Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP)
Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
August 3, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22707
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles
Summary
In late 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD) launched a major procurement initiative to
replace most uparmored High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) in Iraq with Mine-
Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles by FY2009. MRAPs have been described as
providing significantly more protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) than
uparmored HMMWVs. DOD’s decision to acquire a new, smaller MRAP variant, the M-ATV, for
use in Afghanistan; the disposition of MRAPs no longer needed in Iraq; and MRAP mechanical,
logistical, and readiness concerns could be potential policy issues for congressional consideration.
This report will be updated.
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Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles
Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
DOD’s MRAP Requirement .................................................................................................. 1
MRAP Survivability.............................................................................................................. 1
MRAPs Deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan ............................................................................ 1
Disposition of MRAPs in Iraq ............................................................................................... 2
Growing Need for MRAPs in Afghanistan............................................................................. 2
A New MRAP Version for Afghanistan ....................................................................................... 2
Significant Increase in M-ATV Requirement ......................................................................... 3
Marines May Not Want All of the M-ATVs Allocated to Them .............................................. 3
Status of M-ATV Effort......................................................................................................... 3
MRAP Funding..................................................................................................................... 4
Prior Year MRAP Funding .............................................................................................. 4
FY2010 MRAP Budget Request...................................................................................... 4
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Markup of the FY2010 National
Defense Authorization Act ........................................................................................... 4
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Markup of the FY2010 National
Defense Authorization Act ........................................................................................... 5
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Markup of the FY2010 Defense
Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326) ................................................................................... 5
Potential Issues for Congress....................................................................................................... 5
MRAP Disposition................................................................................................................ 5
M-ATV Program ................................................................................................................... 5
The Marines and the M-ATV................................................................................................. 6
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 6
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Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles
Background
MRAPs are a family of vehicles produced by a variety of domestic and international companies
that generally incorporate a “V”-shaped hull and armor plating designed to provide protection
against mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). DOD originally intended to procure
three types of MRAPs.1 These included Category I vehicles, capable of carrying up to 7 personnel
and intended for urban operations; Category II vehicles, capable of carrying up to 11 personnel
and intended for a variety of missions such as supporting security, convoy escort, troop or cargo
transport, medical, explosive ordnance disposal, or combat engineer operations; and Category III
vehicles, intended to be used primarily to clear mines and IEDs, which are capable of carrying up
to 13 personnel. The Army and Marines first employed MRAPs in limited numbers in Iraq and
Afghanistan in 2003, primarily for route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
operations. These route clearance MRAPs quickly gained a reputation for providing superior
protection for their crews, and some suggested that MRAPs might be a better alternative for
transporting troops in combat than uparmored HMMWVs.
DOD’s MRAP Requirement2
In 2008, DOD approved the following MRAP acquisitions quantities by service and for other
uses: Army, 12,000; Marine Corps, 2,225; Navy, 544; Air Force, 558; U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM), 378; and ballistic testing, 133, for a total of 15,858 vehicles of all
categories.
MRAP Survivability3
DOD officials have stated that the casualty rate for MRAPs is 6%, making it “the most survivable
vehicle we have in our arsenal by a multitude.” By comparison, the M-1 Abrams main battle tank
was said to have a casualty rate of 15%, and the uparmored HMMWV, a 22% casualty rate.
MRAPs Deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan4
As of July 9, 2009, 3,200 MRAPs had reportedly been shipped to Afghanistan, with more than
15,000 MRAPs having been shipped to both Iraq and Afghanistan. About half of Afghanistan’s
MRAPs have been shipped by air and the other half by sealift.
1 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report, Subject: Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicles, July 15, 2008.
2 Ibid.
3 Information in this section is taken from DOD Press Transcripts, “DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell,” May 15,
2008.
4 Donna Miles, “More Mine-Resistant Vehicles Flow to Afghanistan,” American Forces Press Services, July 9, 2009.
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Disposition of MRAPs in Iraq5
As U.S. forces begin drawing down in Iraq, the Army and Marines plan to put the majority of
MRAPs into prepositioned stocks at various overseas locations, ship a number back to the United
States for training, and place a number into logistics and route clearance units. Out of the Army’s
eventual 12,000 Iraq-based MRAPs, the Army plans to use only 2,675 in operational units. The
Army plans on allocating 702 MRAPs for training in addition to the 50 MRAPs already
designated for training drivers. Another 1,400 MRAPs will be incorporated into route clearance
units and some MRAPs will likely be given to or sold to Iraqi forces. The rest (possibly as many
as 7,000) will be placed in world-wide prepositioned stocks. The Marines plan to keep only about
800 of their 2,225 MRAPs with operating forces, with the rest being sent to prepositioned stocks.
Growing Need for MRAPs in Afghanistan6
The Pentagon’s Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) reports that
roadside bomb casualties in Afghanistan in March 2009 increased almost fivefold since 2007. In
March 2007 there were 163 IED incidents in Afghanistan, including devices that were found and
disarmed, that resulted in eight successful attacks that resulted in 16 U.S. and coalition casualties.
In March 2009, there were 361 incidents, resulting in 27 effective attacks that killed 19 troops and
wounded 56. Pentagon officials note that insurgents are building larger IEDs and are finding
better ways to conceal them.
A New MRAP Version for Afghanistan
In the summer of 2008, DOD began to examine the possibility of developing and procuring a
lighter-weight, all-terrain capable MRAP variant to address the poor roads and extreme terrain of
Afghanistan. This new vehicle—designated the MRAP-All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV)—is
intended to weigh between 7 to 10 tons (as opposed to the 14 to 24 tons of the current MRAP
variants) and have better off-road mobility.7 In early December 2008, a Request for Proposal
(RFP) was issued with DOD officials suggesting that as many as 10,000 M-ATVs could be
procured, but a more likely estimate was 2,080 vehicles.8 This requirement for M-ATVs is in
addition to the original 15,858 MRAPs approved by DOD in 2008. The Pentagon planned to
award up to five contracts for test vehicles in the spring of 2009 and a final production contract to
a single firm in May 2009, although DOD did not rule out awarding a final contract to more than
one firm.9 DOD stated that it wished to make a final award to a single firm to avoid the logistical
problems encountered in the MRAP program where MRAPs came from a variety of firms.10 DOD
5 Information in this section is taken from Emelie Rutherford, “Some Mine-Resistant Vehicles in Iraq Destined for
Prepositioned Stocks, CONUS Training,” Defense Daily, March 17, 2009 and Marjorie Censer, “Army to Move
MRAPs Into Training, Route Clearance, Logistics Units,” InsideDefense.com, March 23, 2009.
6 Information in this section is taken from Kris Osborn, “Bomb Attacks Worsen in Afghanistan,” Defense News, May 4,
2009.
7 Kris Osborn, “DOD Doubles Potential Buy of Lighter MRAPs,” Defense News, November 17, 2008.
8 Emelie Rutherford, “Pentagon Eyeing $1.5 Billion Request to Hill for New All-Terrain MRAP Effort,” Defense
Daily, December 3, 2008.
9 Ibid.
10 Rebekah Gordon, “Brogan: Step-Ladder Pricing, Cumulative Volume Pricing in M-ATV Contract,”
InsideDefense.com, February 5, 2009.
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also hoped to do a better job of pricing M-ATVs, as the Pentagon Inspector General determined
that DOD had likely overpaid $45.7 million on some 2,900 MRAPs because they failed to
properly determine if contract prices were “fair and reasonable” for the first nine MRAP contracts
awarded.11 The total cost for the M-ATV program is estimated by some to be approximately $3
billion.12
Significant Increase in M-ATV Requirement13
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has reportedly agreed to increase the M-ATV
program requirement to 5,244 as of June 3, 2009. Under this new requirement, the Army would
receive 2,598 M-ATVs; 1,565 would go to the Marines; 643 to U.S. Special Operations
Command; 280 to the Air Force; 65 to the Navy; and 93 dedicated to testing. The increase in M-
ATVs was attributed to further refinement of the original “Operational Needs Statement” and a
request from U.S. Central Command. Some suggest that, based on this new requirement, it might
not be practical for DOD to award the M-ATV contract to a single firm. The JROC was also
reportedly concerned that manufactures might not be able to meet the new M-ATV demand and
that the program might not be logistically supportable.
Marines May Not Want All of the M-ATVs Allocated to Them14
Marine Corps leadership has indicated that they are not willing to wait for M-ATVs and have
instead taken measures to retro-fit Category I and II MRAPs that they already have with a new
suspension system at a fraction of the cost of newer M-ATVs. The Marines are apparently
satisfied with the performance of these retro-fitted MRAPs and are considering procuring fewer
M-ATVs as a result. The Marines have said that “we’re going to get it [retrofitted MRAPs] there
faster than waiting for the development of the MRAP series designated for Afghan use [M-ATVs]
and we’re going to do it at a fraction of the price.”15 Because of the Marines’ recent statements
regarding their acquisition of M-ATVs, the recent JROC allocation of 1,565 M-ATVs might not
accurately represent actual Marine Corps needs.
Status of M-ATV Effort
In January 2009, Navistar, a Force Protection and Michigan-based General Dynamics Land
Systems (GDLS) team, Oskkosh, General Dynamics Land Systems- Canada (GDLS-C), and BAE
Systems were said to have submitted written bids and armor samples.16 In late February 2009,
prototypes were delivered to Aberdeen Proving Grounds for evaluation with a contract award
11 Ibid.
12 Emelie Rutherford, “Pentagon Eyeing $1.5 Billion Request to Hill for New All-Terrain MRAP Effort,” Defense
Daily, December 3, 2008.
13 Information in this section is from Marjorie Censer, “JROC Dramatically Increases the M-ATV Program
Requirement to 5,244 Trucks,” InsideDefense.com, June 4, 2009.
14 Emelie Rutherford, “Conway: Marine Corps May Buy Limited Number of M-ATVs,” Defense Daily, June 3, 2009
and Bettina H. Chavanne, “U.S. Marine Corps Reconsiders JLTV,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, April 30, 2009.
15 Michael Bruno, “U.S. Marine Commandant Promises Osprey, MRAP Developments,” Aerospace Daily & Defense
Report, June 12, 2009.
16 Rebekah Gordon.
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scheduled for June 2009. On March 30, 2009, Navistar reportedly filed a protest citing an
“unspecified technicality in the government’s evaluation of its proposal” and GDLS-C announced
that they were dropping out of the M-ATV competition.17 Navistar withdrew its protest in early
April after the contract was amended by program officials and the award of a single production
contract is still expected in June 2009.18 On June 30, 2009, the U.S. Army Tank and Automotive
Command awarded Oshkosh a $1.1 billion contract for 2,444 M-ATVs, and it is expected that
Oshkosh would receive another contract by the end of July to build all 5,244 M-ATVs over the
next nine months.19
MRAP Funding
Prior Year MRAP Funding20
Prior year MRAP funding, including wartime supplementals and reprogramming, in billions:
• FY2006 and prior: $0.173
• FY2007: $5.411
• FY2008: $16.838
• FY2009: $4.393
• TOTAL: $26.815
FY2010 MRAP Budget Request21
The Pentagon requested $5.456 billion in its Other Contingency Operations (OCO) FY2010
Budget request for 1,080 M-ATVs. There was no request for MRAP funds in the FY2010 Base
Budget.
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Markup of the FY2010 National
Defense Authorization Act22
The HASC recommended fully funding the President’s Budget Request for MRAPs. The
committee also encourages the Secretary of Defense to use funds provided to address critical
MRAP pre-deployment training shortfalls and to also fully fund the M-ATV program.
17 Marjorie Censer, “Navistar Files Protest in MRAP ATV Competition; GDLS-C Out,” InsideDefense.com, April 2,
2009.
18 Marjorie Censer, “Navistar Withdraws M-ATV Protest After Corrective Action Taken in RFP,” InsideDefense.com,
April 9, 2009.
19 Emelie Rutherford, “Brogan: Oshkosh Likely to Build All 5,244 M-ATVs Without Help,” Defense daily, July 2,
2009.
20 Department of Defense FY2008 Budget Amendment for Global War on Terror (GWOT) Request Budget
Justification, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles, July 31, 2007 and United States Department of
Defense Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification, May 2009.
21 United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification, May 2009.
22 HASC Summary, FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647), June 17, 2009.
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Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Markup of the FY2010 National
Defense Authorization Act23
The SASC recommended providing $6.7 billion for the MRAP Vehicle Fund, including an
increase of $1.2 billion over the President’s Budget request for M-ATVs.
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Markup of the FY2010
Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326)24
The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense recommended $3.6 billion for MRAP
procurement, $1.9 billion below the request because additional funding was provided in the 2009
Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 2346).
Potential Issues for Congress
MRAP Disposition
Recent testimony by Army and Marine Corps leadership suggests that almost 8,000 of the almost
16,000 MRAPs are destined for an inactive status in the prepositioned stocks of those Services.
As MRAP fielding began in 2007, many of these vehicles destined for prepositioning are likely
less than two years old, and it can be argued that this is an inadequate return on investment. On
April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates announced that he intended to significantly restructure
the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) program.25 As part of his justification to restructure
FCS, Secretary Gates was concerned that the FCS program did not include a role for MRAPs and
implied that there needed to be a greater role for MRAPs in the Army’s vehicle modernization
plan. It is not known if current Army and Marine Corps plans to inactivate upwards of 8,000
MRAPs constitutes the role that Secretary of Defense Gates envisions for these vehicles, but it
might prove beneficial to clarify both DOD’s and the Service’s positions on this potential point of
contention. With the recent FCS program restructuring, the Army will be required to develop a
Vehicle Modernization Plan, and the Army plans to replace the FCS Program with what it calls
the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization Plan. Both plans can be expected to address
MRAP and M-ATV allocation to Army forces.
M-ATV Program
DOD leadership has suggested that they have learned a number of lessons from the MRAP
program that will play a role in how they structure and execute the M-ATV program.26 These
23 SASC Press Release, “ Senate Armed Services Committee Completes Markup of National Defense Authorization
Bill for Fiscal Year 2010,” June 26, 2009.
24 Press Release, Rep. John P. Murtha, “Murtha Unveils FY10 Defense Appropriations Bill,” July 16, 2009.
25 Information in this section is taken from a transcript of Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates Budget Press Briefing,
Arlington, VA April 6, 2009. For detailed information on the Future Combat System see CRS Report RL32888, The
Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
26 Kris Osborn, “MRAP Breakthrough,” Defense News, October 6, 2008 and “Implementing Lessons from MRAP,”
Defense Update, March 2009.
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lessons include contractual, order quantity, and pricing lessons as well as safety lessons—
including design features to address frequent MRAP rollovers. Other issues from the original
MRAP program include problems with a lack of repair parts in theater and vehicle readiness and
availability. As congressional committees examine the M-ATV program, it might prove useful to
have M-ATV program management address how the M-ATV program will address these and
other lessons learned from the MRAP program and how any associated corrective actions will
result in a better, more cost-efficient, safer, and operationally superior product.
The Marines and the M-ATV
The Marines appear to be aggressively pursuing the retrofitting of Category I and II MRAPs with
an enhanced suspension system in lieu of a large scale M-ATV acquisition. The Marines claim
that this is also a more cost-effective approach (supposedly $160,000 per vehicle27) to the
operational need for lighter and more maneuverable MRAPs for Afghanistan. The Marines’
approach raises a number of questions for possible consideration. What are the alleged cost
savings associated with the Marines’ retrofitting effort? Given retrofitting, do the Marines require
the JROC-mandated 1,565 M-ATVs, or do the Marines actually require fewer vehicles? Have the
other Services—particularly the Army—considered the Marine approach to retrofitting Class I
and II MRAPs? If the other Services have examined the Marines’ approach and rejected it, what
was their operational rationale for doing so?
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
27 Scott Calvert, “Aberdeen Tests Military’s Cougar,” Baltimore Sun, July 12, 2009.
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