The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other
Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Amy Belasco
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
September 28, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33110
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Summary
With enactment of the FY2009 Supplemental (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32) on June 24, 2009,
Congress has approved a total of about $944 billion for military operations, base security,
reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations
initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other
counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military
bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Congress is currently considering the FY2010 War
request that was submitted to Congress along with DOD’s baseline request. The House passed its
bill on July 30, 2009 (H.R. 3326) and the Senate is expected to act on its version in late
September 2009. This $944 billion total covers all appropriations approved by Congress for
FY2001 to meet war needs through FY2009, the current fiscal year ending September 30, 2009.
Of that total, CRS estimates that Iraq will receive about $683 billion (72%), OEF about $227
billion (24%) and enhanced base security about $29 billion (3%), with about $5 billion that CRS
cannot allocate (1%). About 94% of the funds are for DOD, 5% for foreign aid programs and
embassy operations, and less than 1% for medical care for veterans.
As of July 2009, DOD’s average monthly obligations for contracts and pay were about $10.9
billion, including $7.3 billion for Iraq, and $3.6 billion for Afghanistan. Compared to a year ago
when the surge ended but troop levels remained high, average obligations have fallen by about
12%. Decreases in costs as troops are withdrawn from Iraq have been largely offset by increases
in costs for additional troops for Afghanistan.
The FY2010 war request totals $139 billion including $130 billion for DOD for both wars, $6.4
billion for the State Department’s foreign and diplomatic operations, and $2.1 billion for VA
medical costs for OEF and OIF veterans. Overall war funding is decreasing from the peak of
$185 billion in FY2008 during the surge in Iraq to $150 billion in FY2009. This decline reflects
primarily lower war-related procurement as DOD’s returned to a narrower, more traditional
definition of war-related costs, rather than lower troop levels since increases for Afghanistan
offset decreases for Iraq. Based on the current request, the cost of the Afghan and Iraq wars
would fall by another 8% in FY2010, a decrease that is less than the currently planned 19%
decrease in overall troop levels.
If the Administration’s FY2010 war request is enacted, total war-related funding would reach
$1.08 trillion, including $748 billion for Iraq, $300 billion for Afghanistan, $29 billion for
enhanced security, and $5 billion that cannot be allocated. Of this cumulative total, 69% would be
for Iraq, 28% for Afghanistan, and 3% for enhanced security. On August 30, 2009, General
Stanley McChrystal, Commander in Afghanistan, submitted a strategic assessment and a request
for additional troops was reportedly given to Secretary of Defense Gates on September 26 , 2009.
That request is unlikely to be vetted either within DOD and the Administration until additional
ongoing White House reviews of the strategy are completed.
In a January 2009 update, the Congressional Budget Office projected that additional war costs for
FY2010-FY2019 could range from $388 billion, if troop levels fell to 30,000 by 2011, to $867
billion, if troop levels fell to 75,000 by about 2013. Under these CBO projections, funding for
Iraq, Afghanistan and the GWOT could total about $1.3 trillion to about $1.8 trillion for FY2001-
FY2019 depending on the scenario.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Total War Funding Enacted ................................................................................................... 1
Total War Costs if FY2010 Request is Approved ................................................................... 2
Pending FY2010 Request ...................................................................................................... 3
Potential Troop Increases in Afghanistan ..................................................................................... 4
War Cost Issues in the 111th Congress.......................................................................................... 4
War Cost Estimates for Iraq and Afghanistan......................................................................... 6
Problems with Reliability of DOD’s Estimates by Operation ........................................... 7
Estimates of War-Related Budget Authority..................................................................... 8
Funding for Each Agency.............................................................................................. 10
Trends in War Funding.............................................................................................................. 12
Estimates for Iraq and Afghanistan and Other Operations .................................................... 15
CBO Projections of Future Costs................................................................................... 16
Past Trends and Future DOD Costs in Iraq .................................................................... 17
Past Trends and Future DOD Costs in Afghanistan ........................................................ 19
Past Trends and Future Costs in Enhanced Security ....................................................... 19
DOD Spending Thus Far..................................................................................................... 19
Changes in Average Monthly Obligations...................................................................... 22
Troop Level Changes in the Bush and Obama Administrations ............................................ 23
Funding to Train and Equip Iraqi and Afghan Security Forces ............................................. 24
Reset and Reconstitution ..................................................................................................... 26
DOD Changes Definition of War Costs ......................................................................... 26
Procurement Funding in FY2007 and FY2008............................................................... 27
Front Loading Reset Funding ........................................................................................ 27
Carryover of DOD War Investment Funding.................................................................. 28
Accuracy and Expansion of Reconstitution Requests..................................................... 29
Modularity as an Emergency Expense ........................................................................... 30
Growing the Force as a War Cost .................................................................................. 30
Questions About War-Related Procurement Issues......................................................... 31
Potential Readiness Issues................................................................................................... 32
Congressional Options to Affect Military Operations........................................................... 33
Problems in War Cost Estimates and Reporting ......................................................................... 35
Difficulties in Explaining DOD’s War Costs........................................................................ 36
Changes in Troop Strength ............................................................................................ 37
Reliance on Reservists Falls .......................................................................................... 40
Changes in Military Personnel Costs ............................................................................. 41
Changes in Operating Costs .......................................................................................... 42
Changes in Investment Costs......................................................................................... 42
Special Funds and the Flexibility Issue.......................................................................... 43
Average Cost Per Deployed Troop and Future Costs............................................................ 45
Estimates of Future Costs.............................................................................................. 46
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Figures
Figure 1. Active-Duty and Reserve Shares of OIF/OEF Average Annual Troop Levels,
FY2003-Early FY2007........................................................................................................... 41
Tables
Table 1. Estimated War Funding by Operation: FY2001-FY2010 War Request ............................ 9
Table 2. Estimated War Funding by Agency: FY2001-FY2010 .................................................. 11
Table 3. Budget Authority for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror
(GWOT) Operations: FY2001-FY2010 Request ..................................................................... 13
Table 4. DOD’s Obligations by Operation: FY2001-FY2009 ..................................................... 20
Table 5. Afghan and Iraq Security Forces Funding: FY2004-FY2009 Bridge ............................. 24
Table 6. Average Troop Strength for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Counter-Terror
Operations, FY2001-FY2007 ................................................................................................. 38
Table 7. DOD’s War Enacted Budget Authority by Title: FY2004-FY2009 Bridge..................... 39
Table 8. Average Annual Cost Per Deployed Troop: FY2003-FY2006 ....................................... 45
Table A-1. Chronology of FY2008 War and FY2009 War Requests ........................................... 47
Table A-2. Enacted FY2008 and FY2009 War Funding.............................................................. 48
Table B-1. Ways To Extend How Long Army Can Operate Without FY2008
Supplemental Appropriations ................................................................................................. 57
Table C-1. Defense Department, Foreign Operations Funding, and VA Medical Funding
for Iraq, Afghanistan and Other Global War on Terror Activities, FY2001-FY2009................. 61
Appendixes
Appendix A. Congressional Action on FY2008 and FY2009 War Funding................................. 47
Appendix B. DOD Tools to Extend Financing War Cost ............................................................ 53
Appendix C. War Appropriations by Act and by Agency............................................................ 61
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 63
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Introduction
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has initiated three military
operations:
• Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) covering Afghanistan and other Global War
on Terror (GWOT) operations ranging from the Philippines to Djibouti that
began immediately after the 9/11 attacks and continues;
• Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) providing enhanced security for U.S. military
bases and other homeland security that was launched in response to the attacks
and continues at a modest level; and
• Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) that began in the fall of 2002 with the buildup of
troops for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and continues with counter-
insurgency and stability operations.
As the ninth year of operations since the 9/11 attacks begins this October, and troops are being
withdrawn in Iraq and increased in Afghanistan, the cost of war is a major concern including the
total amount appropriated, the amount for each operation, average monthly spending rates, and
the scope and duration of future costs. Information on costs is useful to Congress to assess
Department of Defense (DOD) war costs in FY2010, conduct oversight of past war costs, and
consider future alternatives for Afghanistan including potential additional increases in troop
levels which could offset some of the savings from the ongoing withdrawal from Iraq. This report
analyzes war funding for the Defense Department and tracks funding for USAID and VA Medical
funding.
Total War Funding Enacted
On June 24, 2009, Congress passed the FY2009 Supplemental (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32). On May
5, 2009, the Administration submitted its budget requests for FY2010 which includes $138.6
billion for DOD war costs, State/USAID foreign and diplomatic operations and VA medical care.
While the House passed all three appropriation bills in July 2009 before the summer recess—the
DOD (H.R. 3326), Military Construction and Veterans Affairs (H.R. 3082), and Department of
State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs (H.R. 3081), the Senate has not yet acted on its
versions. The DOD appropriations bill is expected to be considered in the Senate in late
September. In the meantime, the House passed a continuing resolution covering funding for the
government through October 31,2009 (H.R. 2918) and the Senate is expected to act this week to
give Congress time to complete action on individual appropriation bills.
At the end of June 2009, Congress passed the FY2009 Supplemental (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32)
which together with the FY2009 bridge fund passed last year (H.R. 2642/P.L. 110-252) provided
war funding for the current fiscal year.
Based on DOD estimates and budget submissions, the cumulative total for funds appropriated
from the 9/11 attacks through FY2009, total funding enacted to date for DOD, State/USAID and
VA for medical costs for the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and enhanced security is $944 billion
including:
• $683 billion for Iraq;
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• $227 billion for Afghanistan;
• $29 billion for enhanced security; and
• $5 billion unallocated.
Of this total, 72% is for Iraq, 24% for Afghanistan, 3% for enhanced security and 1% unallocated.
Almost all of the funding for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is for Afghanistan.
Some 94% of this funding goes to the Department of Defense to cover primarily incremental war-
related costs, that is, costs that are in addition to normal peacetime activities. These costs include
funds to deploy troops and their equipment to Iraq and Afghanistan, to conduct military
operations, to provide in-country support at bases, to provide special pay for deployed personnel,
and to repair, replace, and upgrade war-worn equipment.
These amounts are in addition to DOD’s funding in its baseline or regular budget which covers
the costs of regular pay for all military personnel, training activities, running and building
facilities on U.S. installations, buying new military equipment, and conducting research to
enhance future military capabilities.
Of total war costs, another 5% is for foreign and diplomatic activities and less than 1% for VA
medical for OEF and OIF veterans (see Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3).
Total War Costs if FY2010 Request is Approved
If the Administration’s request for $139 billion in war costs is enacted, cumulative appropriations
for the Afghan and Iraq wars would reach $1.08 trillion dollars. As the number of troops in
Afghanistan rises and those in Iraq falls, reflecting President Obama’s decisions in March 2009,
the share of overall costs begins to shift to Afghanistan. The $1.08 trillion total includes:
• $706 billion for Iraq (69%);
• $300 billion for Afghanistan (28%);
• $29 billion for enhanced security (3%); and
• $5 billion unallocated DOD costs (1%).
In FY2010, annual war costs decline by 8% as the total number of deployed troops falls from the
peaks reached in FY2008 and FY2009. The peak of 188,000 in-country in Afghanistan and Iraq
in FY2008 is about the same troop level as in FY2009 as additional troops for Afghanistan offset
initial withdrawals in Iraq.
The $73 billion in war costs for Afghanistan in FY2010 represents a $30 billion or 70% increase
over FY2008, two years earlier (see Table 1). With that increase, the balance between the cost of
Iraq and Afghanistan would shift—with Afghan war costs exceeding that of Iraq for the first time.
In FY2008, the cost of Iraq was 75% and that of Afghanistan 25%. Two years later, Iraq would
make up 47% and Afghanistan 53% of the total.
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For later years, the Administration included initial planning estimates of $50 billion for war costs
in FY2011- FY2012 in its first budget document.1
Pending FY2010 Request
The Obama Administration’s request for $130 billion to cover the cost of DOD operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan reflects a review of U.S. strategy for both wars completed in March 2009. As a
result of those reviews, the Administration adopted a withdrawal plan for Iraq under which the
number of troops in-country would be reduced from about 140,000 in February 2009 to between
35,000 and 50,000 by August 31, 2010, with all U.S. troops slated to be out of Iraq by December
31, 2011, to comply with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement that went into effect on January 1,
2009.
At the same time, the President decided to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan by
21,000 above the total already approved by former President Bush. With this increase, the
number of troops in Afghanistan is expected to reach 68,000 by the end of September 2009
representing a 68% increase above the previous year.2 In addition to U.S. troops, NATO nations
contribute another 35,000 troops, bringing the total foreign troop level in Afghanistan now to
about 102,000.3
President Obama’s decisions about troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan were reflected in both
the FY2009 Spring Supplemental Appropriations Bill for Overseas Contingencies (H.R.
2346/P.L. 111-32) enacted on June 24, 2009 and in the DOD request for $130 billion to cover
FY2010 war costs, which was submitted to Congress with the FY2010 base budget request on
May 7, 2009. The FY2010 war request is included in the FY2010 defense authorization and
appropriations bills currently before Congress (H.R. 2647/S. 1390 and H.R. 3326).
The number of troops slated for deployment to Afghanistan would not be affected by a budget
amendment that President Obama submitted to Congress on August 13, 2009, which proposes to
re-allocate $1 billion of DOD’s FY2010 war funding request to pay for temporarily adding
22,000 military personnel to the Army over two years. According to the Administration, the
adding these troops is intended to reduce stress on the current force by increasing “the number
of troops available to deploy while also helping the Army to end the practice of retaining
soldiers beyond their period of obligated service,” a practice often referred to as “stop-loss.”4
1 OMB, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise, 2-26-09, Table S-7;
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/pdf/fy10-newera.pdf.
2 See See CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential
Issues, by Amy Belasco.
3 International Security Assistance Force, “Facts and Figures,” July 23, 2009;
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf.
4 The White House, “Letter Transmitting Department of Defense Budget Amendment,” August 13, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Letter-from-the-President-to-the-Speaker-of-the-House/. Under the
Administration’s proposal, the cost of these additional Army personnel would be offset by reducing by a total of $1
billion the amounts requested for procurement of certain items including High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles, or HMMWVs, Hellfire missiles, and Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, the requirements for which are
being reassessed. See DOD, Budget Amendment to the FY2010 President’s Budget Request for Overseas OCntingency
Operations (OCO), Summary and Explanation of Changes, Exhibits for FY2010, Amended Justification Material,
August 2009, p. 3-5; http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_oco.pdf.
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Both the House-passed and Senate-reported defense appropriations bills are close to the
Administration’s $130 billion request.5
Potential Troop Increases in Afghanistan
On June 15, 2009, General Stanley McChrystal took over as the overall U.S. and NATO
Commander in Afghanistan after the dismissal of his predecessor General David McKiernan.
Tasked to re-assess U.S. military strategy, General McChrystal submitted his report to Secretary
of Defense Gates on August 30, 2009. Recently leaked to the Washington Post, the McChrystal
report calls for additional resources but does not include a specific request for additional troops
beyond those already approved by President Obama in March 2009. In testimony on September
15, 2009, while Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen endorsed additional resources
for Afghanistan, but noted that a troop request has not yet been submitted.6
On September 27, 2009 General McChrystal submitted a request for additional troops to
Secretary Gates but the Department of Defense’s review of that request and its forwarding to the
White House is expected to await ongoing additional reviews of the strategy in the
Administration.7 In a recent press conference, Secretary Gates stated he remains undecided about
additional troops for Afghanistan—"There are issues on both sides of it, and frankly, I haven't
made up my own mind at this point in terms of whether I think more forces are needed."8 Recent
press reports suggest that General McChrystal request may include several options including one
for as many as 40,000 more troops; these requests remain to be vetted within the Defense
Department and by the White House.9 Some Members of Congress have also already raised
concerns about deploying additional troops as well as the new McChrystal strategy.
War Cost Issues in the 111th Congress
This report is designed to answer frequently asked questions and to provide information that can
be used to address some of the major war cost issues that confront the 111th Congress.
Some of the most commonly asked questions center on total war-related costs.
• How much has Congress appropriated in total and for each of the three missions
since the 9/11 attacks—Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq), Operation Enduring
5 See Table 4 in CRS Report R40567, Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations, coordinated by Pat Towell.
6 Baker, Peter, and Dexter Filkins. “Groundwork is Laid For New Troops in Afghanistan.” New York Times,
September 1, 2009. Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan and U.S. Forces,
Afghanistan, "Commander's Initial Assessment," August 30, 2009, p. 2-20. Available at:
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf.
Senate Armed Services Committee, Transcript, “Nominations of Admiral Michael Mullen for Reappointment to the
Grade of Admiral and Reappointment as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” September 15, 2009, p.6.
7 Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Geoffrey Morrell,” September 23, 2009;
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4483.
8 Washington Post, “Dem Leader Wants 'Successful' Plan For Afghanistan,” September 9, 2009.
9 Wall Street Journal, “Pelosi Sees Support Ebbing for Afghan War, Congress's Reluctance to Increase Troops May Pit
Majority Against White House,” September 11,2009.
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Freedom (Afghanistan and other Global War on Terror operations), and
Operation Noble Eagle (enhanced security for defense bases) for defense, foreign
operations, and related VA medical care?
• How and why have average monthly DOD obligations changed over time for
each mission?
• How reliable are DOD war cost estimates and what can be done to make war
costs more reliable and more transparent?
War cost issues that the new Congress faces during its consideration of FY2010 war request
include the following.
• What are current and likely future war costs of the Obama Administration plan
outlined in February and March 2009 that calls for a withdrawal from Iraq by
December 2011 and an increase to 68,000 troops in Afghanistan and how might
those costs change if additional troops are sent to Afghanistan or if the
withdrawal of troops from Iraq is delayed?
• How does Congress participate in policy decisions setting troop levels,
measuring the effectiveness of U.S. policies, delineating basing policy, and
ensuring contractor oversight.
• What have been the costs to date of training Afghan and Iraqi security forces so
that they can take over their own defense and what are the prospects for future
costs?
• Over the next five to ten years, what are the cost implications of alternative
scenarios for U.S. deployed troop levels in the region?
• What types of funding are appropriate to include as war costs and what types of
costs are more appropriately included in DOD’s baseline as persistent presence
expenses?
• How has the definition of reconstitution and reset costs for repair and
replacement of war-worn equipment changed and affected equipment
modernization?
• What has been the cost of war funding to increase the size of the Army and
Marine Corps and how has that affected the time between deployments and dwell
time at home which is perceived to be a significant morale and readiness issue?
• How much is being spent on funding for bases in Afghanistan and does this
reflect the congressional prohibition of permanent bases?
• How accurate are DOD’s FY2009 and FY2010 estimates of operational funding
for Iraq and Afghanistan in light of changes in troop levels and operational
activities?
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Additional CRS Reports
For additional information about troop levels, see CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars,
FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, by Amy Belasco. For more information about foreign assistance
programs for Iraq and Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff and CRS
Report R40699, Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff. For political-military developments in both
countries, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman and CRS Report
RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman. For more on the FY2009
Supplemental, see CRS Report R40531, FY2009 Spring Supplemental Appropriations for Overseas Contingency Operations,
coordinated by Stephen Daggett and Susan B. Epstein.
For DOD’s FY2010 request, see CRS Report R40567, Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations, coordinated
by Pat Towell. For more on the FY2010 foreign assistance request, see CRS Report R40693, State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs: FY2010 Budget and Appropriations, by Susan B. Epstein, Kennon H. Nakamura, and Marian
Leonardo Lawson.
War Cost Estimates for Iraq and Afghanistan
Since the 9/11 attacks and particularly since the beginning of the Iraq war, Congress has been
interested in the allocation of supplemental emergency funds between Afghanistan and Iraq.
Congress does not, however, appropriate funds to DOD by individual operation. Rather,
appropriations are provided to cover particular types of expenses, e.g., special combat pay for
military personnel, the cost of supporting deployed troops. Similarly, the State Department and
USAID requests funds for particular types of activities, such as diplomatic operations or
Economic Support Funds rather than for individual countries like Afghanistan and Iraq though
estimates are included in budget justification materials.
In recent years, DOD has estimated the split between Iraq and Afghanistan for most but not all of
the war funding requests. DOD has excluded from its estimates funds for non-DOD intelligence
as well as for other programs that have been funded in supplementals but which are not directly
linked to ongoing operations such as monies to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps.10
CRS estimates use DOD figures when available with some adjustments. For earlier years when
DOD did not provide estimates, CRS based its estimates on reported obligations incurred for
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),almost all for Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF),
and Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), enhanced security in the United States. These obligations
reflect when personnel are paid, contracts are signed, or orders are placed. CRS also added
funding for some activities, such as national intelligence, which are not reported in DOD
obligations reports.
Since 2006, Congress has also required that GAO submit quarterly reports to Congress on the
cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) based on DOD’s
10See for example, Table 1 in FY2009 Supplemental Justification, DOD, Overseas Contingency Operations Request,
FY2009 Supplemental: Summary Justification Material, April 2009;
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/Supplemental/FY2009_Supplemental_Request/pdfs/FY_200
9_Supplemental_Request_04-08-09.pdf.
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monthly cost of war reports. These reports summarize DOD’s cumulative and most recent
quarterly obligations as well as the allocation between OIF and OEF.11
Unlike DOD, CRS includes non-DOD classified as well as some programs and activities that
DOD does not consider to be war-related. Like DOD, CRS excludes funding in supplementals
that is clearly not related to war such as additional childcare centers, base closure funds, incentive
pay and fuel funds for DOD’s baseline programs.12 CRS war cost estimates also exclude funding
in supplementals for other emergency programs such as additional food aid, military and
economic assistance to Pakistan and foreign assistance activities in several African countries. For
all these reasons, the total funding levels in this report are not necessarily the same as those
reported for supplemental appropriations acts.
CRS uses budget justification material and other data from the State Department for diplomatic
operations and USAID programs, and from the Veterans Administration for VA medical costs for
OEF/OIF veterans to compile the total funding for war-related activities in Afghanistan and Iraq.
CBO has also estimated total war funding, excluding some funds appropriated in supplementals
that are not war-related. CRS and CBO estimates are generally close.13
Problems with Reliability of DOD’s Estimates by Operation
Accurately capturing the cost of DOD operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is important not only to
give Congress a sense of how war resources are allocated but also because future budgeting is
generally guided by past experience. This is particularly important now when troop levels are
being reduced in Iraq and increased in Afghanistan. Generally, DOD relies on reporting of
obligations as a way to validate earlier estimates and guide later requests.
In a recent report, GAO raised questions about whether DOD war cost reporting accurately
captures the split between Afghanistan and Iraq. According to their report, the services have
considerable difficulty in allocating funds between the two operations, and tend to overstate the
amounts attributable to Iraq because costs that could not be attributable are allocated to Iraq
“since it is viewed as the larger of the two operations . . .”14 This is particularly the case with
11 Reporting requirement is in P.L. 109-163, Section 1221 (c). For most recent GAO report, see Memo to
Congressional Committees, GAO-09-449R, “Global War on Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of
Defense; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09449r.pdf. The Defense Finance Accounting Service compiles data from the
services in its monthly report entitled, “Supplemental & Cost of War Execution Reports” which allocate funds by
service, appropriation account, type of expense, and operation. In October, DOD revised the format of this report.
12 For example, DOD excludes Congressional adds for C-17 aircraft, a transport aircraft that has seen heavy use in
Afghanistan and Iraq. CRS includes those funds on the basis that additional purchases may be needed because aircraft
may not last as long as anticipated because of their heavy use.
13 See for example, Box 1-1, CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, September 2008, p. 13. For DOD,
see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, “Cost of War Update as of February 28, 2009,” p. 6. DOD
justification material for its FY2007 and FY2008 war requests shows that budget authority for war fell $2 billion short
in FY2001 and $4 billion short in FY2004—a gap presumably met by transferring funds from its regular
appropriations. CRS added $2 billion to its estimates to reflect these funds. Specifically, CRS calculations of DOD
funding include some $5 billion appropriated for GWOT in FY2003 in P.L. 107-48, about $10 billion in transfers from
DOD’s baseline appropriations that were transferred to meet war needs, as well as intelligence and other funding not
tracked by DOD (see Table B-1 and section, “Problems in War Cost Estimates and Reporting”).
14 GAO, Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to More Accurately Capture and Report the Costs of Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. GAO-09-302, March 17, 2009, p. 17, see discussion, p. 15-17.
(continued...)
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procurement funds which peaked in FY2008 at over $60 billion. Despite this critique, it’s not
clear the extent of inaccuracy in DOD-reported war obligations.
In response to GAO’s criticisms, DOD required the Services to estimate the split between
Afghanistan and Iraq on an activity-by-activity or item-by-item basis. Previous allocations in
supplemental requests had been developed on a more macro basis by the Secretary of Defense’s
Comptroller’s Office. It is not clear, however, how DOD will know whether its estimates are
accurate. Without some check of the validity of its estimates, the reliability of DOD’s current and
future estimates could be problematic. In addition, DOD is continuing to report the cumulative
split in funding for OEF and OIF using its obligations reports.
Estimates of War-Related Budget Authority
In this report, CRS estimates the allocation of all funds appropriated to DOD for war costs
(excluding clearly non-war items in supplementals) rather than only those obligated thus far.
CRS has estimated how budget authority is allocated between Afghanistan and Iraq by using a
combination of obligations data reported by the DFAS obligations data, revised DOD estimates,
congressional appropriations reports, and other data sources. CRS has also compiled the funds
allocated to Iraq and Afghanistan for foreign and diplomatic operations and for VA medical costs
for OIF/OEF veterans (see Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3).
(...continued)
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09302.pdf.
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Table 1. Estimated War Funding by Operation: FY2001-FY2010 War Request
(CRS estimates in billions of dollars of budget authority)
Cumulative
Operation/
FY01
Enacted
Total:
Source of
and
FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
FY10
Cum.:
FY01-FY10
Funding
FY02
Request
FY01-
Including
FY09
FY10
Request
Iraq
0.0
53.0 75.9 85.5 101.6 130.8 141.1
94.8
65.4 682.8 748.2
OEF
20.8 14.7 14.5 20.0 19.0 39.1 43.4 55.2 72.9 226.7 299.6
Enhanced
13.0 8.0 3.7 2.1 0.8 .5 .1
.2
.2 28.5 28.7
Security
Unal ocated
0.0 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0
0
0 5.5 5.5
Total
33.8
81.1 94.1 107.6 121.4 171.0 184.8 150.4 138.6
943.8
1,082.4
Annual
NA 58%
14% 13% 11% 29% 8% -19% -8%
NA
NA
Change
Change
NA NA 16% 33% 50% 111% 128% 85% 71%
NA
NA
Since FY03
Sources and Notes: NA = not applicable. Totals may not add due to rounding. Public laws, congressional appropriations reports, Department of Defense data, and CRS
estimates; see Table 3 for additional information.
CRS-9
The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Funding for Each Agency
Of the $944 billion enacted thus far, about $888 billion, the lion’s share or over 90% goes to the
Department of Defense. DOD regulations require that the services request incremental war costs,
in other words, costs that are in addition to regular military salaries, training and support
activities, and weapons procurement, RDT&E or military construction (see Table 3).
For military personnel, incremental costs cover hostile fire or other combat-related special pays
and the cost of activating reservists and paying them on a full-time basis. For operations and
maintenance, war costs cover the cost of transporting troops and equipment to the war zone,
conducting war operations, and supporting deployed troops, as well as repairing and replacing
equipment worn out by war operations.
As of passage of FY2009 war funding, State and USAID have together received about $51.8
billion for reconstruction, embassy operations and construction, and various foreign aid programs
for Iraq and Afghanistan. The Veterans Administration has received about $4.2 billion for medical
care for veterans of these operations including funds above their request.15
15 Foreign operations activities are managed by both the State Department and USAID, which handles most U.S.
development assistance programs.
Congressional Research Service
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Table 2. Estimated War Funding by Agency: FY2001-FY2010
(CRS estimates in billions of dollars of budget authority)
Cumulative
Operation/
FY01
Cum.
Total: FY01-
Source of
and
FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08
FY09
FY10
Enacted:
FY10
Funding
FY02
Request
FY01-FY09
Including
Request
DOD
33.0 77.4 72.4 102.6 116.8 164.4 179.1
142.0
130.2
887.8 1,018.0
State/USAID 0.8 3.7 21.7 4.8 4.3 5.0 4.7
6.9
6.4
51.8 58.2
VA
Medical 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 1.0 1.0
1.6
2.1
4.2 6.3
Total
33.8 81.1 94.1 107.6 121.4 170.4 184.8
150.4
138.6
943.8 1,082.4
Sources and Notes: NA = not applicable. TBD = to be determined. Totals may not add due to rounding. Public laws, congressional appropriations reports, Department of
Defense data, and CRS estimates; see Table 3 for additional information.
CRS-11
The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Trends in War Funding
The total cost for all three operations—Iraq, Afghanistan, and other GWOT and enhanced
security—has risen steeply since the 9/11 attacks primarily because of higher DOD spending in
Iraq. Annual war appropriations more than doubled from about $34 billion in FY2001/FY2002 to
about $80 billion for the preparation and invasion of Iraq in FY2003 (see Table 3).
By FY2007, annual appropriations for both wars doubled again to $171 billion. With enactment
of the full year’s war funding in the FY2008 Supplemental (H.R. 2642/P.L. 110-252), annual war
funding for both operations totaled $185 billion. This FY2008 level is the peak for war funding
thus far and almost double the funding in FY2004, which could be considered the first year of
stability operations. At $150 billion, FY2009 funding is the first overall decrease reflecting the
decline in troop levels in Iraq after the troop surge and the beginning of troop withdrawals in Iraq,
and increases in troop levels in Afghanistan. As of the FY2010 war funding request, troop
withdrawals in Iraq become more rapid, and troop levels in Afghanistan remain the same,
bringing costs down by $139 billion, an 8% decrease.
Table 3 provides a breakdown of war-related funds for each operation and each agency by fiscal
year. DOD’s funding covers not only operational costs but also replacing and upgrading military
equipment, converting units to new modular configuration, training Afghan and Iraqi security
forces, providing support to allies and enhanced security at DOD bases. Such investment funding
has grown steeply in recent years (see Table 4). Foreign and diplomatic operations cover the cost
of reconstruction, building and operating embassies in Iraq and Afghanistan and various foreign
aid programs.
Over 90% of DOD’s funds were provided as emergency funds in supplemental or additional
appropriations; the remainder were provided in regular defense bills or in transfers from regular
appropriations. Emergency funding is exempt from ceilings applying to discretionary spending in
Congress’s annual budget resolutions. Some Members have argued that continuing to fund
ongoing operations in supplementals reduces congressional oversight. Generally, much of foreign
and diplomatic funding has been funded in regular rather than emergency appropriations.
Congressional Research Service
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Table 3. Budget Authority for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror (GWOT) Operations: FY2001-FY2010
Request
(CRS estimates in billions of budget authority)
Operation
FY01
FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 Cumulative Cumulative
and Source
and
Pending
Enacted:
Total:
of Funding
FY02
Request
FY01-FY09
FY01-FY10
Including
Request
IRAQ
Department of
Defense
0 50.0 56.4 83.4 98.1 126.8 138.3 90.6 61.9 643.6 705.5
Foreign Aid
and Diplomatic
0 3.0 19.5 2.0 3.2 3.2 1.9 3.0 2.3 35.7 37.9
Ops
VA
Medical
0 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.2 3.5
4.7
Total:
Iraq
0.0 53.0 75.9 85.5 101.7 130.8 141.1 94.8 65.4 682.8 748.2
AFGHANISTAN
Department of
Defense
20.0
14.0 12.4 17.2 17.9 37.1 40.6 51.1 68.1 210.2 278.3
Foreign Aid
and Diplomatic
0.8
0.7 2.2 2.8 1.1 1.9 2.6 3.7 4.0 15.8 19.7
Ops
VA
Medical
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.7
1.6
Total:
OEF
20.8
14.7 14.5 20.0 19.0 39.1 43.4 55.2 72.9 226.7 299.6
ENHANCED SECURITY
Department of
Defense
13.0
8.0 3.7 2.1 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 28.5 28.7
Total:
Enhanced
13.0
8.0 3.7 2.1 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 28.5 28.7
Security
DOD
Unallocate
0.0
[5.5] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5
5.5
CRS-13
Operation
FY01
FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 Cumulative Cumulative
and Source
and
Pending
Enacted:
Total:
of Funding
FY02
Request
FY01-FY09
FY01-FY10
Including
Request
TOTAL: ALL MISSIONS
Department of
Defense
33.0 77.4 72.4 102.6 116.8 164.4 179.1 142.0 130.2 887.8 1,018.0
Foreign Aid
and Diplomatic
0.8
3.7 21.7 4.8 4.3 5.0 4.7 6.9 6.4 51.8 58.2
Operations
VA
Medical
0 0 0 0.2 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.6 2.1
4.2 6.3
Total: All
Missions
33.8 81.2 94.1 107.6 121.4 170.4 184.8 150.4 138.6 943.8 1,082.4
Sources and Notes: Public laws, congressional appropriations reports, Department of Defense data, and CRS estimates. CRS budget authority (BA) totals are higher
than DOD figures because CRS includes al funding provided in supplementals, bridge funds, continuing resolutions, omnibus, consolidated, and baseline appropriations for
Iraq, Afghanistan and other counter-terror operations as wel as transfers from DOD’s baseline funds for GWOT requirements beginning with P.L. 107-38, the first
emergency supplemental after 9/11 through the FY2010 request. CRS cal s Operation Noble Eagle, Enhanced Security because these funds provide higher security at DOD
bases, support combat air patrol, and rebuilt the Pentagon. CRS includes additional $2 billion in BA in FY2003 included by DOD in its tally but not in DFAS obligations;
source of funds unclear. CRS splits the $25 billion provided in the FY2005 Title IX bridge between the $1.8 billion obligated in FY2004 and the remainder available for
FY2005; al those funds are scored as FY2004 because they were available upon enactment in August 2005. CRS estimates for DOD reflect obligations reported in DOD’s
Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS) reports, Supplemental & Cost of War Execution Reports and budget justification materials including DOD, FY2007 Supp, February
2007, Table 1a.; http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2007_Emergency_Supplemental_Request_for_the_GWOT.pdf; DOD, FY2008
Supplemental Requests, February, July, and October 2007, and DOD, Overseas Contingency Operations Request, FY2009 Supplemental: Summary Justification Material, April
2009, p. 81 and other data;
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/Supplemental/FY2009_Supplemental_Request/pdfs/FY_2009_Supplemental_Request_04-08-09.pdf. CRS excludes
items that are clearly not war-related including $5.2 billion in FY2007 and $8.0 billion in FY2008, Examples from FY2008 include funds for higher fuel prices for DOD’s
regular program, base closure funding, and childcare centers, hospitals, medical facilities, and Army barracks renovation funds in the United States. Foreign operations
figures include monies for reconstruction, development and humanitarian aid, embassy operations, counter narcotics, initial training of the Afghan and Iraqi army, foreign
military sales credits, and Economic Support Funds. See also CRS Report R40699, Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff. Updates of foreign aid from State
Department, U.S. Foreign Assistance, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Summary Tables, Fiscal Year 2010, May 28, 2009;
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/124295.pdf. Updates of diplomatic operations from State Department response to CRS query. Updates for VA Medical
reflect CRS estimates of shares for OIF and OEF veterans based on applying troop shares to totals shown in Department of Veterans Affairs, FY2010 budget justification
materials; http://www.va.gov/budget/summary/2010/index.htm. Numbers may not add due to rounding.
CRS-14
The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Estimates for Iraq and Afghanistan and Other Operations
How much has Congress provided for each of the three operations launched since the 9/11
attacks—Iraq, Afghanistan and other GWOT, and enhanced security? Relying primarily on DOD
data, congressional reports and other methods, CRS estimated the distribution of war-related
funds appropriated for defense, foreign operations, and VA medical costs from the 9/11 attacks
through the FY2009 supplemental (see Table 3).
• $683 billion for Iraq (or 74%);
• $227 billion for Afghanistan (or 22%);
• $29 billion for enhanced security (3%); and
• $5 billion unallocated (1%) (see Table 3).
For FY2009, this includes appropriations from two acts—the FY2008/FY2009 Bridge
Supplemental (H.R. 2642 /P.L. 110-252), and the FY2009 Supplemental (H.R. 2346 P.L. 111-32).
Since the FY2003 invasion, DOD’s war costs have been dominated by Iraq. Costs for OEF have
risen dramatically since FY2006 as troop levels and the intensity of conflict have grown. The cost
of enhanced security in the United States has fallen off from the earlier years which included
initial responses to the 9/11 attacks. Foreign and diplomatic operations costs peaked in FY2004
with the $20 billion appropriated for Iraq and Afghan reconstruction and since then run about $4
billion to $5 billion a year.
Although some of the factors behind the rapid increase in DOD funding are known—the growing
intensity of operations, additional force protection gear and equipment, substantial upgrades of
equipment, converting units to modular configurations, and new funding to train and equip Iraqi
security forces—these elements do not appear to be enough to explain the size of and
continuation of increases. Although DOD included more extensive justification of its FY2007 and
FY2008 supplemental requests, it still provides little explanation of how changes in force levels
affect funding levels.
The FY2007 DOD Emergency Request and the FY2008 Global War on Terror (GWOT) request
provide more justification material than previously. The FY2009 budget initially included a $70
billion placeholder figure for war costs that was superceded by an amendment in the spring of
2009 and more detailed justification though much of it was posted after congressional
consideration was largely complete.16
In its initial budget document, the Obama Administration included a $75 billion funding level for
the FY2009 Supplemental and $130 billion funding for FY2010 as well as planning figures of
$50 billion a year for FY2012-FY2014. The FY2010 war funding request was submitted with the
FY2010 DOD baseline budget on May 5, 2009 and is being considered simultaneously.
16 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Global War on Terror Bridge Request, May 2008 (posted on defenselink
in late summer); http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/Supplemental/
FY2009_Global_War_On_Terror_Bridge_Request.pdf; U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Global War on
Terror Bridge Request, May 2008; http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/Supplemental/
FY2009_Global_War_On_Terror_Bridge_Request.pdf, http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/
supplemental/FY2009_Global_War_On_Terror.pdf.
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
CBO Projections of Future Costs
Based on two illustrative scenarios assuming a more and a less gradual drawdown in deployed
troop levels, CBO updated its projections for the cost of all three operations for the next ten years
from 2010 - 2019 in January 2009. CBO projects that over the next ten years war costs for DOD,
State, and VA could total
• $388 billion if troop levels fell to 30,000 by 2011; or
• $867 billion if troop levels fell to 75,000 by 2013.17
This CBO estimate does not split funding for Iraq and Afghanistan. If these CBO projections are
added to funding already appropriated, the cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and enhanced security could
reach from $1.3 trillion to $1.8 trillion by 2019 if troops fell to 30,000 or 75,000 respectively.
Under CBO’s “low alternate path” where troop levels fall to 30,000 troops by FY2011, additional
funding would total about $388 billion in the next ten years between FY2010 and FY2019. In this
projection, costs would fall from $155 billion in FY2009 for 180,000 deployed troops to:
• $92 billion for 90,000 troops in FY2010;
• $42 billion for 30,000 troops in FY2011;
• $32 billion a year for 30,000 deployed troops in FY2012-FY2019.18
For CBO’s “high alternate path,” funding would total about $867 billion for FY2010 – FY2019
with deployed troops reaching a steady-state level of 75,000 by FY2013. Starting from the same
level in FY2009 of $155 billion for 180,000 deployed troops, CBO’s year-by-year projections for
costs and deployed troops levels are:
• $149 billion for 190,000 troops in FY2010;
• $129 billion for 170,000 troops in FY2011;
• $95 billion for about 123,000 troops in FY2012;
• $70 billion per year for 75,000 troops from FY2013-FY2019.19
Some observers would suggest that these two scenarios bound the most likely alternatives in the
next ten years while others might argue that maintaining current levels or withdrawing entirely
could also be options. These CBO projections assume that troops withdrawn return to the United
States. Yet another option would be for some number of troops to remain deployed in neighboring
countries like Kuwait. These options do not reflect specific assumptions about troop levels in Iraq
or in Afghanistan.
CBO considers these to be rough projections rather than formal estimates in part because future
costs are difficult to estimate given the problems with current information from DOD on costs
incurred to date, the lack of outlays or actual expenditures for war because war and baseline funds
17 CBO, A Preliminary Analysis of the President’s Budget and an Update of CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook,
p.21-p.24, Table 7 footnotes; http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10014/03-20-PresidentBudget.pdf.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
are mixed in the same accounts. Nor is information available on many of the key factors that
determine costs such as personnel levels each year or the pace of operations.20 In CBO’s
projections, costs initially fall somewhat more slowly than troops levels, and eventually catch up
and become proportional.
Both the FY2009 Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act
(H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329) and the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 3001/NDAA),
passed at the end of the session, recognize the need for better information on troop levels. The
FY2009 NDAA requires that DOD identify separately troop levels and funding in Iraq and in
Afghanistan in its budget requests while the appropriations act requires monthly reporting on
current troop levels and related funding as well as those in the next three months.21 To estimate
future costs, however, better information on past troop levels and other factors driving costs
would be useful; currently that information is inconsistent and spotty (see discussion on war cost
reporting).
The new Administration has announced declines in troop levels in Iraq to meet the Status of
Forces agreement signed with Iraq this January which requires that all U.S. troops be out of Iraq
by the end of 2011 (the first quarter of FY2012). President Obama has also announced plans to
increase troops in Afghanistan by about 21,000 troops in the next year in addition to the 15,000
already approved by President Bush bringing the total by the end of FY2009 to 68,000. The
FY2010 DOD war funding request assumes that troops in Afghanistan remain at that level In
2004, Congress enacted a statutory reporting requirement that the President submit a cost estimate
for FY2006-FY2011 that was not provided.22
Past Trends and Future DOD Costs in Iraq
How has funding for Iraq changed over time and what is the outlook for the future? CRS
estimates that Iraq funding totals about $683 billion as of passage of the FY2009 Supplemental
Appropriations Act (see Appendix A), primarily DOD funding. That funding for Iraq has risen
sharply from initial funding to deploy troops starting in the fall of 2002 (presumably drawn from
DOD’s regular appropriations since supplemental funds were not available) to $53 billion in the
invasion year of 2003, about $131 billion for FY2007, $141 billion for FY2008, $95 billion in
FY2009 as troop levels decline from surge levels, and $65 billion in the FY2010 request as the
withdrawal proceeds (Table 1).
20 CRS adjusted the CBO estimates by subtracting $70 billion for the additional funding assumed by CBO for FY2007;
see Letter to Chair, Senate Budget Committee, Kent Conrad, “Summarizing and projecting funding for Iraq and GWOT
under two scenarios,” February 7, 2007, Table 1 and p. 2 - p. 3; http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7793/02-07-
CostOfWar.pdf. See also, CBO, Statement of Robert A. Sunshine, Assistant Director, before the House Budget
Committee, “Issues in Budgeting for Operations in Iraq and the War on Terrorism,” January 18, 2007.
21 Sec. 1502, S. 3001 as passed by both houses and signed by the president; no public law number assigned yet; and
“Boots-on-the-Ground and Cost of War Reporting,” in Joint Explanatory Statement for H.R. 2638 in Congressional
Record, September 24, 2008, P. H9438, which may be submitted in a classified form.
22 Sec. 9012 required that the president submit an estimate for FY2006-FY2011 unless he submitted a written
certification that national security reasons made that impossible; the Administration did not submit a waiver but then-
OMB Director, Joshua B. Bolten sent a letter on May 13, 2005 to Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastert saying that an
estimate was not possible because there were too many uncertainties.
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Projections of Future Iraq Costs
Since FY2004, the first year of stability operations, the DOD total for Iraq has doubled (see Table
3).23 The enacted total for Iraq in FY2008 is some $141 billion, or about 10% more than the
previous year. Much of the large increases in recent year is due to higher procurement funding,
that, in turn, reflects an expansive definition of reset—funds to restore units to pre-war
condition—to cover only the repair and replacement of equipment damaged in war or that is not
worth fixing but also to upgrade and buy new equipment to meet future needs for the “long war
on terror (discussed further in section on reset and reconstitution).24
With the adoption of a withdrawal plan by President Obama in February 2009, costs for Iraq have
begun to decline. The Administration’s FY2010 budget shows DOD’s Iraq costs more than
halving from a highpoint of $141 billion in FY2008 to $65 billion in FY2010 when much of the
drawdown is complete. Outyear estimates by operation are not available but costs would be
expected to fall rapidly with the withdrawal of most U.S. troops in FY2011 and all U.S. troops by
December 2011(the first part of FY2012) as required by the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement.25
Another Withdrawal Option
In response to a request in 2006, CBO estimated the cost of two alternative scenarios for Iraq for
FY2007-FY2016 if all troop levels were to be removed by the end of 2009 or if the number of
deployed troops fell to 40,000 by 2010. Adjusting CBO’s estimates for passage of the FY2007
Supplemental, a withdrawal by FY2009 could cost an additional $147 billion while a reduction to
40,000 troops by 2010 could cost an additional $318 billion.26
Maintaining a Long-Term Presence
CBO has also estimated that the annual cost of maintaining about 55,000 troops in Iraq over the
long-term—referred to as the Korea option—in Iraq would be about $10 billion in a non-combat
scenario and $25 billion with combat operations.27 CBO’s projections of costs assumes only
minimal procurement costs for replacing or upgrading war-worn equipment unlike DOD’s recent
and current war requests.
23 CRS estimates the allocation of about $9 billion in funding requested in the FY2007 Supplemental for classified
programs and for baseline fuel that DOD does not include for either OIF or OEF. CRS also excludes some DOD
funding not related to war, as e.g. funds for baseline fuel cost increases.
24 See CRS, Testimony of Amy Belasco to House Budget Committee, “the Growing Cost of the Iraq War,” October 24,
2007.
25 See CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential
Issues, by Amy Belasco.
26 CBO, Letter to Congressman John M. Spratt, Jr., “Estimated funding for two specified scenarios for Iraq over the
period 2007-2016,” July 13, 2006, Table 1; http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/73xx/doc7393/07-13-IraqCost_Letter.pdf.
CRS adjusted CBO’s estimate by subtracting the amount assumed for FY2007.
27 CBO, Letter to Congressman Spratt on Long-Term Presence in Iraq, 9-20-07 http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/86xx/
doc8641/09-20-ConradLTpresenceinIraq.pdf.
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Past Trends and Future DOD Costs in Afghanistan
How has funding for Afghanistan and other Global War on Terror Operations changed over time
and what does the future hold? As of enactment of the FY2009 Supplemental, Afghanistan has
received about $227 billion in appropriations for DOD, foreign and diplomatic operations, and
VA medical. In recent years, funding for Afghanistan was about $20 billion annually but jumped
by 75% to about $39 billion in FY2007, $43 billion in FY2008, $55 billion in FY2009, and a
request of $73 billion in FY2010 (see Table 1).
Cost increases reflect higher troop levels, training of Afghan forces, and a share of upgrading and
replacing equipment and converting Army and Marine Corps units to a new modular
configuration, higher U.S. troop levels, and other unidentified factors.
In FY2009, DOD costs for Afghanistan rise sharply as troop levels from, from $41 billion in
FY2008 to $68 billion in the FY2010 request. If additional troops are sent to Afghanistan, costs
would be expected to grow.
Past Trends and Future Costs in Enhanced Security
How has the cost of Operation Noble Eagle or enhanced security for DOD bases changed since
9/11? Funding for enhanced base security and other responses to the initial attacks fell from the
$12 billion available in the first year after the attacks to $8 billion in 2003. These decreases
reflect the end of one-time costs like Pentagon reconstruction ($1.3 billion), the completion of
security upgrades, the scaling back of combat air patrol (about $1.3 billion for around-the-clock
coverage), and a cut in the number of reservists guarding bases.28 In FY2004, the cost of
enhanced security more than halved again, dropping to $3.7 billion.
Beginning in FY2005, DOD funded this operation in its baseline budget rather than in
supplementals and costs fell to under $1 billion in FY2006 and $500 million in FY2007, and
about $200 million for FY2008 as well (see Table 3). The services are now requesting funds for
some base security in the United States that they consider war costs in the FY2007 and FY2008
Supplemental, which could overlap with the enhanced security mission.
DOD Spending Thus Far
Average monthly obligations are frequently used as a way to measure the rate of ongoing war
spending. Obligations capture the amount of budget authority for military and civilian pay and for
contracts signed by the government or orders placed within DOD for parts, repairs, and purchase
of weapons systems and supplies. As of the end of July 2009, DOD estimated that the cumulative
total of war-related obligations were $755.3 billion. This includes:
• $577.0 billion for Iraq (76% of total);
• $150.2 billion for OEF (24%); and
28 DOD’s new estimate for ONE is $8 billion rather than the $6.5 billion shown in an earlier DOD briefing. For more
information, see CRS Report RL31187, Combating Terrorism: 2001 Congressional Debate on Emergency
Supplemental Allocations, and CRS Report RL31829, Supplemental Appropriations FY2003: Iraq Conflict,
Afghanistan, Global War on Terrorism, and Homeland Security, both by Amy Belasco and Larry Nowels.
Congressional Research Service
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
• $28.1 billion for enhanced security (Operation Noble Eagle) (4%). 29
The share for Iraq is declining and that for Afghanistan is rising as U.S. troops withdraw from
Iraq and grow in Afghanistan. These DOD figures do not include obligations for intelligence or
other expenses that are included in CRS average monthly estimates below but not captured by
DOD’s war reports compiled by the Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS).
Based on DOD’s most recent obligations report for July 2009, obligations are currently running
about $10.9 illion a month, or almost 25% less than the $14.3 billion average per month in
FY2008 during the Iraq surge. This year’s decrease reflects primarily a drop in average
obligations in Iraq and a rise in obligations for Afghanistan. Specifically, average obligations are
running:
• $7.3 billion in FY2009 compared to $11.1 billion in FY2008 in Iraq and;
• $3.6 billion in FY2009 compared to $3.1 billion in FY2008 in Afghanistan (see
Table 4).
The decrease in Iraq reflects the gradual reversal of the troop surge, where troop levels remained
high for much of the year in FY2008, and the beginning of the drawdown. Average obligations
based on obligations through July 2009 reflect the deployment of 37,000 additional troops to
Afghanistan based on decisions made by the Bush Administration in the winter of 2008 and the
Obama Administration this spring. CRS estimates are based on DOD’s obligations reports with
additions for funds not reported by DOD such as national intelligence ($43 billion to date) and
certain items DOD does not consider war-related, such as congressional adds for C-17 aircraft,
force-protection and other items, which are not captured in DOD’s war cost reports.30
Table 4. DOD’s Obligations by Operation: FY2001-FY2009
(in billions of dollars)
Average Monthly Obligations
DOD
Reported
Cumulative
Mission and
Obligations
Type of
FY09 As of
from FY01-
Spending
FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 July 2009a
July 31, 2009
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Operationsb 4.2 4.3 4.7 5.9 7.1 7.6
5.8 NA
Investmentc 0.2 0.6 1.8 1.3 3.2 3.5
1.5 NA
Total
4.4 4.8 6.5 7.2 10.3 11.1
7.3
577.0
Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrord
Operationsb 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.9 2.8
3.2 NA
29 DOD, “Cost of War Slides As of February 28, 2009,” April 2009.
30 DOD, “Cost of War Slides,” February 2009” shows average overall obligations of $13.5 billion. Communication
with DOD Comptroller staff, October 2007 and Table 1a in DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Amendment, October
2007, for total for non-DOD intelligence and non-GWOT; http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/
Supplemental/FY2008_October_Global_War_On_Terror_Amendment.pdf.
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Average Monthly Obligations
DOD
Reported
Cumulative
Mission and
Obligations
Type of
FY09 As of
from FY01-
Spending
FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 July 2009a
July 31, 2009
Investmentc 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 .3
0.4
NA
Total
1.3 1.0 1.1 1.4 2.0 3.1
3.6
150.2
Enhanced Security and Other
Operationsb 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
0 NA
Investmentc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0 NA
Total
0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
0
28.1
All Missions
Operationsb 5.8 5.5 5.8 7.2 9.1 10.5
9.1 NA
Investmentc 0.4 0.7 2.0 1.5 3.2 3.8
1.9 NA
Total
6.2 6.2 7.7 8.7 12.3 14.3 10.9
755.3
Sources and Notes: NA = Not available. Numbers may not add due to rounding. Monthly estimates reflect
Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS) reported obligations through July 31, 2009; see DOD, “Cost War
Slides,” July 31, 2009; Operation Enduring Freedom includes Afghanistan and other “Global War on Terror”
operations.
Monthly average figures for FY2003-July 2009 reflect CRS calculations based on DFAS reports with estimated
adjustments for funds excluded by DFAS such as intelligence and some Congressional additions. DOD figures in
last column do not include these adjustments. “Enhanced Security and Other” includes additional security at
defense bases, combat air patrol around U.S. cities, and reconstruction of the Pentagon after the 9/11 attacks.
Reflects FY2009 obligations as of July 2009 as reported in DFAS, “Status of Funds Report,” July 2009.
b. Includes funds appropriated for military personnel, operation and maintenance, working capital, and defense
health.
c. Includes funds appropriated for procurement, RDT&E, and military construction.
d. Operation Enduring Freedom funds Afghanistan and other global war on terror (GWOT) activities.
Although obligations go up and down from month-to-month, average obligations are a good
indicator of ongoing operational costs because these funds must be obligated—put in contract—
within the first year. For investment costs, however, average monthly obligations lag appropriated
budget authority since only some funds are obligated in the first year because of the time for the
planning and negotiation of contracts.
Obligations figures do not reflect outlays—or payments made when goods and services are
delivered—which would be a better measure of spending rates and actual costs. In its new Status
of War Reports, DOD is now tracking outlays, reversing its previous stance that these could not
be captured because war-related appropriations are co-mingled with regular or baseline funds.
Outlays are useful in giving a better sense of actual spending rates.
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Changes in Average Monthly Obligations
Largely on the basis of DOD accounting reports, average monthly obligations grew from
$6.2 billion in FY2004 to $14.2 billion in FY2008, more than doubling in four years for Iraq and
Afghanistan together. As of July 2009, monthly obligations have fallen to $10.9 billion reflecting
the withdrawal of troops sent to Iraq after the surge and the buildup of troops in Afghanistan.
More Procurement Increases Iraq Spending
In the case of Iraq, much of the increase reflects a five-fold increase in investment obligations,
primarily procurement, as the services have begun to spend substantial amounts on reset—the
procurement of new weapons systems and equipment not simply to replace war losses (a small
share of the total) but more often to upgrade and replace “stressed” equipment and enhance force
protection.
Some observers have questioned whether all of DOD’s war-related procurement reflects the
stresses of war. For example, a recent CBO study found that more than 40% of the Army’s
spending for reset—the repair and replacement of war-worn equipment—was not for replacing
lost equipment or repairing equipment sent home. Instead, Army funds were spent to upgrade
systems to increase capability, to buy equipment to eliminate longstanding shortfalls in inventory,
to convert new units to a modular configuration, and to replace equipment stored overseas for
contingencies.31 DOD has suggested that procurement obligations slowed in FY2008 as DOD
awaited passage of the FY2008 supplemental.32
Operating Costs Rise in Afghanistan
In the case of Afghanistan, spending rates are growing for operations because of rising troop
levels, increasing hostilities, and more spending to upgrade Afghan Security forces. In response to
rising levels of violence, DOD deployed additional Army and Marine Corps forces in FY2008. In
FY2009 then-President Bush approved an additional 15,000 troops before leaving office in
January 2009, and President Obama approved an additional 21,000 troops all of which are
expected to be in-place as of September 30, 2009, bringing total troops in Afghanistan to
68,000.33
As of July 2009, obligations are running about $3.6 billion a month in Afghanistan, above the
$3.1 billion average for FY2008 as troop levels grow and operational activities intensify. The
average for enhanced security (Operation Noble Eagle) has fallen substantially from $520 million
per month in FY2003 to $12 million in FY2008 as one-time costs ended and costs have been
incorporated in day-to-day base operations.
31 CBO, Replacing and Repairing Equipment Used In Iraq and Afghanistan: The Army’s Reset Program by Frances M.
Lussier, September 2007, p. ix, pp. 35-37; available at http://www.cbo.gov/
showdoc.cfm?index=8629&sequcence=0&from=7.
32 Office of Undersecretary Comptroller, “Cost of War Update as of July 31, 2008,” p. 3.
33 See CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential
Issues, by Amy Belasco and Senate Armed Services Committee, Transcript, “Hearing on Nominations of Admiral
Mullen for Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and Reappointment as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,j”
September 15, 2009, p. 6
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Troop Level Changes in the Bush and Obama Administrations
In response to rising levels of violence, General McKiernan, overall U.S. Commander and NATO
commander in Afghanistan, requested four brigade combat teams and an aviation support union,
or about 40,000 more troops in October 2008. In December 2008 and early January 2009, at the
end of the Bush Administration, DOD announced the deployment of some 15,000 of the troops
requested by General McKiernan including the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain
Division arriving in February and the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade of the 82nd Airborne
deploying in the spring of 2009, with the associated support troops. DOD spokesman Geoff
Morrell emphasized that there would be a review of the McKiernan request in the new
Administration.34
While Secretary of Defense Gates voiced a willingness to be responsive to General McKiernan’s
request, including a hope to deploy an additional two brigades by late spring, the final decision
on the rest of the request was left in the hands of the President Obama, who had just asked
Secretary Gates to remain as head of the Defense Department.35 Thus by the end of the Bush
Administration, some 47,000 troops were slated to be deployed in Afghanistan by the spring of
2009.
In December 2008, the Bush Administration concluded the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, which
required that the United States withdraw all combat troops from Iraqi cities by July 2009, reduce
troop levels to 35,000 to 50,000 by August 31, 2011 and remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by
December 31, 2011. In the fall of 2008, the withdrawal of U.S. troops began with the removal of
one brigade without replacement.
In February and March 2009 after a review of both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the new
Obama Administration announced its plan to deploy an additional 21,000 troops to Afghanistan
including two additional brigade combat teams and 4,000 trainers, providing all but one of the
brigade combat teams requested by General McKiernan the previous October. With this decision,
troop levels in Afghanistan were slated to reach 68,000 by September 2008.
At the same time, the Obama Administration endorsed the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement with
plans to reduce troop levels in 2010 after the Iraqi elections in January. The FY2009
Supplemental, submitted on April 9, 2009 and the FY2010 request for war funding submitted
with the regular FY2010 budget on June 5, 2009 incorporated these troop decisions.
On June 15, 2009, General Stanley McChrystal took over as chief U.S. Commander in
Afghanistan after the dismissal of his predecessor General Dvid McKiernan. Tasked to re-assess
U.S. military strategy, General McChrystal submitted his report to Secretary of Defense Gate s on
August 30th, 2009. While the report includes an evaluation of the current situation in
Afghanistan and calls for additional resources, it did not include a troop request. According to
press reports, General McChrystal submitted his troop request to Secretary Gates on September
34 DOD, “DOD News Briefing with General McKiernan from the Pentagon,” October 1, 2008, see
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4297; DOD, “DOD News Briefing with Geoff
Morrell from the Pentagon,” December 18, 2008,
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4334; DOD, “DOD News Briefing with Geoff
Morrell from the Pentagon,” January 8, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4336.
35 DOD, “Media Availability with Secretary Gates from Kandahar, Afghanistan, “ December 11, 2008,
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4331.
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25th, 2009.36 In interviews this past weekend, Secretary Gates suggested the request will be
remain in his hands until further reviews are completed and that any additional troops would not
deploy until after January 2009, which is when the troop withdrawals from Iraq begins to pick up
steam.37 Although the Administration submitted a budget amendment on August 13, 2009 to shift
$1 billion in the original FY2010 war request from procurement to military personnel to
temporarily increase the Army by some 22,000, that request is intended to “reduce stress and
strain on the force” by providing additional personnel rather than to deploy additional troops.38
Funding to Train and Equip Iraqi and Afghan Security Forces
U.S. commanders have argued for some time that the pace of withdrawal of U.S. forces depends
on both conditions on the ground, i.e. the number and types of attacks by various insurgent
groups—and the size, readiness and capabilities of Afghan and Iraqi security Forces. As of
passage of the FY2008 Supplemental/FY2009 Bridge (H.R. 2642/P.L. 110-252) this summer,
funding to train and equip these forces totals $39 billion including $15.6 billion for Afghanistan
and $23.2 billion for Iraq. Since FY2004, annual funding to train Afghan forces has grown
rapidly reaching a highpoint of $7.4 billion in FY2007 and then falling off to $2.8 billion in
FY2008. Funding for Iraqi forces has fluctuated between $3 billion and $5 billion in those years,
falling in FY2008 as well (see Table 5).39
Table 5. Afghan and Iraq Security Forces Funding: FY2004-FY2009 Bridge
(in billions of dollars)
Account FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08a FY09
Bridgea Total
Enacteda
Afghan Security Forces Fundb [.348]a 1.285 1.908 7.406 2.750
2.000
15.647
Iraq Security Forces Fundb [5.000]a 5.700 3.007 5.542 3.000
1.000
23.249
Total
[5.339] 6.985 4.915 12.948 5.750
3.000
38.946
Sources and Notes:
a. Includes al appropriations through FY2008 Supplemental/FY2009 bridge (H.R. 2642/P.L. 110-252), including
funds provided to the President in FY2004 shown in square brackets.
b. Figures in [ ] brackets are funds to train Iraqi security forces that were appropriated to the President and
transferred to the Coalition Provisional Authority, and implemented by the Army. Iraq total includes
enacted funds from all U.S. sources. Afghanistan total does not include about $1 billion to $2 billion that
Afghan security forces received in FY2004 and FY2005 through State Department or foreign military sales
financing according to GAO-05-575, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made
Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, June 2005, p. 9. Figures reflect CRS calculations from
public laws and conference reports.
36 New York Times, “Afghanistan Troop Request Splits Advisors to Obama,” September 27, 2009.
37 CNN, “State of the Union, Interview of Secretary Robert Gates by John King “ September 27, 2009.
38 DOD, Budget Amendment to the FY2010 President’s Budget Request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),
Summary and Explanation of Changes, Exhibits for FY2010, Amended Justification Material, August 2009, p. 1;
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_oco.pdf.
39 Total includes $5 billion appropriated to the State Department for Iraq training in FY2004. Afghanistan has also
received funding for its training from State Department accounts.
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Despite Congressional concerns about the readiness of Afghan and Iraqi security forces, and the
effectiveness of training efforts thus far, Congress provided full funding of DOD’s request
through the FY2008 presumably because of the high stakes involved. This year, however,
Congress has voiced additional concerns about U.S. funding of the rebuilding of Iraqi security
forces at a time when Iraqi government revenues have been rising rapidly with the swell in oil
prices.
In the FY2009 bridge fund, Congress halved the ISFF request and cut the ASFF request from
$3.67 billion to $2.0 billion. With DOD’s recent announcement of proposals to double the size of
the Afghan security forces in the next four years at a cost of about $20 billion, congressional
concerns may start to include Afghanistan as well. Secretary of Defense Gates has discussed cost-
sharing with NATO partners but without success thus far.40
The House Budget Committee’s September 2008 hearing on war costs and the Iraqi budget
surplus included many calls for more “burdensharing” by Iraq in the rebuilding of its security
forces. The hearing was held in response to a recent GAO report that estimated that the Iraqis
could accumulate a surplus of from $67 billion to $79 billion by 2008 depending on oil prices and
production, though those amounts could be reduced with the August passage of an Iraqi
supplemental.41
Iraq’s ability to pay for the expansion and improvement of its security forces depends on several
factors ranging from the effects of attacks on the pipelines and corruption on production to
reaching consensus within the country on managing and distributing oil revenues.42 During the
hearing, members raised concerns about the Iraqi government’s recent spending rate of below
30% for investment projects.43 About 70% of all U.S. funds to train and equip Iraqi forces have
been obligated—or contracted for—though the amount spent has not been reported.44
This push to require Iraq to share the burden of rebuilding its security forces is also evident in
new restrictions recently enacted that prohibit or place restrictions on U.S. funding of
“infrastructure” projects in Iraq, including those to rebuild security forces. The FY2008
Supplemental (P.L. 110-252) requires cost-sharing of all infrastructure projects above $750,000
while the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 3001) prohibits U.S. funding of any
facilities projects for Iraqi forces other than U.S. military construction projects or small-scale
reconstruction funding in the Commanders Emergency Response Program.45
40 “U.S. Urges Allis to Fund Afghan Army Growth,” September 19, 2008.
41 GAO-08-1144T,Statement of Joseph A. Christoff before the House Budget Committee, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding
Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus,” p. 3, September 16, 2008.
42 CRS Statement of Christopher M. Blanchard, CRS, “Iraqis Budget Surplus,” before the House Budget Committee,
September 16, 2008.
43 House Budget Committee, Transcript of hearing, Iraqi’s Budget Surplus,” September 16, 2008, p. 4, and passim.
44 CRS calculations based on Defense Finance Accounting System monthly reports, “Supplemental & Cost of War
Reports.”
45 See Explanatory Statement for H.R. 2642 in Congressional Record, May 19, 2008, p. S4337; and Sec. 1508 in S.
3001, the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act.
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To monitor Iraqi progress, the FY2008 Supplementals also require continuation of DOD reports
on the readiness, operations, and transfer of responsibility to Iraqi units as well as an estimate
from OMB of the total cost to train both Iraqi and Afghan security forces every 90 days.46
Reset and Reconstitution
Another major unsettled war cost issue that may arise during consideration of the FY2008
Supplemental this spring and the FY2009 bridge fund once it is presented to Congress is the
amount of funds needed to “reset” or restore the services’ equipment to pre-war levels. In its
FY2008, DOD requested $46 billion for reconstitution, primarily procurement funds. In the
FY2008 , Congress funded only a small portion of that request.47 The largest single reason for the
increase is war costs between FY2004 and FY2007 is the amount requested and received by DOD
for reset. Although repair and replacement costs might be expected to grow over time as
operations wear down equipment, it appears that much of the growth reflects a broadening of the
definition of what is required.48
DOD Changes Definition of War Costs
For the past ten years, DOD financial regulations have defined the cost of contingencies to
include only incremental costs directly related to operations. Until October 2006, that guidance
was largely used by the services to prepare their estimates for Iraq and GWOT. The guidance
required that the service show assumptions about troop levels, operational tempo, and
reconstitution and limits requests to incremental costs—“that would not have been incurred had
the contingency operation not been supported.” Investment requests are also to be incremental
and included “only if the expenditures were necessary to support a contingency operation.”49
(Little of this information was provided to Congress in DOD’s requests.)
In the July 19, 2006 guidance to the services for developing the FY2007 Supplemental and
FY2008 war cost requests, these strictures were reiterated. That guidance also prohibited
including Army modularity “because it is already programmed in FY2007 and the outyears,” and
warned that the services would have to demonstrate that investment items were “directly
associated with GWOT operations,” rather than to offset “normal recurring replacement of
equipment.”50 In addition, the services would have to show that reset plans could be executable in
FY2007, likely to mean within the last several months of the fiscal year based on experience in
FY2006.
On October 25, 2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England issued new guidance for
requesting war funds to the services, requiring them to submit new requests within two weeks that
reflect the “longer war on terror” rather than strictly the requirements for war operations in Iraq,
46 Sec. 9205, P.L. 110-252.
47 Division L.
48 CRS, Statement of Amy Belasco before the House Budget Committee, “The Growing Cost of the Iraq War,” October
24, 2007 http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2007/10.24Belasco_testimony.pdf.
49 DOD, Financial Management Regulations, Chapter 12, Sec. 23, “Contingency Operations,” p. 23-11ff, 23-21, 23-25,
23-27; http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/fmr/12/12_23.pdf.
50 Under Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2008-
2013 Program and Budget Review,” July 19, 2006, p. 34-49, specifically p. 36, 39, 41.
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Afghanistan and other counter-terror operations.51 Such a substantial change would be expected
to reflect guidance from the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget and the
President. This new definition appeared to open the way for including a far broader range of
requirements particularly since the needs of the “longer war” are relatively undefined.
In its review of the FY2007 Supplemental, the appropriators rejected certain procurement and
depot maintenance requests as either unexecutable or not clearly an emergency. (See CRS Report
RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other
Purposes, coordinated by Stephen Daggett.) Since the long war on terror is now part of DOD’s
key missions according to the national strategy, it could be argued that these types of expenses
should be included in DOD’s regular budget where they would compete with other defense needs.
Procurement Funding in FY2007 and FY2008
War-justified procurement requests have increased substantially in recent years from $20.4 billion
in FY2006 to $39.7 billion in FY2007 and $64.0 billion in FY2008. Although some of this
increase may reflect additional force protection and replacement of “stressed” equipment, much
may be in response to Mr. England’s new guidance to fund requirements for the “longer war”
rather than DOD’s traditional definition of war costs as strictly related to immediate war needs.
For example, the Navy initially requested $450 million for six EA-18G aircraft, a new electronic
warfare version of the F-18, and the Air Force $389 million for two Joint Strike Fighters, an
aircraft just entering production; such new aircraft would not be delivered for about three years
and so could not be used meet immediate war needs. Other new aircraft in DOD’s supplemental
request include CV-22 Ospreys and C-130J aircraft. In its March amendment to the FY2007
Supplemental, the Administration withdrew several of these requests, possibly in anticipation that
Congress would cut these aircraft.
Front Loading Reset Funding
The FY2007 Supplemental included an additional $14 billion for reset—the replacement of war-
worn equipment. DOD’s request appears to front load (or fund in advance) DOD’s reset
requirements, a fact acknowledged by then-OMB Director Robert Portman in recent testimony.52
According to DOD figures, Army and Marine Corps reset requirements were fully met in the
enacted FY2007 fund when Congress provided $23.7 billion for Army and Marine Corps reset
costs, the amount that the services said was needed.53
As substantial amounts of equipment are being sent back to the United States for repair, the Army
and Marine Corps would be expected to be able to check previous estimates of the effect of
current operations on wear and tear of equipment. As of enactment of the FY2007 Supplemental,
DOD has received about $64 billion for reset, which is defined as the “process of bringing a unit
51 Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, “Ground
Rules and Process for FY’07 Spring Supplemental,” October 25, 2006.
52 Testimony of OMB Director Robert Portman before the House Budget Committee, Hearing on the FY2008 DOD
Budget, February 6, 2007, p. 41 of transcript.
53 See table inserted by Senator Stevens in Congressional Record, August 2, 2006, p. S8571 showing $23.7 billion for
reset, including $14 billion in procurement; total funded also provided $4.9 billion for unfunded FY2006 requirement;
see also DOD’s Report to Congress, Long-Term Equipment Repair Costs, September 2006.
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back to full readiness once it has been rotated out of a combat operation,” by repairing and
replacing equipment and resting and retraining troops.54 The services are to repair equipment if
economical or replace it if replacement costs almost as much as repair.
The FY2007 Supplemental and the FY2008 war request both appear to include an extra year of
Army and Marine Corps reset requirements. According to statements by Army Chief of Staff,
General Peter J. Schoomaker and other military spokesman, Army reset is estimated to be $12
billion to $13 billion a year as long as the conflict lasts at the current level and “for a minimum of
two to three years beyond”55 According to Marine Corps Commandant, General Michael Hagee,
their requirements are about $5 billion a year for a total of about $17 billion for the two services
most heavily affected.56
DOD estimated that reconstitution would total $37.5 billion in FY2007 and $46 billion in
FY2008, which was largely supported by Congress in FY2007.57 The front loading of
requirements may be an attempt by the services to avoid being in the position of requesting reset
funds after U.S. troops have started to withdraw. While Congress endorsed most of the repair
piece of reconstitution (funded in O&M) in the $70 billion FY2008 fund, only $6 billion of
procurement monies related to reconstitution was included.58
Carryover of DOD War Investment Funding
DOD’s latest procurement request for reconstitution could be considered less urgent because
DOD had a $45 billion carryover of war-justified investment funds—i.e., funds provided in
previous years’ acts but not yet obligated or placed on contract—as of the beginning of FY2008.59
Because investment funding is available for two to three (RDT&E for two years, procurement
and military construction for three years), some of the funds may be obligated beyond the first
year as contracts are written and processed.
54 See CRS Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes,
coordinated by Stephen Daggett; for definition, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report to Congress, Ground Force
Equipment Repair, Replacement, and Recapitalization Requirements Resulting from Sustained Combat Operations, April
2005, p. 8; see also GAO-06-604T, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues
for the Army and Marine Corps, p. 3.
55 Statement of Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, before the House Armed Services
Committee, “Reset Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft,” June 27, 2006, p.2; see also testimony of
Brigadier General Charles Anderson, U.S. Army, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces Hold, transcript, “Joint Hearing on Costs and Problems of Maintaining Military
Equipment in Iraq,” January 31, 2007, p. 6.
56 Testimony of General Michael Hagee, Marine Corps Commandant before the House Armed Services Committee,
“Army and Marine Corps Reset Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft,” June 27, 2006, p. 41.
57 DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Request, February 2007, Table 3; http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/
fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_Request.pdf hereinafter, DOD, FY2008 GWOT
Request.
58 Congress also provided $16.8 billion to buy and support MRAPS, a force protection request not related to
reconstitution; see December 18, 2007 Congressional Record, p. S15858 for procurement items funded in the FY2008
included in Division L of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act.
59 CRS, Statement of Amy Belasco before the House Budget Committee, “The Rising Cost of the Iraq War,” October
24, 2007; http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2007/10.24Belasco_testimony.pdf.
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Most of these funds are procurement monies, suggesting that unobligated war-related
procurement funds still available to be spent are about half of the $81 billion in procurement
funds provided to DOD in FY2007 for its regular appropriations.60
Accuracy and Expansion of Reconstitution Requests
Although it is clear that reset requirements reflect the stress on equipment from operations, the
accuracy of services estimates has not been determined. Recently, GAO testified that until
FY2007, the Army, with the largest reset requirement, could not track reset or ensure that funds
appropriated for reset were in fact spent for that purpose, making it more difficult to assess the
accuracy of DOD’s requests.61 In addition, presumably much of the equipment that is being
repaired now because of the effect of war operations, was originally slated for repair or
replacement at a later date, and so is being repaired or replaced sooner than anticipated. That
could mean DOD’s baseline budget could be reduced to offset war funding already provided.
Reset requirements may also be uncertain because the number of troops and intensity of
operations may change. Service estimates of requirements have changed over the past couple of
years. In a September 2006 report to Congress, for example, annual reset requirements in FY2008
were estimated to be $13 billion for the Army and about $1 billion for the Marine Corps.62
Several months earlier in the spring of 2006, the Army estimated that reset requirements would
decrease from $13 billion a year to $10.5 billion a year for the next two years and then decline to
$2 billion a year if troops were withdrawn over a two-year period.63 A year earlier, in March
2005, CBO estimated that annual repair and replacement costs would run about $8 billion a year
based on the current pace of operations and service data.64 In a report last fall, CBO estimated that
40% of the Army’s war requests were not directly for reset needs.65
DOD’s definition of reset now includes not only replacing battle losses (typically about 10% of
the total), equipment repair (about half) but also recapitalization that typically upgrades current
equipment, and repair and replacement of prepositioned equipment stored overseas that has been
tapped to meet war needs. The Army has been planning to recapitalize equipment and modernize
prepositioned equipment stocks to match the new modular designs as part of its ongoing
modernization. For this reason, it’s not clear whether these expenses are actually incremental
wartime requirements.
60 See Table 2 in CRS Report RL33999, Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations, by Pat Towell, Stephen
Daggett, and Amy Belasco.
61 GAO-07-439T, Testimony of William Solis before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Air and Land Forces, House
Armed Services Committee, January 31, 2007, p. 2 and 3.
62 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report to the Congress, “Long-Term Equipment Repair Costs,” September 2006,
p. 24 and p. 25.
63 Army Briefing, “Army Equipment Reset Update,” May 18, 2006, p. 8.
64 CBO Testimony by Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, “The Potential Costs Resulting from Increased Usage of Military
Equipment in Ongoing Operations,” before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee April
6, 2005, p. 2.
65 CBO, Replacing and Repairing Equipment Used In Iraq and Afghanistan: The Army’s Reset Program by Frances M.
Lussier, September 2007; http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=8629&sequcence=0&from=7, p. ix.
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Modularity as an Emergency Expense
The distinction between war-related and regular funding has also been made murky by DOD
requests to treat conversion of Army and Marine Corps units to new standard configurations—
known as modularity and restructuring—as a war requirement. In a report last year, for example,
the Army acknowledged that “since modularity requirements mirror the equipment requirements
the Army already procures for its units, the ability to precisely track modularity funds is lost.”66
At DOD’s request, Congress agreed to provide $5 billion in the FY2005 and in FY2006
supplementals for converting units with the understanding that DOD would move these funds
back to its regular budget in later years. The FY2007 supplemental again included $3.6 billion to
convert two Army brigade teams and create an additional Marine Corps regimental combat team
highlighting the issue of whether funds that are part of DOD’s regular requirements are being
shifted to emergency funding. The FY2008 war request also includes $1.6 billion to accelerate the
creation of more modular brigades plus additional funds for equipping them.67
DOD argued that these costs should be considered war-related because having more modular
units makes it easier to rotate units to the war zone and hence would extend the time between
deployments giving soldiers more time at home, or “dwell time” and hence improving readiness.
This conclusion has been questioned in studies by CBO and the RAND. Both studies found that
modularity would only marginally improve rotation schedules. CBO estimated that the Army’s
modularity initiative would only make available an additional 6,000 to 7,000 troops.68 DOD does
not estimate the effect of either its previous or new funding for modularity on the amount of time
soldiers have at home between deployments.
Congress included the funds in the FY2005 and FY2006 with some reluctance (effectively giving
the Army more room in its regular budget for two years) based on an understanding with DOD
that this funding would return to the regular budget after FY2006 and that $25 billion was set
aside for the Army in future years to cover these costs.69 Congress appears to have approved these
costs in FY2007 as well.
Growing the Force as a War Cost
Previously, Congress has provided funding to cover “overstrength” or the cost of recruiting and
retaining additional personnel above the Army’s pre-war end strength of 482,000 and the Marine
Corps end strength of 175,000. DOD has argued that these increases were required to reduce the
stress on forces and that the increases would be temporary. In January 2007, the President
announced plans to permanently increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps by 92,000 over
the next six years including the almost 30,000 additional personnel already on board.
66 Secretary of the Army, “Sec. 323 report required by the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 109-364,”
February 14, 2007, p. 4.
67 DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Amendment, October 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/
fy2008/Supplemental/FY2008_October_Global_War_On_Terror_Amendment.pdf, p. 48 and 49.
68 The RAND study argued that the types of units created were not those most needed. RAND, Stretched Thin: Army
Forces for Sustained Operations, 7-15-05; http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG362.pdf. CBO, An
Analysis of the Military’s Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq: an Update, October 5, 2005; http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/66xx/doc6682/10-05-05-IraqLetter.pdf.
69 Program Budget Decision 753, “Other Secretary of Defense Decisions,” December 23, 2004, p. 1.
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The FY2007 supplemental included a total of $4.9 billion to cover the military personnel cost of
additional troops plus $1.7 billion for equipment and infrastructure for the forces to be added in
FY2007. DOD promises that funding to equip future increases in the force will be funded in the
regular budget starting in FY2009.
In a reversal of its previous position, DOD argued that the Army and Marine Corps need to be
permanently expanded by 92,000 by 2012. The President’s proposal marks a major change and
appears to assume that the United States needs to be able to deploy substantial numbers of troops
on a permanent basis. CBO estimates that adding two divisions to the Army—roughly equivalent
to the President’s proposal—would require an additional $108 billion between FY2008 and
FY2017, a major investment.70
Questions About War-Related Procurement Issues
To evaluate DOD’s war-related reconstitution and procurement requests, Congress may want to
consider
• whether reset requirements are sufficiently firm to justify front loading and what
assumptions about force levels and the pace of operations underlie those
requests;
• whether upgrading equipment and replacing prepositioned equipment is actually
a war expense rather than a part of ongoing modernization initiatives;
• how war funding of repair and replacement of equipment could affect
maintenance and procurement needs funded in DOD’s regular budget;
• whether upgrades requested reflect requirements to equip deployed or deploying
forces—war-related—or the entire force; and
• whether DOD estimates of war requirements for force protection reflect war-
related requirements for deploying forces or modernization of the entire force.
To some extent, these war-related requirements for recapitalization, modularity, force protection,
and upgrades overlap each other and the baseline budget since all involve the purchase of new
equipment to improve capability. Since DOD is constantly modernizing, some of the funding for
these requirements may have been assumed in estimates for the later years of DOD’s baseline
budget. DOD appears to have shifted some of its baseline requirements to war requests.
Shifting funding from the regular budget to emergency funding is attractive because DOD’s
emergency spending has not been subject to budget caps, allowing the services to substitute other
less urgent requirements in their baseline budgets. On the other hand, DOD consistently faces
budget pressure from unanticipated increases in the cost of its new weapon systems.
The FY2007 Supplemental also includes a more than doubling of the amounts for force
protection, and substantial increases in funding Iraq and Afghan Security Forces as well as over
$1 billion for military construction funding in FY2007. See CRS Report RL33900, FY2007
Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes, coordinated by
Stephen Daggett for additional information on these and other war issues.
70 CBO, Budget Options, February 2007, p. 9-10 http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/78xx/doc7821/02-23-BudgetOptions.pdf.
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Potential Readiness Issues
For some time, service representatives and Members of Congress have raised concerns about
current readiness levels, particularly the Army’s ability to respond to the full range of potential
war scenarios with trained personnel and fully operational equipment, a concern recently
reiterated to Congress by General Pace, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.71 According to reports,
current Army readiness rates have declined to the lowest levels since the end of the Vietnam war
with roughly half of all Army units, both active and reserve, at the lowest readiness ratings for
currently available units.72
Because DOD’s standard ratings (known as C-ratings) assess readiness relative to the full range
of standard wartime scenarios, however, they do not necessarily reflect whether units are ready to
deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan to conduct counterinsurgency operations. For example when
asked about his readiness concerns during a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee,
General Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army stated that “I have no concerns about how we
are equipping, training and manning the forces that are going across the berm into harm’s way.
But I do have continued concerns about the strategic depth of the Army and its readiness,”
referring to other potential missions of the Army [italics added].73
General Schoomaker’s testimony may reflect an alternate DOD readiness system that assesses
units about to deploy to carry out missions that are not their traditional ones. In this circumstance,
the services use an alternate readiness reporting system known as “Percent Effective” or PCTEF.
Unlike standard ratings, which largely reflect specific quantitative criteria, percent effectiveness
ratings reflect a “subjective assessment of the unit’s ability to execute its currently assigned
‘nontraditional’ mission.”74 Unit commanders are to judge whether the unit has:
• the required resources and is trained to carry out all missions (a rating of 1);
• most of its missions (a rating of 2);
• many but not all of its missions (a rating of 3); or
• requires additional resources to carry out its assigned missions (a rating of 4).75
According to reports, the Army is facing shortages of certain equipment and personnel for state-
side units who are currently either training up so as to deploy at a later date or are part of the
strategic reserve who could be called upon should other contingencies arise elsewhere. Such
shortages could affect a unit’s ability to train and be fully prepared for its various missions. At the
same time, some training limitations that are captured in a unit’s standard readiness ratings—for
example, for large-scale combat operations—may not affect a unit’s ability to conduct counter-
insurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. In testimony in January 2007, however, then-Army
Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker acknowledged that for deploying units, “there is
71 Washingtonpost.com, “General Pace: Military Capability Eroding,” February 27, 2007.
72 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations—Democratic Staff, “United States Army Military
Readiness,” September 13, 2006, pp. 2-4.
73 Transcript of hearing before House Armed Services Committee, “Hearing on Iraq Policy Issues: Implications of the
President’s Policy for Readiness, the Total Force and Strategic Risk,” January 23, 2007, p. 10.
74 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.02A,” p. J-4.
75 Ibid.
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important equipment that is only available in Kuwait that they must train on before they cross the
berm,” that is training conducted shortly before final deployment in-country.76
Another readiness concern is the fact that some active duty members are redeploying with less
than a year at home to rest and retrain raising concerns that members may choose not to reenlist
which could create problems in meeting recruitment and retention goals. Although there were
some shortfalls in FY2005, the Army was only 1% short of meeting its FY2006 goal of recruiting
186,000 personnel for its active-duty and reserve forces, and retention continues to exceed
goals.77
While some units redeploy within a year, many of the individuals that make up those units are no
longer in that unit because of new assignments. A better measure may be the fact that of the 1.5
million individuals who have deployed for Iraq of OEF, about 30% have had more than one
deployment.78
Reserve units have also been frequently cited as short of equipment because some equipment has
been left behind in Iraq and replacement equipment has not been delivered. Problems with
reserve readiness are longstanding because until the Afghan and Iraq operations, reservists were
seldom deployed for contingencies and thus were traditionally given less equipment and fewer
personnel.79 Recent DOD requests include substantial funding for new equipment for the
reserves.
While some readiness concerns, like those of the reserves, are longstanding, it is not clear how
long other readiness problems have persisted or how long they will continue. This debate about
readiness has sharpened with the President’s decision to increase troop levels in Iraq and
Afghanistan by about 35,000 and congressional consideration of withdrawal options. At issue
may be how long readiness problems are expected to persist and whether problems reflect lack of
resources or management problems such as an inability to identify ongoing reset and hence
ensure that equipment that is needed most urgently is fixed or replaced first.
Congressional Options to Affect Military Operations
As interest in alternate policies for Iraq has grown, Congress may turn to the Vietnam and other
experience to look for ways to affect military operations and troop levels in Iraq. In the past,
Congress has considered both funding and non-funding options. Most observers would maintain
that restrictions tied to appropriations have been more effective. (For an analysis of the legal
issues in restricting military operations, see CRS Report RL33837, Congressional Authority to
Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq, by Jennifer K. Elsea, Michael John Garcia, and Thomas J.
Nicola. For examples of past enacted and proposed restrictions, see CRS Report RL33803,
Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia,
76 Transcript of hearing before House Armed Services Committee, “Hearing on Iraq Policy Issues: Implications of the
President’s Policy for Readiness, the Total Force and Strategic Risk,” January 23, 2007, p. 10.
77 See Tables 1, 3, and 5 in CRS Report RL32965, Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2006 and FY2007
Results for Active and Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel, by Lawrence Kapp and Charles A. Henning.
78 Defense Manpower Data Center, “Contingency Tracking System Deployment File for Operations Enduring Freedom
& Iraqi Freedom,” as of December 31, 2006.
79 GAO-5-660, Reserve Forces: An Integrated; GAO-06-1109T, Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army
Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges, September 21, 2006.
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and Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding Approaches, by Amy Belasco et al. For recent proposals
to restrict military operations, see CRS Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations
for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes, coordinated by Stephen Daggett.)
Restrictive funding options generally prohibit the obligation or expenditure of current or
previously appropriated funds. Obligations occur when the government pays military or civilian
personnel, or the services sign contracts or place orders to buy goods or services. Expenditures, or
outlays, take place when payment is provided.
Past attempts or provisions to restrict funding have followed several patterns including those that
• cut off funding for particular types of military activities but permit funding for
other activities (e.g., prohibiting funds for combat activities but permitting funds
to withdraw troops);
• cut off funds as of a certain date in a specific country;
• cut off funds “at the earliest practical date,” which essentially gives the president
leeway to set the date;
• cut off funds if certain conditions are met (such as a new authorization) or certain
events take place (such as the release of U.S. prisoners of war).
Other non-funding approaches to restrict military operations have
• required that troops be withdrawn by a specified date in the future or at the
“earliest practical date;”
• withdrawn funds unless there was a declaration of war or a specific congressional
authorization of the war activities; or
• repealed previous congressional resolutions authorizing military activities.
One or both houses may also state a “sense of the Congress,” or non-binding resolution that does
not need to be signed by the President that U.S. military operations should be wound down or
ended or forces withdrawn.
While only a handful of provisions have been enacted, congressional consideration of these
various limiting provisions placed pressure on the Administration and thus influenced the course
of events. For example, the well-known Cooper-Church provision that prohibited the introduction
of U.S. ground troops into Cambodia was enacted in early 1971 after U.S. forces had invaded and
then been withdrawn from Cambodia; that provision was intended to prevent the reintroduction of
troops.80
Although President Nixon did not reintroduce U.S. troops, the United States continued to bomb
Cambodia for the next three years. Later in 1973, Congress passed two provisions that prohibited
the obligation or expenditures of “any funds in this or any previous law on or after August 15,
1973” for combat “in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or
80 See discussion and language of the Cooper-Church amendment (Sec.7, P.L. 91-652) in CRS Report RL33803,
Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding
and Non-Funding Approaches, by Amy Belasco et al.
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Cambodia.”81 The final version reflected negotiations between the Administration and Congress
about when the prohibition would go into effect with August 15, 1973 set in the enacted version
and bombing did stop on that day.
Several well-known proposals that were not enacted—two McGovern-Hatfield amendments and
an earlier Cooper-Church amendment—were also part of this Vietnam Era jockeying between the
Administration and Congress. One McGovern-Hatfield amendment prohibited expenditure of
previously appropriated funds after a specified date “in or over Indochina” except for the purpose
of withdrawing troops or protecting our Indochinese allies while another also prohibiting
spending funds to support more than a specified number of troops unless the president notified
the Congress of the need for a 60 day extension. The earlier Cooper-Church amendment
prohibited the expenditure of any funds after July 1, 1970 to retain troops in Cambodia “unless
specifically authorized by law hereafter.”82
Generally, Congress continued to provide funds for U.S. troops in Vietnam at the requested levels
as the Nixon Administration reduced troop levels. Overall, funding restrictions have generally
proven more effective than the War Powers Act, which has been challenged by the executive
branch on constitutional grounds.83
Problems in War Cost Estimates and Reporting
GAO, CBO and CRS have all testified to Congress about the limited transparency in DOD’ war
cost estimating and reporting.84 While DOD has provided considerably more justification material
for its war cost requests beginning with the FY2007 Supplemental, many questions remain
difficult to answer—such as the effect of changes in troop levels on costs—and there continue to
be unexplained discrepancies in DOD’s war cost reports.
How might Congress get better, accurate information on war costs? To provide Congress a better
basis for oversight, DOD could:
• provide estimates of the allocations of all budget authority provided for OIF and
OEF, and compare those to outlays to date;
• provide past, current and future estimates of average troop strength—both
deployed and total—for each operation and other key cost drivers such as
operating tempo;
81 One provision was included in both P.L. 93-52, the Continuing Appropriations Act of 1974 and the Second
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1973, P.L. 93-50, both enacted July 1, 1973; see CRS Report RL33803,
Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding
and Non-Funding Approaches.
82 See H.R. 17123, H.R. 6531, and H.R. 15628 in Table 1 and Appendix of CRS Report RL33803, Congressional
Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding and Non-
Funding Approaches.
83 CRS Report RS20775, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and
Overseas Deployments, by Richard F. Grimmett.
84 See testimony to House Budget Committee, October 24, 2007, July 31, 2007, and testimony to Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Affairs, House Government Reform, July 18, 2006.
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• set up separate appropriation accounts for war funding to create visibility on
outlays and increase accuracy;
• compare all budget authority appropriated for war with obligations for each
operation to identify trends and reporting inconsistencies;
• explain the rationale and assumptions underlying estimates of reset requirements
to repair and replace equipment that is worn out or lost in combat, and track
amounts actually spent;
• estimate and explain how recapitalization and upgrade requirements are related to
war needs rather than ongoing modernization;
• show how funding provided in supplemental appropriations may reduce DOD’s
baseline requests by funding maintenance or procurement earlier than
anticipated;
• estimate future costs under various scenarios.
In its Section 9010 report, DOD provides Congress with fairly detailed quarterly reporting on
various metrics for success in Iraq—ranging from average daily hours of electrical power by
province to average weekly attacks on civilians, Iraq Security Forces and coalition forces—but
measures of U.S. military costs are not required. Detailed reporting of different military costs and
troop levels could be included as a metric for assessing operations Iraq, Afghanistan and other
counter terror operations.85 Particularly if the global war on terror is indeed “the long war” of
indefinite duration, better cost reporting could aid congressional oversight and assessment of
emergency funding requests.
Difficulties in Explaining DOD’s War Costs
What makes war costs change? Changes in war costs would be expected to vary with troops
levels, war-related benefits, the intensity of operations, and levels of basing and support. The
extent of competition in contracts and the price of oil would also be expected to affect the prices
of goods and services purchased by DOD.
A list of the primary war cost drivers would be expected to include:
• the number of troops deployed or anticipated to deploy;
• changes in the pace of operations or optempo;
• changes in the amount of equipment and number of personnel to be transported
to the theater of operations;
• whether support is designed to be temporary or longer-term;
• force protection needs;
• how quickly equipment breaks down and how quickly it is to be replaced or
upgraded; and
85 H.Rept. 109-72, p. 97; DOD, Section 9010 Report to Congress, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq”
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/iraq_measures.html.
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• military basing plans that underlie construction requests.
Troop levels would be expected to be the basic underlying factor that determines the cost of
military activities and support ranging from the number of miles driven by trucks (which, in turn,
affects how quickly trucks break down), purchases of body armor (varying with the threat), or
meals served and housing provided. Troop levels, however, have risen far less than costs.
Little of the $93 billion DOD increase between FY2004 and FY2007 appears to reflect changes in
the number of deployed personnel, which has grown by only 15% (see Table 6). Rather the
increase is attributable to several factors:
• certain unanticipated requirements for force protection gear and equipment;
• the cost of training and equipping Afghan and Iraqi security forces; and
• even more, a broadened definition of the types of programs that DOD considers
part of war reconstitution or reset—funds to repair and replace war-worn
equipment.86
Changes in Troop Strength
In testimony and supplemental requests, DOD typically cites the number of “boots on the
ground” at a particular time to illustrate military personnel levels. For example, DOD figures
show that there were about 139,000 troops in Iraq and 19,000 in Afghanistan or about 158,000 as
of October 1, 2006.87 Similar figures are cited by DOD witnesses in hearings.
This figure, however, does not include all troops in the region deployed for OIF or OEF
operations or capture the annual average as troops rotate in and out of the theater during the year.
Nor does it capture activated reservists in the United States who are training, backfilling for
deployed troops, or supporting DOD’s enhanced security (ONE) mission. For these reasons,
“boots on the ground” figures understate the number of military personnel dedicated to these
operations.
For example, in FY2006, average troop strength was some 297,000 for operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan and other counter-terror operations or almost twice as high as “boots on the ground”
figures (see Table 5). In its new supplemental request, DOD cites about 320,000 for its troop
strength in FY2007, acknowledging the higher troop levels for the first time.88 The reported
average for the year was 303,000 (see Table 5).
In FY2004, the first year of occupation, DOD figures show average troop strength for all three
missions of 304,000. In its FY2007 Supplemental request, DOD projected a total of about
319,000 troops, a 5% increase since FY2004. Costs would more than double from $72 billion in
FY2004 to $165 billion for FY2007 (see Table 2). Reported troop strength for FY2007 was
303,000 (see Table 5).
86 See CRS, Statement of Amy Belasco before the House Budget Committee, Hearing on “The Rising Cost of the Iraq
War,” October 24, 2007; http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2007/10.24Belasco_testimony.pdf Stat.
87 DOD, Information Paper, “Congressional Research Service Request for Boots on the Ground (BOG) Statistics for
Iraq and Afghanistan, January 1, 2007,” 1-2-07.
88 DOD, FY2007 Emergency Supp, p. 16. http://dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/
FY2007_Emergency_Supplemental_Request_for_the_GWOT.pdf.
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Some would argue that the average number of deployed troops dedicated to Iraq and GWOT
operations would be provide a better metric to explain war costs because those are the troops
carrying out ongoing operations. Under this reasoning, reservists in the United States—whether
training up or backfilling—are considered the support tail for deployed troops.
Between FY2004 and FY2006, average deployed troop strength increased from about 216,000 to
247,000 or by about 14% whereas funding levels increased by 60% (see Table 5). DOD’s “surge”
or “plus-up” for FY2007 of about 30,000 troops increased average troop strength by only 10,000
or about 4% over FY2006 (taking into accounts dips earlier in the year and the fact that additional
troops would be in place for only part of the year). That brought troop strength for FY2007 to
about 256,000 or about 19% above FY2004. At the same time, DOD’s enacted funding for
FY2007 is more than double the amount in FY2004. Changes in troop strength do not explain
such increases. Defense Manpower Data Center does not show average troop strength data by
operation.
Table 6. Average Troop Strength for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Counter-Terror
Operations, FY2001-FY2007
(in thousands)
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07
Average Deployed
by Service
51 77 220 216 245 247 256
Army
8 17 110 143 156 156 156
Navy
29 30 42 25 29 32 40
Marine
Corps
0 4 32 25 35 32 32
Air
Force
14 26 35 24 25 27 27
Activated Reserves State-sidea NAb 51 92 87 66 50 46
All OIF/OEF/ONE Military Personnel
50 129 312 304 312 297 303
Source: CRS calculations from Defense Manpower Data Center, DRS17253 Report, Average Number of
Members By Month, 0901-1107, January 2008.
Note: Average strength computed by the Defense Manpower Data Center by totaling the number of days
deployed for each service member in a year and then dividing that figure by the 365 days in the year. Numbers
may not add due to rounding.
a. Activated reservists in the United States are training up for deployments, backfilling the positions of
deployed active-duty personnel, or providing enhanced security at U.S. instal ations.
b. Not available.
Military personnel funding has hovered between $16 billion and $20 billion a year (see Table 6).
About half of war-related military personnel cost is for the full-time pay and benefits to the
150,000 reservists to110,000 reservists who have been activated each year since FY2004, with the
number falling in recent years.89
89 Average annual strength for activated reservists from Defense Manpower Data Center, “Average Member Days
Deployed by Service Component and Month/Year, 9/01 to 11/06.”
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Table 7. DOD’s War Enacted Budget Authority by Title: FY2004-FY2009 Bridge
(in billions of dollars)
FY09
Title
FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 Bridge
Military
Personnel
17.8 19.7 16.7 18.8 19.1 1.2
Operation
&
Maintenance
42.0 47.9 60.0 75.0 78.3 51.9
Defense
Health
0.7 1.0 1.2 3.0 2.0 1.1
Other Defense Programsa
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2
Procurement
7.2 18.0 22.9 45.4 44.8 4.4
Research,
Dev.,
Testing
&
Evaluation
0.4 0.6 0.8 1.5 1.6 0.4
Working Capital Fundsb
1.6 3.0 3.0 1.1 1.9 0.0
Military
Construction
0.5 1.2 0.2 1.7 2.7 0.0
Subtotal:
Regular
Titles
70.3 91.7 105.1 146.9 150.4
59.2
Special Funds and Caps
Iraqi
Freedom
Fund
(IFF)
2.0 3.8 3.3 0.4 3.8 0.0
Afghan Sec. Forces Training Fundc
0.0 1.3 1.9 7.4 2.8 2.0
Iraq Security Forces Training Fundc
[5.0] 5.7 3.0 5.5 3.0 1.0
Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Fundd
0.0
0.0 3.3 4.4 4.3 2.0
Strategic Reserve Readiness Fundd
0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0
Coalition Support Cape
[1.2] [1.2] [.9] [1.1] [.8] [.2]
Lift and sustain Capf
[0] [0] [.4] [.3] [0] [0]
Global lift and sustain Cape
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
Global train and equip Cape
[0] [0] [.1] [0] [.2] [NA]
Cmdrs’ Emerg. Response Cape [.2]
[.8]
[.9]
[1.0]
[1.8].
[1.3]
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Transfer Account
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
16.8
1.7
Special Transfer Authority Capf
[3.0] [3.0] [4.5] [3.5] [6.5] [4.0]
Subtotal: Special Funds
2.0 10.7 11.5 19.3 30.6 6.7
Dept. of Defense Total
72.3
102.4 116.7 166.2 181.1
65.9
Coast
Guard
Transfer
0.0 [.2] [.1] [.2] [.2] [0]
Intell.
Comm.
Mgt
Fund
0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Def.
Nuclear
Nonproliferation
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Salaries
&
Expenses,
FBI
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Subtotal: Defense-Relatedg
0.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0
National
Defense
Total
72.3 102.6 116.8 166.5 181.1
65.9
Sources: CRS calculations based on H.Rept. 110-60, S.Rept. 110-37, H.Rept. 110-107, H.R. 1591 and H.R. 2206
as passed by both houses, and “additional explanatory materials” in the Congressional Record, May 24, 2007, p. H
.8506ff. Submitted by Congressman Obey, Chair of the House Appropriations Committee.
Notes: Numbers may not add due to rounding. This table separates funds with special purposes such as the
Afghan Security Forces Fund from the regular titles to better identify trends. For FY2007, request reflects
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amended FY2007 supplemental submission of March 9, 2007; see OMB, Appendix: FY2008 Budget, “Other
Materials: FY2007 Supplemental and FY2008,” February 5, 2007 for original request, p. 1143ff;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/appendix/sup.pdf. For amended request, see OMB, “Estimate
No. 3,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/amendments/amendment_3_9_07.pdf. Includes transfers from
baseline accounts to war to meet unanticipated needs through FY2005.
a.
“Other Defense Programs” includes counter drug and Office of Inspector General funds.
b. Working capital funds finance additional inventory for support items such as spare parts.
c. Training Iraqi security forces was initially funded in the State Department [ shown in brackets ] but is now
funded in DOD. The Afghan Army also received some State Department funds.
d.
The Joint IED Defeat Fund finances responses to IED attacks through transfers to procurement, RDT&E,
and operation and maintenance programs. Initially, Congress appropriated $1.4 billion for IED Defeat to the
Iraq Freedom Fund and then appropriated $1.9 billion to a separate new account, the Joint IED Defeat Fund.
The $3.3 billion total for FY2006 includes both amounts.
e. Congress sets caps on different types of coalition support—reimbursements to allies conducting operations
or logistical support for OIF and OEF, and lift, support, training and equipping of allies conducting other
counter-terror operations. Congress also sets a cap on CERP, a program which permits military commanders
to fund small-scale reconstruction projects in Iraq and Afghanistan.
f. Congress sets the amount of transfer authority in each bill. The table includes amounts provided for both
bridge and supplemental funds. Includes $10.4 billion for Iraq Freedom Fund in FY2003 (deducting specified
floors) plus $2 billion in transfer authority.
g. Defense-related programs are included in the national defense budget function.
Funds for war-related military personnel also include special war-related pay and benefits (e.g.,
hostile fire or imminent danger pay or survivors benefits) and “overstrength” or the additional
active-duty personnel who have been recruited and retained to meet wartime needs above DOD’s
pre-war strengths—482,000 for the Army and 172,000 for the Marine Corps. “Overstrength” has
been considered a war cost because DOD initially argued that the increases would be temporary
but in the FY2007 Supplemental, the Defense Department requested that these increases be part
of a permanent expansion of the Army and Marine Corps, an issue still to be resolved.
Since FY2004, DOD has reduced its reliance on reservists with the number activated falling from
151,000 in FY2004 to 113,000 in FY2006. Despite this 25% decrease, DFAS cost reports show a
more modest 8% decrease in cost from $8.8 billion to $8.1 billion. It is not clear why cost figures
are inconsistent with average troop levels but GAO has found various inconsistencies in DOD
reporting of military personnel costs.90
Reliance on Reservists Falls
Between FY2004 and FY2006, DOD reduced its reliance on reservists as their share of total
personnel dedicated to war missions declined from 30% to 24% (see Figure 1). This change
reflects the fact that some reservists have bumped up against a DOD-imposed policy set after the
9/11 attacks that limited their total deployment time to 24 months. Since reserve deployments
were typically for 18 months—including time to train up—reservists were often available for
only one deployment.
90 GAO, FY2004 Costs for Global War on Terrorism Will Exceed Supplemental, July 2004 http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d04915.pdf.
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Secretary Gates recently changed this policy, setting call-ups for 12 rather than 18 months. The
services could also exclude train up and demobilization time and make exceptions if necessary.
The policy change also emphasizes activating units rather than individuals to improve morale and
readiness.91 This policy change is likely to make reservists available for two tours if necessary.
Changes in Military Personnel Costs
As DOD reduces its reliance on activated reservists, war-related military personnel costs would
be expected to fall because the incremental cost of active-duty personnel—special pays—is less
than paying full-time salaries to reservists. Budget authority for military personnel dips in
FY2006 but rises again in FY2007 (see Table 6). At the same time, military personnel costs
increase as DOD “overstrength” or the number of personnel over the Army and Marine Corps
pre-war levels—grows. Yet DFAS reports show a decline in funding for overstrength from $2.0
billion in FY2005 to $1 billion in FY2006, possibly a reporting error.92 Although the
Administration announced in January 2007 that these increases would be permanent in order to
sustain higher deployments for the Global War on Terror, DOD requested the funds in the
FY2007 supplemental as an unanticipated emergency expense.
Figure 1. Active-Duty and Reserve Shares of OIF/OEF Average Annual Troop Levels,
FY2003-Early FY2007
120%
100%
17%
24%
30%
24%
23%
34%
80%
All Reserves
60%
Active-Duty
83%
40%
76%
70%
76%
77%
66%
20%
0%
02
03
04
05
06
11/06
Notes: Includes all activated reservists whether deployed, preparing to deploy or serving in the United States.
Data from Defense Manpower Data Center, Contingency Tracking System, “Average Member Days Deployed by
Service Component and Month/Year,” November 2006. The Contingency Tracking System covers military
personnel serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Noble Eagle.
91 David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel
and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the World Trade Center and
Pentagon Attacks,” September 20, 2001; and Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, “Utilization of the Total Force,”
January 19, 2007.
92 DFAS, Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Reports, September 2005 and September 2006, “DoD Totals.”
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Changes in Operating Costs
Even if troop strength remains the same, operational costs could grow if operating tempo
intensifies, repair costs increase, or support costs grow. These factors appear to explain some but
not all of the $17 billion increase in operating costs from $43 billion in FY2004 to $60 billion in
FY2006 (see Table 7). Based on DOD reporting of obligations, this increase reflects
• more body armor and other protective gear for troops (purchased with O&M
funds), growth of $1 billion to $2 billion;
• the jump in oil prices and the rise in intensity of operations, growth of about $4
billion;
• the coming due of maintenance bills as equipment wears out, growth of $4
billion; and
• a $2 billion increase in command, communications, control, computers and
intelligence support.93
With the exception of force protection gear where congressional interest has been high, DOD has
provided little explanation for these changes.
With enactment of the FY2007 Supplemental, operating costs jump from $60 billion in FY2006
to $75 billion in FY2007 or by 25%. This increase reflects the Administration’s surge in troop
levels and naval presence (about $5 billion), higher repair costs ($3 billion), more force protection
gear (about $1 billion), a doubling in transportation costs for unspecified reasons ($2 billion),
increased LOGCAP contractor support ($300 million), and higher operating tempo.94 These
factors account for some but not all of the increase though the rationales for the changes are often
not clear. The total of $78 billion in FY2008 is similar to FY2007 with the surge in effect for part
of that year as well.
Changes in Investment Costs
Since FY2004, the rise in investment costs has been dramatic—about a sixfold increase from $7.2
billion in FY2004 to $45 billion in FY2007 and in FY2008. Procurement almost doubles between
FY2006 and FY2007. Investment costs include procurement, RDT&E and military construction.
As a share of DOD war appropriations, investment monies grew from about 10% in FY2004 to
about 20% in FY2006 and about 29% in FY2007 and FY2008. Since FY2003, DOD has received
about $142 billion in war-related procurement funds—equal to about 1 and 1/2 year’s worth of
peacetime procurement budgets (see Table 6).95
Again, some of the reasons for this upsurge in war-related investment costs are known:
93 DFAS, Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Reports, September 2005 and September 2006, “DoD Totals.”
94 Department of the Army, Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)/Regional War on Terrorism (RWOT), FY2007
Supplemental Budget Estimate, Volume 1, February 2007; http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/fy08-09/sup/fy07/
oma-v1.pdf.
95 DOD received $80.9 billion for procurement in FY2006; see H.Rept. 109-676, p. 135.
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• a push by both DOD and Congress to provide more force protection equipment
and increase situational awareness (e.g., uparmored High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), radios, sensors);
• a decision to fund equipment for newly configured Army and Marine Corps
units, known as modularity or restructuring;
• the growing bill to rebuild or replace damaged equipment, a process known as
reset or reconstitution;
• extensive upgrading of equipment; and
• the building of more extensive infrastructure to support troops and equipment in
and around Iraq and Afghanistan.
These reasons do not fully explain the scope of increases thus far or sort out whether the new
requests are war-related emergencies rather than being part of ongoing modernization or
transformation programs. DOD has provided little rationale or explanation for its requirements or
changes in requirements for replacing war-worn equipment or extensive upgrades.
In some cases, requirements do not appear to be strictly related to war needs. For example,
Congress included funds for C-17 aircraft in order to keep the production line open though its
relationship to current war needs is tenuous. Congress also agreed to fund the cost of equipping
newly configured Army and Marine Corps units—a pre-war initiative known as modularity or
restructuring initiative—in the FY2005 and FY2006 supplemental (see section on reset below and
CRS Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and
Other Purposes, coordinated by Stephen Daggett on FY2007 Supplemental).
Typically, war funds do not include RDT&E or military construction because both activities take
considerable time, and hence do not appear to meet an emergency criterion. In this respect, the
Iraq and GWOT conflicts are breaking new ground. DOD is now receiving war funding for
RDT&E in both specific programs and in the Joint IED Defeat Fund, a new account where DOD
transfers funds after enactment with prior reporting to Congress.
In the FY2007 Supplemental, DOD is receiving an additional $1.7 billion for military
construction, almost doubling the previous peak in FY2005. Funding for military construction has
been controversial for two reasons—concerns among some Members that construction indicates
an intent to set up permanent bases in Iraq and construction funding in the United States that is
part of proposed plans to increase the size of the force, and not clearly an emergency. Although
DOD has not ruled out retaining bases in Iraq, current guidelines limit the use of concrete
structures and emphasize building relocatable units and the FY2007 Supplemental continues a
prohibition on spending funds to set up permanent bases in Iraq. In FY2008, DOD receives an
additional $2.7 billion for war-related military construction.
Special Funds and the Flexibility Issue
Since the 9/11 attacks, Congress has relied on a variety of special accounts that give DOD
additional flexibility to respond to the uncertainty of wartime needs. Congress has also been more
willing to approve higher levels of transfer authority which allow DOD to move funds into
different accounts after enactment. The funding in these new accounts generally does not reflect
troop levels or immediate operational needs.
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Table 6 shows the funding provided in these flexible accounts including
• Afghan and Iraq Security Forces Funds for training and equipping police and
security forces;
• the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Fund for providing funds to
be transferred to procurement, RDT&E, or operation and maintenance to develop
and field solutions to the IED threat;
• the Iraq Freedom Fund set up to cover war operations cost in the first year of the
invasion and occupation (IFF);
• the Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund set up to cover expected damage
to Iraqi oil fields; and
• the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF).
Typically, Congress has given DOD latitude in how to use these funds and required after-the-fact
quarterly reporting.
The Afghan and Iraq Security Forces Funds provide lump sums which DOD could then allocate
between equipment and training needs. Similarly the Joint IED Defeat Fund allows DOD to
decide where funds are needed to meet this threat. Although the new accounts are designated to
meet particular goals, they are similar to funding flexibility given to DOD after the 9/11 attacks.
In the first two years after the 9/11 attacks, Congress gave DOD substantial leeway to move funds
after enactment to meet war needs by appropriating funds to special accounts. Initially, DOD
received $17 billion in its Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF), spending those funds in
broadly defined allocations such as “increased situational awareness,” and “increased worldwide
posture.”96 In the FY2002 Supplemental, Congress appropriated $13 billion for war costs
including $11.9 billion in the DERF, transformed into a transfer account, with guidelines set in
the conference report.97
In the FY2003 Supplemental, Congress appropriated a total of $77.4 billion in war funding,
including $15.6 billion in a new Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF) where DOD could transfer funds after
enactment and then report to Congress.98 Since FY2004, Congress has appropriated most war
funds to specific accounts but has given DOD larger amounts of transfer authority where DOD
can move funds after enactment with the consent of the four congressional defense committees
(see Table 6) as well as setting up new transfer accounts for specific purposes such as training
Iraqi security forces.
Congress has also set caps or ceilings on funding within O&M accounts for specific purposes
rather than set program limits. These include funding for
96 Congress appropriated $20 billion in the government-wide Emergency Response Fund which could be spent by the
President at his discretion (P.L. 107-38). DOD also received another $3.5 billion in the DERF but had to follow
allocations that were set in the FY2002 DOD Conference report (H.Rept. 107-350, p. 423).
97 H.Rept. 107-593, p. 17 and 128.
98 Congress rescinded $3.5 billion of the $15.6 billion originally appropriated to the IFF and included ceilings for
certain purposes, such as intelligence, within the total.
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• various types of coalition support which pays U.S. allies for their logistical
support in counter-terror operations related to OIF and OEF or other counter-
terror operations; and
• Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) for small reconstruction
projects selected and run by individual commanders;
The issue for Congress is the amount of flexibility to give DOD to meet needs which it cannot
define when appropriations are provided.
Average Cost Per Deployed Troop and Future Costs
To give another window into trends and how changes in troop levels may affect costs, CRS
estimated the average annual cost for each deployed troop—showing operational and investment
costs separately. Because only some costs (e.g., for meals, body armor, operating tempo, and
ammunition) are likely to vary in proportion with troop levels, the average cost per troop cannot
be used to directly estimate the cost of alternate troop levels (see Table 8).
Table 8. Average Annual Cost Per Deployed Troop: FY2003-FY2006
Average Troop Strength &
Change Since
Obligations
FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06
FY2003
Number of deployed troopsa
225,800 219,600 258,800 269,300
19%
Average annual obligations
$320,000 $340,000 $350,000 $390,000
22%
(in 000s of $)
Operational costsb
$300,000 $300,000 $270,000 $325,000
8%
Investment costsc
$20,000 $40,000 $80,000 $65,000
225%
Notes: Numbers rounded. CRS calculations based on average deployed troop strength from the Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and costs from Defense Finance Accounting Service, Supplemental & Cost of
War Execution Reports, FY2003-FY2006 with CRS estimates of unreported expenses. DMDC troop strength does
not separate Iraq and OEF.
a.
Does not include additional activated reservists who are training up for deployments, backfilling for active-
duty personnel or providing additional security at bases. DMDC figures do not separate military personnel in
OIF and OEF.
b. Includes military personnel and operation and maintenance costs.
c. Includes procurement, RDT&E, and military construction costs.
Some costs would rise or fall immediately as troops are withdrawn (e.g., meals served, fuel
consumed, spare parts replaced), whereas other costs would change more slowly (e.g., utilities
costs, building maintenance, equipment wear and tear). Still other costs would temporarily
increase, such as transportation costs to ship personnel and equipment back to the United States.
Over time, however, support costs would begin to change in proportion with personnel levels if
higher troop levels persist or if troops are withdrawn.
Since FY2003, the estimated average cost per deployed troop has risen from about $320,000 to
$390,000 per deployed troop.99 While that increase reflects primarily more spending for
99 CRS revised these costs because of better data on average deployed troop levels received recently from the Defense
(continued...)
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procurement—for replacement and upgrading of equipment—operational costs have also grown
(see Table 8).
Estimates of Future Costs
CBO has again projected the future cost of the Global War on Terror under two alternative
scenarios—both Iraq and OEF—in its most recent 2008-2018 budget outlook. Under the faster
drawdown scenario, troop levels would decline from about 205,000 to 30,000 troops by FY2010.
Concurrently, costs would decline from $193 billion in FY2008 (the Administration’s request) to
about $33 billion in FY2011 with:
• $118 billion in FY2008;
• $50 billion n FY2010;
• $33 billion in FY2011;
• $33 to $35 billion each year from FY2012 through FY2018.
Under the more gradual drawdown scenario, troop levels would decline from 205,000 to 75,000
troops by FY2013. Costs would decline to about $77 billion once the steady state was reached
with:
• $161 billion in FY2009;
• $147 billion in FY2010;
• $128 billion in FY2011;
• $101 billion in FY2012;
• $79 billion in FY2013; and
• about $77 billion a year for FY2014 through FY2018.100
CBO did not estimate a more rapid withdrawal of troops.
(...continued)
Manpower Data Center. Because this data does not segregate military personnel by OIF and OEF, CRS includes only
one figure for both.
100 See Table 1-5 in CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook” Fiscal Years 2008-2018, January 2008;
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=8917.
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Appendix A. Congressional Action on FY2008 and
FY2009 War Funding
On June 30, 2008, the President signed the FY2008 Supplemental and FY2009 Bridge Fund
(H.R. 2642, P.L. 110-252) that was passed by the Senate on June 26, 2008 and by the House a
week earlier. Referred to as the FY2008 Supplemental, the act provides a total of about $160
billion including $92 billion to cover the rest of FY2008 (in addition to the $90 billion already
appropriated) plus a $67 billion bridge fund that is expected to cover war costs until July 2009
well into a new Administration. The bulk of the funding is for DOD war operations, troop
support, and modernization.
Congress reduced the Administration’s request by about $13.7 billion, with some $12.6 billion
taken from the DOD request, including an across-the-board cut of $3.8 billion of DOD’s
investment and working capital fund accounts and a substitution of $5.7 billion of funding not
related to war such as the cost of higher fuel costs and base closure costs for DOD’s baseline
budget as well as hospitals, childcare centers and modernization of DOD facilities in the United
States.101 These reductions may indicate growing congressional skepticism about the validity of
DOD requests as well as congressional decisions to fund additional C-17 and C-130 aircraft not
requested by the Administration.
Table A-1. Chronology of FY2008 War and FY2009 War Requests
(in billions of $)
Agency FY2008
FY2008:
FY2008:
Total
FY2008
FY2009
FY2009
Req. As of
July 07
Oct. 07
FY2008
Supp.
Baseline
Bridge,
Feb. 07
MRAP
Amdt.
Req.b
Req.
War Req. As
May 2,
Amdt.a
of Feb. 08
2008 Req.
DOD
141.0 5.3 42.3 188.7 101.3
0.2 66.0
State/USAID 5.0 0.0 1.1 3.4 3.4 1.4 2.5
VA
Medical 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.3 0.0
Total
146.8 5.3 43.4 192.8 104.7
2.9
68.5
Sources: CRS calculations based on Administration request and relevant acts and bills, except where otherwise
noted. Totals may not add due to rounding.
Notes:
a.
MRAP = Mine Resistant Ambush Program (MRAP) vehicles.
b.
CRS includes an estimated $530 million for enhanced security based on FY2007 obligations, $504
million for health care increases for Wounded, Ill and Injured soldiers as war-related, and excludes
101 The Administration’s October 2007 amended request included about $1.2 billion in non-war costs. CRS calculations
based on H.R. 2642 as requested by the Administration and passed by the House on June 19, 2008, and the Senate on
June 26, 2008. DOD’s Title IX funding was passed by the House on May 22, 2008 and by the Senate on June 19, 2008.
Both houses also passed Military Construction/VA/State/USAID funding plus the across-the-board cut to DOD
investment and working capital fund accounts on June 19, 2008 by the House and on June 26, 2008 by the Senate. For
statutory language, see P.L. 110-252; for explanatory statements, see Congressional Record, May 19, 2008, p. S4318ff,
Amendment #2, for DOD funding and Congressional Record, June 26, 2008, p. S6239ff for Military Construction, VA,
and State/USAID funding.
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$762 million to cover higher fuel costs in DOD’s regular program and $416 million to accelerate the
conversion of Walter Reed Army Medical Hospital, and non-emergency State/USAID requests; DOD
considers the last three ‘Other Emergency’ requests. CRS calculations based on OMB and DOD budget
submissions.
Taking into account all war funds appropriated, Congress provided a total of $182 billion for
FY2008—some $11 billion more than in FY2007, continuing the annual increases albeit at a
slower rate. The Administration requested funds from Congress in three installments—an original
FY2008 request in February 2008, an amendment for Mine Resistant Ambush Program (MRAP)
vehicles on July 31, 2008, and a second amendment to cover additional costs submitted on
October 22, 2008 (see Table B-1).
Like last year, the newly enacted P.L. 110-252 also provides funds to cover part of FY2009 war
costs expected to last until June or July of 2009, well into the next administration by relying on
both supplemental and regular appropriations.102 Congress passed a Continuing Resolution to
fund the Administration’s FY2009 baseline requests for all agencies except for DOD, VA, and the
Department of Homeland Security (see Table A-1).
P.L. 110-252 includes an additional $92 billion for FY2008 for DOD, State/USAID and VA as
well as $67.4 billion in bridge funds for FY2009 (see Table A-2). Combined with regular DOD
funding, these monies would cover war costs until about June or July 2009 or well into a new
administration. The Administration did not submit a request for war funding for the entire fiscal
year despite a congressional requirement to do so, presumably because of uncertainty about future
troop levels in Iraq.
Table A-2. Enacted FY2008 and FY2009 War Funding
(in billions of dollars)
Agency First FY2008 DOD
Division L,
FY2008
FY2008
FY2009
Total
Continuing
Approp. P.L.
FY2008
Total
Supp. in
Bridge in
FY2008/
Resolution,
110-92,
Consolidated Enacted as
H.R. 2642/
H.R. 2642/
FY2009 Fdg
P.L. 110-5,
11-13-07a
Approp.
of
P.L. 110-
P.L. 110-252, in H.R. 2642/
9-29-07
P.L. 110-161,
6-15-08
252,
6-30-08a
P.L. 110-252,
12-26-07
6-30-08a
6-30-08a
DOD 5.2 12.2
70.0
87.4
88.7 65.9
154.7
State/
0.0 0.0 2.1
2.1 3.1 1.4 4.5
USAID
VA
0.0 0.0 0.9
0.9 0.4 0.0 0.4
Medical
Total 5.2 12.2 73.0
90.3
92.2 67.4
159.6
Sources: CRS calculations based on public laws cited above and explanatory statements in Congressional Record,
May 19, 2008 and June 26, 2008.
Note:
102 The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act included $70 billion for FY2008 war funding to cover the first part of
the fiscal year. The amended FY2009 request provides a breakdown by account and some details compared to the
“placeholder” request submitted with the FY2009 budget. The House Appropriations Committee said that the DOD
request arrived too late in the process to be considered.
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a.
CRS excludes $5.7 billion in P.L. 110-252 as non-war costs including $2.5 billion for higher fuel costs for
DOD’s regular program, $1.3 billion in BRAC costs, and $1.9 billion to renovate or build new facilities on
bases in the United States ($500 million for facilities modernization, $172 million for childcare centers, $200
million for Army barracks renovations, $818 million for hospitals, and $293 million for medical facility
renovations).
The final version of the FY2008 Supplemental represents a compromise between congressional
and Administration positions including an expansion of education benefits for veterans and
extended unemployment insurance originally opposed by the Administration, and lower amounts
for domestic funding endorsed by the Senate, plus new disaster funding for flooding in the
Midwest.103
Earlier versions of H.R. 2642, the FY2008 Supplemental and the FY2009 bridge fund were
passed before the Memorial Day recess, partly in response to warnings from the Administration
that the current funding would run out by June 15, 2008 unless DOD took additional actions.104 A
recently approved funding transfer extended DOD war financing until early July 2008 (see
below). To avoid threatened vetoes by the president, the final version included funding for Iraq
and Afghanistan for DOD, reduced funding for domestic emergencies, modified new GI benefits
developed by Congress, and dropped policy provisions on Iraq.
Estimates of FY2008 and FY2009 Funding for Iraq and Afghanistan
CRS estimates that the enacted version of the FY2008 Supplemental includes a total of about
$160 billion in war costs including about $128 billion for Iraq and $32 billion for Afghanistan for
all agencies.
For FY2008, CRS estimates that H.R. 2642/P.L. 110-252 includes an additional $92.2 for war
funding for Iraq and Afghanistan for all agencies. This includes:
• $73.7 billion additional for Iraq bringing the FY2008 total to about $149.2
billion, or about $16 billion above FY2007;
• $18.5 billion additional for Afghanistan bringing the FY2008 total to about $33
billion, or $4.1 billion below FY2007.
For FY2009, CRS estimates the FY2008 Supplemental includes a total $67.4 for war funding for
Iraq and Afghanistan for all agencies, including:
• $54.3 billion for Iraq or about $900 million more than the request; and
• $13.1 billion for Afghanistan, or about $2 billion below the request.
103 OMB, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 2642, Supplemental Appropriations Act,” June 19, 2008; available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-2/saphr2642-h2.pdf. Senate Appropriations Committee, Press
Release, “Statement of Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) Chairman, Senate Appropriations Committee n
Supplemental Funding for Investments in America, June 26, 2008”; http://appropriations.senate.gov/pressroom.cfm;
House Appropriations Committee, Press Release, “Emergency Supplemental Funding for Iraq, Afghanistan Veterans,
workers, and Midwest Disasters,” June 19, 2008; http://appropriations.house.gov/pdf/EmergencySupplemental6-19-
08.pdf.
104 Congress Daily, “Reid Pushes Back Supplemental Timing,” 5-14-08; Inside the Navy, “Nussle: War Funds Needed
Before June To Avoid Furlough Warnings,” 4-21-08.
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CRS estimated the allocation of FY2009 funding between the two operations using DOD data for
the prior year because DOD did not provide that information for its FY2009 bridge request.105
Nor did DOD request funding for the full year or provide detailed justification materials as is
required by the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364).106
FY2008 Supplemental and FY2009 Bridge Funding by Agency
As in the past, most of the war funding enacted in the FY2008 Supplemental goes to the
Department of Defense for operations, troop support, and modernization of equipment. The $160
billion total in P.L. 110-252 includes
• $88.7 billion in FY2008 and $65.9 billion in FY2009 for DOD;
• $3.1 billion in FY2008 and $1.4 billion in FY2009 for State’s foreign and
diplomatic operations; and
• a $400 million congressional add for VA medical in FY2008 to accelerate
construction of an additional poly trauma center.107
These estimates exclude $1.4 billion requested in the regular FY2009 budget of $1.4 billion for
foreign and diplomatic operations and $1.3 billion in Department of Veterans Affairs funding for
medical services for Iraq and Afghanistan that are being considered separately during the regular
appropriations process.
Congressional Changes to DOD Requests
In March 2008, DOD submitted an informal request to the congressional defense committees to
reallocate $9.9 billion within the pending FY2008 Supplemental request; no official request is
planned. The draft DOD reallocation would free up funds primarily from $2.5 billion in
unanticipated savings in Army operating costs because of reliance on more lightly equipped units
and $6.6 billion cuts in Army procurement reflecting execution or lower requirements.
These funds would be used to fund higher fuel prices in DOD’s base program (+$3.3 billion),
unanticipated base closure costs, other Army and Marine Corps war-related procurement ($4
billion), higher National Guard recruiting costs, an increase for the Commanders Emergency
Response Program (a $500 million increase from $1.2 billion to $1.7 billion) and other
adjustments. Congress adopted most of the savings proposed by DOD and some but not all of the
additional requests (e.g. funding fuel and some urgent procurement).
The war request assumed that by July 2008, DOD gradually withdraws the five additional
brigades deployed last spring and summer and returns to the 15 brigade level that pre-date last
105 CRS requested this information two months ago and is awaiting a reply.
106 OMB, Letter to the President, May 1, 2008, accompanying Estimate #2—FY 2009 Emergency Budget Amendments:
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Selected Other International Activities, 5/2/08, p. 2;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/amendments/amendment_5_2_08.pdf. The CRS calculation relies on DOD
allocations between OIF and OEF by account for FY2008 because DOD did not provide any allocation for FY2009,
and allocations for international affairs based on the explanatory statement for the Senate-passed version of H.R. 2642
in the Congressional Record, May 19, 2008 (see p. S. 4709ff).
107 CRS calculations based on H.R. 2642 as passed by the Senate on 5-22-08 relying on bill language and the
explanatory statement in the Congressional Record, May 19, 2008, p. S4709ff.
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spring’s “surge.” On April 8, 2008, General Petraeus, the commanding general in Iraq, testified
that he is recommending that a 45-day period of “consolidation and evaluation” after the
completion the withdrawal of the five brigades that were deployed last year for the “surge” in
July to be followed by a “process of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground and,
over time, determine when we can make recommendations for further reductions.”108 The last of
the five combat brigades is expected to be withdrawn by the end of July and it not clear whether
DOD will recommend any additional withdrawals in 2008.109
Both houses shifted the mix of funding in FY2008, providing less for procurement and Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E), and more for Military Construction including $1.3
billion to cover DOD’s request for BRAC monies to implement base closures that were dropped
in DOD’s regular bill, a non-war cost.
For FY2009, appropriators shifted funds into operations accounts while reducing funds for Iraqi
Security Forces in response to congressional pressure for the Iraqis to shoulder more of the cost
of rebuilding their security forces, and cutting other accounts where the needs were uncertain.
The new bill includes a prohibition on paying salaries of Iraqi security forces.
Based on a comparison of the request with the enacted version, the chief changes to the request
were to:
• reduce the Army procurement request by $9 billion ( a 25% cut) and the Navy by
$1.6 billion (an 8% cut) through both an across-the-board cut and reductions to
Other Procurement which has received large infusions of funds in recent years;
• add procurement funds for additional C-17 transport aircraft, in part to meet the
needs of a larger Army and U.S. Marine Corps as well as keep the production line
open, and add funds for C-130 aircraft and MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aircraft;
• halve DOD’s request for Research, Development, Test & Evaluation to $1.7
billion; and
• provide additional funds for Military Construction including non-war funding for
base closures, hospitals, and childcare centers; and
• use savings in Operations and Maintenance (O&M) to fund higher fuel costs.
For FY2009, Congress recommended close to the Administration’s $66 billion request but:
• shifted an additional $6 billion into operating accounts;
• decreased FY2009 funding for the Afghan Security Forces by $1.7 billion and for
the Iraq Security Forces Fund by $1 billion as well as prohibit DOD from paying
Iraqi salary costs in order to get them to shoulder more of their own rebuilding
costs, a strong congressional concern; and
• trimmed funds requested for Mine Resistant Ambush Program (MRAP) vehicles
and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Fund by about $1 billion each, both
108 Testimony of General David Petraeus before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 8, 2008.
109 DOD, “Transcript of Press Conference with Geoffrey Morrell,” 5-21-08; http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4232.
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of which are transfer accounts which have received substantial funding and
where requirements are uncertain.
H.R. 2642, as proposed by the House and Senate appropriators, also includes funding levels for
diplomatic operations and foreign assistance that differ from the Administration’s request and
would affect war cost estimates.
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Appendix B. DOD Tools to Extend Financing
War Cost
Urgency in Passing the FY2008 Supplemental
On June 4, 2008 while awaiting further congressional action on the supplemental, the House and
Senate appropriations committees approved part of DOD’s request to transfer additional funds to
the Army to cover military personnel and operating costs until passage of the supplemental.
Without transfers of funds, DOD had raised alarms that the Army would otherwise run out of
funds to pay troops by mid-June 2008 and to fund operating expenses soon thereafter, and would
need to furlough employees.
The FY2008 Supplemental was passed by both houses by June 26, 2008 and signed by the
President on June 30, 2008. To ensure that military pay and operations were funded until then, the
Defense appropriations subcommittees approved all of DOD’s request to temporarily “loan” $5.7
billion in military personnel funds from the other services to the Army, and $1.6 billion of DOD’s
$4 billion request to transfer funds to the Army’s operations and maintenance funds.110
In a memorandum of June 9, 2008, Deputy Secretary England issued guidance and required the
services to describe activities that would be shut down, estimate the number of furloughs should
funding not be received, and identify activities essential to national security that would continue
should supplemental funding not be received, repeating some of the actions announced in
December 2007 during the last stand-off over the FY2008 Fund.111
The reprogramming approved carried DOD until early July 2008. If necessary, DOD could have
requested the congressional defense committees to approve transfer of an additional $7.8 billion
that would enable the Army to last until early August 2008, or another five weeks. These funds
could be available from excess cash in its DOD’s working capital fund and transfer authority
provided in the FY2008 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-116) and the FY2008 bridge fund
(P.L. 110-161) that is still available.112
110 Congress Daily, “Senate Panel OKs Only Part of Pentagon’s Transfer Request,” June 11, 2008; Department of
Defense, Press Release, “DoD Submits Reprogramming Action to Cover the Absence of Supplemental Funding,” 5-28-
08.DOD, FY08-18PA, “Army Military Personnel Requirements, and DOD, FY08-19PA, “Army Operational
Requirements,” May 27, 2008; Congress Daily, “Senate Panel OKs Only Part of Pentagon’s Transfer Request, June 11,
2008.
111 Inside Defense, “England Outlines Guidance to Military brass in Anticipation of Furlough Notices,” June 12, 2008;
DOD, DoD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell,” from the Pentagon, Arlington, Va; available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4224; Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Navy and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Contingency
Budget planning,” November 16, 2007.
112 This CRS estimate assumes that DOD still has available $6.2 billion of transfer authority for FY2008 that was
provided in P.L. 110-116 and P.L. 110-161 as well as $1.6 billion in excess cash reserves from working capital funds
based on a GAO estimate. CRS calculations of Army needs are based on obligations to date in the March 2008
Standard Form 133, a projection of third quarter obligations, prior approval and internal transfers to date, revised
O&M, Army war requirements this year (see above), and a weekly obligation rate of $1.5 billion for the remainder of
the year.
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If no additional funds are transferred, DOD has sufficient transfer authority to move operating
funds “loaned” by the Air Force and Navy to the Army back to the original accounts. In the past,
Congress has exempted similar transfers, allowing DOD to return funds as well as recoup its
transfer authority and use it for other purposes.
With enactment the FY2008 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-116) and the FY2008
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-116), DOD has relied on both its regular funding and
the $86 billion already appropriated for war costs, which has provided some cushion before
passage of the remaining war request. In the last couple of months, DOD has been financing its
war costs by using funds for its regular activities that are slated to be used at the end of the year, a
practice known as cash flowing. (Unless Congress restricts the use of these funds, DOD, for
example, can pay for fixing a truck in either Iraq or Kansas using operations and maintenance
funds appropriations provided in either its regular or supplemental appropriations; the funds are
mixed in the same account.)113
At issue has been the extent to which Congress will approve and DOD is willing to exploit
available tools to transfer funds from other accounts to meet Army needs should the supplemental
not be passed as planned and when funds run out, a now familiar dilemma. (See Table B-1 for a
list of tools available to DOD.)
Last year, while awaiting passage of the FY2008 fund, DOD adopted a similar approach, but
assumed that civilian workers needed to be notified of potential furloughs two months in advance
which would have required sending notices out just before the December holidays. This time,
DOD has not yet notified civilians of potential furloughs; according to current regulations, a
minimum of 15 days notification of short furloughs is required unless there is a sudden
emergency.114
Although DOD prefers to use its transfer authority to make programmatic adjustments later in the
year, financing war costs is consistent with the standard criteria for transferring funds—the need
to meet higher priority needs—and would be less disruptive than furloughing civilians or
planning to close down operations, as DOD has proposed. DOD could also temporarily free up
monies by delaying the signing of contracts for non-essential base support or depot maintenance
113 This practice of mixing war and baseline appropriations in the same accounts increases flexibility for both the
Administration and Congress but reduces visibility on war costs because war and baseline funds are co-mingled in the
same accounts. Exceptions are separate accounts to fund the training of Iraq and Afghan security forces, and the Iraq
Freedom Fund transfer account as well as the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction set up by Congress.
114 Washington Post, Federal Diary, “Pentagon Prepares for Layoffs in Budget Standoff,” December 12, 2007. For non-
emergency furloughs of less than 30 days, DOD civilians must receive a minimum of 15 days advance notification
unless the action is due to “unforeseen circumstances,” including “sudden emergencies requiring immediate curtailment
of activities;” see Code of Federal Regulations, Sec. 9901.609. CRS analysts Jon Shimabukuro, Thomas Nicola, and
Barbara Schwemle provided assistance with this issue. See 5 Code of Federal Regulations, Sec. 9901.714.Based on this
concern, DOD announced that the Secretary of Defense had directed the Army and Marine Corps to initiate planning to
“reduce operations at all Army bases by mid-February and all Marine installations by mid-March 2008,” and to “begin
notifying roughly 200,000 civilians and contractors that we can no longer afford their services and that absent
additional funding, they will be furloughed, or temporarily laid off, within a matter of weeks...just before Christmas;”
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England notified the defense committees News Briefing, Transcript, “Defense
Department Holds Regular News Briefing, November 20, 2007 http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4091. See Vice Chair, Army, General Richard A. Cody, “Contingency Budget Planning,”
November 26, 2007 for instructions. Notification requirement is in 10 U.S.C. 1597 (e) and is cited in Deputy Secretary
of Defense Gordon England, “Letter to Senator Carl Levin, Chair, Senate Armed Services Committee,” December 7,
2007.
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contracts where there is currently a large backlog (see Table B-1 for a listing of tools
available).115
Based on an analysis of past obligations, current funding and DOD authorities, CRS estimates
that DOD could continue to finance war costs for an additional one to two months by using
currently available tools such as transfer authority to provide additional resources to the Army
until passage of the supplemental.
Similar arguments about the disruption and harmfulness of delays in providing war funds have
been made in previous years. DOD contended that if Congress did not pass the FY2007
supplemental in the spring of 2007, the Army would run out of funds for its wartime and
peacetime operations, and face serious readiness problems and disruption in Army operations. To
cope with the delay, the Army adopted a series of restrictions to slow non-war-related activities to
conserve funding that would not affect readiness, projecting that $3.6 billion could temporarily be
saved and used to fund war needs.
Since FY2005, Congress has provided DOD with bridge funds to cover the gap in funding of war
costs before passage of a supplemental, providing $25 billion in FY2005 (P.L. 108-287), $50
billion in FY2006 (P.L. 109-148), $70 billion in FY2007 (P.L. 109-289), and $86 billion in
FY2008 (see Table A-1).116 With these bridge funds, the debate has shifted to the spring of each
year as those funds run low.
In the case of both the FY2007 and FY2008 supplementals, DOD appears to have taken
advantage of some but not all the tools at its disposal to extend these time lines and provide
additional funding to the Army. Based on DOD data, CRS and the Army estimated that the Army
had sufficient funds to last through June 2007 before passage of the FY2007 Supplemental.117
The supplemental was enacted on May 25, 2007.118 In the case of the FY2008 war request, DOD
argued in November 2007 that passage was needed by December 2007 to avoid furloughs of
civilian personnel in February 2008. At that time, CRS estimated that the Army could last until
late March by using available transfer authority, excess cash and delaying placing depot orders. In
December 2007, Congress included $70 billion for war funds in the FY2008 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161). With those funds, DOD estimates that the Army
can last until early July 2008.
115 Congressional Quarterly, “Charges of ‘Starving the Troops’ Color Debate Over War Supplemental Bill,” May 9,
2008.
116 Army Budget Office, “OMA FY07 Spending Projections,” February 5, 2007. The FY2006 Supplemental was
enacted in mid-June 2006, while the Army claimed that the supplemental needed to be enacted by the end of April
2007 to avoid disruptions to Army operation and maintenance activities, including childcare centers.
117 For additional information about the FY2007 Supplemental, see CRS Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental
Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes, coordinated by Stephen Daggett. Department of
Defense Press Release, “President Bush’s FY2008 Defense Submission,” February 5, 2007.
118 Army Briefing, April 2007. See the section titled, “Financing Army Operations Until Passage of the Supplemental,”
in CRS Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes, for
more details.
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Time Line for the FY2008 Supplemental
CRS checked DOD estimates that the Army could operate until early July 2008 with the $70
billion bridge fund in the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act by analyzing Army
obligations in FY2007 taking into account DOD’s current plans to withdraw this spring the five
additional combat brigades sent to Iraq and Afghanistan in last year’s “surge.” Although CRS
estimates also suggest that the Army’s current funding will be exhausted by mid-June for Military
Personnel and early July, 2008 for O&M. DOD could extend that time line by one to two months
or until early August 2008 if necessary by using available authority to transfer additional funds to
the Army or by temporarily slowing spending.
With the current bridge fund, the Army has $62.5 billion available in regular and emergency
appropriations to cover its total costs—both wartime and regular—for Army Operations and
Maintenance. Although Army obligations for Operation and Maintenance (O&M) dipped and
spiked from month to month in FY2007, CRS estimated that monthly obligations will be lower in
the first quarter of FY2008 ($5.9 billion actual) as the Army benefits from high obligations or
supply orders placed at the end of FY2007, and in the third quarter ($6.2 billion) as the additional
troops sent to Iraq last spring are withdrawn. Conversely, obligations are likely to be higher in the
quarter of FY2008 ($7.0 billion) as the Army reorders and at the end of the year as the Army
places its orders to repair equipment returning home with the planned withdrawal of the five
brigades sent last year ($6.5 billion).119
In the case of military personnel, the Army has some $32.3 billion to fund its regular and wartime
military personnel costs, which DOD estimates will last until about late June 2008. In addition,
Congress has given DOD authority to transfer funds among military personnel accounts (Sec.
8005, P.L. 110-116), which allows DOD to extend the financing of the Army’s military personnel
war costs by “loaning” funds from the other services without tapping its General Transfer
Authority. Military personnel war costs are likely to drop in the second half of the year as the five
additional brigades sent to Iraq for the surge are withdrawn.
Tools to Extend How Long the Army Can Last
Table B-1 outlines tools that are currently available to DOD that could extend financing of Army
military personnel and Operations and Maintenance should passage of the FY2008 Supplemental
be delayed and outlines precedents and potential consequences of using these tools. Although
these tools are routinely used by DOD to meet unanticipated needs, tapping these authority for
war needs would reduce DOD’s flexibility to finance other unanticipated higher priority needs.
The most readily available tool for DOD to extend financing of war costs is to transfer funds into
Army military personnel and O&M accounts from other accounts. In FY2008, DOD has available
two sources of transfer authority that total $7.7 billion which permits DOD to respond to
unanticipated higher priority needs by moving funds between accounts. This total includes:
• $3.7 billion in general transfer authority where funds can be moved
119 CRS’s cross-check of DOD estimates assumes total Operation and Maintenance, (O&M) Army budget authority
from both baseline and emergency funds of $62.5 billion with monthly obligations for Army Operation and
Maintenance by quarter as follows: $5.9 billion in 1st quarter based on actuals; estimate of $7.0 billion in 2nd quarter,
estimate of $6.2 billion in 3rd quarter; and estimate of $6.5 billion in fourth quarter based on experience in FY2007 and
plans to reverse the “surge.”
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• from DOD’s baseline program to war needs; and
• $4.0 billion within the $70 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations
which could be moved between wartime needs, e.g. from procurement to
operations;
• $2.1 billion in excess cash in the working capital funds.
Other available tools that DOD could use to extend funding, such as using excess working capital
fund cash (often done in the past), deferring placing depot maintenance orders or slowing
baseline operations, would need to be implemented before funds run out to be effective.
Slowing spending as the Army did last spring could temporarily save $3.6 billion but would have
to be implemented soon. DOD has argued that slowdowns or “belt-tightening,” achieved mostly
by delaying contracts to upgrade facilities and deferring orders of non-essential supplies by
relying on current inventories at bases, would not be worthwhile in light of the amount of time
gained vs. the potential disruption to Army operations. Last spring, while the slowdown was in
effect, the Army’s regular O&M obligations slowed considerably without evidence of harmful
effects, perhaps partly because obligations were higher in the early part of the year.
Deferring placing depot maintenance orders would not necessarily delay equipment repairs
because the Army’s has a 7½ months backlog of work awaiting repairs at depots. A deferral all
new FY2008 depot maintenance contracts for four months would reduce the backlog to about
three months, similar to backlogs in previous years. In addition, the Army could use this hiatus to
evaluate which orders should be placed first in line to meet the needs of troops preparing to
deploy. Both GAO and CBO have criticized the Army for its lack of priority setting for repairing
items in depot maintenance that are needed by troops preparing to deploy.
Another longstanding authority that has been used in emergency situations is to invoke the Feed
and Forage Act, an emergency authority that allows DOD to contract for emergency operational
needs without having the necessary appropriations. Although DOD has mentioned this civil war
era authority that permits the department to sign contracts to provide support for troops even if
appropriations are not available, and it has been used periodically, the authority has been
criticized for eroding congressional authority, particularly the War Powers Act. If implemented at
the maximum level used in the past, it would finance one month of Army needs. At the same
time, DOD might have to convince contractors to accept delayed payment, which could raise
prices.
Table B-1. Ways To Extend How Long Army Can Operate Without FY2008
Supplemental Appropriations
Potential
Number
Date Funding
Potential
of Weeks
Might Run
Additional
or Days
Out if
Options Are
Option
Funds/Reduction
Financed
in Obligation of
at
Cumulative
Precedents/Notes
Potential
Consequences
FY2008 Funding
Obligation
and Fully
in billions of $
Rate
Implemented
Assumed
Precedents/
by Army
Notes
Currently Available Tools
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Potential
Number
Date Funding
Potential
of Weeks
Might Run
Additional
or Days
Out if
Funds/Reduction
Financed
Options Are
Potential
Option
in Obligation of
at
Cumulative
Precedents/Notes
Consequences
FY2008 Funding
Obligation
and Fully
in billions of $
Rate
Implemented
Assumed
Precedents/
by Army
Notes
Cash flow using $27.4 billion for
38 to 40
3rd week of
“Cash flowing”—i.e.,
Services have
FY2008 DOD
Army O&M and
weeks
June for Military moving funds from
long complained
Appropriations $31.5 billion in
Personnel and
the end of the year
that “cash
Army Military
early July for
to the beginning has
flowing” such
Personnel in
O&M
been common in
large amounts is
FY2008 DOD
recent years.
disruptive.
Appropriations Act
earlier in the year
Use general
$3.7 billion
2 -3 weeks
Until 2nd or 3rd
General Transfer
Would exhaust
transfer
week in July
Authority was used
$3.7 billion in
authority
2008
in FY2007 was later
General Transfer
provided in
restored by
Authority which
FY2008 DOD
Congress. Requires
DOD would
Appropriations
approval of
prefer to have
Act (Sec. 8005,
congressional
available for
P.L. 110-116)
defense committees. other
unanticipated
needs unless and
until Congress
were to restore
it.
Use special
$4.0 billion
2 -3 weeks
End of 1st wk of Special Transfer
DOD would not
DOD transfer
August 2008
Authority is intended be able to use
authority in
and has been used to this authority for
FY2008
respond to
other
Consolidated
unanticipated
unanticipated war
Appropriations
wartime needs, such
needs.
(Sec. 603, P.L.
as purchase of
110-161)
uparmored
HMMWVs or
MRAPs
Use all
$2.1 billion as of
1-2 weeks
2nd week of
Cash balances are a
Would probably
remaining
the beginning of the
August 2008
common source of
require action
excess cash
fiscal year
funding for O&M
before funds run
balances in
accounts; requires
out.
working capital
approval of
funds
congressional
defense committees
Slow
$3.6 billion
2 weeks
3rd week of
In April, DOD
Proposed
obligations of
August 2008
achieved savings
measures
baseline O&M
from delaying
appeared likely to
funds as the
contracts and other
become
Army did in
belt-tightening
increasingly
FY2007
measures. Monthly
disruptive to
obligations often
Army operations
fluctuate.
over time. Effects
uncertain.
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Potential
Number
Date Funding
Potential
of Weeks
Might Run
Additional
or Days
Out if
Funds/Reduction
Financed
Options Are
Potential
Option
in Obligation of
at
Cumulative
Precedents/Notes
Consequences
FY2008 Funding
Obligation
and Fully
in billions of $
Rate
Implemented
Assumed
Precedents/
by Army
Notes
Invoke Feed
To be determined
4 weeks?
TBD
This emergency
Requires
and Forage
(TBD)
authority to contract contractors to
Act, 41 U.S.C.
without having
accept potential
11
appropriations in
delays in payment
hand has been
for goods or
invoked 11 times
services, which
since 1962 for as
could mean
much as $7.4 billion.
higher prices.
Requires
appropriations once
payment is due.
Transfer
Illustrative $5
3 to 6
TBD
Secretary of Defense No precedents.
responsibility
billion to $10
weeks
has the authority to
Could be
for LOGCAP,
billion
assign responsibility
analogous to lead
Other Base
for management and
roles of individual
Support,
funding of war-
services in
Civilian
related support to
specific missions;
Subsistence
any service, and to
e.g. Air Force
and Linguists
transfer civilian
role in space-
from Army to
personnel managing
based
another
those services.
intelligence;
services.
uncertain
whether there
would be
implementation
problems. Could
erode
congressional
controls on use
of funds unless
Congress
endorses
transfers.
Sources and Notes: CRS calculations based on Army, Justification of FY2008 GWOT Operation and
Maintenance Request, October amendment, 2007; H.Rept. 110-434, Conference report on FY2008 DOD
Appropriations Act, November 6, 2007; Department of Defense, Supplemental & Cost of War Execution
Reports, monthly for FY2007; H.R. 2764, December 17, 2007; see Division L, “Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations for Operation Enduring Freedom and for Other Purposes,” FY2008 Consolidated, H.R. 2764, as
amended/P.L. 110-161; http://www.rules.house.gov/110/text/omni/amnd2/110_hr2764amnd2.pdf.
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New Tools
A new tool that would require some planning and early implementation, for which there is not a
precedent but where the authority is currently available, would be to transfer funding and
management responsibility for certain war-related support functions from the Army—such as
$6.2 billion in wartime logistical support for all the services (LOGCAP), other base support ($3
billion), a $1.1 billion contract for linguists, and $675 million in subsistence costs for DOD
civilians and contractor personnel120—to the Air Force and Navy. This could finance an additional
month or two of Army operations and would reduce funding for Air Force and Navy by about two
months. Assessing whether such a change is worth considering now and for future years could
also depend on the likelihood that providing war funds continues to be a contentious issue.
Under statute, the Secretary of Defense has the authority to transfer support functions for
deployed forces to any service. Title X, Section 165 provides that “the Secretary of Defense may
assign the responsibility (or any part of the responsibility) for the administration and support of
forces assigned to the combatant commands to other components of the Department of
Defense...”121 The Secretary also has authority to detail civilian personnel from one service to
another as part of his general responsibility for managing the department so Army personnel
currently managing these contracts could be detailed to another service to ensure continuity.122
If the Secretary were to transfer responsibility for these types of activities, the Army could be
relieved of $5 billion to $10 billion of funding responsibility for wartime support activities. While
this would extend the time the Army or Marine Corps could operate without a supplemental, it
would reduce the funding for Air Force and Navy operations by about two months. War costs of
the Air Force and Navy are much smaller than those of the Army.123 Congress might be concerned
by this action because it could undermine congressional limitations on funds and the integrity of
the account structure.
120 Department of the Army, Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Supplemental Budget Estimate, Operation and Maintenance, Army,
Justification Book—Amendment, October 2007, p. 13 and p. 22; http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/fy08-09/sup/
fy08/oma-v1.pdf.
121 Sec. 165, Title X.
122 See Title 5, Section 3341 and Title 10, Sec. 113 (d).
123 For example, Navy O&M war-related obligations totaled $6.5 billion in FY2007 compared to $33.1 billion for its
FY2008 baseline O&M.
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Appendix C. War Appropriations by Act and
by Agency
The table below shows enacted appropriations by act from FY2001-FY2009 Supplemental.124
Table C-1. Defense Department, Foreign Operations Funding, and VA Medical
Funding for Iraq, Afghanistan and Other Global War on Terror Activities,
FY2001-FY2009
(in billions of dollars of budget authority)
Public
Date
DOD
Foreign Aid
VA
Total
Name of Law
Law No.
Enacted
Funds
Embassy
Medical
cost
FY2001 Emerg. Supp. Approp. Act for
Recovery from and Response to
P.L. 107-38
9/18/01 14.0
0.3 0.0 14.3
Terrorist Attacks on the United States
FY2002 Dept. Of Defense and
Emergency Terrorism Response Act
P.L. 107-117
1/10/02 3.4
0.0 0.0 3.4
FY2002 Emergency Supplemental
P.L. 107-206
8/2/02 13.8
0.4 0.0 14.1
FY2002 Regular Foreign Operations
P.L. 107-115
1/10-02 0.0
0.2 0.0 0.2
FY2003 Consolidated Approps
P.L. 108-7
2/20/03 10.0
0.4 0.0 10.4
FY2003 Emergency Supplemental
P.L. 108-11
4/16/03 62.6
3.4 0.0 66.0
FY2003 DOD Appropriationsa P.L.
107-48
10/23/02 7.1
0.0 0.0 7.1
FY2004 DOD Appropriations Acta P.L.
108-87
9/30/03 -3.5
0.0 0.0 -3.5
FY2004 Emergency Supplemental
P.L. 108-106
11/6/03 64.9
21.2 0.0 86.1
FY2004 Foreign Operations Approps.
P.L. 108-199
1/23/04 0.0
0.5 0.0 0.5
FY2005 DOD Appropriations Act,
Titles IX and Xb
P.L. 108-287
8/5/04 25.0
0.7 0.0 25.7
FY2005 Supplemental Appropsc P.L.
109-13
5/11/05 75.9
3.1 0.0 79.0
FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations
P.L. 108-447
12/8/04 0.0
1.0 0.0 1.0
FY2005 DOD Appropriations Actd P.L.
108-287
8/5/04 2.1
0.0 0.0 2.1
FY2006 DOD Approps Act, Title IXb P.L.
109-148
12/30/05 50.0
0.0 0.0 50.0
FY2006 DOD Appropriations Actd P.L.
109-148
12/30/05 0.8
0.0 0.0 0.8
FY2006 Foreign Operations Approps.
P.L. 109-102
11/14/05 0.0
1.0 0.0 1.0
FY2006 Science, State, & Rel. Agencies
Appropriations Actc
P.L. 109-108
11/22/05 0.0
0.1 0.0 0.1
FY2006 Interior & Rel. Ag. Approp.e P.L.
109-54
8/2/05 0.0
0.0 0.2 0.2
124 NA=Not Applicable. Totals may not add due to rounding. Totals reflect budget authority for war-related expenses
from appropriations and transfers, and exclude contingent appropriations not approved, rescissions that do not affect
war-related funds, and transfers that were later restored in supplemental appropriations.
Congressional Research Service
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Public
Date
DOD
Foreign Aid
VA
Total
Name of Law
Law No.
Enacted
Funds
Embassy
Medical
cost
FY2006 Military Quality of Life &
Veterans Affairse
P.L. 109-114
11/30/05 0.0
0.0 0.4 0.4
FY2006 Emergency Supplemental
P.L. 109-234
6/14/06 66.0
3.2 0.0 69.2
FY2007 DOD Appropriations Act,
Baseline and Title IXb
P.L. 109-289
9/29/06 70.5
0.0 0.0 70.5
FY2007 Continuing Resolutionf P.L.
110-5
2/15/07 0.0
1.3 0.6 1.8
FY2007 Supplemental
P.L. 110-28
5/25/07 94.5
3.8 0.4 98.7
FY2008 Continuing Resolution
P.L. 110-92
9/29/07 5.2
0.0 0.0 5.2
FY2008 DOD Appropriations Act
P.L. 110-116
11/13/07 12.2
0.0 0.0 12.2
FY2008 Consolidated Approps. Act
P.L. 110-161
12/26/07 70.0
2.1 0.9 73.0
FY2008 Supplemental Approps. Act
P.L. 110-252
6/30/08 160.2
3.1
0.4 163.6
Subtotal
804.1 46.6
2.9
864.0
Unidentified Transfersg unknown
unknown
2.0
0.0
0.0
2.0
FY2003 Transfers
various
NA
1.2
0.0
0.0
1.2
FY2004 Transfers
various
NA
5.7
0.0
0.0
5.7
FY2005 Transfers
various
NA
1.5
0.0
0.0
1.5
Subtotal Transfersg
10.4 0.0
0.0
10.4
Total Enacted (w/transfers)
NA NA
814.5 46.6
2.9
864.0
Sources: CRS calculations based on public laws, reports, explanatory statements, and DOD documents. Totals
may not add due to rounding.
a. FY2003 Appropriations Act included $7.1 billion in regular FY2003 defense appropriations for GWOT that
DOD cannot track; the FY2004 DOD Appropriations Act rescinded $3.5 billion in FY2003 war monies.
b. DOD’s regular appropriations bills included a separate Title IX for additional emergency appropriations for
war costs in FY2005, FY2006, and FY2007 to “bridge” the gap between the beginning of the fiscal year and
passage of a supplemental. Title IX funds in FY2005 do not include a $1.8 billion scoring adjustment that
reverses the previous rescission of FY2004 funds because this did not change wartime monies.
c. Excludes funds for Tsunami relief.
d. Reflects funds obligated for enhanced security (Operation Noble Eagle) in FY2005 and FY2006 from DOD’s
baseline funds as reported by Defense Finance Accounting Service.
e. Includes VA medical funds for Iraq and Afghan veterans in emergency funding in Interior bill and in regular
VA appropriations.
f.
State Department figures for foreign aid, reconstruction and embassy operations in FY2007 CR and CRS
estimates of likely amounts to be provided for Iraq and Afghanistan for VA medical under the FY2007
Continuing Resolution.
g. CRS calculations of transfers from DOD’s regular appropriations to war funding based on DOD’s 1414
reports on prior approval reprogrammings and other sources. From DOD documents, it appears that DOD
transferred about $2.0 billion from its baseline funds to prepare for the Iraq invasion during the summer
and fal of 2002 but the source of those funds is not identified.
Congressional Research Service
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The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
Author Contact Information
Amy Belasco
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
abelasco@crs.loc.gov, 7-7627
Congressional Research Service
63