U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and
Policy Issues
J. F. Hornbeck
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
September 3, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
98-840
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

---

U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues

Summary
Trade is one of the more enduring issues in contemporary U.S.-Latin America relations. Latin
America is far from the largest U.S. regional trade partner, but it is the fastest growing one, with
the current exception of Africa, which has had strong export growth based largely on the rise of
petroleum prices through mid-2008. Latin American countries have made noted progress in trade
liberalization, reducing tariffs significantly and entering into their own regional agreements over
the past two decades, although the pace has slowed of late.
Over the last 15 years, the United States has implemented multiple free trade agreements (FTAs)
with the region, which are more comprehensive than FTAs that include only Latin American
countries. Many of the largest economies in South America, however, are not part of U.S. FTAs
and have resisted a region-wide agreement, the Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA). The
main problems involve disagreements over what trade disciplines should be included. The
inability to consummate an FTAA, the growing skepticism of U.S. bilateral free trade agreements
(FTAs), both abroad and in the United States, trade disputes, and the anxiety over the global
economic downturn all contribute to a sense of uncertainty over the future path of hemispheric
economic integration.
The result in the Western Hemisphere has been the expanding system of disparate bilateral and
plurilateral agreements, which are widely understood to be a second best solution for reaping the
benefits of trade liberalization. The bilateral option may also have run its course for the United
States. The United States has implemented FTAs with Mexico, Central America, the Dominican
Republic, Chile, and Peru, and signed agreements with Panama and Colombia that await
congressional action. The prospects for an FTA with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and
Venezuela, by contrast, seem unlikely.
Alternatives to a new round of currently unpopular FTAs are being debated. In the United States,
it has been suggested, for example, that FTAs be revised, enhancing controversial environment,
labor, and other chapters. The response in Latin, however, has been unenthusiastic. Another
option is to move incrementally toward harmonization or convergence of the vast array of trade
arrangements in the Western Hemisphere by adopting solutions administratively in trade
agreements where possible, without opening them up for renegotiation. One example would be to
incrementally expand rules of origin and cumulation provisions to broaden the allowable
movement of goods from and through countries with reasonably similar agreements.
In the area of trade agreement enforcement, another critical issue in the U.S. Congress, some
Latin American countries have advocated for more trade-for-aid and technical assistance to help
them with capacity building and supply-side constraints in areas such as port and customs
operations modernization, infrastructure investment, technology enhancement, and development
of common standards in general. These are often major constraints to the more fluid movement of
goods in Latin American countries under existing agreements. It is uncertain what the next step in
Western Hemisphere economic integration may be, including whether any of these alternatives
will lead to a new chapter in trade relations between the United States and Latin America. They
may be difficult to implement and monitor, but at the margin, could provide benefits in light of
the apparent hiatus in moving ahead with either a multilateral or hemispheric trade accord.

Congressional Research Service

---

U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues

Contents
U.S.-Latin America Trade Agreements ........................................................................................ 1
Trends in U.S.-Latin American Trade .......................................................................................... 2
The Future of U.S.-Latin America Trade Relations ...................................................................... 5

Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Direction of Total Trade, 1996 and 2008 ............................................................... 3

Tables
Table 1. Measures of Trade Openness for Seven Top U.S. Trading Partners in Latin
America ................................................................................................................................... 4

Appendixes
Appendix A. U.S. Merchandise Exports to Latin American Countries and Groups, 1996-
2008 ........................................................................................................................................ 8
Appendix B. U.S. Merchandise Imports from Latin American Countries and Groups,
1996-2008................................................................................................................................ 9

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 10

Congressional Research Service

---

U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues

rade is one of the more enduring issues in contemporary U.S.-Latin America relations.
Historically, growth in U.S. trade with Latin America has outpaced that of all other
T regions, and over the last 15 years, the United States has signed reciprocal free trade
agreements (FTAs) with 11 Latin American countries and implemented nine of them.
Nonetheless, a hemispheric-wide Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA) has eluded the region
and there appears to be little interest in pursuing the current U.S. FTA model by those countries
that have yet to sign on to one. Under these circumstances, the future for deepening regional
economic integration is uncertain. This report provides a summary to the U.S.-Latin American
trade relationship, looking primarily at trade data and trends, and highlights some current policy
options for enhancing U.S.-Latin American trade agreements.
U.S.-Latin America Trade Agreements
Latin America has made noted progress in trade liberalization over the past two decades, reducing
tariffs significantly and entering into multiple subregional agreements of their own. Early Latin
American trade agreements were inward looking, defensive in nature, and so largely unsuccessful
in leading to significantly deeper regional integration. Agreements struck more recently, under the
rubric of the “New Regionalism,” have made gains in reducing trade barriers, cultivated by the
desire to integrate more fully, and by the growing belief that trade liberalization can be a
cornerstone for broader reform and development.1 The United States has been a part of this trend,
negotiating bilateral or plurilateral reciprocal trade agreements with many, but not all, Latin
American countries. These include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and
FTAs with Chile, Peru, and possibly in the future, Panama and Colombia.
The United States has pursued bilateral FTAs for nearly 25 years, beginning with the U.S.-Israel
FTA in 1985, because they are widely viewed as beneficial for both economic and foreign policy
reasons. In Latin America, reciprocal FTAs open markets for U.S. goods and services in a region
with declining, but still relatively high applied tariff rates. In many cases, these same countries
already had preferential access to the U.S. market under unilateral arrangements such as the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), or the Andean
Trade Preference Act (ATPA), so moving to a reciprocal agreement opens markets for U.S. goods
as well. It has also been argued that progress made at the regional level could provide incentives
to move forward with multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO), although
there is evidence to the contrary as well. FTAs with Latin America also support U.S. foreign
policy, which has historically viewed much of the region as a strategic “backyard.” Encouraging
economic development and social stability has been a long-term goal, considered directly
supportive of U.S. regional security.
As for the Latin American countries, economic gains provide the overriding rationale for entering
into an FTA with the United States. The United States is by far their largest export market and the
primary investor in the region, particularly in the Mexico and the Caribbean Basin region (Central
America, Panama, and the Caribbean Islands). For these countries, moving to a reciprocal FTA
provides permanent rules of trade that do not require periodic reauthorization by the U.S.
Congress, as do the unilateral preferential arrangements, such as the CBI. This feature of FTAs

1 Inter-American Development Bank. Beyond Borders: The New Regionalism in Latin America. Economic and Social
Progress Report. Washington, D.C. 2002. pp. 24-29.
Congressional Research Service
1

---

U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues

and its rules-based framework provide a greater incentive for foreign investors and gives the
Latin American countries more control over their trade relationship with the United States. Many
see FTAs as anchors of broader economic reform and as providing greater opportunity for
production-sharing technology transfer that can improve economic competitiveness.
U.S.-Latin American FTAs, however, have also been criticized from various perspectives. Many
economists are skeptical of their benefits given the discriminatory, complicated, and at times
inefficient trading network they create.2 Latin Americans point to other problems like the
asymmetrical negotiation power, where the United States has been able to unilaterally limit the
scope of discussion, for example, by excluding agricultural subsidies and antidumping policies,
and limiting access to key import sensitive products such as sugar and apparel. The United States
has also had increasing success in forcing accommodation on issues not addressed in the
multilateral arena such as labor and environment provisions. In the United States, many have
criticized these agreements for not going far enough on these same issues and also risking the
possibility of increasing job losses and lower wages.
The FTAA encountered resistance in part because it represents an extension of the same trade
model used by the United States in bilateral agreements, and so highlights the limitations of this
template. Countries south of the Caribbean Basin have been reluctant to enter into such a deal
because it does not meet their primary negotiation objectives. Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela
are less compelled to capitulate to U.S. demands because they are far less dependent on the U.S.
economy than those in the Caribbean Basin, do not rely on previously existing unilateral
preferential arrangements, and would have to redefine their subregional trade pacts. In short, in
light of the failure to conclude an FTAA, and given increasing skepticism over the U.S. FTA
model, the next step in Western Hemisphere economic integration is ripe for discussion.
Trends in U.S.-Latin American Trade
Latin America is far from the largest U.S. regional trade partner, but it has long been the fastest
growing one, with the current exception of Africa, which has had strong export growth (from a
very small base) because of higher petroleum prices. Between 1996 and 2008, total U.S.
merchandise trade (exports plus imports) with Latin America grew by 288% compared to 126%
for Asia (driven largely by China), 133% for the European Union, 392% for Africa, and 140% for
the world (see Figure 1 for U.S. direction of trade). There are two important trends. First, Mexico
has historically been by far the largest U.S. trade partner in Latin America, but total trade with
many other Latin American countries increased faster in 2008, skewed heavily by their oil exports
(individual country data appear in the Appendixes.) Second, for the second consecutive year,
U.S. exports to Latin America grew faster than U.S. imports.
In 2008, U.S. trade worldwide continued the expansion begun after the 2001 global economic
downturn, despite the abrupt fall in global trade in the second half of the year that accompanied
the current global financial crisis. (This trend, however, collapsed fully in 2009). U.S. exports to
the world grew by 11.8% in 2008, compared to 12.1% in 2007. Among the larger U.S. trade
partners, exports grew by 11.0% to the EU-27, 9.5% to China, 6.2% to Japan, 4.5% to Canada,
and 0.5% to South Korea.

2 For a detailed critique, see: Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements
Undermine Free Trade (London: Oxford University Press, 2008).
Congressional Research Service
2

---

U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues

Figure 1. U.S. Direction of Total Trade, 1996 and 2008

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce data as presented in World Trade Atlas.
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean, except Mexico.
U.S. exports to Latin America grew well above the average for the world (11.8%), expanding by
18.8% in 2008. Export growth to Mexico, the second largest U.S. export market, grew by 11.3%,
while U.S. export growth to the other major Latin American markets rose by 51.2% to Peru,
45.8% to Chile, 33.7% to Brazil, 32.6% to Colombia, and 27.1% to Argentina. These trends
reflect strong national economic growth experienced in much of Latin America through most of
the year. Exports to major Latin American trading blocs varied, but all grew above the average for
U.S. export growth to the world.
On the import side, U.S. demand for foreign goods rose by 7.3% in 2008 compared to 5.5% in
2007. Among the larger U.S. trade partners, imports expanded by 5.8% from Canada, 5.1% from
China, 3.8% from the EU, 1.1% from South Korea, and -4.3% from Japan. Imports from Latin
America rose by 8.8% on average and by 49.2% from Ecuador, 39.4% from Colombia, 28.8%
from Venezuela, 19.1% from Brazil, and 2.5% from Mexico, with large increases in the U.S. oil
import bill standing out among other products.
Mexico composed 10.8% of total U.S. merchandise trade (exports plus imports) in 2008 and is
the largest Latin American trade partner, accounting for 55% of the region’s trade with the United
States. These trends point to a long history of economic integration between the two countries, in
part the result of their deliberate trade liberalization efforts, including the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). By contrast, the rest of Latin America together makes up only 8.8%
of U.S. trade, leaving room for significant growth. Brazil, for example, has the largest economy
in Latin America, is the second largest Latin American trade partner of the United States, but
accounts for only 9.5% of U.S. trade with Latin America, or one-sixth that of Mexico.
In the United States, total merchandise trade has become an increasingly important component of
the economy, growing from 8.2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1970 to 23.6% in 2008.
Latin America’s growing importance as a U.S. trade partner is a key aspect of this trend. Since the
1980s, many Latin American countries have adopted trade liberalization as part of broader
economic reform programs. Average Latin American import tariffs declined from 45% in 1985 to
Congressional Research Service
3

---

U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues

9.3% by 2002, although the rates varied among countries.3 Trade reform, however, has not been
embraced with equal vigor by all countries and U.S. exports are not all treated equally under
various liberalization schemes. Also, trade reform has stalled or even reversed in some countries
when faced with economic instability or changing political philosophy. Brazil, for example, has
actually raised its applied tariffs on non-agricultural products in recent years and made little
progress in addressing trade-related regulatory reform.4
In addition to tariff rates, which have generally fallen throughout Latin America, differences
among individual countries in achieving economic integration with the United States may be seen
in other trends. Two simple measures of trade openness appear in Table 1 and point to cases
where trade liberalization may be more apparent than in others. For example, Mexico, Chile, and
Costa Rica are considered among the early and more successful reformers of trade policy. For
each in 2007, total merchandise trade was more than 50% of GDP. By contrast, in two countries
historically associated with incomplete trade reforms, total trade accounted for a much smaller
22% of GDP in Brazil, and 38% in Argentina.
Table 1. Measures of Trade Openness for Seven Top U.S. Trading Partners in Latin
America

Trade in Goods
Trade in Goods
Per Capita
Per Capita
Per Capita
(% of GDP) 1996
(% of GDP) 2007
Imports from
Imports from
GDP 2007
U.S. 1996
U.S. 2007
Mexico 55.8% 54.3% $611 $1,250

$9,576
Chile 45.3% 68.1% $284
$491
$9,872
Costa Rica
65.8%
82.1%
$516
$991
$5,862
Dom. Rep.
57.9%
51.3%
$393
$607
$4,207
Colombia 24.7%
30.0%
$122

$181 $4,469
Brazil
13.1%
21.6%
$77
$125
$6,750
Argentina 17.0%
37.5%
$128

$146 $6,669
Data Sources: Calculations by CRS from the IMF and United Nations data.
The trade-to-GDP ratio, however, may reflect other than trade policy factors. The ratio can be
smaller for those countries with large domestic markets that are less trade dependent. This may be
the case for Brazil, which has a large domestic manufacturing base. Conversely, the ratio may be
larger for small economies that are relatively more trade dependent, such as the Dominican
Republic, which as part of its pursuit of trade liberalization, has also developed a manufacturing
export base tightly linked to the United States. Still, the lower trade-to-GDP ratio for Brazil is
telling.
The per capita dollar value of goods a country imports from the United States is another particular
measure of trade openness (Table 1). Brazil and Argentina increased their per capita dollar value
of U.S. imports from 1996 to 2007, but to only a fraction of that for Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile,

3 Data provided by Inter-American Development Bank.
4 World Trade Organization. Report by the Secretariat. Trade Policy Review – Brazil. February 2, 2009. p. xii. Simple
average applied non-agricultural tariffs rose from 10.4% in 2004 to 11.5% in 2009. See also: Organization of Economic
Co-Operation and Development. Globalization and Emerging Economies. Policy Brief. March 2009. p. 4.
Congressional Research Service
4

---

U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues

and the Dominican Republic. Mexico’s high figure again reflects an evolving trade liberalization
policy dating to the mid-1980s and its historical ties with the U.S. economy. Costa Rica’s high per
capita consumption of U.S. goods reflects a similar relationship that has seen enormous growth in
recent years, including strong intra-industry, production-sharing trade. Brazil and Argentina, by
contrast, have a more diversified trade relationship with the world. The low number for U.S.
imports also points to their higher restrictions on trade with the United States and other countries,
in part reflecting both a tradition of industrial policy and a defensive trade policy defined by the
regional customs union, Mercosur.5 Differences in income can also be an important factor
explaining variations in consumption of U.S. imports, but per capita GDP data shown in Table 1
suggest that they do not stand out in this case.
The trade data suggest that there may be room for growth in trade between South America and the
United States. Trade policy changes could provide some of the basis for growth in U.S.-South
American trade, but they may not be immediately huge given South America’s historically small
interest in the United States and the limited size of its markets. Still, many economists believe
that lowering barriers to U.S. exports and guaranteeing market access may generate long-term
trade and investment opportunities, which in turn could lead to higher growth in productivity and
output, with both producer and consumer benefits. Similarly, the prospect for even greater access
the large U.S. market presents attractive opportunities for South American countries, as well.
The Future of U.S.-Latin America Trade Relations
The United States and Latin America have pursued trade liberalization through multilateral,
regional, and bilateral negotiations, with mixed results. In part this reflects divergent priorities
that have been difficult to reconcile. For many Latin American countries, reducing barriers to
agricultural trade is top of the list for a successful agreement. This goal includes reducing market
access barriers (tariffs and tariff rate quotas – TRQs), domestic subsidies, and nontariff barriers
(administrative rules, antidumping provisions). Although there are many other issues, agriculture
policy has played a big part in slowing progress in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha
Development Round and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).6 The United States has
made clear its unwillingness to address most agricultural and antidumping issues in a regional
agreement like the FTAA to preserve its bargaining leverage in the WTO against other
subsidizing countries such as the European Union and Japan. Latin American counties have their
own sensitive issues and a particular concern for easing its subsistence agricultural sectors slowly
toward trade liberalization.
In addition to market access, the United States has focused its trade negotiating goals on areas
where it is most competitive such as services trade (e.g. financial, tourism, technology,
professional); intellectual property rights (IPR); government procurement; and investment. Not
surprisingly, these are areas where many Latin American countries are more reluctant to
negotiate. Hence, there is a near reversal of priorities that has slowed the progress of

5 For more, see CRS Report RL33258, Brazilian Trade Policy and the United States, by J. F. Hornbeck and CRS
Report RL33620, Mercosur: Evolution and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, by J. F. Hornbeck.
6 In fact, some see the stalemate over the FTAA as due in part to the United States and Brazil being unable to address
protectionist policies that most affect the other’s main exports. See Abreu, Marcelo de Paiva. The FTAA and the
Political Economy of Protection in Brazil and the US. Inter-American Development Bank. Washington, DC, March
2006. pp. 1-4, 61-62.
Congressional Research Service
5

---

U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues

comprehensive agreements at the multilateral and regional levels, reflecting inherent differences
seen between many developed and developing countries.
The result in the Western Hemisphere has been the proliferation of reciprocal bilateral and
plurilateral agreements. Despite the “success” the United States has had in implementing FTAs
with Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Peru, the prospects are
limited at best for doing the same with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Brazil,
as the major regional economy not in a unilateral preferential arrangement with the United States,
has abandoned the FTAA model and moved ahead separately by adding associate members to
Mercosur, supporting Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur as a full member, and leading in the
formation of broader economic and political integration pacts in South America. Although these
are neither deep nor comprehensive trade arrangements, they do signal a political will to
consolidate regional bargaining interests in juxtaposition to the U.S.-backed FTAA.
Two clear challenges emerge from this picture. First, Brazil and the United States appear to have
difficulties moving off their respective positions, which bodes poorly for resurrecting the FTAA.
The addition of Venezuela and possibly other countries with less than sympathetic attitudes
toward the United States as full Mercosur members could solidify this standoff. Nationalizations
of key industries and other efforts to increase the role of the state in managing the economies of
Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador also do not augur well for broadening support for market-based
trade solutions. Second, multiple FTAs, by definition, promote an inefficient and cumbersome
trading system with each FTA having its own rules of origin (to deter non-member transshipment
of goods) and related customs administration and enforcement requirements that can complicate
trade and investment decisions. It is not without reason, therefore, that many interest groups wish
to find a way to rationalize such a convoluted system.
Reconciling the disparate trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere will be difficult and
perhaps not possible in the absence of a multilateral solution. For example, conventional wisdom
argues that without advancement in agricultural issues at the WTO, action on a comprehensive
FTAA (or something like it) is unlikely. Further, a less comprehensive FTAA has so far been
rejected and offers a far less compelling alternative to a multilateral agreement on economic
grounds. Therefore, the FTAA may not emerge in the near future, despite the logical solution that
a hemispheric-wide agreement presents to improving the flow of trade (and investment).
Without a hemispheric-wide solution and given the limitations to further expansion of U.S.
bilateral FTAs, alternatives are being debated on how to deepen hemispheric trade relations. An
emerging line of thinking calls for reform of the U.S. FTA template, including reopening existing
FTAs to revise and deepen labor and environment chapters, among others. The evolving nature of
commitments to these disciplines continues, as evident in congressional insistence on revising
bilateral agreements already negotiated, such as the ones with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and
South Korea. The consensus from Latin America countries, however, appears to be that such a
task would be too difficult, could lead to a wholesale renegotiation of the FTA, and has little to
offer those countries that have already implemented agreements with less stringent provisions.
Another option is to move incrementally, where possible, toward harmonization or convergence
of the vast array of trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere, which may be more widely
acceptable. One train of thought suggests that progress might be made by working with
administrative solutions in trade agreements, without opening them up for renegotiation. One
example would be to expand rules of origin and cumulation provisions incrementally to broaden
the allowable movement of goods from and through countries with reasonably similar
Congressional Research Service
6

---

U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues

agreements. An incremental administrative approach would allow broader integration with
relative ease in trade disciplines where there is fundamental agreement.7
In the area of trade agreement enforcement, another critical issue in the U.S. Congress, some
Latin American countries have advocated increasing trade-for-aid and technical assistance. This
would help them with capacity building and overcoming supply-side constraints in areas such as
port and customs operations modernization, infrastructure investment, technology enhancement,
and development of common standards in general. These are often major constraints to the more
fluid movement of goods in Latin American countries.8
It is uncertain if any of these alternatives will lead to a new chapter in trade relations between the
United States and Latin America. For one, they may be difficult to implement and monitor, but
nonetheless could provide marginal benefits in light of the apparent hiatus in moving toward a
broad and comprehensive hemispheric trade agreement.

7 Comments by Anabel Gonzalez. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. A New Trade Policy for the
United States: Lessons from Latin America. Forum held March 27, 2009.
8 See: Lee, Nancy. Now More than Ever: The Case for a New Integration Strategy for the Americas. Focal and Center
for Global Development. March 2009. The United States supports many of these measures already, see: Office of the
United States Trade Representative. 2009 Trade Policy Agenda and 2008 Annual Report of the President of the United
States on the Trade Agreements Program. March 2009. p. 4.
Congressional Research Service
7

---

U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues

Appendix A. U.S. Merchandise Exports to Latin
American Countries and Groups, 1996-2008
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2007 2008 % Change % Change
2007-08
1996-08
Brazil
12.7 15.2 15.4 12.4 13.9 24.6 32.9 33.74% 159.06%
Venezuela
4.8 6.5 5.6 4.5 4.8 10.2 12.6 23.53% 162.50%
Chile
4.1 4.0 3.5 2.6 3.6 8.3 12.1 45.78% 195.12%
Colombia

4.7 4.8 3.7 3.6 4.5 8.6 11.4 32.56% 82.98%
Argentina 4.5
5.9
4.7
1.6
3.4
5.9
7.5
27.12%
66.67%
Dom. Rep.
3.2
4.0
4.4
4.3
4.4
6.1
6.6
8.20%
106.25%
Peru 1.8
2.1
1.7
1.6
2.1
4.1
6.2
51.22%
238.89%
Costa Rica
1.8
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.3
4.6
5.7
23.91%
216.67%
Panama 1.4
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.8
3.7
4.9
32.43%
250.00%
Honduras 1.6
2.3
2.6
2.6
3.1
4.4
4.9
11.36%
206.25%
Other
11.7 14.4 13.4 13.4 21.4 27.0 36.2 34.07% 209.40%
Total
LAC* 52.5 63.4 59.3 51.7 61.5 107.5 137.9 28.28% 162.67%
Mexico 56.8
79.0
111.7
97.5
110.8
136.1
151.5
11.32%
166.73%
Total Latin
America
109.3 142.4
171.0 149.2 172.3 243.6 289.4 18.80% 164.78%
CAFTA-DR 9.5 12.4 13.5 14.1 15.8 22.4 25.4 13.39% 167.37%
Caricom
4.4 5.0 5.4 5.0 5.8 9.2 11.0 19.57% 150.00%
Mercosur
18.6 22.4 21.0 14.6 18.2 32.4 43.0 32.72% 131.18%
Andean
Comm.
12.8 15.5 12.2 11.4 13.2 26.1 34.1 30.65% 166.41%
World 625.1
680.5
780.4
693.1
818.8
1,162.5
1,300.1
11.84%
107.98%
Source: Table created by CRS from U.S. Department of Commerce data.
* LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean, except Mexico.

Congressional Research Service
8

---

U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues

Appendix B. U.S. Merchandise Imports from Latin
American Countries and Groups, 1996-2008
Country
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2007 2008 % Change % Change
2007-08
1996-08
Venezuela
12.9 9.3 18.7 15.1 24.9 39.9 51.4 28.82% 298.45%
Brazil
8.8
10.1 13.9 15.8 21.2 25.6 30.5 19.14% 246.59%
Colombia

4.3
4.7 7.0 5.6 7.3 9.4 13.1 39.36% 204.65%
Ecuador
1.9
1.8 2.2 2.1 4.3 6.1 9.1 49.18% 378.95%
Trin.
&
Tobago 1.0
1.0 2.2 2.4 5.8 8.8 9.0 2.27% 800.00%
Chile
2.3
2.5 3.2 3.8 4.7 9.0 8.2 -8.89% 256.52%
Peru
1.3
2.0 2.0 1.9 3.7 5.3 5.9 11.32% 353.85%
Argentina
2.3
2.3 3.1 3.2 3.8 4.5 5.8 28.89% 152.17%
Honduras
1.8
2.6 3.1 3.3 3.7 3.9 4.0 2.56% 122.22%
Dom.
Rep.
3.6
4.4 4.4 4.2 4.5 4.2 4.0 -4.76% 11.11%
Other
7.8 7.6 11.7 10.8 18.4 18.1 29.7 64.09% 280.77%
Total
LAC*
48.8
50.4 73.3 69.6 98.7 134.8 160.0 18.69% 227.87%
Mexico
74.3 94.7 135.9 134.7 155.9 210.7 215.9
2.47% 190.58%
Total Latin
America
123.1
145.1 209.2 204.3 254.6 345.5 375.9
8.80% 205.36%
CAFTA-DR
10.4
13.7 16.1 16.0 17.7 18.7 19.3 3.75% 85.58%
Caricom
2.9
2.6 4.0 4.0 7.7 11.0 11.4 3.64% 293.10%
Mercosur
11.4
12.6 17.3 19.2 25.5 30.7 36.6 19.22% 221.05%
Andean
Comm. 21.1
17.8 30.0 24.9 40.4 61.1 80.0 30.93% 279.15%
World
795.3 913.9 1,216.9 1,161.4 1,469.7 1,957.0 2,100.1
7.31%
164.06%
Source: Table created by CRS from U.S. Department of Commerce data.
LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean, except Mexico.




Congressional Research Service
9

---

U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues

Author Contact Information

J. F. Hornbeck

Specialist in International Trade and Finance
jhornbeck@crs.loc.gov, 7-7782




Congressional Research Service
10

---