Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central
America: Funding and Policy Issues

Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
August 21, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40135
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues

Summary
Increasing violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and other criminal
groups is threatening citizen security in Mexico and Central America. Drug-related violence
claimed more than 5,600 lives in Mexico in 2008, and several Central American countries have
among the highest homicide rates in the world. Mexican DTOs dominate the illicit drug market in
the United States and are expanding their operations by forming partnerships with U.S. gangs. As
a result, some of the drug-related violence in Mexico has spilled over into the United States.
On October 22, 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a multi-year
proposal for $1.4 billion in U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance to Mexico and Central
America. In June 2008, the 110th Congress appropriated $400 million for Mexico and $65 million
for Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in the FY2008 Supplemental
Appropriations Act, (P.L. 110-252). The human rights conditions in P.L. 110-252 are less
demanding than earlier versions of the bill, largely because of Mexico’s objections that some of
the original conditions would have violated its national sovereignty. Congress has released almost
all of the FY2008 funds for Central America, and has just released $60 million in FY2008 funds
for Mexico that were being withheld pending the submission of a human rights progress report by
the State Department.
The 111th Congress has demonstrated a strong interest in addressing the spiraling drug trafficking
violence in Mexico through Mérida and related domestic programs. In March 2009, the 111th
Congress appropriated $300 million for Mexico and $110 million for Central America, Haiti and
the Dominican Republic in the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, (P.L. 111-8). In June 2009,
Congress passed a supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32) that included $420 million in Mérida
assistance for Mexico, substantially higher than the Administration’s $66 million request. With
the 2009 supplemental, total funding appropriated for Mérida to date is roughly $1.3 billion. The
FY2009 regular and supplemental appropriations bills also contain human rights conditions.
For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $450 million for Mexico and $100 million for
Central America. On July 9, 2009, the House passed H.R. 3081, the FY2010 State
Department/Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which includes security-related assistance of
$235.8 million for Mexico, $83 million for Central America under a new Central America
Regional Security Initiative, and $37 million under a new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
The Senate Appropriation’s Committees version of the FY2010 State Department/Foreign
Operations Appropriations bill, S. 1434, would provide $115 million for Mexico and $90 million
for Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic under the Mérida Initiative. While both
the House and the Senate would provide less than the Administration’s FY2010 request, Congress
had appropriated significantly more for Mexico in the FY2009 supplemental spending measure.
Policy issues that have emerged in consideration of Mérida include what levels and types of
funding should be provided; how well U.S. agencies and their foreign counterparts are
implementing the Initiative; and the degree to which the nations involved are fulfilling their
domestic obligations under Mérida. Congress has expressed a keen interest in enforcement of
Mérida’s human rights conditions, particularly with respect to Mexico. This report provides an
overview of the funding provided for the Mérida Initiative, the status of Mérida implementation,
and a discussion of some policy issues that Congress may consider as it oversees the Initiative.
For related information, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,
and CRS Report R40582, Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence.
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Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues

Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
The Development of the Mérida Initiative ............................................................................. 2
Funding the Mérida Initiative ...................................................................................................... 3
Mexico ................................................................................................................................. 3
FY2009 Request and Appropriations ............................................................................... 4
FY2009 Supplemental Request and Appropriations ......................................................... 5
FY2010 Request and Committee Action.......................................................................... 5
Central America .................................................................................................................... 7
FY2009 Request and Appropriations ............................................................................... 8
FY2010 Request and Committee Action.......................................................................... 8
The Caribbean....................................................................................................................... 9
Other Mérida Legislation in the 111th Congress ......................................................................... 10
Status of Implementation........................................................................................................... 10
Mexico ............................................................................................................................... 10
FY2008 Obligations and Human Rights Reporting Requirements .................................. 10
Projects Implemented with FY2008 Mérida Funds ........................................................ 11
Availability of FY2009 Regular and Supplemental Funds.............................................. 11
Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic........................................................... 12
Policy Issues ............................................................................................................................. 12
Is Mérida the Right Drug Control Approach? ...................................................................... 13
Balancing “Hard-side” and “Soft-side” Assistance............................................................... 14
Monitoring Progress............................................................................................................ 15
Pace of Implementation....................................................................................................... 15
Interagency Coordination .............................................................................................. 16
Role of the Department of Defense...................................................................................... 17
U.S. Pledges Under the Mérida Initiative............................................................................. 17
Weapons Trafficking ..................................................................................................... 18
Drug Demand ............................................................................................................... 19
Bulk Cash Smuggling ................................................................................................... 20
Mexico Policy Issues .......................................................................................................... 21
Domestic Counterdrug Efforts....................................................................................... 21
Police Reform and Anti-Corruption Efforts ................................................................... 22
Implementation of Judicial Reforms .............................................................................. 22
Protection of Human Rights .......................................................................................... 23
Central America Policy Issues ....................................................................................... 24
The Caribbean..................................................................................................................... 25

Tables
Table 1. FY2008 – FY2010 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account .................................... 6
Table 2. FY2008 – FY2010 Mérida Funding for Central America by Aid Account ....................... 9
Table A-1. Estimated Mérida Requests and Appropriations by Country ..................................... 26

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Appendixes
Appendix A. Estimated Merida Requests and Appropriations by Country .................................. 26
Appendix B. Conditions on FY2008 Supplemental Assistance for Mérida ................................. 27

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 28
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 28

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Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues

Background
Mexico is a major producer and supplier to the U.S. market of heroin, methamphetamine, and
marijuana and the major transit country for cocaine sold in the United States. According to the
Department of State’s 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, as much as 90% of
the cocaine entering the United States now transits through Mexico. A small number of Mexican
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), often referred to as “drug cartels,”1 control the most
significant drug distribution operations along the Southwest border. Drug trafficking-related
violence in Mexico has spiked dramatically in recent years as DTOs have competed for control of
lucrative smuggling routes into the United States.2
Since taking office in December 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón has made combating
the DTOs a centerpiece of his domestic policy agenda. In 2008, the Calderón government’s
crackdown on the cartels, as well as turf wars among Mexico’s drug cartels, fueled an escalation
in violence throughout the country, including states along the U.S.-Mexico border. In 2008, more
than 5,600 people in Mexico were killed in drug-related violence, a 110% increase over 2007.3
Among those murdered were some 522 Mexican military and law enforcement officers.4 The
violence has continued in 2009, even in areas where large contingents of federal military and
police have been deployed. In Ciudad Juarez, a border town across from El Paso, TX, some 900
people were killed in the first six months of 2009 as compared to 800 over the same period in
2008; another 244 people were reportedly killed in July alone.5
Mexican DTOs are increasingly expanding their operations into Central America6, a region in
which security officials have even less training and equipment to deal with DTOs and criminal
gangs than their Mexican counterparts.7 According to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime,
Guatemala and El Salvador are internationally among the most violent countries for which
standardized data has been collected. Whereas homicide rates in Colombia, historically the most
violent country in Latin America, have fallen in the past few years, homicides have increased in
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 8 In addition, Mexico and Central America continue to

1 The term drug cartel remains the term used colloquially and in the press, but some experts disagree with this because
“cartel” often refers to price-setting groups and it is not clear that Mexican drug trafficking organizations are setting
illicit drug prices.
2 For more information, see CRS Report R40582, Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence , by June S. Beittel
3 “Mexico-U.S.: The Drugs War—Dissecting the threat perceived in Washington,” Latin American Security &
Strategic Review
, January 2009.
4 Testimony of David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement (INL) Affairs, before the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, Related Programs of House
Committee on Appropriations, March 10, 2009.
5 “Army Feeble as Murders Surge in Mexico Drug War City,” Reuters, July 8, 2009; Alfredo Corchado, “Mexican
Officials Defend Drug War Strategy as Deaths Rise,” Dallas Morning News, August 2, 2009.
6 The Central American countries include Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Panama.
7 Sara Miller Llana, "Mexico's Drug War Seeps Southward," Christian Science Monitor, June 14, 2009.
8 No standardized CTS data are available for Honduras, but police statistics indicate that it also has a serious murder
problem. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime and Development in Central America:
Caught in the Crossfire
, May 2007, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/central_america_study.pdf. For
recent estimates of homicide rates in Central America, see Observatorio Centroamericano Sobre Violencia, available at
http://www.ocavi.com/index.php.
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have problems with impunity, police corruption, and human rights abuses by security forces that
have hindered the performance and reputation of their law enforcement and judicial systems.9
The Development of the Mérida Initiative
Prior to 2007, neither Mexico nor any of the countries in Central America had received large
amounts of U.S. counternarcotics (CN) assistance.10 In FY2007, for example, Mexico received
$36.7 million in CN assistance and the only Central American countries to receive CN funds were
Guatemala ($1.9 million) and Panama ($3.3 million).
In response to the Mexican government’s request for increased cooperation and assistance, in
October 2007 the United States and Mexico proposed the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S.
counterdrug and anticrime assistance to Mexico and Central America. 11 As proposed, the Mérida
Initiative would provide some $1.4 billion in assistance, largely in the form of equipment and
training, beginning in FY2008 and lasting through FY2010. According to the State Department,
the four primary goals of the Mérida Initiative are to: 1) break the power and impunity of criminal
organizations; 2) assist the Mexican and Central American governments in strengthening border,
air, and maritime controls; 3) improve the capacity of justice systems in the region; and, 4) curtail
gang activity in Mexico and Central America and diminish the demand for drugs in the region.
Within these broad, overarching goals, the State Department developed specific objectives and
performance measures that can be used to evaluate the success of the Mérida Initiative (see
“Monitoring Progress”).12
The Mérida Initiative is not only the largest foreign aid package for the Western Hemisphere
since Plan Colombia,13 but, according to its proponents, it is a new kind of regional security
partnership among the United States, Mexico and Central America. Analysts and U.S. officials
have repeatedly said that for the Initiative to be successful, all the countries involved will have to
accept their “shared responsibility” to tackle domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking
and crime in the region, including U.S. drug demand.14 Since President Calderón took office,
Mexico has increased security spending, including a reported $5 billion increase in the 2009

9 For background information on conditions in Mexico and Central America, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S.
Relations: Issues for Congress
, CRS Report R40582, Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence , by June S. Beittel.
10 For an evaluation of previous U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Mexico, see Government Accountability Office,
“U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow into the
United States,” August 17, 2007.
11 The U.S. and Mexican joint statement on the Mérida Initiative highlighted counterdrug and anticrime efforts of both
countries, including Mexico’s 24% increase in security spending in 2007 under President Felipe Calderón and U.S.
efforts to reduce weapons, human, and drug trafficking along the Mexican border. Although the statement did not
announce additional funding for U.S. domestic efforts, it cited several examples of such efforts to combat drugs and
crime that are already in place. Those examples included the 2007 Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy and the
2008 National Drug Control Strategy. See U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on
the Mérida Initiative,” October 22, 2007.
12 U.S. Department of State, ,“FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan, Mexico, Central America, Haiti,
and the Dominican Republic,” September 9, 2008, pp. 16-39.
13 Developed by former Colombian President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002), Plan Colombia sought to end Colombia’s
military conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote development. Since FY2000, Congress has appropriated more
than $6 billion to support Plan Colombia, largely through the Andean Counterdrug Program account.
14Andrew Selee, “U.S.-Mexico Cooperation: A New Opportunity?” Americas Quarterly, Summer 2009; U.S.
Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia
Espinosa After Their Meeting,” Mexico City, Mexico, March 25, 2009.
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budget, mobilized thousands of soldiers and police to drug trafficking “hot-spots” throughout the
country, and enacted judicial and law enforcement reforms.15 The Obama Administration has,
among other measures, posted more agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF) and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) along the Southwest border
to help intercept arms and bulk cash flowing into Mexico.16 Central American leaders have
regularly met to develop ways to better coordinate their security and counterdrug efforts through
the Central American Integration System (SICA).
While Members of the 110th Congress initially expressed concern that they were not adequately
consulted during the development of the Mérida Initiative, a majority of House Members seemed
supportive of the aid package. On February 7, 2008, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a
hearing on Mérida, and on May 14, 2008 the Committee passed legislation introduced by
Chairman Berman to fund the Initiative. On June 11, 2008, the House approved that legislation,
H.R. 6028, the Mérida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce Organized Crime
Authorization Act of 2008, by a vote of 311 to 106, demonstrating bipartisan support in the House
for the proposed aid. Among the bill’s various conditions on providing the assistance, the measure
would have required that vetting procedures to ensure that members or units of military or police
agencies receiving assistance were not involved in human rights violations. The Senate, however,
did not take any action on the House legislation, so the measure was never enacted.
Funding the Mérida Initiative
Mexico
In June 2008, the 110th Congress appropriated $352 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance
and $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental assistance for Mexico in P.L. 110-252, the
FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (see Table 1 for funding for Mexico by year and aid
account).17 In contrast to the Bush Administration, which requested all Mérida funding in the
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, Congress divided the
funding for Mexico in P.L. 110-252 among the INCLE, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and
Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid accounts. Congress limited the amount of FMF and INCLE
available to provide equipment to the Mexican Army/Air Force and Navy and made 15% of FMF
and IMET contingent on meeting certain human rights conditions. Congress also earmarked $73.5
million for judicial reform, institution building, rule of law, and anti-corruption activities.18
The human rights conditions in P.L. 110-252 are less demanding than earlier House and Senate
versions, largely because of Mexico’s objections that some of the original conditions would have

15 Figure cited in U.S. Department of State, “Mexico- Merida Initiative Report,” August 2009.
16 In June 2009, the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) published the 2009 National Southwest
Border Counternarcotics Strategy, which for the first time included a separate chapter on cooperation with Mexico. For
information on other recent U.S. border security efforts, see: U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, “Remarks to Border
Security Conference at the University of Texas at El Paso,” El Paso, Texas, August 11, 2009.
17 For more information on the FY2008 supplemental assistance proposal for the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report
RS22837, Mérida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America, by Clare
Ribando Seelke.
18 In addition to the broad $73.5 million earmark, Congress earmarked $3 million to support the creation a national
police registry, $10 million for drug demand reduction programs, and $5 million for police training programs.
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violated its national sovereignty. As enacted, the measure reduced the amount of funding subject
to human rights conditions, from 25% to 15% of FMF and INCLE, and removed conditions that
would have required the Mexican government to try military officials accused of abuses in
civilian courts and to enhance the power of its National Human Rights Commission. The
legislation also softened the language concerning other conditions. (See Appendix B for the final
language of the human rights conditions in P.L. 110-252). Congress also stipulated that none of
the funds may be used for budget support or as cash payments.
According to the Department of State,19 which is leading Mérida Initiative implementation, the
first tranche of $400 million for the foreign aid program provided in P.L. 110-252 includes
funding for the following:
• helicopters (up to five Bell 412 helicopters) and surveillance aircraft (up to two
CASA maritime patrol aircraft) to support interdiction and rapid response of
Mexican law enforcement agencies;
• non-intrusive inspection equipment, ion scanners, and canine units for Mexican
customs, the new Mexican federal police and the military to interdict trafficked
drugs, arms, cash, and persons;
• technologies and secure communications to improve data collection and storage;
• and technical advice and training to strengthen the institutions of justice in order
to improve vetting for the Mexican police force, to provide case management
software to track investigations through the legal process, to support offices of
citizen complaint and professional responsibility, and to promote the
establishment of witness protection programs.
FY2009 Request and Appropriations20
The Bush Administration requested $450 million in INCLE funding for Mexico under Mérida in
its FY2009 budget request, placing more emphasis on assistance to non-military agencies than in
the FY2008 supplemental request. The FY2009 request included $118 million to improve
infrastructure and information systems at non-military agencies. With respect to military aid, the
FY2009 request included $100 million to supply aircraft for the Mexican Navy and $20 million in
inspection equipment for use at Army checkpoints. The Bush Administration requested $158.5
million in public security and law enforcement assistance, with $147.6 million for the Mexican
federal police. It sought significantly less funding for institution building programs in FY2009
than in the FY2008 supplemental, just $30.7 million. The request also included $22.5 million to
cover program support.
The 110th Congress did not include Mérida Initiative funding in a continuing resolution for
FY2009 because the initial tranche of Mérida funding was provided through a supplemental
assistance measure. In March 2009, the 111th Congress passed the Omnibus Appropriations Act,
(P.L. 111-8) providing $300 million for Mexico within the INCLE, ESF, and FMF accounts with

19 U.S. Embassy, Mexico, “U.S.-Mexico At a Glance: The Mérida Initiative,” September 2008; U.S. Department of
State, “FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan, Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican
Republic,” September 9, 2008.
20 For more detail on the FY2009 request, see CRS Report RS22837, Mérida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and
Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America
, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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not less than $75 million for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law
activities. The measure continues the same human rights conditions originally set forth in P.L.
110-252, and also has a provision requiring that prior to the procurement or lease of aircraft, that
the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations an analysis of alternatives for the
acquisition of all aircraft for the Mérida Initiative.
FY2009 Supplemental Request and Appropriations
On April 9, 2009, the Obama Administration submitted a FY2009 supplemental request that
included an additional $66 million in INCLE assistance for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative.
According to the request, the assistance was sought to acquire three Blackhawk helicopters for
Mexico’s civilian Public Security Secretariat to provide urgently needed air transport capacity,
along with spare parts and support for those helicopters. Another $16 million in reprogrammed
Mérida Initiative funds previously appropriated in P.L. 110-252 would be used to pay for
maintenance of the helicopters.
On June 24, 2009, President Obama signed the FY2009 supplemental appropriations measure
passed by Congress (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32), which includes $160 million in INCLE assistance
and $260 million in FMF for Mexico, $354 million more than the Administration’s request. The
$160 million in INCLE funds can be used to supply the Mexican federal police with items such as
forensics and nonintrusive inspection equipment, computers, training, and fixed and rotary wing
aircraft (including the requested Blackhawk helicopters). The $260 million in FMF funding is for
expedited aviation assistance to the Mexican Navy (SEMAR) to enhance air transport ability and
aerial surveillance. Anticipated purposes of the funding are for CASA airplanes and for medium
lift maritime helicopters. P.L. 111-32 also appropriates significant funds to other U.S. agencies,
including the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, to increase security on the
Southwest border.
Of the $420 million in FY2009 supplemental assistance to Mexico, 15% of the $160 million in
INCLE assistance is subject to the same human rights conditions set forth in the FY2009 omnibus
appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8, section 7045(e) of Division H). However, the FMF funds
appropriated in P.L. 111-32 are not subject to human rights conditions. According to the
conference report (H.Rept. 111-151), the supplemental measure requires a report from the
Secretary of State within 45 days of enactment of the measure detailing actions by the
government of Mexico since June 30, 2008, to investigate and prosecute human rights violations
by members of the Mexican federal police and military forces. The report also calls for a
“thorough, independent, and credible investigation” of the murder of Bradley Will, an American
journalist killed while covering a protest in Oaxaca in 2006 (for more, see CRS Report RL32724,
Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress).
FY2010 Request and Committee Action
For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $450 million in INCLE assistance for Mexico
as part of the Mérida Initiative. The Administration requested helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft and
surveillance systems for Mexico’s reorganized federal police (SSP), as well as helicopters for the
Mexican Navy. It requested additional funding to provide non-intrusive inspection equipment for
SSP, the Mexican military and Customs. The Administration sought support for law enforcement
training programs in investigative techniques and ethics, as well as anti-corruption training for
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internal watchdog units within the PGR and SSP. The Administration’s FY2010 request also
included funding for ongoing rule of law reforms, including the expansion of an existing case-
tracking system used by the Mexican Attorney General’s office.
On July 9, 2009, the House passed H.R. 3081, the FY2010 State Department-Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act, which includes $235.8 million for Mexico in the INCLE, ESF, and FMF
accounts. In H.Rept. 111-187, the Committee no longer refers to this assistance as the “Mérida
Initiative,” but does subject funding in those accounts to the same human rights conditions as P.L.
110-252 and P.L. 111-8. The House bill would provide $205.3 million in INCLE funds to
modernize the Mexican National Migration Institute; procure non-intrusive inspection equipment
and canine detection training for SSP and Customs; and provide support for anti-gang and anti-
organized crime units, victim/witness protection programs, and extradition training programs. It
would provide $20 million in ESF for rule of law, civil society programs, and institution-building
programs, as well as $10.5 million in FMF assistance.
On July 9, 2009, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the State-Foreign
Operations Appropriations bill, S. 1434, which would provide $105 million in INCLE and $10
million in ESF for Mexico as part of the Mérida Initiative. S. 1434 contains human rights
conditions that are similar to P.L. 110-252 and P.L. 111-8.
Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committee reports (H.Rept. 111-187 and S.Rept. 111-
44) state that a significant portion of the Administration’s FY2010 request was “forward-funded”
in the FY2009 supplemental in an attempt to expedite the delivery of much-needed equipment to
bolster Mexico’s counternarcotics efforts. Table 1 describes the various funding levels addressed
above.
Table 1. FY2008 – FY2010 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account
($ in millions)
FY2009
FY2008
FY2009
FY2009
Supp.
Supp. (P.L. Bridge (P.L. (P.L. 111-
(P.L. 111-
FY2010
Account
110-252)
110-252)
8)
32)
Request H.R.
3081 S.1434
ESF 20.0
0.0
15.0
0.0
0
20.0
10.0
INCLE 215.5 48.0 246.0 160.0 450.0 205.3 105.0
FMF 116.5 0.0 39.0
260.0 0 10.5 0.0
Total
352.0 48.0 300.0 420.0 450.0 235.8 115.0
Sources: U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan and FY2009
Appropriations Spending Plan; FY2009 Supplemental Justification, Department of State & U.S. Agency for
International Development; Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2346, House Report 111-151; U.S.
Department of State, “Summary and Highlights, International Affairs, Function 150, Fiscal Year 2010;” House
Report to H.R. 3081, the State-Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for FY2010 , House Report 111-187; and
Senate Report to S.1434, Senate Report 111-044.
Notes: ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; INCLE=International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement.
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Central America21
The FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252) included $60 million in Mérida
funds for Central America.22 As with Mexico, Congress divided the funding for Central America
among several different accounts (see Table 2). In addition to changing the account structure,
Congress shifted the bulk of funding for Central America from public security and law
enforcement programs to institution building, rule of law, and development programs. It did so by
earmarking $25 million in ESF funds for the creation of an Economic and Social Development
Fund for Central America. Of the ESF funds provided, $20 million are being administered by the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for youth violence prevention, community
policing, and community development programs in violence-prone areas. The other $5 million in
ESF funds are supporting educational and cultural exchange programs administered by the State
Department. Congress also earmarked $1 million to support the International Commission against
Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).23
Due to these shifts in the type of funds provided by Congress, the State Department scaled back
some of its law enforcement programs supported by INCLE funding, such as the transnational
anti-gang units and the training provided at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA).
Congress did provide close to full funding for counternarcotics and border security programs.
Those programs include efforts to include information-sharing and data collection among the
Central American countries; programs to improve port, airport, and border security; and regional
arms trafficking and maritime interdiction programs. These programs are being supported by a
combination of INCLE, FMF, and Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs
(NADR) funding.
According to the State Department supplemental spending plan, some 40% of the Mérida funding
appropriated for Central America will be used to support regional programs. Among the Central
American countries, those with the highest violent crime rates and greatest prevalence of gangs
and organized criminal groups—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—will receive the most
bilateral funding.
As with Mexico, P.L. 110-252 requires that 15% of INCLE and FMF assistance be withheld until
the Secretary of State reports that the Central American governments are taking steps to create
police complaints commissions, reform their judiciaries, and investigate and prosecute military
and police forces who have been credibly alleged to have committed human rights violations.
(See Appendix B for the final language of the human rights conditions.)

21 For more information on the FY2008 supplemental request for Central America, see CRS Report RS22837, Mérida
Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America
, by Clare Ribando Seelke. For
more information on how Mérida programs seek to address gangs, see CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central
America
, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
22 For a detailed description of the FY2008 supplemental assistance proposal for the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report
RS22837, Mérida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America, by Clare
Ribando Seelke.
23 In December 2006, the United Nations and the Guatemalan government signed an agreement to establish the
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) to investigate illegal security groups and clandestine
organizations, some of which have been tied, directly or indirectly, to the Guatemalan state. In August 2007, the
Guatemalan Congress ratified the UN-Guatemala agreement allowing the creation of the CICIG. The CICIG was
inaugurated on January 11, 2008.
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FY2009 Request and Appropriations24
The Bush Administration requested $100 million in FY2009 funds for Central America under the
Mérida Initiative. The FY2009 request included $40 million for border security and counterdrug
programs, $32 million for public security and law enforcement initiatives, $23 million for
institution and rule of law programs, and $5 million in unspecified program support. In the
FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-8, Congress provided $105 million in funding for
Central America subject to similar human rights conditions as in P.L. 110-252. The explanatory
statement to the FY2009 omnibus bill provides $70 million in INCLE. It also stipulates that $15
million of the FMF funds appropriated must support maritime security programs and that $12
million of the ESF appropriated must fund USAID’s Economic and Social Fund for Central
America.
FY2010 Request and Committee Action
The Mérida Initiative funding in the FY2010 request for Central America includes $75 million in
INCLE assistance to enhance the regional capability to protect citizen security, combat illegal
trafficking and build stronger justice sector institutions. According to the request, funding would
support the U.S. anti-gangs strategy, provide equipment and technical assistance for community
policing and juvenile justice systems, and implement anti-corruption measures.
The House-passed version of the FY2010 State Department-Foreign Operations appropriations
bill, H.R. 3081, would replace the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative with a new
Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). According to H.Rept. 111-187, addressing
drugs and crime in Central America requires a longer term commitment than the three-year
Mérida program. As such, H.R. 3081 would provide $75 million in INCLE Western Hemisphere
funding to address drug trafficking and related violence; judicial, police, and prison reform; gang
prevention; and anti-corruption activities in Central America. It would also appropriate $8 million
in FMF to support the ongoing maritime security assistance program.
The Senate version of the State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill, S. 1434, would continue
funding programs for Central America under the existing Mérida framework. It would provide
$75 million in INCLE funds for Central America, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, with no less
than $25 million of those funds to be spent for judicial reform, institution building, anti-
corruption, and rule of law programs. S. 1434 would also provide $15 million to support
USAID’s Economic and Social Development Fund for Central America.
Both the House and Senate versions of the FY2010 State-Foreign Operations measure contain
human rights conditions that are similar to those in P.L. 110-252.


24 For more detail on the FY2009 request, see CRS Report RS22837, Mérida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and
Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America
, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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Table 2. FY2008 – FY2010 Mérida Funding for Central America by Aid Account
($ in millions)

FY2008 Supp.
FY2009 (P.L.
FY2010
Account
(P.L. 110-252)
111-8)
Request
H.R. 3081a S.
1434
ESF
25.0 18.0 25.0 75.0 15.0
INCLE 24.8
70.0
75.0
0.0
75.0
NADR
6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FMF
4.0 17.0 0.0 8.0 0.0
Total 60.0
105.0
100.0
83.0
90.0
Source: U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan, FY2009 Appropriations
Spending Plan, and “Summary and Highlights, International Affairs, Function 150, Fiscal Year 2010;” ;” House
Report to H.R. 3081, the State-Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for FY2010 , H.Rept. 111-187; and S.Rept.
111-44 to S. 1434.
Notes: ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; INCLE=International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs.
a. H.R. 3081, would replace the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative with a new Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).
The Caribbean
Although not included in the original Mérida request, Congress dedicated $2.5 million in INCLE
funding for Haiti and $2.5 million for the Dominican Republic, two major drug transit countries
in the Caribbean, in the FY2008 supplemental measure. In Haiti, Mérida funds are being used to
install a secure communications network for the Haitian National Police (HNP), support the
HNP’s drug interdiction efforts, and provide training for Haitian judicial officials. In the
Dominican Republic, Mérida funds are being used to support police professionalization
programs, provide logistical support to interdiction units, and train judicial authorities in
implementing the new criminal procedure code. A portion of the Mérida funds for each country is
also supporting the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Congress appropriated
another $2.5 million in INCLE funding under Mérida for Haiti and for the Dominican Republic in
the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, (P.L. 111-8).
For 2010, the Obama Administration did not seek Mérida Initiative funding for Haiti and the
Dominican Republic in its budget request, but proposed a new security regime for the Caribbean,
the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The House-passed version of the FY2010 State-
Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, H.R. 3081, includes funding for the proposed CBSI rather
than including Mérida funding for Haiti and the Dominican Republic. H.R. 3081 would provide
$37 million for the CBSI: $13.1 million in Western Hemisphere regional ESF funds for education
and workforce development programs for at-risk youth; $8 million in Caribbean regional funds
for training and scholarship programs; $5.9 million in INCLE for counterdrug training for
security forces, efforts to reform crime legislation, and rule of law activities, and $10 million in
FMF for naval cooperation. In contrast to the House, the Senate Foreign Operations measure, S.
1434, would continue funding Mérida programs in Haiti and the Dominican Republic out of the
$75 million allocated for Central America.
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Other Mérida Legislation in the 111th Congress
H.R. 2410 (Berman) Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011.
Introduced May 14, 2009; House Committee on Foreign Affairs held markup and ordered the bill
reported. House approved June 22, 2009. Title IX, Subtitle A of the bill, as introduced, consists of
actions to enhance the Mérida Initiative, including the designation of a high-level coordinator
within the Department of State to implement the program; the addition of Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) countries to the Mérida Initiative; the establishment and implementation of a
program to assess the effectiveness of assistance provided under the Mérida Initiative; within 180
days and not later than December 1 of each year thereafter, a reporting requirement regarding the
programs and activities carried out under the Mérida Initiative. Title IX, Subtitle B of the bill
would require the President to establish an inter-agency task force on the prevention of illicit
small arms trafficking in the Western Hemisphere; increase penalties for illicit trafficking in small
arms and light weapons; and express congressional support for the ratification by the United
States of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA).
H.R. 3239 (Kirkpatrick) Introduced July 16, 2009; referred to Committees on Homeland
Security and Foreign Affairs. The bill would require the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, to submit a report on the effects of the Mérida Initiative
on the border security of the United States.
Status of Implementation
Prior to the disbursal of INCLE funding for Mérida, the State Department had to negotiate and
sign Letters of Agreement with the countries that were to receive those funds. On December 3,
2008, the United States and Mexico signed a Letter of Agreement, allowing $197 million in
Mérida funds to be disbursed.25 By the end of June 2009, all the Central American countries,
Haiti, and the Dominican Republic had signed Letters of Agreement with the United States.26
Mexico
FY2008 Obligations and Human Rights Reporting Requirements
As noted earlier, on June 30, 2008, Congress appropriated the first $400 million in Mérida
funding for Mexico. As of late July 2009, Congress was still withholding some $57.0 million in
FY2008 supplemental INCLE and FMF funds pending submission of a State Department human
rights progress report for Mexico. The same report was needed in order for $31.5 million in
FY2009 regular funds for Mexico to be released. The $57 million in FY2008 supplemental funds
and the $5.9 million in FMF appropriated in the FY2009 Omnibus will expire on September 30,
2009.

25 See Embassy of the United States in Mexico, Press Release, “Mérida Initiative Monies Released; Letter of
Agreement signed,” December 3, 2008. The $197 million does not include $24 million in program support funds.
26 U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheets provided to Congressional Research Service on July 22, 2009.
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In early August 2009, press reports indicated that the State Department had decided to delay
submission of a favorable human rights report for Mexico to Congress due to the likelihood that it
would have been rejected by Senate appropriators.27 U.S. and Mexican human rights groups had
urged the State Department not to issue a favorable report on the Mexican government’s human
rights record because they maintained that the Mexican military has failed to investigate,
prosecute, or punish human rights violations committed by its forces.28 After receiving additional
information from the Mexican military regarding its efforts to prosecute soldiers charged with
human rights and other abuses, the State Department issued a somewhat favorable report to
Congress on August 13, 2009.29
The recent submission of the State Department’s human rights progress report for Mexico meets
the statutory requirement for the release of the FY2008 supplemental and FY2009 regular FMF
and IMET funds that had been on hold. Those funds total roughly $88.5 million. Some $2.8
million in FY2008 funding is still on hold until Congress is certain that the Mexican Attorney
General is thoroughly investigating the murder of Bradley Will, an American journalist killed
while covering a protest in Oaxaca in 2006.
Projects Implemented with FY2008 Mérida Funds
Mérida implementation is still in its initial stages. As of late July 2009, roughly $328 million of
the $340.2 million in FY2008 funds available at that time had been obligated. 30 INCLE funds had
supported a bilateral arms trafficking workshop held in Mexico in April 2009, the opening of
three new immigration control sites along the Mexico-Guatemala border, the creation of an anti-
human-trafficking system for the Mexican Attorney General’s Office, and the implementation of a
train-the-trainer program for Mexican federal prison officers.31 FMF funds had enabled the
Department of Defense to sign a contract for five Bell 412 helicopters that may begin arriving in
Mexico in late 2009. Ion scanners and a CASA surveillance aircraft, which is in the process of
being ordered, will also be purchased with FY2008 supplemental funding. ESF funds had enabled
USAID to sponsor workshops and study tours for Mexican legal professionals and to co-host a
forum on citizen participation councils and public security. USAID also formed four new
university partnerships to support Mexico’s judicial modernization efforts.32
Availability of FY2009 Regular and Supplemental Funds
On March 11, 2009, Congress appropriated $300 million for Mexico under Mérida in P.L. 111-8.
Those funds will not be available for obligation until a spending plan has been submitted to and
approved by Congress. The State Department submitted an FY2009 spending plan for Mérida to
Congress in mid-August 2009. In addition, 15% of the INCLE and FMF funds appropriated

27 William Booth and Steve Fainaru, "Leahy Blocks Positive Report on Mexico's Rights Record," Washington Post,
August 5, 2009.
28 Letter from Amnesty International and Other Human Rights Groups to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Human
Rights Concerns to Inform the U.S. Department of State’s Merida Initiative Reporting on Mexico, July 24, 2009.
29 William Booth, “Mexico May Get More Anti-Drug Aid,” Washington Post Foreign Service, August 18, 2009.
30 U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet provided to CRS, July 22, 2009;
31 David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, “The Merida Initiative: A New Security Cooperation Partnership,” National Strategy Forum, Fall
2009.
32 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Merida Status Update for CRS,” July 22, 2009.
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(roughly $31.5 million) that had been on hold pending the submission of the human rights report
discussed above are now available for obligation.
On June 24, 2009, Congress appropriated another $420 million for Mexico in the FY2009
supplemental measure (P.L. 111-32). Those funds will also not be available until a new spending
plan detailing how the FY2009 supplemental funding will be obligated has been submitted to
Congress. Some 15% of the INCLE funding in P.L. 111-32 will also be withheld until another
human rights progress report is submitted by the State Department to Congress.
Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic
By late July 2009, roughly $60.7 million of the $65 million in FY2008 supplemental funds
appropriated for Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic were available for
obligation.33 Of the $60.7 million available for obligation as of July 2009, close to $32 million
had been obligated.34 While all FMF funds and the vast majority of INCLE funds available had
been obligated, USAID obligated its first $2.1 million in ESF funds for a project to develop five
community-based youth centers in high crime areas of Panama on July 7, 2009. USAID also
transferred $5 million to the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs for
educational exchange programs, of which $2.2 million had been obligated. Similarly, just
$853,403 of the $6 million in NADR funds appropriated had been obligated, with those funds
supporting border inspection equipment and training.35
As with Mexico, the $110 million appropriated for Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican
Republic under Mérida in P.L. 111-8 will not be available for obligation until a spending plan has
been submitted to and approved by Congress. The State Department submitted an FY2009
spending plan for Mérida to Congress in mid-August 2009. In addition, 15% of the INCLE and
FMF funds appropriated are being withheld until human rights progress reports for each country
are submitted to Congress.36
Policy Issues
A broad consensus appears to be shared by the Administration, Congress and the policy
community on the need for the United States to support neighboring governments in Mexico and
Central America that are struggling to address drug-related violence. President Obama reiterated
his support for President Calderón’s “courageous effort” to take on the DTOs during a press
conference held in Mexico after the conclusion of the North American Leaders Summit on August
10, 2009.37 This year Congress has held numerous hearings on the heightened drug-related
violence in Mexico, and its potential spillover effects on the United States. Congress is closely

33 To date, roughly $800,000 in FY2008 INCLE funds for Guatemala remain on hold. Those funds will expire on
September 30, 2009.
34 U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet provided to CRS, July 22, 2009.
35 Ibid.
36 Unlike with Mexico, Congress required the State Department to issue separate human rights progress reports for the
Central American countries, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic for the FY2008 supplemental funds and the FY2009
regular funds.
37 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Conference by President Obama, President Calderón of
Mexico, and Prime Minister Harper of Canada,” Guadalajara, Mexico, August 10, 2009.
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monitoring the efficacy of assistance provided through the Mérida Initiative, as well as
compliance with Mérida’s human rights conditions.
When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Mexico on March 25–26, 2009, she
commented on the importance of bilateral cooperation under the Initiative. During her trip, she
acknowledged that an “insatiable demand for illegal drugs” in the United States “fuels the drug
trade.”38 With regard to the United States as a source of the weapons that arm the drug cartels,
Clinton also acknowledged that “our inability to prevent weapons from being smuggled across
the border to arm these criminals causes the deaths of police, soldiers and civilians.”39 Congress is
likely to continue to examine how well the U.S. government is demonstrating its “shared
responsibility” to tackle domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and crime in the
region, including U.S. drug demand. This section of the report raises some questions and policy
issues Congress is likely to consider at it oversees implementation of the Mérida Initiative.
Is Mérida the Right Drug Control Approach?40
Unless programs like the Mérida Initiative are woven into a more holistic U.S. drug policy
focusing on reducing demand as well as supply, many analysts predict that they are unlikely to
have a significant impact on drug flows in the region. Analysts from a range of organizations
have called for a new comprehensive U.S. counternarcotics policy that attacks the drug problem
in source, transit, and, perhaps most importantly, consumer countries. 41 As a comparison, many
studies, including an October 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), have
concluded that while Plan Colombia has improved security conditions in Colombia, it has not
significantly reduced the amount of drugs flowing into the United States.42
These concerns have also been expressed by some Members of Congress. The Western
Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act of 2009, H.R. 2134 (Engel), would establish a
commission to evaluate U.S. drug control policies and programs directed at the Western
Hemisphere and to provide recommendations on how to improve U.S. international and domestic
drug policies.
Assessments of the likely impact of the Mérida Initiative are varied. Mérida supporters describe
the initiative as a security cooperation partnership against drug traffickers and organized criminal
groups, rather than a foreign assistance program. They emphasize the importance of fully funding
Mérida in order to build up the capacity of both military and civilian institutions in partner
nations so that bilateral and regional counterdrug efforts can be more successful.43 Others are

38 Mary Beth Sheridan, “On Mexico Trip, Clinton Criticizes U.S. Drug Policy,” Washington Post, March 26, 2009; and
Mark Lander, “Clinton Says Demand for Illegal Drugs in the U.S. ‘Fuels the Drug Trade’ in Mexico,” New York Times,
March 26, 2009.
39 Ibid.
40 For more information on U.S. international drug control policy, see CRS Report RL34543, International Drug
Control Policy
, by Liana Sun Wyler.
41 International Crisis Group, “Latin American Drugs II: Improving Policy and Reducing Harm,” March 14, 2008;
Brookings Institution, “Re-Thinking U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent
World,” November 24, 2008; “Drugs and Democracy: Towards a Paradigm Shift: Statement by the Latin American
Commission on Drugs and Democracy,” February 11, 2009.
42 Government Accountability Office, “Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, But Security Has
Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance,” October 2008, GAO-09-7.
43 American Enterprise Institute, “Five Perspectives on the Mérida Initiative: What it is and why it Must Succeed,”
(continued...)
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more skeptical, maintaining that fighting the drug trade will require more than providing
equipment and training for Mexican and Central American military and police forces. They assert
that Mérida needs to include more funding to address the weak civilian judicial and law
enforcement institutions, as well as the underlying societal problems, such as poverty and
corruption, that have allowed the drug trade to flourish in the region. They also emphasize the
importance of addressing U.S. and European drug demand.44
Balancing “Hard-side” and “Soft-side” Assistance
During the 110th Congress, debates emerged within Congress about the balance of security vs.
institution-building funding in the Bush Administration’s FY2008 supplemental request for
Mexico. Several Members of Congress opposed the request’s apparent emphasis on providing
expensive equipment to the Mexican military with its poor human rights record. In response,
Administration officials contended that the Calderón government specifically requested security
assistance from the United States because Mexican law enforcement and military forces were
being outgunned by the drug cartels. They assured Members of Congress that military and police
units receiving U.S. equipment and training would be properly vetted.45
As noted above, Congress has employed a variety of measures to ensure that various “soft-side”
programs receive support from the Mérida Initiative. These have included limiting the FMF and
INCLE funds available to provide equipment to the Mexican military, and earmarking $73.5
million in FY2008 supplemental funds and $75 million in FY2009 assistance for institution
building, rule of law, and anti-corruption activities in Mexico. Similarly, Congress reduced border
security and counterdrug assistance for Central America in the FY2008 supplemental in order to
free up $25 million in ESF funds for an Economic and Social Development Fund for the region.
With respect to funding for Mexico, several studies have criticized the Mérida Initiative for
focusing too much on technology transfer and not enough on capacity-building and institutional
reform. In addition to increasing funding for existing rule of law, human rights, and anti-
corruption programs, these studies have identified several other “soft-side” programs and
approaches that could be implemented. One study urged U.S. support for the establishment of
constabulary forces and community policing programs in order to improve police-community
relations. Another suggested financing micro-credit, job training, and alternative livelihoods
programs aimed at addressing the poverty that has led some people to collaborate with the
DTOs.46 Still another urged the United States to consider channeling a larger proportion of
assistance to state and local entities, particularly initiatives aimed at improving transparency and
accountability in government.47

(...continued)
March 4, 2008; Heritage Foundation, “Executive Summary: Mexico, Drug Cartels, and the Merida Initiative: A Fight
We Cannot Afford to Lose,” by Ray Walser, July 23, 2008.
44 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), “The Mérida Initiative and Citizen Security in Mexico and Central
America,” March 19, 2008; Council on Foreign Relations, “Task Force Report: U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New
Direction for a New Reality,” May 2008.
45 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Hearing on Mexico and Central America Counternarcotics Aid,” November
15, 2007.
46 Hal Brands, “Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy,” Strategic Studies Institute, May 2009.
47 See, for example, Schaefer et al., “Security in Mexico: Implications for U.S. Policy Options,” RAND Corporation,
2009.
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Monitoring Progress
Recently, several think tanks have held forums addressing the issue of how to monitor progress in
implementing the Mérida Initiative. Many analysts maintain that it is crucial for both the U.S. and
Mexican executive branches to manage legislative and popular expectations for the Initiative.
They argue that it is important that the goals for the Initiative be realistic, and that progress made
towards meeting those goals be regularly communicated to legislators and to the general public in
both countries. For example, an achievable goal would not be to end drug trafficking through
Mexico, but to reduce trafficking and related violence from a national security threat to a public
security issue. Many predict that it is likely to take much longer than three years for Mérida to
help partner governments make real headway in achieving that goal.48
U.S. and Mexican security experts have also urged Congress to look at a range of indicators when
evaluating the Mérida Initiative, rather than merely measuring its effects on drug seizures and
flows. Perhaps in response to that advice, Congress asked the State Department to include a list of
performance measures for each portion of the Mérida Initiative in its FY2008 supplemental
spending plan. For example, some indicators that might indicate that Mérida is helping break the
power and impunity of criminal organizations, might include trends in narcotics flows from
Mexico to the United States, changes in the amount of illicit materials seized, and the number of
high-profile drug traffickers arrested.49
State Department officials have warned, however, that sometimes certain indicators can be
misleading. For example, drug seizures in Mexico decreased in 2008 as compared to 2007. Rather
than attributing a decline in seizures as an indicator of some deficiency in Mexican CN efforts,
U.S. law enforcement officials believe that traffickers have been forced to seek alternate routes
because of better enforcement in Mexico.50 This trend could continue with Mérida
implementation. U.S. officials also maintain that some of the most important results of Mérida
thus far may be impossible to quantify, such as the increase in communication and cooperation
that has developed as a result of the Initiative among U.S., Mexican, and Central American law
enforcement and security officials.51
Pace of Implementation
The recent escalation of the violence in Mexico and the potential threat of spillover along the
Southwest border has focused congressional concern about the pace of the implementation of
Mérida aid on that country most vividly. There has been increasing criticism from Mexican
officials as well as from Members of the U.S. Congress about the slow delivery of Mérida
assistance to Mexico. Although many programs will be operational by the end of 2009, others that
fund military equipment have a longer procurement process. U.S. officials reportedly have
attributed delays in disbursal of FY2008 funds to cumbersome U.S. government contracting
regulations, negotiations with Mexico about what equipment is actually needed, and the difficulty

48 See, for example, comments made at the Woodrow Wilson Center Event, “U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: The
Mérida Initiative and Beyond,” February 8, 2008. Available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=5949&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=370648.
49 For a complete list of those indicators, see U.S. Department of State, ,“FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations
Spending Plan, Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic,” September 9, 2008, pp. 16-39.
50 U.S. Department of State, 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, February 27, 2009.
51 Interview with State Department officials, July 13, 2009.
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of delivering an aid package that involves so many agencies and encompasses so many
programs.52 Secretary of State Clinton has recently acknowledged “that our long process of
approval [for purchasing and delivering helicopters paid for by FMF funds] was cumbersome and
challenging for the Mexican government.” She vowed to “see what we can do to cut that time.”53
Some of the more recent delays in Mérida implementation have also been due to the fact that
Congress did not pass an FY2009 appropriations bill until well into the FY2009 fiscal year. Other
delays have occurred as result of ongoing consultations between the State Department and
congressional appropriators on the contents of the spending plans and human rights progress
reports required by the Merida appropriations legislation.
Interagency Coordination
In the last few years, several studies have noted the proliferation of U.S. agencies engaged in
foreign assistance and homeland security activities, as well as the challenges of getting those
agencies to work together in a coordinated fashion. Each federal agency tends to have its own
mission, priorities, and operating style. Instead of working together to implement a particular
policy or initiative, agencies often engage in “turf battles” as they compete for leadership roles
and budgetary resources. For example, a recent GAO report concluded that U.S. efforts to combat
arms trafficking to Mexico have been hampered by, among other things, a lack of coordination
between Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and ATF, the two agencies primarily
responsible for dealing with that issue.54
Interagency coordination may prove particularly difficult during implementation of the Mérida
Initiative because its diverse program components are being carried out by a wide range of U.S.
agencies under the leadership of the State Department. Most Mérida programs are being
administered by the State Department and USAID. However, because border security is a key
component of Mérida, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also has a major role to play
in its implementation. Within DHS, officials from ICE, Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
and the U.S. Coast Guard are providing training and logistical support to their counterparts in
Mexico and Central America. Similarly, agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) within the Department of Justice are
working with law enforcement officials in partner countries.
“Turf battles” may emerge among implementing agencies, but they may also play out in the
congressional committees that have an interest in overseeing Mérida. Because it is a foreign
assistance program, primary oversight responsibilities for Mérida is to rest with the Senate
Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees. However, other committees, such as
the Senate and House Homeland Security Committees, may want to continue weighing in on how
Mérida funding is being spent, how its progress is being evaluated, and how Mérida-funded
programs are dovetailing with U.S. homeland security programs.

52 William Booth and Steve Fainaru, “U.S. Aid Delays in Drug War Criticized,” Washington Post, April 5, 2009.
53 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa After Their
Meeting,” Washington, D.C., July 1, 2009.
54 GAO, “Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination
Challenges,” June 2009, GAO-09-709.
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Role of the Department of Defense
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) has become
increasingly involved in funding counterterrorism and other foreign assistance programs around
the world.55 In Latin America, DOD, acting through its Southern Command (Southcom), has
expanded its definition of security threats to include nontraditional threats such as international
crime, public health crises, and even poverty and inequality. Human rights groups have tracked
DOD’s expanding role in providing foreign aid in Latin America, alleging DOD’s “mission
creep” into programs and activities they feel are best funded and administered by the State
Department or USAID.56
When the Mérida Initiative was first announced, analysts from across the political spectrum
praised the fact that it did not appear to involve an active role for U.S. military forces in Mexico
or Central America.57 Some were pleased that civilian officials from the Central American
Integration System (SICA) and the State Department designed the Central American portion of
the proposal, rather than military personnel from the Central American Armed Forces Conference
(CFAC) and Southcom.58 Although DOD may not have taken a leadership role in designing
Mérida, it will be administering assistance provided to Mexico through the FMF aid account, as
well as a maritime assistance package in Central America. Apart from the Mérida Initiative, DOD
provided a $13 million counterterrorism training and equipment package to the Mexican military
in FY2008.59 In addition, while DOD only provided some $3.1 million in CN training assistance
to Mexico in FY2008, DOD assistance expanded to roughly $28.2 million in FY2009 in order to
complement Mérida programs.60 Congress is likely to monitor DOD’s role in Mérida, as well as
how its other programs in Mexico and Central America complement the Initiative.
U.S. Pledges Under the Mérida Initiative
In the U.S. and Mexico joint statement announcing the Mérida Initiative, the United States
government pledged to “intensify its efforts to address all aspects of drug trafficking (including
demand-related portions) and continue to combat trafficking of weapons and bulk currency to
Mexico.”61 Many security experts argue that this pledge may be even more important to the
success of regional counterdrug and anticrime efforts than any amount of U.S. foreign aid

55 For more information, see CRS Report RL34639, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance:
Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress
, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino.
56 WOLA, Center for International Policy, and Latin America Working Group Education Fund, “Ready, Aim, Foreign
Policy: How the Pentagon Takes Over More and More Areas of Foreign Policy,” April 20, 2008.
57 Heritage Foundation, July 2008; WOLA, March 2008.
58 U.S. Department of State, Office of Language Services Translating Division, “Not All That is Gold Glitters and Not
All That Glitters is Gold,” by Joel Fyke and Maureen Meyer, published in Foreign Affairs en Español, vol. 8, no. 1.
59 In the FY2006-FY2008 annual Department of Defense (DOD) authorization bills, Congress provided DOD with
authority to train and equip foreign military forces to perform counterterrorism operations. This “Section 1206”
authority, as it is known, enables DOD to use defense funds to conduct or support train and equip programs such as
those usually provided under State Department security assistance authorities and budgets. U.S. Department of
Defense, “Section 1206 Programs Fact Sheet.” July 29, 2009.
60 Section 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181) extends Section
1033(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 to make available train and equip authorities to
Mexico. Estimates of DOD CN support to Mexico for FY2008 and FY2009 are from U.S. Department of Defense,
“Fact Sheet: Current DOD CN Support to Mexico,” July 2009.
61 U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative,” October 22, 2007.
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provided to Mexico or Central America.62 However, Mérida was proposed and funded as a
foreign assistance package without any companion legislation on the domestic side. As such, it
may prove difficult for Congress to monitor the degree to which the U.S. government is fulfilling
its domestic pledges under the Mérida Initiative.
Weapons Trafficking63
U.S. officials estimate that 90% of the firearms recovered from crime scenes in Mexico originated
in the United States.64 Mexican drug cartels and enforcer gangs are reportedly buying
semiautomatic versions of AK-47 and AR-15 style assault rifles, and other military-style firearms
in the United States. The cartels often obtain their weapons through “straw purchases,” whereby
people who are legally qualified buy the weapons from licensed gun dealers or at gun shows in
border states and sell them to smugglers who take them across the border.
ATF began a Southwest border initiative dubbed Project Gunrunner in FY2004 that aims to
disrupt illegal flows of weapons from the United States into Mexico. In FY2006 and FY2007,
around 100 ATF special agents and 25 industry operations investigators were dedicated to Project
Gunrunner, while by March 2009, the numbers had increased to 148 special agents and 59
industry operations investigators.65 From FY2004 through June 2009, ATF referred 882 cases for
prosecution involving more than 1,838 defendants, including almost 415 cases for firearms
trafficking involving more than 1,135 defendants and almost 13,382 guns.66
In addition to these efforts in the United States, ATF received $4.5 million in Mérida funds and
$4.5 million in asset forfeiture funds from the Department of the Treasury for the deployment of
eTrace firearms tracking technology to U.S. Consulates in Mexico to combat arms trafficking.67
In FY2008, Mexico submitted more than 7,500 recovered guns for tracing, showing that most
originated in Texas, Arizona, and California.68
The Department of Homeland Security, especially ICE and CBP, are also involved in taking
action to stop the southbound flow of weapons to Mexico. Both ICE and CBP have the authority
to enforce export provisions of the Arms Exports Control Act. In collaboration with Mexican law
enforcement authorities, ICE launched a new bilateral program against weapons smuggling in
June 2008 known as Operation Armas Cruzadas. Among other activities, the program involves
intelligence sharing and joint law enforcement efforts with vetted Mexican units. As DHS

62 Brookings Institution, November 2008.
63 For more information, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border, by Vivian S. Chu and
William J. Krouse
64 U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico, “U.S.-Mexico, “U.S.-Mexico at a Glance: Combating Illicit Firearms,”
February 2009.
65 Department of Justice (DOJ), Statement of William Hoover, Assistant Director for Field Operations, ATF, and
Anthony P. Placido, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence Division, DEA, before Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, March 17, 2009.
66 DOJ, Statement of Anthony P. Placido, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence Division, DEA, and Bill McMahon,
Deputy Assistant Director, ATF, before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime,
and Global Counterterrorism, July 16, 2009.
67 Ibid.
68 U.S. Department of Justice, “Department of Justice Announces Resources for Fight against Mexican Drug Cartels,”
Fact Sheet, March 24, 2009.
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reported in March 2009, the operation has resulted in more than 100 criminal arrests, 42
convictions, and the seizure of more than 400 weapons.69
According to DHS, the Mexican government began a pilot program in February 2009 to screen
incoming traffic to look for guns, bulk cash, and other contraband, and hopes to expand the
program across the entire border by the fall of 2009.70 In addition, under the Mérida Initiative, the
United States will be providing non-intrusive inspection equipment that will assist Mexican
officials to prevent arms and cash smuggling from the United States.71
Some analysts have suggested that the U.S. government could further expand its efforts against
gun trafficking to Mexico. They have advocated for, among other things, improving regulations to
combat “straw purchases,” better regulating how weapons that are particularly attractive to
criminal groups (such as “vest-buster” handguns and anti-armor rifles) are marketed, and enacting
an effective assault weapons ban.72
Others have called for the U.S. Senate to act on a pending treaty, the Inter-American Convention
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and
Other Related Materials.”73 According to the Department of State, the convention will help shut
down the illicit transnational arms market that fuels the violence associated with drug trafficking,
terrorism, and international organized crime. The treaty, which was signed by the United States in
1997, entered into force in July 1998. It was submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent in
June 1998.74
Drug Demand
U.S. drug demand fuels a multi-billion dollar illicit industry that has enhanced the power of
DTOs and other allied gangs and organized criminal groups. In 2007, more than 35 million
people in the United States reported using illicit drugs or abusing prescription drugs. Studies have
shown that addressing drug demand through a combination of treatment programs for heavy users
and prevention programs is more successful and cost-effective than through supply reduction
programs.75 Nevertheless, the U.S. drug control budget has continued to emphasize supply-side
programs, including drug crop eradication in source countries, interdiction, and domestic law
enforcement efforts, rather than demand reduction efforts. From FY2002 through the FY2009
budget request, funding for supply-side programs reportedly increased by almost 57%, whereas

69 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Statement of Mark Koumans, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of
International Affairs,” before House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, March 10,
2009.
70 Ibid.
71 U.S. Department of State, “Statement of David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,” before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, March 18, 2009.
72 Tom Diaz, Violence Policy Center, “Disrupting Arms Trafficking to Mexico,” October 17, 2008.
73 Peter DeShazo and Johnna Mendelson Forman, “A treaty that can help stem drug violence in Mexico,” Washington
Times
, February 24, 2009.
74 U.S. Department of State, The Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials,” Fact Sheet, March 25, 2009.
75 P. Rydell and S. Everingham, “Controlling Cocaine Supply Versus Demand Programs,” RAND: Santa Monica, C.A.,
1994; David Boyum and Peter Reuter, An Analytic Assessment of U.S. Drug Policy, Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 2005.
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support for demand reduction efforts increased by less than 3%.76 Supply reduction efforts now
account for nearly two-thirds of the federal drug control budget.
U.S. pledges to intensify domestic demand reduction efforts in order to complement the Mérida
Initiative have yet to be reflected in new budgetary priorities. The FY2010 federal drug control
request submitted by the Obama Administration includes slightly less funding for demand
reduction programs (-0.8%) than what was enacted in FY2009.77 Ongoing debates about the
proper balance of funding for supply reduction vs. demand reduction programs are likely to
continue in the 111th Congress.78
Bulk Cash Smuggling
Interrupting the flow of money from drug sales in the United States to Mexico, estimated to range
from $15 billion to $25 billion annually,79 may be one of the most effective ways to disrupt the
activities of the Mexican DTOs. A portion of this money is used to buy weapons in the United
States to arm the DTOs and their drug enforcers. Other drug proceeds are used to corrupt law
enforcement and public officials, enabling the DTOs to continue to operate with impunity. Some
analysts believe that the U.S. Treasury is doing a good job of making it difficult to launder money
within financial institutions. Therefore, the preferred mode to transfer drug proceeds by the
Mexican DTOs is through shipments of bulk cash.80
In order to address the problem of bulk cash smuggling, the DEA has carried out bulk cash
seizures with the FBI, ICE, and CBP. In 2005, ICE and CBP launched a program known as
“Operation Firewall,” which increased operations against bulk cash smuggling in the U.S.-
Mexico border region. Since 2005, Operation Firewall has resulted in 452 arrests and the seizure
of more than $195 million.81 Many operations have been carried out in coordination with
Mexican customs and the Mexican money laundering vetted unit. In 2008, ICE created a Trade
Transparency Unit (TTU) in Mexico. Mexican TTU representatives are receiving training and
technical support from ICE officials in how to identify cross-border trade anomalies that could be
indicative of bulk cash smuggling.

76 “FY02-FY09 Budget Emphasizes Least Effective Ingredients of Drug Policy,” Carnevale Associates, February 2008.
77 U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: FY2010 Budget Summary, May 7,
2009, p. 13.
78 For more information on U.S. domestic drug policy, see CRS Report RL32352, War on Drugs: Reauthorization and
Oversight of the Office of National Drug Control Policy
, by Mark Eddy.
79 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute, The United States and Mexico: Towards a
Strategic Partnership
, January 2009.
80 Testimony of Andrew Selee, Director of the Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center before the House
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
March 12, 2009.
81 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Statement of John T. Morton, Assistant Secretary, ICE, before the House
Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, June 11, 2009.
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Mexico Policy Issues82
As the U.S. Congress oversees implementation of the Mérida Initiative, it is likely to maintain an
interest in what the Mexican government is doing to combat the drug cartels and reform its law
enforcement and judicial systems. Congress may want to ensure that U.S. and Mexican
counternarcotics programs are complementing, rather than duplicating each other’s efforts.
Congress may also want to monitor the Mexican government’s anti-corruption efforts, as well as
its ability to hold police and military forces accountable for human rights abuses.
Domestic Counterdrug Efforts
President Calderón has made combating drug cartels a top priority of his administration. He has
increased Mexico’s security budget from roughly $2 billion in 2006, to some $4 billion in 2008,
and a reported $9.3 billion for 2009.83 He has mobilized thousands of soldiers and federal police
to arrest drug traffickers, establish check points, burn marijuana and opium plants, and interdict
drug shipments. A 2008 U.S. government report credits Mexico’s recently established import
restrictions on products containing methamphetamine precursors with reducing Mexican
methamphetamine shipments to the United States.84 President Calderón has also used extradition
as a major tool to combat drug traffickers, extraditing 83 alleged criminals to the United States in
2007 and a record 95 individuals in 2008.85
While a majority of Mexicans still support President Calderón, there have been increasing calls
for him to consider a new anti-drug approach. Drug-related arrests and extraditions have
increased, but drug-related killings have also continued at record levels, even in communities
where large numbers of military and federal police have been deployed. 86 Some have expressed
concerns about the militarization of Mexican law enforcement. Calderón officials have staunchly
defended their current anti-drug approach, saying that the military strategy, though difficult, is
producing positive results.87 Many experts maintain that there needs to be greater oversight of the
military by civilian institutions, particularly the Congress.88 Others assert that Calderón has not
devoted enough resources to addressing issues that are closely linked to the drug trade, such as
money laundering. Still others remain concerned that ongoing corruption, impunity, and human
rights abuses by military and police forces are not being adequately addressed.89

82 For more information, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan
and June S. Beittel.
83 Steve Fainaru and William Booth, "As Mexico Battles Cartels, The Army Becomes the Law," Washington Post,
April 2, 2009.
84 NDIC, National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, November 2008.
85 U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico, “U.S.-Mexico At a Glance: Extraditions,” February 2009.
86 Alfredo Corchado, “Mexican Officials Defend Drug War Strategy as Deaths Rise,” Dallas Morning News, August 2,
2009.
87 Steve Fainaru and William Booth, "New Strategy Urged in Mexico," Washington Post, July 28, 2009.
88 Woodrow Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, The United States and Mexico: Toward a Strategic Partnership, January
2009.
89 Human Rights Watch, Uniform Impunity, Mexico’s Misuse of Military Justice to Prosecute Abuses in
Counternarcotics and Public Security Operations, April 2009, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/29/mexico-hold-military-account-rights-abuses.
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Police Reform and Anti-Corruption Efforts
Instances of corruption of law enforcement and government officials have been a significant
problem that has made the campaign against drug cartels more difficult. In August 2008, six
members of the federal Attorney General’s office known as SIEDO reportedly had been arrested
on suspicion of leaking information to drug traffickers. In October 2008, an elite unit within
SIEDO was implicated in a scandal involving payoffs for sensitive information about antidrug
activities, with at least 35 officials fired or arrested.90 In November 2008, the former head of
SIEDO was arrested and accused of accepting bribes from a drug cartel.
President Calderón has taken steps to reform the country’s federal, state, and municipal police
forces and to crack down on corruption within the police and other government institutions.
Calderón has reorganized the two federal police agencies under a single commander, established a
new police training institute, and created a national database through which police can share
information and intelligence. His government has begun to test the competency of state and local
police forces and to reward units whose officers meet certain standards with higher budgets. Only
roughly 50% of officers tested in 2008 are said to have met the minimum standards. President
Calderón has also purged hundreds of corrupt police officers. In late December 2008, he asserted
that some 11,500 law enforcement and other government employees had been fined for
corruption in the past two years, with fines totaling close to $300 million.91
The State Department’s 2008 human rights report, issued in March 2009, recognized the Mexican
government’s efforts to reform and professionalize the police force, although it highlighted that
corruption and impunity, particularly at the state and local levels, remain endemic problems.
Analysts have suggested that the Calderón government consider implementing other reforms,
including, but not limited to, strengthening police professionalization programs, establishing a
career track within federal and state police forces, and developing internal and external review
mechanisms for police performance.92
Implementation of Judicial Reforms
The Mexican judicial system has been widely criticized for being opaque, inefficient, and corrupt.
It is plagued by long case backlogs, a high pre-trial detention rate (some 40% of Mexican inmates
are simply awaiting trials), and an inability to secure convictions. In June 2008, President
Calderón signed a judicial reform decree after securing the approval of Congress and Mexico’s
states for an amendment to Mexico’s Constitution. Under the reform, Mexico has eight years to
replace its trial procedures, moving from a closed-door process based on written arguments to a
public trial system with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. In
addition to oral trials, the judicial system is to adopt additional means of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR), which should help make it more flexible and efficient.
Implementing these judicial reforms is likely to bring additional challenges. Some of those
challenges may include the need to update law school curricula, retrain current legal
professionals, build new courtrooms, improve forensic technology, and encourage the use of

90 Tracy Wilkinson, “Mexico Under Siege: Elite Police Tainted by Drug Gang,” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2008.
91 Sara Miller Llana, “Setbacks in Mexico’s War on Corruption,” Christian Science Monitor, December 29, 2008.
92 Woodrow Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, The United States and Mexico: Toward a Strategic Partnership, January
2009.
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ADR. Many observers hope that the federal government can learn how to identify and overcome
those challenges by looking at the experiences that states such as Chihuahua and Oaxaca have
had in adopting an accusatorial justice system and in using ADR.93 USAID has been supporting
state-level judicial reform programs in Mexico since the mid-1990s, and is now supporting
implementation of the federal judicial reform.
Protection of Human Rights
Both the Mexican police and military have poor human rights records. According to the State
Department’s most recent human rights report, there were credible reports of police involvement
in extrajudicial killings, kidnappings for ransom, and torture. There has been increasing concern
that the Mexican military, which has had less human rights training and is less accountable to
civilian authorities than the police, is committing more human rights abuses as it is increasingly
tasked with public security tasks.94 According to Mexico’s Human Rights Commission (the
CNDH), complaints of human rights abuses by the Mexican military increased from 182 in 2006
to 1,230 in 2008.95
In addition to expressing concerns about current human rights abuses being committed, Mexican
and international human rights groups have criticized the Mexican government for failing to hold
military and police officials accountable for past abuses. On July 13, 2009, Human Rights Watch
issued a statement asserting that “Mexican military courts ... have not convicted a single member
of the military accused of committing a serious human rights violation.”96 The head of the
Mexican military’s human rights office held a press conference on July 23, 2009, to dispute those
assertions, but reportedly did not provide details on particular cases that had been successfully
prosecuted in the military justice system.97
Human rights organizations generally lauded the inclusion of human rights conditions (described
in Appendix B) in Mérida Initiative appropriations legislation. U.S. and Mexican human rights
groups have urged the State Department not to issue a favorable report on the Mexican
government’s human rights record. They maintain that the Mexican military has failed to
investigate, prosecute, or punish human rights violations committed by its forces.98
On August 13, 2009, the State Department submitted its human rights progress report for Mexico
to Congress, thereby meeting the statutory requirements for FY2008 supplemental and FY2009
regular funds that had been on hold to be released. While acknowledging that serious problems
remain, the report outlines steps that the Mexican government has made to improve police

93 David Shirk and Lourna M. Márquez-Carrasquillo, “Border Brief: State Level Judicial Reform Initiatives in
Mexico,” February 21, 2008.
94 See testimony by Joy Olson, Washington Office on Latin America, and Lisa Haugaard, Latin America Working
Group, before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs, hearing on the Mérida Initiative, March 10, 2009.
95 Statistics are available in annual reports of Mexico’s Human Rights Commission, available at
http://www.cndh.org.mx.
96 Human Rights Watch, “Mexico: U.S. Should Withhold Military Aid: Rights Conditions in Merida Initiative Remain
Unmet,” July 13, 1009, available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/13/mexico-us-should-withhold-military-aid.
97 Booth and Fainaru, August 5, 2009.
98 Letter from Amnesty International and Other Human Rights Groups to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Human
Rights Concerns to Inform the U.S. Department of State’s Merida Initiative Reporting on Mexico, July 24, 2009.
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transparency and accountability, consult with Mexican human rights organizations and civil
society on the Mérida Initiative, investigate and prosecute allegations of human rights abuses by
security forces, and prohibit the use of torture. The report acknowledges that human rights
complaints against the Mexican military have “increased almost six-fold” since the beginning of
the Calderon government. It also states that “the opaqueness of the [Mexican] military court
system makes it difficult to analyze the nature and type of complaints filed, the status of cases
against members of the military alleged to have violated human rights, or the results of the
military prosecution.”99
Central America Policy Issues
A number of policy issues may emerge as Congress considers the Central American portion of the
Mérida Initiative including concerns about:
Funding: When the Mérida Initiative was announced, Central American leaders
and some Members of Congress expressed concerns about the funding disparity
between the Mexican and Central American portions of the Initiative.100
Depending upon how much funding Central America receives in the FY2010
budget for Mérida, there may be lingering questions about the adequacy of the
funds provided, as well as how much of those funds should be spent on regional
programs versus bilateral programs in the seven Central American countries.
Type of Funds Provided: In the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act,
Congress reduced the funds appropriated for law enforcement programs in
Central America in order to increase funding for institution-building, rule of law,
and development programs. Members are likely to continue to debate how
funding should be balanced among the various program components, particularly
how much funding should support law enforcement programs and drug
interdiction efforts versus institution-building and rule of law activities.
Creation of a Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). House
and Senate versions of the FY2010 State-Foreign Operations bill differ over
whether to continue funding security assistance to Central America through the
Mérida Initiative or not. The conference committee is likely to decide whether to
keep the existing Mérida framework or to replace it with a separate security
initiative for Central America.
Instability in Particular Countries. As a result of the recent ouster of President
Zelaya, some Mérida assistance for Honduras has been put on hold. How will
regional programs like the ongoing maritime security initiative be affected by the
suspension of funding to one country?
Interagency Coordination: Debates are likely to continue concerning what U.S.
agency is best equipped to oversee Mérida programs, including the issue of
whether there is a role for the U.S. Southern Command in anticrime efforts, and
how U.S. programs should be coordinated with those funded by other donors.

99 U.S. Department of State, “Mexico- Merida Initiative Report,” August 2009.
100 Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Central Americans See Peril in Bush’s Anti-Drug Priorities,” Washington Post, November
29. 2007.
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Anti-gang Policies: There is ongoing disagreement over the level and
combination of preventive and suppressive policies that should be used in Central
America to address the gang problem. Proponents of law enforcement solutions
maintain that Central American law enforcement officials lack the capacity and
resources to target gang leaders effectively, share data, and conduct thorough
investigations that lead to successful prosecutions. Human rights groups tend to
emphasize the importance of prevention and rehabilitation programs.
U.S. Deportation Procedures: Congress may also maintain an interest in how
U.S. deportation procedures for individuals with criminal records might be
improved and whether U.S. assistance should be provided to help receiving
governments reintegrate deportees.
The Caribbean
The Bush Administration originally conceived the Mérida Initiative as a foreign assistance
package for Mexico and Central America, the countries through which the bulk of cocaine
heading to the United States now flows. However, some Members of Congress felt that the
Initiative should also include funding for the Caribbean drug transit countries of Haiti and the
Dominican Republic. If they are not funded, they argued, a successful Mérida Initiative will force
drug traffickers to return to the Caribbean transit zone. As a result, the 110th Congress included
Haiti and the Dominican Republic in Mérida authorizations and appropriations legislation. The
111th Congress provided additional Mérida funding for Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the
2009 Omnibus appropriations measure signed into law on March 11, 2009.
Some favor including Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the Mérida Initiative since both
countries are key transhipment points for cocaine bound from South America to the United States
and Europe. They point out that both countries have experienced a surge in air smuggling of
cocaine from Venezuela since 2007.101 Haiti, the poorest and most unstable country in the Western
Hemisphere, is particularly attractive to narcotics traffickers since its coasts and border with the
Dominican Republic are largely uncontrolled. Others oppose providing additional Mérida funds
for Haiti and the Dominican Republic since there are only limited funds available for the
Initiative. Haiti and the Dominican Republic already receive U.S. counternarcotics assistance
through other foreign aid accounts. Moreover, they argue, both countries are also receiving
counternarcotics training and support from the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti.
Finally, some Members of Congress have called for a broader expansion of Mérida Initiative-
related security assistance to the Caribbean nations. They support additional foreign operations
appropriations in FY2010 so that all the nations of the Caribbean receive Mérida assistance. In
the authorization legislation in the 111th Congress, all Caribbean community (CARICOM) nations
are included. The Obama Administration did not include Haiti and the Dominican Republic in its
FY2010 request for Mérida. It did announce a new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative at the
Summit of the Americas held in April 2009. This Caribbean expansion is reflected in H.R. 3081,
the House-passed version of the FY2010 State-Foreign Operations Appropriation measure.

101 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2008.
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Appendix A. Estimated Merida Requests and
Appropriations by Country

This table provides an overview of the funds that have been requested and appropriated for the
Mérida Initiative by country. The FY2009 Appropriations Plan submitted by the State Department
did not specify country amounts for Central America, neither did the FY2010 budget request.
Table A-1. Estimated Mérida Requests and Appropriations by Country
($ in millions)
FY2008
FY2009
FY2009

Supp.
Omnibus
Supp.
FY2010
FY2008
App. Act
App. Act
FY2009
App. Act
Request
Supp.
(P.L. 110-
FY2009
(P.L. 111-
Supp.
(P.L. 111-
Country
Request
252)
Request
8)
Request
32)

Mexico
500.0 400.0 450.0 300.0 66.0 420.0 450.0
Belize
1.9
1.5
5.8
- - - -
Costa
Rica 4.3
4.3
9.5
- - - -
El
Salvador 7.1
6.1
17.3
- - - -
Guatemala 11.1
10.6
17.7
- - - -
Honduras 10.8
7.3
12.4
- - - -
Nicaragua 3.7
2.4
6.7
- - - -
Panama
3.9
2.0
8.9
- - - -
Central
7.2
24.9
21.7
- - - -
America
(Regional)
Central
50.0 60.0 100.0 105.0 -
- 100.0
America
(total)
Haiti 0.0
2.5
0.0
2.5
-
-
-
Dominican
0.0 2.5 0.0 2.5 - - -
Republic
Total
550.0 465.0 550.0 410.0 66.0 420.0 550.0
Source: U.S. Department of State briefing papers provided to Congressional offices; FY2008 Supplemental
Appropriations Spending Plan; 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-8, (Division H and Joint Explanatory
Statement, H.R. 1105); FY2009 Supplemental Justification, Department of State & U.S. Agency for International
Development; Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2346, H.Rept. 111-151. and U.S. Department of State,
“Summary and Highlights, International Affairs, Function 150, Fiscal Year 2010.”
Notes: The FY2009 Appropriations Plan submitted by the State Department did not specify country amounts for
Central America. In addition, the FY2010 request does not contain a specific country breakdown.



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Appendix B. Conditions on FY2008 Supplemental
Assistance for Mérida

Mexico
The FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252), which includes the first tranche of
funding provided for the Mérida Initiative, has softer human rights conditions than earlier House
and Senate versions, in large part because of Mexico’s objections that some of the conditions
would violate its national sovereignty. The Secretary of State, after consultation with Mexican
authorities, is required to submit a report on procedures in place to implement Section 620J of the
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. That section of the FAA “prohibits assistance to any unit
of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such
unit has committed gross violations of human rights.” An exception to this prohibition is provided
in Section 620J if the Secretary of State determines and reports to Congress that the government
of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security
forces unit to justice.
In P.L. 110-252, human rights conditions require that 15% of INCLE and FMF assistance be
withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that Mexico is taking action in four human
rights areas:
• improving transparency and accountability of federal police forces;
• establishing a mechanism for regular consultations among relevant Mexican
government authorities, Mexican human rights organizations, and other relevant
Mexican civil society organizations, to make consultations concerning
implementation of the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and
international law;
• ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and
prosecuting, in accordance with Mexican and international law, members of the
federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to have
committed violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces
are fully cooperating with the investigations; and
• enforcing the prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and international law, on
the use of testimony obtained through torture or other ill-treatment.
Central America, Haiti and the Dominican Republic
P.L. 110-252 includes similar conditions on assistance provided to Central America, Haiti and the
Dominican Republic. As with Mexico, The Secretary of State is required to submit a report on
procedures in place to implement Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 in
order for Mérida funding to be released.
Other human rights conditions require that 15% of INCLE and FMF assistance be withheld until
the Secretary of State reports in writing that the governments of the countries in Central America,
Haiti, and the Dominican Republic are taking action in three areas:
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Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues

• establishing police complaints commissions with authority and independence to
receive complaints and carry out effective investigations;
• implementing reforms to improve the capacity and ensure the independence of
the judiciary; and
• investigating and prosecuting members of the federal police and military forces
who have been credibly alleged to have committed violations of human rights.

Author Contact Information

Clare Ribando Seelke

Specialist in Latin American Affairs
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229


Acknowledgments
Parts of this report were contributed by June S. Beittel, CRS Analyst in Latin American Affair



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