Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and
Policy Implications
Kerry Dumbaugh
Specialist in Asian Affairs
August 21, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40493
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and Policy Implications
Summary
U.S. policy toward Taiwan (officially titled, but rarely referred to as, the Republic of China) is
unique in U.S. foreign relationships. Since both the Chinese governments on Taiwan and on
mainland China held that they alone were the legitimate ruling government of all China, U.S.
diplomatic relations with Taiwan had to be severed in 1979 when the United States decided to
recognize the government in Beijing as China’s sole legitimate government. Since then, the
United States has maintained extensive but unofficial relations with Taiwan built around the
framework of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA – P.L. 96-8) and shaped by three U.S.-PRC
communiqués. Under these, the United States maintains diplomatic relations with the PRC, but
continues to have critical interests in and ties with Taiwan absent diplomatic relations. These
include significant commercial ties, objections to PRC threats to use force against Taiwan, arms
sales and security assurances, and support for Taiwan’s democratic development. U.S. policy
today remains rooted in a general notion of maintaining the “status quo” between Taiwan and the
PRC. But other factors have changed dramatically since 1979, including growing PRC power and
importance, Taiwan’s democratization, and the deepening of Taiwan-PRC economic and social
linkages. These changes have led to periodic discussions about the efficacy of current U.S. policy
and whether or not it should be reviewed or changed.
Taiwan’s current president, Ma Ying-jeou, elected in March 2008, moved quickly to jump start
Taiwan-PRC talks that had been stalled since 1998. The talks to date have yielded a number of
agreements, including agreements to establish regular direct weekend charter flights, direct sea
and air transportation, postal links, and food safety mechanisms. Taiwan also has lifted long-
standing caps on Taiwan investment in the PRC and lowered the profile of its bids for
participation in U.N. agencies. These and other initiatives are welcomed by many as having
contributed to greater regional stability. More pessimistic observers see growing PRC-Taiwan ties
eroding U.S. influence, strengthening PRC leverage and, particularly in the face of expanding
economic links, jeopardizing Taiwan autonomy and economic security.
The changing dynamic between Taiwan and the PRC poses increasingly difficult, competing
policy challenges for the United States. Along with new policy challenges – such as what U.S.
policy should be if Taiwan should continue to move closer to or even align with the PRC – the
Obama Administration will be faced with other challenges familiar from past years, including
decisions on new arms sales to Taiwan, which are anathema to the PRC; how to accommodate
requests for visits to the United States by President Ma and other senior Taiwan officials; the
overall nature of U.S. relations with the Ma government; whether to pursue closer economic ties
with Taiwan; what role, if any, Washington should play in cross-strait relations; and more broadly,
what form of defense assurances to offer Taiwan. In addition, the Taiwan government also seeks
to raise its international profile in other ways involving the United States. Taiwan successfully has
sought to be removed from the U.S. Special 301 “Watch List” for intellectual property rights
violations, and it is seeking to qualify for the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which eliminates
some visa requirements for qualified countries. The Taiwan government also continues to ask for
a U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which would broaden the current and stalled avenue
for U.S.-Taiwan trade discussions, the 1994 Trade and Investment Framework (TIFA).
Legislation in the 111th Congress concerning Taiwan includes H.Con.Res. 18, urging that the
United States resume diplomatic relations with Taiwan; and H.Con.Res. 55, expressing U.S.
support for and commitment to Taiwan. This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and Policy Implications
Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
Key U.S. Policy Questions .......................................................................................................... 1
Brief Background to Taiwan’s Political Landscape ...................................................................... 2
Fundamentals of U.S. Policy ................................................................................................. 3
The Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8) .............................................................................. 3
Changing Political Dynamics in Taiwan ................................................................................ 4
Key Current Issues ...................................................................................................................... 5
Current Political Situation in Taiwan ..................................................................................... 5
Resumption of Cross-Strait Talks .......................................................................................... 6
Bid for U.N. Membership/Participation ................................................................................. 7
Corruption Investigations: Former Chen Administration........................................................ 9
Special Expense Accounts............................................................................................. 10
Economic and Trade Relations ............................................................................................ 10
Taiwan-U.S. Trade and Investment ................................................................................ 10
Cross-Strait Trade and Investment ................................................................................. 12
Other Key Bilateral Issues................................................................................................... 12
U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan and Taiwan’s Defense Budget.............................................. 12
Visa Waiver Program (VWP) ........................................................................................ 13
U.S. Policy Trends .............................................................................................................. 14
Policy Options for Congress...................................................................................................... 15
Maintain and Reaffirm the Current AOne-China@ Policy....................................................... 15
Change the AOne China@ Policy ........................................................................................... 16
Policy Adjustments at the Margins ...................................................................................... 16
Another ATaiwan Policy Review@ .................................................................................. 16
More Active U.S. Role on Cross-Strait Relations........................................................... 18
Exert More Pressure on the PRC ................................................................................... 18
More Overt U.S. Support for Taiwan Democracy .......................................................... 19
Implications ........................................................................................................................ 19
For Cross-Strait Relations ............................................................................................. 20
For U.S. Arms Sales...................................................................................................... 21
For PRC Policy and Credibility ..................................................................................... 21
For Taiwan Democracy ................................................................................................. 22
Legislation in the 111th Congress ............................................................................................... 22
Chronology............................................................................................................................... 23
For Additional Reading ............................................................................................................. 26
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 26
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Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and Policy Implications
Recent Developments
August 19, 2009—Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Taiwan would not seek
full membership in the U.N. this year, but instead would seek to participate in the activities of
U.N. specialized institutions, like the World Meteorological Organization and the World Maritime
Organization.
August 07, 2009—Over a period of several days, Typhoon Morakot slammed into the Philippines,
Taiwan, and China, causing hundreds of millions of dollars in damage and numerous fatalities.
July 27, 2009—PRC President and Communist Party Secretary Hu Jintao sent a congratulatory
note to Taiwan’s newly elected KMT chairman Ma Ying-jeou.
July 26, 2009—Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou was elected to the chairmanship of his political
Party, the Nationalist Party (KMT).
July 21, 2009—It was reported that Taiwan and China plan to open semi-official tourism offices
in each other’s territories by the end of 2009.
July 16, 2009—The opening ceremony of the 2009 World Games began, being hosted by Taiwan.
Key U.S. Policy Questions
U.S. policy on Taiwan, which is enshrined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (the TRA, P.L. 96-8),
remains rooted in a general notion of maintaining the “status quo” as it existed when the TRA
was enacted. The United States has interpreted the “status quo” as the preservation of peace and
stability in the Taiwan Strait until such time as the undecided issue of Taiwan’s political status can
be resolved peacefully by agreement between Taiwan and the PRC. Some in the United
States also see the “status quo” as the maintenance of a relative military, economic, and
diplomatic balance between the two sides.1 Everything that has followed since then in U.S. policy
toward Taiwan has been bound up within this delicate balance.
But while U.S. policy has remained static, the circumstances it was designed to address have
changed dramatically. Complex political changes have occurred in both Taiwan and the PRC. The
military balance is shifting inexorably in the PRC’s favor, there have been dramatic
improvements in the PRC’s economic fortunes, and the two sides have increasingly connected
economic interests. These changes have resulted in periodic speculation about whether the current
U.S. policy framework remains appropriate or should be revised. Issues involving Taiwan’s
unresolved political status remain key features in other U.S. interactions with both Taiwan and the
PRC. They include complex policy trade-offs and questions such as:
1 Definitions of the “status quo” for Taiwan vary among the parties involved. Some in the United States, such as
Georgetown University Professor Robert Sutter, see the “status quo” as the maintenance of balance between the two
sides. The former government of Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian interpreted “status quo” to mean that Taiwan was
already a fully independent, sovereign state. The current Taiwan government of President Ma Ying-jeou has described
the “status quo” more as de facto independence. The PRC definition of the “status quo” counts Taiwan as an
unalienable part of China.
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• how far the United States should go in trying to accommodate PRC sensitivities about
Taiwan without compromising U.S. principles supporting Taiwan’s democratic
development;
• how much the United States should try to pressure either China or Taiwan or both to
avoid provocative actions;
• whether the United States should change its policy of not arbitrating or facilitating
negotiations between Taiwan and the PRC in favor of a more direct, interventionist
approach; and
• whether the United States should conduct a reassessment of its Taiwan policy in light of
changing circumstances, and what the extent of such a possible reassessment should be.
Brief Background to Taiwan’s Political Landscape
Once a U.S. World War II ally, China’s situation changed dramatically after the civil war victory
of Mao Tse-tung in 1949. The reigning Chinese government, led by Chiang Kai-shek and his
Kuomintang (KMT) party, fled mainland China and moved to Taiwan, an island off the southern
Chinese coast. For the next 30 years, the United States continued officially to recognize the
government on Taiwan while both regimes—the KMT government on Taiwan and the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) government on the mainland—claimed legitimacy as the sole legal
government of the Chinese people.
With these competing claims of sovereignty, official U.S. relations with the government on
Taiwan became a casualty of the 1979 decision to establish U.S. diplomatic relations with the
PRC government as the sole government of all China. U.S. unofficial relations with Taiwan,
meanwhile, have been shaped since then by three U.S.-China communiqués and built on the
framework of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8). Under these agreements, the United
States maintains its official relations with the PRC while selling Taiwan military weapons and
having extensive economic, political, and security interests there. Since then, absent formal
diplomatic relations, the United States still has maintained substantial economic and security
relationships with Taiwan, including the sale of defensive military weapons and services.2 But
continuing political and economic transformations in both the PRC and Taiwan since 1979 mean
that U.S. policymakers are facing a different set of complex policy choices with each passing
year.
This report focuses on current developments in Taiwan, analyzing how those developments are
affecting choices the United States makes about its policy toward Taiwan specifically and toward
the PRC more broadly. Other CRS reports provide more details about the myriad historical
complexities of Taiwan’s current situation in U.S. policy, such as: historical background about
how the ROC on Taiwan went from a U.S. ally to a government with no diplomatic U.S.
relations, including the fundamentals governing U.S. policy toward Taiwan today (CRS Report
RS22388, Taiwan’s Political Status: Historical Background and Ongoing Implications); the
increase in U.S.-Taiwan tensions under the former administration of President Chen Shui-bian
2 U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan are governed by Section 2 and Section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8: 22
U.S.C., Chapter 48, Sections 3301-3316.
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(CRS Report RL33684, Underlying Strains in Taiwan-U.S. Political Relations); the 2008
elections in Taiwan (CRS Report RS22853, Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential Election, all by Kerry
Dumbaugh; as well as the subtle permutations of the “one-China” policy over three decades and
its role in U.S. policy (CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China”
Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei) and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
(CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990), both by Shirley A. Kan.
Fundamentals of U.S. Policy
The fundamental framework of U.S. policy toward Taiwan was laid down decades ago, beginning
with the Nixon opening to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1971 that resulted in the
severing of official relations with the government on Taiwan in 1979. U.S. policy toward Taiwan
since then has been defined by four primary documents: the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8,
enacted in 1979); and three U.S. communiqués with the PRC:
• the Shanghai Communiqué (1972), in which the United States “acknowledge[d]" that
both China and Taiwan maintain there is but one China, declared it did “not challenge
that position," and reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question.
• the Communiqué on Normalization of Relations with the PRC (1979), in which the
United States recognized the PRC government as the sole legitimate government of all
China and “acknowledge[d] the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan
is part of China", and
• the August 17 Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan (1982), in which the United
States stated it had no intention of pursuing a “two-China" policy; that it appreciated
China's pledges to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question; and that it did not
plan on a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan.
In addition, U.S. policy has been shaped during these decades by a combination of other factors.
Among these are a set of six policy assurances the United States gave Taiwan in the 1980s;3 the
precedents set by a collection of sensitive “guidelines on Taiwan” that the executive branch has
adopted to define and constrain its actions; a variety of statements by successive U.S.
Administrations about the nature of U.S. policy toward Taiwan and the PRC; and periodic
initiatives by Members of Congress intended to affect U.S. policy in some way.
The Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8)
In 1979, the Carter Administration announced the United States would sever official relations
with Taiwan and recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China. While Members of
the 96th Congress clearly concurred with the strategic imperative of such a move, many Members
were unhappy with what they saw as the Carter Administration’s minimal proposals for continued
dealings with the government on Taiwan. In particular, some were concerned that the package of
3 Various participants in crafting U.S. Taiwan policy report differing versions of the “six assurances.” Basically, the
assurances are that the United States will not change the TRA and will not pressure Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC;
or become involved as mediator in negotiations between Taiwan and the PRC. For a more thorough discussion, see
CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington,
Beijing, and Taipei, by Shirley A. Kan.
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legislation the White House submitted to Congress to govern future unofficial relations with
Taiwan – the “Taiwan Enabling Act” – did not go far enough in protecting either Taiwan or U.S.
interests. Congressional debate on the legislation in 1979 was extensive and complicated. The end
result was passage of a much amended version of the Administration’s proposal—the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA – P.L. 96-8)—which remains the domestic legal authority for conducting
unofficial U.S. relations with Taiwan today.4 Much of the TRA deals with the logistics of U.S.-
Taiwan relations: the establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) as the unofficial
U.S. representative for diplomatic interactions with Taiwan, including details about its staffing,
functions, and funding; and the continued application of existing U.S. laws and treaties affecting
Taiwan after the severing of ties.5
Although it is a common American misperception that the TRA mandates the United States to
defend Taiwan in case of attack, nothing in the TRA specifically obligates the United States to do
so or to resort to military conflict on Taiwan’s behalf. In 1995-1996, precedent was set for
potential U.S. involvement when the United States sent two carrier battle groups to the area after
China conducted an unprecedented series of live-fire missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait. In
light of the lack of a mandate in the TRA but the apparent U.S. willingness to act in the Taiwan
Strait missile crisis, there remain questions about how the United States may react in a
comparable situation now.
Of particular relevance for long-term U.S. policy are Section 2 (b) and Section 3 of the TRA,
dealing with U.S. strategic interests in and arms sales commitments to Taiwan.6 Section 2 of the
TRA speaks in broad terms about U.S. interests for peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question,
saying that any forceful resolution would be of “grave concern to the United States.” It further
states that U.S. policy is to “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist ... coercion” in
addressing the Taiwan issue. Section 3 provides for the sale of U.S. defense articles and services
to Taiwan, but is non-specific about the nature of these articles. It merely calls for “such defense
articles and services ... as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability.” It also gives Congress a role in determining what needs Taiwan may have. Much of
the U.S. debate on Taiwan arms sales since the TRA was enacted has involved differing
judgments—often between Congress and the White House—about what should be the capabilities
and quantities of the “necessary” articles and services the United States provide to Taiwan under
Section 3.
Changing Political Dynamics in Taiwan
Until the mid-1980s, Taiwan had a one-party system in which Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarian
Nationalist Party (KMT) ruled under martial law.7 The KMT permitted no political opposition and
held no democratic elections. In 1986, the party began to liberalize, allowing the formation of
4 For more detailed discussions of congressional actions at the time, see “Congress and U.S. policy in Asia: New
relationships with China and Taiwan,” in Congress and Foreign Policy – 1979, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1980, pp. 54-71; Wolff, Lester L. And Simon, David L., eds.,
Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, American Association for Chinese Studies, Jamaica, New York, 1982;
Jones, DuPre, ed., China: U.S. Policy Since 1945, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1980.
5 See the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) website at [ http://www.ait.org.tw/en/]
6 See CRS Report 96-246, Taiwan: Texts of the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. - China Communiques, and the "Six
Assurances", by Kerry Dumbaugh.
7 In Chinese, the Nationalist Party is “Kuomintang” (or KMT) in Taiwan and Guomindang (or GMD) in the PRC.
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opposition parties, including the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a party whose platform
advocated Taiwan independence from China. The KMT government also ended martial law (in
1987), and for the first time opened government positions to native “Taiwanese”—the 85% of the
island’s population who predated the influx of the two million “mainlanders” fleeing civil war in
China. In the ensuing years, members of the ROC legislature on Taiwan, elected on mainland
China over 40 years earlier, were asked to retire, and a new, streamlined legislature was elected in
1992.
In 1996, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election, which was won by KMT leader Lee
Teng-hui, himself a native Taiwanese. During his presidency, Lee increasingly distanced himself
from his party’s long-standing position that there was only “one China” and that Taiwan was part
of it. Instead he began emphasizing Taiwan’s distinct culture and identity apart from the PRC’s.
This posed complications for one of the fundamental tenets on which U.S. relations with the PRC
were based—the statement that “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side
of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.”8
The uninterrupted KMT dynasty on Taiwan finally was broken on March 18, 2000, when DPP
candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidency with only 39% of the popular vote in a three-way
race. The victory was a stunning defeat for the KMT and its unbroken 50-year tenure in power on
Taiwan. By the narrowest of margins, President Chen was elected to a second (and final) term in
March 2004, winning by only 29,518 votes out of a reported 13.25 million votes cast.9 The
KMT’s fall from political dominance was compounded in two subsequent legislative elections in
December 2001 and December 2004. By 2004, the KMT saw its majority of 115 seats in the 225-
member Legislative Yuan (LY) cut to just 79.
With neither the DPP nor the KMT having a working majority, each formed coalitions with
smaller parties to gain strength. President Chen Shui-bian presided over a “Pan-Green” coalition
composed of his DPP party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union; it was opposed by the “pan-Blue”
coalition of the KMT and the People First Party (PFP), which together retained the barest control
of Taiwan’s 225-member legislature. Since the two opposing coalitions had very different
political ideologies and roughly equal political strength, this split government created significant
gridlock in Taiwan’s political arena, and thus difficult political realities for U.S. policymakers
throughout Chen’s tenure.
Key Current Issues
Current Political Situation in Taiwan
The political situation in Taiwan changed substantially in 2008 when momentum swung back
behind the KMT while the DPP, struggling with growing political scandal and low voter
8 This particular quote is from the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué issued at the conclusion of President Richard Nixon’s
landmark trip to China. A somewhat vaguer formulation—“The [United States] acknowledges the Chinese position that
there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”—was part of the 1979 communiqué normalizing U.S. relations
with the PRC.
9 In this campaign, President Chen and his Vice-president, Annette Lu, were both shot and slightly wounded just before
the election. KMT opponents, who believed they were on the verge of victory, called this the “shooting incident,”
believing it helped the DPP attain victory.
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confidence, lost power in both presidential and legislative elections. Taiwan’s new President, Ma
Ying-jeou, of the KMT, has pursued a more conciliatory approach toward the PRC and has vowed
to improve relations with the United States. Since his landslide election, however, Ma’s
popularity has fallen, plagued among other things by a faltering economy, tumbling stock
markets, and rising energy prices as well as by concerns over his cross-strait policies and by
residual domestic political tensions in Taiwan. Under Taiwan’s new KMT government, then, the
United States faces new challenges involving the implications of closer and more cordial ties
between Taiwan and the PRC for U.S. interests, and what role, if any, Washington should play in
cross-strait relations.
The return of the KMT to power in Taiwan has raised questions about the political health of the
DPP opposition, which was effectively crushed in 2008 elections. The DPP has been demoralized
further by political scandals involving former President Chen. There have been some reports that
a key DPP figure and former presidential candidate, Frank Hsieh, may even be considering
forming a separate political party, something that would deal a serious blow to DPP fortunes.10 In
an effort to ensure its future, DPP leadership appears to be reducing the party’s emphasis on
Taiwan sovereignty and independence in favor of pursuing a broader strategy emphasizing social
and political reform.11 A critical test for the party will be how well it can do in city and county
elections scheduled for the end of 2009 and in 2010.
Although the KMT is dominant once more, the new government has been criticized not only for
cross-strait initiatives, but for its handling of the 2008 indictment of former President Chen on
corruption and money-laundering charges. Chen has been held in detention without bail since
December 30, 2008, ostensibly (according to the Taipei District Court) out of fear that he would
collude with witnesses, destroy evidence, or flee. The court also has said Chen has “interfered”
with the case by communicating with the public through friends and family. The court’s decisions
have led to growing criticism, including by legal experts, that Chen’s ongoing detention without
bail is a violation of human rights and “seriously undermine[s] the credibility of the judiciary.”12
President Ma also has been criticized for seeking and winning (on July 26, 2009) the KMT
chairmanship. Ma, the sole candidate for the post, campaigned for president on assurances that he
would not seek his party’s chairmanship. Ma’s position as party chair will assure him more
control over the nomination of party candidates and will help him counter the lingering influence
of old-time KMT leaders. His position as head of the party also should increase his stature in the
cross-strait process, since as party chair (but not as Taiwan president) he can justify
communicating directly with Beijing. On July 27, 2009, for instance, PRC Party Secretary Hu
Jintao sent Ma written congratulations on his election as KMT chair – a communication not now
possible in the two men’s respective roles as presidents
Resumption of Cross-Strait Talks
Many observers believe that the election of President Ma presented an opportunity to lay a new
framework in Taiwan-PRC relations—one that moves toward cross-strait improvements and new
understandings, and away from the more confrontational policies of the past. Ma has sought to
10 Young, David, “Ex-Premier Hsieh may form a new party,” The China Post, May 31, 2009.
11 According to Ms. Tsai Ing-wen, current DPP chair.
12 “DPP chair launches drive for ex-president’s release,” The China Post, June 26, 2009.
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ease tensions with China and improve cross-strait ties, and leaders in Beijing have been receptive.
Cross-strait improvements to date have occurred on a number of levels. In a symbolic move,
Taiwan in mid-May 2008 worked jointly with the PRC in providing disaster relief after the
Sichuan earthquake. By late May, Taiwan had accepted a PRC invitation to resume a direct SEF-
ARATS dialogue for the first time since October 1998. Three rounds of cross-Strait talks have
been held to date.13 They include:
• A first round in Beijing on June 12-13, 2008, resulting in agreements to allow weekend
direct charter flights and boost PRC tourism to Taiwan.
• A second round in Taiwan on November 4-7, 2008, resulting in four agreements on direct
sea transportation, air transportation, food safety, and direct postal links.
• A third round in Nanjing, China on April 26-28, 2009, resulting in agreements on cross-
strait crime fighting, mutual judicial assistance, and others, plus a consensus, for the first
time, on promoting mainland investment in Taiwan.
In addition, both sides also have taken unilateral steps, with Taiwan among other things easing
investment restrictions with China and the PRC dropping its long-standing objection to allowing
Taiwan to participate (as a non-member) in the 2009 World Health Assembly, the annual meeting
of the U.N.’s World Health Organization (WHO). PRC and Taiwan officials also have talked
about creating a comprehensive agreement to expand economic cooperation between Taiwan and
China – the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) – discussed elsewhere in this
memo. Some in Taiwan are critical of the cross-strait initiatives, saying they are too rapid and that
easing cross-strait economic restrictions has jeopardized Taiwan’s interests. Taiwan’s economy,
they say, will become more vulnerable to PRC pressure and manipulation under Ma’s cross-strait
initiatives.14 The opposition party also has criticized Ma’s diplomatic overtures toward China as
being “over-dependent on China’s goodwill.”15 In March 2009, the Chairman of the U.S.
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Ray Burghardt, said that the United States was “comfortable
with what’s happening” in Taiwan-PRC engagement.
Bid for U.N. Membership/Participation
With cross-strait rapprochement, Beijing in 2009 began to moderate its long-standing objection to
Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the U.N. health organizations. On January 13, 2009, WHO
sent a letter to Taiwan stating that the island henceforth would be included in the International
Health Regulations (IHR), a set of legally binding rules governing international commitment to
disease surveillance, alert, and response. As an IHR participant, Taiwan will be included in the
Global Outbreak and Alert Response Network, receiving the latest updates on global epidemics.
On April 29, 2009, Taiwan authorities announced that the World Health Organization (WHO) had
13 The Taiwan and PRC governments still do not negotiate directly. In Taiwan, cross-strait talks are handled on the
Taiwan side by the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), a nominally non-governmental organization authorized to
handle such exchanges. The corresponding body in the PRC is the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
(ARATS), under the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. All three rounds of talks were conducted by these two
bodies.
14 Wu, Sofia, “Cross-strait talks should be accelerated: president,” Central News Agency English, June 15, 2008.
15 “Ma’s cross-strait economic and trade policies are not ready,” DPP News link, July 22, 2008, http://www.dpp.org.tw/
.
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invited Taiwan to attend the 2009 WHA meeting from May 18-27 as an observer. The invitation
marked the first time that Taiwan has been permitted to participate in an activity of U.N.
specialized agency since it lost its U.N. seat to the PRC in 1971. Taiwan’s Department of Health
sent a 15-member delegation to the meeting using the name “Chinese Taipei.”
Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou attributed the 2009 invitation to his moderate and flexible
approach toward Beijing during the first year of his tenure. In its first WHO bid on August 14,
2008, the Ma Administration submitted a proposal to the U.N. Secretariat asking to be allowed to
have “meaningful participation” in U.N. special organizations such as the WHO.16 Because of
PRC objections, a U.N. subcommittee decided on September 18, 2008 not to include Taiwan’s
request for “meaningful participation” in U.N. activities on the agenda for the 63rd General
Assembly.
Other Taiwan observers have bristled at the suggestion that PRC officials essentially had given
“permission” for Taiwan to participate by negotiating directly with the WHO to include Taiwan.17
Taiwan’s Foreign Minister, Francisco H.L. Ou, earlier had said that Taiwan would only accept an
invitation extended directly by the WHO Secretariat, not one routed through Beijing.18 Taiwan
had been unsuccessful in 15 previous attempts to gain either membership or non-member status in
the U.N. and its affiliates such as the WHO. Taiwan’s efforts under the DPP Administration of
President Chen included an application both for full U.N. membership as well as for use of either
the name “Republic of China” or “Taiwan.” These applications had been of particular concern to
both China and the United States.
U.S. government officials, on record in the past as supporting Taiwan’s membership in
organizations “where statehood is not an issue,”19 had been unusually blunt and outspoken in
opposition to some of Taiwan’s past U.N. application efforts under President Chen. In August
2007, for instance, a senior U.S. officials said:
We are very supportive of Taiwan on many many fronts.... However, membership in the
United Nations requires statehood. Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is not at this point a
state in the international community. The position of the United States government is that the
ROC ... is an issue undecided, and it has been left undecided ... for many, many years.20
In response to the 2009 announcement, however, the U.S. State Department issued a statement
saying that the United States has “long supported Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the WHO,
including observers status at the WHA.”21 Taipei also points out that it is a full member in other
international organizations to which the PRC also belongs, such as the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
16 According to The China Post of August 16, 2008, the resolution was titled “The Need to Examine the Fundamental
Rights of the 23 Million People of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to Participate Meaningfully in the Activities of the
U.N. Specialized Agencies.”
17 Xie Yu, “Taiwan put under WHO health rules,” China Daily, February 12, 2009.
18 Chen, Jian, “WHA arrangements directed by China unacceptable: foreign minister,” Central News Agency, March
19, 2009.
19 A State Department spokesman, in response to a press question at the State Department press briefing of March 20,
2002.
20 Dennis Wilder, National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs, at a White House press briefing on the
President’s September APEC trip, August 30, 2007.
21 U.S. Department of State, Statement by Robert A. Wood, Acting Spokesman, dated April 29, 2009.
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(APEC).22 In 2004, the 108th Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 108-235) requiring the Secretary
of State to seek Taiwan’s observer status in WHO each year at its annual meeting, the World
Health Assembly (WHA). Taiwan has maintained that its “observer status” in U.N. bodies such as
WHO would be an apolitical solution since other non-sovereign entities, like the Holy See and the
Palestine Liberation Organization, have been given such status.
Corruption Investigations: Former Chen Administration
On December 12, 2008, former President Chen Shui-bian was indicted on charges of corruption
and money laundering while he served as Taiwan’s president. He was arrested on those charges
on November 12, 2008; his trial began on March 26, 2009. The presiding judge in the case has
said that he will render his decision on the Chen cases in September 2009. The KMT government
has been criticized for its handling of the case against the former president. Chen has been held in
detention without bail since December 30, 2008, ostensibly (according to the Taipei District
Court) out of fear that he would collude with witnesses, destroy evidence, or flee. The court also
has said Chen has “interfered” with the case by communicating with the public through friends
and family.23 The court’s decisions have led to growing criticism, including by legal experts, that
Chen’s ongoing detention without bail is a violation of human rights and “seriously undermine[s]
the credibility of the judiciary.”24
The Taiwan government conducted broadening investigations into allegations of corruption made
since 2006 against then-President Chen, his family members, and officials in his administration.
New allegations of money-laundering arose in August 2008 against Chen and his family, plunging
the DPP further into crisis, according to current DPP chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen.25 The August
2008 allegations, which involve foreign government investigations and not just those of Taiwan’s
KMT-dominated government, also are the first in which Chen publicly admitted even partial
culpability, saying that the funds were from campaign contributions, legally acquired, that he
failed to report. On August 15, 2008, Chen apologized to the DPP for causing “humiliation” and
“irreparable damage” to the party for his failure to declare the campaign funds. He announced his
and his wife’s immediate resignations from DPP party membership.26
Shortly after Chen stepped down as president on May 20, 2008 (thereby losing his presidential
immunity), Taiwan prosecutors announced they were starting an official investigation on his
potential role in the 2006 corruption and malfeasance charges. In pursuit of these allegations,
President Ma on August 6, 2008 announced that he was declassifying documents, classified by
Chen while he was president, that allegedly implicated Chen in the case of the special expenses
fund. Chen has maintained that the funds wired to overseas accounts are undeclared campaign
funds legally acquired, not government funds embezzled from the “special affairs” account while
he was president or bribes associated with the 2004 financial reforms he initiated.27 He has called
22 Hong Kong also enjoys separate membership in these organizations from its sovereign, the PRC.
23 Chen was first arrested and detained on November 12, 2008; he was released without bail on December 13, 2008, but
prosecutors appealed that decision and sought to detain him again. On December 30, 2008, the court ordered Chen
returned to jail, where he has since remained.
24 “DPP chair launches drive for ex-president’s release,” The China Post, June 26, 2009.
25 DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen, quoted in “DPP chief ‘shocked’ by former President Chen’s graft scandal,” The
China Post in English, August 17, 2008.
26 “ Former president quits DPP in disgrace,” Central News Agency in English, August 15, 2008.
27 After questioning by prosecutors on August 12, 2008, former President Chen was quoted as saying “I have never put
(continued...)
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the corruption investigations a “political vendetta” by the KMT against him and his family. One
Taiwan press editorial has criticized recurring corruption allegations in recent years—which have
involved a number of senior Taiwan politicians—suggesting they are fueled more by political
partisanship than by interest in real reform.28
Special Expense Accounts
Investigations and indictments for corruption have been a recurring feature of political life in
Taiwan, particularly over the issue of how senior officials use and account for expenditures from
so-called “special expense accounts.” Such accounts are to be used for official expenses only, but
give the controlling officials broad discretion on how the funds are spent. They operate generally
with poor government oversight and are subject to vague rules that many Taiwan officials have
said are confusing. Among those investigated and cleared of such charges in the past are: current
President Ma Ying-jeou, former foreign minister James Huang, former economics minister Steve
Chen, and current DPP chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen (investigated when she was head of the
Mainland Affairs Council). Other investigations for “special expense account” infractions include
former Vice President Annette Lu, former justice minister Shi Mao-lin, former education minister
Tu Cheng-sheng, former interior minister Lee Yi-yang, and former civil service minister Chu Wu-
hsien, among others.
Economic and Trade Relations
Taiwan’s economy grew rapidly (around 10% a year) in the 1970s and 1980s. Growth declined to
around 5-6% a year in the 1990s as the economy matured. But Taiwan’s economy has faltered in
the global financial crisis, experiencing a serious slowdown beginning in the 4th quarter of 2008.
According to a March 2009 report by Taiwan’s Council for Economic Planning and Development
Taiwan’s export-heavy economy suffered a 28.6% drop in exports from February 2008 to
February 2009.29
Taiwan-U.S. Trade and Investment
Taiwan is the United States’ ninth-largest overall trading partner, with two-way trade in 2008
valued at $61.6 billion, a slight decrease from 2007. Taiwan also is the sixth-largest destination
for U.S. agricultural exports, about $2.5 billion annually. In addition to agricultural goods,
Taiwan’s U.S. imports include industrial raw materials and machinery and equipment; its exports
to the United States are largely electronics and consumer goods. Once Taiwan’s largest trading
partner, the United States has been surpassed by China and Japan and is now Taiwan’s third-
largest trading partner, supplying 11% of Taiwan’s imports and absorbing 14% of its exports. The
U.S. trade deficit with Taiwan in 2008 was $11 billion.
(...continued)
any illegal income in my own or in my family’s pockets. I believe the judiciary will prove me innocent.” “Former
President Chen professes his innocence after questioning,” Taiwan News Online, August 13, 2008.
28 “Does corruption stop here?” Taipei Times, August 22, 2008, p. 8.
29The report, issued on March 27, 2009, (Taiwan’s Economic Situation and Outlook), can be found at the website:
http://www.cepd.gov.tw/encontent/m1.aspx?sNo=0011655.
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Special 301 Watch List
Taiwan was on the U.S. Special 301 Watch List for years because of strong U.S. concerns that it
maintained insufficient protections for intellectual property rights (IPR). This changed in 2009,
after Taiwan initiated a series of new laws and established institutional frameworks to assure IPR
protections. On January 16, 2009, the USTR announced that Taiwan had made sufficient
improvements to be removed from the list.30
To address U.S. concerns, the Taiwan government passed more robust copyright legislation,
enacted new laws targeting illegal Internet file sharing, and improved prosecution of IPR offenses
through the establishment (July 1, 2008) of a specialized Intellectual Property Court.31 The U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) had removed Taiwan from the more stringent “Priority Watch List”
in 2004. But pursuant to provisions the Trade Act of 1974, Taiwan remained on the U.S. Special
301 “Watch List”—a designation of a less serious risk of IPR violations than indicated by the
“Priority Watch List.”
The U.S. business community was divided on whether Taiwan had made sufficient IPR
improvements to merit removal from the “Watch List.” For instance, in separate letters to USTR
dated September 8, 2008, the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council said it “strongly supports” Taiwan’s
removal from the Watch List, while the U.S.-based International Intellectual Property Alliance
recommended that “Taiwan remain on the Watch List” pending further IPR improvements.
Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
Taiwan for years has been seeking the economic and political benefits of a U.S.-Taiwan Free
Trade Agreement (FTA), so far without success. President Ma reportedly mentioned the subject
again during his August 2008 transit visit through the United States on his way to Latin
America.32 To date, U.S.-Taiwan trade discussions have been held under a 1994 Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), a non-binding consultative mechanism the United
States employs for resolving trade and investment difficulties with countries still opening their
economies.33 In some instances, a TIFA may lead to economic liberalization that is significant
enough to result in a U.S. FTA with the TIFA country. Taiwan has argued that its status as a major
trading partner of the United States justifies an FTA on economic grounds.
U.S. officials cite a number of obstacles to an FTA with Taiwan over the near term—not only
trade matters, such as Taiwan’s record on intellectual property rights (IPR), but more
fundamentally, the complicated political issues involving both Taiwan’s and U.S. relations with
the PRC. The PRC strongly opposes a U.S.-Taiwan FTA. In the past, Taiwan’s bid has had its
30 USTR News, “USTR announces conclusion of the Special 301 Out-of-Cycle review for Taiwan,” January 16, 2009,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2009/January/asset_upload_file824_15293.pdf?ht=.
31 “2008 Special 301 Report,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, text at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2008/2008_Special_301_Report/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf.
32 Lin Yi-feng and Wu, Lilian, “President Ma arrives in San Francisco,” Central News Agency in English, August 18,
2008.
33 Negotiations for the TIFA were conducted through the respective U.S. and Taiwan unofficial representative bodies at
the time: the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA).
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supporters in the U.S. Congress, several of whom have introduced measures regarding an FTA for
Taiwan.34
Cross-Strait Trade and Investment
Since 1949, both Taiwan and the PRC have maintained restrictions on trade and economic
investment relations across the Taiwan Strait. These have included requirements that goods and
articles be transshipped via third parties and not directly; restrictions on the kinds of goods and
articles that can be traded; and caps on investment levels, among others. Even with these
restrictions on official trade and contacts, Taiwan businesses have invested increasingly across the
strait into the mainland, although the exact figures remain unclear. Taiwan-China trade has also
increased dramatically, so that China (along with Hong Kong) has surpassed the United States as
Taiwan’s most important trading partner. According to Taiwan’s Central News Agency, Taiwan’s
total bilateral trade with the PRC for 2008 was $105.4 billion.
Taiwan’s growing economic interconnectedness with the PRC has created increasing pressures on
a succession of Taiwan governments to ease its restrictions on direct travel and investment. Since
1987, Taiwan incrementally eased long-standing restrictions on contacts with the PRC. Initiatives
under President Chen and the DPP, included the start in January 2005 of the first non-stop direct
charter flights flown in 55 years between the two adversaries (limited to the Lunar New Year
holiday that year).
The resumption of cross-strait talks in June 2008 and the subsequent agreements signed
(discussed elsewhere in this report) have already increased the potential for cross-strait trade and
investment. Ma Administration officials also have talked about creating a comprehensive
agreement to expand economic cooperation between Taiwan and China – with names suggested
such as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) or the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The idea is controversial to some in Taiwan because
of the economic inter-dependence they fear such an agreement could help create.35 President Ma’s
willingness to significantly expand such cross-strait exchanges has concerned many DPP
members and pro-independence advocates in Taiwan, who see the Ma initiatives as having overly
ambitious expectations and as moving far too rapidly. These DPP observers say that cross-strait
overtures need to be calibrated carefully to avoid compromising Taiwan’s economic security and
political autonomy.
Other Key Bilateral Issues
U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan and Taiwan’s Defense Budget
Under the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8), the United States is obligated to provide Taiwan with
defense articles and services for its self-defense—a commitment to which the PRC objects. In
spite of the apparent warming ties with Taiwan after the March 2008 presidential election, many
thought the Bush Administration delayed sending forward notifications to Congress concerning a
34 S.Con.Res. 60 (Sen. Baucus), introduced on December 18, 2007; and H.Con.Res. 137 (Rep. Berkley), introduced on
May 1, 2007, both express congressional support for the opening of FTA negotiations with Taiwan.
35 The Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, for instance, expressed opposition to the idea: “No CEPA to
be signed with China: MAC,” The China Post, October 17, 2008.
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number of long-pending U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.36 In June 2008, some Members of the U.S.
Senate wrote to President Bush expressing concern about the reports and urging the White House
to act swiftly on Taiwan’s arms sales requests.37 Some speculated that the delay in arms sales
notifications was related to Beijing’s hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games from August
8-24, 2008. One Pentagon official hinted in a public forum that the United States may have
imposed a freeze on weapons sales to Taiwan.38 A State Department spokesman at the time
maintained that the pending arms sales still were being discussed in “an internal interagency
process.”39
Since then, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have resumed. On August 25, 2008, the Pentagon
announced that it was awarding the McDonnell-Douglas Corp. (owned by Boeing) a contract to
provide Taiwan with 60 Harpoon missiles and associated hardware, worth $89.8 million, that
Taiwan requested in 2007.40 On October 3, 2008, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA) notified Congress of the possible Foreign Military Sale of six different types of defense
articles and equipment, consistent with the policies of P.L. 96-8, which could total a maximum of
approximately $6.4 billion. These included:
• upgrades of four E-2T Aircraft to the HAWKEYE 2000 configuration (est.
maximum of $250 million)
• 30 AH-64D Block III APACHE Longbow Attack helicopters (est. maximum of
$2.532 billion)
• 330 PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missiles (est. maximum of $3.1
billion)
• 32 UGM-84L Sub-Launched HARPOON Block II missiles and 2 UTM-84L
HARPOON Block II Exercise missiles (est. maximum of $200 million)
• follow-on spare parts in support of F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, and Indigenous
Defense Fighter IDF aircraft (est. maximum of $334 million)
• 182 JAVELIN guided missile rounds and 20 JAVELIN command launch units
(est. maximum of $47 million)41
Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
Taiwan also has sought to qualify for coverage under the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP),
which eliminates some visa requirements for qualified countries, allowing their citizens to make
temporary U.S. visits without first obtaining a valid visa. VWP countries must meet certain
36 For details on Taiwan’s arms purchases, see CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by
Shirley A. Kan.
37 “Inhofe urges support of Taiwan,” June 30, 2008 press release. For a full text, see http://inhofe.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=DAB422E7-802A-23AD-4101-
32FFB910FFE4.
38 Admiral Timothy Keating hinted at a freeze during a briefing at the Heritage Foundation on July 16, 2008.
39 State Department spokesman Sean McCormack, in response to a question at the Daily Briefing on July 17, 2008.
40 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), No. 717-08, August 25,
2008. http://www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=3848
41 The notifications can be found on the DSCA website under “36(b) Arms Sales Notifications.” http://www.dsca.mil/
PressReleases/36-b/36b_index.htm
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criteria—such as offering reciprocal privileges to U.S. citizens, having machine-readable
passports, and having a low nonimmigrant refusal rate (defined as the formal denial of a
nonimmigrant visa application by a U.S. consular official). The latter criteria appears to have
been a particularly difficult one for Taiwan.42 In 2007, Congress enacted amendments to the VWP
which may provide for a waiver of the non-immigrant refusal rate.43 With a waiver, Taiwan may
meet the requirements of the program.
Although Taiwan citizens would benefit from the facilitated travel that the U.S. Visa Waiver
Program affords, another key Taiwan government motive is thought to be the international stature
that Taiwan would gain from being among the VWP’s group of participants. In addition,
participation in the program is often seen as evidence of close ties with the United States. In
addition to its current failure to meet all of the program’s qualifications (absent a non-immigrant
refusal rate waiver), Taiwan’s chances of participation in the VWP also are subject to the
anticipated kinds of political difficulties involving the PRC that are aspects of other U.S.-Taiwan
relations. The PRC does not qualify for the VWP.
U.S. Policy Trends
It is unclear at this point what the Taiwan policy of the Obama Administration will be. Trends
since 1979 strongly suggest that the White House will maintain policy continuity, with U.S.
policy remaining rooted firmly in the fundamentals of the Taiwan Relations Act and the three
communiqués. In a press conference in Taiwan on March 18, 2009, for example, AIT Chairman
Ray Burghardt stressed that U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act will remain
unchanged, and also emphasized that U.S. officials “truly are enthusiastic” about improvements
in cross-strait ties.44
Recent history on U.S. Taiwan policy indicates, however, that even within the framework of
policy continuity there can be nuance. Many observers concluded in 2001 that the newly elected
George W. Bush then had abandoned the long-standing U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” in
favor of “strategic clarity” that placed a clearer emphasis on Taiwan’s interests and showed less
concern for PRC views. In addition to approving a major arms sales package for Taiwan in 2001,
subsequent statements and actions by Bush Administration officials continued to appear more
supportive of Taiwan than those of previous U.S. Administrations. This support was in keeping
with growing concern in Congress in the late 1990s that the U.S. policy framework toward
Taiwan had become outdated and that Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities had eroded while those
of the PRC had grown. A series of congressionally mandated annual reports issued by the
Pentagon supported these conclusions, assessing that the military balance in the Taiwan Strait was
increasingly tilting in the PRC’s favor.
During its tenure, however, the Bush Administration began reshaping its own policy articulations
concerning both Taiwan and the PRC. Administration officials came to see that smooth U.S.-PRC
relations may be an important tool in cooperating against terrorism, maintaining stability on the
42 For additional information on the Visa Waiver Program, see CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by Alison
Siskin.
43 The measure was enacted in 2007 in P.L. 110-53, although the visa waiver did not become available until October
2008.
44 Chairman Raymond Burghardt, AIT Press Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, March 18, 2009, http://www.ait.org.tw/en/
news/officialtext/viewer.aspx?id=2009031901.
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Korean peninsula, and many other key U.S. strategic goals. As articulated by Vice President
Cheney during his visit to Shanghai in April 2004, the White House judged that “the areas of
agreement [between the United States and the PRC] are far greater than those areas where we
disagree ... ”45 Also, such problems of trust developed between Taiwan’s President Chen and U.S.
officials that the bilateral atmosphere eroded significantly during the Bush Administration.46 The
Bush White House came to balance criticisms of China’s military buildup opposite Taiwan with
periodic warnings to the Taiwan government that U.S. support was not unconditional.47 Whether
such nuance will continue in the Obama Administration remains to be seen.
Policy Options for Congress
Given developments in U.S. relations with Taiwan since 2001, lawmakers who are concerned
about current trends and the U.S. ability to meet future challenges may consider a number of
various options for U.S. policy.
Maintain and Reaffirm the Current AOne-China@ Policy
The official U.S. policy view is that the Aone-China@ policy and the fundamental framework
surrounding it is an important constant in an otherwise dangerously fluid and evolving U.S.-
Taiwan-PRC relationship. In this view, any alteration or apparent flexibility in that policy would
lead to a Adisintegrating policy@ damaging to U.S. interests.48 In addition, according to this view,
the current policy framework helps protect the United States and U.S. policies from becoming
greater factors in the domestic Taiwan and PRC political environments. The slightest deviation
from U.S. policy formulations and actions C an off-the-cuff comment, the use of different
wording beyond that already approved, a visit by a more senior U.S. official C can be and has in
the past been seized upon by actors from either side to further domestic political agendas,
inevitably creating nettlesome diplomatic problems for U.S. policy.
Moreover, these proponents say, those who advocate scrapping the Aone-China@ policy and other
aspects of the U.S. policy framework are recklessly discounting PRC resolve on unifying Taiwan
with the mainland and irresponsibly advocating actions that well could lead to the use of U.S.
military forces in a U.S.-PRC conflict. The Taiwan Relations Act and the current policy approach,
according to these proponents, should be maintained and regularly reaffirmed. As the PRC itself
is firmly committed to the “one-China” policy, maintaining and reaffirming the current policy
would be the last disruptive to U.S.-PRC relations. Any change in this policy, these proponents
say, would be an about-face in the long-standing U.S. position and would involve the greatest risk
to U.S.-PRC relations. Some suggest also that such a move would be damaging to Taiwan’s
ultimate economic and political security.
45 From the Q & A session with Vice President Cheney following his speech at Fudan University in Shanghai,
broadcast by Beijing CCTV in English, found in FBIS, April 15, 2004.
46 See CRS Report RL33684, Underlying Strains in Taiwan-U.S. Political Relations, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
47 “There are limitations with respect to what the United States will support as Taiwan considers possible changes to its
constitution.” Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly before the House International Relations
Committee, April 21, 2004.
48 Interview with former U.S. government official, June 22, 2006.
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Change the AOne China@ Policy
Outside the U.S. government, a minority of some Taiwan proponents places greater emphasis on
the political aspirations and rights to self-determination of the people on Taiwan. According to
this view, the current U.S. policy framework on Taiwan is out of step with the American emphasis
on global democratization. This view holds that as the PRC and Taiwan have evolved, the original
U.S. policy framework on Taiwan has grown increasingly irrelevant. The Aone-China@ policy
itself, they argue, originally was based on the U.S. acknowledgment that both Taiwan and the
PRC held there was only one China and that Taiwan was part of it.49 They contend that this U.S.
policy has become untenable; it no longer reflects the reality in Taiwan. Therefore, they say, the
Aone-China@ policy needs to be abandoned and replaced with a Aone-China, one-Taiwan@ policy in
which the United States would work toward gradual normalization of relations with Taiwan.
Some who advocate this viewpoint believe that the costs of such a policy change for the United
States would be minimal. They believe that PRC actions and statements on Taiwan are just
Asaber-rattling,@ and they doubt that the PRC will attack Taiwan should Taipei declare
independence.50 Even if the PRC should attack Taiwan, these proponents appear confident that for
political and strategic reasons, the United States would come to Taiwan=s aid.51 To do nothing,
they say, would seriously damage U.S. credibility and influence in Asia.
Policy Adjustments at the Margins
Bracketed within the above two policy options is a steady but quiet flow of alternative policy
suggestions. These tend to advocate various substantive changes in day-to-day U.S. relations with
Taiwan that their proponents believe would remain within the boundaries of the current policy
framework and within U.S. understandings with the PRC.
Another ATaiwan Policy Review@
At the very least, some say, the United States needs to consider doing another comprehensive
review of its Taiwan policy in order to revisit once again the 1979-1980 ATaiwan Guidelines@ that
govern U.S. government interactions with Taiwan and with Taiwan officials. Reportedly, only one
such review to update the guidelines has been conducted since 1979 C the 1993-1994 Taiwan
Policy Review undertaken in the Clinton Administration C and that review resulted in a new
approval for exchanges of high-level official visits in the economic arena.52 But even the high-
49 This was the formulation in the U.S.-PRC AShanghai Communiqué@ of 1972, which held that AThe United States
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a
part of China. The [U.S.] Government does not challenge that position.@ In repeating this assertion, the Joint
Communiqué of 1979 establishing official relations with the PRC eliminated specific mention of either government:
AThe Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and
Taiwan is part of China.@ See CRS Report 96-246, for full texts of the Taiwan Relations Act and the three U.S.-China
communiqués.
50 Coen Blaauw, of FAPA, and John Tkacik, of The Heritage Foundation, are two proponents of this view.
51 Tkacik, John, ed. Rethinking One China, The Heritage Foundation, December 1, 2004.
52 Apart from the Taiwan Policy Review, several other Clinton Administration decisions led to debates over whether
the United States had changed its policy on Taiwan. In 1997-1998, the White House made statements that became
known as the Athree noes@ C that the United States did not support a Aone China, One Taiwan@ policy, Taiwan
independence, or Taiwan membership in international organizations requiring statehood. In 2000, the Clinton
(continued...)
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level economic visits resulting from the 1993-1994 policy review were not pursued with vigor by
the Bush Administration, according to these proponents.53
Furthermore, since the 1993-1994 policy review, there have been dramatic developments in
Taiwan=s political development. From an authoritarian, one-party government some saw as only
marginally more democratic than that of the PRC, Taiwan has become a fully functioning
democracy, with multiple political parties, competitive elections, and two complete, peaceful
shifts in government – the DPP’s victory under Chen in 2000 and the KMT’s return to power
under Ma in 2008.
In addition, since 1995 the PRC has undertaken a substantial military buildup along the coast
opposite Taiwan, and in 2005 Beijing adopted the anti-secession law suggesting hostile intent
against Taiwan. These significant developments since 1993-1994, according to this view, justify
another Taiwan Policy Review to make selected changes in U.S. policy. Proponents of a review
believe that the importance of Taiwan for U.S. interests, and of peace and stability in the Taiwan
strait, warrant such renewed policy attention. Limited changes, they argue, could result in a more
rational policy process and could improve communications. Among the policy changes that have
been discussed are:
• More transparent and open interactions with Taiwan at the working level,
including visits between U.S. and Taiwan officials in official U.S. government
buildings and invitations to Taiwan officials to attend special events such as
swearing-in ceremonies;
• Higher level U.S. government visits and exchanges with Taiwan counterparts;
• Greater coordination within the U.S. government C including regular inter-
departmental meetings involving the Departments of Commerce, Defense, State,
and Treasury, among others C on policy and substantive issues involving Taiwan;
and
• More open and active support for Taiwan=s participation in international
organizations for which statehood is not a requirement, and greater support for
observer status for Taiwan in organizations for which statehood is a requirement
(such as the United Nations and World Health Organization).
The implications of a Taiwan policy review for U.S.-PRC relations likely would depend on the
nature of the policy review itself. A substantial or comprehensive public review undoubtedly
would raise concerns both in the PRC and likely in Taiwan. As stated before, however, such a
review is not without precedent, and could be seen by both U.S. and PRC officials as a pragmatic
adjustment to current circumstances.
(...continued)
Administration made further incremental changes to U.S. rhetoric by adding the U.S. expectation that any resolution to
the Taiwan issue would not only be peaceful, but decided Awith the assent of the Taiwan people.@ For these and other
U.S. policy statements, see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key
Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, by Shirley A. Kan.
53 The only such contact in recent years was the Taiwan visit of Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Karan Bhatia in
May-June 2006.
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More Active U.S. Role on Cross-Strait Relations
Among those suggesting alternative approaches, there appears to be greater sentiment that a more
active U.S. role in cross-strait matters is both justifiable within the current policy framework and
warranted by changing sentiments within the PRC and Taiwan. They suggest, for instance, that
there is room for U.S. involvement in trying to moderate, re-shape, or otherwise influence those
contending positions of the two sides that remain major obstacles to greater stability in the
Taiwan Strait. Such greater involvement would require changes in long-standing U.S. assurances
to Taiwan that the United States would not become involved in a mediating role between the two
sides, and long-standing objections from the PRC that the United States not “interfere” in China’s
internal affairs. U.S. officials maintain, however, both governments in recent years have changed
the way they talk to Washington about Taiwan. U.S. officials now are under subtle and perhaps
increasing pressure from both governments to become directly involved in some aspects of cross-
strait issues.
According to U.S. officials, the PRC during Taiwan’s Chen Administration suggested that Beijing
and Washington cooperate to manage controversial Taiwan issues. This included suggestions and
pressure from PRC officials that the United States pressure Chen into shelving plans for an
island-wide referendum and that U.S. officials avoid sending the “wrong signals” to Taiwan,
encouraging independence aspirations.54 For their part, members of the Taiwan government
suggested that the Taiwan Relations Act needed to be strengthened or reevaluated. They sought
U.S. support for Chen’s constitutional reform plans and more visible and routine U.S.-Taiwan
official interaction. As a result, some observers in both Taiwan and the United States suggest that
the time may be ripe for the United States to step up its rhetoric and activities to promote cross-
strait dialogue.
Nevertheless, this receptivity to U.S. involvement has significant limitations—the chief of which
is that each side wants U.S. involvement only on behalf of its own interests. Taiwan urges the
United States to press the PRC to renounce the use of force and to agree to no pre-conditions for
cross-strait talks. The PRC urges the United States to oppose Taiwan independence and to be
more forceful in opposing unilateral changes in the status quo. According to many, U.S.
involvement in such a one-sided way could help foster rather than ease cross-strait tensions.
Former U.S. officials report that the United States is willing to help in a cross-strait dialogue if
both sides can reach consensus on the kind of U.S. help they can accept.55
Exert More Pressure on the PRC
Another alternate view is that the United States has become too responsive to PRC sensitivities
on Taiwan, and therefore unwilling to exert more pressure on the PRC government to reduce its
hostile military posture toward Taiwan. According to this view, the U.S. stake in maintaining a
democratic Taiwan, along with the potential cost of a non-peaceful resolution to Taiwan=s political
status, is too high for the U.S. government to remain on the sidelines. The United States should
use more of its considerable leverage with Beijing in an effort to bring about more conciliatory
behavior and promote more cross-strait concessions. Proponents suggest that U.S. officials could
54 Some critics of U.S. policy suggest that the PRC’s search for U.S. involvement is a “united front” tactic designed
primarily to isolate Taiwan from some of its U.S. support.
55 Former U.S. government official interviewed on July 5, 2006.
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pressure the PRC to reduce its missile and military buildup opposite Taiwan and to revisit China’s
2005 Anti-Secession Law which specifically provides for use of force against Taiwan.
More Overt U.S. Support for Taiwan Democracy
Another set of policy suggestions supports greater U.S. support for and involvement in Taiwan=s
democratic institutions. According to this view, Taiwan has already transformed itself by adopting
a democratic system of governance; it is in the interests of all parties to have Taiwan=s
government be as effective and stable as possible. In particular, Taiwan’s democratic system
serves as a principle barrier to a Taiwan leadership’s “preemptive capitulation” to PRC
initiatives.56 But proponents of this view say that the very immaturity of Taiwan=s democracy and
the infrastructural weaknesses of its political institutions are hampering Taiwan governance,
contributing to cross-strait tensions, and posing problems for U.S. policy. Proponents suggest that
the U.S. might pursue initiatives to improve the effectiveness of Taiwan=s governance, such as:
• U.S. support for limited constitutional reforms in Taiwan (such as movement to a
parliamentary system or reduction in the multiple levels of government) that
could contribute directly to more effective government institutions and a more
workable balance of power;
• Greater dialogue and more direct contact between the U.S. Congress and
Taiwan=s Legislative Yuan (LY), particularly to assist the LY=s current structural
reform and committee structure and processes; and
• Encouragement for Taiwan to use its political strengths and resources in a non-
isolating way C by de-emphasizing divisive sovereignty issues, for instance, and
instead emphasizing the global role Taiwan can play in democratic capacity
building C such as in vote-counting and monitoring.
In addition, say these proponents, the United States can and should be more open in offering
rhetorical support for the statements and actions of Taiwan leaders, defending them as natural
components of Taiwan=s democratic processes.57 The United States might feel obliged publicly to
disagree with those espousing Taiwan independence aspirations, according to this view, but U.S.
officials should openly support the rights of Taiwan officials to say such things as an essential
part of the open debate that characterizes a democratic government.
Implications
Many consider the continued success in 2008 of the democratic process in Taiwan to be a
validation of U.S. goals for the spread of democratic values. It also further emphasizes the unique
and delicate challenge for U.S. policy that Taiwan continues to pose: Taiwan is our ninth largest
trading partner with a vibrant and free democratic government on an island claimed by the PRC,
with which the United States has no diplomatic relations but does have defense commitments,
and whose independence from China U.S. officials say they do not support. With Taiwan under
the KMT government, the United States will be faced with some challenges familiar from past
56 Bush, Richard and Romberg, Alan, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States,” the Brookings Institution,
March 30, 2009.
57 John Tkacik, from The Heritage Foundation, is one of the proponents of this view.
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years, including decisions on: new arms sales; how to accommodate requests for visits to the
United States by President Ma and other senior Taiwan officials; the level of U.S. relations with
the Ma government; and whether to pursue closer economic ties, such as through a Free Trade
Agreement. In addition, Taiwan-U.S. relations under the KMT government face new
challenges—notably the implications that President Ma’s initiatives toward the PRC have for U.S.
interests; and what role, if any, Washington should play in Taiwan-PRC relations.
For Cross-Strait Relations
President Ma’s emphasis on improving relations with the PRC presents a potentially new policy
environment for the United States. U.S. policy had been stressed after President Chen abandoned
his early, unsuccessful olive branches to Beijing in favor of a more pro-independence approach,
with U.S. officials subjected to increasing pressure from both sides to become directly involved in
some aspects of cross-strait ties. PRC officials began quietly urging the United States to pressure
Chen into shelving plans for an island-wide referendum, and they pressed U.S. officials to avoid
sending the “wrong signals” to Taiwan. Members of the Taiwan government urged U.S. officials
to give more overt support for Taiwan’s democracy and to put more pressure on Beijing to lessen
its hostility – efforts that some see as setting a precedent for overriding the “six assurances” to
Taiwan. U.S. officials were put in the position of continually seeking to re-balance the cross-strait
relationship to achieve some sort of stasis in keeping with stated U.S. policy goals.
The cross-strait policy of President Ma’s government presents the United States with a different
set of challenges. Ma’s new approach toward the PRC would seem to be in keeping with U.S.
wishes, as U.S. officials in the past have urged both sides to move toward greater conciliation and
less confrontation. In 2008, a U.S. State Department spokesman spoke favorably (if somewhat
tepidly, in keeping with most U.S. policy pronouncements on Taiwan issues) of the resumption of
cross-strait talks under the Ma Administration, responding to a reporter’s question with “ ... we
believe it’s important for the two to work towards a peaceful resolution of the ... Cross-Strait
issues.”58
While U.S. policy favors improvements in Taiwan-PRC relations, it has been silent on what
should be the speed, depth, and degree of cross-strait conciliation. Some observers worry that the
KMT government may be overly responsive to economic imperatives and to pressures from
influential Taiwan business interests that have substantial economic investments in China. They
worry that the Ma government could reach a swift accommodation with Beijing that may
complicate U.S. regional interests.
The implication for U.S. interests is only one factor President Ma will have to continue to
consider in pursuing his PRC policy. Ma faces multiple balancing acts. These include efforts to
improve cross-strait relations—and Taiwan’s economic opportunities on the mainland—while not
appearing overly eager to voters who worry that he will sell out Taiwan’s political interests in
pursuit of closer mainland economic ties. He also will have to strike a balance between those in
the electorate who favor unification with China; those who argue for a strong defense for Taiwan
and the continuation of U.S. weapons purchases; and those who urge significant improvements in
Taiwan’s relations with Beijing.
58 Acting Deputy Spokesman Gonzalo R. Gallegos, State Department Daily Press Briefing, June 12, 2008.
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Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and Policy Implications
For U.S. Arms Sales
Relatedly, the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan takes on new shades of delicacy in an
environment of improving Taiwan-PRC ties. While U.S. law mandating arms sales to Taiwan
states that these sales shall be “based solely upon ... the needs of Taiwan,” such decisions can be
and have been a useful U.S. policy lever in U.S.-Taiwan-PRC relations.59 Either the approval of a
major weapons package to Taiwan or an apparent “freeze” in weapons sales can have symbolic
significance for either side of the strait. U.S. policymakers will be faced with decisions on what
kind of signal a specific U.S. arms sale will send under current circumstances. The PRC objects
to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and has reacted punitively in some cases, so that future U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan may have significant implications for cross-strait ties. A recent news story from a
Taiwan newspaper alleged that U.S. military officials are concerned that potential Taiwan-PRC
military exchanges could provide Beijing with an opportunity to learn details about sensitive U.S.
military technology sold to Taiwan and, therefore, could jeopardize future U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan.60
For PRC Policy and Credibility
Despite the challenges that Ma faces, many believe that his policy approach will be an important
test of the PRC’s stated intentions of approaching cross-strait problems by “putting aside
differences and seeking a win-win result.”61 Having railed against President Chen’s
independence-aspirations for eight years while wooing the KMT, the PRC now is faced with the
question of whether it wishes to follow through with creative initiatives if it is to capitalize on the
opportunity that a KMT government presents. Rebuffing a new and, at least initially, a more
conciliatory Taiwan government could damage the PRC’s credibility that it wishes to pursue a
peaceful and constructive solution for cross-strait ties. Any perceived PRC reluctance also could
serve to revitalize U.S. and congressional opposition to the PRC’s Taiwan policy—opposition
which remained relatively muted for years in part because of mutual U.S.-PRC problems with
former President Chen.
Observers suggest there are a number of options now for Beijing to make meaningful gestures
toward Taiwan that would not impinge on PRC sovereignty claims. Beijing has appeared willing
to take some guarded steps. These include willingness to restart cross-strait talks on a mutually
acceptable basis; a new willingness to entertain Taiwan’s aspirations to be a “meaningful
participant” in the WHO; and, with the November 2008 meeting between Taiwan’s Lien Chan
and PRC President Hu Jintao during the APEC meeting, at least the suggestion of a halt to
inflexible posturing against Taiwan in APEC and other multilateral organizations. Other such
steps could include a suspension of Taiwan-focused military exercises and other military
maneuvers in the strait and a meaningful drawing-down of missiles deployed opposite the Taiwan
coast.
59 Arms sales to Taiwan are mandated in P.L. 96-8, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Section 3302(b) of U.S.C. 22, Ch.
48, Sect. 3301-3316, enacted April 10, 1979.
60
Lowther, William, “Pentagon wary of PRC-Taiwan ties,” Taipei Times, January 7, 2009, p. 1.
61 Reportedly language in a letter written to the U.N. Secretary General by the PRC’s U.N. Ambassador Wang Guangya
concerning Taiwan’s current bid for “meaningful participation” in the U.N. “China gives U.N. bid cold shoulder,”
CNA, September 10, 2008.
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For Taiwan Democracy
Many Americans have welcomed the 2008 election results as a sign that Taiwan’s democracy has
continued to ripen and mature. They say Taiwan’s democratic development has been validated by
having passed the “Huntington test” for established democracies—having two successful,
consecutive changes of government through a free and peaceful electoral process.62 Those
harboring concern about how the DPP’s supporters would take such a defeat were reassured
greatly by the gracious concession speech of candidate Frank Hsieh and the widespread DPP
acceptance of the results of the democratic process. To some watching the March 22, 2008
election, the Taiwan electorate also appeared to have attained a new level of maturity and
sophistication, apparently motivated more in its election decisions by pragmatic calculations of
governmental performance than by more emotional issues involving U.N. membership or
sovereignty issues.63
Some, however, suggest that functional political pluralism in Taiwan may be in trouble over the
short term. An effective democracy requires a viable opposition, and the overwhelming KMT
electoral victories in 2008 left Taiwan’s polity lopsided, the opposition effectively crushed. The
DPP has been demoralized and decimated further by the political scandals involving former
President Chen, who brought the party from a fledgling opposition party to the pinnacle of power.
The scandals, wrote DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen, have brought the DPP “a kind of sadness so
painful it cannot be soothed, and a kind of disappointment so grave it cannot be overcome.”64
Despite the warming U.S.-Taiwan relationship under the KMT, then, many feel that U.S. interests
in having Taiwan remain a full-fledged democracy may be compromised should the opposition
remain too feeble effectively to monitor and hold accountable the majority party.
Legislation in the 111th Congress
S. 1390 (Levin)
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010. Section 1226 of the bill requires the Department
of Defense to submit a report to Congress, in both classified and unclassified versions, a report on
Taiwan’s air force, including the number, type, age, and capabilities of its aircraft; an assessment
of the weapons platforms Taiwan would need to provide for its self-defense in the face of a PRC
missile attack; and a five-year plan for fulfilling U.S. obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act
to aid Taiwan in controlling its own air space. The Committee on Armed Services introduced an
original measure on July 2, 2009, with written report S.Rept. 111-35. The Senate took up
consideration on July 14, 2009, and passed an amended bill by unanimous consent on July 23,
2009.
62 Samuel P. Huntington defined this process in his book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century, Norman and London, 1991. Taiwan qualifies by virtue of the DPP having wrested power from the KMT in
2000 and the KMT having regained power in 2008.
63 Many U.S. and other foreign election observers were in Taiwan before and after the March 22 election, including this
author. This report draws heavily on these personal observations and insights.
64 DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen, “An open letter to DPP supporters,” Taipei Times, August 27, 2008, p. 8.
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H.Con.Res. 18 (Linder)
Expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should resume normal diplomatic
relations with Taiwan. The measure calls on the President to abandon the “one-China” policy,
adopt a “one-China, one-Taiwan” policy that recognizes Taiwan sovereignty, and begin
establishing normal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The measure also calls on the President to
aggressively support Taiwan’s membership in the U.N. and other international organizations for
which statehood is a requirement. The measure was introduced on January 9, 2009, and referred
to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
H.Con.Res. 55 (Berkley)
Recognizing the 30th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. The resolution reaffirms the
unwavering U.S. commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act, reaffirms strong U.S. support for
Taiwan’s democratic development, and supports deepening U.S.-Taiwan ties. The measure was
introduced on February 23, 2009, and referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, which held mark-up on March 19, 2009. The
Subcommittee forwarded the bill to the full Committee, amended, by voice vote the same day.
Chronology
08/19/09—Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Taiwan would not seek full
membership in the U.N. this year, but instead would seek to participate in the activities of U.N.
specialized institutions, like the World Meteorological Organization and the World Maritime
Organization.
08/07/09—Over a period of several days, Typhoon Morakot slammed into the Philippines,
Taiwan, and China, causing hundreds of millions of dollars in damage and numerous fatalities.
07/27/09—PRC President and Communist Party Secretary Hu Jintao sent a congratulatory note to
Taiwan’s newly elected KMT chairman Ma Ying-jeou.
07/26/09—Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou was elected to the chairmanship of his political Party,
the Nationalist Party (KMT).
07/21/09—It was reported that Taiwan and China plan to open semi-official tourism offices in
each other’s territories by the end of 2009.
07/16/09—The opening ceremony of the 2009 World Games began, being hosted by Taiwan.
07/01/09—William Stanton, a career U.S. diplomat, was announced to be the next director of the
American Institute in Taiwan in Taipei.
05/18/09—For the first time since its ouster from the U.N. in 1971, Taiwan participated as an
observer in the four-day 2009 World Health Assembly, the annual meeting of the World Health
Organization (WHO).
04/26/09—The third round of cross-strait talks between Taiwan and China began in Nanjing,
China.
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03/18/09—U.S. American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) chairman Ray Burghardt said that the United
States was “comfortable with what’s happening” in Taiwan-PRC engagement. The same day,
former President Chen Shui-bian appeared at his final pre-trial hearing before going on trial for
corruption, scheduled to begin March 26, 2009.
03/17/09—The first luxury cruise ship (Ocean Mystery) to sail directly to Taiwan from the PRC
(Shanghai) arrived at Keelung, reportedly carrying 1,600 PRC tourists.
03/16/09—In its first quadrennial report (QDR), Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense said that Taiwan
would cut its military personnel from 275,000 to 215,000 over the next five years – part of a plan
to create an all-volunteer force by December 2014.
03/14/09—The Taiwan government urged the PRC to jettison its “anti-secession” law. The law,
passed in March 2005, justifies the use of force to prevent Taiwan independence.
01/13/09—World Health Organization officials sent a letter to the Taiwan government stating that
the island henceforth would be included in the International Health Regulations (IHR), a set of
legally binding rules governing international commitment to disease surveillance, alert, and
response
01/07/09—Taiwan’s cross-strait negotiator, Chiang Pin-kung, began a visit to four PRC cities to
discuss issues facing Taiwan investors in the mainland.
12/12/08—Former Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian was indicted on charges of corruption,
having been arrested on November 12, 2008.
11/21/08 – On November 21, 2008, Taiwan’s Lien Chan, a former Vice-President and Premier,
met with PRC President Hu Jintao during the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
meeting in Peru. It was said to be the highest-level meeting between the two sides in an
international forum since 1949.
10/03/08—The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of the possible Foreign
Military Sale of six different types of defense articles and equipment, totaling approximately $6.4
billion.
09/08/08—Taiwan announced that it would cancel the live-fire exercise portion of its annual five-
day military exercises, in deference to warming ties between Taiwan and the PRC.
09/08/08—Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry announced it would seek closer participation in the 16-
member Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Taiwan has taken part every year in the PIF since joining in
1993, but because of PRC objections has been restricted to dialoguing only with its 6 diplomatic
South Pacific partners.
08/27/08—The Pentagon announced the sale of 58 Harpoon missiles as well as related support,
logistics, and training equipment to Taiwan worth about $101 million.
08/19/08—Taiwan’s Special Investigation Unit (SIU) announced it was inviting the Taipei-based
Central Bank of China (CBC) and the cabinet-level Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) to
assist in investigating the source of $21 million in a Swiss bank account in the name of former
President Chen Shui-bian’s daughter-in-law, Huang Jui-ching. SIU investigators said they were
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looking into possible irregularities in the second-phase financial reform initiated by President
Chen in 2004 as a potential source of the funds.
08/18/08—Prosecutors in Taiwan named five suspects in an alleged high-level money laundering
scheme involving former President Chen Shui-bian. They included Chen Shui-bian; his wife Wu
Shu-jen; Chen’s son Chen Chih-chung and his wife Huang Jui-ching; and Wu’s brother Wu
Ching-mao.
08/17/08—Tsai Ing-wen, head of Taiwan’s DPP party, said the current political crisis had come
about because the DPP put too much faith and trust in Chen Shui-bian.
08/14/08—Former Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian held a press conference to resign from DPP
membership. He admitted failing fully to declare campaign funds and for wiring millions of
dollars overseas, and apologized for causing “humiliation” and “irreparable damage” to the party.
08/14/08—Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) confirmed that the Swiss
Confederation’s Department of Justice sought assistance from Taiwan about suspected money
laundering by Chen’s daughter-in-law, Huang Jui-ching.
08/14/08—Taiwan submitted a proposal to the UN Secretariat via St. Vincent and the Solomon
Islands (2 of Taiwan’s diplomatic relationships), asking the UN to consider permitting Taiwan to
have “meaningful participation” in the organization’s specialized agencies.
08/13/08—A spokesman for Taiwan’s presidential office said that this year’s UN bid would focus
on “participation” in specialized UN agencies.
08/12/08—AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt gave a dinner for President Ma in Los Angeles. Ma also
met with Members of Congress.
08/12/08—Taiwan President Ma YJ left for state visits to Paraguay and the Dominican Republic,
returning on the 19th. He flew a commercial flight to the United States—a first for a Taiwan
president—and transited through LA (coming) and through San Francisco (returning home).
07/27/08—Taiwan’s Sports Affairs Council (SAC—a cabinet-level council) announced that
several Taiwan Ministers would attend the 2008 Olympic Games at IOC invitation using National
Olympic Committee ID cards. In the past, China’s protests had led to the issuance of the less
prestigious “Guest Card” for Taiwan officials.
07/22/08—Taiwan’s SEF chairman, Chiang Pin-kung, was reported as having said he wants to
study and promote the creation of a cross-strait comprehensive economic cooperation agreement
(CECA).
07/17/08—Taiwan’s cabinet announced it would revise regulations limiting investment by Taiwan
companies in China, and that new measures would be put into place August 1. Preliminary reports
said that the current investment cap would be abolished for some companies and raised to 60% of
net worth for other companies.
06/12/08—The first cross-strait meetings in a decade began between China and Taiwan in Beijing
at the Diaoyutai State Guest House, conducted by SEF and ARATS. The two sides reportedly
agreed to set up permanent offices in each other’s territory and to begin regular weekend direct
charter flights.
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05/26/08—KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung visited China and met with PRC Party Secretary Hu
Jintao at the latter’s invitation in the highest-level contact between the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait.
05/20/08—Ma Ying-jeou was inaugurated President of Taiwan.
05/19/08—Tsai Ing-wen, considered a moderate in the DPP Party and a former Vice-Premier, was
elected chairwoman of the Party.
05/19/08—The WHO rejected Taiwan’s bid for observer status.
03/22/08—KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou was elected president of Taiwan, defeating the rival
DPP ticket of Frank Hsieh.
For Additional Reading
CRS Report RS22853, Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential Election, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
CRS Report RL33684, Underlying Strains in Taiwan-U.S. Political Relations, by Kerry
Dumbaugh.
CRS Report RS22388, Taiwan’s Political Status: Historical Background and Ongoing
Implications, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley A. Kan.
CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements
from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, by Shirley A. Kan.
Author Contact Information
Kerry Dumbaugh
Specialist in Asian Affairs
kdumbaugh@crs.loc.gov, 7-7683
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