islamic Courts leadership can be
considered extremist, according to a senior State Department official. In late June 2006, the
Courts established a consultative body to function as the legislative (Shura) arm of the Courts.
Hassan Dahir Aweys was elected to head the Legislative Council. Aweys was one of the top
leaders of the now-defunct Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI—for more see below) and was
designated by the Bush Administration as a terrorist. Sharif Sheik Ahmed, the leader of the
Courts, was appointed chairman of the Council’s Executive Committee to lead the day-to-day
affairs of the Courts. Some observers and government officials have erroneously described Aweys
as the leader of the Courts. However, the moderate leader of the Courts, Sharif Sheik Ahmed, was
never replaced by Aweys. Some observers argued that referring to Aweys as the leader of the
Courts was deliberately designed by some groups and governments to give the Courts a bad
image.
The leadership of the Islamic Courts remained largely under the control of religious scholars and
academics (see “The Top Leaders of the Courts” below). The focus by some observers and
officials on three individuals, Aweys, Hassan Al-Turki, and Aden Ayro, may have been to show
the Islamic Courts as a group controlled and influenced by these individuals. Al-Turki, a man
born in the ethnically Somali Ogaden region of Ethiopia, was listed by the Bush administration as
a terrorist because of his membership in Al-Ittihad. According to Courts officials, Al-Turki did not
even hold a leadership position within the organization. Both Aweys and Al-Turki were placed on
the list because of their membership in Al-Ittihad. There is no public record to support that these
individuals were engaged in terrorist activities against U.S. or western interests. Ayro’s role
within the Courts was highly exaggerated since he did not have a leadership position in the
organization. Ayro was often referred to as the leader of the Shibaab, the Youth, although there is
no evidence to support that he was the leader of that group. Ayro was suspected of killing four aid
workers in the breakaway region of Somaliland as well as a Somali scholar in Mogadishu named
Abdulqadir Yahya. In May 2008, Ayro was killed in a U.S. air strike. Since the killing of Ayro, the
insurgency has intensified its attacks and is now in control of many parts of south-central
Somalia.
The Top Leaders of the Courts: Background
The Executive Council (Before the Split)
Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. Received a Law Degree from a University in Libya; served as President
of Somali Intellectuals Associations; President of the District Court in Jowhar; President of
Somali Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC); never been active in politics; married with two
children. Now, Chairman of the ARS.
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Abdurahman Muhamoud Farah. Vice President of SCIC. Studied in Mogadishu; a longtime
advocate of peace and clan unity; never active in politics.
Abdulqadir Ali Omar. Vice President of SCIC. Longtime advocate of clan unity; religious
scholar, and advocated against abuses by the warlords.
Ibrahim Hassan Addou. Foreign Secretary and a member of the Shura (Legislative Council) of
the SCIC; Ph.D., MA, BA from American University, Washington, D.C.; Worked at American
University from 1981 to 1992; held several positions at Benadir University in Mogadishu,
including Vice President for Academic Affairs and President; married with three children.
The Legislative Council or Shura (Before the Split)
Hassan Dahir Aweys. Speaker of the Shura. Former army officer in the Somali Armed Forces;
fought in the Ethiopia-Somalia wars in the 1970s; former senior member of Al-Ittihad; fought
against Ethiopia and Abdullahi Yusuf in the mid-1990s.
Omar Imam Abubakar. Number two in the Shura and effectively the most influential and active
member of the Shura; received his Ph.D. from a University in Saudi Arabia; lectured in
Mauritania and Somalia for many years.
Abdulahi Ali Afrah. Senior leader in the Shura. Holds a BA in Agriculture, longtime civil
servant in the Siad Barre government; received an MA from a University in the U.S. and lived in
Canada for many years.
Muhamoud Ibrahim Suleh. Senior member of the Shura, son of a well-known religious leader.
Ethiopia-Somalia Relations
For over four decades, relations between successive Ethiopian governments and Somalia have
been poor. Somalia invaded Ethiopia twice in the 1960s under Emperor Haile Selassie and in
1976 during the Mengistu Haile Mariam military rule. In the first war, the Ethiopian military
commander General Aman Andom defeated Somali forces, but his request to go inside Somalia
was rejected by the Emperor, and he was ordered to remain behind the border. The 1976 invasion
of Ethiopia by Somali forces and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) initially
succeeded, leading to the capture of many Ethiopian towns by Somali forces. Somali forces
briefly captured the third-largest city, Dire Dawa, in Eastern Ethiopia. However, Ethiopian forces,
with the support of Cuban and South Yemeni forces, were able to defeat the Somali forces,
although elements of the Somali rebel forces remained in control of remote areas in the largely
Somali inhabited areas of Ethiopia.
Both Ethiopian and Somali governments intervened in the internal affairs of the two countries,
and successive governments on both sides supported each others’ armed opposition groups. The
current president of the Transitional Federal Government, President Abdullahi Yusuf, was one of
the first to receive Ethiopia’s assistance after he fled Somalia in the late 1970s. He was one of the
first senior officials to challenge the Siad Barre government. Ethiopia was also the principal
backer of the Somali National Movement (SNM), the group that liberated the northwest region of
Somalia, currently known as Somaliland. The change of government in Ethiopia did not end
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Ethiopia’s intervention in Somali affairs. The current government of Ethiopia became a key
backer of a number of Somali factions and leaders, including the current president of the TFG,
Abdullahi Yusuf, Hussein Aideed, and other Somali factions.
The Barre government was also a major sponsor of Ethiopian armed rebel groups. The current
ruling party of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF),
received assistance from Somali authorities and a number of the EPRDF leaders reportedly
carried Somali-issued passports. Other rebel groups, including the Ogaden National Liberation
Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), also received assistance from Somalia.
The ouster of the Siad Barre government and the absence of a central government in Somalia
ended support for Ethiopian armed groups, although some Somali factions continue to support the
ONLF. For most of the 1990s, Ethiopia’s primary concern was Al-Ittihad in Somalia and its
activities in support of the ONLF.
Al-Ittihad and ONLF carried out a number of attacks against Ethiopian targets, and Ethiopian
security forces have violently retaliated against these groups and their supporters. The fighting
with Al-Ittihad was triggered in the early 1990s when Ethiopian security forces brutally cracked
down on the Ogaden National Liberation Front, a member of the first transitional government of
Ethiopia. The ONLF joined the transitional government of Ethiopia in part because the Ethiopian
Transitional Charter provided nations and nationalities the right to self determination; however,
the ONLF push for self determination created tension between the ruling EPRDF and the ONLF.
In the early 1990s, Ethiopian security forces assassinated a number of ONLF leaders, cracked
down on the organization, and moved the Ethiopian Somali region capital from Gode to Jijiga, a
central government stronghold. Members of the ONLF fled to Somalia and were embraced by Al-
Ittihad, a fairly new group at that time. Hence, some observers view Al-Ittihad as a group largely
concerned with domestic issues. Ethiopia’s principal interest at that time was to ensure that a
united Somalia did not pose a threat to Ethiopia and that the Somali-inhabited region of Ethiopia
remained stable. Ethiopian forces attacked Somalia a number of times over the past decade and
often maintained presence inside Somali territory. Ethiopia’s relationship with the current
president of the TFG was strengthened when Yusuf backed Ethiopia’s efforts against Al-Ittihad in
the 1990s. The Ethiopian government’s animosity towards the ousted Shura leader of the Islamic
Courts, Sheik Aweys, is linked to Aweys’ role as one of the leaders of Al-Ittihad fighting against
Ethiopia and that of Abdullahi Yusuf.
In 2004, the government of Ethiopia released a report, the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy, Security Policy and Strategy. The 158-page report covers a wide range
of issues, including Ethiopia’s assessment of its relations with Somalia. The report states that
Somalia attacked Ethiopia twice in pursuit of its Greater Somalia ambition. The report notes that
“at this time the Greater Somalia agenda has failed.” Moreover, the Greater Somalia agenda no
longer poses a serious threat to Ethiopia. The report contends that the factionalization of Somalia
has allowed anti-peace and extremists elements to become strong, posing a threat to Ethiopia. In
order to reduce the threat from some parts of Somalia, the Ethiopian government must pursue a
policy of engagement and support to Puntland and Somaliland, according to the report. The report
also recommends a policy of targeting those armed elements that threaten Ethiopian security. This
report was released two years before the Islamic Courts emerged, although the report gave the
same labels of extremist, terrorist, and anti-peace to groups that were dominant at that time.
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Somalia: Background (1991-2006)
In 1991, General Mohamed Siad Barre, who came to power through a military coup in 1969, was
ousted from power by several Somali armed groups. Following the collapse of central authority in
Mogadishu, rival Somali groups engaged in armed struggle for personal political power and
prevented food and medicine from reaching innocent civilians suffering from drought and famine.
An estimated 500,000 people died from violence, starvation, and disease as Somalia was wracked
by continued internal chaos. On November 9, 1992, then-President George H.W. Bush authorized
Operation Restore Hope, using the U.S. military, to safeguard non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the suffering Somali civilian
population.
The U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF) successfully subdued the warlords and armed factions
and enabled NGOs to safely provide humanitarian relief to Somalis. In May 1993, UNITAF
handed over the operation to the United Nations. The U.N. effort was known as United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II. In May 1993, UNOSOM II coalition forces were attacked
by one of the factions in Mogadishu. On October 3, 1993, after a 17-hour battle between U.S.
troops and Somali factions in Mogadishu, in which 18 U.S. Rangers were killed, President
Clinton ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia. In March 1994, the United States
completely pulled out of Somalia and, one year later, the United Nations pulled out the remaining
peacekeepers. Since the withdrawal of United Nations forces in March 1995, Somalia has been
without a central government and has been splintered into several regions controlled by clan-
based factions.
Peace Processes
There have been 14 Somali reconciliation or peace conferences to bring an end to the fighting in
Somalia since the early 1990s. Some were held under the auspices of or were supported by the
United Nations, or governments in the Horn of Africa. These efforts have largely failed to bring
about lasting peace in Somalia. Moreover, competing efforts by international actors contributed to
the failure of peace efforts in Somalia. In 1996, the Government of Ethiopia convened a peace
process in the resort town of Sodere, Ethiopia. Many political actors and armed factions
participated, although a few boycotted the peace process. The Sodere process collapsed when the
government of Egypt convened another meeting of the Somali groups in Cairo in 1997.
Subsequently, the Cairo initiative failed when yet another peace conference was convened by
Somali factions in Bosaso, Somalia in 1998. In February 2000, IGAD approved a peace plan
proposed by the government of Djibouti. In May 2000, the Somali Reconciliation Conference
opened in Arta, Djibouti in which 400 delegates took part for several months of deliberation. The
Arta process was boycotted by several powerful warlords, as well as the governments of
Somaliland and Puntland.
On August 13, 2000, participants agreed to the creation of a Transitional National Government
(TNG) and a Transitional National Assembly (TNA). On August 26, 2000, participants nominated
Abdulqassim Salad Hassan as president of the TNG. In October 2002, the Inter-Governmental
Authority for Development launched another peace process, led by the government of Kenya. An
estimated 350 delegates from different regions of Somalia participated in the opening session of
the conference in the Kenyan town of Eldoret. The Government of Somaliland boycotted the
conference. In the first phase of the conference, the parties signed a temporary cease-fire, and
agreed to respect and honor the outcome of the conference. The parties further agreed to establish
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a federal system of government and committed themselves to fight terrorism. In September 2003,
the parties agreed on a Transitional National Charter, paving the way for a National Unity
government.
In August 2004, a new Transitional Somali Parliament was inaugurated in Kenya. The 275-
member parliament consists of the major political factions and seems to represent all the major
clans of Somalia. The Transitional Charter allocated 61 seats for the major four clans and 31 seats
for the small clans. The Charter also allocated 12% of the seats to women. The Charter accepted
Islam as the national religion and agreed that Sharia law would be the basis of national
legislation. In fact, previous Somali constitutions had similar provisions. In October 2004, the
Somali Transitional Parliament elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as the new president of Somalia.
The swearing-in ceremony was attended by 11 heads of government from African countries and
representatives from regional organizations and the United Nations.
In November 2004, President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed appointed Professor Ali Mohamed Gedi as
prime minister. The transitional government, however, was not able to function effectively or
move to Mogadishu in large part due to opposition from the warlords in Mogadishu, even though
some of these warlords signed the agreement and were ministers in the government. The inability
of the transitional government to establish effective control allowed warlords and clan factions to
dominate many parts of Somalia until late December 2006. Some observers contend that the
defeat of the warlords by the Islamic Courts paved the way for the establishment of central
authority in Mogadishu.
National Reconciliation Conference
Somalia’s recent peace effort, the National Reconciliation Congress, convened in the Shagaani
district of Mogadishu on July 15, 2007 after being postponed twice for logistical and security
reasons. The first phase of the conference came to an end on August 30, 2007. Somali
Ambassador to Kenya Mohammed Ali Nur spoke optimistically about the results of the first
phase of the conference at a news conference in Nairobi, Kenya: “I am happy to announce the
declaration of peace agreement between major clans who are participating in the congress has
already been signed … The transitional government has done and will continue doing its best to
lead the process of reviving Somalia from the ashes of the vicious civil war.” Whereas the first
phase of the conference focused on the resolution of clan conflicts and disarmament, the second
phase focused on issues such as power sharing, governance, sharing of natural resources, sea
piracy, welfare, and internally displaced persons. The TFG did not take steps to address these
issues since the Congress ended its meeting in late 2007.
Somalia: Safe Haven for Terrorist Groups?
The United States, Somali neighbors, and some Somali groups have expressed concern over the
years about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia. In the mid-1990s, Islamic courts
began to emerge in parts of the country, especially in the capital of Mogadishu. These courts
functioned as local governments and often enforced decisions by using their own Islamic militia.
Members of the Al-Ittihad militia (see “Al-Ittihad” below for background) reportedly provided
the bulk of the security forces for these courts in the areas AIAI had a presence. The absence of
central authority in Somalia created an environment conducive to the proliferation of armed
factions throughout the country. Ethiopian security forces invaded Somalia on a number of
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occasions to disrupt the activities of Al-Ittihad and its allies or in support of certain armed
factions.
Somali factions, including the so-called Islamic groups, often go through realignments or simply
disappear from the scene. Very little is known about the leadership or organizational structure of
these groups, including Al-Ittihad. There have been three known Islamic groups in Somalia
whose prominence has alternately waxed and waned: Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (mentioned below),
Al-Islah (Reform), and Al-Tabligh (Conveyers of God’s Work). In 1995, a group called Jihad al-
Islam, led by Sheikh Abbas bin Omar, emerged in Mogadishu, and gave the two main warlords,
General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi, an ultimatum to end their factional fighting. The
group claimed at that time that it maintained offices in several countries, including Yemen,
Pakistan, Kenya, and Sudan. Not much was heard subsequently from Jihad al-Islam, although a
group of Somalis later formed the Sharia (Islamic law) Implementation Club (SIC) in 1996.
SIC’s principal objective was to establish Sharia courts throughout the country. Some members of
the Mogadishu-based former Transitional National Government (TNG) reportedly were key
players in the establishment of these courts. Very little is known about al-Islah, although it is
perceived as a group dominated by Hawiye clan businessmen. According to the State
Department’s 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism, “while numerous Islamist groups engaged in a
broad range of activities operate inside Somalia, few of these organizations have any known links
to terrorist activities. Movements such as Harakat al-Islah (al-Islah), Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa
(ASWJ), and Majma Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya (Majma’) sought power by political
rather than violent means and pursued political action via missionary or charity work. Missionary
Islamists, such as followers of the Tablighi sect and the “New Salafis” generally renounce explicit
political activism. Other Islamist organizations became providers of basic health, education, and
commercial services, and were perceived by some as pursuing a strategy to take political power.
U.S. officials have long expressed concern about the presence of known terrorist individuals in
East Africa. Some observers contend that Somalia is being used as a transit and hiding place by
some of these individuals, including Haroon Fazul, the leader of the 1998 and 2002 bombings,
Saleh Nabhan, and Talha al-Sudani. Nabhan was killed by U.S. forces in September 2009 and al-
Sudani was reportedly killed in Somalia in 2007. But no Somali group has been directly linked to
any terrorist attacks against the U.S. or its allies.
Al-Ittihad
Al-Ittihad was perhaps the most active and at one point most successful of all the Islamic groups.
Al-Ittihad is an Islamic group whose principal ideology was to establish an Islamic state and to
bring law and order by utilizing the Islamic court system. Founded in the late 1980s and early
1990s, Al-Ittihad unsuccessfully sought to replace clan and warlord politics with an Islamic state.
In the early 1990s, Al-Ittihad had modest successes; for example, it administered territories under
its control in the south. But Al-Ittihad never emerged as a major military or political force in
Somalia. The clan-based groups and factions led by warlords in Mogadishu are secular and have
been at odds with Al-Ittihad, even though some of these groups maintained tactical alliances from
time to time with Al-Ittihad. Al-Ittihad’s failure to maintain control over territories and spread its
ideology led to a shift in strategy in the mid-1990s. Al-Ittihad abandoned its ambition to spread its
ideology through military means and began to concentrate on providing social services to
communities through Islamic schools and health care centers.
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Al-Ittihad’s social activities and religious objectives in Somalia seemed inconsistent with its
activities in support of armed groups in the Somali-inhabited region of Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, Al-
Ittihad was reportedly engaged in military activities in support of ethnic Somalis. Several anti-
Ethiopian groups are active in the Somali region and Al-Ittihad cooperated with these groups in
carrying out attacks against Ethiopian targets. In 1999, the Ogaden Islamic Union under the
leadership of Muhammad Muallem Omar Abdi, the Somali People’s Liberation Front under the
leadership of Ahmed Ali Ismail, and the Western Somali Liberation Front under the leadership of
Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Hussein formed a coalition called the United Front for the Liberation of
Western Somalia, their term for the Somali-inhabited region of Ethiopia.21 The Ogaden National
Liberation Front was engaged in military activities in the region, and in the past formed alliances
with other Ethiopian opposition groups.
Many Somali watchers believe that Al-Ittihad’s strength was highly exaggerated and that
information about its alleged links with international terrorist organizations is unreliable. The
State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism stated in 2006 that “in recent years the
existence of a coherent entity operating as AIAI (Al-Ittihad) has become difficult to prove.” There
is no reliable information or pattern of behavior to suggest that Al-Ittihad had an international
agenda, as was the case with the National Islamic Front (NIF) government of Sudan. Some
observers note that if Al-Ittihad had a clear internationally oriented agenda, its obvious ally in the
region would be the NIF regime in Sudan or the Sudanese-backed Eritrean Islamic Jihad. The
Sudanese regime did back regional extremist groups and international terrorist organizations, but
there was no apparent relationship between the NIF and Al-Ittihad. Many Somalis often refer to
Al-Ittihad’s social services and the peace and stability that prevailed in the areas it controlled.
In late September 2001, the Bush Administration added Al-Ittihad to a list of terrorism-related
entities whose assets were frozen by an Executive Order. Bush Administration officials accused
Al-Ittihad of links with Al Qaeda. The Administration did not publicly offer evidence supporting
its allegations, but some officials asserted that links between AIAI and Al Qaeda date back to the
U.S. presence in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope (1992-1994). This assertion, however,
seems inconsistent with the reality on the ground at that time, according to some observers. Then,
the dominant players in Mogadishu were the warlords and not Al-Ittihad. In early November
2001, federal authorities raided several Somali-owned money transfer businesses in the United
States operated by Al-Barakaat Companies.
The Bush Administration ordered the assets of Al-Barakaat frozen because of its alleged links to
Al Qaeda. U.S. officials, however, later seemed to back off from their earlier assertion that Al-
Barakaat and individuals associated with the money transfer business sector are directly linked to
Al Qaeda. In September 2002, U.S. officials cleared three Somalis and three Al-Barakaat
branches accused of ties with Al Qaeda. The three individuals and businesses were removed from
the U.S. Treasury Department list of terrorist supporters and their assets were also unfrozen.
Nonetheless, the Bush Administration remains concerned about terrorist activities in Somalia,
although no attacks against U.S. interests have been carried out by any known Somali groups.
The United States has had no presence in Somalia since Washington pulled out of the
peacekeeping operation in 1994. In September 2008, the European Court of Justice annulled the
decision taken by the EU Council to freeze the assets of two Somalis and Al-Barakaat
International Foundation of Sweden.

21 Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS). “Islamists Regroup Their Forces After Ethiopian Preemptive
Strike,” May 17-23, 1999.
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Figure 1. Major Somali Clans and Subclans

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Figure 2. Map of Somalia

Source: Adapted by CRS. Cartographic Section, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Map
No. 3690 Rev. 7, January 2007.

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Author Contact Information

Ted Dagne

Specialist in African Affairs
tdagne@crs.loc.gov, 7-7646




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