Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
August 28, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21922
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Summary
The Afghan government’s limited writ and widespread official corruption are helping sustain a
Taliban insurgency, and have fed pessimism about the Afghanistan stabilization effort. However,
President Hamid Karzai has been able to confine ethnic disputes to political competition by
engaging in compromises with major faction leaders, combined with occasional moves to weaken
them. This strategy has enabled Karzai to focus on trying, with limited success to date, to win
over disillusioned members of his ethnic Pashtun community, some of whom are tolerating or
even supporting Taliban insurgents. Despite the measurable loss of confidence in Karzai, many
Afghans consider their country’s difficulties as beyond his control, and he was still considered a
favorite for reelection on August 20, 2009. Turnout was lower than expected, particularly in
Karzai’s home provinces in the south, and, with only partial results released, a major question is
whether he has won more than 50% to avoid a second-round runoff. The United States was
officially neutral in the contest, although Karzai has complained about U.S. official meetings with
his challengers.
Winning Pashtun support for the Afghan government is predicated, at least in part, on the success
of efforts over the past few years to build local governing structures. New provincial councils in
each of the 34 provinces were elected on August 20 as well, although their roles in local
governance and their relationships to appointed governors remain unclear and inconsistent across
Afghanistan. The trend toward promoting local governing bodies will be accelerated, according to
the Obama Administration’s review of U.S. strategy, the results of which were announced on
March 27, 2009. The core of the new strategy is a so-called “civilian surge” that is in the process
of doubling, to about 900, the number of U.S. civilian personnel to deploy to Afghanistan to help
build its governing and security institutions, particularly at local levels, and to increase economic
development efforts, particularly in agriculture.
Under an FY2009 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32), the Administration is required to
develop, by September 23, 2009, “metrics” by which to judge progress in Afghanistan, including
the performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government and its efforts to curb official
corruption. Small amounts of U.S. funds are tied to Afghanistan’s performance on such metrics.
For further information, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Contents
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape .......................................................................... 1
Overview of Governance....................................................................................................... 1
Many Traditional Patterns Endure ................................................................................... 2
Afghan Politics: Karzai and His Opponents........................................................................... 2
The Opposition and Its Strength ...................................................................................... 3
Government Capacity and Performance....................................................................................... 4
Dealing With Regional Faction Leaders ................................................................................ 5
Official Corruption................................................................................................................ 7
Expanding Local Governance................................................................................................ 8
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils................................................................. 9
Security Benefits of Local Governance Programs ............................................................ 9
Overall Human Rights Issues .............................................................................................. 10
Religious Freedom ........................................................................................................ 10
Human Trafficking........................................................................................................ 11
Advancement of Women ............................................................................................... 12
Democracy, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues ................................................. 13
2009 Elections .......................................................................................................................... 14
Dispute over the Election Date ............................................................................................ 14
Election Modalities and Processes....................................................................................... 14
The Political Contest ........................................................................................................... 16
The Campaign............................................................................................................... 17
The Election Results and Prospects ..................................................................................... 19
U.S. Policy and Interests in the Election .............................................................................. 20
Figures
Figure 1. Afghanistan Ethnic Groups......................................................................................... 24
Tables
Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process....................................................................... 21
Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations ........................................................................... 22
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 24
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 24
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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape
A U.S. priority, particularly during 2001-2007, has been to extend the authority and encourage the
reform of Afghanistan’s central government. The policy is predicated on the observation that
weak and corrupt governance is causing some Afghans to acquiesce to, or even support outright,
Taliban insurgents as providers of security and impartial justice. Since 2007, the U.S. and Afghan
focus has been on expanding and strengthening governance at local levels.
Overview of Governance
Although democracy promotion, per se, was not a major feature of the Obama Administration’s
March 27, 2009, strategy announcement, Afghanistan has taken significant formal steps toward
democracy since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001. Karzai’s is the first fully elected
government in Afghan history, although there were parliamentary elections during the reign of
King Zahir Shah (the last were in 1969, before his reign was ended in a 1973 military coup).
Presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections, and adoption of a constitution were part of a
post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major
Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany, on December 5, 2001, (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the
Taliban had fallen. The political transition process is depicted in Table 1.
Elections—coupled with a post-Taliban sense that Afghanistan is for all Afghans, regardless of
ethnicity and political ideology—have produced relative peace among Afghanistan’s many
communities. However, reflecting the sense among Pashtuns that they, as the largest single
ethnicity, have the right to rule, Karzai’s government has come to be progressively dominated by
ethnic Pashtuns. Pashtuns are about 42% of the population and, with few exceptions, have
governed Afghanistan. One recent exception was the 1992-1996 presidency of the mujahedin
government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik. A table on major Pashtun clans is provided below
(see Table 2), as is a map showing the distribution of Afghanistan’s various ethnicities (see
Figure 1).
Although other ethnicities have tended to accept the right of the Pashtun community to hold the
top position in Afghanistan, non-Pashtuns want to be included at high levels of the central
government and to have a measure of control over how government programs are implemented in
their geographic regions. Currently, of the major security ministries and organizations, only the
National Directorate for Security (NDS, the Intelligence directorate) is still headed by a non-
Pashtun (Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik). Attempting to maintain the fragile consensus among the
various ethnicities, the other security ministries (Defense, Interior) tend to have non-Pashtuns in
key deputy or subordinate positions. In the Defense Ministry, the chief of staff is a Tajik
(Bismillah Khan), who reports to a Pashtun Defense Minister (Abdul Rahim Wardak).
Afghanistan’s non-Pashtun communities have said that they will not rebel against their
diminution in the upper levels of government, but would keep their competition peaceful. Some
observers take a different view, asserting that Tajiks continue to control many of the command
ranks of the Afghan military and security services, and that Pashtuns constitute merely an upper
veneer of control of these organizations, causing Pashtun resentment.
1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
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Many Traditional Patterns Endure
Despite the formal procedures of democracy established since the fall of the Taliban, many
traditional patterns of authority remain. These patterns have been evident in the 2009 presidential
campaign in Afghanistan, where many candidates, Karzai in particular, have forged campaign
strategies designed to assemble blocs of ethnic and geographic votes, rather than promote specific
new ideas. Some say that Afghanistan continues to be run mostly by local faction leaders who
selectively apply, or in some cases ignore entirely, Afghan law and who undermine internationally
accepted standards of rule of law.
Some believe that traditional Afghan patterns of decision making have some democratic and
representative elements. This could be considered helpful to forging a modern democracy,
although some might see these traditional patterns as competing mechanisms that resist change
and modernization, and do not meet international standards of democratic governance. At the
national level, the loya jirga, or traditional Afghan assembly consisting of about 1,000 delegates
from all over Afghanistan, has been used to ratify some major decisions in the post-Taliban period
(Karzai’s leadership, the post-Taliban constitution, and long-term defense relations with the
United States). At the local level, shuras, or jirgas (consultative councils) composed of local
notables, are key mechanisms for making authoritative local decisions or dispensing justice.
Afghans turn often to these local mechanisms to adjudicate disputes rather than use the national
court system. Some estimates say that 80% of cases are decided in the informal justice system.
Afghan Politics: Karzai and His Opponents
In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the National Assembly (parliament)—particularly the 249-seat
elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People)—has become the key institution for the
non-Pashtun ethnic minorities to exert influence on Karzai. To the chagrin of many Afghans who
want to build a democratic Afghanistan governed by technocrats and newly emerging political
figures, many seats in the lower house are held by personalities and factions prominent in
Afghanistan’s recent wars, many of whom are non-Pashtuns from the north and the west. These
figures constitute about one-third of the Wolesi Jirga; the remainder of the body is divided among
pro-Karzai deputies and technocratic “independents” of varied ethnicities. The factions in the
lower house are not strictly organized according to Afghanistan’s 108 registered political parties,
and the various non-Pashtun ethnicities are not monolithic in opposition to Karzai.
Karzai has not formed his own party, but his core supporters in the Wolesi Jirga are former
members of the conservative Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party (the same party as that headed by
insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar); and supporters of Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf—a prominent
Islamic conservative mujahedin party leader.2 Another base of Karzai’s support in parliament is
the contingent from Qandahar (Karzai’s home province) and Helmand provinces, including
several Karzai clan members. One clan member in the body is his cousin Jamil Karzai, and
another is relative by marriage Aref Nurzai. Karzai’s elder brother, Qayyum, was in the lower
house representing Qandahar until his October 2008 resignation, although Qayyum continues to
represent his brother informally domestically and abroad, including at 2008 and 2009 meetings to
explore negotiated settlements with “moderate” Taliban figures.
2 Sayyaf led the Ittihad Islami (Islamic Union) mujahedin party during the war against the Soviet occupation.
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Other pro-Karzai Pashtuns are former militia and Taliban leaders, including Hazrat Ali
(Nangarhar Province), who led the Afghan component of the failed assault on Osama bin Laden’s
purported redoubt at Tora Bora in December 2001; Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some
accounts, helped Osama bin Laden escape Tora Bora; and Mullah Abdul Salam (“Mullah
Rocketi”), from Zabol. (Salam has filed to run for president in 2009.)
The Opposition and Its Strength
Although the “opposition” to Karzai is fluid and amenable to compromises with him, those who
can be considered opposition are mainly ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) who were
in an alliance against Taliban rule that was called the “Northern Alliance.” Leaders of these
groups, and particularly Tajiks, view as a betrayal Karzai’s firing of many of the non-Pashtuns
from the cabinet—such as former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Tajik, dismissed from
that post by Karzai in 2006, now challenging him for President).
The main ethnic opposition grouping is called the United Front (UF). It was formed in April 2007
by Wolesi Jirga Speaker Yunus Qanooni and former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani
(both, like Abdullah, are prominent ethnic Tajik Northern Alliance figures and former associates
of the legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masood). It is broader than the Tajik-
dominated Northern Alliance in that it includes some Pashtuns, such as prominent Soviet-
occupation era security figures Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, who chairs
parliament’s defense committee. Both of Karzai’s vice presidents joined the UF when it was
formed, although they subsequently continued to serve as vice presidents. The UF advocates
amending the constitution to give more power to parliament and to empower the elected
provincial councils (instead of the President) to select governors and mayors. Fearing Pashtun
consolidation, the UF has been generally opposed to Karzai’s overtures to Taliban fighters to end
their fight and join government—an initiative that is now backed by the Obama Administration as
a means of combating the Taliban insurgency.
Even before the formation of the UF, the opposition bloc in the Wolesi Jirga first showed its
strength in March 2006, following the December 19, 2005, inauguration of parliament, by
requiring Karzai’s cabinet to be approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition
leverage. However, Karzai rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. In
May 2006, the opposition compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the
highest judicial body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as
chief justice. Parliament approved his new Court choices in July 2006, all of whom are trained in
modern jurisprudence.
In May 2007, the UF achieved a majority to oust Karzai ally Rangin Spanta as Foreign Minister.
Karzai refused to replace him, instead seeking a Supreme Court ruling that Spanta should remain,
on the grounds that his ouster was related to a refugee issue (Iran’s expulsion of 100,000 Afghan
refugees), not a foreign policy issue. The Court has, to date, supported Karzai, and Spanta
remains Foreign Minister, although it is likely he will not stay in that post in the post-election
cabinet, if Karzai wins the election.
Karzai and the UF have often competed for the support of the “independents” in the lower house.
Among them are several outspoken women, intellectuals, and business leaders, such as the 39-
year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), a leading critic of war-era faction leaders. In May 2007
the lower house voted to suspend her for this criticism for the duration of her term. Others in this
camp include Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, editor of Woman
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Mirror magazine; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions
parliamentary powers and has established a “complaints tent” outside the parliament building to
highlight and combat official corruption. (He ran for president in the 2009 elections on an anti-
corruption platform.) U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI) has helped train the
independents; the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has assisted the more established factions.
The Upper House of the National Assembly
Karzai has relatively fewer critics in the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga (House of Elder, upper house),
partly because of his bloc of 34 appointments (one-third of that body). He engineered the
appointment of an ally as Speaker: Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, a noted Islamic scholar and former
mujahedin party leader who headed the post-Communist mujahedin government for one month
(May 1992).3 Mojadeddi has since 2003 headed an effort to reconcile with Taliban figures (Peace
and Reconciliation Commission, or “PTSD” program), which is formally still ongoing, although
it has been overtaken by direct talks between Taliban figures and Karzai representatives. Karzai
also appointed Northern Alliance military leader Muhammad Fahim to the body, perhaps to
compensate for his removal as Defense Minister, although he resigned after a few months and
later joined the UF. (He is now Karzai’s primary running mate in the 2009 elections.) There is one
Hindu, and 23 women; 17 are Karzai appointees and 6 were selected in their own right.
The upper house tends to be more Islamist conservative than the lower house, advocating a legal
system that accords with Islamic law, and restrictions on press and Westernized media broadcasts.
In late 2008, the body approved a resolution opposing a U.S.-Afghan plan to establish local
security organs to help keep Taliban infiltrators out of Afghan communities. The plan, now
termed the “Afghan Public Protection Program,” is being implemented in Wardak province.
On less contentious issues, the executive and the legislature have worked well. During 2008,
parliament passed a labor law that brings Afghan labor law more in line with international labor
laws, a mines law, a law on economic cooperatives, and a convention on tobacco control. It also
confirmed several Karzai nominees, including the final justice to fill out the Supreme Court. In
2009, as discussed further below, the National Assembly approved a Shiite Personal Status Law.
Both houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by the Ministry of Finance, are staffed
by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a “secretariat.” There are 18 oversight committees, a research
unit and a library.
Government Capacity and Performance4
U.S. policy has been to help expand Afghan institutions and to urge reforms. Such reforms
include instituting merit-based performance criteria, ending the practice of hiring based on
kinship and ethnicity rather than qualifications, and weeding out of the rampant official
corruption. Afghan ministries based in Kabul are growing their staffs and technologically
capabilities, although they still suffer from a low resource and skill base, and corruption is fed in
3 The mujahedin party he headed during the anti-Soviet war was the Afghan National Liberation Front.
4 Some information in this section is from the State Department reports on human rights in Afghanistan for 2008.
February 25, 2009; for text, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/sca/119131.htm and the International
Religious Freedom Report, released September 19, 2008. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/2007/90225.htm.
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part by the fact that government workers receive very low salaries. Central government
representation in outlying provinces is expanding only very slowly.
There has also been a growing perception that Karzai’s government is weak in its administrative
ability. The former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, who is of Afghan origin
(a Pashtun), was reported in May 2009 to be negotiating with Karzai about becoming a strong
chief executive officer (“chief of staff,” or “de-facto prime minister”) if Karzai is re-elected; these
talks came after Khalilzad declined to run against Karzai in the upcoming election. The Obama
Administration did not take a firm position on the Khalilzad idea during Karzai’s May 2009 visit
to the United States. Some in the Administration are said to be backing the concept of placing
more administrative experience in Karzai’s office, although not necessary for Khalilzad to play
that role. Some believe that a high-ranking position for Khalilzad in the Afghan government
could further confuse the channels of communication between the Obama Administration and the
Karzai government. (Khalilzad’s political activities are discussed further below.) In August 2009,
it was reported that one of Karzai’s election challengers, Ashaf Ghani, might be negotiating to
take that role if Karzai is re-elected. Others mentioned have been Interior Minister Mohammad
Hanif Atmar.
The anti-corruption and governmental performance aspect of U.S. policy is to be enhanced by the
Obama Administration’s strategy announced March 27, 2009, which concluded that more needed
to be done to promote the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government at both the
Kabul and local levels. As a consequence of the review, the Administration has recruited about
500 U.S. civilian personnel from the State Department, USAID, the Department of Agriculture,
and several other agencies—and many additional civilians from partner countries will join
them—to advise Afghan ministries, and provincial and district administrations. About one third
have arrived in Afghanistan, to date.
The Administration is also developing metrics to assess progress in building Afghan governance,
as it is required to do so (by September 23, 2009) under P.L. 111-32, an FY2009 supplemental
appropriation. The effort is said to be complicated and Administration officials have briefed
Members in July 2009 on some concepts that will be used as metrics. Some in Congress have said
they oppose firm conditionality of any U.S. aid to Afghanistan on Afghanistan’s performance on
such metrics, or linkage to any timelines of progress in the U.S. stabilization effort.
Dealing With Regional Faction Leaders
The Obama Administration review did not specifically outline any new measures to sideline
regional strongmen, who are often referred to as “warlords.” Karzai has at times indulged and at
other times move against regional strongmen, but he has been hesitant to confront them outright
to the point where their followers go into armed rebellion. His choice of Muhammad Fahim, the
military chief of the Northern Alliance/UF faction, as first Vice Presidential running mate in the
August 2009 elections is likely to reignite concerns that Karzai continues to rely on faction
leaders rather than promote officials who are politically neutral. Karzai argues that the faction
leaders have significant followings and that compromises with them is needed to keep the
government intact as he focuses on fighting “unrepentant” Taliban insurgents.
Some observers cited Karzai’s handling of prominent Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostam as
evidence of political weakness and reliance on traditional leaders with questionable histories and
intents. Dostam is often referred to as a “warlord” because of his command of partisans in his
redoubt in northern Afghanistan (Jowzjan and Balkh provinces), and he is widely accused of
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human rights abuses of political opponents in the north. To try to separate him from his militia, in
2005 Karzai appointed him to the post of chief of staff of the armed forces. On February 4, 2008,
Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to reports that he attacked an
ethnic Turkmen rival, but Karzai did not order his arrest for fear of stirring unrest among
Dostam’s followers. To try to resolve the issue without stirring unrest, in early December 2008
Karzai purportedly reached an agreement with Dostam under which he resigned as chief of staff
and went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the dropping any case against him.5 On July 11,
2009, the New York Times reported that allegations that Dostam had caused the death of several
hundred Taliban prisoners during the major combat phase of OEF were not investigated by the
Bush Administration, and that the State Department had dissuaded Karzai, at least temporarily,
from implementing his June 2009 reappointment of Dostam as chief military advisor. In
responding to assertions that there was no investigation because Dostam was a U.S. ally,
President Obama said any allegations of violations of laws of war need to be investigated.
Dostam responded to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (which carried the story) that only 200
Taliban prisoners died and this was due to combat and disease, and not due to intentional actions
of forces under his command.
Dostam, who returned to Afghanistan on August 16 and subsequently held a large pro-Karzai
election rally in his home city of Shebergan, purportedly seeks to weaken another strong figure in
the north, Balkh Province governor Atta Mohammad. Mohammad is a Tajik but, under a 2005
compromise with Karzai, is in control of a province that is inhabited mostly by Uzbeks—a source
of irritation for Dostam and other Uzbek leaders. Mohammad views himself as relatively
independent of Kabul’s writ, and Dostam reportedly is hoping that, by supporting Karzai in the
election, Dostam will be able to convince Karzai to remove Mohammad from Balkh if Karzai is
re-elected. In July 2009, Mohammad announced his political support for the candidacy of fellow
Tajik Dr. Abdullah, which might represent a natural realignment rather than a move against
Karzai.
Another strongman that Karzai has sought to weaken, while keeping him politically satisfied, is
prominent Tajik political leader and former Herat governor Ismail Khan. In 2006, Karzai
appointed him Minister of Energy and Water, taking him away from his political base in the west.
However, he remains influential there, and Karzai’s compromises with Khan have won Karzai
Khan’s election support. Khan can deliver potentially decisive Tajik votes in the west that might
otherwise go to Dr. Abdullah, who is a Tajik and the main challenger to Karzai. Others say that
Karzai’s governing strategy has cost Afghanistan as a nation because some strong governors, such
as Ghul Agha Shirzai of Nangarhar, are using their positions to siphon off customs duties at
border crossings, undermining the revenue flow to the central government.
In other cases, Karzai has sought to govern through allies who are criticized for poor human
rights practices or involvement in narcotics. One such ally is Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh,
who was a close associate of Karzai when they were in exile in Quetta, Pakistan, during Taliban
rule. Karzai appointed him governor of Helmand after the fall of the Taliban, but in 2005, Britain
demanded he be removed for his abuses, as a condition of Britain taking security control of
Helmand. Karzai reportedly wants to reappoint Akhundzadeh, who Karzai believes was more
successful against militants in Helmand using his local militiamen than has Britain with its more
than 8,000 troops there. However, Britain and the United States have urged Karzai to keep the
existing governor, Ghulab Mangal, who is winning wide praise for his successes against poppy
5 CRS e-mail conversation with National Security aide to President Karzai. December 2008.
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cultivation in Helmand (discussed further below under “Expanding Local Governance”).
Akhunzadeh is attempting to deliver large numbers of votes for Karzai in Helmand and Qandahar.
In February 2007, both houses passed a law giving amnesty to so-called “warlords.” Karzai
altered the draft to give victims the right to seek justice for any abuses; Karzai did not sign a
modified version in May 2007, leaving the status unclear.
Official Corruption
During the Bush Administration, U.S. officials generally refrained from publicly criticizing
Karzai when, in the interests of political harmony, he has purportedly tolerated corruption.
However, President Obama and his senior aides, including the special representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, have been somewhat more publicly
critical of Karzai’s shortcomings than were Bush Administration officials. The Obama
Administration strategy review highlights the need to reduce official corruption. The FY2009
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32) withholds 10% of about $90 million in State
Department counter-narcotics funding subject to a certification that the Afghan government is
acting against officials who are corrupt or committing gross human rights violations.
Partly as a result of what many Afghans view as a “predatory” central government, many Afghans
and international donors are said to be losing faith in the government and in Karzai’s leadership.
Some observers, such as former Coordinator for Counter-Narcotics and Justice Reform Thomas
Schweich, in a July 27, 2008, New York Times article, have gone so far as to assert that Karzai, to
build political support, is deliberately tolerating officials in his government who are allegedly
involved in the narcotics trade. The New York Times reported allegations (October 5, 2008) that
another Karzai brother, Qandahar provincial council chief Ahmad Wali Karzai, has protected
narcotics trafficking in the province. Some Afghans explain Ahmad Wali Karzai’s activities as an
effort to ensure that his constituents in Qandahar have financial means to sustain themselves,
even if through narcotics trade, before there are viable alternative sources of livelihood. Another
brother, Mahmoud Karzai, has apparently grown wealthy through real estate and auto sales
ventures in Qandahar and Kabul, purportedly by fostering the impression he can influence his
brother, President Karzai. Mahmoud Karzai held a press conference in Washington, DC, on April
16, 2009, denying allegations of corruption. In Helmand, some of the British objections to
Akhunzadeh returning as governor concern his alleged role in protecting traffickers in the
province.
Observers who follow the issue say that most of the corruption takes place in the course of
performing mundane governmental functions, such as government processing of official
documents, in which processing services routinely require bribes in exchange for action.6 In other
cases, Afghan security officials are said to sell U.S./internationally provided vehicles, fuel, and
equipment to supplement their salaries. Other observers who have served in Afghanistan say that
Karzai has appointed some provincial governors to “reward them” and that these appointments
have gone on to “prey” economically on the populations of that province. Several high officials,
despite very low official government salaries, have acquired ornate properties in west Kabul since
2002, according to Afghan observers. Transparency International, a German organization that
assesses governmental corruption worldwide, ranked Afghanistan in 2008 as 176th out of 180
6 Filkins, Dexter. “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government.” New York Times, January 2, 2009.
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countries ranked in terms of government corruption. Because of the corruption, only about 10%
of U.S. aid is channeled through the Afghan government, although Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke said in May 2009 that empowering Afghan
governance requires raising that to about 40% or 50%. Currently, the Ministry of Health and the
Ministry of Communications qualify to have U.S. funds channeled through them.
Another successful ministry is the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD),
headed by Ehsan Zia. It runs the widely praised National Solidarity Program, which awards local
development grants for specific projects. Zia has developed a capability, widely praised by
Britain, according to observers, to account for large percentages of donated funds to ensure they
are not siphoned off by corruption.
To try to address the criticism, in August 2008 Karzai, with reported U.S. prodding, set up the
“High Office of Oversight for the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy” with the power to
investigate the police, courts, and the attorney general’s office, and to catalogue the overseas
assets of Afghan officials. Karzai himself declared his assets on March 27, 2009. In October
2008, Karzai replaced the ministers of Interior, of Education, and of Agriculture with officials,
particularly the Interior Minister (former Soviet-era official Muhammad Hanif Atmar) believed to
be dedicated to reform of their ministries and weeding out of official corruption. However,
Atmar’s appointment incurred further UF concern because Atmar, a Pashtun, replaced a Tajik
(Zarrar Moqbel) in that post. In his public appearances during his visit to the United States in
May 2009, Karzai repeatedly stressed what he said were efforts by him and his government to
remove corrupt officials and combat official corruption.
Some of Karzai’s anti-corruption steps have been recommended in studies within the State
Department, the Afghan government, and the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime which is
responsible for assisting Afghanistan on counter-narcotics. The Afghan government committed
itself to anti-corruption efforts in the so-called “Afghanistan Compact” adopted at an international
meeting in London on February 1, 2006, and it ratified the U.N. Convention Against Corruption
in August 2008.
Expanding Local Governance
In part to address the flaws of the Afghan central government, U.S. policy shifted somewhat in
2008 toward promoting local security and governance solutions. The Afghan government asserts
that it itself is promoting local governance as the next stage in Afghanistan’s political and
economic development, although some say that this is part of an effort by Karzai to improve his
re-election prospects by developing a local networks of supporters. A key indicator of this Afghan
shift came in August 2007 when Karzai placed the selection process for local leaders (provincial
governors and down) in a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)—and out
of the Interior Ministry.
The IDLG, with advice from India and other donors, is also in the process of empowering
localities to decide on development priorities by forming Community Development Councils
(CDC’s). Thus far, there are about 22,000 CDC’s established, with a goal of over 30,000, and they
are eventually to be elected. The IDLG does not envision that the local leaders being elected will
conflict with any district leaderships elected when Afghanistan finally does hold (still delayed)
district elections. Some accounts say that the efforts to expand local governance has been
hampered by corruption and limited availability of skilled Afghans.
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Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils
Many believe that the key to effective local governance is the appointment of competent
governors. The UNODC report said that improving governance in some provinces had
contributed to the increase to 18 “poppy free” provinces (out of 34), from 13 in the same report in
2007. Another four provinces might move into that category by the end of 2009, according to
UNODC. In March 2008 Karzai replaced the weak and ineffective governor of Helmand
(Asadullah Wafa) with Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman Province and who the U.N. Office
of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) said in an August 2008 report is taking relatively effective action
to convince farmers to grow crops other than poppy. A subsequent UNODC report in February
2009 said his efforts are likely to result in a reduction of cultivation in Helmand in 2009. Mangal
has held a series of meetings with local elders and government officials in newly cleared areas of
Helmand Province in the course of a U.S.-led offensive there that began July 2, 2009. Ghul Agha
Shirzai has been effective in curbing cultivation in Nangarhar, although Shirzai reportedly has
also not remitted all the customs duties collected at the Khyber Pass/Torkham crossing to the
central government.
Governing Qandahar is a sensitive issue in Kabul because of Karzai’s active interest in his home
province and his expectations of large numbers of Pashtun votes from the province (as well as
from Helmand). In Qandahar, Ahmad Wali Karzai, Karzai’s elder brother, is chair of the
provincial council. He has always been more powerful than any appointed governor of Qandahar.
Yet, because of his close interest in the province, President Karzai has frequently rotated the
governors of Qandahar. He appointed General Rahmatullah Raufi to replace Asadullah Khalid
after an August 7, 2008 Taliban assault on the Qandahar prison that led to the freeing of several
hundred Taliban fighters incarcerated there. Karzai changed that governorship again in December
2008, naming Canadian-Afghan academic Tooryalai Wesa as governor, perhaps hoping that his
ties to Canada would assuage Canadian reticence to continuing its mission in Qandahar beyond
2011.
One problem noted by governance experts is that the role of the elected provincial councils is
unclear. The elections for the provincial councils in all 34 provinces were held on August 20,
2009, concurrent with the presidential elections. The last provincial council elections were held
concurrent with the parliamentary elections in September 2005. In most provinces, the provincial
councils do not act as true legislatures, and they are considered weak compared to the power and
influence of the provincial governors.
Still, the provincial councils play a major role in choosing the upper house of the National
Assembly (Meshrano Jirga); in the absence of district councils (no elections held or scheduled),
the provincial councils choose two-thirds of the 102 seat Meshrano Jirga. The councils elected in
August 2009 will likely select new Meshrano Jirga representatives after the lower house elections
planned for 2010.
Security Benefits of Local Governance Programs
The IDLG is also the chief implementer of the “Social Outreach Program” which provides
financial support (about $125—200 per month) and other benefits to tribal and local leaders in
exchange for their cooperation with U.S./NATO led forces against the Taliban insurgency. The
civilian aspects of the program are funded partly by USAID.
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A more widely debated security aspect of the program is the Afghan Public Protection Program,
referred to above. Afghan officials say it is not a resurrection of the traditional tribal militias
(“arbokai”) that provided local security—and often clashed with each other—before and during
Afghanistan’s recent wars, but that the local forces formed under the program are under the
authority of the Interior Ministry. More information on this program is provided in CRS Report
RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman.
Overall Human Rights Issues
The Obama Administration strategy review announcement did not specifically delineate a new
U.S. policy on Afghanistan’s human rights practices, although this issue could be deemed
addressed implicitly by the Administration’s statement that policy is intended to make the Afghan
government more “accountable.” On human rights issues, the overall State Department judgment
is that the country’s human rights record remains poor, according to the Department’s report for
2008 (issued February 25, 2009). The security forces, and local faction leaders, are widely cited
for abuses and corruption, including torture and abuse of detainees.
There has been some backsliding in recent years on media freedoms, which were hailed during
2002-2008 as a major benefit of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. A press law was passed in
September 2008 that gives some independence to the official media outlet, but also contains a
number of content restrictions, and requires that new newspapers and electronic media be
licensed by the government. Prior to the new law, Afghanistan’s conservative Council of Ulema
(Islamic scholars) has been ascendant. With the Council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of
Information and Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that they are
too risque, although the programs were restored in August 2008 under a compromise that also
brought in some Islamic-oriented programs from Turkey. At the same time, there has been a
growing number of arrests or intimidation of journalists who criticize the central government or
local leaders.
On the other hand, freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the Taliban with
their elections to the parliament, their service at many levels of government, including a
governorship (Bamiyan Province), and their growing presence in the judiciary (67 female judges),
the press, and the private sector. Wearing the burqa (head-to-toe covering) is no longer required
but many women still wear it. Alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores,
although it is not banned.
Religious Freedom
The September 2008 International Religious Freedom report says the Afghan government took
limited steps during the year to increase religious freedom. Still, members of minority religions,
including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court
declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of blasphemy in May 2007. In October 2007, Afghanistan
resumed enforcing the death penalty after a four-year moratorium, executing 15 criminals. One
major case incurring international criticism has been the January 2008 death sentence, imposed in
a quick trial, against 23-year-old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material
critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20 years in
prison; a judgment upheld by another court in March 2009. He still might receive a Karzai
pardon.
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A positive development is that Afghanistan’s Shiite minority, mostly from the Hazara tribes of
central Afghanistan (Bamiyan and Dai Kundi provinces) can celebrate their holidays openly, a
development unknown before the fall of the Taliban. Some Afghan Shiites follow Iran’s clerical
leaders politically, but Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. The Minister of Justice is a Shiite, the first of that sect to hold that post.
There was unrest among some Shiite leaders in late May 2009 when they learned that the Afghan
government had dumped 2,000 Iranian-supplied religious texts into a river when an Afghan
official complained that the books insulted the Sunni majority.
The Afghan government tried to further accommodate Shiite demands in 2009 by enacting
(passage by the National Assembly and signature by Karzai in March 2009) a “Shiite Personal
Status Law,” at the request of Shiite leaders. The law was intended to provide a legal framework
for members of the Shiite minority in family law issues. However, the issue turned controversial
when international human rights groups and governments—and Afghan women in a
demonstration in Kabul—complained about provisions that would appear to sanction marital rape
and which would allow males to control the ability of females in their family to go outside the
home. President Obama publicly called these provisions “abhorrent.” In early April 2009, taking
into account the outcry, Karzai sent the law back to the Justice Ministry for review, saying it
would be altered if it were found to conflict with the Afghan constitution. On April 19, 2009,
Karzai said on CNN that his government’s review of specific provisions of the law, which was
long and highly detailed, had been inadequate, and Karzai reiterated during his U.S. visit in May
2009 that the controversial provisions would be removed.
The offending clauses were substantially revised by the Justice Ministry in July 2009, requiring
that wives “perform housework,” but also apparently giving the husband the right to deny a wife
food if she refuses sex. The revised law was passed by the National Assembly in late July 2009,
signed by Karzai, and published in the official gazette on July 27, 2009.
A previous religious freedom case earned congressional attention in March 2006. An Afghan
man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working for a
Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a potential death penalty trial for
apostasy—his refusal to convert back to Islam. Facing international pressure, Karzai prevailed on
Kabul court authorities to release him (March 29, 2006). His release came the same day the
House passed H.Res. 736 calling on protections for Afghan converts.
Human Trafficking
Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2 in the State Department report on human trafficking
issued in June 2009 (Trafficking in Persons Report for 2009, released June 15, 2009). The
government is assessed as not complying with minimum standards for eliminating trafficking, but
making significant efforts to do so. The says that women (reportedly from China and Central
Asia) are being trafficked into Afghanistan for sexual exploitation. Other reports say some are
brought to work in night clubs purportedly frequented by members of many international NGOs.
In an effort to also increase protections for Afghan women, in August 2008 the Interior Ministry
announced a crackdown on sexual assault—an effort to publicly air a taboo subject. The United
States has spent $500,000 to eliminate human trafficking in Afghanistan since FY2001.
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Advancement of Women
According to the State Department human rights report for 2008, the Afghan government is
promoting the advancement of women, but numerous abuses, such as denial of educational and
employment opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. A
major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the formation of a Ministry of Women’s
Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights, although numerous accounts say the ministry’s
influence is limited. It promotes the involvement of women in business ventures, and it plays a
key role in trying to protect women from domestic abuse by running a growing number of
women’s shelters across Afghanistan. Many women continue to wear the head-to-toe burqa
covering, even though wearing it has not been required since the Taliban government was ousted.
Three female ministers were in the 2004-2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda
Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa Balkhi (Minister for Martyrs and the Disabled), and
Amina Afzali (Minister of Youth). Karzai nominated Soraya Sobhrang as Minister of Women’s
Affairs in the 2006 cabinet, but she was voted down by Islamist conservatives in parliament. He
eventually appointed another female, Husn Banu Ghazanfar, as Minister; she is the only woman
in the cabinet at this time. In March 2005, Karzai appointed a former Minister of Women’s
Affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras. (She
hosted then First Lady Laura Bush in Bamiyan in June 2008.)
The constitution reserves for women at least 17 of the 102 seats in the upper house and 62 of the
249 seats in the lower house of parliament. There are 68 women in the lower house, meaning 6
were elected without the quota. There are 23 serving in the upper house, 6 more than Karzai’s
mandated bloc of 17 female appointees. There are also 121 women holding seats in the 420
provincial council seats nationwide, 3 fewer than the 124 that are the election law goals for the
number of females on these councils. Two women are running for president for the August 20
election, 2009, as discussed below. However, some NGOs and other groups believe that the
women elected by the quota system are not viewed as equally legitimate parliamentarians.
More generally, women are performing jobs that were rarely held by women even before the
Taliban came to power in 1996, including in the new police force. There are 67 female judges and
447 female journalists working nationwide. The most senior Afghan woman in the police force
was assassinated in Qandahar in September 2008. Press reports say Afghan women are
increasingly learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body
covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it than was the
case a few years ago. On the other hand, women’s advancement has made women a target of
attacks by Taliban supporters or highly conservative Afghans. Attacks on girls’ schools and
athletic facilities have increased in the most restive areas. On November 12, 2008, suspected
Taliban sprayed acid on the faces of several schoolgirls in Qandahar.
U.S. officials have had some influence in persuading the government to codify women’s rights.
After the Karzai government took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set
up a U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women.
According to the State Department, the United States has implemented several hundred projects
directly in support of Afghan women, including women’s empowerment, maternal and child
health and nutrition, funding the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and micro-finance projects.
The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per
year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Those monies are donated to the
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Ministry from Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts controlled by USAID. S. 229, the
Afghan Women Empowerment Act of 2009, introduced in the 111th Congress, would authorize
$45 million per year in FY2010-FY2012 for grants to Afghan women, for the ministry of
Women’s Affairs ($5 million), and for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission ($10
million).
Democracy, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues
U.S. funding for democracy, governance, and rule of law programs is expected to grow
dramatically in line with the Obama Administration strategy for Afghanistan. During FY2002-
2008, a total of $1.8 billion was spent on democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights,
and elections support. Of these, by far the largest category was “good governance,” which, in
large part, are grant awards to provinces that make progress against narcotics.
The following is to be spent in FY2009.
• $881 million for all of democracy and governance, including:
• $283 million for good governance
• $150 million for National Solidarity Program and direct budget support to
Afghan government.
• $174 million for election support
• $50 million for strategic program development
• $212 million for rule of law, funded by both USAID and State Dept. Bureau of
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).
Requested for FY2010.
• $801 million for all democracy and governance, including:
• $191 million for good governance
• $200 million for National Solidarity Program and direct budget support to
Afghan government.
• $90 million for election support
• $100 million for strategic program development
• $210 million for rule of law (USAID and INCLE)
The election support funds are being used for the election process itself as well as for voter
registration and education and election security support functions. The total cost of the Afghan
elections in 2009 are to be about $200 million, with other international donors contributing funds
to close the gap left by the U.S. contribution.
A substantial amount of the “good governance” funds go to support the IDLG and to fund the
Social Outreach Program and a separate “Governor’s Performance Fund.” about $95 million is
going to the IDLG to help it construct new district centers and rehabilitate fifty provincial and
district offices. For comprehensive tables on U.S. aid to Afghanistan, by fiscal year and by
category and type of aid, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
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2009 Elections
The 2009 presidential and provincial elections represent another important step in Afghanistan’s
political development—they are the first post-Taliban elections that were run by the Afghan
government itself. Special Representative Ambassador Richard Holbrooke said at a public forum
on August 12, 2009, that the elections are key to legitimizing the Afghan government, no matter
who wins. Yet, it is not clear that the elections will produce major political change, and there are
concerns that a Karzai reelection might prolong the political strength exercised by traditional
faction leaders. There are also concerns that the first round held on August 20, 2009, might set off
ethnic and factional recriminations that will cause violence and undermine the legitimacy of the
government going forward.
Dispute over the Election Date
Afghan leaders put aside early differences over the date of the election, although Ambassador
Holbrooke says the election delay has forestalled institution of some key U.S. governance
programs. On February 3, 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) set
August 20, 2009, as the election date—a change from a date mandated by Article 61 of the
Constitution as April 21, 2009—in order to allow at least 30 days before Karzai’s term expires on
May 22, 2009. The IEC decision on the latter date cited Article 33 of the Constitution as
mandating universal accessibility to the voting—and saying that the April 21 date was precluded
by difficulties in registering voters, printing ballots, training staff, advertising the elections, and
the dependence on international donor funding, in addition to the security questions.7 This
decision caused the UF bloc to say it would not “recognize” Karzai’s presidency after May 22.
In response to the UF criticism that he sought to prolong his term and use his incumbency to his
advantage, Karzai issued a February 28, 2009, decree directing the IEC to set the elections in
accordance with all provisions of the constitution. However, observers say Karzai’s decree was
largely political because it is widely recognized that Afghan authorities would not be ready to
hold elections by the April 21 date. The IEC reaffirmed on March 4, 2009, that the election would
be held on August 20, 2009.
Karzai’s maneuvers and the official decision did not stop the UF from insisting that Karzai step
down on May 22 in favor of a caretaker government. Karzai argued that the Constitution does not
provide for any transfer of power other than in case of election or death of a President. The
Afghan Supreme Court backed that decision on March 28, 2009. The Obama Administration
publicly backed both the IEC and the Supreme Court rulings even though such backing would be
viewed as an Obama Administration endorsement of Karzai. Ambassador Holbrooke said on
several occasions that the United States is strictly neutral, as discussed further below.
Election Modalities and Processes
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public
appeared to be high in the run-up to the election. Registration (updating of 2005 voter rolls)
7 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat. February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
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began in October 2008 and was completed as of the beginning of March 2009. About 4.5 million
new voters registered, and about 17 million total Afghans were registered. However, there were
widespread reports of registration fraud, with some voters registering on behalf of women who do
not, by custom, show up at registration sites. U.S. and other election observers found instances of
fraudulent registration cards and evidence that cards had been offered for sale. U.S./NATO
military operations in some areas, including in Helmand in January 2009, were conducted to
secure registration centers; however, some election observers noted that there was insufficient
international assistance to the Afghanistan Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which ran
the election, to ensure a clean registration process.
With the August 20 date set, candidates filed to run during April 24-May 8, 2009. A total of 44
registered to run for President, of which three were disqualified for various reasons, leaving a
field of 41 (later reduced to 38 after several dropped out, as discussed below, although their
names may have remained on the ballot).
In the provincial elections, 3,200 persons competed for about 420 seats nationwide. Those
elections were conducted on a “Single Non-Transferable Vote” (SNTV) system, in which each
voter votes for one candidate in a multi-member constituency. That system encourages lots of
candidacies and is considered to discourage the participation of political parties. Although about
80% of the candidates ran as independents, some of Afghanistan’s parties, including Hezb-i-
Islam, which is a prominent grouping in the National Assembly, fielded multiple candidates in
several different provinces. Still, the provincial elections component of the election received little
attention, in part because the role of these councils is unclear. Of the seats up for election, about
200 women competed for the 124 seats reserved for women (25%) on the provincial councils,
although in two provinces (Qandahar and Uruzgan) there were fewer women candidates than
reserved seats. In Kabul Province, 524 candidates were competing for the 29 seats on its
provincial council.
As noted, the elections were run by the IEC—as such, it is the first election that is run by the
Afghans since the late 1960s. There have been assertions of a lack of credibility of the IEC,
because most of its commissioners were selected by the Karzai government. However, the orderly
voting process and vote count process since the August 20 first round appears to have dampened
such criticism. There is also an Elections Complaints Commission (ECC) that reviews fraud
complaints, which have been many—2,200 complaints filed of which 270 have been deemed, to
date, to have had a potential material effect on the election.
The European Union, supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) will send a few hundred observers, and the International Republican Institute and
National Democratic Institute sent observers as well. About 8,000 Afghans assisted the
observation missions, according to the U.N. Nations Development Program. Because much of
Afghanistan is inaccessible by road, ballots were distributed (and have been brought for counting)
by animals in addition to vehicles and aircraft.
Preliminary results are to be announced by September 3, and, after a two-week complaints
evaluation period, final results are to be announced September 17. If a second round is needed,
the constitution requires it be held two weeks after the results of the first round are announced—
meaning the second round would likely be held on October 1. A failed election—one marred by
violence or fraud so vast that no outcome is viewed as legitimate—could be settled by the calling
of a loya jirga to select a new president.
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Security was a major issue for all the international actors supporting the Afghan elections process,
amid open Taliban threats against Afghans who vote. About 7,000 polling centers were to be
established (with each center having multiple polling places, totaling about 29,000), but, of those,
about 800 were deemed too unsafe to open, most of them in restive Helmand and Qandahar
provinces. A total of about 6,200 polling centers opened on election day. Still, the Taliban
intimidation appears to have suppressed the total turnout to about 5.5 million votes cast, or about
a 30% turnout, far lower than expected. Turnout was said by observers and U.S. and other
military personnel based there to have been very low, particularly in Helmand Province, despite
the fact that Helmand has been the focus of a U.S. military-led stabilization offensive that began
July 2, 2009, with the participation of about 8,000 U.S. Marines. The low turnout in Karzai’s
presumed strongholds in the south indicates that Karzai did not materially benefit from the
election delay to August 20, 2009, because southern Afghanistan was not secured during the
summer to the point where voters in that area—particularly women—felt confident enough to
vote in large numbers.
Some observers said that turnout among women nationwide was primarily because there were not
sufficient numbers of female poll workers recruited by the IEC to make women feel comfortable
enough to vote. In general, however, election observers reported that poll workers were generally
attentive and well trained, and the voting process appeared orderly.
In normally secure Kabul, turnout was said to be far lighter than in the 2004 presidential election.
Turnout might have been dampened by a suicide bombing on August 15, 2009, outside
NATO/ISAF military headquarters and intended to intimidate voters not to participate. In
addition, several dozen provincial council candidates, and some workers on the presidential
campaigns, were killed in election-related violence. A convoy carrying Fahim (Karzai Vice
Presidential running mate, see below) was bombed, although Fahim was unharmed.
The Political Contest
The presidential competition took shape in May 2009. In the election-related political deal-
making,8 Karzai obtained an agreement from Muhammad Fahim (a Tajik), formerly his
antagonist and a UF member, to run as his first vice presidential running mate. Karzai, Fahim,
and incumbent second Vice President Karim Khalili (a Hazara) registered their ticket on May 4,
2009, just before Karzai left to visit the United States for the latest round of three-way strategic
talks (U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan). The Fahim choice was criticized by human rights and other
groups because of Fahim’s long identity as a mujahedin commander/militia faction leader, but the
selection, and Fahim’s acceptance, was viewed as a major political coup for Karzai by splitting
off a major figure from the UF bloc. A New York Times story of August 27, 2009, said that the
Bush Administration continued to deal with Fahim when he was Defense Minister (2001-2004)
despite reports that he was involved in facilitating narcotics trafficking in northern Afghanistan.
These reports could complicate U.S. relations with Fahim—to the point of rendering him
ineligible for travel to the United States—if he becomes Vice President as a result of the 2009
election.
Karzai convinced several prominent Pashtuns not to run. Ghul Agha Shirzai, a member of the
powerful Barakzai clan, reportedly reached an arrangement with Karzai the week of the
8 Some of the information in this section obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide. December
2008.
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registration period that headed off his candidacy. Anwar al-Haq Ahady, the former Finance
Minister and Central Bank governor, did not run. Nor did Bush Administration U.S. Ambassador
to the U.N., Afghan-born Zalmay Khalilzad run; he organized a conference of Karzai opponents
in Dubai in early March 2009 and was, up until the last minute, said to be trying to build support
for a candidacy or to unify anti-Karzai factions.
Anti-Karzai Pashtuns did not succeed in coalescing around one challenger. Former Interior
Minister Ali Jalali (who resigned in 2005 over Karzai’s compromises with faction leaders), and
former Finance Minister (2002-2004) and Karzai critic Ashraf Ghani did not reach agreement to
forge a single ticket. In the end, Ghani, the 54-year-old former World Bank official, registered his
candidacy, but without Jalali or prominent representation from other ethnicities in his vice
presidential slots.
As noted above, the UF also failed to forge a united challenge to Karzai. Burhanuddin Rabbani
(Afghanistan president during 1992-1996), the elder statesman of the UF bloc, reportedly insisted
that an ethnic Tajik (the ethnic core of the UF) head the UF ticket. Former Foreign Minister Dr.
Abdullah Abdullah, the 50-year-old former opthalmologist and foreign envoy of the legendary
Tajik mujahedin leader Ahmad Shah Masoud, registered to run with UF backing. His running
mates are Dr. Cheragh Ali Cheragh, a Hazara who did poorly in the 2004 election, and a little
known Pashtun, Homayoun Wasefi. Reports in May 2009 that Ghani and Abdullah might
ultimately forge a joint ticket were not realized. Another problem for the UF was that Ahmad Zia
Massoud (currently one of Karzai’s Vice Presidents) did not win support of the bloc to head its
ticket. Massoud is the brother of Ahmad Shah Masoud (see above), who was killed purportedly
by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks on the United States, and Ahmad Zia has
support among followers of his slain brother.
The Campaign
Karzai went into the election as a clear favorite. However, the key questions was, and still is,
whether he would win in the first round (more than 50% of the vote). IRI and other pre-election
polls showed him with about 45% support. Dr. Abdullah polled about 25% and emerged as the
main challenger, leading some to believe Dr. Abdullah could unify anti-Karzai Afghans to win a
second-round victory, although the conventional wisdom is that the two-round format favors a
Pashtun candidate. During the campaign, one candidate dropped out and endorsed Dr. Abdullah,
and two dropped out and endorsed Karzai.
Among the main issues in the campaign, Karzai’s public support was harmed by perceptions of
ineffectiveness and corruption, although many Afghan voters apparently see many of
Afghanistan’s problems as beyond Karzai’s control. Karzai used some U.S. policy setbacks to
bolster his electoral prospects, for example by railing against civilian casualties resulting from
U.S./NATO operations, and by proposing new curbs on international military operations in
Afghanistan. During the campaign, Karzai announced new measures to limit international forces’
operations in civilian areas and said he would hold a loya jirga, if elected, including Taliban
figures, to try to reach a settlement with the insurgency.
Karzai was criticized for an unfocused campaign that relies on personal ties to ethnic faction
leaders rather than a retail campaign that includes use of the internet and other channels. Karzai
had agreed to public debates with rivals, although he backed out of a scheduled July 23 debate
with Abdullah and Ghani on the grounds that the event was scheduled on short notice and was
limited to only those three. Abdullah and Ghani debated without Karzai, generating additional
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criticism of Karzai. Karzai did attend the next debate on August 16, debating Ghani and
Bashardost, but Abdullah did not participate. There was also a radio forum in which all major
candidates participated. Karzai was said to benefit from his ready access to media attention,
which focuses on his daily schedule as President, including meetings with foreign leaders.
Dr. Abdullah stressed his background of mixed ethnicity (one parent is Pashtun and one is Tajik)
to appeal to Pashtuns, but his experience and background has been with other Tajik leaders and he
campaigned extensively in the north and west, which is populated mainly by Tajiks. However, he
also campaigned in Qandahar, suggesting he would not cede Pashtun votes to Karzai. Isma’il
Khan’s endorsement of Karzai in mid-August apparently helped Karzai win Tajik votes in the
west (Herat Province and environs) and may have lowered Abdullah’s totals among that
community. Dostam’s return to Afghanistan on August 16 apparently delivered many Uzbek votes
to Karzai. Both Karzai and Abdullah held large rallies in Kabul and elsewhere.
Ghani polled at about 6% just before the election, according to surveys. This indicated he might
not win enough Pashtun votes to suppress Karzai’s total in that community. Ghani appeared
frequently in U.S. and Afghan media broadcasts criticizing Karzai for failing to establish
democratic and effective institutions, but he has previously spent much time in the United States
and Europe and many average Afghans view him as a global technocrat who is not necessarily in
touch with day-to-day problems in Afghanistan. Ghani made extensive use of the internet for
advertising and fundraising, and he hired political consultant James Carville to advise his
campaign.9 He emphasized new programs for women in the August 16 debate.
Another candidate who polled unexpectedly well was 54-year-old anti-corruption parliamentarian
Ramazan Bashardost, an ethnic Hazara. He was polling close to 10% just before the election. He
ran a low-budget campaign with low-paid personnel and volunteers, but attracted a lot of media.
This suggests that, despite most Hazara ethnic leaders, such as Mohammad Mohaqiq, endorsing
Karzai, Bashardost would do well among Hazaras, particularly those who are the most educated.
Some believe the Shiite personal status law, discussed above, was an effort by Karzai to win
Hazara Shiite votes. Other significant candidates are shown in the box below.
9 Mulrine, Anna. “Afghan Presidential Candidate Takes a Page From Obama’s Playbook.” U.S. News and World
Report, June 25, 2009.
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Other Candidates
Abd al-Salam Rocketi ("Mullah Rocketi”). A Pashtun, reconciled Taliban figure, member of the lower house of
parliament. May do unexpectedly well if Taliban sympathizers participate, but some believe he might drop out and
endorse Karzai.
Hedayat Amin Arsala. A Pashtun, was a Vice President during 2001-2004. He is a prominent economist and perceived
as close to the former royal family.
Abd al Jabbar Sabit. A Pashtun, was fired by Karzai in 2007 for considering run against Karzai in the election.
Shahnawaz Tanai. A Pashtun. Served as Defense Minister in the Communist government of Najibullah (which was left
in place after the Soviets withdrew in 1989) but led failed coup against Najibullah in April 1990.
Mirwais Yasini. Another strong Pashtun candidate, viewed as a dark horse possible winner. 48-year-old deputy
speaker of the lower house of parliament but also without wel -known non-Pashtun running mates.
Haj Nasrullah Baryalai. Pashtun tribal leader from Jalalabad. Some say he is a candidate to watch, although he attracts
little attention outside Afghanistan.
Frozan Fana and Shahla Ata. The two women candidates in the race. Fana is the wife of the first post-Taliban aviation
minister, who was killed during an altercation at Kabul airport in 2002. These two candidates are widely given almost
no chance of winning, but are attracting substantial media attention as trail-blazers.
The Election Results and Prospects
As noted, the voting process was relatively orderly on election day. However, 27 Afghans, mostly
security forces personnel, were killed in election-day violence. Taliban fighters reportedly fired
mortars and other weapons in some places, including Helmand, to suppress turnout. Those efforts,
as noted, appeared to keep turnout to about 30%. Most significantly, the low turnout in the
presumed Karzai strongholds in southern Afghanistan could lead Karzai and many Pashtuns to
question the election’s legitimacy.
Further clouding the election have been the widespread fraud allegations coming from all sides.
Dr. Abdullah has held two news conferences since the election, purporting to show evidence of
ballot stuffing in favor of Karzai. Karzai’s camp has made similar allegations against Abdullah as
applied to his presumed strongholds in northern Afghanistan.
The IEC has been releasing results slowly. The most recent results were released on August 26,
2009, showing Karzai at 44.8% and Dr. Abdullah at 35.1%, based on a count of 17% of total
votes cast. Bashardost and Ghani were receiving single digit vote counts, with trace amounts for
the remainder of the field. Most of the provinces counted thus far are presumed to be favorable to
Abdullah, and some expect Karzai’s count to climb further. However, because turnout in the south
was very low, Karzai might not receive the 50% needed to avoid a second round between him and
Abdullah. The next set of results are to be released on August 29, with a goal of a preliminary
final count on September 3, and a final count by September 17. There are a number of subsequent
possibilities if no candidate receives 50%:
• The IEC could follow the constitution strictly and set the date for a second round,
two weeks after final results are released. That would put the second round
on/about October 1.
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• Or, and observers say this is a growing possibility, there could be a negotiated
settlement between Karzai and Abdullah. This possibility rises in direct
relationship to the degree to which Karzai’s vote total approaches the 50%
threshold. The closer is Karzai’s total to 50%, the more strongly will Afghan
leaders of all ethnicities try to persuade Abdullah that it is not worth risking
further violence, and all-out Pashtun-Tajik ethnic conflict, to go forward with a
second round. In a second round, many Pashtuns are likely to try to defy threats
of violence in order to prevent a Tajik from becoming President. A settlement
could involve Abdullah’s agreeing to drop his candidacy, possibly in exchange
for cabinet seats for Abdullah and his allies in a post-election government.
Abdullah might also demand a review of the constitution to provide for selection
of provincial governors by provincial councils, and Abdullah input into
governmental negotiations with Taliban figures. It is also possible that a loya
jirga could be held to ratify or provide input into any deal made between the two
camps.
• Some observers believe that Karzai might use his purported influence over the
IEC to create an adjustment to the vote count so as to put his total just above the
50% total, in order to avoid a second round. However, such a move would
constitute direct fraud that is in clear violation of Afghan election laws, and CRS
has no way to independently determine the likelihood of such an action or its
potential for success, if attempted.
U.S. Policy and Interests in the Election
Some believe that U.S. success in stabilizing Afghanistan requires a new Afghan president
untainted by corruption among associates. Others believe that Karzai’s opponents might not
necessarily perform better if they are elected, and would similarly favor their clansmen and other
inner-circle members. Others say that Karzai continues to deserve U.S. support because he has
held the various ethnicities together despite the major strains of the Taliban insurgency.
No matter the implications for the U.S. stabilization mission, the Obama Administration has
decided that trying to affect the outcome of the election would be counterproductive or
inappropriate. U.S. officials expressed clear U.S. neutrality in the election; Ambassador Timothy
Carney was appointed to head the U.S. election support effort at U.S. Embassy Kabul, tasked to
ensure that the United States was even-handed. Still, some leading Karzai supporters criticized
the attendance by Ambassador Karl Eikenberry at news conferences of the major candidates in
mid-June, as the campaign period formally kicked off. Ambassador Holbrooke met with several
major challengers during a July 2009 visit to Afghanistan.
A major U.S. Administration fear has been that the election would be marred by violence, or by
real or perceived fraud. The day after the election, President Obama called the election “an
important step forward in the Afghan people’s effort to take control of their future, even as violent
extremists stand in their way.” Some believe the statement might have been too optimistic,
coming before many allegations of election fraud were revealed in subsequent days.
In articulating their position on the vote count, complaint period, and possibility of a second
round, Obama Administration officials have expressed the view that the United States is looking
for a legitimate process to unfold, in line with Afghanistan’s constitution and election laws. That
position would indicate that the Administration supports a run-off being held if Karzai gets any
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less than a majority of the first-round votes. Ambassador Holbrooke reportedly expressed that
view directly to Karzai on August 27, 2009, and the two purportedly engaged in sharp exchanges
as Karzai may have indicated his support for a negotiated settlement that avoids a second-round
run-off. A U.S. official, commenting on the Holbrooke-Karzai exchange, said that “whether there
is a run-off is an issue for the Afghan electoral bodies [and not Karzai] to determine.”10 Some
might argue that a negotiated settlement that avoids a second round is in line with Afghan
traditions, would avoid any potential for Pashtun-Tajik conflict, and should attract U.S. support.
Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim Administration
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key
security positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai
reaffirmed as leader by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional
Afghan assembly).
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong
presidency, a rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance
presidential power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men
and women equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are
not “un-Islamic”; allows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter
7, Article 15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential,
provincial, and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-
hereditary position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for 5-year term, held Oct. 9, 2004.
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia
Masud, a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud,
who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the Sept. 11 attacks, and Karim
Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter,
Northern Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female
ran, got about 1%. Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq got 11.7%; and Dostam won
10%. Funded with $90 million in international aid, including $40 million from U.S.
(FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106).
Parliamentary Elections
Elections held Sept. 18, 2005 on Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
stood as individuals, not part of party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower
house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house
(Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). Voting was for one candidate only, although
number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to
33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11
seats each. The body is 28% female (68 persons), in line with the legal minimum of 68
women - two per each of the 34 provinces. Upper house appointed by Karzai (34
seats, half of which are to be women), by the provincial councils (34 seats), and
district councils (remaining 34 seats). There are 23 women in it, above the 17
required by the constitution. Because district elections (400 district councils) were
not held, provincial councils selected 68 on interim basis. 2,815 candidates for
Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5
million registered. Funded by $160 million in international aid, including $45 million
from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 109-13).
Provincial Elections/
Provincial elections held Sept. 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections.
District Elections
Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial
council sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats
are 420, of which 121 held by women. l3,185 candidates, including 279 women. Some
criticize the provincial election system as disproportionately weighted toward large
districts within each province. District elections not held due to complexity and
potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Cabinet
Full-term 27 seat cabinet named by Karzai in December 2004. Heavily weighted
10 Braithwaite, Tom. “U.S. Envoy Confronts Afghan President Over Poll.” Financial Times, August 28, 2009. Cable
News Network, August 28, 2009.
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toward Pashtuns, and created new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. Rahim Wardak
named Defense Minister, replacing Northern Alliance military leader Mohammad
Fahim. Qanooni not in cabinet, subsequently was selected Wolesi Jirga Speaker.
Northern Alliance figure Dr. Abdullah replaced as Foreign Minister in March 2006.
Cabinet reshuffle in October 2008 including appointment of Muhammad Hanif Atmar
as Interior Minister.
Next Elections
Presidential and provincial elections to be held Aug. 20, 2009. Parliamentary, district,
and municipal elections to follow in 2010. Each election to cost $200 million.
Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations
Clan/Tribal
Location Example
Confederations
Durrani
Qandahar
Popalzai
Qandahar
Hamid Karzai, President of
Afghanistan; Jelani Popal,
head of the Independent
Directorate of Local
Governance
Alikozai Qandahar
N/A
Barakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Ghul Agha Shirzai
(Governor, Nangarhar
Province)
Achakzai Qandahar,
Helmand
Alizai
Helmand (Musa Qala district) Sher Mohammad
Akhunzadeh (former
Helmand governor)
Noorzai
Qandahar
Noorzai brothers, briefly in
charge of Qandahar after the
fall of the Taliban in
November 2001
Ghilzai
Paktia, Paktika and Khost
Mullah Omar
Ahmadzai
Paktia, Paktika, Khost
Mohammed Najibullah
(pres. 1986-1992); Ashraf
Ghani, Finance
Finance Minister 2002-2004
Taraki
Nur Mohammed Taraki
(leader 1978-1979)
Kharoti
Hafizullah Amin (leader
September - December1979)
Zadran
Paktia, Khost
Pacha Khan Zadran (see
text); Insurgent leader
Jalaludin Haqqani
Kodai
Mangal
Paktia, Khost
Ghulab Mangal (Governor of
Helmand Province)
Orkazai
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Clan/Tribal
Location Example
Confederations
Shinwari
Nangarhar province
Fasl Ahmed Shinwari, former
Supreme Court Chief Justice
Mandezai
Sangu Khel
Sipah
Wardak
Wardak Province
Abdul Rahim Wardak
(Pashtu-speaking
(Defense Minister)
non-Pashtun)
Afridis
Tirah, Khyber Pass, Kohat
Zaka khel
Jawaki
Adam khel
Malikdin, etc
Yusufzais
Khursan, Swat, Kabul
Akozais
Malizais
Loezais
Khattaks
Kohat, Peshawar, Bangash
Akorai
Terai
Mohmands
Near Khazan, Peshawar
Baizai
Alimzai
Uthmanzais
Khawazais
Wazirs Mainly
in
Waziristan
Darwesh khel
Bannu
Source: This table was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.
Note: N/A indicates no example is available.
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Figure 1. Afghanistan Ethnic Groups
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Acknowledgments
The table of major Pashtun tribes was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.
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