.

Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and
U.S. Interests

Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
August 20, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
97-1058
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
c11173008

.
Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Summary
Kazakhstan is an important power in Central Asia by virtue of its geographic location, large
territory, ample natural resources, and economic growth, but it faces ethnic, political, and other
challenges to stability. This report discusses U.S. policy and assistance; basic facts and
biographical data are also provided. Related products include CRS Report RL33458, Central
Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
, by Jim Nichol


Congressional Research Service

.
Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Contents
U.S. Policy.................................................................................................................................. 1
Counter-Terrorism Support.......................................................................................................... 3
Foreign Policy and Defense......................................................................................................... 3
Political and Economic Developments ........................................................................................ 4
Energy ........................................................................................................................................ 7

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Kazakhstan ...................................................................................................... 1

Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 8

Congressional Research Service



.
Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

U.S. Policy
According to the Obama Administration’s Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign
Operations
, “the United States’ fundamental strategic aim in Kazakhstan is a stable, democratic,
and prosperous partner that maintains freedom of action on the international stage, embraces free
market competition and rule of law, and is a respected regional leader. U.S. assistance has played
a key role in strengthening Kazakhstan’s independence.”1
Figure 1. Map of Kazakhstan

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
During President Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a Charter on
Democratic Partnership, which recognized Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect
for human rights, and economic reform. During his December 2001 and September 2006 visits,
Nazarbayev repeated these pledges in joint statements with then-President Bush. During a July
2009 visit to Kazakhstan, Under Secretary of State William Burns stated that President Obama
and Secretary of State Clinton had asked the delegation led by Burns “to emphasize the
importance and the high priority that the new American Administration attaches to our
relationship with Kazakhstan,” including “our cooperation in Afghanistan, which is a common
challenge,” and President Nazarbayev’s “leadership on the issue of non-proliferation.” The two
sides agreed to resurrect a Clinton-era bilateral cooperation commission covering security,
diplomatic, human rights, energy, trade, and investment issues. President Nazarbayev will meet
with President Obama at a nuclear security summit in the United States planned for spring 2010.

1 U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2010, May 12, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
1

.
Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Kazakh Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin visited the United States in June 2009 and met with
various U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, National Security Advisor Jim
Jones, and Secretary of Energy Steven Chu. They reportedly discussed Kazakhstan’s partnership
with the United States and with NATO in helping to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan,
cooperation in energy development and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010.2
Cumulative U.S. aid budgeted for Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan: Basic Facts
in fiscal years 1992 through 2007 was $1.47
Area and Population: Land area is 1,049,200 sq. mi.;
billion (FREEDOM Support Act and agency
about four times the size of Texas. The population is
funds), with Kazakhstan ranking fifth in aid
15.4 million (The World Factbook, mid-2009 est.).
among the twelve Soviet successor states. A
Ethnicity: 53.4% are Kazakh and 30% are Russian (1999
large part of U.S. aid has supported
Kazakh census). Other ethnic groups include Uzbeks,
Comprehensive Threat Reduction (CTR)
Tatars, Uighurs, and Germans.
programs to prevent the proliferation of
Gross Domestic Product: $176.9 billion; per capita
weapons of mass destruction. Budgeted aid for
GDP is about $11,500 (The World Factbook, 2008 est.,
FY2008 was $21.1 million, estimated aid for
purchasing power parity).
FY2009 was $19.3 million, and requested aid
Political Leaders: President: Nursultan Nazarbayev;
for FY2010 is $17.3 million (FREEDOM
Chair of the Majilis: Oral Mukhamedzhanov; Chair of the
Senate: Kasymzhomart Tokayev; Prime Minister: Karim
Support Act and other foreign aid, excluding
Masimov; Foreign Minister: Marat Tazhin; Defense Minister:
Defense and Energy Department funds).
Adilbek Zhaksybekov.
Among Defense Department assistance for
Biography: Nazarbayev, born in 1940, moved up
FY2009, $10.58 million was appropriated for
through the ranks of the Kazakh Communist Party
counter-narcotics efforts (P.L. 111-32). The
(KCP), becoming its head in 1989. He also was appointed
Administration request for FY2010
president by the legislature in 1990. He resigned from
emphasizes aid for equipment and training to
the KCP in 1991 and won an unopposed popular election
bolster the capabilities of “a professional,
as president in December 1991. A 1995 referendum
extended his rule. He was reelected in 1999 and 2005. In
rapidly-deployable NATO and U.S.-
2000, legislation granted him some official powers for life,
compatible military capable of protecting its
and in 2007 he was exempted from term limits.
territory.” The request underlines that support
for the Huey II helicopter fleet to protect energy infrastructure and respond to threats in the
Caspian Sea region will be “a major priority” of U.S. security assistance. The United States will
continue aid to bolster primary healthcare to help Kazakhstan become a model for the region.
Because of the global economic downturn, the Administration has postponed—at Kazakhstan’s
request—plans to end economic-related assistance, although the amount of such assistance will
be greatly reduced in line with the eventual shift to Kazakh funding for these programs. Aid will
focus on creating regional electric power and water markets, fostering investment in electrical
network and generation capacities, and expanding electricity exports to Afghanistan.
Among congressional actions, Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7) forbade
assistance to the government of Kazakhstan unless the Secretary of State determined and reported
that Kazakhstan had significantly improved its human rights record during the preceding six-
month period. The Secretary could, however, waive this prohibition on national security grounds.
This language has been continued in yearly appropriations acts. The Secretary reported in
FY2003 and FY2004 that Kazakhstan had made such progress, eliciting some criticism of these
findings from Congress. In FY2005 and thereafter, the Secretary of State (or the designee) has

2 U.S. Embassy, Astana, Kazakhstan. Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland Press Conference, June 10, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
2

.
Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

reported to Congress that Kazakhstan has failed to significantly improve its human rights record,
but that aid restrictions have been waived on national security grounds.
Counter-Terrorism Support
In June 2001, Nazarbayev had warned that Taliban actions in Afghanistan increasingly threatened
regional security, and after September 11 he offered overflight rights and the use of airbases to the
U.S.-led coalition, but did not offer troops. Kazakhstan also facilitated the transshipment of
supplies to U.S. bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. A U.S.-Kazakh memorandum of
understanding was signed in July 2002 that permitted U.S. military aircraft to use Kazakhstan’s
Almaty airport for emergency military landings. In September 2003, a five-year military
cooperation agreement was signed to combat terrorism, develop peacekeeping forces, bolster air
defense capabilities, and enhance security in the Caspian Sea. In April 2008, Kazakhstan agreed
in principle that it would facilitate rail shipments of nonlethal supplies to support the operations
of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The Russia-Georgia conflict
interrupted progress in gaining Russian agreement for transit. Days after Russia indicated that it
would permit the land transit of U.S. coalition supplies to Afghanistan, the Kazakh government
announced in February 2009 that it also would permit such transit. A pilot shipment of goods
from Latvia crossed Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to Afghanistan in March 2009.
Kazakhstan’s then-Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev on March 28, 2003, voiced general
support for disarming Iraq. Tokayev later explained that Kazakhstan had decided to support the
coalition because it feared that Saddam Hussein was building WMD. Reportedly responding to a
U.S. appeal, the Kazakh legislature in May 2003 approved sending military engineers to Iraq. The
27 troops trained Iraqis in de-mining and water purification. They pulled out of Iraq in late 2008.
Kazakhstan long argued that there were few terrorists within the country but this stance began to
change in late 2003 with the establishment of an Anti-Terrorist Center as part of the National
Security Committee. Shocking many Kazakhs, it reported the apprehension in late 2004 of over a
dozen members of the obscure Islamic Jihad Group/Union of Uzbekistan (reportedly an offshoot
of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan). It alleged that the group had ties to Al Qaeda; had cells
in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia; and had been involved in attacks in Uzbekistan. In mid-
2006, authorities detained 15-30 members the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir group. In April 2007, sixteen
alleged terrorists were arrested on charges of planning attacks against security and police forces.
In February 2008, security forces arrested five members of an alleged Salafi Jihadi Jamaat, whose
leader had received training in Syria.
Foreign Policy and Defense
Nazarbayev has stated that the geographic location of Kazakhstan and its ethnic makeup dictate
its “multipolar orientation toward both West and East.” He has pursued close ties with Turkey,
trade links with Iran, and better relations with China, which many Kazakhs have traditionally
viewed as a security threat. There are over one million ethnic Kazakhs in China, and 300,000
ethnic Uighurs of China residing in Kazakhstan, who have contributed to complicated relations
between the two states. In July 2009, China suppressed violence between ethnic Uighurs and Han
Chinese in Xinjiang Province, resulting in a few ethnic Uighurs reportedly fleeing to Kazakhstan
despite the sealing of borders. Several protests were held in Kazakhstan, but the Kazakh
government did not criticize China’s actions. While seeking to protect Kazakh independence,
Congressional Research Service
3

.
Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Nazarbayev has pursued close relations with Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) members for economic and security reasons. In 1998, Kazakhstan and Russia signed
a friendship treaty, in 1998 and 2002 they signed accords settling Caspian seabed resource claims,
and in 2005 they signed a border delineation agreement. In late 2005, the Central Asian
Cooperation Organization merged with the Eurasian Economic Community (Eurasec; Russia and
Kazakhstan belonged to both). Eurasec members Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan plan to launch
a customs union in 2010 and apply for membership in the World Trade Organization en masse.
Kazakhstan still relies heavily on Russia for military training and equipment, but has expanded
defense cooperation with other states. About 49,000 Kazakh troops serve in the ground force, air
force, and navy. There are about 9,000 border guards, about 20,000 Internal Security (police)
troops, and 2,500 presidential and government guards.3 In 1999, Kazakhstan reaffirmed a CIS
Collective Security Treaty (CST) pledging the parties to provide military assistance in case of
aggression against any one of them. Kazakhstan is also a member of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), composed of Russia, China, and the Central Asian states (except
Turkmenistan), which aims to combat terrorism and facilitate trade ties. In 1994, Kazakhstan
joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) and regularly takes part in PFP exercises, but states
that it does not aim to join the Alliance. A new military doctrine adopted in March 2007 calls for
eventually creating volunteer armed forces. Reforms include the transition to a brigade-based
organizational and staff structure, the creation of the Shokan Ualikhanov Cadet Corps school for
non-commissioned officers, and other elements of a hierarchy of military educational institutions.
In mid-2009, efforts were announced to boost declining salaries and other social support for
troops.
After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power (in reality
Russia controlled these weapons). All bombers and their air-launched cruise missiles were
removed to Russia by late February 1994. On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040 nuclear
warheads had been removed from the SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and Kazakhstan
announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. U.S. Comprehensive Threat Reduction (CTR)
assistance was used for these efforts, and for subsequent control and elimination of nuclear
materials and former chemical and biological warfare facilities. The U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction
Center works with Kazakhstan to facilitate verification and compliance with arms control and
security agreements to enhance peace and prevent the proliferation of WMD. Cumulative U.S.
CTR assistance to Kazakhstan was about $303 million from FY1992 through FY2007, which was
over 40% of all U.S. assistance to the country.
Political and Economic Developments
Kazakhstan’s moves toward democracy have been halting. The 1995 constitution establishes
strong presidential power. As further fleshed out by a presidential edict, the legislature does not
control the budget, cannot initiate constitutional changes, or exercise oversight over the executive
branch. Most bills are initiated by the president, and if the legislature fails within 30 days to pass
one of his “urgent” bills, he may issue it by decree. The bicameral legislature consists of a
popularly-elected lower chamber, the Majilis, and an upper chamber, the Senate, whose members
are indirectly elected by regional assemblies or by the president. A People’s Assembly composed
of cultural and ethnic leaders serves as a presidential propaganda forum.

3 International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, February 2009.
Congressional Research Service
4

.
Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

On December 4, 2005, President Nazarbayev was reelected with 91.1% of 6.74 million votes cast
in a five-man race. Many observers credited economic growth in the country and increases in
pensions and state wages as bolstering Nazarbayev’s popularity. He campaigned widely and
pledged democratic reforms and poverty relief. Five pro-government parties formed a People’s
Coalition to back him. Many oppositionists supported a Movement for a Just Kazakhstan, which
backed Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, the head of the Social Democratic Party. Another candidate,
Alikhan Baymenov, had been nominated by the “moderate opposition” Ak Zhol Party. Observers
from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and others assessed the
election as progressive but still falling short of a free and fair race.
The legislature approved constitutional changes in May 2007 that President Nazarbayev claimed
would increase legislative power and boost democratization. The changes included increasing the
number of deputies in both legislative chambers, decreasing the president’s term in office from
seven to five years, and requiring a court order in case of detention or arrest. Seemingly non-
reformist changes included a requirement for a two-thirds vote in each legislative chamber to
override presidential alterations to approved bills, a provision that nine deputies of the Majilis
(the lower legislative chamber) are appointed by the People’s Assembly, and a change “initiated”
by the legislature excluding Nazarbayev from term limits. Visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State Richard Boucher stated in June 2007 that “these constitutional amendments go in the right
direction.... [and] point the way to a stable, democratic system.”4
An early Majilis election was called for August 18, 2007. As per constitutional amendments and
election law changes, the size of the chamber was increased to 107 members. Ninety-eight
members were to be elected by party lists and nine by the People’s Assembly headed by the
president. Seven parties were registered for the election, six of which were pro-government and
one of which was an opposition party. The ruling party, Nur-Otan (Fatherland’s Ray of Light),
reportedly received 88.05% of 8.87 million votes cast and won all 98 seats. The other parties
were unable to clear a 7% threshold needed to win seats. Observers from the OSCE praised some
positive aspects of the vote, but judged it as falling short of a free and fair race.5
In its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008, the U.S. State Department did not
report whether or not the Kazakh government’s human rights record had improved during the
year, but did identify ongoing problems and progress. Police and prison officials at times beat and
abused detainees, often to obtain confessions. Citizens generally believed that most police were
corrupt. Authorities fired about 250 police for abuse of power or corruption during the year.
Government opponents occasionally were arrested or detained, sometimes for minor infractions.
There were no reports of political prisoners. The president recommended or appointed all judges.
Human rights monitors alleged that judges and prosecutors solicited bribes in exchange for
favorable rulings in most criminal cases. Courts conducted 30 jury trials for aggravated murder
cases during the year, but judges, who deliberated with the jurors, tended to dominate the process.
The government used laws, harassment, licensing regulations, Internet restrictions, and criminal
and administrative charges to limit freedom of expression. Media observers believed that most
national television broadcasters were wholly or partly government owned. Reportedly, over 200
incidents of harassment and violence against journalists occurred during the year. Owners,

4 U.S. Embassy, Astana, Kazakhstan. Interview by ... Richard A. Boucher with Aybek Aldabergenov of Era TV,
June 6, 2007.
5 OSCE. ODIHR. Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections, 18 August 2007: Election Observation Mission
Report
, October 30, 2007.
Congressional Research Service
5

.
Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

editors, distributors, and journalists were threatened with prosecution if an article was deemed to
undermine state security or to advocate class, social, race, national, or religious superiority, or
cruelty and violence. It also was a criminal offense to violate the “honor or dignity” of the
president and other officials. Opposition and human rights monitors complained that local
authorities turned down most applications to hold a demonstration or public meeting. The
government restricted freedom of association by requiring all groups to register with the Ministry
of Justice. Onerous procedures were required for a political party to register. Some human rights
NGOs reportedly were subjected to police visits and surveillance. A few NGOs were allowed to
carry out nonpartisan political party training activities. The country was a source, transit, and
destination country for victims of trafficking for labor and sex. Police and border guard
corruption sometimes facilitated trafficking.6
Although Kazakhstan lobbied extensively for holding the presidency of the OSCE in 2009, the
15th Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE at the end of November 2007 decided that Greece would
hold the OSCE presidency in 2009, followed in 2010 by Kazakhstan. Foreign Minister Tazhin
pledged at the meeting that suggestions made by ODIHR for changes to media, electoral, and
political party laws would be submitted for consideration by the Kazakh legislature by the end of
2008. He stated that amendments to the media law would include reducing criminal penalties for
libel by the media, setting up “media self-regulation mechanisms” to address libel issues, and
easing the registration process for media. He also promised that the Kazakh government would
soon move to increase local self-government. He assured the OSCE that Kazakhstan “consider[s]
the human dimension to be one of the most important directions of the OSCE activity,” and that
in chairing the OSCE, Kazakhstan would ensure that NGOs are able to participate in OSCE
events and that ODIHR’s mandate is preserved. He argued that Kazakhstan’s chairmanship would
be “a powerful catalyst of the reform process [in Kazakhstan] and an additional confirmation of
the rightly chosen path of further liberalization and openness.”7 Addressing the Parliamentary
Assembly of the OSCE in Astana on June 29, 2008, President Nazarbayev stated that his
country’s preparations for holding the chairmanship included the elaboration of a blueprint he
termed “the path to Europe,” which envisages Kazakhstan’s integration into Europe in the areas
of energy, transport, technology transfers, education, culture, and democratization.
In early February 2009, President Nazarbayev approved changes to laws on the media, elections,
and political parties. Political parties that did not gain at least 7% of votes cast in an Majlis
election were accorded the right to participate in some legislative affairs, the number of signatures
necessary for registering a party for a Majlis election was reduced from 50,000 to 40,000, and
requirements for registering media were eased. Critics termed the changes minor.8 One positive
sign was an action by the constitutional court in February 2009 to strike down a proposed law that
would have tightened restrictions on religious freedom. In April 2009, ODIHR criticized
proposed further amendments to the media law that would restrict access to the Internet. Other
changes would bar media reporting that “interfere[s] with election campaigns,” takes place during
times when campaign news is not allowed, tries to influence election results, or influences
participation in strikes. Further amendments would bar foreign broadcasts from “complicat[ing]

6 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008, February 25, 2009.
7 OSCE. 15th Ministerial Council Meeting. Address of Marat Tazhin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Kazakhstan
, November 29, 2007.
8 Human Rights Watch. An Atmosphere of Quiet Repression: Freedom of Religion, Assembly and Expression in
Kazakhstan
, December 2008.
Congressional Research Service
6

.
Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

or support[ing] the nomination or election” of candidates or parties. The changes were signed into
law in July 2009.9
Kazakhstan is the most economically developed of the former Soviet Central Asian republics. Up
to one-third of GDP is generated by the oil and gas sector. Kazakhstan is the sixth largest
producer of wheat in the world and a major exporter. Up to one-fifth of the population, however,
lives below the poverty level. In 1997, President Nazarbayev launched a plan to create an
economically developed, secure, healthy, and educated country by 2030. In late 2005, he called
for bringing Kazakhstan into the ranks of the top fifty developed countries within ten years. He
urged revamping tax and budgetary policies and developing export-oriented manufacturing to
reduce over-dependence on the energy sector as the engine of GDP growth. In May 2009,
President Nazarbayev announced that a five-year plan for industrial innovation would be
launched at the beginning of 2010 in line with his goals for 2030.
In 2008, tightening credit contributed to the collapse of the real estate market, but high oil prices
in the first part of the year partly cushioned the decline in GDP. Declining oil revenues and
foreign debt repayments in subsequent months led the central bank to devalue the tenge by 20
percent against the U.S. dollar in February 2009. Bad debts, however, are causing further pressure
on banks. Two large banks have been taken over and a finance company has been declared
bankrupt. In November 2008, President Nazarbayev launched a concerted anti-crisis plan that
included lowering tax rates and drawing $10 billion from a National Oil Fund (created in 2000 to
stabilize the economy in the case of swings in world prices of oil, gas, and metals) to recapitalize
banks, support the tenge, and otherwise boost the economy. Although oil prices are expected to
remain low, some international lending and continued (though reduced) foreign direct investment
and will somewhat buffer the economic contraction this year and contribute to some growth in
2010, according to the IMF. Kazakhstan obtained a $10 billion loan from China in April 2009 and
a $2 billion loan from the World Bank in June 2009 to finance infrastructure development. The
IMF calls for Kazakhstan to assist troubled banks to pay their foreign debts and for authorities to
maintain a balance between increasing the amount of currency in circulation to boost the
economy and maintaining a low rate of inflation. The IMF also called for greater transparency in
disbursements from the oil fund in order to combat corruption and for future disbursements to
focus on strengthening the social safety net, health, education, and infrastructure development.10
Energy
Second to Russia, Kazakhstan has the largest oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Sea regional
states, holding promise of large export revenues. The U.S. Energy Department in February 2008
estimated that there were 9 billion to 40 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (comparable to
Algeria on the low end and Libya on the high end). It also reported estimates of 100 trillion cubic
feet (tcf) of proven gas reserves (comparable to Turkmenistan). Kazakhstan’s oil exports currently
are about 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd). The Kazakh government plans for production to reach
3.5 million bpd by 2015. Kazakhstan expects to be a net gas exporter in 2008. U.S. foreign direct
investment (FDI) plays a dominant role in the development of Kazakhstani oil and gas resources,

9 Human Rights Watch. Human Rights in Kazakhstan: Seven Months before the OSCE Chairmanship, Human Rights
Watch Memorandum, May 20, 2009.
10 IMF. IMF Executive Board Concludes 2009 Article IV Consultation with the Republic of Kazakhstan,
Public Information Notice Number 09/91, July 28, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
7

.
Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

and amounted to about $12.6 billion in Kazakhstan (27% of all FDI in the country) as of 2006.
Some U.S. energy firms and other private foreign investors have become discouraged in recent
months by harsher Kazakh government terms, taxes, and fines that some allege reflect corruption
within the ruling elite.
Russia seeks maximum influence over Kazakhstan’s energy resources by providing the primary
pipeline export routes and by becoming involved in production. Russian shareholders have a
controlling interest, 44%, in the Caspian pipeline consortium (CPC), which built a 980-mile oil
pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk that carried 690,000 bpd of
oil in 2007. Kazakhstan also currently transports over 100,000 bpd by rail and barge to Baku.
Kazakhstan agreed with Azerbaijan in 2006 that it will boost these shipments to help fill an oil
pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey, which will reduce Kazakhstan’s dependence on routes
through Russia. This dependence also has been lessened somewhat by construction of a 597-mile
oil pipeline from Atasu in central Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang region of China. Kazakhstan began
delivering oil through the pipeline in May 2006. Initial capacity is 146.6 million barrels per year.
At Atasu, it links to another pipeline from the town of Kumkol, also in central Kazakhstan. On
Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea border, China has finished construction of an oil pipeline from the port
city of Atyrau eastward to the town of Kenkiyak. The last section of the route from the Caspian
Sea to China, a link between the towns of Kenkiyak and Kumkol, began to be built in late 2007
and is expected to be completed in 2009.

Author Contact Information

Jim Nichol

Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289




Congressional Research Service
8