Illegal Drug Trade in Africa:
Trends and U.S. Policy
Liana Sun Wyler
Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
September 30, 2009
Congressional Research Service
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Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy

Summary
Africa has historically held a peripheral role in the transnational illicit drug trade, but in recent
years has increasingly become a locus for drug trafficking, particularly of cocaine. Recent
estimates suggest that each year between 46 and 300 metric tons of South American cocaine may
transit West Africa en route to Europe. Recent cocaine seizure levels are sharply higher than those
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which in all of Africa rarely exceeded 1 metric ton a year.
Africa’s emergence as a trafficking nexus appears to have resulted from structural shifts in
international drug trafficking patterns, including heighted European demand for cocaine,
international counternarcotics pressure driving drug traffickers away from traditional trafficking
routes, and the operational allure for traffickers of low levels of law enforcement capacity and
high rates of corruption in many African countries.
The growth of drug trafficking through Africa poses new challenges to international
counternarcotics efforts, as well as a variety of emergent threats to the United States. Novel
strategies and adaptations of existing efforts may be required to track emergent drug flow
patterns, dismantle major criminal syndicates involved in such trafficking, and prevent future
hotspots from emerging. While most of the cocaine transiting Africa is destined for Europe, and
little of it enters the United States, other illicit substances trafficked through the region, notably
heroin and illegally traded chemical precursors used to produce illicit drugs, do enter the United
States. The growing drug trade in Africa also poses other threats to U.S. interests. These include
the reported involvement of Latin American criminal groups, including elements of at least one
U.S.-designated terrorist organization, that are targets of U.S. counternarcotics or military
operations. Other challenges include threats to U.S. policy interests and assistance programs in
Africa, such as efforts to advance good governance, political stability, rule of law, and human
rights, and programs to build African law enforcement and counternarcotics capacities.
U.S. counternarcotics policy responses to the rise in trans-Africa drug trafficking are in the
formative stages. Several U.S. agencies are evaluating the scope of the problem and identifying
short-term remedies, such as efforts to expand drug monitoring and interdiction in Africa, and
long-term efforts designed to strengthen local capacity to combat drugs in the region. In recent
years, U.S. agencies have begun to devote greater resources to combating the drug trade in Africa.
The State Department requested $7.5 million for counternarcotics assistance in Africa in FY2010,
up from about $0.5 million in FY2006, while the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to allocate
$19.3 million in FY2009 and $28 million in FY2010 to counternarcotics programs in Africa.
The threat of drug trafficking in Africa has drawn attention in recent Congresses. P.L. 110-417,
for instance, required that DOD submit a report to Congress laying out a counternarcotics strategy
for the region. On June 23, 2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing entitled
Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa. In responding to recent and ongoing executive
branch efforts to devote increased resources and attention to this problem, Congress may choose
to review existing authorities and funding levels for counternarcotics programs in Africa. Key
policy questions that may arise in this respect include how best to reduce gaps in intelligence and
data collection relating to the drug trade in Africa, how to balance short-term and long-term
counternarcotics goals and strategies, how various U.S. civilian and military and international
agency counternarcotics roles and responsibilities in Africa should be defined, and what types and
levels of resources these efforts may require.

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Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy

Contents
Introduction: The Rising Drug Trafficking Threat........................................................................ 1
Implications for U.S. Interests ..................................................................................................... 2
Confluence of Transnational Drug Syndicates and Other Security Threats ............................. 3
Potential Links Between Drug Trafficking and Terrorist Groups ............................................ 4
Potential for Narco-Violence? ............................................................................................... 5
Other Threats to U.S. Foreign Policy Goals ........................................................................... 5
Corruption and Other Funding-Based Threats to Law Enforcement ................................. 6
Possible Economic Effects .............................................................................................. 6
Possible Governance Impacts .......................................................................................... 7
Drug Trafficking and Use Trends in Africa .................................................................................. 7
Trafficking: Overview........................................................................................................... 7
Cocaine................................................................................................................................. 9
Sources and Destinations................................................................................................. 9
Volume ......................................................................................................................... 10
Geography of Trafficking .............................................................................................. 11
Trafficking Patterns and Actors ..................................................................................... 12
Heroin................................................................................................................................. 14
Cannabis and Cannabis Resin.............................................................................................. 16
Synthetic Drugs and Precursor Chemicals ........................................................................... 20
Illicit Drug Use Trends in Africa ............................................................................................... 22
Focus on West Africa: Explaining the Emergence of the Sub-region as a Global Cocaine
Transit Hub............................................................................................................................ 23
Driving Factors ................................................................................................................... 23
Push Factors ................................................................................................................. 23
Pull Factors................................................................................................................... 24
Driving Factors: Two Applied Examples ....................................................................... 25
Role of West African Criminal Syndicates ........................................................................... 26
U.S. Policy................................................................................................................................ 27
Interagency Approach ......................................................................................................... 28
Implementation ................................................................................................................... 29
Counternarcotics Foreign Assistance ................................................................................... 30
State Department........................................................................................................... 30
DOD/AFRICOM .......................................................................................................... 31
Maritime and Airport Security Assistance...................................................................... 33
Detection, Monitoring, and Interdiction Operations ............................................................. 33
Drug Enforcement Administration Role............................................................................... 34
Drug-Related Anti-money Laundering Efforts ..................................................................... 35
Multilateral and Regional Efforts to Combat Drug Trafficking in Africa .................................... 35
Congressional Role and Possible Oversight Issues..................................................................... 39
Data Reliability: Implications for Analysis and Policymaking.............................................. 39
Short-Term, Targeted Counternarcotics Assistance Versus Long-Term Law
Enforcement Capacity Building........................................................................................ 40
Resource Level and Allocation Considerations .................................................................... 41
Defining Agency Roles and Responsibilities ....................................................................... 42
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Figures
Figure A-1. Map of Africa ......................................................................................................... 48

Tables
Table 1.2006 Drug Seizures in Africa .......................................................................................... 8
Table 2. Cocaine Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006......................................................................... 11
Table 3. Heroin and Morphine Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006 .................................................... 16
Table 4. Cannabis Herb Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006 .............................................................. 17
Table 5. Cannabis Plant Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006 .............................................................. 17
Table 6. Cannabis Resin Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006 ............................................................. 19
Table 7. Amphetamine-Type Drug Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006 .............................................. 20
Table 8. Ecstasy Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006 ......................................................................... 21
Table 9.Number of Drug Users in Africa, 2005-2006................................................................. 23
Table 10. Status of Interagency Country Assessments ................................................................ 29
Table 11. State Department Counternarcotics Assistance to Africa, FY2006 Actual-
FY2010 Request .................................................................................................................... 31
Table 12. DOD/AFRICOM Counternarcotics Assistance to Africa, FY2009-FY2010................. 32
Table A-1. Reported Cocaine Seizures of 10 Kilos or More in West Africa Since 2000 .............. 43
Table A-2. Status of Sub-Saharan and North African Countries’ Membership in
Multilateral Anti-Crime Agreements or Bodies ....................................................................... 45

Appendixes
Appendix. Cocaine Seizures and African Membership in Illicit Drug Conventions .................... 43

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 49

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Introduction: The Rising Drug Trafficking Threat
A rise in illicit drug trafficking in Africa in recent years has drawn the attention of U.S. policy
makers. The 110th Congress, for instance, passed P.L. 110-417, which required that the
Department of Defense submit a report to Congress laying out a counternarcotics strategy for the
region, among other related goals. The issue has also arisen in the 111th Congress. On June 23,
2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing entitled Confronting Drug
Trafficking in West Africa, and other recent hearings have also referenced this issue. President
Barack Obama has also highlighted the challenge posed by drug trafficking in Africa, which he
has stated “threatens stability” throughout West Africa.1
Africans have been involved in the global illicit drug trade for several decades, both in Africa and
elsewhere, but as a region, sub-Saharan Africa played a generally peripheral role in large-scale
global drug trafficking prior to the mid-2000s. This was due, in part, to its geographic distance
from traditional key centers of non-cannabis illicit drug production and consumption and from
primary transit routes between them. While commercially significant amounts of some drugs,
particularly heroin, reportedly transited the region in the 1980s and 1990s, the amounts trafficked
were generally much smaller than those in most other global regions. With the exception of
cannabis, local drug demand and supply incentives also remained low by global standards for
several reasons. These included a relative lack of purchasing power as a result of low average
household incomes across much of sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa” hereafter, except where
otherwise noted), along with widespread cultural unfamiliarity with and exposure to the main
non-cannabis, illicit narcotics common in other parts of the world.
Africa’s relative peripheral status vis-à-vis the global trade in non-cannabis illicit narcotic drugs
appears, however, to be ending. Hotspots of illegal drug activity have emerged in West Africa and
East Africa, as well as in Southern Africa. Diverse signs of drug trafficking activity in West Africa
during the past five years indicate that this sub-region is emerging as a key warehousing and
transshipment hub for large-scale consignments of South American cocaine being smuggled en
route to Europe.2 In recent years, the region has witnessed a sharp rise in record-sized multi-ton
cocaine seizures and a rise in reported cocaine criminal cases involving diverse foreign and
African individuals, including African state officials and Latin American drug syndicate
members.
Recent reports showing a decline in cocaine seizures in Africa in early 2009 have emerged in
contrast to the rapid rise in reported trafficking volumes passing through the region in recent prior
years. Analysts are currently debating whether the decline in 2009 seizures is indicative of a
short-term or long-term trend. Questions at issue include whether the decline is the result of
increasing counterdrug efforts in the region, recent positive changes in political and governance

1White House, Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament, (Accra, Ghana), July 11, 2009; and White
House, Readout of the President’s Call with President Mills of Ghana, Office of the Press Secretary, April 10, 2009.
2 See, for example, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in
West Africa, November 2008; UNODC, Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development
(with Special Reference to Guinea-Bissau), December 2007; UNODC, Crime and Development in Africa, June 2005;
and UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 2005, as well as numerous press reports.
UNODC, which monitors drug trafficking trends in globally and assists countries to design and carry out
counternarcotics efforts, is a key source of data on illicit drug trafficking and other criminal trends in Africa.
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factors in the region, or an indication that drug traffickers have adopted improved smuggling
methods and are successfully evading detection.3
According to analyses by government and multilateral agencies, Kenya and Ethiopia are notable
transshipment hubs for heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan. East Africa is the primary
smuggling conduit for moving heroin from Southwest Asia to Africa for further transshipment
around the globe, according to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).4 South Africa
has become a source and transshipment point for synthetic drugs, like methamphetamine and
other amphetamine-type drugs, for both domestic consumption and foreign destinations in Europe
and South Asia. There are also reports that multiple countries in Africa are being used as hubs for
the illicit diversion of chemical precursors used to manufacture illegal drugs. According to the
INCB, Africa “has emerged as a major area” for the diversion to the Americas and elsewhere of
the key methamphetamine precursor chemicals ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.5
Local drug consumption trends are generally not well documented because of a paucity of data on
illicit drug usage rates.6 Cannabis use rates in Africa, however, are reportedly among the highest
worldwide, while available data indicate that use of other drugs, including cocaine, heroin, and
amphetamines, is generally below the use rates of other world regions but is growing in some
African countries.7
Implications for U.S. Interests
Historically, U.S. and international policy makers directed relatively little attention to
counternarcotics issues in Africa, largely because the potential consequences for the United States
and other non-African countries arising from drug trafficking in the region were typically viewed
as limited. The perception that such activity may indeed threaten U.S. and other international
interests has grown, however, as Africa’s role in global trafficking has expanded. Some U.S.
observers now argue that the rise in drug trafficking in Africa has been so rapid and large—an
indication that international drug trafficking patterns are in flux—that it must now be given
heightened consideration within the context of global U.S. counternarcotics goals and strategies.8

3 UNODC, “Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment,” 2009; and Oxford
Analytica, “West Africa: Reports Underestimate Trafficking Impact,” August 10, 2009.
4 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2008,
E/INCB/2008/1, February 2009.
5 See INCB (2009). See also INCB, Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, March 2008.
6 Such a lack of data is in part due to a lack of treatment facilities, which often help collect such information. UNODC,
2009 World Drug Report, June 2009.
7 Illicit drug markets sometimes arise as an indirect effect of trafficking in countries that lie along trafficking routes but
are not primary target market destinations for drug shipments. The availability of local supplies that generate drug use
and demand may be created when, for instance, in-kind drug payments are made by large-scale smugglers to local
accomplices; when drugs are found on beaches or elsewhere after being lost by smugglers due to shipwrecks or
jettisoning to escape law enforcement; or when corrupt police officials sell seized drug stocks. In the context of cocaine
trafficking West Africa en route to Europe, this appears to have occurred most prominently in Guinea-Bissau. See, for
instance, Kevin Sullivan, “Route of Evil,” Washington Post, May 25, 2008; and U.N. Integrated Regional Information
Networks (IRIN hereafter) “Guinea-Bissau: Cocaine to Europe Produces Addicts Locally,” March 3, 2008.
8 For such a discussion, see hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs:
Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009.
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The extent of this rise also suggests that such activities have the potential to threaten diverse U.S.
security, foreign policy, and economic interests within Africa.
Confluence of Transnational Drug Syndicates and Other
Security Threats
The growth of drug trafficking through Africa poses new challenges to international
counternarcotics efforts, as well as a variety of emergent threats to the United States. These trends
suggest that novel strategies or adaptations of existing ones may be required to track emergent
drug flow patterns, dismantle major criminal syndicates involved in such trafficking, and prevent
future hotspots from emerging. Many observers have raised concerns about potentially growing
operational linkages between Latin American, West African, and Southwest Asian drug syndicates
and European criminal elements. The increased trade suggests that such organizations are
growing in capacity, strength, and global reach.9 There are signs that Latin American trafficking
syndicates have expanded into the region. Several Latin American individuals from countries
such as Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Mexico, some with known or suspected ties to
cocaine syndicates, have been arrested in cocaine cases in West Africa in recent years. The U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) also reports that since 2007, “DEA has identified at
least nine top-tier South American and Mexican DTOs [drug trafficking organizations] that have
established operations in Africa.”10 Numerous Latin American persons, some suspected of having
drug links, have reportedly established residences and businesses in Africa, particularly in West
Africa.11
Many of the same transnational Latin American drug trafficking organizations that supply U.S.
drug markets and engage in other, often violent, crimes targeting U.S. citizens, interests, or
jurisdictions are believed to be playing a key role in the rapid growth of drug trafficking in
Africa.12 In this respect, the threat to U.S. interests posed by this trend is direct, because these
actors’ expansion into Africa increases their global reach and provides them additional profits and
organizational linkages, making them more financially and operationally diversified, robust, and
versatile—and thus more difficult and to track and halt. For West African criminal groups,
growing involvement with Latin American cocaine traffickers signifies their expansion beyond
heroin trafficking, their traditional niche in the drug trade.

9 See, for example, Amado Philip de Andrés, “West Africa Under Attack: Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism as
the New Threats to Global Security,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, January 2008; Antonio L. Mazzitelli, “Transnational
Organized Crime in West Africa: The Additional Challenge,” International Affairs, 83:6, 2007; UNODC, Organized
Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe, July 2006; and UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the
West African Region, 2005.
10 Testimony of Thomas Harrigan, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs:
Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009.
11 For examples, see Appendix A, Table A 1, Reported Cocaine Seizures of 10 Kilos or More in West Africa Since
2000.
12 See testimony of Michael Braun, Managing Partner of the Spectre Group International, before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: Merida Initiative, March 18, 2009.
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Potential Links Between Drug Trafficking and Terrorist Groups
Drug trafficking in Africa may also facilitate collaboration or other synergies between drug
trafficking organizations and the activities or interests of other entities that are adversarial to U.S.
interests. These may include non-drug-related transnational organized crime networks and,
potentially, U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations, including the leftist rebel group, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and Hezbollah. Both of these groups are
reportedly involved in drug trafficking and money laundering in regions other than Africa, and
Hezbollah supporters are reportedly common among West Africa’s Lebanese commercial
diaspora. These or similar entities, potentially including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), could earn money directly from participation in the African drug trade.13 Such entities
could also derive indirect benefits from the African drug trade (e.g., sources of financing for non-
drug operations, increased international ties with other illicit actors, or access to barter deals
involving drugs and other illicit goods, such as black market arms).14
The strongest known link between drug trafficking and international terrorist groups in West
Africa involves the FARC, which has been linked to cocaine trafficking into Venezuela, from
where much of the cocaine now transiting West Africa is believed to be exported. 15 Hezbollah,
which reportedly has financial and business ties and a network of supporters in West Africa and in
Europe, among other world regions, has been linked to cocaine traffic originating in or transiting
Venezuela, as well as in other countries, including the United States. Although there are no
substantiated public reports of Hezbollah involvement in trans-African cocaine traffic originating
in Venezuela, given the group’s reported involvement in cocaine trafficking in other countries and
its links in Africa, some analysts believe that Hezbollah may be involved in Africa-related
trafficking trade, particularly with regard to the laundering of trafficking earnings between
Europe and Africa.16 Some analysts believe that a portion of earnings from the trade are laundered

13 AQIM is a regional affiliate of the international Al Qaeda terrorist group that operates in multiple countries within
the Sahara and is believed to be involved in contraband trade along traditional trans-Saharan smuggling routes. Daniel
Williams, “Al-Qaeda Sahara Network Spurs U.S. to Train Chad, Mali Forces,” Bloomberg News, April 23, 2008; and
Nicholas Schmidle, “The Saharan Conundrum,” New York Times Magazine, February 15, 2009.
14 See Williams (2008); Schmidle (2009); David M. Luna/State Department, “Narco-Trafficking: What Is the Nexus With
the War on Terror?” panel presentation, Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association/Southern Command
Conference SOUTH 2008: Drugs and the Americas: What Are the Challenges and the Global Impact?, October 8, 2008;
Alain Rodier, “L’Infiltration d’Al-Qaeda en Afrique’” [Al-Qaeda’s Infiltration of Africa], Centre Français de Recherche sur
le Renseignement (CF2R), Note d'Actualité, No. 2, 2004; and J. Peter Pham, “Islamist Extremism’s Rising Challenge to
Morocco,” World Defense Review, August 7, 2008.
15 See CRS Report RL32488, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy, by Mark P. Sullivan; UNODC, The
Threat of Narco-Trafficking in the Americas (October 2008); International Crisis Group [ICG], Drugs I: Losing the
Fight and Latin American Drugs II: Improving Policy and Reducing Harm, both dated March 14, 2008; Andy Webb-
Vidal, “Cocaine Coasts: Venezuela’s and West Africa’s Drug Axis,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 2009; Angel
Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional
Stability, RAND Corporation, 2001; Samuel Logan, “FARC Moves to Consolidate Trafficking Network,”
[commentary], Security Watch, International Relations and Security Network, July 18, 2006; and Juliette Kerr Luis
Carlos Niño, “Brazil to Strengthen Ties with Colombia and Bolivia, Global Insight Daily Analysis, July 18, 2008.
16 On Hezbollah, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Hizballah Network in Africa,” press release
TG-149, May 27, 2009; Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, “Drug Probe finds Hezbollah Link,” Los Angeles Times,
October 22, 2008; Sara A. Carter, “Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes into U.S.,” Washington Times, March 27,
2009; Prepared Statement of James Phillips, for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe:
Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List, June 20, 2007; Douglas Farah, Hezbollah’s External Support Network in
West Africa and Latin America, International Assessment and Strategy Center, August 4, 2006; Michael P. Arena,
“Hizballah’s Global Criminal Operations,” Global Crime, August 1, 2006; Luna/State Department (2008); and Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, Counterfeit Goods: Easy Cash for Criminals and
(continued...)
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through a process in which cash earnings are illicitly exported to African countries, where the
funds are then legally wired to banks in the Middle East in which Hezbollah may play a role.
Little known evidence, however, indicates that either Hezbollah or AQIM are playing a
significant role in drug flows through the region—with the possible exception of hashish in the
case of AQIM.17
Potential for Narco-Violence?
Some analysts warn that the rise in drug trafficking in Africa could prompt a rise in criminal
violence in the region. African authorities have seized small arms from Latin American cocaine
trafficking suspects in several West African cocaine cases, and several drug trade-related shoot-
outs and murders in the region are known to have occurred in recent years. To date, however,
there has been no marked or widespread rise in drug-linked criminal violence in Africa.18 While
analysts may debate whether there is a potential for the growth of drug-related violence in Africa,
other countries’ experiences, most notably Mexico today, highlight the potential danger of drug-
related violence.
One of the most recent violent, possibly drug-related incidents involved the assassination of
Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces chief, Batista Tagme Na Wai, on March 1, 2009, which was
followed within hours by a reportedly retaliatory murder of the country’s president, Joao
Bernardo “Nino” Vieira. No publicly available evidence suggests that drug trafficking
organizations were behind the assassinations, and there are strong indications that political factors
may have played a role in the deaths. Both men were party to Guinea-Bissau’s 1998 civil war, and
the two men were reportedly bitter political rivals. Some reports suggest, however, that the
remote-controlled bomb that was used to assassinate Na Wai could imply a drug link in his death.
Such devices are reportedly rarely used in the region but are frequently used by Mexican and
Colombian drug trafficking organizations. Both men had taken public stances against drug
trafficking, but both were also reportedly believed by diplomatic sources, international
organization representatives, and some analysts to have had links to the drug trade.19
Other Threats to U.S. Foreign Policy Goals
Growing transnational drug trafficking in Africa may directly jeopardize other U.S. foreign and
economic policy goals in Africa, such as the promotion of legitimate economic growth, state

(...continued)
Terrorists, May 25, 2005.
17 Testimony of William Wechsler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Office of Counternarcotics and Global
Threats, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on
African Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009.
18 Isolated reported incidents include a shootout between smugglers and security forces prior to the seizure of 750
kilograms of cocaine in Mali near Algeria, and the death of two suspected Ghanaian smugglers in Benin prior to an
August 2007 seizure of 350 kilograms of cocaine.
19 See Brent Latham, “Bissau Assassinations Highlight Obstacles to Drug Trafficking Fight,” VOA News, March 3,
2009; Todd Pitman, “Guinea-Bissau Collapse Deepens after Leader Killed,” Associated Press, March 5, 2009; Assimo
Balde and Rukmini Callimachi, “Twin Assassinations Leave Guinea-Bissau in Turmoil,” Associated Press, March 2,
2009; Tristan McConnell, “President Joao Bernardo Vieira of Guinea-Bissau Assassinated by Army,” The Times,
March 3, 2009; Agence France Presse, “Murdered GBissau General Found 200 kilos of Cocaine: Officer,” March 5,
2009.
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institution-building, and diverse other foreign aid program goals.20 It could also put at risk large
amounts of peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction assistance that the United States and
other donors have invested in the region, notably in West Africa, in recent decades.
Corruption and Other Funding-Based Threats to Law Enforcement
An increase in drug trafficking could have a negative impact on levels of corruption among law
enforcement, judicial, and military officials. Drug corruption poses a particular danger to African
states since, due to their institutional and economic weaknesses, relatively small financial
resources may be required to elicit high levels of corrupt behavior by officials and to vastly
expand the challenges faced by already-challenged criminal justice systems (see text box on
“Regional Vulnerabilities,” below).21 Moreover, the high volumes and value of the drugs being
moved through the region mean that large-scale traffickers have at their disposal financial
resources that are significant in relation to low average incomes common in the region. There are
indications that this threat is being realized—particularly at regional air and sea ports of entry,
where high levels of corruption and low official pay facilitates the trafficking of illegal drugs.22
State officials have been implicated in a number of drug-related cases in multiple African
countries. Similarly, the organizational and logistical assets that Latin American drug syndicates
can potentially bring to bear in operations in Africa are extensive and sophisticated in comparison
to those available to many law enforcement agencies in the region. Should trafficking through the
region grow substantially, these assets could pose a substantial added challenge to governments’
capacities to combat such activities.
Possible Economic Effects
There are some indications that the scale of the illicit narcotics trade may be growing so large as
to rival the volume of legal trade in some sectors. The United Nations (U.N.) Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) has reported that the wholesale value of the cocaine transiting West Africa, for

20 See, for example, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Framework, which outlines the U.S. government’s primary foreign aid
goals, including, good governance, rule of law and human rights, transnational crime, and counternarcotics. State
Department, Supplemental Reference: Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions, December 12,
2008.
21 Such corruption has been reported in the region in several countries, most notably Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, and
Ghana, among others. In Guinea-Bissau and Ghana, there have been several cases in which suspected large-scale
cocaine shipments that were seized or targeted in drug operations disappeared prior to or after being confiscated, in
most cases with alleged with official connivance. The National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD)
junta that took power in Guinea in after the death of long-time president Lansana Conte in December 2008, however,
has pledged to end cocaine trafficking, even though there are reports that some of its membership has been tied to
cocaine trafficking. See UNODC (December 2007); Léonard Vincent, Guinea-Bissau: Cocaine and Coups Haunt
Gagged Nation, Reporters Without Borders, November 2007; Alistair Thomson, “Drugs Trade Threatens to Corrode
Ghana’s Image,” Reuters, December 23, 2008; Africa Confidential, “Ghana: Snow White,” July 21, 2006, and “Ghana:
Show Time for the Spooks,” January 16, 2008; Bismark Bebli, “The Drug Menace, Country Sits on Time Bomb,”
Ghanaian Chronicle, May 7, 2008; Dan McDougall, “Ghana to UK: The New Trail of Misery,” The Observer (UK),
November 11, 2007; BBC News, “Guinea Drug Agents are ‘Corrupt,’” October 22, 2008; BBC News, “Guinea Drugs
Bust Nets Officials,” September 5, 2008; Pascal Fletcher, “Bauxite-Exporter Guinea Faces Drugs Trade Threat-UN,”
July 12, 2008; Integrated Regional Information Networks News (IRIN)/U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, “Guinea: Drug Trade ‘Potentially More Dangerous Than Guinea-Bissau,’” October 10, 2008;
Saliou Samb, “Guinea Holds Conte Son in Drugs Probe - Police,” Reuters, February 24, 2009; and Agence France
Presse, “Guinea: Son of Late President Conte Confesses to Drugs Trafficking,” February 26, 2009.
22 Stephanie Hanson, “In West Africa, Threat of Narco-States,” Council on Foreign Relations—Daily Analysis, July
10, 2007.
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example, may be starting to rival that of a number of primary legal export commodities produced
in the region. UNODC findings have also highlighted several economic trends that may be
indicative of drug-related effects on economies in the region, including the unexplained doubling
or tripling in annual remittances from Europe to several West African countries, and relatively
sudden, substantial increases in foreign direct investments in several others.23
If drug-related criminality in the region were to increase markedly, some analysts fear that legal
foreign investment in the region—which is already low in many countries, due to a variety of
factors—could be further deterred, potentially negatively affecting U.S. interests in the region.24
For example, State Department analysts suggest that such inhibitions on investment could
potentially negatively affect U.S. energy security interests in the region by affecting U.S. oil
sector investments.25 On the other hand, it remains unclear how much of a marginal increase
drug-related inhibitions on investment, including investment in the energy sector, might add to a
substantial existing level of foreign business reticence to invest in Africa. Large energy firms
have long routinely operated in very challenging business climates, remote and harsh
environmental contexts, and in countries that are affected by high levels of corruption or political
instability.
Possible Governance Impacts
Corruption and the economic value of inflows of drug-related hard currency funds into Africa’s
relatively small economies hold the potential to undermine the political will to strongly back
substantive and effective counter-narcotics efforts, and could pose a range of broader governance
threats. These include the potential undermining of civil and constitutional liberties, notably
freedom of the press, and limitations on citizens’ franchise powers to suit the interests of corrupt
officials. In the extreme, in cases in which the operational influence of drug trafficking networks
significantly penetrates key institutions, such as the military, the sovereignty or viability of states
as independent rule of law-based entities may be jeopardized. Such concerns have been
repeatedly raised by many analysts with regard to Guinea-Bissau, as well as Guinea, albeit to a
lesser extent, during the final years in power of the late President Conte.
Drug Trafficking and Use Trends in Africa
Trafficking: Overview
Although long considered a relatively minor global source, destination, and transit point for
illegal drugs, Africa’s role in global illicit drug trade has grown in recent years (see Table 1 for
drug seizure levels in 2006, the most recent year for which Africa-wide data were available).

23 See for example UNODC (November 2008) and UNODC (December 2007).
24 Such factors include investor concerns over high business risk, perceived high levels of corruption, lack of
infrastructure and diversified supply chains, and the relative difficulty of doing business in the region, among others.
Several studies and annual indices show that, whether merited or not, such factors are widely viewed by many investors
as major impediments to investment in Africa. See, for instance, World Bank Ease of Doing Business, 2009; and Africa
Business Initiative, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Inside the Boardroom: How Corporate America Really Views Africa,
May 2009; and Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2008.
25 State Department response to CRS inquiry, June 2, 2009.
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Most prominent among recent drug trafficking trends in Africa is the record number of multi-ton
seizures of cocaine in West Africa. Between 2005 and 2008, West African, European, and U.S.
officials have seized at least 46 metric tons of cocaine bound for Europe via West Africa. This
represents a significant rise over impoundment levels in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when
total drug seizures rarely exceeded more than 1 metric ton per year for the entire continent.
Although the region has long been a transit point for small consignments of cocaine destined for
Europe, the volume and frequency of cocaine seizures in recent years appears to indicate
emerging changes in methods used for trafficking of cocaine, the mix of criminal actors involved,
and in patterns of global cocaine movement and consumption. How durable such changes may
prove, however, is unclear.
Table 1.2006 Drug Seizures in Africa
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)
Heroin
and
Cannabis
Cannabis
Cannabis

Morphine Cocaine Herb
Plant
Resin Amphetamines
Ecstasy
East Africa
137.9
17.0
225,340.6
32,236.1
2.3
N/A
0.0
North
Africa 78.6
91.2
146,490.5 427.7
118,523.6 2.1
1.0
Southern
29.7
363.4 637,227.9 145,751.6 54.8
315.4
22.9
Africa
West and
107.6 14,578.9
207,820.0
928.4 10,426.0
517.7
3.5
Central
Africa
Africa
Total 353.8
15,050.6 1,216,879.1
179,343.7 129,006.8 835.1
27.5
World
Total 103,991.6 705,789.4 5,239,695.3 1,340,507.5 1,024,828.6 43,171.5
4,510.7
African Share
0.3% 2.1% 23.2% 13.4% 12.5% 1.9%
0.6%
of Global
Total (%)
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding. According to the UNODC, a possible seizure estimate error
related to a cocaine case in Nigeria in 2006 may exaggerate total cocaine seizures for the region by as much as
11 tons for that year. In addition, a lack of data for some countries may result in under-reporting for all years.
No other source for comparable data is available as of June 10, 2009.
While a wide variety of factors may explain the relatively sudden rise of cocaine trafficking
through West Africa, a number of structural and institutional characteristics common to many
African countries may make the region as a whole susceptible to trafficking of various illicit
substances. These are discussed in the following text box.




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Regional Vulnerabilities
Africa—in particular West Africa with respect to cocaine trafficking—is viewed as attractive to traffickers because
they are likely to face relatively lower risks of monitoring and apprehension by law enforcement there than in many
other world regions. While the capabilities of African governments vary, sometimes substantially, many countries on
the sub-continent share a number of socio-economic and state characteristics that appear to make the region a
favorable operating environment for traffickers. These include the following:
• Poor internal transport and communications systems, which impede tracking and monitoring of drug trafficking.
• Large, sparsely populated, remote zones; porous land borders, frequent, often long-established patterns of
unrecorded or illicit cross-border trade.
• Lack of maritime, air, and land surveillance and interdiction technical capacities, and often limited seaport,
airport, and border post security and goods shipment controls, and lack of operational and logistical resources
for these purposes.
• Institutionally weak law enforcement and judicial systems that, in some cases, are subject to corruption or
political influence.
• Limited state regulatory controls and administrative capacities, and a frequent general lack of public fiscal
resources, resulting in low levels of public sector compensation and/or salary arrears and often widespread
public sector corruption.
• High rates of poverty and unemployment, and a sizable differential between average income levels in the region
and the amount of operational capital and profits available to large-scale trafficking organizations.
The latter three factors may give rise to financial incentives that may prompt significant numbers of African citizens or
public officials to accept payment in exchange for facilitating or participating in trafficking. Several countries also share
other unique features seen as making them particularly susceptible to trafficking. Gambia, Benin, and Togo, for
instance, host busy ports that function as large-scale import and re-export hubs for regional trade in licit, gray, and
black market goods. This loosely regulated, high-volume trade may offer a useful conduit for concealing illicit drugs.
Similarly, several countries, notably Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Ghana, host regional commercial air traffic
hubs that connect the region to Europe and are used by drug mules. Lastly, several countries, notably including
Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, are seen as especially vulnerable to trafficking activities because they have
emerged from civil wars within the last decade. Their institutional and governance capacities, notably in the area of
law enforcement, remain weak and rudimentary, even in regional comparison. They also have lengthy histories of
public sector corruption. Sizable cocaine seizures have taken place in each of them, indicating that trafficking can be
empirically documented as affecting them.
Cocaine
Sources and Destinations
As with practically all illegal cocaine, that which transits West Africa originates in South
America, where it is processed in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia using coca leaves grown in the
same countries.26 In 2007, Colombian authorities estimated that approximately 35% of cocaine
produced and shipped from the coasts of Colombia, Venezuela, the Guyanas, and Brazil is
trafficked via West Africa to Europe.27 During the same time period, U.S. and international
authorities estimated that approximately 80% of cocaine traveling from Latin America to Africa

26 In this report, unless otherwise noted, all references to cocaine are to illicit cocaine, and not to cocaine that may be
legally produced and consumed for medical purposes.
27 See UNODC, 2008 World Drug Report; Webb-Vidal (2009); Joanna Wright, “Cocaine Traffickers Develop New
Routes From Brazil,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1, 2006; José De Cordoba and David Luhnow, “U.S.
Accuses Venezuelan Officials in Drug Case,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2008; and José De Cordoba, “Chávez
Lets Colombia Rebels Wield Power Inside Venezuela,” Wall Street Journal, November 25, 2008.
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moved by sea and the remaining 20% by air. In recent years, the proportion of Latin American
cocaine moving through West Africa en route to Europe has increased.
UNODC reports that seizures in Africa increased from under 1 metric ton per year in the 1998-
2002 period to 15 metric tons in 2006, and that during the three years from 2005 through 2007,
officials seized at least 33 metric tons of cocaine bound for Europe via West Africa.28 There has
been a corresponding increase in other drug trafficking indicators: in 2006, 34% and 30% of
cocaine seized at European airports came from the Caribbean and Latin America, respectively,
and 24% came from Africa. In 2007, European cocaine seizures that transited through Africa had
jumped to 46% of the total, while those trafficked directly from Latin America provenance
increased only slightly, to 33%, and those from the Caribbean dropped to 12%.29 In global terms,
African cocaine seizures increased from 0.1% of total global seizures in 2000 to 0.3% in 2005 to
2.1% in 2006 Table 2.30 While this rise may suggest that cocaine trafficking through Africa
remains peripheral in global terms, the proportional rate of growth of this increase has been
abrupt, as has its potential impact on European and African drug supply and use trends.
Volume
The actual amount of cocaine transiting Africa en route to Europe is not known; estimates of both
the total amount of annual European cocaine consumption and the amount being trafficked
through Africa vary significantly. Based on reported drug usage levels in Europe and
extrapolations based on drug seizure data, various U.S., European, and international agency
estimates suggest that between 46 tons and as much as 300 metric tons of cocaine consumed in
Europe may transit West Africa annually.31 Estimates of the value of this trade, and the possible
amount of profit that it may generate for traffickers, also vary widely. One UNODC study
estimated that in 2006, about 40 tons of cocaine worth $1.8 billion—just over 27% of total
European cocaine consumption of 146 tons in that year—passed through Africa. Wholesale
profits on this 40 ton amount are estimated at $450 million, or 25% of the value; these profits
may have been significantly higher if some of this amount was retailed.32 Potential earnings may
also be far higher given that some estimates of the total amount of cocaine entering Europe are
significantly higher than the 146 tons used by UNODC to compile this estimate.33

28 UNODC (December 2007); Simon Baynham, “Drugs Set to Become Africa’s New Invaders,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review, September 1996; and Stephen Ellis, “West Africa’s International Drug Trade,” African Affairs, 108:431, April
2009.
29 UNODC (December 2007).
30UNODC, 2008 World Drug Report.
31INTERPOL estimates that as much as 300 metric tons transit through Africa en route to Europe. The U.S.
Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement estimates that approximately 70% of European demand of about 350
metric tons per year, or 245 metric tons, was being trafficked through Africa or African waters. EUROPOL, the
European Union Police Office, has estimated that recent annual supply levels of 250 tons, while the INCB reports that
approximately 200 to 300 metric tons are smuggled into Europe each year. According to the UNODC, data on seizures
of cocaine in Europe for which a place of provenance had been established indicated that 22% of seized cocaine in
Europe in 2007 passed through Africa, up from 5% in 2004. This increase was steady; European cocaine seizures with
an African provenance stood at 9% in 2005 and 12% in 2006, although there are questions about the methodology used
to measure a large seizure in Nigeria in 2006, which contributed to this dramatic rise. See UNODC (November 2008);
UNODC, 2008 World Drug Report; EUROPOL, “Project COLA: European Union Cocaine Situation Report 2007,”
September 5, 2007; and 2007 INCB Report.
32 UNODC (December 2007).
33 EUROPOL (2007); and 2007 INCB Report.
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In contrast to the reported upward trends in cocaine trafficking through West Africa that have
been reported in recent years, data on cocaine seizures in early 2009 show a drop in the volume of
cocaine transiting through Africa. A UNODC analysis of drug interdiction data from the first
quarter of 2009 suggests that airport seizure incidents have halved since 2008 and that no multi-
ton seizures have occurred to date in 2009 (compared to 11 in 2007 and 4 in 2008).34
Table 2. Cocaine Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
East
Africa
8.0 7.5 25.0 5.7 1,178.4
12.2 17.0
North
Africa
35.8 6.4 21.6 17.2 9.2 843.4 91.2
Southern
Africa
272.6 180.7 455.1 818.7 611.0 343.9 363.4
West & Central Africa
137.1
273.0
98.3
269.3
1,797.9
1,365.0
14,578.9
AFRICA
TOTAL
453.5 467.7 599.9 1,110.9
3,596.6
2,564.4
15,050.6

Change from Prior
2.6% 3.1% 28.3% 85.2% 223.8%
-28.7%
486.9%
Year (%)
Number
of
1,750 539 148 69
2,533 3,681 4,081
Reported Drug
Seizures

Number of African
23 21 21 24 25 30 27
Countries Reporting
Seizures
GLOBAL
TOTAL
344,454.1 365,922.2 372,418.2 499,025.2 579,526.7 749,895.7 705,789.4
AFRICA’S SHARE OF
0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.3% 2.1%
GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs, data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding. According to the UNODC, an error in data for West Africa in
2006 may likely exaggerate total cocaine seizures for the region by as much as 11 tons. No other source for
comparable data is available as of June 10, 2009.
Geography of Trafficking
Traditionally, cocaine destined for Europe followed a northerly route from South America,
through the eastern Caribbean and the Azores, to landing points on the Iberian peninsula and the
Netherlands. Interdiction pressures and other factors appear to have prompted a southward shift in
routing, generating the rise in cocaine trafficking to Europe through West Africa. Large
consignments of cocaine are now transported from Colombia and onward to Brazil, Venezuela,
and some smaller destinations, from where they are dispatched to Africa, primarily West Africa.
The largest known loads of cocaine en route to Europe via West Africa have been transported by
boat (including fishing boats, sailing yachts, and speedboats) and on container ships and other so-
called mother ships that hand off shipments to smaller, faster boats outside territorial waters.35

34 UNODC (2009).
35 Wright (2007).
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Small private airplanes are also commonly used. The bulk of cocaine shipments are believed to
arrive in Cape Verde and in countries along the West African coast, ranging from Mauritania
southward along the West African Atlantic coast as far as west as Nigeria. Key regional entry
points include Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ghana, among others. Some
shipments are also offloaded in South Africa, which is a destination for small quantities of
cocaine as well as a transit point. Major European entry points for cocaine transiting through
West Africa include Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, and Italy.
While more circuitous than direct routes between South America and Europe, the southern trans-
Atlantic oceanic distance between South America and Africa is geographically shorter and thus
more secure for trafficking purposes than that between South America and Europe. These
southern routes are also located south of the Atlantic zone where U.S. and European maritime
shipping monitoring and drug interdiction efforts have historically been most intense. In recent
years, the southern routes through Africa have been reportedly characterized by denser traffic and
larger average cocaine cargo sizes than the northern ones, as indicated by a growing number of
large seizures, including a number of multi-ton consignments.36 Smuggling roughly along
Latitude 10ÌŠ North between northern South America and the West African coast (specifically
between Venezuela and Guinea and adjacent Guinea-Bissau), has become so common that law
enforcement agencies have dubbed it “Highway 10.” Another major southern route appears to
link northern Latin American source countries with Gulf of Guinea countries from Ghana to
Nigeria. Some landlocked Sahelian countries that lie along routes connecting coastal West Africa
to northern Africa via the Sahel, such as Mali, have also seen an increase in trafficking. 37
Trafficking Patterns and Actors
Limited data on cocaine trafficking into and within Africa are available, but many indications
suggest that the bulk of cocaine is trafficked into West Africa, as opposed to other sub-regions on
the continent. This pattern may be explained by geographic factors and changes in trafficking
patterns spurred by developments outside of Africa, but it may also be rooted in the preexisting
role of West Africans in the international narcotics trade. As early as the 1970s, reports indicate
West Africans of multiple nationalities were significantly involved in international heroin and
cocaine trafficking.38 In 2000, the U.S. government International Crime Threat Assessment report
stated that Nigerian criminal syndicates dominated “transatlantic cocaine shipments between
Brazil and Africa” and were “increasingly trafficking South American cocaine to various regions
in Africa and throughout Europe.”39 The report stated that Nigerian traffickers primarily
transshipped cocaine using drug couriers traveling via commercial air flights.
As the size of the cocaine shipments has grown in recent years, the actors involved in its trans-
Atlantic transport appear to have changed. Much of the recent large-scale trafficking from South
America to West Africa appears to have been dominated by Latin Americans, in particular

36 For examples of large seizures, see the Appendix and Wright (2007).
37 Gemma Ware and Marshall Van Vale, “Drugs: Powder Trails,” The Africa Report, June-July 2008; and UNODC
(October 2007).
38 See Ellis (2009), p. 181.
39 Departments of Justice, State, and Treasury, “Chapter 3: Worldwide Areas of International Criminal Activity,” in
International Crime Threat Assessment, [report by U.S. Government interagency working group in support the
President’s International Crime Control Strategy], December 2000.
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Colombians, and some Europeans.40 The rise in cocaine trafficking through West Africa in recent
years had led some analysts to conclude that the increase might indicate a long-term shift in
strategies by Latin American cocaine traffickers. However, the sharp drop in cocaine seizures in
early 2009 suggests to others that such a conclusion might be premature or inaccurate. Despite
such uncertainties, there are some indications that suspected Latin American traffickers have been
establishing a long-term permanent presence in West Africa in recent years. A relatively recent
small flow of apparently wealthy Latin Americans into West Africa has drawn attention in a
number of countries in the sub-region. A number of these persons, who often claim to be investors
in the local economy, have purchased or constructed elaborate villas and compounds, and often
drive expensive vehicles.41 Another possible indicator that traffickers may be moving portions of
the wholesale cocaine supply chain across the Atlantic is the discovery of cocaine processing labs
that convert cocaine base into a finished product, cocaine hydrochloride (HCL). Several such labs
have been recently found in Spain and Portugal.42
Latin American traffickers are believed both to directly organize cocaine transport onward from
West Africa to Europe and to collaborate with West African traffickers in other cocaine
redistribution and export activities. According to UNODC, “[t]here appear to be two parallel
flows. One, mainly involving large maritime and private air shipments, is owned and managed by
South Americans,” while West African crime groups, either in collaboration with nationals from
other world regions or individually, “also traffic these drugs to Europe, usually via commercial air
flights.”43 West African traffickers are reportedly paid in kind with cocaine for their logistics
services and buy wholesale consignments of cocaine from their South American counterparts.
Some of these actors may, in turn, sell or consign cocaine to low-level, freelancing traffickers
who are also involved in moving cocaine from West Africa to Europe.44 West Africans have also
been associated with relatively smaller amounts of cocaine smuggled from South America to
Africa.
Tracking the movement of cocaine from West Africa to Europe is challenging for law
enforcement and intelligence agencies because of a lack of manpower, technological, and other
resources. Some patterns have been identified, however. In general, drug syndicates, mainly from
West Africa and, to a lesser extent, South America, move cocaine from West Africa to Europe
using human couriers flying commercial air passenger routes. Parcel post, private air flights,
trans-Sahel land and air routes, and boats are also employed.45 The trafficking of cocaine via
commercial airlines is, in particular, believed to be well-established among West African drug
syndicates. Recent UNODC drug seizure data suggest that two sub-regional repackaging and
redistribution trafficking patterns have emerged. One involves cocaine entering Guinea Bissau
that is then routed to Senegal, Guinea, Gambia, and Mali for onward transport to Europe,
primarily by passenger air flights, but also by land. Cocaine entering the Gulf of Guinea, by

40 United Kingdom (UK) Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), 2008/9 UK Threat Assessment of Serious
Organised Crime, 2008; and UNODC (November 2008).
41 UNODC (December 2007); and multiple press accounts.
42 UNODC (November 2008), p. 12.
43 See UNODC (November 2008); and press reports.
44 Mazzitelli (2007), p. 1076; UNODC (November 2008); and Ellis (2009), p. 188.
45 State Department, 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), “Morocco,” 2008; UNODC
(October 2007); and Wright (2007).
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contrast, reportedly often flows through Ghana into Togo, Benin, and Nigeria, and then onward to
Europe, primarily by passenger air flight.46
Surveillance efforts in Europe targeting commercial air flights regularly interdict numerous
human couriers, known as mules, who either swallow their shipments (a procedure known as
“body packing”) or transport them on their persons or in their luggage. This mode of trafficking
appears to use a so-called “shotgun” approach, in which numerous individual mules each carry
amounts typically ranging from a few ounces to several kilograms. Jointly, they transport large
quantities of cocaine, but traffickers face relatively low losses if some of the mules are
apprehended.47 According to the UNODC, between 2004 and a portion of 2008, at least 1,357
couriers were detected on Europe-bound flights originating in West Africa, with each courier
attempting to smuggle up to 4 kilograms of cocaine.48
Heroin
Africa is not a production source of illegal heroin and other opioids, and the level of opioid abuse
in Africa is low in global comparative terms, although there are some signs that use rates may be
increasing moderately in some countries, notably in countries along key heroin trafficking routes
in East and Southern Africa (see Table 3).49 Heroin trafficking through Africa and by African
drug networks, however, is a relatively longstanding phenomenon, with one of the first reported
instances of heroin trafficking occurring in Nigeria in the early 1980s.50 West African crime
networks, in particular, have long played a key role in international heroin trafficking, both with
respect to the procurement of wholesale heroin from producer countries and with regard to the
wholesale and retail sale of heroin in consumer countries, including the United States. West
African crime networks have long played a substantial role in the U.S. and European heroin
markets.51 In 1994, Nigerian-controlled couriers accounted for 30% of all heroin seized by the

46 UNODC (November 2008).
47 In this strategy, the criminal groups assume that authorities will catch some of the mules, but are unlikely to catch all
of them. As a result, their profit margin remains viable. In addition, those who are apprehended are often of little value
to law enforcement or intelligence collection efforts because mules are typically low-level actors who lack substantial
knowledge about the structure of the crime organization and higher-level actors who employ them. UNODC
(November 2008); Alex Klein, “Mules or Couriers: The Role of Nigerian Drug Couriers in the International Drug
Trade,” mimeo; Mazzitelli (2007), pp. 1071-1090; U.S. Government, The Threat from International Organized Crime
to U.S. National Interests, September 2006; U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Organized
Crime: African Criminal Enterprises,” n.d.; UNODC (October 2007); and Wright (2007).
48 The greatest volumes of cocaine came from Senegal, Nigeria, and Guinea, but Senegalese made up only 2% of
couriers by nationality. Nigerians made up the largest share of couriers (57%), and operated across the West African
sub-region; they were the single most detected nationality on flights from every country in the sub-region, with some
exceptions. In a few countries, the majority of couriers were from Guinea-Bissau. The greatest number of couriers flew
out of Guinea and Mali. The leading two destinations by volume for cocaine trafficked from West Africa to Europe
were Spain and the United Kingdom, which “host the two largest populations of cocaine users in Europe,” according to
UNODC, which also reports that “Spain serves as both a prime destination and as a redistribution centre” in Europe.
Other key destinations included the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and likely Italy, although seizure data regarding
trafficking into Italy were reportedly incomplete. UNODC also reports that West Africans are often involved in
distribution activities within Europe. UNODC (November 2008); and UK SOCA (2008).
49The poppy flower, the source of opiates like heroin, is generally not grown in Africa. At least one news report,
however, indicates that very small amounts of illegal opium poppy are being cultivated in Algeria. Hasna Yacoub,
“New Plantations discovered in Adrar: Algeria In the Process of Becoming the New Opium ‘Kingdom,’” La Tribune
(Algiers), March 12, 2008 via BBC Monitoring Middle East; and UNODC, 2009 World Drug Report, June 2009.
50 UNODC (2005); see also Ellis (2008).
51 See, for instance, Eniwoke Ibagere, “Drugs: The Nigerian connection,” BBC News, June 6, 2000; and Joseph B.
(continued...)
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U.S. Customs Service.52 The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has reported that West
Africans are continuing to play a primary role in transporting and distributing heroin in the
United States.53
Historically, West African networks have sourced heroin in Southeast Asia and trafficked it to
consuming countries through networks mainly controlled from Nigeria and transnational
operations based in various countries, particularly Southeast Asian ones, such as Thailand. In
recent years, as Southwest Asian heroin has come to dominate the global market, West African
heroin networks have become active in the trafficking of Southwest Asian heroin, particularly
from Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to UNODC data, for example, at least 600 Nigerians
have been arrested in Pakistan since 2000 in possession of more than 100 grams of heroin.54
According to the State Department, Nigerian and Ghanaian trafficking organizations are involved
in smuggling heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan to several parts of the United States,
including Ohio and the New York area.55
Today, heroin is smuggled from Southwest Asia through East and West Africa into Europe and
North America, usually by commercial air courier.56 East Africa—which has longstanding trading
links with South Asia, a global heroin source region, and the Middle East, a heroin transit zone
that is today linked with these regions via multiple commercial airline routes and growing trade
ties—is a particularly notable entry point for heroin shipments to the continent.57 Annual reported
seizure volumes and incident totals in Africa, however, are generally very limited compared with
those in other world regions, and some observers hypothesize that heroin trafficking through West
Africa may be in decline, as heroin markets in both Europe and North America appear to be
stabilizing.58



(...continued)
Treaster, “Nigerian Connection Floods U.S. Airports With Asian Heroin,” New York Times, February 15, 1992.
52 Testimony by Donnie Marshall, DEA, before the House International Relations Committee: Heroin, June 24, 1998.
53 Testimony by Thomas Harrigan, DEA, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African
Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009.
54 UNODC (November 2008).
55 In November 2004, two alleged drug traffickers from Ghana were indicted in Columbus, Ohio, for shipping heroin
for distribution across central Ohio. A Ghanaian parliamentarian arrested in November 2005 revealed a similar
trafficking network operating in New York. In 2006 several Ghanaians were arrested in the United States for trafficking
heroin. In 2007, two Afghan nationals were arrested by Ghanaian police and extradited to the United States for
conspiring to distribute heroin in the United States. See 2008 INCSR, “Ghana” and “Nigeria.”
56 In East Africa, heroin is smuggled mainly through Kenya and Ethiopia, but also Tanzania, Egypt, and Mozambique.
In West Africa, heroin is smuggled mainly through Cote D’Ivoire and its neighbors. See INCB 2007 Report.
57 See UNODC, 2008 World Drug Report and previous annual editions of the report, as well as annual reports by the
now defunct Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD, or Geopolitical Drug Watch).
58 Mazzitelli (2007), p. 1076.
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Table 3. Heroin and Morphine Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
East
Africa
59.5 66.7 95.7 68.3 87.8 79.8 137.9
North
Africa
48.6 57.3 66.0 36.0 56.7 57.0 78.6
Southern
Africa
17.5 30.9 15.5 35.6 19.9 49.5 29.7
West
&
Central
Africa 100.0 77.4 114.7 105.7 237.5 140.5 107.6
AFRICA
TOTAL
225.5 232.4 291.7 245.6 401.9 326.7 353.8

Change from Prior
-2.5% 3.0% 25.6% -15.8% 63.7% -18.7% 8.3%
Year (%)
Number
of
785 2,594 900 1,121 1,530 2,712 4,883
Reported Drug
Seizures

Number of African
22 26 26 22 26 30 23
Countries Reporting
Seizures
GLOBAL
TOTAL
80,924.4 65,613.4 73,447.9 97,565.7 100,089.8 90,427.6 103,991.6
AFRICA’S SHARE OF
0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3%
GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.
Cannabis and Cannabis Resin
Cannabis has long been produced, trafficked, or used in practically every country in Africa—and
analysts predict strong long-term increases in cannabis production in the region (see Table 4 and
Table 5).59 The illegal cannabis drug market is by far the largest drug market in Africa; according
to the UNODC, somewhere between 28.9 million and 56.4 million Africans used cannabis at least
once in 2007.60 Like other world regions, cannabis production in Africa supplies a largely
domestic or intra-regional population of users. In addition—and unlike most other world
regions—the continent is the source of a significant cross-regional cannabis export market,
mainly to West and Central Europe and to a lesser extent to East Asia and North America.61



59 UNODC, Cannabis in Africa: An Overview, November 2007.
60 UNODC, 2009 World Drug Report.
61 See for example INCB 2008 Report, and UNODC (November 2007).
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Table 4. Cannabis Herb Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
East
Africa
36,268.1 683,111.6 175,663.7 769,986.1 983,384.4 162,876.0 225,340.6
North
Africa
116,004.5 118,544.6 147,812.0 153,878.6 398,866.0 193,084.0 146,490.5
Southern
Africa
1,062,221.8
161,966.0 141,894.4 151,059.0 878,503.8 347,094.4 637,227.9
West
&
Central
Africa 284,082.7 335,268.2 526,007.0 562,363.0 697,871.2 162,919.8 207,820.0
AFRICA
TOTAL
1,498,577.1 1,298,890.4 991,377.0 1,637,286.7 2,958,625.4 865,974.2 1,216,879.1
Change from Prior
201.4% -13.3% -23.7% 65.2% 80.7% -70.7% 40.5%
Year (%)
Number of Reported
18,469 8,156 19,288 8,193 11,402 10,050 35,245
Drug Seizures
Number of African
28 27 31 30 30 34 25
Countries Reporting
Seizures
GLOBAL
TOTAL
4,679,750.8 4,758,433.4 4,798,430.3 5,940,558.1 7,152,169.8 4,667,495.8 5,229,695.3
AFRICA’S SHARE OF
32.0% 27.3% 20.7% 27.6% 41.4% 18.6% 23.3%
GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.
Table 5. Cannabis Plant Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
East
Africa
10,981.0 81,098.8 1,057,021.1
674,8621.4 15,454.2 436,113.4 32,236.1
North
Africa
N/A
73,857.7 93,613.0 21,091.1 421.2 37,590.0 427.7
Southern
Africa
929,438.4 660,035.7 760,604.2 98,803.4 97,414.8 3,397.4 145,751.6
West & Central Africa
50.6
273607.5
5120.5
313.9
2790.0
N/A
928.4
AFRICA
TOTAL
940,470.1 1,088,599.8 1,916,358.8 6,868,829.8 116,080.2 477,100.8 179,343.7
Change from Prior
246.1% 15.8% 76.0% 258.4% -98.3% 311.0% -62.4%
Year (%)
Number
of
509 1606 727 1,359 1,888
529 754
Reported Drug
Seizures
Number of African
9 14 14 14 11 10 13
Countries
Reporting Seizures
GLOBAL
TOTAL
6,120,773.1 6,098,692.7 11,351,607.3 12,253,027.8 3,597,710.2 3,790,275.2 1,340,507.5
AFRICA’S SHARE OF
15.4% 17.9% 16.9% 56.1% 3.2% 12.6% 13.4%
GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.
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According to UNODC figures, Africa contributes between an estimated 22% and 26% of global
cannabis production. Major producers include Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia,
along with Egypt and Morocco in North Africa.62 Compared to other regions, Africa is one of the
largest annual sources of cannabis production and ranks among the top regions with respect to the
number and volume of annual local cannabis seizures. While cannabis is known to be widely
produced in Africa, and some cannabis-related production, distribution, retail value, and use
trends can be discerned, detailed country-level data on these phenomena are often lacking.63
While cannabis availability is widespread across the continent, views regarding the acceptability
of its use vary considerably by country and among social groups. In some African countries,
cannabis has long been widely used for diverse work-related, recreational, medicinal, cultural,
and other purposes. In others, acceptance of its use differs among social or economic groups; for
example, in many African countries, cannabis is primarily consumed by poor populations, notably
in urban areas, and shunned by elites.64
In many African countries, law enforcement efforts to counter the cannabis trade are sporadic, in
part because often under-resourced police agencies face a range of more serious, violent crimes.
In addition, according to the UNODC, while the drug is considered a problem from a public
health perspective, it is often seen as less of a threat to national security than other types of drugs,
such as cocaine and heroin. In general, illicit profits and incidents of drug-related violence
associated with African cannabis trafficking are fewer than those associated with other drugs or
criminal activities.65
Cannabis resin, which is used in the production of hashish, is the second most widely trafficked
drug in Africa, but is predominantly produced in North Africa (see Table 6). In addition to
possessing the world’s largest documented cannabis cultivation area, Morocco is the world’s
largest producer of cannabis resin.66 Unlike cannabis herb production, cannabis resin production
is reportedly set for a gradual but global decline, due in large part to declining demand in Europe
and various other factors.67



62 INCB 2008 Report.
63 Factors accounting for this data deficit include varying levels of counternarcotics law enforcement capacity; a
frequent lack of political will among African countries to devote significant resources to combating the cannabis trade;
and the often highly decentralized nature of cannabis markets in Africa. Typically, many small players cultivate and
distribute the drug, making monitoring of such activities difficult. UNODC, Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in
West Africa, November 2008, p. 31.
64 UNODCCP, The Drug Nexus in Africa, ODCCP Studies on Drugs and Crime Monographs, March 1999.
65 UNODC (November 2008), p. 31.
66 UNODC (November 2007); INCB 2007 Report.
67 UNODC (November 2008).
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Table 6. Cannabis Resin Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
East
Africa
6,404.1 51.5
1,885.8 898.4 0.2
12,333.7 2.3
North
Africa
150,119.8 71,892.2 70,604.1 117,970.5 107,705.0 109,145.4 118,523.6
Southern
Africa
27,056.6
539.5 1,744.2
219.6 0.0 95.0 54.8
West & Central Africa
350.0
13.0
2.0
13.2
975.7
1.4
10,426.0
AFRICA
TOTAL
183,930.4 72,496.2 74,236.1 119,101.7 108,681.0 121,575.6 129,006.8
Change from Prior
192.2% -60.6% 2.4% 60.4% -8.8% 11.9% 6.1%
Year (%)
Number of Reported
128 28 421 567 1215 7960 7512
Drug Seizures
Number of African
13 15 16 15 10 16 12
Countries Reporting
Seizures
GLOBAL
TOTAL
1,050,590.5 941,518.6 1,088,429.8 1,391,926.6 1,470,752.4 1,269,506.1 1,024,828.6
AFRICA’S SHARE OF
17.5% 7.7% 6.8% 8.6% 7.4% 9.6% 12.6%
GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of
September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.
One well-known smuggling route for both cannabis and cannabis resin to Europe is through
Morocco. From Morocco, traffickers reportedly smuggle illegal cannabis into Spain, where it can
be easily transshipped to other EU countries because of limited border security within the EU.68
Some of the same routes used for trafficking cannabis from Morocco to Europe are reportedly
being used for transiting cocaine. EUROPOL has found that Colombian and Moroccan criminal
groups are cooperating together to smuggle both cocaine and cannabis into Europe.69 Such trends
may not last, however. Some analysts hypothesize that the co-mingling of cocaine and cannabis
shipments and their transport along North African routes traditionally used for cannabis
smuggling may decline because of concern by smugglers that the merger of cocaine and cannabis
trafficking might draw increased law enforcement attention and increase the risk of interdiction.
At the same time, however, reported drug seizures by the government of Niger indicate that North
African smugglers are willing to go to considerable lengths to protect their routes. In one
incident, for example, the Nigerien military encountered “considerable resistance” from a
“professional” hashish smuggling operation that was trafficking the drug in convoys of three to
five four-wheel drive vehicles secured with military-grade weaponry and satellite phones.70

68 2008 INCSR, “Morocco.”
69 2008 INCSR, “Morocco;” and Wright (2007).
70 UNODC (November 2008).
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Synthetic Drugs and Precursor Chemicals
The illegal synthetic drug market in Africa is reportedly relatively small (see Table 7 and Table
8). One exception to this is South Africa, which is a destination and sometimes also a production
source for methaqualone, methamphetamine, and MDMA (ecstasy); foreign production sources
for these drugs include China, India, and Europe. Maxiton Forte, an amphetamine-type drug, is
also reportedly produced in Egypt for domestic abuse. Despite limited data availability, reports
indicate that the non-medical abuse of pharmaceutical preparations containing psychotropic
substances occurs in West and Central Africa.71 Amphetamine users in Africa are estimated at 2.3
million, or approximately 9% of the world total, and the International Narcotics Control Board
(INCB) predicts that the number of users in Africa will continue to increase gradually, in large
part due to increasing South African demand for methamphetamine and crystal
methamphetamine.72
Table 7. Amphetamine-Type Drug Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
East
Africa
6.0 N/A N/A 0.3 N/A N/A N/A
North
Africa
13.6 17.0 11.8 0.3 3.4 1.4 2.1
Southern
Africa 0.0 1.8 1.3 0.5 N/A 1078.5
315.4
West & Central Africa
6.2
6.0
3.2
2,326.8
344.2
2,064.5
835.1
AFRICA
TOTAL 25.8 24.8 16.3 2,327.9
348.2 2,064.5
835.1
Change from Prior
-93.9% -4.2% -34.3% 14,211.4%
-85.0% 492.9% -59.6%
Year (%)
Number of Reported
59 321 17 204 N/A
4026
4881
Drug Seizures
Number of African
8 7 6 8 3 6 4
Countries Reporting
Seizures
GLOBAL
TOTAL
43,622.2 26,343.0 22,773.0 36,840.4 30,485.3 41,302.2 43,171.5
AFRICA’S SHARE OF
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 6.3% 1.1% 5.0% 1.9%
GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding.


71 2008 INCB Report.
72 Ibid.
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Table 8. Ecstasy Seizures in Africa, 2000-2006
(simplified drug breakdown, in kilogram equivalents)


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
East
Africa
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.0 0.0
North
Africa
0.3 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.3 1.0
Southern
Africa 30.9 9.6 58.9 40.2 195.0 0.0 22.9
West
&
Central
Africa
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.5
AFRICA
TOTAL 31.2 10.3 58.9 40.6 195.6 1.4 27.5
Change from Prior
933.8% -66.9% 469.9% -31.1% 381.9% -99.3% 1,933.4%
Year (%)
Number of Reported
779 327 3 5 3129 6 33
Drug Seizures
Number of African
3 4 4 5 4 6 6
Countries Reporting
Seizures
GLOBAL
TOTAL
4,993.5 4,537.5 6,865.5 4,810.9 8,209.2 5,131.8 4,510.7
AFRICA’S SHARE OF
0.6% 0.2% 0.9% 0.8% 2.4% 0.0% 0.6%
GLOBAL TOTAL (%)
Source: UNODC, Interactive Seizures Tables and Graphs. Data current as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: Data may not total due to rounding. Ecstasy data includes the psychotropic compounds MDA, MDEA,
MDMA.
The INCB reports that Africa is also emerging as an increasingly significant transshipment point
for the illicit diversion of precursor chemicals, particularly ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, used
to manufacture illicit drugs.73 Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are two key precursor chemicals
used to manufacture methamphetamine. Recent reports indicate that much of more than 120
metric tons precursor chemicals for methamphetamine had been diverted to or through Africa in
2006. The countries in Africa to which these shipments were destined included Burundi, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan,
Tanzania, and Zambia. If the precursor chemicals had not been seized, they could have been
converted into a total of approximately 80 metric tons of methamphetamine—a total that
represents approximately one-third of current global methamphetamine production estimates.74
The low level of commercial and pharmacological regulation and a frequent lack of trade
monitoring and weak customs capacities in much of Africa compared to those in many other
world regions have made the continent attractive as a transshipment hub for precursor chemicals
used in illicit drug manufacture. Once in Africa, traffickers may be able to relatively easily divert
such chemicals from the legal commerce into illicit trade. As a result, new precursor routes and
re-shipment operations are expected to continue to emerge in Africa, given that many
governments in the region lack the enforcement and forensic infrastructure to detect such
trafficking.75

73 INCB, 2007 Report and 2008 Report.
74 INCB 2008 Report.
75 See INCB 2008 Report; and INCB, Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic
(continued...)
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In July 2009, Guinean authorities seized large quantities of solvents used to process cocaine and
heroin, precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of MDMA (ecstasy), and equipment used in
such production processes. A subsequent assessment by the UNODC and INTERPOL found that
the “quantities and nature” of the chemicals found were “far in excess of the legitimate demands
in Guinea.” Their findings suggested that “the clandestine production of controlled drugs might
be widespread in Guinea” and that the discoveries provide “the best evidence yet for clandestine
[illicit drug] laboratory activity.”76
Illicit Drug Use Trends in Africa
U.N. data also suggest that regional consumption of heroin, cocaine, cannabis, and amphetamine-
type drugs is increasing, likely as a side-effect of the continent’s growing prominence in the
global drug trade (see Table 9). South Africa has long been the largest consumer of illegal drugs
in Africa. There is a well-established trade in all major illicit drugs in South Africa, where
cannabis, methaqualone (known locally as mandrax), methamphetamine (known locally as tik),
and MDMA (ecstasy) are produced for domestic consumption and international export. East
Africa is reportedly a growing transit point for heroin from Southwest Asia mainly to Europe, and
heroin abuse is a relatively small but growing problem in Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa, and
Zambia, as well as in Egypt, in North Africa.77 In addition to emerging as a major transit hub for
cocaine being trafficked from South America to Europe, West Africa has become an important
transit point for heroin being smuggled from Southwest Asia to the United States and Europe.
There is also concern that several countries in Africa are increasingly being used as major
transshipment points for precursor chemicals, primarily pseudoephedrine, as well as ephedrine,
which are both used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine and other amphetamine-type
drugs.





(...continued)
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, March 5, 2008.
76 UNODC, “Evidence of Clandestine Laboratory Activity in West Africa,” Press Release, July 31, 2009. Antonio
Mazzitelli, the UNODC representative for West Africa, later emphasized, however, that his agency “cannot conclude
that narcotic labs are operating in Guinea” but that the findings are a firm indication “that traffickers in Guinea had
developed the capacity to produce drugs like ecstasy and refine cocaine and heroin.” See IRIN, “Residents of Conakry
are Worried for Their Health after the Discovery of Chemical Products Only Metres from Where They Live,” August
11, 2009.
77 2008 INCB Report.
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Table 9.Number of Drug Users in Africa, 2005-2006
(number of drug users and percent share)
Africa Use as a Share of
Africa
Use Global
Use Global Use

2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Opiates 980,000 1,360,000
15,550,000
16,540,000
6.3% 8.2%
Cocaine 1,084,000 1,147,000 14,257,000 15,987,000 7.6%
7.2%
Cannabis 38,200,000 41,600,000 158,800,000 165,600,000 24.1%
25.1%
Amphetamines
2,100,000 2,260,000 24,890,000 24,650,000 8.4%
9,2%
Ecstasy 193,000 199,000 8,561,000
9,047,000
2.3%
2.2%
Source: UNODC, 2007 and 2008 Word Drug Reports; World Bank World Development Indicators, and CRS
calculations.
Notes: Estimates of domestic drug use in Africa are inherently limited by a lack of consistent or reliable data
col ection and reporting. Africans constituted 11.8% and 12% of the total world population in 2005 and 2006,
respectively. As a result, drug use rates are proportionally lower for Africa than the global average for all drugs,
except cannabis. However, estimates of drug use in Africa may vary substantial y from rates estimated by the
UNODC, since there is little available data on drug use trends in many African countries.
Focus on West Africa: Explaining the Emergence of
the Sub-region as a Global Cocaine Transit Hub
In the 1980s and 1990s, Nigerian-dominated criminal organizations active in many countries
became key players in the international smuggling of heroin, particularly into the United States,
drawing the concern of U.S. policy makers. Apart from heroin, however, West Africa long
remained a minor destination and transshipment point for other illegal drugs from regions outside
of Africa. During the past half decade, West Africa has become a prominent locus of international
drug trafficking, especially with regard to cocaine being trafficked onward to Europe, as
previously discussed.
Driving Factors
West Africa’s increasing use as a trafficking nexus appears to have resulted from changes in the
mix of disincentives and incentives, or “push” and “pull” factors, that have traditionally
structured international drug trafficking patterns.
Push Factors
Push factors, notably with regard to cocaine, include heightened U.S. anti-drug and counter-
terrorism law enforcement and border control efforts, and U.S. and European interdiction efforts
targeting northern trans-Atlantic cocaine routes directly connecting South America cocaine
production sources with European destination markets. Such activities have reportedly gradually
forced smuggling southward toward Africa’s western coast, to the waters off Cape Verde en route
to the Canary Islands and the Iberian peninsula, and further south, to destinations from Mauritania
to as far south as Nigeria.
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Other push factors include continued counterdrug pressure in source countries, stepped-up U.S.
drug interdiction efforts in U.S. drug transit zones in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and an
expansion of cocaine exports via Venezuela and Brazil from Colombia, in part due to increased
involvement in the cocaine trade by the Colombian FARC rebel group, as previously discussed.78
Growing Mexican government pressure on violent and politically powerful Mexican trafficking
organizations, which have enjoyed a high degree of control of over traffic passing through
Mexico into the United States—as well as competition between these groups—may also be
driving South American criminal organizations to seek alternative non-U.S. markets and transit
routes.79 Other factors include the declining value of the U.S. dollar prior to August 2008,
declines in U.S. seizures attributed to increased interdiction efforts, and relatively stable cocaine
demand in the United States, which remains the largest single cocaine consumption market
globally.80
Pull Factors
Important pull factors, or incentives attracting increased cocaine transit through West Africa,
include the high value of the Euro in recent years, steadily rising European cocaine use rates and
strong demand, and stable or rising cocaine prices in Europe, where cocaine prices are as much as
double the level of U.S. prices, according to the UNODC.81 West Africa is also attractive to
traffickers because it is the nearest land mass located en route from South America to Europe.82
Traffickers may have also been attracted to the lack of effective drug interdiction in countries
such as Venezuela and Brazil—countries that are well-positioned as transit countries for cocaine
movement across the Atlantic toward Africa and Europe.
Regional institutional and other state and economic weaknesses in the sub-region are other major
pull factors. West Africa is seen as attractive to traffickers because many countries there lack law
enforcement and border control capabilities and resources, and are characterized by high levels of
corruption, poverty, and unemployment, as discussed below.83 Traffickers operating in many West
African countries are likely to face relatively lower risks of apprehension by law enforcement
than in many other world regions where police and the justice system are more effective or less
susceptible to corruption. Large-scale traffickers with access to large amounts of capital are also
well-positioned, given high rates of poverty and unemployment in the region, to tap a diverse
pool of potential African accomplices who may be willing to accept payment in exchange for
facilitating or directly engaging in trafficking activities. Latin American traffickers may also be
able to tap into an extensive pool of experienced West African drug traffickers to facilitate drug

78 See UNODC (October 2008); ICG (2008); U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Drug Control: U.S.
Counternarcotics Cooperation with Venezuela Has Declined,” Report to the Ranking Member, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, July 2009; and Webb-Vidal (2009).
79 Juan Carlos Llorca and Frank Bajak, “Mexican Drug Cartels Expand Abroad,” Associated Press, July 21, 2009.
80 UNODC (November 2008); see also Daniel Mejia and Carlos Esteban Posada, Cocaine Production and Trafficking:
What Do We Know? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4618, May 1, 2008.
81 The Euro is the common currency for most countries in the EU. One indication of rising European demand is a rise
in European cocaine seizures. UNODC (November 2008); Mejia and Posada (2008).
82 For a discussion of other geographic pull factors, see discussion under the cocaine trafficking trend section of this
report, above.
83 See World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 1996–2008; Transparency International, 2008
Corruption Perceptions Index, among other indices that suggest that many African countries face problems of
corruption and poverty. Among other works that discuss weak law enforcement practices in Africa, see Jean-Francois
Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa, James Currey, Oxford, 1999.
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transit through the region, as well as to connect with other criminals in West Africa with expertise
in related illicit activities, including money laundering, human smuggling, and document fraud.
Driving Factors: Two Applied Examples
Some of the push and pull factors discussed above—as well as state characteristics discussed in
the earlier “Regional Vulnerabilities” the text box—are illustrated by a rise in trafficking in recent
years in Guinea-Bissau, a tiny impoverished country that suffered a civil war in 1998 and has
been wracked by numerous coups d’état, putsches, political assassinations, periodic civil unrest,
and chronic military interference in governance. It has seen a sharp rise in trafficking, in part due
to geographic factors: its territory contains a remote, lightly populated island archipelago and
many colonial-era airstrips. Numerous reports also suggest that trafficking is often undertaken or
facilitated by state security personnel, notably elements within the military, which is among the
most influential institutions in the country.84
Such reports indicate that the country fundamentally lacks a capacity to counter trafficking. The
national police system is highly underfunded and operates without some of the most basic
equipment, notably including vehicles and fuel for them; the 60-person drug control agency has
one vehicle and police reportedly use public taxis for official business, such as transporting
arrested persons.85 Police also receive “low salaries that are seldom paid, lack phones, computers,
and often even electricity. They have almost no ships to patrol a rugged coastline, and little fuel
for their few police cars. Moreover, many police officers can neither shoot a gun nor swim; the
latter, a real problem in a country with a long coastline and many islands.”86 The judiciary is
significantly under-resourced and the country is without a prison, reportedly prompting judges to
refrain from passing jail sentences on convicted offenders.87 Many of these problems are
recognized by the government of Guinea-Bissau. The relatively new president of the country,
Malam Bacai Sanha, who was elected in July 2009, has pledged to end Guinea-Bissau’s use as a
hub for drug trafficking.88
Guinea-Bissau’s southern neighbor, Guinea, has also reportedly emerged as a key cocaine
transshipment point. Investigations by the junta that took power after President Lansana Conte’s
death in late 2008 indicate that Conte’s son and numerous top security sector officials were
involved in cocaine trafficking and used state resources, including diplomatic pouch traffic, in
their activities. Its anti-drug police unit, while slightly better equipped than that of Guinea-Bissau,
is also reportedly highly under-resourced and lacks operational capabilities. According to the
State Department, the police agency that was until recently in charge of counternarcotics
activities lacks “almost everything—training, equipment, investigating skills, and organizational
motivation—to accomplish its mission.”89

84Alberto Dabo, “Guinea-Bissau Probes State Complicity in Drug Trade,” Reuters, June 1, 2007; 2008 INCSR; and Vincent
(November 2007).
85 UNODC (December 2007); and Vincent (November 2007).
86 Raggie Johansen, “Guinea-Bissau: A new hub for cocaine trafficking,” Perspectives [UNODC magazine], May 2008.
87 Ibid.
88 Sanha assumed office on September 8, succeeding Joao Bernardo Vieira who was assassinated following the death of
army chief General Batista Tagme Na Waie, as previously discussed. BBC, “Guinea-Bissau ‘to Tackle Drugs,’”
September 25, 2009; and Agence France Presse, “Guinea-Bissau Leader Vows End to Drug Transits,” September 24,
2009.
89 In recent months that agency’s counternarcotics role has been supplanted by that of an ad hoc unit controlled by the
(continued...)
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Role of West African Criminal Syndicates
West African crime groups operate in more than 80 countries and are organized into more than
500 cells internationally.90 They have long been involved in heroin trafficking and marketing, but
increasingly also smuggle cocaine and other contraband, including persons, and are involved in
diverse other crime, such as financial fraud. Financial crimes, including 419 fraud schemes,
reportedly cost the United States alone between $1 billion and $2 billion per year.91 The
transnational reach of such groups has given them a reputation as being among the most
aggressively expansionist perpetrators of crime internationally. West African crime groups are
primarily engaged in financial frauds and drug trafficking. The United States and the United
Kingdom are reportedly key targets of West African crime groups, but these groups operate small
cells in strategically useful locations worldwide (e.g., in illicit drug source and producing
countries, financial centers in which crime proceeds can be laundered with relative ease, and key
ports of entry and other international transportation hubs).
With respect to drug trafficking, West African crime groups in the 1980s were one of the primary
groups to popularize the relatively low-risk but sophisticated use of low-level traffickers, called
couriers or mules, to traffic drugs across international borders via commercial passenger flights.92
When using this method of drug smuggling, West African crime groups sometimes plant “decoy”
couriers who intentionally draw the attention of law enforcement personnel and therefore increase
the chances of one or more couriers on the same flight—often couriers trafficking greater
amounts of the contraband substance—to avoid detection. West African crime groups also recruit
“low profile” couriers, such as Caucasians, women with children, the elderly, or the disabled, who
may be less likely to draw the attention of authorities.93
Few publicly available documents describe the organizational structure and composition of West
African crime groups—and those that do broadly describe them as highly fluid and adaptable,
loosely organized across a networked web of West African diaspora communities worldwide.
Individual West African crime groups vary, but in general, they
• draw members from families or communities with which they have close
national, ethnic, regional, or kinship ties;

(...continued)
junta that seized power in Guinea in late 2008. The new organization’s role is to fight drugs, corruption and organized
crime. 2008 INCSR, “Guinea”; and CRS Report R40703, Guinea's 2008 Military Coup and Relations with the United
States, by Alexis Arieff and Nicolas Cook.
90 This paragraph draws from U.S. Government, International Crime Threat Assessment, “Nigerian Criminal
Enterprises,” December 2000.
91 419 schemes, a term derived from a provision in the Nigerian Criminal Code, involve advance-fee fraud. While these
schemes vary, 419 swindlers typically approach individuals overseas by postal letter or by email. They promise to share
with their intended targets putative “unclaimed” assets in financial or other overseas institutions in exchange for
various “fees” and “administrative costs” paid upfront by the target of the scheme. In such schemes, the assets, often
described by the swindler as unclaimed inheritances or funds resulting from administrative oversight, are fictitious, and
any fees paid by the fraud target are taken by the swindler. U.S. Department of Justice, “Organized Crime: African
Criminal Enterprises,” n.d.; see also Daniel Jordan Smith, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular
Discontent in Nigeria, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
92 For a discussion of mules, see the cocaine trafficking trends section of this report, above.
93 McDougall (2007); UK HM Revenue & Customs, “Ghana Drugs Case Shows the Misery of Narcotics Trafficking,”
January 23, 2008; Damien Francis, “The Young Women Targeted as Mules by Cocaine Smugglers,” The Guardian,
August 27, 2008; and UNODC (November 2008).
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• are composed of small, compartmentalized cells that often range in size between
2 and 10 members, and limit members’ access to information or details about a
criminal network to specific operations or tasks for which they are responsible;
• communicate mostly in African indigenous languages, which often insulates the
crime group from outside infiltration;
• often function on a project-by-project basis, with impermanent operating
structures that last only as long as a given project;
• may include members who are simultaneously active in more than one crime
network;
• rarely fall under the permanent control of a static leader and loyalty to a single
crime boss is not required; and
• are mainly motivated to participate in criminal activity in the pursuit of profit.94
These characteristics contrast sharply with those of traditional organized crime, modeled on the
Italian mafia and Chinese triads. While membership in both traditional, non-African organized
crime and West African groups typically relies on kin-based, ethnic ties, the former groups tend to
be organized hierarchically, with senior leaders making decisions and low-level actors carrying
out the orders. By contrast, membership in West African crime groups tends to be task-based and
revolve around distinct criminal specialties (e.g., procuring drugs, falsifying passports and travel
documentation, recruiting couriers, laundering illicit proceeds, and similar activities). West
African crime groups also tend to be more willing than others to cooperate with other West
African crime groups, rather than to compete for turf or dominance in a given crime sector.
Instead, some have been known to pool their joint resources in order to improve their mutual
profit potential. Their networked organizations also make West African crime groups more
immune to tactics typically used by law enforcement to dismantle traditional organized crime
groups, which can involve either targeting the senior leader or pitting several groups against one
another. 95
U.S. Policy
In general, U.S. policy responses to the rise in drug trafficking through Africa remain in the
formative stages.96 Many African countries lack effective law enforcement agencies and judicial
systems, which fundamentally limit counternarcotics efforts in the region. In many cases,
substantial U.S. and European operational cooperation or capacity-building assistance has
accompanied African government efforts to increase drug trafficking monitoring, detection, and
seizure rates. A fundamental challenge confronting policy makers is how to develop a strategy
and find the resources to both stem the rising flow of drug trafficking through Africa—
particularly West Africa—in the short term, through such means as effective interdiction

94 See Mazzitelli (2007), pp. 1071-1090; U.S. Government, The Threat from International Organized Crime to U.S.
National Interests, September 2006.
95 U.S. Government, The Threat from International Organized Crime to U.S. National Interests, September 2006.
96 For more information on U.S. foreign counternarcotics policy generally, see CRS Report RL34543, International
Drug Control Policy, International Drug Control Policy, by Liana Wyler.
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operations, and simultaneously address the underlying, long-term law enforcement capacity
weaknesses that make the region vulnerable to drug trafficking.
Several U.S. government agencies are currently developing policy strategies to achieve such
ends, and the amounts of personnel, financial, and other resources being devoted to anti-drug
efforts in the region are increasing. These efforts include the establishment of at least one new
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) office in Ghana, and potentially more in other
countries in the region in the future, including in Nairobi, Kenya. Total Africa-related State
Department counternarcotics assistance is gradually expanding; it rose from approximately $0.5
million in FY2006 to $1.6 million in FY2009. The Obama Administration requested $7.5 million
for such purposes in Africa in FY2010. 97 Such levels of funding remain small compared to some
other regions, but there are indications that greater policy attention—in terms of strategy
development, programming, resources, and international cooperation—is being devoted to
combating the illegal drug trade in West Africa and elsewhere on the continent.
Interagency Approach
No public interagency counternarcotics strategy focusing specifically on Africa was available as
of mid-August 2009. However, several internal U.S. government agency strategy documents have
been formulated or are being developed. One such agency strategy involves the State
Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL). As of mid-
August 2009 INL’s strategy was focused specifically on providing assistance to African countries
for the targeting, investigation, and prosecution of narcotics traffickers. In addition, INL has,
since 2008, conducted several country assessments in West Africa (see Table 10). INL conducts
these assessments jointly with other U.S. government agencies, including the Department of
Defense (DOD), DEA, and the Department of the Treasury. The country assessments are intended
to inform the development of multi-agency counternarcotics aid programs for the individual
countries and for the region as a whole.
Another indication of a growing U.S. government focus on counternarcotics in Africa is the
inclusion of seven African countries in the 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR), released by the State Department but consisting of interagency agreement on the years’
top foreign counternarcotics priorities. The INCSR is an annual report mandated by Congress that
provides a country-by-country analysis of selected drug producing or transit countries, including
a description of the current drug situation and government efforts to improve conditions. The
2008 INCSR identified West Africa as an emerging “hub for cocaine trafficking from South
America to Europe.”98 New African country narratives for the 2009 INCSR include Cote
D’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
DOD is also developing a counternarcotics strategy for the region. The FY2009 National Defense
Authorization Act, P.L. 110-417, requires that DOD, in consultation with the State Department,
submit to Congress no later than June 30, 2009, “a comprehensive strategy ... with regard to
counter-narcotics efforts in Africa, with an emphasis on West Africa and the Maghreb.”99
Required components in the requested report include a description of the overall U.S.

97 State Department, Congressional Budget Justification - Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2010.
98 INCSR, “Policy and Program Developments: Overview for 2008.”
99 Sec. 1025(a).
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counternarcotics policy for Africa and DOD’s roles and missions, including the U.S. Combatant
Command for Africa, AFRICOM, in support of overall U.S. counternarcotics policy in Africa.
Table 10. Status of Interagency Country Assessments
Status of Country
Visit/Assessment
U.S. Agencies Involved
Assessment/Strategy
Country
Completion Date
in the Assessmenta
Completion
Ghana
September 2008
AFRICOM, DEA, DOJ,
Complete
DOS
Senegal
September 2008
AFRICOM, DEA, DOJ,
Complete
DOS
Guinea-Bissau
March 2009
AFRICOM, DEA, DOS, FBI, Complete
Treasury, USAID
Togo
March 2009
AFRICOM, DEA, DOS,
Complete
Treasury
Benin November/December
2009
TBD
—
Cape Verde
November/December 2009 TBD
—
Liberia October
2009
TBD
—
Sierra Leone
September 2009
TBD
—
Gambia September
2009
TBD
—
Burkina Faso
2010
TBD
—
Guinea
TBD, post “free and fair
TBD —
elections”
Source: State Department response to CRS inquiry, June 2, 2009.
Notes: Country assessments are not available for public distribution.
a. AFRICOM: Africa Command; DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration; DOJ: Department of Justice; DOS:
Department of State.
As of early June 2009, the State Department’s INL bureau had hosted one working-level
interagency meeting on counternarcotics and related issues in Africa. It was attended by
representatives from the State Department, DEA, DOD, Treasury, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), and the National Security Council (NSC). Each agency provided an overview of
its assistance in Africa. Participants also discussed next steps in developing and coordinating a
comprehensive approach to the Administration’s counternarcotics assistance in Africa. 100
Implementation
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is responsible for overseeing the
implementation of overall U.S. drug control policy, including international counternarcotics
efforts.101 Primary agencies involved in formulating and implementing counternarcotics efforts in

100 State Department response to CRS inquiry, June 2, 2009.
101 Sec. 703 of P.L. 105-277 (112 Stat 2681-672; 21 USC 1702), October 21, 1998. As early as 1993, under
congressional authorization that was subsequently repealed and superseded, the President designated the Office on
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) as the lead executive branch agency with the responsibility to establish
(continued...)
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Africa include the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
The State Department coordinates all U.S. foreign assistance to support international efforts to
combat illicit narcotics production and trafficking.102 DOD is responsible for the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs, and is also authorized to provide
counternarcotics training and equipping assistance to foreign countries in certain
circumstances.103 DEA leads U.S. coordination of law enforcement investigations involving
international production, trafficking and sale of illegal drugs and other controlled substances. The
Department of Homeland Security is responsible for drug-related maritime security and border
control and related policy issues, while the Treasury Department occasionally undertakes
activities to combat drug-related financial crimes.
The United States has begun to increase multilateral cooperation on countering drug trafficking in
Africa with European and other partners, both informally and formally. Formal coordination takes
place through mechanisms such as the U.S.-European Union (EU) Drug Troika talks. 104 In
addition, since 2007, the United States has shared counternarcotics intelligence and other
information with the European Maritime Analysis and Operation Center–Narcotics (MAOC-N),
located in Lisbon, Portugal. In the 2008 U.S.-E.U. Summit Declaration, the United States and the
European Union also symbolically committed to continue their counternarcotics cooperation,
particularly as it related to drug trafficking through West Africa.
Counternarcotics Foreign Assistance
State Department
The two major sources of counternarcotics foreign assistance to the region are administered by
the State Department and DOD. The State Department provides counterdrug assistance to a
number of countries in Africa, primarily through programs funded under its International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account. A key INCLE program funded by the
State Department since 2001 is the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in
Gabarone, Botswana. There, the United States trains approximately 500 African law enforcement
officials each year, providing courses on drug enforcement, anti-corruption, financial crimes,
border security, and other matters.105 INL also provides bilateral anti-crime assistance, which
includes efforts to bolster counternarcotics capacities, to a number of African countries. The
Obama Administration’s FY2010 budget request included $7.5 million in counterdrug foreign aid

(...continued)
policies, priorities, and objectives for U.S. drug control policy. See President Bill Clinton, “National Drug Control
Program,” Executive Order 12880, November 16, 1993, as originally authorized by Sec. 1005(d)(1) of P.L. 100-690
(102 Stat 4187), November 18, 1988.
102 Sec. 4601 of P.L. 100-690 (102 Stat 4286; 22 USC 2291(b)(1)), November 18, 1988.
103 The authority to serve as the lead agency for detection and monitoring stems from Sec. 1202(a)(1) of P.L. 101-189
(103 Stat 1563; 10 USC 124), November 29, 1989.
104 The EU Troika includes the Foreign Affairs Minister of the EU Member State holding the current Presidency of the
Council of the European Union; the EU Secretary-General for common EU foreign and security policy; and the
European Commissioner in charge of external relations.
105 INCSR, “U.S. Government Assistance,” 2009.
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to seven countries—up since the Bush Administration’s FY2009 budget request, which included
$1.45 million in counterdrug foreign aid to six countries in Africa (see Table 11).
Table 11. State Department Counternarcotics Assistance to Africa,
FY2006 Actual-FY2010 Request
(in current $USD millions)
FY2009
FY2010
Country
FY2006 Actual FY2007 Actual FY2008 Actual
Estimate
Request
Burkina
Faso
— — — $0.100
$0.100
Cape
Verde
—
—
$0.496 $0.500 $2.000
Ghana —
—
$0.246 $0.500 $0.500
Guinea
— — — $0.500
$0.110
Guinea-Bissau
—
—
$0.600 $0.100 $3.000
Morocco
— — — — $0.750
Nigeria
$0.495 $0.200 —
$0.360 $1.000
Africa
Total
$0.495 $0.200 $1.342 $1.610 $7.500
GLOBAL


$1,133.664 $1,322,277 $1,538.063
TOTAL
Source: State Department, Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2008-FY2010 (which include data from FY2006
actual to FY2010 request).
DOD/AFRICOM
DOD provides foreign assistance to train, equip, and improve counternarcotics capacity and
capabilities in foreign countries under two authorities, commonly known as Section 1004 and
Section 1033. Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year
1991 (P.L. 101-510), authorizes DOD to provide counternarcotics-related training and transport of
foreign law enforcement personnel. Under its Section 1004 authority, DOD has provided
counternarcotics training assistance for several years. Section 1033 of the NDAA for FY1998
(P.L. 105-85), as amended, enables DOD to assist 22 foreign countries’ counternarcotics efforts
by providing non-lethal protective and utility personnel equipment, including equipment for
navigation, secure and non-secure communications, and radar surveillance, as well as night vision
systems, vehicles, aircraft, and boats.
In FY2009, Congress authorized DOD to provide Guinea-Bissau and Senegal with Section 1033
counternarcotics assistance; this was the first instance of a congressional grant of authority to
DOD under Section 1033 to provide counternarcotics aid to African countries. In FY2009, DOD
estimates that it will provide approximately $19.3 million for counternarcotics assistance in
Africa, mainly through AFRICOM (see Table 12).106 The bulk of the assistance is committed to
regional counternarcotics programming, which cannot be attributed to a single country alone.
Leading individual country recipients in FY2009 include Nigeria ($1 million), Mauritania ($0.9

106 DOD response to CRS request, received June 16, 2009. For more information on AFRICOM, see CRS Report RL34003,
Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic
Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
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million), Liberia ($0.8 million), Cameroon ($0.6 million), and Ghana ($0.6 million). DOD also
provides counternarcotics-related Excess Defense Articles to some African countries.
Table 12. DOD/AFRICOM Counternarcotics Assistance to Africa, FY2009-FY2010
(in current $USD millions)
Country
FY2009 (estimate)
FY2010 (request)
Algeria $0.012
—
Benin $0.018 0.012
Burkina Faso
$0.007
0.007
Cameroon $0.635
0.817
Cape Verde
$0.185
0.300
Cote D’Ivoire
$0.025
0.025
Djibouti $0.100
0.012
Gabon $0.136
—
Gambia —
0.500
Ghana $0.591
3.872
Guinea $0.238
0.332
Guinea-Bissau $0.042
0.854
Kenya $0.422
0.055
Liberia $0.806
1.341
Libya $0.010 —
Madagascar $0.012
—
Mali $0.012 —
Mauritania $0.900
0.885
Mauritius $0.012
0.020
Morocco $0.012
0.350
Mozambique $0.101
—
Niger $0.006 —
Nigeria $1.042
2.617
Rwanda —
0.005
Sao Tome
$0.370
0.070
Senegal $0.200
0.975
Seychel es $0.012
0.015
Sierra Leone
$0.368
0.795
South Africa
$0.112
—
Tanzania $0.100
—
Togo $0.015 0.066
Tunisia $0.773
0.761
Zambia $0.012
—
Africa/Europe Regional
$12.022
14.538
TOTAL # of COUNTRIES
31 countries
23 countries
TOTAL ASSISTANCE
$19.308
$27.964
Source: DOD response to CRS inquiry, June 17, 2009.
Notes: This chart includes DOD counternarcotics funding under al existing DOD counternarcotics authorities,
including Sections 1004 and 1033. This data estimates of DOD counternarcotics support provided or efforts in
these nations or regions. DOD does not budget counternarcotics programs by regions or countries, but by
program.
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Maritime and Airport Security Assistance
While maritime security in Africa is a general issue of interest for U.S. policy, counterdrug-
related maritime security efforts in the region have focused mainly on West Africa in recent years.
According to General William E. Ward, Commander of AFRICOM, the “absence of credible
maritime security capacity” along the coast of West Africa has allowed drug trafficking and other
criminal activity in the region to thrive.107 To address such challenges, various DOD elements, as
well as the U.S. Coast Guard and several U.S. civilian agencies, have become involved in an
increasing number of bilateral and multilateral maritime security cooperation activities in West
African coastal countries.
One such training initiative is the Africa Partnership Station (APS), implemented by U.S. Navy
Forces Africa and AFRICOM, in partnership with U.S. civilian and non-governmental agencies,
to increase the capacity of West and Central African coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea to patrol
and monitor their waters. APS vessels sponsor a variety of joint exercises, on-board trainings, and
port visits aimed at enhancing diverse maritime security capacities.108 In addition, since early
2008, at least one U.S. Navy surface combatant is on patrol off West Africa at any time, a
threefold increase in such a patrol presence since 2002.109 Other projects underway include
maritime port and airport security assistance and infrastructure construction and related training.
DOD is involved in constructing boat and refueling facilities for West and Central African navies
and coast guards and seeks to enhance the capacity of African port and customs security agencies
by providing training and equipment for law enforcement personnel, including scanners and other
facility improvements.110
Detection, Monitoring, and Interdiction Operations
Several other DOD elements are involved in the detection and monitoring of illicit drugs that
flow through Africa. The combatant command for Africa, AFRICOM, which began initial
operations in October 2007 and became fully operational in October 2008, includes
counternarcotics efforts as one of its strategic areas of activity.111 DOD’s Joint Interagency Task
Force-South (JIATF-South), which traditionally has coordinated drug interdiction monitoring and
detection operations in the transit zone between South America and the United States, also
coordinates with AFRICOM and European counterpart agencies regarding similar operations
relating to the trafficking of drugs from South America to Africa. JIATF-South-European
cooperation has, in particular, focused on the goals and activities of the European Maritime

107 Statement by General William E. Ward, before the House Armed Services Committee: Fiscal Year 2009 Defense
Authorization, March 13, 2008.
108 The first APS deployed in 2007 and was completed in spring, 2008. It involved a variety of joint exercises, on-board
trainings, and port visits in West African coastal countries from Senegal to Gabon. In 2008, a follow-on APS initiative
engaged 15 West and Central African countries, hosted 79 ship riders from 10 foreign countries, conducted more than
1,700 training sessions involving more than 1,500 participants. A second APS cruise occurred in spring 2009.
AFRICOM, Fact Sheet: Africa Partnership Station, January 28, 2009.
109 Richard Reeve, “Commanding Presence: AFRICOM’s Uncertain Mission Statement,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
January 2008.
110 DOD response to CRS inquiry, June 17, 2009; Testimony of William Wechsler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Office of Counternarcotics and Global Threats, DOD, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on African Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009.
111 Statement by General William E. Ward, before the House Armed Services Committee: Fiscal Year 2009 Defense
Authorization, March 13, 2008.
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Analysis and Operations Centre—Narcotics (MAOC-N), located in Portugal. DOD is also
involved in the establishment of an “Information Fusion Center” in Cape Verde, which would
help to collect and share drug-related intelligence.
Drug Enforcement Administration Role
DEA, with DOD/AFRICOM funding, is seeking to establish U.S.-vetted African police units,
which would help expand DEA’s counternarcotics operations cooperation with African
governments. Although plans are not final, DEA hopes to establish the first of such units on the
continent in Ghana, which would be the first of its kind in Africa. The pending proposal calls for
Ghanaian personnel to be hand-picked by DEA to undergo extra training, as well as to undergo
background checks, including polygraphs.112 To date, the United States established no vetted
African law enforcement units, largely because personnel and funding have not been provided for
such purposes. Vetted units are designed to improve U.S. capacity to coordinate with host nations
regarding counternarcotics matters and to minimize the risk of joint law enforcement operations
from being compromised through official corruption.
DEA also participates in drug interdiction and other drug-related law enforcement operations in
Africa. The State Department’s 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report states that
DEA, in coordination with European and African law enforcement agencies, “has developed and
implemented a program to gain increased understanding of narcotics trafficking in West Africa,
fill intelligence gaps, and promote intelligence sharing.”113 Public details about such activities are
limited, however, to avoid compromising ongoing DEA operations.
Recent DEA-related activities in Africa include the extradition of two Colombians from Sierra
Leone in April 2009, the first such defendant transfer in the history of U.S.-Sierra Leone
relations. A third suspect who is a material witness in the case was also transferred to U.S.
custody.114 The Colombians were allegedly involved in an attempt to smuggle about 600
kilograms of cocaine to Freetown, Sierra Leone, in 2008, on a small plane. Another U.S. case in
2009 involved an alleged Colombian drug cell head, who was expelled from Togo and transferred
to U.S. custody to face U.S. drug charges.115 In 2006 and 2007, a DEA investigation also
disrupted an Afghanistan-based drug trafficking organization’s heroin smuggling route through
West Africa en route to the United States; two of the targets of the investigation were expelled
from Ghana and convicted of the drug trafficking charges in the United States.116
Key legal tools in such efforts include two provisions of U.S. law—21 U.S.C. 959 and 21 U.S.C.
960a—that provide the DEA with the “extra-territorial jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
drug offenses with a nexus to the U.S. even though the drugs in question have not actually

112 See testimony by Thomas Harrigan, DEA, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa
Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009.
113 2009 INCSR.
114 U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, “United States Announces
Historic Transfer of Defendants from Sierra Leone to Face Cocaine Importation Charges,” April 22, 2009; “Un
Colombiano Es El Primero Narco Extraditado Desde Sierra Leona a E.U.,” El Tiempo, April 29, 2009; and information
provided to CRS by the DEA, July 21, 2009.
115 Testimony of Thomas Harrigan, DEA, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa
Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009.
116 Ibid.
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entered the United States.” Similar authority is provided in cases in which a drug trafficking
crime can be tied to terrorist activities anywhere in the world.117
Drug-Related Anti-money Laundering Efforts
To combat money laundering originating from drug proceeds, Congress passed the Foreign
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act in 1999. It authorizes the President to target and block
financial criminal proceeds of “Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker Kingpins,” or
SDNTKs.118 The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) implements
the SDNTK asset blocking program. In 2000, the first year that the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act was implemented, the President identified 12 SDNTKs, 2 of whom were
Nigerians.119 The President has since named a total of 70 SDNTKs, but apart from the two
Nigerians designated in 2000, a husband and wife team, no others have been nationals of an
African country.
Multilateral and Regional Efforts to Combat Drug
Trafficking in Africa
In addition to the United States, multiple African and donor governments and multilateral
organizations are involved in combating drug trafficking in Africa. In general, while most actors
involved at the multilateral and regional level agree that drug trafficking through Africa is a
growing phenomenon and poses a variety of law enforcement challenges, a shared consensus on
how to address these challenges has not emerged.
Limited resources and, in some cases, limited political will, often hamper the effectiveness of
African and multinational efforts to combat the illegal drug trade. For these and other reasons,
some African policy makers reportedly do not view drug trafficking as a priority problem.120 As
one report explains: “for such poor countries ... unless funded from abroad, the advantages of
directing policing resources to countering narcotics trafficking are not as apparent as in the rich
consumer states that they supply.”121
Nevertheless, there is growing support among African governments for efforts to address the drug
situation, both at the national level and in multilateral fora. Some West African countries, notably
Cape Verde, Senegal, Ghana, and Sierra Leone, have recently won praise from U.S. officials for
their efforts to mount effective law enforcement responses to the problem, and for their

117 Testimony of Thomas M. Harrigan, DEA, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa
Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009.
118 Title VIII, International Narcotics Trafficking, of P.L. 106-120, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000 (21 U.S.C. 1901-1908; 8 U.S.C. 1182). The law was reportedly modeled on Treasury's sanctions program
pursuant to Executive Order 12978 (October 1995) against Colombia drug cartels under authority of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (Title II of P.L. 95-223; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and the National Emergencies Act
(P.L. 94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
119 Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Sanctions under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, p.
1063, William J. Clinton, Book 1 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 2000-2001.
120 UNODC (2005).
121 Reeve (2008).
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willingness to cooperate with U.S. and international counternarcotics efforts.122 Forty-five of 53
African countries have signed all three international U.N. drug control conventions.123 Key
multilateral, European, and African country groupings that are developing efforts to combat drug
trafficking in Africa include the following:
• U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Established in 1997, UNODC is
mandated to assist Member States in their efforts to combat illegal drugs,
transnational crime, and terrorism. UNODC publishes an annual report on drug
trafficking, called the World Drug Report, and collects data on drug cultivation,
production, seizures, and other drug-related statistics. In Africa, UNODC
maintains five field offices: one in Egypt, covering Northern Africa and the
Middle East; one in Kenya, covering Eastern Africa; one in Nigeria; one in
Senegal, covering West and Central Africa; and one in South Africa, covering
Southern Africa. These offices report on drug trafficking and other criminal
activity trends at the regional level. They also help to build anti-crime policy and
institutional capacities at the regional and country level, including with respect to
counternarcotics efforts, through programs that foster drug law enforcement
mentoring and training, justice and penal sector reform, and drug demand
reduction. UNODC also supports Data for Africa, a project launched in 2005 that
is designed to increase the amount and reliability of data and information on
African crime and drug trends.
• U.N. Office for West Africa (UNOWA). Established in 2001 by the U.N.
Security Council, UNOWA is mandated to further the United Nations’ peace and
security objectives in West Africa. UNOWA focuses on cross-border illicit
activity in the sub-region, among other issues, and helps to raise West African
government’s awareness of the challenges posed by drug trafficking. It also
facilitates related multilateral security and political cooperation in the sub-
region.124
• African Union (AU). Established in 2002, the African Union is a regional
multilateral grouping of all states in Sub-Saharan and North Africa except
Morocco. The African Union has addressed drug trafficking through its Revised
AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012). In
March 2009, the A.U. Commission and the UNODC launched a joint project to
support the implementation of the A.U. Plan of Action, building on earlier joint
efforts focused on drug demand reduction and drug trafficking, among other
crime prevention and criminal justice issues.125

122 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West
Africa, June 23, 2009.
123 The three U.N. drug treaties include the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended; the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances.
124 The current mandate for UNOWA lasts until December 2010. See U.N. Security Council, “Letter Dated 28
November 2007 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2007/753,
December 21, 2007. The most recent mid-year report on the activities of UNOWA, covering the period from July 1,
2008, to December 31, 2008, discusses drug trafficking a priority cross-border subject. See U.N. Security Council,
“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office for West Africa,” S/2009/39, January 15, 2009.
125 UNODC, “African Union Commission and UNODC Launch Joint Project to Combat Drugs and Crime in Africa,”
March 12, 2009; UNODC, “UNODC and AU Extend Cooperation,” December 10, 2007; and CRS Report RS21332,
(continued...)
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• Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Established in
1975, ECOWAS is a 15-member multilateral grouping of West Africa states that
promotes regional economic integration and security cooperation. Recently,
ECOWAS has begun to play a greater role in combating drug trafficking in the
region. In October 2008, an ECOWAS ministerial conference, organized in
collaboration with the UNODC and UNOWA and held in Praia, Cape Verde,
adopted a draft Political Declaration on Prevention of Drug Abuse, Drug
Trafficking and Organized Crimes in West Africa. One of the organization’s
stated goals for 2009 is to complete an ECOWAS convention against drug
trafficking and abuse.126
• Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and FATF-Style Regional Bodies
(FSRBs) in Africa. Established in 1989, FATF is a multilateral organization that
establishes international standards for legislative and regulatory reform to combat
money laundering, including drug-related money laundering and terrorist
financing. South Africa is the only African member of FATF. However, two
African FSRBs―the Eastern and South African Anti-Money Laundering Group
(ESAAMLG) and the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money
Laundering in West Africa (GIABA, its French acronym)―support and promote
the standards established by FATF.
• International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). The INCB is an independent
and quasi-judicial control organ that monitors the implementation of U.N. drug
control treaties. In 2007, the INCB conducted a program to monitor and prevent
illicit trade in precursor chemicals through Africa, called Operation Crystal Flow.
The findings from that operation proved that Africa is a transshipment point for
international trade in illegally diverted precursor chemicals. In its recent annual
reports, the INCB has urged African countries and donor nations to continue to
take steps to curtail cocaine trafficking and the emergent precursor trade in
Africa.
• INTERPOL. Established in 1923, the International Criminal Police
Organization, or INTERPOL, is a 187-member state organization that facilitates
international police co-operation and efforts to prevent and combat international
crime. With respect to counternarcotics issues, INTERPOL assists its member
states to identify new drug trafficking trends and criminal organizations, and
supports law enforcement efforts to combat drug trafficking. In Africa,
INTERPOL launched Project COCAF (Cocaine Trafficking from Western Africa
to Europe) in 2006, which facilitates information sharing between European and
African law enforcement agencies to identify and target emerging drug
trafficking routes, particularly cocaine shipment on commercial air flights from

(...continued)
The African Union, The African Union, by Nicolas Cook.
126 At the conference ― which was also attended by multiple U.N. agencies, EUROPOL, MAOC, INTERPOL, and
multiple non-African governments, including that of the United States ― the UNODC released its November 2008
report, Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa. See Antonio Maria Costa, UNODC Executive Director,
“West Africa Under Attack/drug Trafficking Is A Security Threat” [speech], ECOWAS High-level Conference on
Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa, October 28, 2008; Final Report, ECOWAS Ministerial
Conference on Illicit Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat to West Africa, October 28-29, 2008; and Melissa Chea-
Annan, “West Africa: ECOWAS Adopts Strategies against Illicit Drugs,” AllAfrica.com, November 4, 2008.
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West Africa.127 INTERPOL has also facilitated two other related efforts, Project
PROTEUS, which was designed to combat cocaine trafficking originating in
South America and transiting Western Africa en route to Europe, and Project
DRUM, an effort to target the diversion of precursor chemicals in Africa.128
INTERPOL is also involved in policy capacity building in Africa, through a
project called OASIS Africa (Providing Operational Assistance, Services, and
Infrastructure Support to African Police Forces).129 The organization also deploys
Response Teams that provide specialized expertise and investigative aid to
countries facing major or serious police issues or cases.130
• European Union (EU). In December 2007, the EU committed to greater
counternarcotics cooperation with and assistance for Africa in the Joint EU-
Africa Strategy, adopted at the Lisbon Summit.131 The European Commission
(EC) and several European countries also provide counternarcotics assistance to
some African countries at the bilateral and regional or sub-regional levels, and
through international multilateral institutions, like the UNODC and the Dublin
Group.132 Two additional initiatives that are partially funded by the EC include
the Maritime Analysis and Operations Center—Narcotics (MAOC-N), located in
Portugal and established in 2007, and the Mediterranean Anti-Drug Coordination
Center (CeCLAD-M), located in France and established in 2008.133 These efforts
support maritime surveillance and intelligence coordination pertaining to drug
trafficking interdiction operations along maritime routes between Africa and
Europe. ECOWAS and the EU Ministerial Troika also meet regularly to promote
mutual security cooperation, including with respect to counternarcotics efforts.

127 INTERPOL Fact Sheet, “Drug Trafficking,” COM/FS/2008-06/DCO-01, June 2008; INTERPOL, “Guinea Bissau
Requests INTERPOL Assistance Following Major Drug Seizure,” July 21, 2008; INTERPOL, “Liberia Requests
INTERPOL Assistance After Major Cocaine Haul,” February 4, 2008; INTERPOL, INTERPOL Response Teams, n.d.
128 Ronald K. Noble, INTERPOL Secretary General, Keynote speech, 9th Meeting of the West African Police Chiefs
Committee (WAPCCO), 3 October 3, 2007; INCB 2006 Report; and INTERPOL, Facilitating International Police Co-
Operation For A Safer World [presentation], n.d.
129 INTERPOL website, “OASIS Africa,” last modified April 3, 2009.
130 INTERPOL, INTERPOL Response Teams, n.d.; and; INTERPOL, “Guinea Bissau Requests INTERPOL Assistance
... ,” and “Liberia requests INTERPOL assistance,” op cit.
131 See also the “EU Drugs Action Plan for 2009-2012,” Official Journal of the European Union, C326/7, December
20, 2008.
132 The Dublin Group is a group of donor countries that coordinates their international counternarcotics assistance; see
Council of the European Union, Regional Report on Western Africa [report to the Dublin Group], CORDROGUE 112
16344/06, December 12, 2006.
133 MAOC-N is staffed by law enforcement and military personnel from the UK, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, France, the
Netherlands, Italy, EUROPOL, as well as personnel from the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force-South, which is the
American drug interdiction corollary to MAOC-N in the Caribbean. The French have invited members of the 5+5
Interministerial Conference of the Western Mediterranean—France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Malta, plus Algeria, Tunisia,
Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania—to participate in CeCLAD-M. See European Commission, Directorate for Maritime
Affairs and Fisheries, “Non-Paper on Maritime Surveillance,” November 13, 2008; Daniel Ducarme (Rapporteur), “A
Common Security and Defence Strategy for Europe—Reply to the Annual Report of the Council,” 55th Session of the
European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of Western European Union, A/2028, December 2008.
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Congressional Role and Possible Oversight Issues
Congress is involved in many aspects of U.S. international drug control policy. Members
regularly appropriate funds for counterdrug initiatives, conduct oversight activities on federal
counterdrug programs, and legislate changes to agency authorities and other counterdrug policies.
Recent activities, as discussed above, include the 110th Congress’s passage of P.L. 110-417, which
required a DOD counternarcotics strategy for Africa and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee’s conduct of a June 23, 2009, hearing entitled Confronting Drug Trafficking in West
Africa.134 During the hearing, the Chair and Ranking Member each expressed their concern
regarding the issue, and stated that further policy efforts to halt rising drug trafficking in Africa
are necessary. Congress may also respond to increasing executive branch prioritization of
counternarcotics assistance efforts in Africa, as previously discussed.135 Key Africa-related
counternarcotics issues that Congress may consider, among others, include the following:
Data Reliability: Implications for Analysis and Policymaking
The analysis of drug trafficking and use trends in Africa—and, in turn, the formulation of policy
solutions to combat drugs in Africa—is inherently limited by the frequent lack of basic crime and
law enforcement statistics, drug-related health and social indicators, and security and justice
sector evaluations in Africa. Data on domestic drug use are often unavailable or cover limited
time periods. Statistics on drug-related arrests, prosecutions, incarcerations, seizures, and other
related trends are often unreliable or non-existent. There is also a paucity of actionable
intelligence data in the region; as the UNODC has reported, many of the largest drug seizures in
recent years in Africa were detected through foreign tips, as a result of non-African law
enforcement actions. Similarly, several of the largest cocaine seizures undertaken by African law
enforcement appear to have arisen from accidental detection and other coincidental
circumstances, rather than as a result of systematic intelligence gathering or other law
enforcement operations.136 As a result of the lack of data on drug trafficking trends and patterns,
estimates of the amount of cocaine currently transiting Africa vary widely, with estimates ranging
from 40 metric tons to 300 metric tons per year, as previously discussed. In the absence of better
data on seizures and traffic volumes, accurate projections of emergent and prospective
trafficking-related trends and developments—which may provide the basis for allocating

134 P.L. 110-417, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009; and U.S. Congress,
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 23,
2009.
135 State Department, Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2010; White House, Remarks by the President to the
Ghanaian Parliament, (Accra, Ghana), July 11, 2009; White House, Readout of the President's Call with President
Mills of Ghana, Office of the Press Secretary, April 10, 2009; and CRS Report RS22809, Ghana: Background and U.S.
Relations, Ghana: Background and U.S. Relations, by Nicolas Cook. Also see testimony of Dennis C. Blair, Director
of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence,” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats
to the United States, February 12, 2009.
136 For instance, in June 2007, a passerby informed Senegalese officials about an unattended boat that had washed
ashore, only to find 1.2 tons of cocaine. Similarly, in May 2006, Ghanaian authorities happened upon 1.9 tons of
cocaine after searching a van during a routine traffic stop. In other situations, African law enforcement reportedly could
have seized more cocaine, if it had more manpower, vehicles, and gasoline to give chase. For example, in April 2007
authorities in Guinea-Bissau intercepted a consignment of 635 kg of cocaine, but traffickers were able to escape with
the rest of the consignment, believed to be about 2.5 tons, because the police did not have the manpower and vehicles
to give chase. UNODC (November 2008).
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resources and formulating policy responses to the problem—are likely to be difficult to generate.
While cocaine trafficking through Africa has risen sharply in recent years, it remains unclear
whether a reported drop in seizures in 2009, for instance, is indicative of a short-term or a long-
term trend.137
Several observers have argued that more and better intelligence and data collection on the nature
of the drug threat in Africa is needed.138 This could take the form of increased human intelligence
collection and the increased deployment of technology-based methods for detecting and
monitoring drug flows transiting the region. Efforts to increase such Africa-related law
enforcement resources, however, are nevertheless likely to be countered by contending pressures
to devote greater resources to similar objectives in other parts of the world where the drug threat
is viewed as being greater. In the absence of better information on the drug threat in Africa, some
observers may argue that significant shifts in U.S. attention to the region may not be warranted.
Others may argue that without good information on the problem, policy makers may be prone to
formulate policies that ineffectively respond to current challenges, or do not address key aspects
of the problem, such as the reported involvement in African drug trafficking of criminal
organizations targeted by the United States in other regions.
Short-Term, Targeted Counternarcotics Assistance Versus Long-
Term Law Enforcement Capacity Building
Given that many African countries lack effective law enforcement agencies and judicial systems
and resources to fund them, many observers have argued that donor countries, including the
United States, should consider scaling up and expanding existing counternarcotics capacity-
building assistance programs in Africa. Such recommendations raise questions over how to
achieve that end. Some policy makers may contend that, given the urgency and extent of the drug
trafficking threat faced by African countries, an immediate rise in U.S. and European interdiction
operations, quick impact training and equipping programs, and other short-term operational
activity are necessary. Others, however, may argue that in the absence of a comprehensive law
enforcement and judicial system capacity-building, the results of such short-term assistance are
likely to be fragmentary and ineffective in the immediate terms, and negligible with regard to
long-term trends. Without a capacity to ensure fair trials; effectively prosecute potentially
wealthy, high-profile defendants; properly control seized drugs for evidentiary purposes and
subsequently destroy them; enforce prison sentences; or to deter police corruption, for instance,
overall efforts to curtail drug trafficking may founder. Such capacity-building assistance would
likely include a broad but integrated combination of law enforcement, rule of law, and
government infrastructure and process training and assistance, as well as facility construction or
upgrades and providing operational equipment.

137 According to the UNODC, seizures in West Africa peaked in 2007, with the share of seized cocaine in Europe
traced to Africa dropping from 27% in 2007 to 7% in 2008.
138 See, for example, testimony of Doug Farah and Johnnie Carson, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on African Affairs: Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa, June 23, 2009.
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Resource Level and Allocation Considerations
Ultimately, questions over the relative mix of immediate impact and long-term development that
may be necessary boil down to decisions on policy prioritization and resource allocation. Some
policy makers are likely to argue that both short-term interventions and long-term capacity-
building efforts may be necessary. In a budgetary context in which federal fiscal resources are
increasingly limited, however, decision makers will need to carefully consider what mix of
resources is likely to have the greatest effects with respect to both time frames.
While some may be inclined to provide such aid, others may question whether a substantial level
of U.S. counternarcotics assistance for Africa is warranted at all, since much of the recent growth
in cocaine traffic through West Africa is believed to be destined to Europe, not the United States.
As a result, some may suggest that European countries should provide the bulk of
counternarcotics assistance in Africa. A related line of debate may center on whether the extent
and effectiveness of current European counterdrug efforts in Africa are adequate, and whether
individual European countries or the EU plan to increase their counterdrug presence in the region.
Such views, however, may be countered by those who contend that drug trafficking in Africa
poses a variety of direct threats to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests in Africa.
Currently, the U.S. counterdrug footprint in Africa is expanding in terms of resources and
personnel. The mix of resources being devoted to such efforts reflects short term and long-term
policy objectives and emphasizes the importance of cooperation with multilateral and U.N.
agencies and with European governments and the EU. The State Department’s FY2009 estimated
level of funding for such purposes is 13 times as large as that for FY2006, and during the same
period, the number of African recipient countries targeted to receive such assistance has grown
from just one country (Nigeria) to six. Additional resources to combat drug trafficking through
the region have also begun to flow through DOD entities and initiatives, including AFRICOM,
APS, and JIATF-South. DEA is also scaling up its presence, having recently augmented its three
existing regional offices by opening a new office in Accra, Ghana. DEA also has provisional
plans to expand its presence in other parts of Africa farther by opening up five additional country
offices and developing new law enforcement operations in five additional locations.139 In
addition, various other U.S. plans for other counterdrug training programs and other projects are
also under development.
Despite recent and prospective increases, counternarcotics efforts in Africa remain relatively
small when compared to U.S. counternarcotics programs in other parts of the world. In FY2008,
for example, the State Department obligated 0.12% of its total counternarcotics aid budget to
Africa, while the State Department’s FY2010 request for counternarcotics assistance to Africa—
which is significantly larger than that of any previous year—comprises just 0.49% of total global
State Department counternarcotics assistance. Personnel resources and attention devoted to drug
trafficking in Africa are also limited. The State Department has one Transnational Crime Affairs
Officer stationed in the region (in Abuja, Nigeria) and has a limited diplomatic presence in some
African countries affected by drug trafficking, such as Guinea-Bissau, where the State
Department maintains an office staffed only with Guinea-Bissau nationals.

139 These include Nairobi, Kenya; Rabat, Morocco; Dakar, Senegal; Cape Town, South Africa; and Conakry, Guinea.
DEA response to CRS request, July 2, 2008.
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Defining Agency Roles and Responsibilities
U.S. government agency roles and responsibilities in combating drugs in Africa are not yet clearly
defined in a public strategy document for the region. In practice, the State Department’s INL
Bureau has taken the lead on counterdrug matters in the region, focusing primarily on country
assessments to inform future programming efforts. INL, however, is only one of several U.S.
government agencies or agency units that could play a role in counterdrug efforts in Africa. As
U.S. assistance for such ends grows, the 111th Congress may see a need to weigh in on what
agencies play which policy implementation and coordination roles, including with respect to the
relative balance of civilian and military agency participation in such efforts, as did the 110th
Congress with regard to the military’s role.140
In the absence of a clear integrated, inter-agency strategy for the region, several questions about
agency participation in counterdrug efforts in Africa and interagency coordination may arise. One
such question is whether an interagency coordination body should formally be established to
ensure policy consistency and avoid program overlap and duplication across U.S. government
agencies and offices. Presently, no such body formally exists, although informal inter-agency
working group sessions have taken place on an ad hoc basis. If policy makers decide that such a
coordinating body is necessary, secondary questions include which agencies should participate in
the group, which agency or agencies might chair or co-chair the group, and whether the members
of the group should meet at the principal, deputies, or working group levels. Similar questions
regarding program coordination on the ground in countries in Africa may also arise.
A related question pertains to the emerging role of the U.S. military, particularly with respect to
the role of the regional combatant command for Africa, AFRICOM—and the proportion of
African counternarcotics assistance currently provided by DOD (approximately $19.3 million in
FY2009 compared to the State Department’s approximately $1.6 million in FY2009). Some
observers have questioned whether DOD’s growing role in counternarcotics activities and
AFRICOM’s prospective participation in these activities, and others that are widely seen as
primarily civilian in nature, is appropriate. Proponents of an expanded DOD counternarcotics role
generally argue that the U.S. military is well-equipped with the resources and monitoring and
detecting skills to help foreign governments counter powerful drug trafficking organizations and
that the absence of DOD’s participation in counternarcotics assistance would lessen the
effectiveness of U.S. programs. Some may also contend that protecting the integrity of national
borders and territory from external threats, including drug trafficking, is an inherently military
activity. Opponents, by contrast, may contend that counternarcotics foreign assistance is primarily
a law enforcement and intelligence activity and not a core military mission. In the view of some,
the training of foreign militaries and police in counternarcotics operations could result in legal
dilemmas and human rights controversies arising from a merging of civilian police and military
roles, potentially resulting in serious political and diplomatic repercussions for the United States
abroad.


140 See P.L. 110-417, which requires that DOD submit a report to Congress on its counternarcotics strategy in and
objectives for the region and DOD roles and missions in support of overall U.S. counter-narcotics policy for Africa,
including the role of AFRICOM in such efforts.
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Appendix. Cocaine Seizures and African
Membership in Illicit Drug Conventions
Table A-1. Reported Cocaine Seizures of 10 Kilos or More in West Africa Since 2000
Reported
Amounts in
Report
Country
Kilograms
Date Summary
Details
Liberia/international
2,400 January
French navy vessel seizes drugs in international waters off
waters
2008
Liberia. Crew of nine Ghanaians arrested and later
convicted.
Togo 500
October
Seizure near port of Lome; eight Colombians arrested, one
2008
of whom Togo agrees to extradite to the United States.
Sierra Leone
691
July 2008
Drugs seized from aircraft originating in Venezuela with fake
Red Cross markings lands without permission at Freetown
International Airport. Suspects flee. Automatic weapons
linked to them are seized. One U.S. citizen, four
Colombians, two Mexicans, a Venezuelan, a national of
Guinea-Bissau, and several Sierra Leoneans convicted in the
case in April 2009. Two suspects later extradited to United
States to stand trial in a separate cocaine trafficking case.
Mauritania
53
April 2008
Persons arrested: two Mauritanians and a Senegalese.
Cocaine seized together with two tons of cannabis. Drugs
seized at Nouadhibou.
Guinea /international
3,000 February
French navy vessel seizes drugs in international waters off
waters
2008
Guinea.
Mali 750
January
Drugs seized near Algerian border after shootout between
2008
Malian security officials and smugglers driving Algerian-
registered vehicles.
Mali 15
January
French woman arrested at Bamako airport.
2008
Mali 116
December
Drugs seized at near Guinean border; two Togolese
2007
arrested.
Mali 35
November
Drugs seized at near Guinean border; a Togolese and a
2007
Nigerian arrested.
Senegal/international
3,700 October
In international waters off Senegal, Spanish police seize ship
waters
2007
suspected of ferrying shipment from off-shore mother ship
to Senegal. Persons arrested: Dutch ship officers and four
Ghanaian crew members.
Mauritania 830-864
August
Persons arrested: two Mauritanians, two Moroccans, a
2007
Senegalese, a Spaniard, and a Mexican.
Benin 350
August
Drugs confiscated from coastal vil age near capital, Cotonou.
2007
During a counter-narcotics operation mounted in response
to a reported smuggling incident, police officers allegedly
divert between 20 and 25 kilos of cocaine, in addition to that
seized; two alleged traffickers are killed; and a reported
Guatemalan trafficker flees, allegedly with official connivance.
These incidents lead to the arrest of 14 police officers.
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Reported
Amounts in
Report
Country
Kilograms
Date Summary
Details
Senegal
1,254
July 2007
Drugs seized near Nianing at private residence close to
location of 1,200 kilo seizure days earlier; links found among
suspects in both cases. Two French nationals and three
Senegalese, and three additional Colombians arrested at
various times in connection to the 1,254 kilo case. Cash and
arms also seized. Suspected trafficking pattern: Cocaine from
Colombia, Venezuela and/or Ecuador transported to Aruba;
shipped to West African coastal waters; and off-loaded from
mother ship to sailing boats.
Senegal
1,200
June 2007
Drugs seized aboard a mechanically disabled, deserted sailing
ship near the coastal resort of Nianing. Travel and financial
documents suggesting links to Guinea-Bissau, Brazil,
Colombia, and Portugal confiscated. A Colombian, a
Venezuelan and an Ecuadoran arrested days later in
connection to the seizure.
Senegal
44
June 2007
Total cocaine seized at Dakar International Airport by mid-
year.
Mauritania
625
May 2007
Origin of cocaine: Venezuela. Persons arrested: one French
national and 13 Mauritanians, including a Mauritanian
Interpol officer and a relative of former Mauritanian military
junta leader Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla. Drugs seized
from aboard a smal aircraft flown from Venezuela near port
of Nouadhibou, a key illegal migration debarkation point.
Guinea Bissau
635
April 2007
Drugs seized by police, who lacked the capacity to
confiscate an estimated additional 2.5 tons of cocaine linked
to the seized drugs. Two military officers arrested in case
ordered freed by military authorities.
Burkina Faso
49
April 2007
Drugs seized near Mali border; five Nigerian females
arrested.
Senegal 12
November
Drugs seized over 10 days at Dakar International Airport.
2006
Persons arrested: Two Bulgarians en route from Guinea to
Spain, and two Nigerians.
Guinea Bissau
674
September
Drugs seized in raid on private residence by police; later
2006
seized by military officials and moved to a national treasury
building; later removed by unknown parties. Two suspected
Venezuelan smugglers arrested after shootout with police
later released by judge.
Benin
100
July 2006
Drugs confiscated at home of former Beninois finance
minister.
Nigeria
14,200
June 2006
Drugs reported packaged in 284 50 kilo bags of hidden
among cement bags of similar appearance. Total seized is the
subject of dispute.
Ghana
30
May 2006
Three Ghanaians and two Chinese nationals arrested; seized
amount suspected of being part of a 2 metric-ton shipment,
which was not recovered, sparking a later inquiry into
possible official links.
Nigeria 80
March
Nigerian arrested.
2006
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Reported
Amounts in
Report
Country
Kilograms
Date Summary
Details
Ghana 588
November
Two Venezuelans charged after drugs seized at their
2005
residence.
Togo/International
374
July 2004
Togo-registered tugboat from Venezuela to Spain
waters
interdicted by French military vessel in coordination with
Togolese officials and turned over to Togolese officials. Six
Venezuelans, a Ukrainian, and the Cuban ship’s captain
arrested.
Ghana 674
January
Drugs seized at port of Tema. One U.S./U.K. dual citizen,
2004
one German, three U.K. nationals, and three Ghanaians
arrested
Ghana 42
September
Drugs concealed in rice sacks imported from Guyana.
2003
Source: Compilation based on multiple press accounts from Agence France Presse, Global Insight Daily
Analysis, BBC Monitoring Middle East, VOA, Reuters, Cotonou Fraternite, and the U.N. Integrated Regional
Information Network.
Table A-2. Status of Sub-Saharan and North African Countries’ Membership in
Multilateral Anti-Crime Agreements or Bodies
Member
States Party
State of
States
to the 1988
a
Party to
U.N.
States Party
Financial
the 1961
States Party
Convention
to the 2000
Action
U.N. Single
to the1971
against Illicit
U.N.
States
Task
Convention
U.N.
Traffic in
Convention
Party to the
Force-
on
Convention
Narcotic
against
2003 U.N.
Style
Narcotic
on
Drugs and
Transnational Convention Regional
Drugs, as
Psychotropic Psychotropic
Organized
against
Body
Countries
amended?
Substances?
Substances?
Crime?
Corruption?
(FSRB)?
Benin
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesb
Burkina
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesb
Faso
Cameroon
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Cape
Verde
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesb
Cent.
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
African Rep.
Chad
No Yes Yes No No No
Congo,
Rep.
Yes
Yes Yes Noa Yes
No
Cote
Yes
Yes Yes Noa Noa Yesb
d’Ivoire
Dem. Rep.
Yes
Yes Yes Yes No No
of Congo
Equatorial
No
No No Yes No No
Guinea
Gabon
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
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Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy

Member
States Party
State of
States
to the 1988
a
Party to
U.N.
States Party
Financial
the 1961
States Party
Convention
to the 2000
Action
U.N. Single
to the1971
against Illicit
U.N.
States
Task
Convention
U.N.
Traffic in
Convention
Party to the
Force-
on
Convention
Narcotic
against
2003 U.N.
Style
Narcotic
on
Drugs and
Transnational Convention Regional
Drugs, as
Psychotropic Psychotropic
Organized
against
Body
Countries
amended?
Substances?
Substances?
Crime?
Corruption?
(FSRB)?
Gambia
Yes
Yes Yes Yes No Yesb
Ghana
Yes
Yes Yes Yes No Yesb
Guinea
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Noa Yesb
Guinea
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesb
Bissau
Liberia Yes
Noa Yes Yes Yes Yesb
Mali
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesb
Mauritania
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesc
Niger
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesb
Nigeria
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesb
Sao Tome
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
and Principe
Senegal
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesb
Sierra
Yes
Yes Yes Noa Yes
Yesb
Leone
Togo
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesb
Burundi
Yes
Yes Yes Noa Yes
No
Comoros
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Noa No
Djibouti
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Eritrea
Yes
Yes Yes Yes No No
Ethiopia
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Kenya
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesd
Madagascar
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Mauritius
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesd
Rwanda
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Seychel es
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesd
Somalia Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Tanzania
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesd
Uganda
Yes
Yes Yes Yes No Yesd
Algeria
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesc
Egypt
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesc
Libya
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesc
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Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy

Member
States Party
State of
States
to the 1988
a
Party to
U.N.
States Party
Financial
the 1961
States Party
Convention
to the 2000
Action
U.N. Single
to the1971
against Illicit
U.N.
States
Task
Convention
U.N.
Traffic in
Convention
Party to the
Force-
on
Convention
Narcotic
against
2003 U.N.
Style
Narcotic
on
Drugs and
Transnational Convention Regional
Drugs, as
Psychotropic Psychotropic
Organized
against
Body
Countries
amended?
Substances?
Substances?
Crime?
Corruption?
(FSRB)?
Morocco
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesc
Sudan
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Noa Yesc
Tunisia
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesc
Angola
Yes
Yes Yes Noa Yes
No
Botswana
Yes
Yes Yes Yes No Yesd
Lesotho
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesd
Malawi
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesd
Mozambique
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesd
Namibia
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesd
South
Africa
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesd
Swaziland
Yes
Yes Yes Noa Noa Yesd
Zambia
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesd
Zimbabwe
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesd
a. The government of this country is a signatory to the Convention, but it did not ratify, accede, or succeed to
the Convention as a States Party.
b. The government of this country is a member of the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money
Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) FSRB.
c. The government of this country is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task
Force (MENA-FATF) FSRB.
d. The government of this country is a member of the Eastern and South African Anti-Money Laundering
Group (ESAAMLG) FSRB.
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Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy

Figure A-1. Map of Africa

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.



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Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy

Author Contact Information

Liana Sun Wyler
Nicolas Cook
Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics
Specialist in African Affairs
lwyler@crs.loc.gov, 7-6177
ncook@crs.loc.gov, 7-0429




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