The National Intelligence Council: Issues and
Options for Congress
Richard A. Best Jr.
Specialist in National Defense
September 2, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40505
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
The National Intelligence Council: Issues and Options for Congress
Summary
The National Intelligence Council (NIC), composed of some 15 senior analysts and national
security policy experts, provides the US Intelligence Community’s best judgments on crucial
international issues. NIC members are appointed by the Director of National Intelligence and
routinely support his office and the National Security Council. Congress occasionally requests
that the NIC prepare specific estimates and other analytical products that may be used during
consideration of legislation.
It is the purpose of this Report to describe the statutory provisions that authorize the NIC, provide
a brief history of its work, and review its role within the Federal Government. The Report will
focus on congressional interaction with the NIC and describe various options for modifying
congressional oversight. This Report will be updated as new information becomes available.
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The National Intelligence Council: Issues and Options for Congress
Contents
Background: What Is the NIC?.................................................................................................... 1
The NIC’s Evolving Role ...................................................................................................... 3
Congressional Options and the NIC....................................................................................... 7
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................. 9
Appendixes
Appendix A. 50 USC 403-3b (extract)....................................................................................... 11
Appendix B. Heads of the Board of National Estimates and the National Intelligence
Council .................................................................................................................................. 13
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 14
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The National Intelligence Council: Issues and Options for Congress
Background: What Is the NIC?
Although the appointment of the chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) does not
require the advice and consent of the Senate, the planned designation of retired Ambassador
Charles Freeman to the position in March 2009 focused attention on the NIC by Members and by
many in the public. Most believe Congressional criticism was undoubtedly a factor in Mr.
Freeman’s ultimate decision to withdraw his name from consideration.1 In May 2009, Director of
National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair announced the appointment of Christopher A. Kojm as NIC
Chairman. Mr. Kojm had earlier served as deputy director of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), in the State Department’s
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and as a professor of international affairs practice at George
Washington University.
The NIC is responsible for the U.S. Intelligence Community’s most authoritative assessments of
major issues affecting the national security. The NIC is a component of the US Intelligence
Community that is not well known even though it is less shrouded in secrecy than most other
intelligence offices.
Inherent to intelligence efforts is analysis of data collected. The first statutory responsibility of the
DNI is to ensure that national intelligence is provided to the President, department heads, military
commanders, and the Congress.2 Although this responsibility along with intelligence
appropriations are sufficient to permit the DNI to establish analytical offices, the National
Security Act also specifically establishes the NIC and defines its role at the center of the
Government’s intelligence analysis efforts.
By law, the NIC is to consist of “senior analysts within the intelligence community and
substantive experts from the public and private sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and
serve at the pleasure” of the DNI.3 The senior analysts are known as National Intelligence
Officers (NIO’s). There is no statutory requirement that a chairman of the NIC be designated. The
NIC is to produce “national intelligence estimates for the United States Government, including
alternative views held by elements of the intelligence community.” National intelligence
estimates and other NIC products are defined as setting forth the judgment of the intelligence
community as a whole on a matter covered by such product. Members of the NIC serve on a full-
time basis as the senior intelligence advisers of the intelligence community to the rest of the
Federal Government. They are part of the Office of the DNI (ODNI) and are not assigned to any
other intelligence agency. By law the ODNI cannot be co-located with any other element of the
intelligence community;4 currently the ODNI headquarters is located a separate building in the
Virginia suburbs of Washington, DC.
In early 2009 the NIC consisted of a chairman, vice chairman, counselor, director of plans and
outreach in addition to some thirteen NIO’s. NIO positions have been established for the
following geographic and functional areas:
1 Mark Mazetti, “Nominee Withdraws Bid for Key Job in Intelligence,” New York Times, March 11, 2009, p. 8.
2 50 U.S.C. § 403-1.
3 50 U.S.C. § 403-3b(b)(1).
4 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(e).
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Africa
East Asia
Economics and Global Issues
Europe
Science and Technology
Military Issues
Near East
South Asia
Russia and Eurasia
Transnational Threats
Warning
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Western Hemisphere5
At present, the National Security Act, as amended, provides that the DNI appoints the members of
the NIC and they serve at his pleasure unlike the preponderance of career analysts in the various
agencies. In recent years these appointments have been balanced among individuals who have
served in the Foreign Service, the Defense Department and the Intelligence Community along
with a number of persons from academic life or nongovernmental organizations. None of the NIC
appointments require the advice and consent of the Senate.
The responsibilities of the NIC are further set forth in Intelligence Community Directive Number
207, National Intelligence Council.6 Directive 207 requires that the NIO’s, acknowledged experts
in their areas of responsibility, provide intelligence assessments to the National Security Council,
military decision-makers and Congress. To accomplish this, NIO’s may task agencies to provide
analytical support. They may also work with officials in the ODNI to establish requirements for
collection efforts by the various agencies (changing collection efforts can involve the major
realignments of technical systems such as satellites). The NIC provides necessary preparatory and
briefing materials for the DNI in his capacity as head of the Intelligence Community.
There can be tension among these duties; involvement in preparing National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) and other assessments requires wide-ranging substantive expertise, participating
in managing the collection effort requires detailed understanding of sophisticated technical
systems, and providing staff support to the DNI can be time-consuming. In the past 15 years there
has been a tendency to include more NIO’s who have served in non-governmental positions in
think-tanks or universities along with ambassadors and retired military leaders. Some argue that
such backgrounds help ensure the relevance of analytical products but do not necessarily provide
the detailed understanding of the limitations of collection capabilities. Others maintain that it is
only essential that NIO’s understand which intelligence collection disciplines are most useful in
answering which analytical questions and that detailed knowledge of technical systems is not
required. Another potential danger is that the NIO’s might become so committed to supporting the
DNI in meetings and testimony that they have insufficient time for more detailed analytical work.
5 See http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_personnel.html.
6 http://odni.gov/electronic_reading_room/ICD_207.pdf. In addition to the NIC the DNI has established a number of
“Mission Managers” to address especially challenging and important collection issues (e.g. counterterrorism,
counterproliferation, counterintelligence, Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Venezuela). The relevant NIO’s, in addressing
collection issues, coordinate with the Mission Managers. See Intelligence Community Directive Number 900, Mission
Management, available at http://odni.gov/electronic_reading_room/ICD900.pdf.
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The NIC produces coordinated assessments of the Intelligence Community’s views, including
NIEs, the NIC’s “flagship product,” that “provides the authoritative written judgments of the
[Intelligence community] on national security issues for the United States Government.” NIEs are
initiated by senior civilian or military policymakers, Congress (by request or mandated in
legislation), or by the NIC itself. After terms of reference are approved, the NIC assigns analysts
to produce a draft. The NIC evaluates the draft which is subsequently forwarded to intelligence
agencies. Representatives from the agencies then meet “to hone and coordinate line-by-line the
full text of an NIE.”7 NIEs are reviewed by the DNI and the heads of relevant Intelligence
Community agencies. Once approved, NIEs are disseminated to the President and to senior
Executive Branch officials and Congress.8
In general, the members of the NIC are not public spokesmen for the Intelligence Community.
They may testify before congressional committees and give occasional public talks to think tanks
or academic meetings, but they are not policymakers and are not charged with informing the
public. Their work is essentially internal to the Federal Government. On occasion some NIEs or
specially prepared summaries are released to the public and become part of policy debates. In
December 2007, an unclassified summary of an NIE on Iran’s nuclear programs was released
inasmuch as it included judgments at variance with an earlier assessment.9 Older NIEs of
historical interest are occasionally published by CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence or are
included in the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States series.
The NIC’s Evolving Role
Long before establishment of the NIC, during World War II, the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS) included a large number of eminent scholars who prepared reports based on all available
intelligence. After the war, these functions and some of the scholars were eventually transferred
to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In 1950 an Office of National Estimates (ONE) was
established in the CIA. The Office included a Board of National Estimates (BNE) consisting of
some 5-12 experts, chaired by former Harvard historian William L. Langer.10 The BNE’s
estimates were to reflect the views of the entire intelligence community, not just the CIA; the goal
was to ensure that the President and other senior officials had the collective wisdom of all
agencies based on all evidence to avoid the mistakes that were made prior to Pearl Harbor.11 The
7 National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: the Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland, July 2007.
8 For further information on NIEs, see CRS Report RL33733, Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress?
9 See Statement by the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, December 3, 2007; available at
http://odni.gov/press_releases/20071203_statement.pdf. The NIE summary generated considerable interest and
controversy; see Dafna Linzer and Joby Warrick, “U.S. Finds that Iran Halted Nuclear Arms Bid in 2003,” Washington
Post, December 4, 2007, p. A1; Walter Pincus, “Estimates to Undergo More Scrutiny,” Washington Post, March 26,
2008, p. A17.
10 A CIA official history maintains that the original BNE consisted of “four eminent professors, one distinguished
combat commander, one lawyer, and two men experienced in he interdepartmental coordination of intelligence
estimates. It should be noted that five of the eight held doctorates in history—excellent training for the exercise of
critical judgment on the basis of incomplete evidence.” Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as
Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950-February 1953 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1992), p. 134. The current (2009) NIC includes some nine CIA analysts, three Foreign Service/State Department
officials, a retired major general, one from academe and one from a think tank; most hold advanced degrees in history,
political science or international relations.
11 As noted by a report prepared for the Church Committee (the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with respect to Intelligence Activities) in 1976, “The shadow of the Pearl Harbor disaster dominated policymakers’
thinking about the purpose of a central intelligence agency. They saw themselves rectifying the conditions that allowed
(continued...)
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then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Walter Bedell Smith, personally selected experts in
the field in strategy, political science, economics, and other social sciences along with individuals
with broad experience in intelligence.12 Among these selected was a Yale historian, Sherman
Kent, who succeeded Langer in 1952 and remained as head of the BNE until 1967. Eventually the
ONE had a professional staff of 25-30 specialists and a support staff.13 At first members of the
Board were expected to be generalists; later on, elements of specialization developed. They had
access to CIA products but also to intelligence produced in other intelligence agencies.
Although the members of the BNE worked directly for the DCI, the relationship of the Office of
National Estimates with the CIA’s analytical component, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI),
varied over the years. In 1952 the ONE was subordinated to the DI; in 1966 it became directly
under the supervision of the DCI.14 The BNE set the pattern for NIEs and other less formal inter-
agency assessments. The analytical standards were high and conclusions focused on issues that
analysts believed policymakers would confront. NIEs became integral parts of most national
security policymaking efforts and more than 1500 NIEs were published over the 23 years of the
BNE’s existence. Inasmuch as the estimates (drafted by the BNE and later by the NIC) were
considered the DCI’s estimates, they did not necessarily reflect the views of CIA analysts or those
of analysts in other agencies.
BNE estimates such as those addressing the Soviet Union’s strategic capabilities provided the
foundation for U.S. defense planning and arms control negotiations during the length of the Cold
War. 15 NIEs during the Vietnam War tended to be more pessimistic in regard to South Vietnam’s
capabilities than were assessments from Defense Department analysts.16 A major embarrassment
was the Board’s judgment in September 1962 that the Soviet Union would be unlikely to deploy
offensive missiles to Cuba. The following month photographic evidence revealed that missile
bases were in fact being installed, a revelation that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis.17
(...continued)
Pearl Harbor to happen—a fragmented military-based intelligence apparatus, which in current terminology could not
distinguish ‘signals’ from ‘noise,’ let alone make its assessments available to senior officials.” U.S. Congress, 94th
Congress, 2d session, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence
Activities, Final Report, Book IV, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence, S.Rept.
94-755, April 28, 1976, p. 7.
12 Quoted in Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950 (University
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), p. 420.
13 Suettinger, Robert L., Tracking the Dragon (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency).
14 Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005
(Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2005), p. 27, n.39.
15 See Scott A. Koch, ed., Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950-1959, History Staff, Center for the Study of
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 1993. Many other NIEs on the Soviet Union are now
available online at http://www.foia.cia.gov/soviet_estimates.asp. Some NIEs are also reprinted in the State
Department’s documentary publications Foreign Relations of the United States. The relationship of intelligence
judgments to policy disputes over the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union is discussed by Lawrence
Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat , 2nd ed., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
16 See David F. Gordon, Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948-1975, National Intelligence Council, NIC 2005-03,
April 2005.
17 Sherman Kent, “A Crucial Estimate Relived,” in Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected
Essays, ed. Donald P. Steury (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency,
1994).
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Over time there were concerns that the Board had become too inward-directed and had lost
contact with policymakers.18 In 1973 DCI William Colby abolished the Board and established a
number of positions designated National Intelligence Officers (NIO’s). Colby later wrote:
I had sensed an ivory-tower mentality in the Board [of National Estimates]; its composition
had tended to shift to a high proportion of senior analysts who had spent most of their careers
at [CIA] and who had developed a “mind-set” about a number of the issues in opposition to
the views of the Pentagon and because of the way [President Richard] Nixon and [National
Security Adviser Henry] Kissinger had excluded them from some of the White House’s more
sensitive international dealings.19
Furthermore:
. . .I was troubled over how badly the machinery was organized to serve me. If I wanted to
know what was happening in China, for example, I would have to assemble individual
experts in China’s politics, its economics, its military, its personalities, as well as the
clandestine operators who would tell me things they would tell no one else. Or I could
commission a study that would, after weeks of debate, deliver a broad set of generalizations
that might be accurate but would be neither timely nor sharp.
. . .
Thus, I created the positions of National Intelligence Officers, and I told the eleven men and
one woman whom I chose for the jobs that they were to put themselves in my chair as DCI
for their subject of specialization. ... They were chosen from the intelligence community and
private life as well as the CIA, and they served as the experts I needed in such subjects as
China, Soviet affairs, Europe, Latin America, strategic weaponry, conventional forces, and
economics, ranging throughout the intelligence community and out into the academic world
to bring to me the best ideas and press the different disciplines to integrate their efforts.20
From 1973 until 1979, there was a position of Deputy to the DCI for the NIO’s. In 1979, the
NIO’s were formally organized into a National Intelligence Council by the then-DCI Stansfield
Turner. The NIC, along with the CIA’s DI, were integrated in a newly created National Foreign
Assessment Center (a name that endured only until the end of 1981). Unlike the members of the
BNE, the NIO’s had specific areas of geographic or functional responsibilities. The NIO’s, like
the members of the BNE reported directly to the DCI but administratively they had a complicated
relationship with the DI; DCI William Casey appointed Robert Gates (currently Secretary of
Defense) to head both the DI and NIC. Later he would recall, “some on the outside thought one
person should not be the head of the Council and also head of CIA’s analytical component. They
were right.”21 Subsequent observers would share the view that the NIO’s need to be separated
from the management of CIA’s DI to permit a certain distance from institutionalized analytical
viewpoints and to ensure that they have equal access to the conclusions of other intelligence
agencies.
18 Steury, Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates, p. xx.
19 William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), p.
351.
20 Ibid., pp. 352, 353.
21 Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: the Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold
War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 333.
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Out of the recurring concern that the Intelligence Community had “grown too isolated from the
consumer it was established to serve,” 22 the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1993 (P.L. 102-
496) provided a statutory authorization for the NIC.23 The provision, which originated in the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, was intended to elevate the institutional status of the
NIC both within the Government and in the private sector. The Senate Intelligence Committee
anticipated that the NIC would include substantive experts from within and outside the
Government.24 The Senate-passed version of the legislation had included a provision that the NIC
would have a designated chairman and two deputy chairmen one of whom was to be from the
private sector.25 This provision was not, however, adopted in the conference report as a result of
objections from the G.H.W. Bush Administration that it would restrict the flexibility of the DCI.
However, the conferees emphasized that they shared the Senate determination to include outside
experts in the NIC; “the conferees believe that effective use of individuals from outside of
government in the NIC is absolutely essential to creating and maintaining the expertise,
objectivity, and independence so critical to the production of national intelligence estimates.”26
After the Soviet collapse, the NIC prepared estimates dealing with a multitude of post-Cold War
issues and, especially during the Clinton Administration, there was emphasis on non-traditional
issues such as the effects of environmental change on national security policy.27 Although the
relevant NIO’s coordinated a 1995 NIE predicting terrorist threats against the U.S. and in the
U.S.,28 the NIC was criticized in December 2002 by the Joint Inquiry of the two congressional
intelligence committees for not having prepared an NIE on the threat to the U.S. posed
specifically by Al Qaeda.29
The NIE process was a source of widespread concern in the aftermath of the NIE on Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) prepared in September 2002 at the request of Members of
Congress. The estimate that Baghdad was hiding large numbers of WMDs was not borne out by a
field investigation undertaken after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime and called into
question the basic competence of the Intelligence Community in general. A subsequent
investigation by the Senate intelligence committee and by an independent presidential
22 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1993 for
Intelligence Activities for the U.S. Government and the Central Intelligence Agency retirement and Disability System;
Provide A Framework for the Improved Management and Execution of U.S. Intelligence Activities, 102nd Cong., 2nd
sess., July 20, 1991, S.Rept. 102-324, p. 30.
23 106 Stat. 3191.
24 To facilitate the employment of outside experts, the statute includes a provision that the DCI might avoid “unduly
intrusive requirements which the Director considers to be unnecessary for this purpose.” This phrase was undoubtedly
intended to allow the appointment of outside experts who would be unwilling to submit to “life-style polygraph
examinations.” For a discussion of polygraphs in another Federal agency, see CRS Report RL31988, Polygraph Use by
the Department of Energy: Issues for Congress.
25 S.Rept. 102-324, p. 29.
26 U.S. Congress, House Committee of Conference, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 102nd Cong.,
2nd sess., October 1, 1992, H.Rept. 102-963, p. 88.
27 See for instance, Intelligence Community Assessment, “Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 2001-2002,” August
2001, available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/special_global human2001.html.
28 National Commission on Terrorist attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, Washington, DC,
July 2004, p. 341, citing NIE 95-13, “The Foreign Terrorist Threat in the United States,” July 1995.
29 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attaches of September 11, 2001,
107th Cong., 2nd sess., December 2002, S.Rept. 107-351/H.Rept. 107-792 (Washington: GPO, 2002), pp. 60, 238, 336,
381.
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commission found that the NIE reflected a number of substantive problems in both collection and
analytical efforts.30
In 2004 the 9/11 Commission, in reviewing the role of intelligence agencies prior to the
September 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, concluded that there was
insufficient coordination across the agencies and a weak capacity to set priorities and move
resources.31 Accordingly, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L.
108-458), enacted in the wake of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations and in view of
widespread congressional concern about the quality of analytical products, created the position of
Director of National Intelligence, and the NIC and the NIO’s were transferred to the Office of the
DNI (ODNI). The chairman of the NIC has been “double-hatted” as a Deputy DNI for Analysis
(one of four deputies that the DNI is authorized to establish). As noted above, this legislation
placed the NIC directly under the DNI and reiterated its statutory responsibilities.
Congressional Options and the NIC
Most observers believe that Congressional committees benefit from the testimony of NIC
members either in open or closed sessions.32 When Congress requests NIEs or other intelligence
assessments, the NIC is responsible for ensuring they are prepared.33 Congressional intelligence
committees conduct oversight of all intelligence activities and have, on occasion, focused on
analytical efforts, including NIEs. Publically available documents do not, however, include
oversight hearings of the NIC and its work.
There are a number of ways that oversight of the NIC might be changed. Congress might choose
to pass legislation to establish the position of NIC chairman and require that appointments to this
position be made by the President subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.34 NIO’s are not
policymakers; they share the Intelligence Community’s mandate to produce intelligence
“independent of political considerations.”35 On the other hand, NIO’s are not simply technical
experts inasmuch as they are required to be substantive experts in fields that are often very
controversial and directly related to policymaking. Requiring confirmation of NIO’s would permit
the Senate to assure itself that nominees were fully qualified and prepared to uphold the statutory
30 See CRS Report RL33733, Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress?, by Richard A. Best Jr.; U.S. Congress,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,
108th Cong., 2nd sess., July 9, 2004, S.Rept. 108-301 (Washington: GPO, 2004); also, U.S. Congress, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They
Compare with Prewar Assessments, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., September 8, 2006, S.Rept. 109-331 (Washington: GPO,
2006); U.S. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the
President of the United States (Washington: GPO, 2005).
31 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 408-409. In the Report, the Commission did not address the role of the NIC.
32 For an example of open testimony, see House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Select Committee on
Energy Independence and Global Warning, National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of
Global Climate Change to 2030, Statement for the Record of D. Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director of National
Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, June 25, 2008.
33 There is a standing requirement for an annual report on the threat of attack on the U.S. using weapons of mass
destruction either as an NIE or as a report having the formality of an NIE. 50 USC 404i(c). For further discussion of
other statutory requirements for NIEs, see CRS Report RL33733, Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress?
34 See CRS Report RL32212, The Appropriate Number of Advice and Consent Positions: An Analysis of the Issue and
Proposals for Change.
35 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(a)(2).
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obligations of providing intelligence that is “timely, objective, independent of political
considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community and other
appropriate entities.”36 The Senate could satisfy itself that the NIC was not being affected by too
many NIO’s with similar perspectives on national security issues. The confirmation process
would provide an oversight opportunity including the chance to obtain a promise by the nominee
to testify in the future.
On the other hand, some might argue that the confirmation process tends to delay appointments
and that Senate confirmation might also add a partisan component to filling a position specifically
designed to be nonpartisan. Some might also argue that Senate confirmation is inappropriate since
the work of the NIC does not involve policymaking or extensive managerial responsibilities
unlike the work of many officials so appointed. Another consideration is that adding a
requirement for Senate confirmation for all NIO’s would absorb additional administrative
resources both in the Executive and Legislative Branches.
Another approach would include greater congressional oversight of the NICs activities and its
products. Much of such oversight would necessarily have to be in closed sessions, but in the past
there have been a number of public reviews of the Intelligence Community’s analytical efforts
that have resulted in a number of modifications to NIC practices.37 On one occasion the NIC
acknowledged that it had taken several steps in accordance with specific congressional
recommendations, viz.:
• Created new procedures to integrate formal reviews of source reporting and
technical judgments. The Director CIA, as the National HUMINT [human
intelligence] Manager, as well as the Directors of NSA [National Security
Agency], NGA [National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency], and DIA [Defense
Intelligence Agency]and the Assistant Secretary/INR [Assistant Secretary of
State for Intelligence and Research] are now required to submit formal
assessments that highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and overall credibility of
their sources used in developing the critical judgments of the NIE.
• Applied more rigorous standards. A textbox is incorporated into all NIEs that
explains what we mean by such terms as “we judge” and that clarifies the
difference between judgments of likelihood and confidence levels. We have made
a concerted effort to not only highlight differences among agencies but to explain
the reasons for such differences and to display them prominently in the Key
Judgments.38
Questions have been raised about the role of NIO’s, and the NIC generally, within the
Government, some arguing that the NIC “has become the administrative support staff for the
[DNI] as he prepares for high-level meetings, assembling briefing books for him.”39 A number of
36 50 U.S.C. § 49301(a)(2).
37 See U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Committee’s Prewar Intelligence
Assessments on Iraq, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., July 8, 2004, S.Rept. 108-301 (Washington: GPO, 2004). A much earlier
example is U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team
Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives, 95th Cong., 2nd session, February 16, 1978, Committee
Print (Washington: GPO, 1978).
38 National Intelligence Council, The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland; available at
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf.
39 See Mark M. Lowenthal, “He blames the Israel Lobby. But the Job Wasn’t Worth It,” Washington Post, March 15,
(continued...)
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observers point to the time consumed in preparing NIEs and other products that may not provide
the best source of intelligence support for policymakers. Others believe that the NIO’s and the
NIC Chairman have not commanded significant influence among Executive Branch agencies or
in Congress. On the other hand, it is also acknowledged that the positions are sufficiently
unstructured as to allow well qualified appointees to recast the position to ensure they have a
thorough knowledge of the Intelligence Community and not become entangled in any
bureaucratic procedures. Key factors remain the capabilities of the appointees and the interest and
support of the DNI—factors over which at present Congress has little influence.
Conclusion
The ultimate goal of the Nation’s intelligence effort is to assist policymakers in understanding
conditions affecting our national security. This is an achievable goal. It is also to be hoped that
analysts can provide warning of imminent threats, but this is not always achievable given the
multitude of players and the variety of threats. Nevertheless, the members of the NIC serve as
“the senior intelligence advisors of the intelligence community for purposes of representing the
views of the intelligence community.”40 As such they have access to the full extent of information
obtained by all U.S. intelligence agencies and they have access to all intelligence analysts in the
Government. They will in addition hopefully have understanding of ways that a particular issue
fits into the entire international environment. Although any able analyst who spends years on a
narrow issue may have unique insights, the NIO’s should be able to provide the sense of context
and a degree of perspective that comes from the service on the NIC.
Most observers would probably agree that the role and missions of the NIC and of the national
estimative process have not yet been fully developed. The NIC supports the DNI and reflects the
views of the Intelligence Community in interagency discussions. They keep abreast of the work
of intelligence agencies in their subject areas. They must avoid the classic temptations of either
preparing academic treatises unrelated to policymaker concerns or becoming so close to the
policy dialogue that they are unable to provide perspective or to offer evidence that might
undermine the chosen policies of a given Administration. Few NIO’s or chairs of the NIC in
recent years have fully met the outlines of the position as envisioned by earlier intelligence
leaders or by the drafters of statutory language regarding the NIC.
As issues become more challenging and interrelated, the role of the NIC may grow. In addition,
Congress may perceive a need for increased scrutiny of NIC products and for more extensive
Legislative Branch oversight of the Intelligence Community’s analytical efforts. Arguably
Congress can have a broadened role in supporting the NIC. Congressional oversight can test
analysts’ conclusions from the multiple perspectives usually found within congressional
committees. The back-and-forth that may result from oversight hearings may be uncomfortable
for analysts and NIO’s, but, given the inherent uncertainties in most intelligence analysis and the
importance of the issues at stake, some observers suggest that rigorous exchanges can serve the
National interest and maintain that their absence in the past led to policy errors or unfairly
exposed the Intelligence Community to ex post facto criticism. All should recognize, however,
(...continued)
2009, p. B2.
40 50 U.S.C. § 403-3b(d).
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that all intelligence is an intellectual activity that inevitably carries with it some degree of
uncertainty.
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The National Intelligence Council: Issues and Options for Congress
Appendix A. 50 USC 403-3b (extract)
(a) National Intelligence Council
There is a National Intelligence Council.
(b) Composition
(1) The National Intelligence Council shall be composed of senior analysts within the intelligence
community and substantive experts from the public and private sector, who shall be appointed by,
report to, and serve at the pleasure of, the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security requirements for personnel appointed from
the private sector as a condition of service on the Council, or as contractors of the Council or
employees of such contractors, to ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods while
avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive requirements which the Director considers to be
unnecessary for this purpose.
(c) Duties and responsibilities
(1) The National Intelligence Council shall -
(A) produce national intelligence estimates for the United States Government, including
alternative views held by elements of the intelligence community and other information as
specified in paragraph (2);
(B) evaluate community-wide collection and production of intelligence by the intelligence
community and the requirements and resources of such collection and production; and
(C) otherwise assist the Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the responsibilities of the
Director under section 403-1 of this title.
(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the Council satisfies the needs of
policymakers and other consumers of intelligence.
(d) Service as senior intelligence advisers Within their respective areas of expertise and under the
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, the members of the National Intelligence
Council shall constitute the senior intelligence advisers of the intelligence community for
purposes of representing the views of the intelligence community within the United States
Government.
(e) Authority to contract
Subject to the direction and control of the Director of National Intelligence, the National
Intelligence Council may carry out its responsibilities under this section by contract, including
contracts for substantive experts necessary to assist the Council with particular assessments under
this section.
(f) Staff
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The Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the National Intelligence Council
such staff as may be necessary to permit the Council to carry out its responsibilities under this
section.
(g) Availability of Council and staff
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the
National Intelligence Council and its staff satisfy the needs of policymaking officials and other
consumers of intelligence.
(2) The Council shall be readily accessible to policymaking officials and other appropriate
individuals not otherwise associated with the intelligence community.
(h) Support
The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall, as appropriate, furnish such
support to the National Intelligence Council, including the preparation of intelligence analyses, as
may be required by the Director of National Intelligence.
(i) National Intelligence Council product intelligence
For purposes of this section, the term “National Intelligence Council product” includes a National
Intelligence Estimate and any other intelligence community assessment that sets forth the
judgment of the intelligence community as a whole on a matter covered by such product.
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Appendix B. Heads of the Board of National
Estimates and the National Intelligence Council
Chairmen of the Board of National Estimates
William Langer 1950-1952
Sherman Kent 1952-1967
Abbot Smith 1968-1971
John Huizenga 1971-1973
Deputies to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers
George Carver 1973-1976
Richard Lehman 1976-1977
Robert Bowie 1977-1979
Chairmen of the National Intelligence Council
Richard Lehman 1979-1981
Henry Rowen 1981-1983
Robert Gates 1983-1986
Frank Horton III, 1986-1987
Fritz Ermarth, 1988-1993
Joseph Nye 1993-1994
Christine Williams 1994-1995
Richard Cooper 1995-1997
John Gannon 1997-2001
John Helgerson 2001-2002
Robert Hutchings 2002-2005
C. Thomas Fingar 2005-2008
Peter Lavoy 2008-2009
Christopher Kojm 2009-
(Source: National Intelligence Council)
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Author Contact Information
Richard A. Best Jr.
Specialist in National Defense
rbest@crs.loc.gov, 7-7607
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