Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
August 13, 2009
Congressional Research Service
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Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy
Summary
Although a small country, Moldova has been of interest to U.S. policymakers due to its position
between NATO and EU member Romania and strategic Ukraine. In addition, some experts have
expressed concern about alleged Russian efforts to extend its hegemony over Moldova through
various methods, including a troop presence, manipulation of Moldova’s relationship with its
breakaway Transnistria region, and energy supplies and other trading links. Moldova’s political
and economic weakness has made it a source of organized criminal activity of concern to U.S.
policymakers, including trafficking in persons and weapons.
On April 5, 2009, Moldova held parliamentary elections. The Communist Party of the Republic
of Moldova (PCRM) won just under 50% of the vote and 60 seats in the 101-seat parliament. The
Communist victory sparked protests against alleged electoral fraud. Some demonstrators sacked
and looted the parliament building and the offices of the president. Moldovan President Vladimir
Voronin denounced the protests as an attempted coup d’etat. He claimed that Romania instigated
the riots, pointing to the Romanian flags some protestors displayed at the demonstrations. The
failure of the PCRM to secure the 61 seats needed to elect a new president triggered new
parliamentary elections on July 27, 2009. The PCRM suffered a drop in support, winning only 48
seats, but the opposition parties also fell short of the total needed to elect their own candidate as
president. This result could prolong the country’s political stalemate yet again, unless the
opposition can reach a compromise with some members of the PCRM.
Moldova is Europe’s poorest country. Living standards are low for the great majority of
Moldovans, particularly in rural areas. Remittances from Moldovans working abroad amounted to
38.3% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product in 2008. The global financial crisis has had a
negative impact on Moldova. Remittances have dropped, as Moldovan emigrants have lost jobs in
other hard-hit countries.
As a self-declared neutral country, Moldova does not seek NATO membership, but participates in
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. Moldova currently has a Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement with the European Union (EU), which provides for cooperation in a wide
variety of spheres and holds out the possibility of an eventual free trade agreement. Moldova
hopes to become a candidate for EU membership, although the EU is unlikely to accept Moldova
as a candidate in the foreseeable future, due to Moldova’s poverty and the EU’s own internal
challenges. The United States and Moldova have enjoyed good relations since the country’s
independence in 1991. The United States has supported democracy and free market reform in
Moldova. The United States reacted cautiously to the outcome of the April 2009 Moldovan
election, saying its view of the vote was “generally positive,” but noting some problems. After the
July 2009 election, a State Department spokesman noted that international observers reached a
similar conclusion about the July vote. The United States has tried to support the country’s fragile
sovereignty and territorial integrity by advocating the withdrawal of Russian forces from
Moldova and for negotiating a settlement of the Transnistria issue consistent with Moldova’s
territorial integrity.
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Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy
Contents
Political Situation........................................................................................................................ 1
Transnistria ........................................................................................................................... 3
Economy .................................................................................................................................... 4
Foreign Policy............................................................................................................................. 5
U.S. Policy.................................................................................................................................. 7
Figures
Figure 1. Transnistria and Gagauz Regions.................................................................................. 3
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 9
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Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy
Political Situation
Although a small country with a population of 3.8 million, Moldova has been of interest to U.S.
policymakers due to its position between NATO and EU member Romania and strategic Ukraine.
In addition, some experts have expressed concern about alleged Russian efforts to extend its
hegemony over Moldova through various methods, including a troop presence, manipulation of
Moldova’s relationship with its breakaway Transnistria region, and energy supplies and other
trading links. Moldova’s political and economic weakness has made it a source of organized
criminal activity of concern to U.S. policymakers, including trafficking in persons and weapons.
The Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) has held power in Moldova after
winning parliamentary elections in 2001 and 2005. The PCRM’s leader is Vladimir Voronin, who
was elected by the parliament as president of Moldova after each of the Communists’ election
victories. The main base of the Communists’ support has been among elderly people and rural
voters. The Communists support closer ties with the European Union, while also having good
relations with Russia.
On April 5, 2009, Moldova held parliamentary elections. The PCRM won just under 50% of the
vote and 60 seats in the 101-seat parliament. Three other parties managed to surpass the 6%
threshold for representation. The Liberal Party of Moldova won 12.78% of the vote and 15 seats.
The deputy chairman of the party is Dorin Chirtoaca, who was elected as mayor of the capital
Chisinau in 2007 on a populist, anti-Communist, anti-corruption platform. The party strongly
favors closer relations with Romania. The Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova won 12.26% of
the vote and 15 seats. It has a pro-business, pro-European-integration orientation. The centrist
Our Moldova Alliance is led by ideologically flexible former Soviet-era leaders who led Moldova
before the PCRM’s 2001 victory. It won 9.81% of the vote and 11 seats. Turnout for the election
was just under 60%.
The International Election Observers Mission (which included observers representing the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and the European
Parliament), said that the election “met many international standards and commitments, but
further improvements are required to ensure an electoral process free from undue administrative
interference and to increase public confidence.” The observers generally praised the conduct of
the vote on election day and the ballot count, although some irregularities were reported. They
cited concerns such as biased reporting by the state broadcaster, misuse of government resources
to assist the PCRM, and frequent allegations of intimidation of voters and candidates, some of
which were verified by the observers.1
The Communist victory sparked demonstrations on April 6 and 7. As many as 10,000 persons
demonstrated in Chisinau, Moldova’s capital, on April 7. Many demonstrators were peaceful, but
some sacked and looted the parliament building and the offices of the president. More than 200
people were injured in clashes between the police and the rioters, and one person died. The
authorities later arrested more than 300 people, allegedly for engaging in violence. Observers
1 For a text of the observers preliminary report, see the OSCE website at
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2009/04/37142_en.pdf
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noted that young people predominated among the protestors, many of whom reportedly found out
about the demonstrations through messaging tools such as Twitter and SMS.
Some observers have asserted that the demonstrators acted out of frustration with Moldova’s
limited economic opportunities and stagnation, which they associate with the Communists, as
well as suspicions of electoral fraud. According to press accounts, in addition to anti-Communist
slogans, some demonstrators chanted “we want to join Europe,” and “we are Romanians,”
pointing to at least some support among the demonstrators for union with neighboring EU
member-state Romania. The opposition parties that won seats in the assembly seemed to be
caught off guard at first by the protests. Nevertheless, they tried to recover the initiative, charging
that the election was fraudulent. They claimed that the government cast fraudulent ballots for
dead persons and those living abroad. Exit polling by the respected Moldovan Institute for Public
Policy estimated the PCRM would receive about 45% of the vote, close to, but a bit less than, the
nearly 50% it did receive.
President Voronin denounced the protests as an attempted coup d’etat and vowed to put down any
further riots with force, if necessary. On the other hand, he agreed to a recount of the vote.
However, opposition leaders rejected participation in the recount, saying it too could be tainted
with fraud, and are demanding new parliamentary elections. Opposition leaders charged that
journalists and students were arrested and in some cases beaten by authorities in the days after the
violence.
According to Moldova’s constitution, a three-fifths majority (61 votes) of the Moldovan
parliament is required to elect a president. The PCRM was unable to secure the presidency for a
candidate of its choosing within a constitutionally mandated 60 days, as it was one vote short of
the needed majority and the other parties remained uncompromising in their opposition to the
Communists. (Voronin was barred by the Moldovan constitution from serving a third term as
President.)
This stalemate triggered new parliamentary elections, which were held on July 29, 2009. The
campaign featured sharp rhetoric, much of it dealing with responsibility for the April 2009
violence. The turnout for the vote was just under 59%. The Communists suffered a drop in
popularity in the election. The PCRM won 44.69% of the vote and 48 seats, 12 fewer than in
April. The Liberal Democratic Party received 16.57% of the vote and 18 seats. The Liberal Party
won 14.68% of the vote and 15 seats. Our Moldova won 7.35% of the vote and 7 seats. The main
beneficiary of the new election was the center-left Democratic Party, which did not win seats in
the April vote. It received 12.55% of the vote and 13 seats. The Democratic Party’s success may
be largely due to Marian Lupu, a former Communist leader and parliament chairman. Lupu took
over the leadership of the Democratic Party after a falling-out with Voronin in June 2009.
The International Election Observers Mission’s assessment of the July elections was very similar
to its judgment on the April vote. The observers said that the July election also “met many
international standards” but stressed the need for further democratic reforms to restore public
trust. The observers noted problems with “subtle intimidation and media bias,” as well as
continuing concerns about the accuracy of voter lists.2
2 For a text of the observer mission’s preliminary report, see
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2009/07/39083_en.pdf
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The opposition parties agreed to form a majority coalition on August 8. However, given the fact
that the opposition fell short of the 61 parliamentary votes needed to elect a new president, the
election result may presage further political deadlock, unless the opposition can persuade part of
the normally highly disciplined Communist faction to join them. Another option would be for one
or more of the opposition parties to decide to come to terms with the PCRM as a whole. Lupu and
the Democratic Party could be the most likely to make a deal with the PCRM, particularly if it
results in Lupu being elected as president. However, poor relations between Lupu and Voronin
may make this option difficult. Indeed, Lupu and the other opposition parties have demanded that
Voronin quit politics as part of any deal.
It is unclear who would take the post of acting president if no president is chosen when the new
parliament convenes. It could be Voronin or the person chosen by the new majority as the new
parliamentary chairman. The Communist-dominated Constitutional Court may have to decide the
issue. According to Moldova’s constitution, a new parliamentary election cannot be held until
early 2010.
Transnistria
Figure 1. Transnistria and Gagauz Regions
Conflict between Moldovan forces and
those of the breakaway “Dniestr Republic”
(a separatist entity proclaimed in 1990 by
ethnic Russian local officials in the
Transnistria region of Moldova) erupted in
March 1992. More than 300 people died in
the violence. A cease-fire was declared in
July 1992 that provided for Russian,
“Dniestr Republic,” and Moldovan
peacekeepers to patrol a “security zone”
between the two regions. Each of the
peacekeeping contingents have roughly 400
personnel. They are overseen by a Joint
Control Commission, which includes the
three sides, as well as the OSCE as an
observer.
The causes of the conflict are complex,
involving ethnic factors and, above all,
maneuvering for power and wealth among
elite groups. Ethnic Russians and
Ukrainians together make up 51% of
Transnistria’s population of about 650,000,
while Moldovans are the single largest
ethnic group, at 40%.
Many analysts are convinced that a key factor obstructing a settlement is the personal interests of
the leaders of the “Dniestr Republic” and associates in Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, who control
the region’s economy. They also allegedly profit from illegal activities that take place in
Transnistria, such as smuggling and human trafficking. The 2008 State Department human rights
report sharply criticized the poor human rights record of the “Dniestr Republic,” noting its record
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of rigged elections, harassment of political opponents, independent media, many religious groups,
and Romanian speakers.
Negotiations over the degree of autonomy to be accorded the Transnistria region within Moldova
have been stalled for many years.3 The two sides have negotiated over Transnistria’s status with
the mediation of Russia, Ukraine and OSCE. In 2005, at the urging of Ukraine and Moldova, the
United States and the European Union joined the talks as observers. In 2006, Moldova offered a
“package” of proposals, in which Transnistria would have broad autonomy, but would remain part
of Moldova. Moldova would reaffirm its neutral status and all foreign (i.e. Russian) troops would
be withdrawn. Russian property rights in Transnistria would be recognized. Nevertheless,
Transnistrian and Russian leaders, apparently satisfied with the present state of affairs, have
blocked any agreement. In September 2006, Transnistria held a referendum on independence and
union with Russia, which passed with 97% of the vote.
Since March 2006, the peace process in Transnistria had been stalled until a series of bilateral
meetings between President Voronin and the “President” of Transnistria, Igor Smirnov, in 2008.
In December, they discussed restarting talks on Transnistria’s status, as well as implementing
confidence-building measures and ensuring the free flow of goods and persons. However, the
talks made little progress, with Smirnov calling on Moldova to recognize Transnistria’s
independence and refusing to restart the “5+2” talks.
On March 18, 2009, Voronin, perhaps hoping to secure political advantage before Moldova’s
April parliamentary elections, met with Smirnov and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev in
Moscow. The three men issued a declaration that called for a resumption of direct talks between
Transnistria and the Moldovan government under Moscow’s aegis. They expressed support for
incorporating the Russian military contingent in Moldova into a peacekeeping force under the
supervision of the OSCE. Critics charged that the statement undermined Moldova’s previous
demand for Russia to withdraw its forces from Transnistria and appeared to put Transnistria’s
leaders and the Moldovan government on equal footing, also in contradiction to Chisinau’s past
policy. However, Voronin pulled out of the subsequent direct talks scheduled for March 25, after
Transnistria issued a travel ban against U.S. and EU diplomats attempting to visit the region.
Progress in talks on Transnistria, if it occurs, will likely have to await the resolution of Moldova’s
current political stalemate.
Economy
According to the World Bank, Moldova’s per capita Gross National Income of $1,140 in 2007
makes it the poorest country in Europe. Living standards are poor for the great majority of
Moldovans, particularly in rural areas. In 2008, the average monthly wage was $270. More than a
quarter of Moldova’s economically active population work abroad. Remittances from those
working abroad amounted to 38.3% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product in 2008, according
to the World Bank. Moldova’s main natural resource is its rich soil. Agriculture, especially fruit,
wine and tobacco, plays a vital role in Moldova’s economy. Most of Moldova’s industry is
located in Transnistria.
3 Another potential secession issue was defused in 1994, when the Moldovan parliament adopted a law establishing a
“national-territorial autonomous unit” for the Gagauz minority. The region has its own elected legislative and executive
authorities and would be entitled to secession from Moldova in the case of Moldova’s reunification with Romania.
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Moldova has had mixed success in economic reform. It has succeeded in achieving a measure of
macroeconomic stability, including the stabilization of Moldova’s national currency, the leu.
However, Moldova’s small economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks. Moldova has
privatized its small- and medium-sized business sector, and it has had success in privatizing
agricultural land. The sale of large firms has stalled under Communist rule and foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Moldova is very low. Cumulative FDI was $1.8 billion at the end of 2007, or
$540 per capita. In comparison, neighboring Romania’s FDI per capita was $2,829. Key problems
include poor governance, a weak judiciary, and corruption.
The global financial crisis has had a negative impact on Moldova. The leu has weakened and
remains under pressure. Remittances have dropped, as Moldovan emigrants have lost jobs in
other hard-hit countries. Moldova’s GDP dropped by 6.9% in the first quarter of 2009, on a year-
on-year basis. The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that Moldova’s GDP will drop 10% in
2009, after growing more than 7% in 2008. Moldova could seek additional loans from the IMF
after the election. However, the IMF will likely require Moldova to undertake sharp budget cuts
to bridge a budget deficit that the IMF estimates could reach 11% of GDP this year.4 Moldova has
also sought loans from Russia and China.
Foreign Policy
Perhaps Moldova’s most important foreign policy relationship is with Russia. Most of Moldova’s
exports go to Russia, and more than 90% of its energy imports come from Russia. In the past,
Moldova has accumulated large debts to Russian energy firms, which has provided Russia with
leverage over Moldova. Some analysts charge that Russia has used negotiations over Transnistria
to expand its political leverage over the country and to block any Moldovan moves toward Euro-
Atlantic integration. The Transnistria issue is complicated by the continued presence of about
1,500 Russian troops in the breakaway region (including the approximately 400-person
peacekeeping contingent in the security zone), as well as huge stockpiles of weapons and
ammunition. Russia has flatly refused to honor commitments it made at the 1999 OSCE summit
in Istanbul to withdraw its forces from Moldova. Russian leaders have also attempted to condition
the withdrawal of Russian troops on the resolution of Transnistria’s status. Russia has provided
financial support to Transnistria, including grants and loans as well as subsidized energy. In
return, Russian firms have assumed control over most of Transnistria’s industry.5
On January 1, 2006, Gazprom cut off natural gas supplies to Moldova, after Moldova rejected
Gazprom’s demand for a doubling of the price Moldova pays for natural gas. Gazprom restored
supplies on January 17, in exchange for a slightly smaller price increase. Moldova also agreed to
give Gazprom, already the majority shareholder, a higher equity stake in Moldovagaz, which
controls Moldova’s natural gas pipelines and other infrastructure. Gazprom is also seeking to
complete the purchase of Transnistria’s stake in Moldovagaz. Some analysts charge that Russia is
using energy supplies and other trade as weapons to pressure Moldova to drop its pro-Western
orientation and to turn its energy infrastructure over to Moscow. In 2005, Russia restricted wine
and other agricultural imports from Moldova, allegedly over health concerns, dealing a very
4 Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report: Moldova, July 2009; EIU Country Profile: Moldova 2008.
5 “Moldova’s Uncertain Future,” International Crisis Group, August 17, 2006, from the ICG website
http://www.crisisweb.org.
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heavy blow to the country’s economy. Russia finally permitted Moldovan wine imports again in
November 2007, but Moldova’s wine exports to Russia remain reduced from former levels.
The Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008 may have an impact on Moldova. Transnistrian
authorities may become even more intransigent in talks over a settlement. They could press
Russia to grant them diplomatic recognition as independent states, as Moscow has done for
Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions, possibly as a prelude to incorporating Transnistria
into Russia. Indeed, Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov has called for Transnistria to be
incorporated into Russia. On the other hand, observers note that the case of Transnistria is
different from that in Georgia in that Moldova is very unlikely to try to retake Transnistria by
military force. Moreover, they point out that Russia does not have a common border with
Transnistria, as it does with Georgia.
Russia could push for a Transnistria settlement that would give the pro-Russian enclave effective
veto power over the country’s foreign and domestic policies, which could stymie any Moldovan
efforts toward European integration. However, even without recognizing Transnistria’s
independence or exerting heavier pressure for a settlement favorable to Transnistria, Russia may
still succeed in dissuading Moldova from pursuing a pro-Western course. Even before the
Georgia war, Russia successfully pressed Moldova to reduce its role in the GUAM regional group
(named after the initial letters of the names of its members—Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and
Moldova), which aims to coordinate the policies of these countries in many areas, including
energy. Russia has seen GUAM as a U.S.-inspired, anti-Russian project in what it views as its
sphere of influence. In May 2008, Moldova approved a national security strategy that reaffirmed
the country’s long-standing neutrality, winning praise from Russian officials.
Russia congratulated the Moldovan Communists for their April 2009 election victory and echoed
their criticisms of alleged Romanian meddling in Moldova’s internal affairs. Voronin visited
Moscow before both the April and July parliamentary elections. In a possible effort to influence
the July vote, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin raised the possibility that Russia could
provide Moldova with a $500 million loan.
As a self-declared neutral country, Moldova does not seek NATO membership, but participates in
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. Moldova currently has a Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement with the European Union (EU), which provides for cooperation in a wide
variety of spheres and holds out the possibility of an eventual free trade agreement. Moldova
signed an Action Plan with the EU in 2005 in the context of the EU’s European Neighborhood
policy. The EU plans to provide 209.7 million Euro ($310 million) in aid to Moldova between
2007 and 2010, a substantial sum for a small country. The EU has granted Moldova trade
preferences that permits it to sell more of its wine and agricultural goods to the EU, enabling it to
reduce its dependence on the Russian market.
Since 2005, an EU mission has helped to monitor Moldova’s Transnistria border with Ukraine, in
an effort to deter smuggling. Many Transnistrian companies have registered in Moldova in order
to benefit from EU trade preferences, a move that could counter pro-independence forces in
Transnistria.
Moldova hopes to become a candidate for EU membership, although the EU is unlikely to accept
Moldova as a candidate in the foreseeable future, due to Moldova’s poverty and the EU’s own
internal challenges. In March 2009, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership Initiative, part of the
EU’s European Neighborhood program. The Partnership is aimed at developing a regional
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approach to the EU’s relations with the countries lying between the EU and Russia, rather than
the bilateral ties that the EU has at present with these states. The program could lead to greater
aid and advice from the EU to Moldova. Long-term goals of the Partnership include a free trade
zone and visa liberalization.
Moldova’s ties with Romania are a sensitive issue in both countries. Many Romanians consider
Moldovans in fact to be Romanians, and support the eventual unification of the two countries.
Although most independent experts consider the “Moldovan language” to be Romanian, the issue
is a matter of political controversy in Moldova. After the incorporation of Moldova into the
Soviet Union during World War II, Soviet authorities promoted the idea of a separate Moldovan
language (using the Cyrillic rather than the Latin script), as a means of countering possible
secessionist ideas. Those favoring the term “Moldovan” tend to favor Moldova’s independence or
close ties with Russia. Many persons favoring the term “Romanian” support union with Romania.
In a 1994 referendum, more than 90% of Moldovans rejected unification with Romania.
However, it is possible that more inhabitants of this impoverished country may begin to favor
union with Romania now that Bucharest is a member of the EU. Romania’s entry into the EU led
to hundreds of thousands of Moldovan applications to Romania for dual Romanian-Moldovan
citizenship.
The riots in the wake of the April 2009 Moldovan parliamentary elections sharply increased
tensions between the Moldovan government and Romania. President Voronin claimed that
Romania instigated the riots, pointing to the Romanian flags some protestors displayed at the
demonstrations. Moldova expelled Romania’s ambassador from Chisinau, instituted a visa regime
for Romanians visiting Moldova, and closed several border crossings with Romania.
The EU took a low profile in the controversy over the April 2009 Moldovan election. The Czech
EU Presidency called on all sides to engage in peaceful dialogue, and to respect the rule of law,
freedom of expression, and media freedoms. The EU pressed Moldova to lift its visa regime
against EU member state Romania, without success. After the July elections, EU foreign policy
chief Javier Solana said that the election met many international standards, albeit with some
shortcomings. He called on Moldovan leaders to move in a “spirit of reconciliation” and in a
“speedy and inclusive manner” to elect a new president and government in order to tackle the
country’s serious problems. EU officials said that talks could begin on a new partnership
agreement with Moldova this fall, but only after the country formed a new government and lifted
visa restrictions against Romania.
U.S. Policy
The United States and Moldova have enjoyed good relations since the country’s independence in
1991. The United States has supported democracy and free market reform in Moldova. U.S. and
other Western officials continue to be critical of some aspects of Moldova’s democratic
development, particularly its uneven record on media freedoms and its weak judiciary. They have
also said Moldova needs to make more progress in fighting corruption and establishing an
attractive business climate for investors.
The United States reacted cautiously to the outcome of the April 2009 Moldovan election. On
April 7, State Department spokesman Robert Wood said that the U.S. view of the election was
“generally positive,” but said that the United States has not completed its assessment of the vote.
He added that the United States urges Moldovans to “desist from any type of violent activity.”
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Similarly, U.S. Ambassador in Moldova Asif Chaudhry urged demonstrators not to engage in
violence, and praised the government for its initial restraint as well as its decision to allow a
recount and permitting the opposition to see voting lists. However, he expressed concern about
government arrests of students and journalists after the violence.
After the July 2009 elections, Ambassador Chaudhry met with Voronin on August 4. Among other
topics, the two men discussed a July 30 statement issued by Senate Foreign Relations Committee
chairman Sen. John Kerry. The statement said that the fact that Moldovans participated in the
election was “inspiring and reassuring,” but that it was “troubling” when political differences turn
violent. Senator Kerry called on Moldova’s leaders to find “common ground” and “set aside their
personal and political interests” in order to deal with the country’s problems. The statement also
said that Moldova could become a bridge between central and eastern Europe rather than prey to
competing spheres of influence.
The United States has tried to support the country’s fragile sovereignty and territorial integrity by
advocating the withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova and for negotiating a settlement of
the Transnistria issue consistent with Moldova’s territorial integrity. The United States has
worked with the European Union to put pressure on the Transnistria leadership to end its
obstructionist tactics in negotiations on the region’s future. On February 22, 2003, the United
States and the European Union announced a visa ban against 17 top Transnistrian leaders. Other
Transnistrian officials involved with the harassment of Latin-script schools were added to this list
in 2004. The United States has refused to ratify the adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
treaty until several conditions are met, including the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova.
In November 2007, Russia suspended its observance of the CFE Treaty, attributing the move to
the failure of the United States and other countries to ratify the adapted treaty.
The United States has called for continued cooperation on weapons proliferation and trafficking
in persons. In May 2003, the United States imposed missile proliferation sanctions on two
Moldovan firms for transferring equipment and technology to Iran. Transnistria has been a center
for the trafficking of small arms to world trouble spots. The 2009 State Department Trafficking in
Persons report is critical of Moldova’s record in this area. It noted that Moldova is a major source
of women and girls trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation. It is a Tier 2 Watch List
country. The report acknowledged some progress over the previous year, when Moldova was
listed as Tier 3, meaning that it did not “fully comply with the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so.” However, the report says
the government needs to make more progress in rooting out trafficking-related government
corruption.
The United States has provided aid to Moldova to help meet political and economic reform
objectives. According to the FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,
in FY2008 the United States provided $19.796 million in aid for Moldova in FY2008. Moldova is
slated to receive an estimated $15.55 million in FY2009. The Obama Administration requested
$22.55 million for aid to Moldova in FY2010. U.S. aid is aimed at supporting independent media
and non-governmental organizations in Moldova, as well as fostering cultural and civic
exchanges. U.S. economic aid is improving the business climate in Moldova, and helping the
country diversify its exports. The United States donates humanitarian aid in the form of food and
medicine to particularly vulnerable parts of Moldova’s impoverished population.
U.S. security assistance is used to help Moldova participate in Partnership for Peace exercises,
and to develop its peacekeeping capacity and interoperability with NATO. The United States
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provides funding to help Moldova strengthen its border and fight trafficking in persons. In
addition to the aid totals listed above, Moldova is in the second year of a $24.7 million program
under the Millennium Challenge Corporation to fight corruption, strengthen the judiciary, and
achieve other reform objectives.
The 109th Congress approved legislation concerning Moldova. In February 2005, the Senate
passed S.Res. 60, which expressed support for democracy in Moldova and called for the
authorities to hold free and fair elections in March 2005. In March 2005, the Senate passed S.Res.
69, which called on Russia to honor its commitments to withdraw its troops from Moldova.
S.Res. 530, passed in July 2006, called on President Bush during the Moscow G-8 summit to
discuss frankly with President Putin a series of policies deemed to be inconsistent with G-8
objectives, including the January 2006 energy cut-off to Moldova.
The 110th Congress has also passed legislation concerning Moldova. S.Res. 278, passed on July
31, 2007, strongly urged Russia to reconsider its suspension of CFE implementation, and called
on Moscow to “move speedily” to withdraw its troops and military equipment from Moldova. A
House companion resolution, S.Res. 603, was introduced on August 1, 2007. H.Res. 457,
introduced on June 5, 2007, calls on Russia to withdraw its forces and armaments from Moldova.
Its says the current Russian-Moldovan peacekeeping force in the security zone should be replaced
by a multinational one under an OSCE mandate.
In the 111th Congress, the Senate passed S.Res. 56 on April 1, 2009. The resolution called on
Moldova to hold free and democratic parliamentary elections on April 5. It notes that a genuinely
democratic political system is a precondition for “full integration of Moldova into the Western
community of nations.” The resolution says that the Senate “in light of the steps taken by the
Government of Moldova, pledges the continued support of the United States Government for the
establishment in Moldova of a fully free and democratic system, the creation of a prosperous
market economy, and the assumption by Moldova of its rightful place as a full and equal member
of the Western community of democracies.”
Author Contact Information
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291
Congressional Research Service
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