Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq
and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Moshe Schwartz
Specialist in Defense Acquisition
August 13, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40764
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Summary
The Department of Defense (DOD) increasingly relies upon contractors to support operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, which has resulted in a DOD workforce in those countries comprising
approximately an equal number of contractors (200,000) as uniformed personnel (194,000). The
critical role contractors play in supporting such military operations and the billions of dollars
spent by DOD on these services requires operational forces to effectively manage contractors
during contingency operations. Lack of sufficient contract management can delay or even prevent
troops from receiving needed support and can also result in wasteful spending. Some analysts
believe that poor contract management has also played a role in abuses and crimes committed by
certain contractors against local nationals, which likely has undermined U.S. counterinsurgency
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
DOD officials have stated that the military’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with
Congressional attention and legislation, has focused DOD’s attention on the importance of
contractors to operational success. DOD has taken steps to improve how it manages and oversees
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. These steps include tracking contracting data, implementing
contracting training for uniformed personnel, increasing the size of the acquisition workforce in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and updating DOD doctrine to incorporate the role of contractors.
However, these efforts are still in progress and could take three years or more to effectively
implement.
The use of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan has raised a number of issues for Congress,
including 1) whether DOD is gathering and analyzing the right data on the use of contractors, 2)
what steps DOD is taking to improve contract management and oversight, and 3) the extent to
which contractors are included in military doctrine and strategy. This report examines current
contractor trends in Iraq and Afghanistan, steps DOD has taken to improve contractor oversight
and management, and the extent to which DOD has incorporated the role of contractors into its
doctrine and strategy. It also reviews steps Congress has taken to exercise oversight over DOD
contracting, including contracting issues that have been the focus of hearings and legislation.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Managing Contractors during Contingency Contracting .............................................................. 2
Number and Roles of Contractors in the Central Command Region ............................................. 3
Contractors in CENTCOM.................................................................................................... 4
Contractors in Iraq ................................................................................................................ 5
Number of Contractors.................................................................................................... 5
Type of Work Performed by Contractors.......................................................................... 6
Profile of Contractors...................................................................................................... 7
Contractors in Afghanistan .................................................................................................... 8
Number of Contractors.................................................................................................... 8
Type of Work Performed by Contractors.......................................................................... 8
Profile of Contractors...................................................................................................... 9
Efforts to Improve Contractor Management and Oversight ........................................................ 10
Contractors in DOD Strategy and Doctrines .............................................................................. 11
Can Contractors Undermine U.S. Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan? ...................................... 11
DOD Strategy and Doctrine ................................................................................................ 12
The National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review.................................. 13
Field Manual on Operations .......................................................................................... 14
Field Manual on Counterinsurgency .............................................................................. 15
New Doctrine, DOD Instructions, and Other Efforts...................................................... 15
Selected Congressional Hearings and Legislation ...................................................................... 16
Private Security Contractors and Interrogators..................................................................... 16
Contract Management, Oversight, and Coordination............................................................ 17
Training Contractors and the Military in Contingency Contracting ...................................... 18
Figures
Figure 1. Contractors as Percentage of Workforce in Recent Operations ...................................... 1
Figure 2. DOD Contractors in Iraq vs. Troop Levels.................................................................... 6
Figure 3. Iraq DOD Contractor Personnel by Type of Service Provided ....................................... 6
Figure 4. Breakdown of DOD Contractor Workforce in Iraq ........................................................ 7
Figure 5. DOD Contractors in Afghanistan vs. Troop Levels ....................................................... 8
Figure 6. Breakdown of DOD Contractor Workforce in Afghanistan............................................ 9
Figure A-1. Trend Analysis of Contractor Support by Type of Service Provided in Iraq.............. 19
Tables
Table 1. Comparison of Contractor Personnel to Troop Levels..................................................... 5
Table 2. DOD Contractor Personnel in Iraq ................................................................................. 7
Table 3. DOD Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan ..................................................................... 9
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Appendixes
Appendix A. Trend Analysis by Type of Service Provided in Iraq .............................................. 19
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 19
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Background
The Department of Defense (DOD) has often relied upon contractors to support military
operations. During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Army relied on contractors to provide
such goods and services as transportation and engineering services, clothing, and weapons.1 Since
then, advances in warfare and technology have expanded the functions and responsibilities of
contractors in military operations.2 After the Cold War, reliance on contractors further increased
when DOD cut logistic and support personnel.3 As a result of these cuts, DOD lost in-house
capability and was forced to rely even further on contractor support.4 Many analysts now believe
that DOD is unable to successfully execute large missions without contractor support. These
analysts point to recent contingency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans—the three
largest operations of the past 15 years—where contractors have comprised approximately 50% of
DOD’s combined contractor and uniformed personnel workforce (see Figure 1).5
Figure 1. Contractors as Percentage of Workforce in Recent Operations
70
60
50
ge
a
40
rcent
30
e
P
20
10
0
Balkans
Afghanistan
Iraq
Source: Congressional Budget Office. Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq. August 2008. pg 13;
Afghanistan and Iraq: CRS Analysis of DOD data
1 Deborah C. Kidwell, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies,” Global War on
Terrorism Occasional Paper 12, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2005, p. 9. See also James
F. Nagle, History of Government Contracting, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University Law
School, 1999), pp. 16-19.
2 Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, August 2008, p. 12.
3 CRS Report R40057, Training the Military to Manage Contractors During Expeditionary Operations: Overview and
Options for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz, p. 1.
4 For example, in 2008 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the Army had a contract for 11,000
linguists because DOD did not have the number of linguists needed. See: U.S. Government Accountability Office,
DOD Needs to Address Contract Oversight and Quality Assurance Issues for Contracts Used to Support Contingency
Operations, GAO-08-1087, September 26, 2008, p. 6.
5 For purposes of this report, DOD’s workforce is defined as uniformed personnel and the contractor workforce. DOD
civilian personnel are excluded from this count. According to a DOD official, the civilian workforce in Iraq is
approximately 8,000, which would be less than 3% of the total force. Based on discussions with DOD officials, July 23,
2009.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Contractors can provide significant operational benefits to DOD. Using contractors to perform
non-combat activities augments the total force and can also free up uniformed personnel to
perform combat missions. Since contractors can be hired faster than DOD can develop an internal
capability, contractors can be quickly deployed to provide critical support capabilities when
necessary. Contractors also provide expertise in specialized fields that DOD may not possess,
such as linguistics. Using contractors can also save DOD money. Contractors can be hired when a
particular need arises and be let go when their services are no longer needed. Hiring contractors
only as needed can be cheaper in the long run than maintaining a permanent in-house capability.
DOD has spent billions of dollars on contractors supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
According to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates, from 2003-2007, DOD obligated
almost $76 billion for contracts in the Iraqi theater.6 For Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 and the first half
of FY2008, DOD obligated approximately $30 billion on contractors for the conflict in Iraq and
Afghanistan (over $5 billion for Afghanistan and approximately $25 billion for Iraq).7
Managing Contractors during Contingency
Contracting
Lack of sufficient contract management can prevent troops from receiving needed support and
lead to wasteful spending.8 In addition, some analysts believe that lax contractor oversight may
lead to contractor abuses which can undermine U.S. counter-insurgency efforts.9
Questions have been raised about DOD’s ability to effectively manage contractors during
contingency operations.10 For example, some analysts assert that DOD has not adequately
planned for the use of contractors, lacks contingency contracting experience, and does not
sufficiently coordinate contracts across military services.11 In 2007, the Commission on Army
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (the Gansler Report) found
that Contracting Officer Representatives, who are responsible for managing contracts, usually
have no prior experience with contractors and receive negligible training on how to manage
contractors.12 Some analysts argue that as a result, DOD is not getting the most out of the services
provided by contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.
6 The following countries are considered to be part of the Iraq theater: Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. See Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S.
Operations in Iraq, August 2008, p. 3.
7 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and
Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO-09-19, October 1, 2008, p. 21.
8 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate
Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments. GAO-08-568T. March 11, 2008. p. 4,6; See also Urgent Reform
Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, Op. Cit., p. 2.
9 See page 11, “Can Contractors Undermine U.S. Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan?”
10 See U.S. Government Accountability Office, High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems
with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, GAO-07-145, December 18, 2006.
11 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contract Management: DOD Developed Draft Guidance for Operational
Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements, GAO-09-114R, November 20, 2008, p. 1.
12 Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, Urgent Reform
Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, October 31, 2007, p. 43.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Questions have also been raised about DOD spending on contractors. The Commission on
Wartime Contracting highlighted over-spending on contracts as a key concern.13 It reported that
managerial shortages and limited oversight of contractors led to potentially unnecessary
construction, such as a new $30 million dining facility to be completed a year before U.S. troops
were required to leave Iraq, even though a then-recently upgraded dining facility was located
nearby.14
Many analysts argue that only a culture shift in the military will improve contracting outcomes.
The Gansler Report found that despite the importance of acquisitions to military performance,
the Army apparently has not valued the skill and experience required to perform those
processes... without significant systemic change, the Army acquisition processes [contracting
process] can be expected to inevitably return to below-mediocrity.15
Other analysts have argued that DOD’s current approach to managing service contracts tends to be
reactive and has not fully addressed key factors for success.16 These analysts argue that to improve
contracting outcomes, DOD must 1) understand how and why it uses contractors, including the
number of contractors and types of services provided, 2) develop better management and contract
oversight structures, and 3) establish and commit to a strategic approach that defines how
contractors should be used to achieve operational success.
The use of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan raises a number of issues for Congress, including
1) whether DOD is gathering and analyzing the right data on the use of contractors, 2) what steps
DOD is taking to improve contract management and oversight, and 3) the extent to which
contractors are included in military doctrine and strategy. This report will discuss current
contracting trends in Iraq and Afghanistan, steps DOD has taken to improve contractor oversight
and management, and the extent to which DOD has incorporated the role of contractors into its
strategy and doctrine.
Number and Roles of Contractors in the Central
Command Region
Contractors supply a wide variety of services and products, including base support, construction,
and transportation, to assist DOD operations within Iraq and Afghanistan. While many of these
contractors work in Iraq and Afghanistan, a number are also present in surrounding countries
within the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (CENTCOM AOR) and in the United States.17
13 Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 10, 2009;
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, At What Cost? Contingency Contracting In Iraq and
Afghanistan, June 2009.
14 Ibid, p. 52-54.
15 Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, p 9; see also New American Foundation, Changing the
Culture of Pentagon Contracting, November 5, 2008.
16 For example, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to
Improve Service Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-20, November 9, 2006, Highlights Page and p. 9.
17 USCENTCOM is responsible for operations in twenty countries in and around the Middle East including
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, U.A.E., Uzbekistan, and Yemen. The number of contractors based in the
(continued...)
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
For example, at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, the Army relies on contractors to refurbish and repair
vehicles used in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and armored
personnel carriers.18
DOD did not begin to gather data on contractors until the second half of 2007. As a result, the
following CRS analysis only includes six quarters, ending March 31, 2009. In addition, a number
of analysts have raised questions about the reliability of the data gathered. For example, in
October 2008, GAO reported that DOD’s quarterly contractor reports were not routinely checked
for accuracy or completeness.19 DOD officials have acknowledged these shortcomings; in the
second quarter for fiscal year 2009 (Q2 FY2009) census, DOD reported that the data system
previously used to count contractors duplicated reported numbers on task order contracts. DOD
stated that they are working to improve the reliability and the type of data gathered.20 For
example, DOD is implementing the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker
(SPOT), which is designed to track and monitor contractor personnel within a contingency
operation. DOD officials stated SPOT is fully functional and will contain all contractor data by
Q1 FY2010, at which time it will replace the CENTCOM quarterly census as the tracking
mechanism for contractor data. SPOT is expected to track contractor data across the entire Iraq
and Afghanistan theaters, including contractors based in neighboring countries. DOD is also
working to gather more detailed information on contractors in Afghanistan (see page 10).
Contractors in CENTCOM
According to DOD, as of March 31, 2009, there were 242,657 DOD contractor personnel in the
CENTCOM AOR compared to approximately 282,000 uniformed personnel in the region who are
supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.21 Contractors made up approximately 46% of
DOD’s combined contractor and uniformed personnel workforce in the CENTCOM AOR22,
representing a .86-1 ratio between contractors and uniformed personnel (see Table 1).
(...continued)
U.S. is small; these contractors are not included in this analysis.
18 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Logistics: The Army Needs to Implement an Effective
Management and Oversight Plan for the Equipment Maintenance Contract in Kuwait, GAO-08-316R, January 22,
2008.
19 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and
Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO-09-19, October 1, 2008, p. 6.
20 Ibid.
21 According to DOD, there were 286,912 troops dedicated to supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based on
historical data, approximately 5,000 of these troops are based outside of the CENTCOM region. See CRS Report
R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, by Amy
Belasco, p. 5-6. We subtracted 5,000 personnel from the total number of troops to approximate the number of troops
based in the CENTCOM region.
22 For purposes of this report, DOD’s workforce is defined as uniformed personnel and the contractor workforce. DOD
civilian personnel are excluded from this count. According to a DOD official, the civilian workforce in Iraq is
approximately 8,000, which would be less than 3% of the total workforce. Based on discussions with DOD officials,
July 23, 2009.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Table 1. Comparison of Contractor Personnel to Troop Levels
(As of March 2009)
Contractors Troops
Ratio
Iraq
Only
132,610 141,300 .94:1
Afghanistan
Only
68,197 52,300 1.30:1
CENTCOM
AOR
242,657 282,000 .86:1
Source: CENTCOM 2nd Quarterly Contractor Census Report (as of March 31, 2009); CRS Report R40682,
Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, by Amy Belasco
Notes: CENTCOM AOR includes figures for Iraq and Afghanistan
According to GAO, lessons learned and data analysis from past operations must be included in
the development of a strategic plan to define contractor involvement in future operations.23 Many
analysts agree that understanding the role contractors play in various DOD operations—including
the relationship between contractors and troop levels—could help to more effectively determine
contractor support requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as future operations.
An analysis of contractor data appears to indicate significant differences in how DOD uses
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, contractors make up 57% of DOD’s combined
uniformed and contractor personnel workforce in Afghanistan compared to 48% of the workforce
in Iraq. In addition, 76% of contractors in Afghanistan are local nationals compared to only 27%
in Iraq (see Table 2 and Table 3). Some analysts contend that understanding these differences,
and why they occur, could help DOD to strategically plan for the management and use of
contractors in future operations. For example, had DOD understood the extent to which it would
rely on private security contractors in Iraq, DOD might have put in place a more robust oversight
and coordination mechanism earlier. 24
Contractors in Iraq
Number of Contractors
As reflected in Table 1, as of March 2009, there were 132,610 DOD contractors in Iraq compared
to 141,300 uniformed personnel in-country. Despite fluctuations throughout the last five quarters,
troop and contractor levels have remained relatively equal (see Figure 2). Similar to the
CENTCOM AOR workforce ratio, contractors made up approximately 48% of DOD’s workforce
in Iraq as of the 2nd quarter for fiscal year 2009.
23 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and Infrastructure
Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and Plans, GAO-09-380T, February 12, 2009.
24 In addition, a number of military bases in Iraq were not large enough to house contractors because DOD did not
originally know how many contractors would be deployed with the military. As a result, DOD had to quickly find
alternative housing for these contractors, which resulted in increased costs for DOD. Based on discussions with DOD
officials, July 23, 2009.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Figure 2. DOD Contractors in Iraq vs. Troop Levels
200
)
150
nds
a
100
ous
h
50
(in t
0
Dec. 07
Mar. 08
June 08
Sept. 08
Dec. 08
Mar. 09
Total Contractors
Troop Level
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports; CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars,
FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, by Amy Belasco.
Type of Work Performed by Contractors
Contractors perform a wide range of services in Iraq. As of March 2009, approximately 77,669
personnel (58% of contractors) performed base support functions such as maintenance of the
grounds, dining facilities, and laundry services (see Figure 3). Construction, the second most
common service provided, utilized approximately 19,941 personnel (15% of contractors).
Combined, these two categories account for almost 75% of DOD contractors in Iraq.
Figure 3. Iraq DOD Contractor Personnel by Type of Service Provided
(as of March 2009)
Base Support 77,669
15%
Construction 19,941
9%
Other 11,494
58%
Security 10,422
8%
Translator/Interpreter 9,241
7%
Transportation 2,383
2%
1%
Communication 1,460
Source: DOD; US CENTCOM 2nd Quarterly Contractor Census Report (as of March 31, 2009).
As the services required by DOD change during the course of operations, the number of
contractors providing the various services also change. For example, since June 2008, as troop
levels dropped by approximately 12,000, contractors providing base support and construction
declined by 13% (12,000 personnel) and 45% (16,000 personnel) respectively, whereas security
and other services increased by 12% (1,000 personnel) and 38% (4,000 personnel) respectively
(see Appendix A).
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Profile of Contractors
Of the approximately 132,000 contractors in Iraq as of March 2009, 36,000 were U.S. citizens,
36,000 were local nationals, and 60,000 were third-country nationals (see Table 2). Third country
nationals made up almost half of all contractor personnel.
Table 2. DOD Contractor Personnel in Iraq
(as of March 2009)
Total Contractors U.S. Citizens Third Country Nationals Local Nationals
Number 132,610
36,061 60,244
36,305
Percent of Total --
27%
45%
27%
Source: CENTCOM 2nd Quarterly Contractor Census Report.
Note: Percentages do not sum to 100% due to rounding.
According to a DOD official, contracting local nationals is an important element in counter-
insurgency strategy.25 Employing local nationals injects money into the local economy, provides
job training, and can give the U.S. a more sophisticated understanding of the local landscape.
Nevertheless, as Figure 4 illustrates, over the last three quarters, the number of Iraqi contractors
has dropped by 34,000 (48%) while the number of U.S. contractors has increased by 9,500 (36%).
This can be only partially explained by the drop in the number of contractors performing
construction (16,000); local nationals represent more than 80% of these workers.
Figure 4. Breakdown of DOD Contractor Workforce in Iraq
180
160
) 140
120
nds
a 100
80
thous
60
n
(i
40
20
0
Dec. 07
Mar. 08
June 08
Sept. 08 Dec. 08
Mar. 09
U.S. Citizens
3rd Country Nationals
Local Nationals
Troop Level
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports; CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and
Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, by Amy Belasco.
25 Based on discussions with DOD officials, July 23, 2009.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Contractors in Afghanistan
Number of Contractors
As reflected in Table 1, as of March 2009, there were 68,197 DOD contractors in Afghanistan,
compared to 52,300 uniformed personnel. Contractors made up 57% of DOD’s workforce in
Afghanistan (see Figure 5). This apparently represented the highest recorded percentage of
contractors used by DOD in any conflict in the history of the United States. 26
Figure 5. DOD Contractors in Afghanistan vs. Troop Levels
80
70
) 60
nds
a 50
s
40
hou 30
(in t 20
10
0
Dec. 07
Mar. 08
June 08
Sept. 08
Dec. 08
Mar. 09
Total Contractors
Troop Level
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports; Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost
and Other Potential Issues, by Amy Belasco.
Some analysts and DOD officials believe that the higher percentage of contractors in Afghanistan
is partially a result of contractors providing some services to the more than 30,000 international
forces that are part of the International Security Assistance Force,27 and DOD’s expansion of
facilities to support the anticipated military surge in Afghanistan.
Type of Work Performed by Contractors
DOD does not report the breakdown of services that contractors provide in Afghanistan, with the
exception of data on private security contractors. Nevertheless, the types of services provided by
contractors in Afghanistan are similar to those conducted in Iraq including: logistics, construction,
linguist services, and transportation; however, the percentage of contractors providing each
service are likely different. For example, in March (Q2) FY2009, 16% of contractors in
Afghanistan provide security compared to 10% of contractors in Iraq. DOD officials stated that
26 CRS Report R40057, Training the Military to Manage Contractors During Expeditionary Operations: Overview and
Options for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz.
27 See ISAF “Placemat”, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
they will start providing data regarding the breakdown of services in Afghanistan in the next
quarterly census.
Profile of Contractors
As of March 2009, of the approximately 68,000 contractors in Afghanistan, 9,378 are U.S.
citizens, 7,043 are third-country nationals, and 51,776 are local nationals (see Table 3). Local
nationals make more than 75% of contractor personnel.
Table 3. DOD Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan
(as of March 2009)
Total Contractors U.S. Citizens Third Country Nationals Local Nationals
Number 68,197
9,378 7,043
51,776
Percent of Total --
14%
10%
76%
Source: CENTCOM 2nd Quarterly Contractor Census Report.
DOD uses significantly more local nationals in Afghanistan than U.S. citizen and third-country
nationals combined. There also appears to be an inverse relationship between troop levels and
local national contractors in Afghanistan (see Figure 6), although there is not enough data to
draw significant conclusions with statistical reliability. Understanding such data could help DOD
plan more effectively for contractor requirements in future operations.
Figure 6. Breakdown of DOD Contractor Workforce in Afghanistan
70
60
)
% 50
(
e
g 40
ta
30
en
rc 20
Pe
10
0
Dec. 08 Mar. 08 June 08 Sept. 08 Dec. 09 Mar. 09
U.S. Citizens
3rd Country Nationals
Local Nationals
Troop Levels
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports; CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and
Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, by Amy Belasco.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Efforts to Improve Contractor Management and
Oversight
In light of DOD’s experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in response to the findings of
numerous studies (including the Gansler Report and numerous GAO reports), DOD has taken a
number of steps to improve how it manages contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD set up the
Joint Contracting Command (JCC) in both Iraq and Afghanistan to provide a more centralized
management system and enforce contracting support requirements during ongoing operations.28
DOD has also increased the size of its acquisition workforce in theater. Additional Defense
Contracting Management Agency staff has been sent to administer complex contracts.29
DOD is also working to improve how it will use contractors in future operations. Responding to a
Gansler Report recommendation, in October 2008, the Army Contracting Command (ACC) was
established as a major subordinate command of the U.S. Army Materiel Command. The ACC
performs most of the contracting work for the Army. In addition, the Expeditionary Contracting
Command was established as a subordinate command of the ACC. The Expeditionary
Contracting Command provides contracting support during expeditionary operations. In addition,
the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office was established to assist commanders in
planning, supporting, and overseeing contracting activities during the early stages of contingency
operations.30 DOD has also developed an Operational Contract Support Concept of Operations
(CONOPS), intended to promote communication and collaboration between contractors and
uniformed personnel in theater.
Uniformed personnel are often responsible for managing contractors during contingency
operations. DOD is developing programs to improve training of uniformed personnel to manage
contractors during contingency operations. DOD intends to introduce courses on contract support
into the curriculum for non-acquisition personnel and is incorporating contract operations into
some mission readiness exercises. DOD is also developing an on-line course that offers pre-
deployment training to personnel about planning for and working with contractors during military
operations.31 Additionally, the Army continues to develop informational handbooks to help guide
military personnel who work with contractors regarding the contracting process and their specific
roles and responsibilities when coordinating with contractors.32
A number of these initiatives have been reflected in recent Congressional legislation. For
example, the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office was established as a result of section
854 of the FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requiring DOD to
28 USCENTCOM, 2nd Quarterly Contractor Census Report, p. 4, May, 2009.
29 Ibid. p. 4-5.
30 See CRS Report R40057, Training the Military to Manage Contractors During Expeditionary Operations: Overview
and Options for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz; and U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Logistics Agency, “New
organization to Help Combatant Commanders Manage Acquisition,” Press Release, October 24, 2008.
31 For a more detailed discussion of DOD efforts, see Training the Military to Manage Contractors During
Expeditionary Operations: Overview and Options for Congress.
32 For example, the Army has published Contracting Basics for Leaders and the Deployed COR which is a pocket-sized
pamphlet that explains key contracting concepts, definitions, and processes. The Army has also developed the
Deployed COR: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures handbook, and is drafting a handbook on Armed Private Security
Contracting.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
create a team of contingency contracting experts that can be deployed to support military
operations.33 In the FY2008 NDAA, Congress mandated contingency contracting training for
non-acquisition military personnel who will have relevant contracting responsibilities34
Furthermore, Congress required that the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker
(SPOT) contain all contract-related information for Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress appropriated
$8,000,000 for SPOT, $2,500,000 for the Joint Contingency Contract Support Office, and
$2,000,000 for training non-acquisition personnel.35
DOD has shown an ability to improve contractor management and oversight. For example, DOD
has made significant efforts to improve the management, oversight, and coordination of private
security companies (PSC). The improvements in how DOD manages PSCs have been noted by
the Special Investigator for Iraqi Reconstruction, the Commission on Wartime Contracting, and
the Government Accountability Office. 36
Contractors in DOD Strategy and Doctrines
Can Contractors Undermine U.S. Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan?
According to the Army Field Manual on counterinsurgency, one of the fundamental strategies in
counterinsurgency operations – such as those undertaken by DOD in Iraq and Afghanistan – is to
retain legitimacy by winning the hearts and minds of the local population.37 Conversely, the field
manual argues that abusing or mistreating the population undermines counterinsurgency efforts,
stating
Though firmness by security forces is often necessary to establish a secure environment, a
government that exceeds accepted local norms and abuses its people... generates resistance to
its rule. People who have been maltreated or have had close friends or relatives killed... may
strike back at their attackers. Security force abuses... can be major escalating factors for
insurgencies.38
In accordance with the manual’s assertion that the local population will ultimately determine the
winner of the conflict, abuses and crimes committed by armed private security contractors and
interrogators against local nationals may have undermined U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.39
33 P.L. 109-364, Sec. 854.
34 P.L. 110-181 Sec. 849.
35 Congressional Record May 19, 2008, pg. S4325.
36 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Field Commanders See Improvements in Controlling and Coordinating
Private Security Contractor Missions in Iraq, SIGIR 09-022, July 28, 2009; U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Commission on Wartime
Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 10, 2009; U.S. Government
Accountability Office, REBUILDING IRAQ: DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and Coordination
of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements, GAO-08-966, July
31, 2008.
37 Department of Defense, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, December 2006.
38 Department of Defense, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, December 2006, p. 1-9.
39 Ibid, p. 1-2, 1-3, 1-22.
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There have been published reports of local nationals being abused and mistreated by some DOD
contractors in such incidents as the shooting at Iraqi civilians by private security contractors40 and
the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.41 Local nationals may not draw a distinction
between government contractors and the U.S. military, and the abuses committed by contractors
may strengthen anti-American insurgents, as evidenced by the public outcry following such
incidents.
Poor contract management may also undermine U.S. efforts in the region. GAO stated that poor
contract management can lead to wasteful spending of billions of dollars.42 Wasteful spending can
divert limited resources away from important U.S. efforts as providing security, social services,
and economic development programs. According to the Army, efforts to establish social services
and develop economic programs are critical to a successful counterinsurgency campaign.43
Therefore, wasting resources that could otherwise have been spent on social services and
economic development may limit the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. Poor contract management
may also result in increased fraud, which could similarly undermine the credibility of the U.S. in
the eyes of the local population.
DOD Strategy and Doctrine
Some analysts believe that DOD strategy and doctrine does not sufficiently address the issue of
contractors. These analysts argue that the public backlash following Abu Ghraib and other such
incidents, as well wasteful spending, should compel DOD to reexamine the role contractors play
in contingency operations and the way DOD integrates contractor support into current strategy
and doctrine.44 For example, then Senator Barack Obama stated that “we cannot win a fight for
hearts and minds when we outsource critical missions to unaccountable contractors.”45 The
Gansler Commission echoed a similar sentiment, finding that segments of the Army have not
recognized the important role contractors now have in DOD operations and the ability of
contractors to influence the success of a contingency operation46 Further integrating contractors
40 For a detailed discussion of the use of private security contractors in Iraq, see CRS Report RL32419, Private Security
Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues, by Jennifer K. Elsea, Moshe Schwartz, and Kennon
H. Nakamura.
41 According to an Army investigative report, a lack of good contractor surveillance at Abu Ghraib prison contributed
to fostering a permissive environment in which prisoner abuses took place at the hands of contractors. Department of
Defense, Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib, August 23, 2004, p. 52. The report found “Proper
oversight did not occur at Abu Ghraib due to a lack of training and inadequate contract management ... [T]his lack of
monitoring was a contributing factor to the problems that were experienced with the performance of the contractors at
Abu Ghraib.” See http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA429125.
42 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate
Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments. GAO-08-568T. March 11, 2008. p. 4,6; See also Urgent Reform
Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, Op. Cit., p. 2.
43 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, Washington, DC, December 15, 2006, pp. 1-1.
44 Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, Urgent Reform Required:
Army Expeditionary Contracting, October 31, 2007; the Commission on Wartime Contracting and Commission on
Wartime Contracting, At What Cost? Contingency Contracting In Iraq and Afghanistan: Interim Report, June 10, 2009;
and Kidwell, D., Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies, Combat Studies
Institute Press, 2005, p. 48.
45 Hauser, C., New Rules for Contractors are Urged by 2 Democrats, the New York Times, October 4, 2007.
46 Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, p.1.
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into doctrine and strategy could help DOD better manage contractors, which in turn may mitigate
the negative effects that some contractors have on DOD operations.
Many analysts and DOD officials argue that the military’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan,
coupled with Congressional attention and legislation, has focused DOD’s attention on the
importance of contractors to operational success. According to DOD officials, prior to the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, contracting was done on an ad-hoc basis and was not adequately
incorporated into the doctrine – or culture – of the military. 47 DOD officials stated that doctrine
and strategy are being updated to incorporate the role of contractors in contingency operations.
DOD strategy can be found in a number of documents, including the National Defense Strategy
and Quadrennial Defense Review. Army doctrine is published in field manuals such as Field
Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, which constitutes the Army’s view on how it conducts operations
and “sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics... detailed in
subordinate field manuals.”48 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, is a subordinate manual
dedicated to counterinsurgency operations, such as those currently being conducted in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
The National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review
The National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) are high-level strategy
documents which supports the Administration’s National Security Strategy.49 Some analysts
believe that, given the critical role contractors play in military operations, these documents should
contain a sufficiently meaningful discussion of contractors.
The most recent QDR, which runs almost 100 pages, spends about five sentences discussing the
role contractors play in military operations. In one reference to contractors, the report states “[t]he
Department’s Total Force – its active and reserve military components, its civil servants, and its
contractors.”50 The QDR’s most extensive discussion on contractors states that
Implementing the new Department of Defense Instruction Contractor Personnel Authorized
to Accompany U.S. Armed Forces is another step toward integrating contractors into the
Total Force. The Department’s policy now directs that performance of commercial activities
by contractors, including contingency contractors and any proposed contractor logistics
support arrangements, shall be included in operational plans and orders. By factoring
contractors into their planning, Combatant Commanders can better determine their mission
needs.51
According to DOD officials, the upcoming QDR will include a more robust discussion on
contractors.52
47 Based on discussions with senior DOD officials on July 23, 2009 and July 27, 2009.
48 Department of Defense, Operations, FM 3-0, February 2008, p. v.
49 For more information, see CRS Report RL34505, National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates, Execution to
Date, and Considerations for Congress, by Catherine Dale.
50 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 75. The issues of what
constitutes the total force is also mentioned on p. 4.
51 Ibid, p. 81.
52 Based on discussions with senior DOD officials on July 23, 2009 and July 27, 2009.
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The National Defense Strategy runs 23 pages and mentions contractors on two occasions. In the
first instance, it states “The Total Force distributes and balances skills across each of its
constituent elements: the Active Component, the Reserve Component, the civilian workforce, and
the private sector and contractor base.”53 In the second instance, the report states “We also must
continue to improve our acquisition and contracting regulations, procedures, and oversight to
ensure agile and timely procurement of critical equipment and materials for our forces.”54
Some analysts argue that the extent to which contractors are addressed in doctrine that is not
specifically aimed at contracting issues, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review and field
manual on operations, reflects the extent to which DOD incorporates contracting into the overall
culture of the military. Other analysts argue that more appropriate publications to determine the
extent to which contractors are incorporated into doctrine are the operational and tactical level
guidance that related to contracting issues, such as FM 3-100.21, Contractors on the Battlefield,
FM 3-100.21 Contractors on the Battlefield, FM 100-16 Army Operational Support, and FM 100-
10-2 Contracting Support on the Battlefield, and Army Regulation 715-9, Logistics – Contractors
Accompanying the Force.55
Field Manual on Operations
In February 2008, the Army updated Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, the first update since
September 11, 2001.56 In some 200 pages, the combined discussion on contractors consists of less
than a page. The most extensive discussion, found in the section on Interagency Coordination and
Cooperation with Other Organizations, states, in toto,
A contractor is a person or business that provides products or services for monetary
compensation. A contractor furnishes supplies and services or performs work at a certain
price or rate based on the terms of a contract (FM 3-100.21). Contracted support often
includes traditional goods and services support but may include interpreter communications,
infrastructure, and other related support. In military operations, contractors may provide life
support, construction and engineering support, weapons system support, security, other
technical services (FM 3-100.21 contains doctrine for contractors accompanying deployed
forces).
There are other isolated references to contractors or contracting, but most analysts consider that
these references provide little actual guidance. For example, one mention of contracting states
“the Army identifies technical matters, such as network operations or contracting, and assigns
responsibilities for them to an appropriate organization.”57
53 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008, p. 19.
54 Ibid.
55 FM 3-100.21, Contractors on the Battlefield, January 2003, states that it is intended to define the role of contractors
and describe the relationship between contractors and combatant commanders. The field manual is intended for
commanders and their staff. Army Regulation 715-9, Logistics – Contractors Accompanying the Force October 1999,
establishes Army policies for using contractors on the battlefield. The regulation is geared to logistics; the proponent
agency of the regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.
56 Operations, p. Forward.
57 Ibid, p. B-13.
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Field Manual on Counterinsurgency
In December 2006, the Army and Marine Corps released Filed Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency,
a field manual devoted exclusively to understanding and conducting counterinsurgency
operations. Prior to publishing 3-24, a manual dedicated to counterinsurgency operations had not
been published for over 20 years. Counterinsurgency was coauthored by then Lieutenant General
David Petraeus (Army) and then Lieutenant General James Amos (Marine Corps). The manual
draws heavily on experiences and lessons from military operations in Iraq.
Counterinsurgency recognizes the role contractors play in counterinsurgency operations and has a
more extensive discussion of contractors than FM 3-0 Operations. The Manual lists multinational
corporations and contractors as key counterinsurgency participants and describes the role played
by contractors. The manual goes on to state that “at a minimum, commanders should know which
companies are present in their AO [area of operation]... commanders should identify contractors
operating in their AO and determine the nature of their contract, existing accountability
mechanisms, and appropriate coordination relationships.”58 And in chapter eight of the manual
there is a four page section dedicated exclusively to Contracted Logistics Support. This section
includes discussions on theater support contracts, counterinsurgency contracting considerations,
and contingency contracting. Contractor issues are also incorporated into other sections of the
manual, such as the section on enforcing discipline.59
New Doctrine, DOD Instructions, and Other Efforts
Since the release of the Gansler report, DOD has undertaken a number of initiatives to develop
doctrine and policies for using contractors during contingency operations. For example, in
October 2008, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Publication 4-10
Operational Contract Support, which contains doctrine for contract support and contract
management during joint contingency operations. The publication applies to commanders of
combatant commands, joint task forces, the military services, and defense agencies in support of
joint operations.60 In March 2009, Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn issued a
Directive detailing who within DOD is responsible for the various aspects of contract
management and oversight, including responsibility for managing contracts, developing policy,
issuing guidance, and integrating contractors into contingency operations.61 In July 2009, DOD
issued an Instruction establishing policy and procedures for managing private security contractors
during contingency operations. And in July 2009, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense,
Under Secretary Ashton Carter established a task force on wartime contracting charged with
evaluating the Commission on Wartime Contracting interim report. The task force is to consist of
representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military services, Joint Staff, and
Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan.62 According to DOD, the task force will examine
the proper roll of contractors in contingency operations. The findings of the task force are
58 Counterinsurgency, pp. 2-4, 2-8.
59 Counterinsurgency, p. d-26.
60 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operational Contract Support, Joint Publication 4-10 , October 17, 2008, p. i.
61 Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III, Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program
Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Directive 3020.49, March 24, 2009.
62 Under Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter, Task Force on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Memorandum, July 26, 2009.
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expected to influence doctrine and policy, including the size of the contractor workforce in future
operations.
Officials stated that additional initiatives are still underway and will take time to complete and
implement.63 One official estimated that it could take three years to update policies and
regulations, integrate contractors into operational planning, and implement appropriate training.
Officials also acknowledged that DOD faces a number of challenges in its effort to incorporate
contracting into the culture of the military and into overall DOD planning and doctrine. One
official stated that DOD still needs to examine under what circumstances contractors should – and
should not – be used during contingency operations. For example, there may be circumstances
when activities such as security, contract management, interrogation, and military training should
not be contracted out. Another challenge is to institutionalize an appreciation for the role of
contractors, lest the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan be forgotten in the future.
Selected Congressional Hearings and Legislation
Congress has held a number of hearings and passed legislation relating to DOD contracting
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hearings have taken place in a number of different committees
and have covered a wide array of related issues, including private security contractors,
interrogators, logistic support, contract management and oversight, and training requirements.
Congress has also passed legislation annually in a number of these areas. Such legislation
generally occurs in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The following section
provides a highlight of key Congressional activity related to contingency contracting.
Private Security Contractors and Interrogators
Congress has focused more on private security contractors than other contracting issues, even
though such contractors comprise roughly 5-10% of DOD contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Interrogators have also been a focus of Congressional scrutiny. Hearings have been held in the
Senate Committee on Armed Services64, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs65, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee66, and the
House Committee on Armed Services.67 This issue was also raised in other hearings, such as the
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s hearing on the Commission on
Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward68 and the House Judiciary
63 Based on discussions with senior DOD officials on July 23, 2009 and July 27, 2009.
64 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody,
110th Cong., 1st sess., August 3, 2007.
65 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, An Uneasy Relationship: U.S.
Reliance on Private Security Firms in Overseas Operations, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., February 27, 2008.
66 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Private Security Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan, 110th Cong., 1st sess., October 2, 2007.
67 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Contingency Contracting: Implementing a Call for Urgent
Reform, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 9, 2008.
68 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess.,
June 9, 2009.
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Committee’s hearing on Enforcement of Federal Criminal Law to Protect Americans Working for
U.S. Contractors in Iraq.69
In the FY2008 NDAA, Congress required the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, to prescribe regulations and guidance relating to screening, equipping, and
managing private security personnel in areas of combat operations. These regulations were to
include tracking private security personnel (PSC), authorizing and accounting for weapons used
by PSCs, and reporting requirements whenever a security contractor discharges a weapon, kills or
injures another person, or is killed or injured.70 Included in the FY2009 NDAA is a “Sense of
Congress” that private security contractors should not perform inherently governmental functions,
such as security protection of resources, in high-threat operational environments.71 In the same
legislation, Congress mandated that interrogation is an inherently governmental function that
DOD may not outsource to contractors.72
Contract Management, Oversight, and Coordination
Management and oversight of contracting personnel in contingency operations has been of
significant interest to Congress. Hearings on these issues have been held in the Senate Committee
on Armed Services73 and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs.74 This issue was also raised by the House Committee on Armed Services’ hearing on
Coordinating Contract Support on the Battlefield: Defense, State, and U.S. AID75 and the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s hearing on Commission on Wartime
Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward.76
In the FY2008 NDAA, Congress mandated the creation of a memorandum of understanding
between the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development to promote coordinated contingency contracting
practices.77 Congress also established the Commission on Wartime Contracting to study wartime
contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, determine the extent to which the federal government relies
69 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security,
Enforcement of Federal Criminal Law to Protect Americans Working for U.S. Contractors in Iraq, 110th Cong., 1st
sess., December 19, 2007.
70 P.L. 110-181, sec 862.
71 P.L. 110-417, sec 832.
72 P.L. 110-417, sec 1057.
73 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, To
Receive Testimony on Department of Defense Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 2,
2008.
74 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal
Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security, Management and
Oversight of Contingency Contracting in Hostile Zones, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., January 24, 2008.
75 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Coordinating
Contract Support on the Battlefield: Defense, State, and U.S. AID, 111th Cong., 1st sess., April 1, 2009.
76 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess.,
June 9, 2009.
77 P.L. 110-181, sec 861.
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on contractors, and examine how U.S. objectives are achieved by this reliance on contractors.78 In
the FY2009 NDAA, Congress added additional requirements and reporting mechanisms for
alleged crimes committed by or against contractor personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan.79
Training Contractors and the Military in Contingency Contracting
Some testimony at various hearings emphasized that increased training is necessary for non-
acquisition personnel throughout the military.80 Concerned that DOD contractors and personnel
are not sufficiently trained to execute contingency contracting, Congress passed legislation
requiring DOD to implement training requirements for contingency contracting personnel (in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Defense Acquisition University), and to provide specific training to contract management
personnel.81 In the FY2008 NDAA, Congress called for contract management training for
personnel outside the acquisition workforce who are responsible for contractor oversight. The
FY2008 NDAA also mandated the incorporation of contractors in mission-readiness exercises
with uniformed personnel.82 In addition, Congress passed legislation establishing of a
government-wide Contingency Contracting Corps that will be available for deployment in
responding to an emergency or major disaster, or a contingency operation.83 Congress authorized
this Corps to receive specific training in contingency contracting.
78 P.L. 110-181, sec 841.
79 P.L. 110-417, sec 854.
80 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Contingency Contracting: Implementing a Call for Urgent
Reform, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 10, 2008; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim
Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 9, 2009; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed
Services, Contingency Contracting: Has the Call for Urgent Reform been Answered?, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March
25, 2009..
81 P.L. 109-193, sec 817 and P.L. 109-364, sec 854.
82 P.L. 110-181, sec 849
83 P.L. 110-417, sec. 870
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Appendix A. Trend Analysis by Type of Service
Provided in Iraq
Figure A-1. Trend Analysis of Contractor Support by Type of Service Provided in Iraq
100000
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000
Count 40000
30000
20000
10000
0
Q1 2008
Q2 2008
Q3 2008
Q4 2008
Q1 2009
Q2 2009
Quarters
Base Support
Construction
Other
Security
Translator/Interpreter
Transportation
Communication
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports
Author Contact Information
Moshe Schwartz
Specialist in Defense Acquisition
mschwartz@crs.loc.gov, 7-1463
Acknowledgments
This report was co-authored by Julia A. Tischuk, a summer intern with the Congressional Research
Service.
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