Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism
Operations: Background and Issues for
Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
October 8, 2009

Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22373
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Navy Role in Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism

Summary
Statements from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and other Department of Defense (DOD)
officials suggest that DOD budgets in FY2010 and subsequent fiscal years will place a certain
amount of emphasis on capabilities for conducting irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as
counterinsurgency operations. In addition, counterterrorism (CT) operations have been a DOD
area of emphasis since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities, and has taken some
steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. The Navy’s IW and CT
activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of
Navy IW activities, specific Navy IW budget priorities, and how much emphasis to place on IW
and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
Committee reports on the FY2010 defense authorization bill (H.R. 2647/S. 1390) and the FY2010
DOD appropriations bill (H.R. 3326) include report language on certain aspects of Navy IW
operations.

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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
DOD Interest in Irregular Warfare ......................................................................................... 1
Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations ............................................................................... 1
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan ................................................................................. 1
Other Operations............................................................................................................. 3
IW Initiatives in Navy Budget ......................................................................................... 3
Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations................................................................................ 6
Recent Navy IW and CT Initiatives ....................................................................................... 7
Navy Irregular Warfare Office......................................................................................... 7
Global Maritime Partnership ........................................................................................... 8
Partnership Stations......................................................................................................... 8
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)........................................................... 10
Riverine Force .............................................................................................................. 12
Other Initiatives ............................................................................................................ 12
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress..................................................................................... 12
Definition of Navy IW Activities......................................................................................... 12
Navy IW Budget Priorities .................................................................................................. 12
Degree of Emphasis on IW and CT in Future Navy Budgets................................................ 13
Additional Oversight Questions........................................................................................... 16
Legislative Activity for FY2010 ................................................................................................ 17
FY2010 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 2647/S. 1390) .................................................... 17
House ........................................................................................................................... 17
Senate ........................................................................................................................... 17
FY2010 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326).................................................................... 19
House ........................................................................................................................... 19
Senate ........................................................................................................................... 19

Appendixes
Appendix. DOD Interest in Irregular Warfare ............................................................................ 20

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 22

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Introduction
Statements from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and other Department of Defense (DOD)
officials suggest that DOD budgets in FY2010 and subsequent fiscal years will place a certain
amount of emphasis on capabilities for conducting irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as
counterinsurgency operations. In addition, counterterrorism (CT) operations have been a DOD
area of emphasis since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities, and has taken some
steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. The Navy’s IW and CT
activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of
Navy IW activities, specific Navy IW budget priorities, and how much emphasis to place on IW
and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
Background
DOD Interest in Irregular Warfare
Statements from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and other Department of Defense (DOD)
officials suggest that DOD budgets in FY2010 and subsequent fiscal years will place a certain
amount of emphasis on capabilities for conducting irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as
counterinsurgency operations. For examples of such statements, see the Appendix.
Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations1
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
Among the most readily visible of the Navy’s current IW operations are those being carried out
by Navy sailors serving ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of the Navy, which
includes the Navy and Marine Corps, states that:
We continue to impose local sea control, sustain power ashore and represent a major
strategic role in Iraq and Afghanistan by providing critical force protection requirements;
training, equipment, and assistance to our coalition partners....
Our overseas force posture is shaped principally by ongoing and projected operational
commitments. This participation currently involves approximately 30,000 Marines
conducting counterinsurgency, security cooperation, and civil-military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. On any given day there are approximately 14,500 Sailors ashore and another
9,200 afloat throughout the U. S. Central Command region conducting riverine operations,
maritime infrastructure protection, explosive ordnance disposal, combat construction
engineering, cargo handling, combat logistics, maritime security, and other forward presence

1 Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section is taken from a Navy briefing to CRS on July 31, 2009, on
Navy IW activities and capabilities.
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activities. In collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Navy also conducts critical port
operations, port and oil platform security, and maritime interception operations....
Strike operations are conducted to damage or destroy objectives or selected enemy
capabilities. Recent examples include simultaneous close air support missions that are
integrated and synchronized with coalition ground forces to protect key infrastructure, deter
and disrupt extremist operations or hostile activities, and provide overwatch for
reconstruction efforts in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.2
More specifically, the Navy states that operations performed by Navy personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan include the following:
• close air support (CAS) and airborne reconnaissance operations, in which
Navy aircraft account for 30% of all such missions;
• expeditionary electronic warfare operations, including operations to defeat
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 75% of airborne electronic attack
operations in Iraq, 100% of such operations in Afghanistan, and operations to
counter insurgent and extremist network communications;
• intelligence and signals intelligence operations, including operations to identify,
map, and track extremist activity, and operations involving tactical intelligence
support teams that are deployed with special operations forces (SOF);
• explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations, including defusing IEDs,
clearing land mines, destroying captured weapon and explosive caches, and
investigating blast scenes so as to obtain evidence for later prosecution.
• riverine warfare operations to secure waterways such as the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers and the Haditha dam;
• maritime security operations, including operations to intercept smugglers and
extremists going to Iraq and Kuwait, and operations to guard Iraqi and U.S.
infrastructure, facilities, and supply lines, such as ports and oil and gas platforms
and pipelines;
• medical and dental services in Iraq and Afghanistan provided by a total of more
than 1,800 naval medical personnel;
• logistics operations, including transporting of 90% of military equipment for Iraq
and Afghanistan on military sealift ships, operating ports in Iraq and Kuwait, and
providing contracting services and reconstruction using Iraqi firms;
• engineering and construction operations, such as rebuilding schools, repairing
roads, reconstructing electrical, water and sewer systems, and training and
equipping Iraqi engineers;
• provincial reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; and
• legal operations, including prosecution of special-group criminals and assisting
Iraqis in drafting governing documents.

2 Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2010 Budget. Washington, 2009. (May 2009)
pp. 2-1 to 2-2.
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In addition, about 90% of equipment for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is transported to those
theaters of operation by military sealift ships.
Other Operations
In addition to participating in U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy states
that its IW operations also include the following:
• security force assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy ships
exercise and work with foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces,
so as to improve their abilities to conduct maritime security operations;
• civic assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy units, including
Navy hospital ships, expeditionary medical teams, fleet surgical teams, and naval
construction units provide medical and construction services in foreign countries
as a complement to other U.S. diplomatic and development activities in those
countries;
• disaster relief operations, of which Navy forces have performed several in
recent years; and
• counter-piracy operations, which have increased since 2008.3
The Navy states that enduring areas of focus for the Navy’s role in IW include the following:
• enhancing regional awareness, which enables better planning, decision making,
and operational agility;
• building maritime partner capability and capacity, so as to deny sanctuaries
to violent extremists; and
• outcome-based application of force, so as to maintain continuous pressure on
extremist groups and their supporting infrastructure.
IW Initiatives in Navy Budget
Items Mentioned in FY2010 Navy Budget Highlights Book
The Navy’s FY2010 budget highlight books states the following regarding FY2010 Navy budget
initiatives for irregular warfare:
• “The FY 2010 budget ensures that our contemporary wartime requirements
receive steady long-term funding similar to our conventional modernization
programs. The increased procurement of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) and other programs that support irregular warfare and capacity building
reflect that shift.”4

3 For more on counter-piracy operations, see CRS Report R40528, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, by Lauren Ploch et al.
4 Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2010 Budget. Washington, 2009. (May 2009)
p. 5-1. A similar statement is made on page 1-12.
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• “[Navy research and development] initiatives support both traditional and
irregular warfare demands in several aviation programs.”5
• “The FY 2010 [Navy] S&T [science and technology] portfolio is aligned to
support naval S&T focus areas which consist of: power and energy; operational
environments; maritime domain awareness, asymmetric and irregular warfare,
information, analysis and communication; power projection; assure access and
hold at risk; distributed operations; naval warrior performance and protection;
survivability and self defense; platform mobility; fleet/force sustainment; and
affordability, maintainability, and reliability.”6
Longer List of Navy IW Budget Initiatives
The Navy states that a longer list of Navy budget initiatives for creating or expanding its IW
capabilities includes the following, which are not necessarily listed in any particular order of
priority:
• shifting funding for the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (or NECC—see
discussion below) from the wartime operations part of the Navy’s budget into the
Navy’s “base” budget (aka, the “regular” part of the Navy’s budget);
• delivering expanded counter-IED and EOD capabilities;
• deploying riverine squadrons and maritime expeditionary support squadrons;
• training Navy personnel in foreign languages, regional affairs, and cultures;
• using the JFK Irregular Warfare Center at the Office of Navy Intelligence (ONI)
to provide intelligence support to joint IW/SOF operations;
• ship operation and acquisition, including:
• using ships (such as amphibious ships) as partnership stations, such as the
Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS)
(see discussion below);
• using ships (such as surface combatants and amphibious ships) for anti-
piracy operations;
• using hospital ships for humanitarian-assistance operations;
• procuring Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs);7
• procuring Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs), which are high-speed sealift
ships;
• restarting procurement of DDG-51 Aegis destroyers;

5 Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2010 Budget. Washington, 2009. (May 2009)
p. 5-12.
6 Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2010 Budget. Washington, 2009. (May 2009)
pp. 5-27 to 5-28.
7 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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• ending procurement of DDG-1000 destroyers;8
• operating four Trident submarines that have been converted into cruise
missile and SOF-support submarines (SSGNs);9
• accelerating acquisition of the P-8 multi-mission aircraft (MMA), the Navy’s
intended successor to the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft;
• accelerating acquisition of certain unmanned systems, including:
• the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS—an unmanned aircraft
that is to be flown form Navy aircraft carriers);
• a sea-based, medium-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV);
• the small tactical unmanned aerial system (STUAS);
• expanding the Navy’s sea-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities;10
and
• expanding the Navy’s cyberwarfare operations force.
A separate list of Navy budgetary areas of emphasis for IW includes the following:
• ships and aircraft;
• persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities;
• unmanned systems;
• language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness (LREC);
• operations to build partnerships with other countries and to expand partner
capacities;
• cybersecurity; and
• tools for fusing information from various sources.
In addition, the Navy states that with regard to rapidly fielding IW new capabilities, specific
current items of focus include the following:
• the Center for IW and Armed Groups (CIWAG)—an 18-month pilot project at
the Naval War College in Newport, RI, whose current grant funding expires in
June 2010;
• a large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) for ISR operations;
• Saber Focus—a land-based unmanned air system (UAS) that would be
established in an overseas location and used for ISR to support IW operations;

8 For more on the Navy’s proposal to restart DDG-51 procurement and end DDG-1000 procurement, see CRS Report
RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
9 For more on the converted Trident submarines, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion
(SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
10 For more on the Navy’s sea-based BMD capabilities, see CRS Report RL33745, Sea-Based Ballistic Missile
Defense—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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• the use of ship-based Scan Eagle UAVs on converted Trident SSGNs for ISR
operations;
• a surface ship- or submarine-based Maritime UAS that would be used for ISR
operations and possibly signals intelligence operations;
• a naval intelligence fusion tool (NIFT) that is to integrate national and tactical
ISR sensors so as to create real-time, actionable intelligence and targeting
recommendations;
• a ship-based system called real time regional gateway (RTRG) for improved
exploitation of signals intelligence to support IW operations; and
• an expansion in the size of helicopter squadrons that directly support special
operations forces (SOF).
Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations
Navy CT operations including the following:
• Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist training camps and
facilities, such as those reportedly conducted in Somalia on March 3 and May 1,
2008,11 and those conducted in 1998 in response to the 1998 terrorist bombings
of U.S. embassies in East Africa;12
• operations by Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs, that are directed
against terrorists;13
• surveillance by Navy ships and aircraft of suspected terrorists overseas;
• maritime intercept operations (MIO) aimed at identifying and intercepting
terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at sea, or potentially threatening ships
or aircraft that are in or approaching U.S. territorial waters—an activity that
includes Navy participation in the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI);14
• working with the Coast Guard to build maritime domain awareness (MDA)—a
real-time understanding of activities on the world’s oceans;
• assisting the Coast Guard in port-security operations;15

11 Edmund Sanders, “U.S. Missile Strike in Somalia Kills 6,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2008; Stephanie
McCrummen and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Airstrike Kills Somali Accused of Links to Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post,
May 2, 2008: A12; Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Qaeda Leader Reported Killed In Somalia,” New York Times,
May 2, 2008.
12 For a recent article on the 1998 strikes, see Pamela Hess, “Report: 1998 Strike Built bin Laden-Taliban Tie,”
NavyTimes.com (Associated Press), August 22, 2008.
13 SEAL is an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land. For further discussion of the SEALs, see CRS Report
RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
14 For more on the PSI, see CRS Report RL34327, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Mary Beth Nikitin.
15 See, for example, Emelie Rutherford, “Navy’s Maritime Domain Awareness System ‘Up And Running’,” Defense
Daily, September 4, 2008; and Dan Taylor, “New Network Allows Navy To Track Thousands of Ships Worldwide,”
Inside the Navy, September 8, 2008. For more on the Coast Guard and port security, see CRS Report RL33383,
Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and Maritime Security, by John Frittelli and Jennifer E. Lake, and
(continued...)
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• protection of forward-deployed Navy ships, an activity that was intensified
following the terrorist attack on the Navy Aegis destroyer Cole (DDG-67) in
October 2000 in the port of Aden, Yemen;16
• protection of domestic and overseas Navy bases and facilities;
• developing Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) as part of Joint
Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA); and
• engaging with the U.S. Coast Guard to use the National Strategy for Maritime
Security to more rapidly develop capabilities for Homeland Security, particularly
in the area of MDA.
The Department of the Navy states that:
While [deployed] forward, acting as the lead element of our defense-in-depth, naval forces
will be positioned for increased roles in combating terrorism..... Expanded Maritime
Interdiction Operations (EMIO) are authorized by the President and directed by the Secretary
of Defense to intercept vessels identified to be transporting terrorists and/or terrorist-related
materiel that poses an imminent threat to the United States and its allies.....
[Strike operations] have also included small, precise attacks against terrorist cells, such as the
2007 missile attacks against terrorist sanctuaries in Somalia....
The FY 2009/FY 2010 contingency operations request supports the expansion of capabilities
sufficient to secure Afghanistan and prevent it from again becoming a haven for international
terrorism and associated militant extremist movements.17
Recent Navy IW and CT Initiatives
The Navy in recent years has implemented a number of initiatives intended to increase its IW and
CT capabilities and activities, including those discussed below.
Navy Irregular Warfare Office
The Navy in July 2008 established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, which is intended, in the
Navy’s words, to “institutionalize current ad hoc efforts in IW missions of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency and the supporting missions of information operations, intelligence operations,
foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to [CT] and
[counterinsurgency].” The office works closely with U.S. Special Operations Command, and
reports to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for information, plans, and strategy.18

(...continued)
CRS Report RL33787, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities, by Paul W. Parfomak
and John Frittelli.
16 For a discussion of the attack on the Cole, see CRS Report RS20721, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Raphael F. Perl and Ronald O'Rourke.
17 Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2010 Budget. Washington, 2009. (May 2009)
pp. 2-2 to 2-3.
18 Zachary M. Peterson, “New Navy Irregular Warfare Office Works to Address ISR Shortfall,” Inside the Navy,
(continued...)
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Global Maritime Partnership
The Global Maritime Partnership, initially known as the 1,000-ship Navy concept, is a U.S. Navy
initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign
navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, for the purpose of ensuring global maritime
security against common threats. The Navy states that
A global maritime partnership is required that unites maritime forces, port operators,
commercial shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies to
address our mutual concerns. This partnership increases all of our maritime capabilities, such
as response time, agility and adaptability, and is purely voluntary, with no legal or
encumbering ties. It is a free-form, selforganizing network of maritime partners–good
neighbors interested in using the power of the sea to unite, rather than to divide.19
Partnership Stations
The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships,
such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to
waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions,
particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries, and for increasing
the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations. The SPS and APS
can be viewed as specific measures for promoting the above-discussed global maritime
partnership. A March 2, 2009, press report states:
The Navy’s nascent effort to engage navies and coast guards on the East Coast of Africa is
slowly ramping up with the current deployment of a frigate to the region and a planned visit
by an amphibious ship later this year, the commodore leading the mission told Inside the
Navy last week.
In the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa, the Navy has regularly conducted training and ship
visits over the past few years, but the service has had very limited engagement on the eastern
side of the continent.
“On the West Coast, they’re about two years ahead of us,” Capt. Nicholas Holman, the
commodore of Task Force 363, said in a Feb. 27 telephone interview from the frigate Robert
G. Bradley (FFG-49) off Tanzania. “They have an international staff and they’re getting
more accomplished. They have high school into college-level training, while we’re at the
elementary-school level.”
The ongoing effort in West Africa dubbed “Africa Partnership Station” officially began in
2007. Right now, the amphibious dock ship Nashville (LPD-13) is on a six-month
deployment in the Gulf of Guinea region. The effort Holman leads was recently named
“African Partnership Station East” to link the two missions together.
“The training we’re doing right now, basic shiphandling, boarding procedures—it’s a lot of
very basic things,” Holman explained.

(...continued)
September 1, 2008.
19 Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2010 Budget. Washington, 2009. (May 2009)
p. 1-4.
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The Bradley has visited Mozambique and Tanzania with a visit to Comoros for a port call
and community- relations projects. Late last week, the ship was set to leave Tanzania for its
last stop in Kenya.
The navies of Mozambique and Tanzania have very little capability, Holman noted, which
means most of the training conducted by Bradley sailors takes place either aboard the frigate
or on U.S. Navy rigid-hull inflatable boats. He noted Kenya has the most robust naval
capabilities of the three countries the Bradley will train.
Due to the lack of operational navies and coast guards, maritime security in the region is
“almost untouched,” the commodore said.
“We have a country like Tanzania, which has [hundreds] of miles of coastline, they don’t
have anything to do patrols—it’s almost untouched,” Holman said.
Tanzania’s chief of naval operations, a brigadier general, could not authorize Holman to visit
the pier where the aging Tanzanian fleet sits idle, he noted.
“I think they’re not as open as they want to be yet, I think they’re not showing us what they
really have,” Holman said. He explained relations have been friendly, nonetheless.
Overall, the naval capabilities in East Africa are low, but the interest level in continued U.S.
Navy engagement in the region is high, according to the commodore.
“The capabilities of the militaries and navies in this region is pretty low, they understand
there are issues out in the ocean, but they really don’t have the capacity or the training to do
anything about it,” Holman said.
The U.S. Navy’s goal is to build capability in East Africa in the coming years.
“From talking to the embassies and the State Department, I think we’ll see some things
happening in the near future where the U.S. government is helping the coast guards and
navies in the region with some small boats,” Holman said.
A visit by a U.S. Navy amphibious ship with a shallow draft to get into the ports in the
region and provide a more robust capability is planned in the next seven months, he added.
In an early February interview, Rear Adm. William Loeffler, director of plans for U.S. Naval
Forces Africa and Europe, told Inside the Navy that the interest in maritime safety and
security training is high around the African continent.
“We have a ship [the Robert G. Bradley] that is moving up the eastern coast of Africa,”
Loeffler said. “This ship will be providing basic maritime training in terms of basic vessel
boarding and searches to increase the countries’ capacity to detect and deter illegal fishing or
smuggling activities in their waters, fisheries management, oceanography as well as oil spill
management technology and small boat repair and maintenance.20

20 Zachary M. Peterson, “Commodore: Navy Engagement In East Africa Developing Slowly,” Inside the Navy, March
2, 2009. Material in brackets as in original. A February 9, 2009, press report states:
As the Navy begins another major ship deployment for its Africa Partnership Station initiative in
West Africa, the service is beginning to look toward expanding the APS mission around the
continent to include East Africa, according to service officials.
This week the amphibious dock ship Nashville (LPD-13) arrived in Senegal for its first stop on a
(continued...)
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Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)
The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), headquartered at Naval Amphibious Base,
Little Creek, VA, was established informally in October 2005 and formally on January 13, 2006.
The creation of NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy
organizations that have a role in IW operations. Navy functions supported by NECC include the
following:
• riverine warfare;
• maritime civil affairs;
• expeditionary training;

(...continued)
six-month deployment to engage in training and community outreach activities with five nations in
the Gulf of Guinea region.
The ship will spend 10 days to three weeks in Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon
before wrapping up the mission in Senegal, Capt. Cynthia Thebaud, who heads the APS initiative,
said.
West Africa, specifically the Gulf of Guinea, is an area of interest to the U.S. military in part
because of rich oil resources in a region plagued by piracy, pollution, illegal trafficking of persons,
narcotics and poaching.
In late 2007, the amphibious ship Fort McHenry (LSD-43) and the high-speed vessel Swift (HSV-
2) deployed to the Gulf of Guinea for the first APS mission. During the first deployment, the ships
visited seven countries with an additional stop in Nigeria. This time, Nashville will go to fewer
countries, but spend more time in each, Thebaud explained in an interview last month.
“Instead of going to a number of places in fairly short period of time, we are going to significantly
fewer places for a longer period of time,” she said.
With the success of the initial APS deployment and regular ship visits to the region, Thebaud said
the interest in training and other engagements around the African continent at large is growing.
“The interest in the APS mission is expanding from countries around the littoral of Africa,” she
noted. “They ask, ‘When is APS coming to us?’”
“One of the most significant indicators we have seen is the increased desire for participation,”
Thebaud added. “We have participation from 10 African countries on the staff with a total of 17
African officers as part of the APS staff, [and] new this year is a staff member from Kenya.”
Next year, the Navy is looking at expanding APS to include visits to countries on the eastern side
of the continent, according to Navy officials.
Rear Adm. William Loeffler, director of plans for U.S. Naval Forces Africa and Europe, told Inside
the Navy last week that the interest in maritime safety and security training is high around the
African continent.
“We have a ship [Robert G. Bradley (FFG-49)] that is moving up the eastern coast of Africa this
month,” Loeffler said. “This ship will be providing basic maritime training in terms of basic vessel
boarding and searches to increase the countries’ capacity to detect and deter illegal fishing or
smuggling activities in their waters, fisheries management, oceanography as well as oil spill
management technology and small boat repair and maintenance.”
The purpose of the APS engagements is threefold, Thebaud said: military-to-military maritime
security training, civil affairs and community outreach.
(Zachary M. Peterson, “Mission May Expand Around Continent,” Inside the Navy, February 9, 2009. Material i
brackets as in original.)
“All events are based on requests from the partner nations,” she said. “Any training, workshops, seminars, whether on
the mil-to-mil side or in the civil sector, are all things that have been specifically requested by the partner nations based
on events they have done previously.”
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• explosive ordnance disposal (EOD);
• expeditionary intelligence;
• naval construction (i.e., the naval construction brigades, aka CBs or “Seabee”);
• maritime expeditionary security;
• expeditionary diving;
• combat camera;
• expeditionary logistics;
• guard battalion; and
• expeditionary combat readiness.
The Department of the Navy states that NECC
is a global force provider of adaptive force packages of expeditionary capabilities to joint
warfighting commanders, centrally managing the current and future readiness, resources,
manning, training, and equipping of a scalable, self-sustaining and integrated expeditionary
force of active and reserve sailors. Expeditionary sailors are deployed from around the globe
in support of the new “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” NECC forces and
capabilities are integral to executing the maritime strategy which is based on expanded core
capabilities of maritime power: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection,
maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. To enable these, NECC
provides a full spectrum of operations, including effective waterborne and ashore anti-
terrorism force protection; theater security cooperation and engagement; and humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief.
NECC leads the way in providing integrated active and reserve forces, highlighted by the
seamlessly integrated operational forces of naval construction (Seabees), maritime
expeditionary security (formerly coastal warfare), navy expeditionary logistics (Cargo
Handling Battalions), explosive ordnance disposal, and the remaining mission capabilities
throughout the command.
NECC is not a standalone or combat force, but rather a protection force of rapidly deployable
mission specialists that agilely fill the gaps in the joint battle space and compliment coalition
capabilities.21
The Navy also states that:
The Reserve Component expeditionary forces are integrated with the Active Component
forces to provide a continuum of capabilities unique to the maritime environment within
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). The Navy Reserve trains and equips 47
percent of Sailors supporting NECC missions, including waterborne and ashore anti-
terrorism force protection, in-theater security, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief,
infrastructure maintenance and improvement, and other mission capabilities which are
seamlessly integrated with operational forces around the world.22

21 Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2010 Budget. Washington, 2009. (May 2009)
p. 4-13.
22 Department of the Navy. Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2010 Budget. Washington, 2009. (May 2009)
(continued...)
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Riverine Force
The riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine capabilities of the SEALs and relieve
Marines who have been conducting maritime security operations in ports and waterways in Iraq.
The force consists of three squadrons of 12 boats each, and includes a total of about 900 sailors.
The Navy established Riverine Group 1 (which oversees the three squadrons) at the Naval
Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, in May 2006. The riverine squadrons were established in
2006-2007.
Other Initiatives
Other Navy initiatives in recent years for supporting IW and CT operations include establishing a
reserve civil affairs battalion, a Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community consisting of
officers with specialized knowledge of foreign countries and regions, a maritime interception
operation (MIO) intelligence exploitation pilot program, an intelligence data-mining capability at
the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress
Definition of Navy IW Activities
Potential oversight questions for Congress regarding the definition of Navy IW activities include
the following:
• Should security force assistance operations, civic assistance operations, disaster
relief operations, and counter-piracy operations be included in the definition of
Navy IW operations?
• Should operations to build partnerships, and to build partner capacities for
conducting maritime security operations, be included in the definition of Navy
IW operations?
• Has the Navy included the kinds of operations listed in the two previous points in
its definition of Navy IW operations in part to satisfy a perceived requirement
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to show that the Navy is
devoting a certain portion of its personnel and budgets to irregular warfare?
• Should the Navy’s CT operations be considered a part of its IW operations? What
is the relationship between IW operations and CT operations?
Navy IW Budget Priorities
Potential oversight questions for Congress regarding Navy IW budget priorities include the
following:

(...continued)
p. 4-22.
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• Is the Navy’s list of IW budget items sufficiently organized and prioritized to
support congressional understanding and oversight, or to permit Congress to
know where any additional dollars available for Navy IW operations might best
be added?
• Should items such as expanding Navy sea-based BMD capabilities, procuring
DDG-51 destroyers, and Navy cyber security operations be included in a list of
Navy IW budgetary initiatives?
• Are the Navy’s current IW-oriented UAV/UAS programs sufficiently
coordinated?
Degree of Emphasis on IW and CT in Future Navy Budgets
A third oversight issue for Congress—an issue related to, but more general than the previous
one—is how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets, and
whether decisions reached by DOD on this issue in the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
are appropriate.
Supporters of placing increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets could
argue that the experience of recent years, including U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
suggests that the United States in coming years will likely need to be able to conduct IW and CT
operations, that the Navy has certain specialized or unique IW and CT capabilities that need to be
supported as part of an effective overall U.S. IW or CT effort, and that there are programs relating
to Navy IW and CT activities that could be funded at higher levels, if additional funding were
made available.
Opponents of placing an increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets
could argue that these activities already receive adequate emphasis on Navy budgets, and that
placing an increased emphasis on these activities could reduce the amount of funding available to
the Navy for programs that support the Navy’s role in acting, along with the Air Force, as a
strategic reserve for the United States in potential conventional inter-state conflicts.
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: To what degree can or should
Navy IW and CT activities be used to reduce the burden on other services for conducting such
activities? Are the Navy’s steps to increase its role in IW and CT partly motivated by concerns
about its perceived relevance, or by a desire to secure a portion of IW and CT funding? Is the
Navy striking an appropriate balance between IW and CT activities and other Navy concerns,
such as preparing for a potential future challenge from improved Chinese maritime military
forces?23
Regarding how issues relating to Navy IW and CT capabilities might be discussed in the QDR, an
April 29, 2009 press report stated that:
The Navy and the nation need to have a lively discussion about the maritime domain and
what it takes for the service to operate in that area—including the ability to support and

23 For additional discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S.
Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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maintain sailors and ships dispersed around the globe, according to [Admiral Gary
Roughead,] the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).
Additionally, the Navy is looking to flush out its requirements for the Naval Expeditionary
Combat Command (NECC) during the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), hoping those
discussions will create an opportunity to see how the NECC should evolve....
As the Navy enters into the QDR, Roughead sees the opportunity for discussions about the
military at large and the role of the various components within the military, as well as,
discussions on the naval capabilities the nation needs, the capacity of those capabilities and
the numbers of those capabilities. “That’s what we are going to be doing in QDR.”
One topic Roughead is looking to discuss during the QDR is the NECC.
“Clearly, I think we are going to be looking at that under the rubric of irregular
warfare…what are the components that make that up,” he said. “For the first time we did a
force structure assessment on the expeditionary combat command and remarkably as we
went out into the COCOMs there was not a definitive requirement that came through loud
and clear on riverine [capabilities]. I want to get into that.”
But the lack of a definitive requirement from the combatant commands should not be seen as
the possible demise of the riverine force, Roughead said.
Proof of his support for NECC was demonstrated this year as he pulled funding for the
command from the supplemental and, for the first time, placed it into the Navy’s baseline
budget.
“My position was, if we are going to have this capability you can’t be hanging it on
supplemental funding because if it goes away where are you? So we are migrating NECC
into the base budget,” Roughead said. “We’ve developed some costing models for NECC
that allow us to better predict what the costs are.”
Roughead views the QDR as a good opportunity for the Navy to also explore where it wants
to grow NECC because, in some instances, the sizing of that capability is influenced by the
other services as well, he said.
For example, Roughead pointed to the Seabees. “How many do you need? Because of the
work they are doing, they are pretty much exclusively focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. So
what’s the growth in Army engineers? That’s why the QDR is going to be a good process.”
If the Navy needs more combat engineers and looks to grow its force, and the Army is
growing its engineering force, too, is that the optimum way to do that? Roughead said. “The
QDR is going to let us get into things like that. The QDR will allow us to better flush out the
riverine portion.”
Roughead said the NECC is performing a really good mission and he is trying to get his arms
around how much bigger it should grow.
The capability is so good, Roughead said, he has been working with his foreign counterparts
to explore a riverine exchange program.
Because of the varying locales the riverine force could operate in—from operations in Iraq to
densely forested or complex delta environments—Roughead wants the force to get some
different experiences.
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“The boats we have are great where they are operating, but how do they hold up in
shallower, muddier, thick vegetation areas? I want to find out more about that,” he said.
In the past year and a half, Roughead said he has taken steps to legitimize and put in place
things that portend a good future for NECC.
“A future based on getting it into our base budget, getting force structure analysis—not just
what people think we should have—but where do we think the demands are going to be?
And then getting in and looking at what the internal structure and manning concept should be
for NECC,” he said. “I would say we are doing some good substantive work and good
foundational work to really get NECC forward.”24
A June 1, 2009, press report states:
Much of the current fleet has the capability to perform newer irregular warfare missions, a
point which will be key as the Navy determines the right balance of the force—including
amphibious lift—in the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review, the service’s top
requirements officer said last week.
“When I look at the flexibility of the naval platforms, I think they are full-spectrum
platforms that can contribute across all areas,” Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, the deputy
chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources, said in a May 27
interview at his Pentagon office. “And so we need to fit within the prescribed guidance that
[Defense Secretary Robert Gates] put out, and that’s what we’re working on for balance.”
Gates has recently called for the military force structure to be 50 percent focused on
conventional warfare, 10 percent focused on irregular warfare and 40 percent focused on
dual-use capability for either conventional or irregular warfare. The QDR, which is now
underway, aims to review military force structure writ large.
McCullough said his worry is that the Navy’s irregular warfare capacity has become too
narrowly focused on Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, an umbrella for expeditionary
capabilities such as explosive ordnance disposal, riverine and naval construction units known
as Seabees.
“While their contribution to irregular warfare is great, and they’re very capable and a very
professional force, that’s not the sole focus of irregular warfare inside the Navy,”
McCullough said.
For example, he said, while aircraft carriers are often cited as the prime example of a
conventional warfare capability, the Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) played a pivotal role in
supporting relief efforts following the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia. The Arleigh Burke-
class destroyers have also been used in recent irregular warfare capacities, such as the
Bainbridge (DDG-96), which aided in the capture and killing of pirates off the coast of
Somalia following the hijacking of an American cargo ship.
“That covers the spectrum of warfare,” McCullough said. “That’s not what those ships were
designed for, but it just goes to show you the inherent flexibility of naval platforms.”

24 Geoff Fein, “CNO Sees Need For Discussion On Maritime Domain,” Defense Daily, April 29, 2009: 1-2. Ellipsis in
quote as in the original.
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Amphibious ships are also “ideally suited” for irregular warfare missions, McCullough said,
echoing a sentiment voiced by Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead in an April
25 meeting with reporters. The Austin-class amphibious dock ship Nashville (LPD-13) just
completed a deployment to the Gulf of Guinea region of West Africa for maritime security
training and outreach to several African nations, an endeavor known as Africa Partnership
Station.
While some have argued that acquiring more coastal patrol boats or 178-foot patrol ships is
the right approach to security cooperation missions like APS, McCullough countered that
their small size and small crew are limiting.
“If you send an amphibious ship, you can interact with a multitude of people in the area
where you’re trying to conduct theater security cooperation or engagement, and you can train
a large a majority of those people, because you can bring their craft to your ship or their
people to your ship to interact,” he said. “So then you’ve got an ability to influence a much
broader spectrum of audience.”25
Additional Oversight Questions
In addition to the issues discussed above, the Navy’s IW and CT activities pose some additional
potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following:
• How many Navy personnel globally are involved in IW and CT activities, and
where are they located? How much funding is the Navy expending each year on
such activities?
• Is the Navy adequately managing its Individual Augmentee (IA) program, which
provides many of the Navy personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan?26
• Is the Navy devoting sufficient attention and resources to riverine warfare?27
• Aside from the establishment of the riverine force and a reserve civil affairs
battalion, what implications might an expanded Navy role in IW and CT have for
Navy force-structure requirements (i.e., the required size and composition of the
Navy)?
• Is the Navy adequately coordinating its IW and CT activities and initiatives with
other organizations, such as the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the
Coast Guard?
• Are the Navy’s recent IW and CT organizational changes appropriate? What
other Navy organizational changes might be needed?

25 Rebekah Gordon, “McCullough: Current Fleet Meets Many Irregular Warfare Missions,” Inside the Navy, June 1,
2009.
26 For a discussion of the Navy’s management of the IA program, see Andrew Scutro, “Fleet Forces Takes Charge of
IA Program,” NavyTimes.com, July 7, 2008.
27 For an article that discusses this question from a critical perspective, see Daniel A. Hancock, “The Navy’s Not
Serious About Riverine Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2008: 14-19.
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Legislative Activity for FY2010
FY2010 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 2647/S. 1390)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on H.R.
2647, states:
Interagency Responsibility for Detection, Monitoring and Information Sharing in the
Maritime Domain
The committee is increasingly concerned with the complicated lines of coordination between
interagency organizations in order to persistently detect, monitor and cue responses to deal
with irregular threats from the maritime domain including piracy, proliferation, illicit
trafficking, and terrorism. The committee notes the success of the Joint Interagency Task
Forces (JIATFs) in developing an effective organization for the execution of interagency
counterdrug operations. The committee notes that the scope of irregular threats to the United
States in the maritime domain has increased since the creation of the JIATFs. The committee
is concerned that current interagency mechanisms may not be effectively leveraging the
JIATF model to ensure that detection, monitoring, early warning, and cuing for the full range
of threats in the maritime domain does not lead to exploited jurisdictional seams, redundancy
and inefficiency in acquisition and mission, and lack of information-sharing. Accordingly,
the committee directs that the Secretary of Defense, in collaboration with the Secretary of the
Navy and other interagency partners, submit a report to the congressional defense
committees on interagency responsibilities for maritime threat detection, monitoring and
information-sharing within 90 days of the date of enactment of this Act. (Page 377-378)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) on S. 1390,
states:
Irregular warfare in the Navy
In prepared statements before the committee on the posture of the Department of Defense
regarding the authorization request for fiscal year 2010, the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff both observed that the Department of Defense (DOD)
needed to shift relative emphasis in resource allocations towards the threats we face today
and will likely face tomorrow.
One of those threats encompasses the irregular warfare (IW) mission area. The committee is
concerned that DOD has not shifted enough emphasis quickly enough in certain areas. One
such area is in the Department of the Navy’s budget for IW programs, which may be
inadequate to achieve the objectives the Secretary has laid out.
A major component of the Navy’s ability to contribute to the IW mission area is the Naval
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). A large proportion of NECC force structure is
ground equipment (i.e., SEABEE equipment and vehicles), underwater demolition and
diving equipment, small boats, riverine craft and maritime expeditionary force equipment.
These categories of equipment have seen persistent use and have been exposed to the harsh
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elements in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Central Command theater of operations.
The committee understands that much of that equipment will be left behind or given to local
forces, such as the Iraqi National Army or police forces, when the U.S. withdraws the bulk of
its forces.
The committee expects that the Quadrennial Defense Review will review this situation and
help inform DOD on the requirements to fully fund NECC modernization and sustainment
requirements, and that the Navy will adequately apply resources to those requirements in
future budgets. In addition, the committee believes that any such review of NECC
requirements should account for equipment shortfalls due to: (1) transferring equipment to
local forces; (2) changing force structure requirements; (3) changing threat levels requiring
equipment modifications or different equipment entirely; (4) losing equipment in combat; (5)
operating beyond economic service life; and (6) operating in environments which result in
excessive wear and tear. (Pages 30-31)
The report also states:
Mobile intelligence and tracking systems
The budget request included $108.0 million in PE 63114N [in the Navy’s research and
development account] for advanced technologies for power projection. The Navy has a
science and technology objective to develop data fusion and analysis technologies for
actionable intelligence generation to defeat adaptive irregular threats in complex
environments. In support of that objective, the committee recommends an increase of $4.0
million for research on data processing and fusion technologies to support multiple
simultaneous detections, tracking, identification, and targeting of asymmetric and mobile
threats in combat operations. (Page 63)
The report also states:
United States Joint Forces Command National Program for Small Unit Excellence
The budget request included $8.75 million in Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) for
the creation of the National Program for Small Unit Excellence. The committee is
encouraged by the United States Joint Forces Command’s (JFCOM) intent to develop a
comprehensive approach to small unit excellence by drawing upon academia, lessons learned
from Iraq and Afghanistan, and the conferences held to date. However, the committee is
concerned that additional steps must first be taken to evaluate small unit training doctrine in
order to ensure the most efficient and effective training is developed by the appropriate
agencies. The committee believes training standards, established irregular warfare doctrine,
and integrated requirements are currently lacking. Additionally, the committee is not yet
convinced the Center’s focus is not already an established training focus within the
individual Services, and that the center may be duplicative rather than complementary.
Accordingly, the committee recommends a decrease of $7.0 million in OMN and $3.0 of
Other Procurement, Navy for the National Small Unit Center for Excellence. The committee
authorizes $10.0 million in research, development, test, and evaluation for efforts related to
the proposed National Program for Small Unit Excellence. The committee directs that none
of these funds be used for the establishment of a center. The committee directs that the funds
be used by the Commander of JFCOM to invest in initiatives that will support the
development of small unit capabilities in the services, and that the priority for funding shall
be initiatives that are cost-shared with a service or defense agency. (Page 108)
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FY2010 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-230 on July 24, 2009) on H.R.
3326, states that:
on December 1, 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued guidance elevating the
importance of irregular warfare making it as strategically important as traditional warfare.
The policy requires that the Department integrate irregular warfare concepts and capabilities
into doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities. But this
integration has not completely occurred. It appears that the Department has focused on
scaling back traditional weapons systems such as the F–22 aircraft and DDG–1000 ship
class, but has not addressed the air operations and underway training requirements changes
associated with a focus on irregular warfare. (Page 64)
The report also states:
AFRICA PARTNERSHIP STATION
The Committee recommends an additional $20,500,000 in Operation and Maintenance, Navy
in support of maritime security capacity building in U.S. Africa Command’s (AFRICOM)
area of responsibility. Since November 2007, the U.S. Navy has led joint exercises, port
visits, professional training and community outreach with the coastal nations of West Africa
through the Africa Partnership Station (APS). The Committee commends the Navy’s effort
to increase the ability of our African partners to extend the rule of law out to sea and better
combat illegal fishing, human smuggling, drug trafficking, oil theft and piracy. To increase
the Navy’s role in AFRICOM and ensure a more predictable, robust schedule of exercises
under APS, the Committee has provided $10,500,000 for APS—West for fiscal year 2010.
The Committee also strongly supports AFRICOM’s plan to carry out similar exercises on the
east coast of Africa, and has provided an additional $10,000,000 for APS—East. (Page 81)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-74 of September 10, 2009) on
H.R. 3326, does not directly discuss Navy IW and CT operations.

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Appendix. DOD Interest in Irregular Warfare
This appendix presents examples of statements from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and other
Department of Defense (DOD) officials suggesting that DOD budgets in FY2010 and subsequent
fiscal years will place a certain amount of emphasis on capabilities for conducting irregular
warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations.
In testimony to the Senate Armed Services committee on January 27, 2009, Secretary Gates
stated:
Efforts to put the [DOD] bureaucracy on a war footing have, in my view, revealed
underlying flaws in the institutional priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures of
America’s defense establishment – a set of institutions largely arranged to plan for future
wars, to prepare for a short war, but not to wage a protracted war. The challenge we face is
how well we can institutionalize the irregular capabilities gained and means to support troops
in theater that have been, for the most part, developed ad hoc and funded outside the base
budget.28
In an April 6, 2009, statement at a news conference on recommendations he intended to make to
the president concerning the proposed FY2010 defense budget (which was submitted to Congress
in early-May 2009), Gates stated:
As I told the Congress in January, our struggles to put the defense bureaucracies on a war
footing these past few years have revealed underlying flaws in the priorities, cultural
preferences, and reward structures of America’s defense establishment – a set of institutions
largely arranged to prepare for conflicts against other modern armies, navies, and air forces.
Programs to directly support, protect, and care for the man or woman at the front have been
developed ad hoc and funded outside the base budget. Put simply, until recently there has not
been an institutional home in the Defense Department for today’s warfighter. Our
contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and a bureaucratic
constituency similar to conventional modernization programs. I intend to use the FY10
budget to begin this process.29
In the question-and-answer portion of the April 6, 2009, news conference, Gates stated:
the reality is that – and let me put this very crudely – if you broke this [recommended
FY2010] budget out, it would probably be about 10 percent for irregular warfare, about 50
percent for traditional, strategic and conventional conflict, and about 40 percent dual-purpose
capabilities.
So this is not about irregular warfare putting the conventional capabilities in the shade. Quite
the contrary: this is just a matter – for me, at least – of having the irregular-war constituency
have a – have a seat at the table for the first time when it comes to the base budget....

28 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Submitted Statement, Senate Armed Services Committee, Tuesday, January
27, 2009, 9:30 A.M., p. 12.
29 Defense Budget Recommendation Statement (Arlington, VA), As Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense
Robert M. Gates, Arlington, VA, Monday, April 6, 2009, available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1341.
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I think that this debate between conventional and irregular is quite artificial. Most of the
people that I talk to are now increasingly talking about, instead of one or the other, a
spectrum of conflict in which you may face at the same time an insurgent with an AK-47 and
his supporting element with a highly sophisticated ballistic missile, where you – where you
have what we have been calling in the last year or so complex hybrid warfare. And so you
really need to be prepared across a spectrum to deal with these capabilities.
And that’s why I – going back to my crude carve-up of the budget of 40 percent dual-
purpose, I think we have to be prepared all along that spectrum. And again, I think what
people have lost sight of is I'm not trying to have irregular capabilities take the place of the
conventional capabilities. I'm just trying to get the irregular guys to have a seat at the table
and to institutionalize some of the needs that they have so that we can get the need – so we
can get what they need to them faster and so that we don't have go outside the Pentagon
bureaucracy every time there’s a need for the warfighter that has to be met in a relatively
short period of time. 30
In a May 5, 2009, statement, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn stated:
To better meet the needs of today’s conflicts, while positioning our force for the future,
Secretary Gates last month announced a reshaping of the budget and priorities of the Defense
Department. As is often the case when bold action is required, some people may not agree.
The decisions were based on three strategic objectives:...
• The second objective is to establish an institutional home for the warfighter in the base
budget. We need to rebalance toward forces dedicated to irregular warfare, while still
hedging against the longer-term risks of larger, more sophisticated adversaries. This
means increasing ISR support for the warfighter, especially through unmanned aerial
vehicles. It means growing our special operations forces. And it means boosting our
global partnership capacity to train and equip foreign militaries to undertake
counterterrorism and stability operations....
The United States today stands unsurpassed on, above, and below the high seas. In terms of
tonnage, our battle fleet is far larger than any potential adversary. And, no other fleet has
anything like the reach or combat power of a single American carrier strike group. One
consideration, as we rebalance the department’s priorities, is that the military dominance we
enjoy is greater in some areas than others. We looked for ways to strengthen irregular-
warfare capabilities while maintaining the overwhelming edge we enjoy in conventional
capabilities.
The Navy must be ready for counterinsurgency and other irregular operations, which means
dealing with non-state actors at sea or near shore, or with a swarm of speedboats sent by
militia groups or countries like Iran. The requirement is for numbers, speed, and the ability to
maneuver in shallow waters.
The craft that best fills that bill is the LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] which, despite its past
development problems, is a versatile ship that can be turned out in quantity and go places
that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the big, blue-water surface combatants. As
we’ve seen off the coast of Somalia, it does not take a large ship to carry out antipiracy
missions.31

30 Transcript of news conference, available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=4396
31 [Statement at] Navy League Sea, Air, and Space Expo, As Prepared for Delivery by Deputy Secretary of Defense
(continued...)
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In a May 14, 2009, statement, Lynn stated:
Even as we strengthen the Joint Force, we’re doing something else. We’re giving our
warfighters an “institutional home:” inclusion in the base budget and the steady, long-term
funding that they deserve and need. We’ve added nearly $2 billion to the base budget for
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), including the unmanned aerial vehicles
so critical in Iraq and Afghanistan. We’re increasing our Special Operations forces, with
more personnel and more equipment. We’re increasing our buy of Littoral Combat Ships.
And we’re reshaping the Army’s Future Combat System. We are immediately pushing out,
throughout the Army, the new technologies and unmanned vehicles needed on the battlefield
today. At the same time, we’re halting the ground vehicle program and we’ll ensure that
future vehicles reflect the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Together, these changes send an unmistakable message to our armed forces and to our
adversaries: from now on, irregular warfare is a regular part of America’s military
planning.32

Author Contact Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610





(...continued)
William J. Lynn, National Harbor, Maryland, Tuesday, May 5, 2009, available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/
speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1348.
32 [Statement entitled] “A New Direction in Defense” at the 3rd Annual Joint Warfighting Conference, As Prepared for
Delivery by Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III, 3rd Annual Joint Warfighting Conference Va. Beach
Convention Center, Thursday, May 14, 2009, available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?
speechid=1372.
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