Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S.
Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
September 17, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21238
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Summary
Uzbekistan is a potential Central Asian regional power by virtue of its relatively large population,
energy and other resources, and location in the heart of the region. However, it has failed to make
progress in economic and political reforms, and many observers criticize its human rights record.
This report discusses U.S. policy and assistance and basic facts and biographical information are
provided. Related products include CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional Developments
and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
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Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Contents
U.S. Relations ............................................................................................................................. 1
Contributions to Counter-Terrorism............................................................................................. 2
Foreign Policy and Defense......................................................................................................... 3
Political and Economic Developments ........................................................................................ 5
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Uzbekistan ....................................................................................................... 2
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 9
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Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
U.S. Relations
According to the Administration, recent improvements in Uzbekistan’s legal framework and its
“increased willingness ... to engage in discussions on sensitive issues such as human rights and
the rule of law may allow an expanded role for U.S. government assistance in the future.”1 U.S.
relations with Uzbekistan were set back in 2005 after the United States joined others in the
international community to criticize an Uzbek government crackdown in the town of Andijon (see
below). The criticism contributed to Uzbekistan’s closure of over a dozen U.S.-based or U.S.-
supported non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the termination of U.S. basing rights at
Karshi-Khanabad (see below), a fall-off in official and diplomatic contacts, and the strengthening
of U.S. Congressional restrictions on aid to the Uzbek government (see below). Relations recently
have appeared to improve, according to some observers.
Cumulative U.S. assistance budgeted for
Uzbekistan Basic Facts
Uzbekistan in FY1992-FY2007 was $845.5
Area and Population: Land area is 174,486 sq. mi.,
million (FREEDOM Support Act and agency
slightly larger than California. The population is 27.61
budgets). Budgeted assistance was $9.5
million (World Factbook, mid-2009 est.). Administrative
million in FY2008 and an estimated $8.56
subdivisions include the Karakalpak Republic.
million in FY2009, and the Administration has
Ethnicity: 80% are Uzbek, 5.5% Russian, 5% Tajik, 3%
requested $10.84 million for FY2010
Kazakh, 2.5% Karakalpak, 1.5% Tatar, and others (World
(FREEDOM Support Act and other Function
Factbook, 1996 est.). More than 1.2 million Uzbeks
reside in Afghanistan, one million in Tajikistan, and a half-
150 foreign aid, excluding Defense and
million in Kyrgyzstan.
Energy Department funds). The main
priorities of U.S. assistance requested for
Gross Domestic Product: $71.7 billion; per capita
GDP is about $2,600 (World Factbook, 2008 est.,
FY2010 are planned to be civil society
purchasing power parity).
development, support for health and
Political Leaders: President: Islam Karimov; Prime
education, and equipment and training to
Minister: Shavkat Mirziyoyev; Speaker of the Legislative
combat weapons of mass destruction. This
Chamber: Dilorom Toshmuhammadova; Speaker of the
assistance is permitted under provisions that
Senate: Ilgizar Sobirov; Foreign Minister: Vladimir Norov;
otherwise limit U.S. aid to Uzbekistan (see
Defense Minister: Ruslan Mirzayev.
below). In the civil society area, legal
Biography: Karimov, born in 1938, worked in Uzbek
assistance will be provided to NGOs and to
state planning and finance for much of his early career. In
foster citizen participation in local
1989, he became First Secretary of the Uzbek
government. U.S. and other donor aid will
Communist Party. In 1990, the Uzbek Supreme Soviet
elected him to the newly created post of President, and
modernize the healthcare system, improve
he also became a member of the Soviet Communist
primary healthcare, and help strengthen
Party Politburo. In December 1991, he was popularly
infectious disease surveillance systems and
elected President of Uzbekistan, winning 86% of the vote
services to vulnerable populations. Education
against opposition Erk Party candidate Mohammed
assistance will support work with children
Solikh. In 1995, Karimov orchestrated a popular
referendum to extend his presidency until 2000, won re-
with disabilities.2
election, and in 2002 orchestrated another to extend his
term until 2007. He was re-elected in December 2007.
Since FY2003, Congress has prohibited
FREEDOM Support Act assistance to the central government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary
of State determines and reports that Uzbekistan is making substantial progress in meeting
commitments to respect human rights, establish a multiparty system, and ensure free and fair
1 U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2010, May 12, 2009.
2 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2010.
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elections, freedom of expression, and the independence of the media. Congress received a
determination of progress in FY2003. In FY2004 and thereafter, however, aid to Uzbekistan has
been withheld because of lack of progress on democratic reforms. In FY2008, Congress added a
provision blocking Uzbek government officials from entering the United States if they are
deemed to have been responsible for events in Andijon or to have violated other human rights.
Among other assistance, International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) programs are conditioned on respect for human rights so also have
been curtailed. Some aid to Uzbekistan that is subject to restrictions has been reprogrammed or
allocated using notwithstanding authority.
Figure 1. Map of Uzbekistan
Source: CRS
Contributions to Counter-Terrorism
An agreement on the U.S. use of the Khanabad airbase, near the town of Karshi (termed the K2
base) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan was signed in October 2001, and a
joint statement pledged the two sides to consult in the event of a threat to Uzbekistan’s security
and territorial integrity. In March 2002, the two sides signed a “Strategic Partnership” accord that
reiterated this nonspecific security guarantee and Uzbekistan pledged to “intensify democratic
transformation.” In addition to security assurances and increased military and other aid, U.S.
forces in Afghanistan killed many terrorists belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU; dedicated to the forceful establishment of Islamic rule in Uzbekistan). Following U.S.
criticism of Uzbek government actions in Andijon, the government demanded at the end of July
2005 that the United States vacate K2 within six months. On November 21, 2005, the United
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States officially ceased operations at K2. The Uzbek government has permitted Germany to
maintain a small airbase at Termez with about 163 troops.3
Among possible signs of improving U.S.-Uzbek relations, in early 2008 Uzbekistan reportedly
permitted U.S. military personnel under NATO command, on a case-by-case basis, to transit
through an airbase near the town of Termez that it has permitted Germany to operate.4 President
Karimov attended the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, in early April 2008 and stated that
Uzbekistan was ready to discuss the transit of non-lethal goods and equipment by NATO through
Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. This issue was part of the agenda during then-Assistant Secretary of
State Richard Boucher’s May 30-June 3, 2008, visit to Uzbekistan. After the Commander of U.S.
Central Command, Gen. David Petraeus, visited Uzbekistan in January 2009, the country
reportedly began facilitating the transit of U.S. non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan. A first rail
shipment of U.S. non-lethal supplies departed from Latvia and entered Afghanistan in late March
2009 after transiting Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. President Karimov announced in May
2009 that the United States and NATO had been permitted to use the Navoi airport (located
between Samarkand and Bukhara in east-central Uzbekistan) to receive non-lethal supplies,
which could then be transported by air, rail, and ground to Afghanistan. Undersecretary of State
William Burns visited Uzbekistan in early July 2009, and in mid-August 2009, Gen. Petraeus
visited and signed an agreement on military cooperation. President Karimov praised the visit by
the “very prestigious delegation” led by Burns as a “positive” move in boosting relations and
hailed the visit by Gen. Petraeus as a sign that “relations between our states are developing
further. In the fact that we are meeting with you again I see a big element of the fact that both
sides are interested in boosting and developing relations.”5
Foreign Policy and Defense
Home to more than half of the population of Central Asia, Uzbekistan seeks to play a leading role
in regional affairs. From the late 1990s until mid-2005, Karimov’s priority was to seek closer ties
with the United States, the European Union, and NATO while maintaining working relations with
Russia and China. However, after the mid-2005 events in Andijon (see below), he shifted to
closer ties with the latter two states. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the SCO and in 2003 insisted on
hosting its Regional Anti-Terrorism Center. Uzbekistan has ongoing tensions with other Central
Asian states over its mining of borders, water-sharing, border delineation, and other issues. In
July 2008, the head of the Tajik Supreme Court asserted that Uzbek security forces had bombed
the Supreme Court building the previous summer as part of efforts to topple the government. In
2002, the Turkmen government accused Uzbek officials of conspiring to overthrow it. The
Kyrgyz premier rejected claims by Karimov in 2005 that Kyrgyzstan had provided training
facilities and other support for the Andijon militants. Karimov again accused Kyrgyzstan in late
May 2009 of harboring terrorists that had attacked across the border (see below).
The Uzbek military is the most advanced among those of the Central Asian states. The armed
forces consist of about 50,000 ground force troops and 17,000 air force troops. There are also up
3 International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, February 1, 2009.
4 “U.S. Military Returns to Ex-Soviet Uzbekistan,” Agence France Presse, March 6, 2008; “Only Germany Can Use
Uzbek Bases Now,” United Press International, December 13, 2005.
5 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), August 18, 2009, Doc. No CEP950264; July
14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950075.
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to 19,000 internal security (police) troops and 1,000 national guard troops.6 Uzbekistan’s military
doctrine proclaims that it makes no territorial claims on other states and adheres to nuclear non-
proliferation. Military cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan is ensured through a 1992
Friendship Treaty, a 1994 military treaty, a 1999 accord on combating terrorism and Islamic
extremism, and a November 2005 Treaty of Alliance. The latter accord calls for mutual
consultations in case of a security threat to either party. After withdrawing in 1999, Uzbekistan
rejoined the Collective Security Treaty Organization in December 2006 (CSTO; members now
include Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan). Uzbekistan
has appeared wary of Russian intentions regarding the CSTO, including by insisting that it will
not participate in rapid reaction forces established in June 2009 unless they pledge to not become
involved in disputes within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Following a Kyrgyzstan-
Russia agreement in early August 2009 to enhance Russia’s military presence in Kyrgyzstan—
which was widely expected to include the creation of an airbase near the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border—
the Uzbek Foreign Ministry warned that “the implementation of such projects ... where the
borders of three Central Asian republics directly converge may give impetus to the strengthening
of militarization processes and initiate all kinds of nationalistic confrontations,” as well as serve
as a lightening rod for militant attacks.7
On February 16, 1999, six bomb blasts in Tashkent’s governmental area by various reports killed
16-28 and wounded 100-351. Karimov termed the bombing an assassination attempt. He alleged
that exiled Erk Party leader Mohammad Solikh led the plot, assisted by Afghanistan’s Taliban and
IMU co-leader Tahir Yuldashev. Solikh denied any role in the bombings. In November 2000,
Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences and Solikh 15.5 years in prison. Another
defendant, Najmiddin Jalolov (see below), received 18 years (all in absentia). Other security
threats included the invasion of neighboring Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999 by several hundred
IMU and other guerrillas. They were rumored to be aiming to create an Islamic state in south
Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. By mid-October 1999, they had been
forced out of Kyrgyzstan with Uzbek aid. The next August, dozens of IMU and other guerrillas
again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but were expelled by late October. In September 2000,
the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and stressed that
the “United States supports the right of Uzbekistan to defend [itself against] the violent actions of
the IMU.”
A series of bombings and armed attacks took place in Uzbekistan in late March-early April 2004,
reportedly killing 47 individuals. President Karimov asserted that the attacks were aimed to
“cause panic among our people, [and] to make them lose their trust” in the government. The then-
Combined Forces Commander for Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David Barno, visited Uzbekistan in April
2004 and stressed that “we stand with Uzbekistan in facing down this terrorist menace.” The
obscure Islamic Jihad Union of Uzbekistan (IJU; reportedly a breakaway faction of the IMU)
claimed responsibility. Suspected terrorists testified at a trial in mid-2004 that Jalolov was the
leader of IJU, that they were trained by Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan,
and that the IJU was linked to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Taliban, Uighur extremists, and Al Qaeda.
During this trial, explosions occurred on July 30, 2004, at the U.S. and Israeli embassies and the
Uzbek Prosecutor-General’s Office in Tashkent. The IMU and IJU claimed responsibility.
6 International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, February 1, 2009.
7 CEDR, August 3, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950224.
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On May 12, 2005, an armed group stormed a prison in Andijon where those on trial were held and
released hundreds of inmates. There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group
contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed mainly of the friends and families of 23
businessmen who were on trial on charges of belonging to an Islamic terrorist group. Many freed
inmates then joined others in storming government buildings the next day. Karimov flew to the
city to direct operations and reportedly had restored order by late on May 13. According to
testimony at the first major trial in late 2005 of alleged Andijon terrorists, the governments of the
United States and Kyrgyzstan had helped finance and support the terrorists’ attempt to establish
an Islamic caliphate, and international media, local human rights groups, and NGOs had
conspired in this attempt. The U.S. and Kyrgyz governments and several media organizations
denied such involvement. The United States and others have called for an international
investigation, which Karimov has rejected.
On May 25-26, 2009, a police checkpoint was attacked on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, attacks took
place in the border town of Khanabad, and four bombings occurred in Andijon in the commercial
district, including at least one by suicide bombers. Several deaths and injuries were alleged,
although reporting was suppressed. Uzbek officials blamed the IMU, although the IJU allegedly
claimed responsibility. President Karimov flew to Andijon on May 31. In late August 2009,
shooting took place in Tashkent that resulted in the deaths of three alleged IMU members and the
apprehension of other group members. The Uzbek government alleged that the group had been
involved in the 1999 explosions and in recent assassinations in Tashkent.
Political and Economic Developments
In January 2002, Karimov orchestrated a referendum on a new constitution that created a
bicameral legislature. A constitutional provision extended the presidential term to seven years.
The legislature (termed the Oliy Majlis or Supreme Assembly) consists of a 120-member,
directly-elected lower chamber, the Legislative Chamber, and a 100-member upper chamber, the
Senate. The Senate is composed of 16 members appointed by the president, with the rest selected
by local legislatures. The Legislative Chamber has formal responsibility for drafting laws.
Constitutional amendments approved in April 2003 established that—after the presidential
election at the end of 2007—the prime minister would exercise greater power. In January 2005,
Karimov explained that he aimed to create three powerful branches of government, to correct a
situation where “everything now depends on me.”
Only government-controlled parties operate legally: the Popular Democratic Party (PDP),
founded by Karimov; the Adolat (Justice) Social Democratic Party; the Liberal-Democratic Party
(LDP), consisting of government-connected businessmen; and the Milliy Tiklanish (National
Revival) Party, consisting of state-supported intellectuals. Opposition parties such as Birdamlik,
Birlik, Erk, Free Farmers, and the Sunshine Coalition are illegal and their leaders are in exile or in
prison. The former Fidokorlar (Self-Sacrifice) National Democracy Party, created by Karimov as
a youth party, merged with the National Revival Party in June 2008, and the enlarged party joined
the “Democratic Bloc” of Legislative Chamber factions (including Adolat and the Liberal
Democratic Party) in August 2008. A constitutional law on parties and democratization came into
effect in 2008 that permits “opposition” party deputies in the Legislative Chamber to offer
alternative bills and take part in debates. The law also calls for the president to “consult” with
Legislative Chamber factions before nominating a candidate for prime minister.
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In December 2008, President Karimov signed legislation that eliminated the nomination of
candidates for legislative and presidential elections by independent initiative groups, leaving only
parties as eligible to nominate candidates. The law also expanded the size of the Legislative
Chamber from 120 to 150. Fifteen of the members of the Chamber are to be elected by delegates
to a conference of the Environmental Movement of Uzbekistan (EMU), an NGO. Founded in
August 2008, the EMU proclaims that it is not like green parties in other countries, so that it can
focus on environmental issues rather than grasping for political power.
A limited observer mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) concluded that Legislative Chamber elections held on December 26, 2004, “fell
significantly short of ... international standards for democratic elections.” The lack of open
information about the race contributed to low public interest and in less than a 50% turnout in
half the districts, triggering required run-offs on January 9, 2005. Two weeks later, local
legislatures, overseen by members of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), selected Senators.
The president’s sixteen appointees to the Senate included deputy prime ministers, the chairman of
the Supreme Court, and the foreign minister, making the Senate an amalgam of the three branches
of government. In the Legislative Chamber, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won the most
seats (41) and has the largest faction in 2009 (39 members), but the ten committee chairmanships
are evenly divided among the four factions, except that the LDP received one more and a
“nonparty independent,” Akmal Saidov (a former member of the PDP), received a chairmanship.
The next election of the Legislative Chamber is scheduled for December 2009.
The Uzbek CEC in mid-November 2007 approved four candidates to run in the prospective
December 23, 2007, presidential election. Incumbent President Karimov was nominated by the
LDP. The party which Karimov once headed, the PDP, nominated its current head, Asliddin
Rustamov. The Adolat Social Democratic Party nominated its head, Dilorom
Toshmuhammadova. A citizen’s initiative committee nominated Akmal Saidov. The CEC
disqualified the candidates nominated by the Milliy Taklanish and Fidokorlar parties at their
conventions (the latter party had sponsored Karimov during his 2000 election), saying they had
not gathered enough signatures. Although the Uzbek constitution bars a president from more than
two terms, the CEC argued that since the most recent constitution was approved in 1992,
Karimov’s “first term” following his election in January 2000, and that he was eligible to run for
a “second term” in December 2007.
According to the report of a small election observation mission sponsored by the OSCE’s Office
of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Uzbek CEC and local electoral
commissions controlled public appearances and spending by the candidates. There were no
campaign debates and media coverage was minimal, according to ODIHR. Each presidential
candidate used similar language to laud economic development and democratization under the
incumbent president. State-owned media urged the electorate to vote for Karimov. According to
the CEC, Karimov received 88% of 14.8 million votes with a 90.6% Turnout. Each of the
remaining three candidates received about 3% of the vote. The OHIDR election mission issued a
press statement assessing the election as “generally fail[ing] to meet many OSCE commitments
for democratic elections.” Besides the problems noted above, others included lax rules regarding
early voting, frequent voting by one member of a household for all members, and an observed
low turnout. In his inaugural address in January 2008, Karimov thanked the citizenry “who gave
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me a massive vote of confidence by freely expressing their will [in an] election which was held in
full compliance with ... universally recognized democratic standards.”8
The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 appeared to argue
that Uzbekistan continued to have a poor human rights record, although it stated that there was
progress in a few areas. Police regularly detained citizens to extort bribes, to prevent public
demonstrations, and to forestall contact with foreign diplomats. Police routinely beat and
otherwise mistreated detainees to obtain confessions or incriminating information. Torture and
abuse were common in prisons and pretrial facilities. Human rights activists and journalists who
criticized the government were subject to harassment, arbitrary arrest, forced psychiatric
treatment, and physical attack. In July 2008, a police investigator reportedly poured boiling water
on human rights activist Akzam Turgunov while he was in detention in an attempt to elicit a
confession. International human rights organizations alleged that there were about one to two
dozen political prisoners. The Interior Ministry created a new human rights department that took
action in some police brutality cases and eight mid-level police officers participated in a course at
the International Law Enforcement Academy in Hungary that included human rights training. A
human rights ombudsman, attached to the legislature, registered more than 9,000 complaints and
handled hundreds of cases, a majority of which dealt with abuse of power by police and local
officials and various labor and social welfare issues.9
The Uzbek government tightly controlled the mass media and suppressed criticism, according to
the State Department. The government permitted a few private local newspapers and television
stations to sometimes report stories critical of local government welfare policies. In June 2008,
state television denounced local RFE/RL reporters as traitors. Print and broadcast journalists were
subjected to government arrest, harassment, and violence. The government gave orders about the
types of stories permitted for publication and practiced active censorship. It used charges of libel,
slander, and defamation to punish journalists and others who criticized the president or
government. The Uzbek government sought to control NGO activity, although for the first time
since 2005, it registered two U.S.-based NGOs, including the National Democratic Institute
(NDI).10
Authorities continued to arrest persons arbitrarily on charges of extremism or association with
banned religious groups, although the number of such cases appeared to decline. There were no
reports of arrests or harassment of Muslim believers based on the wearing of beards or veils or
the frequency of mosque attendance. The government allowed a small number of unofficial,
independent mosques to operate. It harassed several religious minority groups and imprisoned
some of their members. Some Protestant churches were unsuccessful in their attempts to register,
in particular Jehovah’s Witnesses. Since 2001, the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom (USCIRF) has recommended that the Secretary of State designate Uzbekistan a “country
of particular concern” (CPC), where severe religious and other human rights violations could lead
to U.S. sanctions. In November 2006, the Secretary of State designated Uzbekistan a CPC. In its
most recent report in 2009, USCIRF recommended that the United States impose several
sanctions on Uzbekistan, some of which already had been legislated by Congress.11
8 CEDR, January 16, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950404.
9 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008, February 25, 2009.
10 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008.
11 USCIRF. Annual Report 2009, May 2009; Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008.
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On human trafficking, the State Department downgraded Uzbekistan in 2006 to “Tier 3”
(designating a source country for human trafficking that did not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking and was not making significant efforts to do so). In
June 2008, Uzbekistan was found to have made some modest progress in addressing human
trafficking problems, and was upgraded to the “Tier 2 Watch List.” In April 2008, anti-trafficking
legislation was signed that strengthened victim protections, required the government to provide
victims with assistance, and criminalized severe forms of human trafficking, including trafficking
into forced labor. In September 2008, the government amended the Criminal Code to strengthen
penalties against convicted traffickers. The Ministry of Justice reported that during the first nine
months of 2008 that there were 339 convictions of traffickers and that most victims were men
trafficked for labor. In late 2008, President Karimov decreed that a national rehabilitation center
be opened to assist trafficking victims. In June 2009, the State Department reported that
Uzbekistan would remain on its “Tier 2 Watch List” because the country had not made progress
in ending forced child labor.12
After economic dislocations associated with the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Uzbek economy
ceased to decline and began to turn around in 1996. GDP increased an estimated 9% in 2008 and
consumer price inflation was officially stated to be 14%, although The World Factbook reports
that independent observers estimated inflation to be 38%. In 2003, Uzbekistan announced that it
would permit full currency convertibility, but vitiated the reform by reducing money in
circulation, closing borders, and placing punitive tariffs on imports. These restrictions helped fuel
organized crime, corruption, and consumer shortages. Uzbekistan is the world’s fifth-largest
cotton producer and second-largest exporter. About one-fourth of the country’s economic activity
is based on agriculture (which employs 44% of the workforce). The largest portion of foreign
currency earnings are based on cotton exports, followed by exports of gold and natural gas. The
government closely controls export earning sectors. One quarter or more of the population
remains below the poverty level, and a large portion of the working age population has migrated
abroad for work. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced in 2004
that it would limit lending in Uzbekistan, citing the government’s poor democratization and
human rights record. Other international financial institutions have maintained some engagement.
Some commercial firms have boycotted purchases of Uzbek cotton and finished goods on the
grounds that forced child labor is used to pick the cotton.
In response to the global economic downturn in 2008, the Uzbek government launched an anti-
crisis program to increase budgetary expenditures on infrastructure modernization, extend credit
to export industries, restructure bank debts, boost investment in small-sized businesses, and
augment public-sector wages and social welfare. Transfers from the Fund for Reconstruction and
Development, a pool of export and portfolio earnings launched in 2006, is being used for some of
these expenditures, although foreign investment also is anticipated. The Economist Intelligence
Unit estimates that a fall-off in migrant worker remittances and exports in 2009 will contribute to
a slowdown in the GDP growth rate to 2.5% for the year.13
12 U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2006, June 2007, June 2008, and June 2009; Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008.
13 Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Uzbekistan, September 2009; President Islam Karimov, The World
Economic Crisis: The View from Uzbekistan, [the] Nexus of Central Asia, American-Uzbekistan Chamber of
Commerce, 2009.
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Russia is the largest importer of Uzbek gas, about 247.2 billion cubic feet in 2008. Some gas also
is provided to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and will be provided to China with the projected
completion of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline at the end of 2009. Uzbekistan repeatedly has
halted its gas exports to Tajikistan as well as Turkmen supplies that transit Uzbekistan to
Tajikistan—including during the worst winter months—due to wrangling over Tajikistan’s
reported $17.4 million gas debt. Uzbekistan supplies some petroleum products and electricity to
Afghanistan.
Author Contact Information
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289
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