The Democratic Party of Japan: Its Foreign
Policy Position and Implications for U.S.
Interests
Weston S. Konishi
Analyst in Asian Affairs
August 12, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40758
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
The Democratic Party of Japan
Summary
According to polls, Japan’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), appears
in position to overtake the main ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), in
parliamentary elections on August 30, 2009. The right-leaning LDP has had almost continuous
control of the Japanese government since 1955 and has long supported the U.S.-Japan alliance in
the face of left-wing domestic opposition. The DPJ, which includes a mixture of right- and left-
leaning members, won control of the Upper House of Japan’s bicameral parliament (known as the
Diet) in 2007. A decisive victory over the LDP in the upcoming Lower House elections would
make the DPJ the ruling party of Japan for the first time in history.
The DPJ policy platform advocates sweeping economic and administrative reforms and has called
for a “proactive” foreign policy with greater “independence” from the United States through
deeper engagement with Asia and a more United Nations-oriented diplomacy. In particular, the
party has in the past criticized many issues related to the U.S.-Japan alliance, such as Japan’s
Host Nation Support (HNS) payments, the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and
plans to realign U.S. forward deployed forces based in Okinawa. In 2007, the DPJ briefly blocked
legislation allowing the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to continue the refueling of
U.S. and allied vessels engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.
However, as the Lower House elections draw near, the DPJ has shown signs that it is taking a
more pragmatic approach toward the U.S.-Japan alliance in order to deflect LDP criticism that it
is not prepared to run the country. The DPJ has dropped demands to end the current legislative
authorization for the JMSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, and has taken a more
ambiguous position regarding the SOFA and other bilateral alliance management issues. The
party’s call for a U.N. and Asia-oriented diplomacy also appears to fall short of a more strategic
shift to replace the U.S.-Japan alliance with an alternative regional security arrangement. Other
signs suggest that the party might indirectly support U.S. foreign policy interests over the long
term through enhanced Japanese contributions to U.N.-sanctioned activities, as well as
engagement in regional trade institutions and multilateral fora.
While a political changeover in Tokyo would represent a watershed moment for Japan and U.S.-
Japan relations, the extent to which there would be significant policy changes in Tokyo remains
uncertain. It is not clear whether some of the DPJ’s past criticism of the U.S.-Japan alliance and
other LDP-backed policies is the result of opposition party politicking or more fundamental
policy principles that will be implemented if the party comes to power. In the event that the DPJ
becomes the ruling party, it would likely face daunting political and economic challenges at home
that would potentially limit its ambitious reform agenda and more drastic proposals for adjusting
the structure of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The recent signs of a more pragmatic policy approach,
particularly toward the bilateral alliance, suggest that some party leaders are already modifying
their positions in light of emerging political realities.
This report analyzes the DPJ’s policy platform and reviews the implications for U.S. strategic and
economic interests in the event that the party takes control of the Japanese government after the
August 30 parliamentary elections.
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The Democratic Party of Japan
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Party Background ................................................................................................................. 2
The DPJ Policy Agenda......................................................................................................... 2
Implications for the United States................................................................................................ 4
The DPJ Position on the U.S.-Japan Alliance......................................................................... 4
Other Implications for U.S. Interests ..................................................................................... 6
Afghanistan .................................................................................................................... 6
Regional Diplomacy ....................................................................................................... 7
North Korea (DPRK) ...................................................................................................... 7
Climate Change .............................................................................................................. 8
Nuclear Issues.................................................................................................................8
Economic Policies........................................................................................................... 9
Post-Election Prospects ................................................................................................... 9
Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 11
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 12
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The Democratic Party of Japan
Introduction
Polls suggest that Japan’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), is likely
to defeat the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in August 30, 2009, elections for the Lower
House of parliament. Led by Yukio Hatoyama, the DPJ will become the main ruling party if it
wins either a majority of seats in the Lower House or wins a plurality of seats and is able to form
a government in coalition with smaller parties. A potential political changeover in Tokyo could
significantly affect U.S. interests and goals in Asia.1
In particular, the DPJ has long called for a more “independent” relationship with the United States
and has been critical of aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance, such as the level of Host Nation
Support (HNS) payments, some provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and some
plans to realign U.S. military forces based in Japan. The party also calls for closer relations with
Asia and greater participation in United Nations-mandated activities. If it comes to power, the
DPJ is nevertheless expected to focus initial attention on sweeping domestic reforms, particularly
reforming the political-bureaucratic structure, and on a large-scale stimulus package aimed at
transforming Japan’s struggling economy.
Aside from a 10-month period in the early 1990s, the conservative LDP has governed Japan since
1955 as either a stand-alone ruling party or, as is currently the case, in coalition with other parties.
Throughout this period, the LDP has been a staunch supporter of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in
the face of left-wing domestic opposition and, in recent years, has sought a major expansion of
bilateral defense cooperation. The LDP’s grip on power was significantly weakened in 2007,
when the left-leaning DPJ won control of the Upper House of Japan’s bicameral parliament
(known as the Diet). The resulting “twisted Diet” has been marked by legislative gridlock across
a range of domestic and foreign policies.
Over the past year, the DPJ has sought to increase its popular support by attacking the LDP’s
handling of the economy, opaque governing style, and unpopular leader, current Prime Minister
Taro Aso. This strategy appears to have been effective, and on July 12, 2009, the DPJ defeated the
LDP in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly elections, prompting Aso to dissolve the Lower House
on July 21 and schedule nationwide elections. Public support for the Aso Cabinet has fallen to
20% or below, while the DPJ now holds double-digit leads over the LDP, according to recent
polls.
Despite Aso’s lack of popularity, it is possible that the LDP could still pull off a victory in the
coming elections if it can successfully convince voters that the untested DPJ is not ready to take
on the responsibilities of running the country. Even if the DPJ falls short of winning the 241 seats
necessary for majority control of the Lower House, it is likely to gain a sizable number of new
seats and to wield considerable legislative influence through the Upper House, which the DPJ
controls in coalition with the leftist Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the anti-reform People’s
New Party (PNP). The DPJ is expected to retain the coalition with the SDP and PNP regardless of
the election outcome on August 30, although a weak result on election day would leave the DPJ
more dependent on its coalition partners to deliver votes in the Diet.
1 For an overview of U.S.-Japan relations, see CRS Report RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,
coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
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If the DPJ wins the Lower House elections and gains control of both houses of the Diet, the party
will be expected to make good on its campaign pledge to “change Japan.” In the run-up to the
August 30 election, however, revised DPJ policy proposals indicate that the party may
demonstrate more flexibility on issues relating to the U.S.-Japan alliance. These modifications to
the party platform are consistent with the views of some analysts who have argued that structural
factors in the Japanese political system would likely force the DPJ to modify some of its policy
positions in order to defeat the LDP and actually govern the country.
Party Background
The DPJ was formed in 1998 as a merger of four smaller parties and was later joined by a fifth
grouping. Most of the party leadership is comprised of former centrist or center-right LDP
lawmakers, but the rank and file has a left-of-center political orientation that includes a number of
former Socialist Party members. The amalgamated nature of the DPJ has led to considerable
internal contradictions, primarily between the party’s hawkish/conservative and pacifist/liberal
wings. In particular, the issues of deploying Japanese troops abroad and revising the war-
renouncing Article 9 of the Japanese constitution have generated considerable internal debate. As
a result, for much of its history, the DPJ had a reputation of failing to agree on coherent
alternatives to the policies implemented by the LDP. Additionally, battles between various party
leaders have at times weakened the party. Since winning the Upper House in 2007, the party has
appeared to present a more unified front, at least on the strategy of criticizing LDP policies and
offering a more compelling alternative approach to Japanese voters. But it is unclear whether this
greater level of public unity would last if the DPJ were to form an actual government.
Over the past year, the DPJ has shown greater resilience in overcoming both external political
challenges and internal strife. Earlier in the spring of 2009, Aso and the LDP appeared to get a
boost in public support after the government unveiled three economic stimulus packages and,
more importantly, from a fundraising scandal that engulfed Ichiro Ozawa, then the leader of the
DPJ. In early May, Ozawa resigned. He was succeeded as DPJ president by former party leader
Yukio Hatoyama, an Ozawa backer. Ozawa remains as a top DPJ leader and campaign strategist,
causing many to speculate that he will continue to wield considerable influence in the intra-party
decision-making process. Ozawa’s resignation was followed by a considerable popular boost for
the DPJ. By mid-July, many polls showed the DPJ having double-digit leads over the LDP when
voters were asked which party they would support in the Lower House elections.
The DPJ Policy Agenda
Ideological divisions within the DPJ have kept the party from reaching a consensus on foreign
policy and national security issues. However, the DPJ platform and other policy statements
throughout the years consistently raise the following main themes:2
• Adopting a more “assertive” foreign policy and enhancing Japan’s defense
capabilities to better defend against outside threats.
2 See, for instance, Democratic Party of Japan, Our Basic Philosophy, at http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/about_us/
philosophy.html.
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• Maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance as the center of Japan’s national security
policy while aiming to achieve a more “mature” alliance partnership with the
United States. The party has called for a reduction of the approximately 50,000
U.S. forward deployed troops in Japan, particularly those based in Okinawa
Prefecture.
• Maintaining constitutional restrictions on collective self-defense while expanding
contributions to international security through U.N.-sanctioned peacekeeping
operations (UNPKO).
• Improving Japan’s relations with Asian countries by reconciling historical and
territorial disputes, as well as actively promoting regional economic integration
through economic partnership agreements (EPA) and free trade agreements
(FTA).
• Supporting the global common good through overseas economic development,
environmental conservation, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,
humanitarian relief, and other measures.
In the broadest sense, the pacifist/liberal wing of the DPJ adheres to a strict interpretation of
Japan’s “peace constitution” and postwar role as a non-military power. The hawkish/conservative
wing of the party, most prominently led by former party head Seiji Maehara, seeks stronger
defense capabilities and looser restrictions on Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) missions to
support international security. Former party head Ichiro Ozawa has called for Japan to increase its
contributions to international security strictly in missions that are authorized by the U.N. Security
Council. Current party leader Yukio Hatoyama appears to support that basic position, although he
is said to take a more flexible view of JSDF deployments that are not under direct U.N. mandate.3
The DPJ embraces a reformist, left-of-center domestic agenda for Japan. The party’s “Basic
Policies” and campaign manifestos call for improving transparency, efficiency and accountability
in government. One main objective is to bolster the decision-making authority of Japan’s cabinet
over the powerful bureaucracy, thus reversing the established power dynamic in which many
policy decisions rest in the hands of the bureaucrats, not the politicians. The DPJ believes that a
“regime change” in Japan will reduce the influence of vested interests over policy makers and
lead to a more dynamic and decentralized nation that is better prepared to handle future
challenges.
Although the DPJ’s reform agenda appeals to many Japanese voters, the party is often criticized
for lacking details about how it will finance and implement its proposals. This is particularly true
of its plans to reform the domestic economy and social welfare system. The party wants to
transform Japan’s highly regulated, export-oriented economy into a deregulated economic system
propelled by consumer-led growth. As part of the DPJ’s two-year ¥21 trillion ($218 billion)
stimulus proposal, household disposable income would be increased through tax cuts and
payment transfers.4 Income support for struggling workers, as well as sweeping health-care and
pension reforms, are also proposed. The DPJ claims that it will offset the cost of these programs
3 The party’s mainstream members appear to support the provision that foreign JSDF missions should only be carried
out under U.N. mandate. However, hawkish elements of the party believe that such a provision would, in effect, give
U.N. Security Council members such as China and Russia veto power over JSDF overseas operations.
4 Democratic Party of Japan, “‘Economic and Financial Crisis Measures’: Opening up a Path Towards the Future by
‘Putting People’s Lives First,’” November 5, 2008, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/financial/f_crisis.html.
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by trimming the national budget and eliminating wasteful spending, but it has been criticized for
lacking details about how its programs will be paid for over the long run. With Japan’s public
sector debt approaching 200% of GDP this year, there are concerns about finding credible ways
of financing stimulus programs over the long term.
Implications for the United States
A possible political changeover in Tokyo following the August 30 elections would represent
something of a watershed moment for U.S.-Japan relations. Cooperation between Washington and
previous LDP-backed governments has been virtually unbroken for much of the postwar period.
Many experts believe that the high point of bilateral relations occurred earlier this decade, partly
as a result of the close personal rapport between former President George W. Bush and former
LDP Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, which set the tone for close working-level coordination
between their two governments. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Koizumi government
stated its unequivocal support for the United States and took unprecedented steps to provide rear-
area assistance for U.S.-led anti-terror operations in Afghanistan. In 2003, Koizumi dispatched
ground and air units of the JSDF to contribute to humanitarian reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
These measures were followed by major bilateral agreements in 2005 and 2006 to “transform” the
U.S.-Japan alliance in order to meet emerging security challenges.5 The DPJ has often expressed
skepticism, and at times outright opposition, to many of these bilateral security initiatives, giving
rise to questions among many U.S.-based experts as to the potential impact a DPJ government
might have on the U.S.-Japan alliance. These concerns are compounded by a relative lack of
familiarity between DPJ leaders and counterparts in
the United States, although interaction between both
DPJ Foreign Policy Goals
sides has increased in recent months.6 A review of
Develop proactive foreign policy strategies and
stated DPJ foreign policy positions indicates some
build a close and equal Japan-U.S. alliance.
areas of concern for U.S. interests, but does not rule
Establish intra-regional cooperative
out potential avenues for enhanced bilateral
mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region with the
aim of building an East Asian Community.
cooperation should the party come to power.
Ensure that North Korea halts development of
nuclear weapons and missiles, and makes every
effort to resolve the abduction issue.
The DPJ Position on the U.S.-Japan
Play a proactive role in UN peacekeeping
Alliance
operations, liberalization of trade and
investment, and the fight against global
The DPJ has often sent conflicting signals about its
warming.
approach toward the U.S.-Japan alliance—a result of
Take the lead to eradicate nuclear weapons,
intra-party ideological divisions and the ongoing
and remove the threat of terrorism.
struggle to differentiate itself from the LDP. The
Source: 2009 DPJ Manifesto
party’s acknowledgment of the bilateral alliance as
the center of Japanese national security policy is a
tacit endorsement of the U.S. alliance system. However, one outstanding question is what the DPJ
actually means by its demand for a more “independent” foreign policy and “equal” alliance
5 For more on the alliance transformation, see CRS Report RL33740, The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications
for U.S. Interests, by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Weston S. Konishi.
6 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met with Ichiro Ozawa and other DPJ leaders during her trip to Tokyo in
February 2009. This was followed by high-level meetings between U.S. officials and party leaders in subsequent
months.
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relationship with the United States. Although these statements do not advocate a strategic
disengagement from the United States, at the very least, they suggest apprehension toward
perceived inequities in the alliance structure. Some analysts interpret the DPJ’s call for greater
independence as a desire to avoid Japanese entanglement in the U.S. global strategy, especially in
activities that may involve financial or military contributions to U.S.-led operations.7 The party
sharply denounced former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi for supporting the U.S. invasion of
Iraq in 2003, in what it saw as Japanese cooperation with “unilateralist” U.S. policies.8 Still
another interpretation of independence, as offered by some DPJ officials, is a desire for Japan to
take greater initiative in international affairs, as opposed to merely reacting to policies emanating
from Washington. Nonetheless, past legislative actions and policy statements by the DPJ
demonstrate the party’s opposition to certain alliance management issues and U.S.-led military
operations. Specifically, the party has in the past:
• Opposed the February 2009 U.S.-Japan Guam accord that pledges to implement
the transfer of 8,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. In April 2009, the
DPJ-led Upper House voted against the accord (it was eventually passed by the
more powerful Lower House). The DPJ opposed the associated relocation of U.S.
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Nago, instead calling for the air station to
be moved “outside” of Okinawa.
• Defeated implementing legislation in the Upper House that temporarily
suspended, in November 2007, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)
deployment to the Indian Ocean to refuel coalition ships involved in Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.
• Promised a “drastic” review of Tokyo’s estimated $4 billion per year Host Nation
Support (HNS) for U.S. forces stationed in Japan.
• Proposed comprehensive revisions to the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) in order to make the alliance more “equal.”
DPJ leaders have also, at times, made remarks that cast doubt about their commitment to the
alliance. In February 2009, Ichiro Ozawa sparked controversy when he told reporters that Japan
should seek an “equal” alliance with the United States by reducing the U.S. force presence in
Japan to all but the U.S. 7th Fleet, based in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture. The remark was
widely interpreted as advocating the withdrawal of the thousands of other U.S. military personnel
based in Okinawa and other parts of Japan. Ozawa later modified his statement by suggesting that
U.S. forces in Japan should only be drawn down as the SDF shoulders greater responsibilities for
defending the homeland against outside threats.9
Despite these concerns, many of the DPJ’s objections to the bilateral alliance are seen as
opposition to LDP policies rather than anti-U.S. positions per se. As the party campaigns to
broaden its support base prior to the Lower House elections and deflect LDP accusations that it is
7 See Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani and Aki Mori, “Electing a New Japanese Security Policy?: Examining Foreign
Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan,” report prepared for Pacific Forum CSIS conference, March 27-
28, 2009. The authors further contend that “A DPJ government will maintain the [U.S.-Japan] alliance, but may revise
down the LDP goal of a global security partnership, limiting the scope of the alliance to Japan’s defense and regional
stability.”
8 Democratic Party of Japan. DPJ Present Position on the Iraqi Issue, February 14, 2003, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/
news/030224/02.html.
9 Sneider, Daniel, “Ozawa in his own words,” The Oriental Economist, June 2009.
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too “irresponsible” to lead the country, the DPJ appears to be taking a more pragmatic approach
toward the United States. In recent weeks, the party has tempered its message on several key
alliance issues. In mid-July, DPJ President Hatoyama announced that he would not seek to end
the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law that authorizes the MSDF refueling mission in the
Indian Ocean before the bill expires in January 2010. The DPJ had previously promised to
terminate the mission at the earliest opportunity.10 The party has also toned down its demands to
“drastically” revise the current SOFA and HNS agreements with the United States, instead
proposing a more ambiguous review of the bilateral agreements.
Other Implications for U.S. Interests
As a way of asserting greater independence in foreign policymaking, some elements in the DPJ
call for a U.N.-centered diplomacy and closer ties with Asia. Although this shift could ostensibly
reposition Japanese diplomacy away from the United States, it may not necessarily portend a
divergence from broader U.S. goals and interests over the long term. The DPJ, at least in rhetoric,
supports a more active international role for Japan through United Nations peacekeeping
operations (UNPKO) and other U.N.-sanctioned activities that are largely consonant with U.S.
foreign policy goals and interests.
The DPJ’s position on foreign deployments was put to test during the last Diet session (ending on
July 21), when the Aso Cabinet introduced two new bills that would allow Japanese Coast Guard
and MSDF vessels to take part in overseas anti-piracy and interdiction operations sanctioned by
the U.N. Security Council.11 Although the DPJ ultimately opposed both bills due to domestic
political considerations, the measures caused considerable debate between conservative and
liberal wings of the party. In the end, the party qualified its opposition to the bills by agreeing in
principle to the purpose and legitimacy of the U.N.-sanctioned operations.12 Some experts believe
that the DPJ would vote to approve similar measures in the future, should it become the
governing party.
Afghanistan
There has been considerable debate within the DPJ on enhancing Japan’s role in the stabilization
of Afghanistan. The party has publicly opposed Japan’s involvement in the U.S.-led Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF), since the U.N. Security Council has not explicitly sanctioned the
operation. However, Ichiro Ozawa and other party members have advocated dispatching SDF
troops for peace-building operations in Afghanistan as long as the mission operates under the
U.N.-mandated International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF). Ozawa’s resignation as party
10 In contrast to the 2007 DPJ Manifesto, which firmly states the party’s opposition to the Indian Ocean mission, the
2009 Manifesto makes no mention of the operation. There are lingering questions as to whether the DPJ would renew
the Indian Ocean refueling bill after it expires next year.
11 One bill, which was eventually passed in the Lower House, permits Japanese Coast Guard and MSDF vessels to
engage in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and other international waters. The other bill, which was not voted
on, was to approve Japan’s participation in enforcing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, calling for member states
to inspect the cargo of North Korean vessels suspected of shipping illicit weapons. Hawkish members of the DPJ,
including Akihisa Nagashima and Seiji Maehara, were early proponents of the bills, but were outnumbered by party
members who opposed the measures.
12 See, for instance, “Anti-piracy legislation rejected by Upper House,” June 19, 2009 at http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/
news/index.html?num=16326.
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president this spring appears to have set back momentum for the proposal within the party. The
DPJ’s 2009 “Policy Index” (a detailed blueprint for the party’s campaign manifesto) drops any
direct mention of Afghanistan, instead promising that Japan will play an active role in
reconstructing impoverished states that are breeding grounds for terrorist activities. There are
signs, however, that the party leadership is considering alternative proposals for on-the-ground
assistance in Afghanistan, such as vocational training programs and other non-combat
reconstruction efforts.
Regional Diplomacy
Interest in increasing Japan’s participation in Asian regional institutions and other initiatives to
enhance regional cooperation is another indication of the DPJ’s desire for a more independent
relationship from the United States. The party’s call for Japan to become a full “member of Asia”
suggests a departure from what the DPJ has characterized as the LDP’s over-emphasis on
relations with the United States, but appears to fall short of a more strategic shift to replace the
U.S.-Japan alliance with an alternative regional security arrangement. Instead, the party views
Japan’s role in helping to create an “East Asian Community” as an opportunity to assert
leadership outside the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance.13 DPJ leaders have emphasized that
regional institutions also provide a multilateral framework for engaging China and managing its
rising influence on the world stage. It should be acknowledged that even under LDP rule, Japan
has long been an active participant in all of the major regional fora, such as the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the East Asia Summit.
Exactly how the DPJ intends to alter the character of Japan’s participation in these regional
meetings is not clear.
Despite the DPJ’s stated interest in greater policy independence from the United States, its
emphasis on enhanced regional relations largely complements U.S. policies for maintaining peace
and stability in East Asia. In particular, the party proposes stronger ties with China and South
Korea through deeper economic integration and enhanced diplomatic engagement. It advocates
“constructive dialogue” to resolve contentious territorial disputes with the two mainland
countries.14 The DPJ also believes it can restore trust with its neighbors by admitting to Japanese
aggression during World War II. Party leaders vow to end the practice of official visits to
Yasukuni Shrine, where 14 Class A war criminals from the World War II era are honored. Past
visits to the shrine by LDP prime ministers have triggered sharp reactions from Beijing and Seoul
that have raised concerns in Washington about tension in the region.
North Korea (DPRK)
As the main opposition party, the DPJ has criticized most of the ruling coalition’s policies, but it
has been reluctant to criticize the LDP’s hard-line approach toward North Korea due to public
outrage at Pyongyang. North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and early
1980s and repeated acts of nuclear brinkmanship have become politically charged issues in
Japan—at times restricting Tokyo’s options for negotiating with North Korea. The DPJ, in turn,
has strongly condemned recent North Korean nuclear tests and missile launches, and supports
13 It is uncertain whether the party, as a whole, envisions U.S. inclusion in a potential East Asian Community.
14 Japan has ongoing disputes with South Korea on sovereignty over the Takeshima islands (known as Dokdo islands in
Korean), and with China on the Senkaku islands (or Diaoyutai islands in Chinese) and areas in the East China Sea.
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Japan’s cooperation with the United States and other nations in the Six-Party Talks aimed at
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Following North Korea’s May 2009 nuclear test, the DPJ
issued a statement in support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, which authorizes strict
new sanctions against the regime.15 In June, DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama told reporters that he
supported the possible reinstatement of North Korea to the U.S. State Department’s list of state
sponsors of terrorism as punishment for Pyongyang’s recent provocations. North Korea was
removed from the list in October 2008, after agreeing at the time to allow inspections of its
nuclear facilities and take other actions toward denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.
Climate Change
The DPJ’s relatively progressive policy agenda in other areas also parallels some of the Obama
Administration’s global initiatives. One such area is the effort to prevent global warming, one of
the party’s core agenda items. The 2009 party Manifesto calls on Japan to take a leadership role in
environmental diplomacy and to encourage the United States and other “major emitter nations” to
concede to new emissions standards under a post-Kyoto protocol framework. Among other
measures called for in the Manifesto, the party proposes to reduce Japan’s greenhouse gas
emissions to 25% below 1990 levels by 2020, and to introduce a U.S.-style cap-and-trade system
for domestic industrial polluters. As with previous LDP governments, a DPJ-led government
would likely welcome the Obama Administration’s expected support for more ambitious
international action on climate change in preparation for the U.N. climate change conference in
Copenhagen this December.
Nuclear Issues
The DPJ and the Obama Administration share overlapping core principles on nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation, although with important differences. The party has made
clear its staunch support for Japan’s long-held Three Non-Nuclear Principles: not to possess,
produce, or transit nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. President Obama’s April 2009 speech
in Prague on a “nuclear-free world” was seen by the DPJ as a rallying call for Japan to take a
leading role in strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).16 The DPJ’s rigid
adherence to nuclear disarmament principles, however, differs from U.S. policies that allow for
some flexibility, such as the 2005 atomic energy agreement between India and the United States.17
Further, several party leaders, including Katsuya Okada and Yoshio Hachiro, advocate a “nuclear-
free zone” in Northeast Asia that to some extent contradicts Japan’s reliance on the U.S. extended
nuclear deterrent.18 The recent disclosure of a secret agreement between Tokyo and Washington
allowing U.S. nuclear-armed vessels into Japanese ports, in violation of Japan’s Three Non-
Nuclear Principles, has focused media attention on the DPJ’s response to the issue as it
maneuvers to take control of the government.19 It remains to be seen whether some members of
15 Democratic Party of Japan, “Statement on approval of new UN Security Council resolution against North Korea,”
June 13, 2009 at http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/index.html?num=16239.
16 See the 2009 DPJ Policy Index (in Japanese) at http://www.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/seisaku2009/index.html.
17 The DPJ Policy Index asserts that the U.S.-India nuclear agreement sends “the wrong message” to states, such as Iran
and North Korea, that pursue nuclear programs outside the conventions of the NPT.
18 Hachiro has been named as the “shadow foreign minister” in a hypothetical DPJ cabinet lineup, although the actual
cabinet ministers may change if the party comes to power.
19 See “DPJ gov’t an opportunity for Japan to step out from U.S. skirts,” The Mainichi Daily News, July 25, 2009.
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the DPJ will modify their position on nuclear arms to accommodate the U.S. nuclear umbrella in
light of the North Korean nuclear program and other regional security threats.
Economic Policies
The DPJ’s economic policy offers possibilities for cooperation as well as potential conflict with
U.S. interests. The party’s ¥21 trillion ($218 billion) stimulus plan and emphasis on a consumer-
oriented economy parallel the Obama Administration’s effort to encourage foreign governments
to support recovery from the global financial crisis through expanded public spending and
policies that encourage domestic consumption. In that vein, it is possible that the DPJ’s plan to
shift Japan away from an export-driven economy by supporting household demand might boost
imports of U.S. goods and services—especially if it is accompanied by the deregulation that the
DPJ has, at times, suggested it would pursue.
As a whole, the DPJ embraces a free-trade agenda, although the party is increasingly cognizant of
protecting domestic agriculture and labor interests. The party has previously called for Japan to
pursue bilateral economic partnership agreements (EPA) and free trade agreements (FTA), as well
as promote global trade and investment through the successful conclusion of World Trade
Organization (WTO) Doha Round negotiations. In what was widely considered a cooperative
gesture toward the United States, the 2009 party Manifesto calls for the creation of a U.S.-Japan
Free Trade Agreement.20 It is not clear, however, that the DPJ would be prepared to consider the
kinds of liberalization in sensitive agricultural sectors that would likely be required to negotiate
an FTA with the United States.
Indeed, several aspects of the DPJ economic policy agenda indicate potentially troubling signs for
U.S. commercial interests. As the party has expanded its voter support base from urban to rural
districts, agriculture policies that protect domestic farming interests have become an increasingly
prominent feature of the party platform. Tokyo’s long-held protection of the agriculture sector is
widely acknowledged as a major impediment to Japan’s ability to play a more constructive role in
multilateral trade negotiations, including the ongoing WTO Doha Round. Of particular concern to
U.S. food exporters is the DPJ’s call for severe restrictions on U.S. beef imports in response to
Japan’s BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, otherwise known as “mad cow disease”)
scare. In the past, the party has called for a complete ban on U.S. beef imports as well as strict
inspection laws that may continue to restrict future U.S. beef sales in Japan.
Post-Election Prospects
The implications of a DPJ victory in the Lower House elections are wide-ranging and significant.
At the very least, political turnover in Tokyo would break the half-century of near continuous
LDP rule of Japan. But the party’s ability to implement its campaign promise of “regime change”
and other reforms would likely face several challenges. Many experts believe that the structural
realities of the Japanese political system would force the DPJ to compromise on many of its
boldest proposals. Even if the party wins a majority of seats in the Lower House elections, for
instance, it would continue to depend on a coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and
20 See the DPJ’s 2009 party Manifesto at http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto.html. In response to
criticism from domestic agriculture interests, the party revised the Manifesto to tone down the promise of concluding a
FTA with the United States, instead suggesting that it will pursue talks on a bilateral trade agreement with Washington.
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the People’s New Party (PNP) to control the Upper House of the Diet. The leftist SDP and the
anti-reform PNP would continue to exert influence on DPJ decision-making—further stretching
the already fragmented party in opposite ideological directions. Without a landslide victory that
gives the DPJ well over the 241 seats needed for a majority in the Lower House, the party may
not enjoy a large enough mandate from the Japanese electorate to implement its reform proposals
as currently envisioned.
Should the DPJ become the ruling party of Japan, at least three developments would be of key
importance for U.S. policy makers to monitor in the months ahead. First among these is the
selection of party members for cabinet positions, particularly the ministers of defense and foreign
affairs, following the Lower House elections. The cabinet lineup would provide some indication
of the policy direction that the new government might adopt. A strong showing in the August 30
elections would likely provide greater latitude for the prime minister to appoint more
conservative members to the cabinet; a weaker showing would possibly increase the chances of a
more liberal cabinet lineup, in deference to the coalition partnership with the SDP. The cabinet’s
ideological orientation would likely have some impact on the new government’s diplomatic
approach, with a more conservative government seen as relatively more willing to cooperate on
the bilateral alliance with the United States, as well as international trade and security issues.
A second important trend is party cohesion over the mid to long term. It is widely believed that
the otherwise deeply divided DPJ is united by a common objection to the LDP and its policies. If
the DPJ defeats the LDP in the Lower House elections, then its opposition to the ruling coalition
would become less of a unifying factor. The DPJ leadership may be challenged to maintain party
cohesion beyond the Lower House elections and through future legislative battles in the Diet. A
great deal may depend on whether Yukio Hatoyama (the presumed next prime minister of Japan
in the event of a DPJ victory) would be able to command loyalty among the party’s ideologically
diverse rank and file, while also managing a disjointed coalition with the SDP and PNP. A weaker
than expected election result on August 30 could splinter the DPJ, as members potentially break
away to form new parties or realign in a potential “Grand Coalition” with the LDP.
The third and perhaps most important trend to monitor should the DPJ come to power is the
party’s ability to implement policy in a consistent and coherent way. The party’s policy toward
the U.S.-Japan alliance is a primary concern to U.S. officials, particularly given its past rhetoric
on bilateral alliance issues. Recent modifications to the party’s position on alliance-related policy
issues suggest that it is adopting a more realistic approach to security matters as it prepares for the
possibility of running the country. Analysts also believe that a DPJ-led government would focus
initial attention on economic and administrative reforms rather than foreign and defense policy
issues.21 U.S. officials are nevertheless likely to closely monitor DPJ policies regarding the
following key alliance issues:
• Host Nation Support (HNS) and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
• Base realignment plans, including the relocation of Futenma and the
implementation of the Guam accord.
• Renewal of the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law permitting MSDF refueling
missions in the Indian Ocean after the law expires in January 2010.
21 Watanabe, Tsuneo, “A Watershed Election and Its Policy Implications,” The Tokyo Foundation, July 24, 2009.
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The DPJ’s handling of the Japanese economy, still one of the world’s largest, would also be a
major concern to U.S. policy makers, as with Japanese voters. Japan is in the midst of its worst
recession since the end of the Second World War, and its GDP is expected to shrink by 6.9% this
year.22 Should it come to power, the DPJ’s ¥21 trillion stimulus package would be put to the test,
including the promise to raise household disposable income and shift the economy to rely more
on domestic consumption—all while setting out a medium- and long-term strategy to slow the
growth of Japan’s burgeoning public-sector debt. Combined with the costs associated with
Japan’s aging society, public-sector debt would present additional challenges to the Japanese
system if left unchecked. Japan’s trade policy may also be a concern if a DPJ government
implements its recent proposals to explore new free trade agreements with the United States and
other countries, or whether it reverts to protectionist policies that shield certain domestic sectors
from foreign competition.
Finally, a significant benchmark for a potential DPJ government would be its ability to carry out
major administrative reforms, including its plan to overhaul the political-bureaucratic power
structure in Japan. Although it is widely agreed that this structure needs to be replaced by a more
effective system, the DPJ would need to carry out administrative reforms in a way that does not
ultimately damage Japan’s governing institutions. Indeed, even if a dramatic transformation of the
government is achieved, the DPJ will still require cooperation from the bureaucracy to implement
policies. Striking the right balance between reform and restraint would be an important test of a
potential new government’s ability to manage Japan for the first time in history.
Conclusion
A DPJ victory in the coming Lower House elections is by no means a foregone conclusion. The
ruling LDP is still a formidable political force, and Japanese voters—who are conservative by
nature—may ultimately decide that the untested DPJ is not ready to oversee Japan’s national
security and fragile economy. Yet polling data and recent local election results suggest that the
DPJ stands a strong chance of gaining power in the Diet, and possibly becoming the main ruling
party after August 30. A political changeover in Japan would, at the very least, require the United
States to cooperate with a new and largely unfamiliar government in Tokyo. Several upcoming
high-level events, such as the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly in September and a
planned U.S.-Japan bilateral summit in Tokyo this November, may present President Obama with
opportunities to interact with a potentially new Japanese counterpart in the coming months. It
remains to be seen whether the two leaders, should they meet, would see eye-to-eye on
strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and enhancing bilateral cooperation in other areas to
confront evolving global challenges.
22 Economist Intelligence Unit, Japan Country Report, July 2009.
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Author Contact Information
Weston S. Konishi
Analyst in Asian Affairs
wkonishi@crs.loc.gov, 7-7525
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