Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in
North Uganda
Ted Dagne
Specialist in African Affairs
July 31, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33701
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Summary
In February 2006, Ugandans voted in the first multi-party elections in almost 26 years. President
Yoweri Museveni and his ruling National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) parliamentary
candidates won a decisive victory over opposition candidate Kizza Besigye and the Forum for
Democracy Coalition. Nevertheless, poll results showed a notable decline in support for President
Museveni from previous elections. International election observers did not condemn the election
results, nor did they fully endorse the electoral process. Critics charged the government with
intimidating the opposition during the pre-election period, and Besigye spent much of the
campaign period in jail. The election followed a controversial move by the Ugandan parliament
in July 2005 to remove the constitutional two-term limit on the presidency.
In the north, the government of Uganda has long fought the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an
armed rebel group backed by the government of Sudan. Through over 20 years of civil war, the
brutal insurgency has created a humanitarian crisis that has displaced over 1.5 million and
resulted in the abduction of over 20,000 children. In 2006-07, the government of Uganda and the
LRA have been actively engaged in an effort to resolve the conflict peacefully. The Government
of Southern Sudan (GOSS) has been mediating the talks since June 2006. In August 2006, the
government of Uganda and the LRA signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. In February
2008, the parties agreed on a Permanent Ceasefire, amended the Agreement on Accountability
and Reconciliation, and Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions. However, the leader of the
LRA, Joseph Kony, failed to show up for the final signing of the agreement on a number of
occasions. Kony and his forces are in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The cessation of hostilities has allowed an estimated 400,000 displaced people to return to their
homes. In June 2007, the parties signed an agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation. In
late October, a LRA delegation went to Kampala for the first time and held talks with senior
Ugandan officials. In October, Vincent Otti, the Deputy Commander of the LRA, reportedly was
killed in Uganda by Joseph Kony, the head of the LRA. Over the past several months, a number
of senior LRA commanders have surrendered to authorities in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) and Uganda.
In late October 2007, President Museveni visited Washington, D.C. and met with President Bush
and other senior administration officials. President Museveni also met with several Members of
Congress. During his visit, President Museveni discussed a wide range of issues, including U.S.-
Uganda relations, the crises in Somalia and Darfur, trade, and HIV/AIDS. Uganda deployed an
estimated 1,800 peacekeeping troops to Somalia, shortly after Ethiopian forces invaded
Mogadishu and installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Ugandan forces have not
been a major target of the insurgents in Mogadishu, although a number of Ugandan peacekeepers
have been killed over the past several months.
Congressional Research Service
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Uganda: Political Profile ............................................................................................................. 1
The 2001 Presidential Elections ............................................................................................ 2
The Third-Term Debate and Adoption of a Multi-Party System ............................................. 2
The 2006 Multi-Party Elections............................................................................................. 3
The Situation in Northern Uganda ...............................................................................................3
Regional Implications ................................................................................................................. 5
Attempts to End the Conflict ................................................................................................. 5
Peace Initiative ........................................................................................................................... 6
Operation Lightning Thunder ................................................................................................ 7
Social and Economic Profile ....................................................................................................... 7
Economic Conditions ............................................................................................................ 7
HIV/AIDS ............................................................................................................................ 8
Regional Relations ...................................................................................................................... 8
Ugandan Troops in Somalia ........................................................................................................ 9
U.S.-Uganda Relations................................................................................................................ 9
U.S. Assistance ......................................................................................................................... 10
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Uganda ........................................................................................... 10
Appendixes
Appendix. Ceasefire Agreement ................................................................................................ 11
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 33
Congressional Research Service
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Background
Uganda, a country slightly smaller than
Uganda at a Glance
Oregon, gained its independence from
Population: 31.3 Million
Britain in 1962. Until the mid-1980s,
Population Growth: 3.6% (2008)
the East African country was mired in
Comparative Area: Slightly smaller than Oregon
civil war and ethnic strife, and its people
suffered under a brutal dictatorship. By
Infant Mortality Rate: 65.9 deaths/1,000 live births (2007)
the time President Yoweri Museveni’s
Life Expectancy at Birth: 52.34 years
National Resistance Army/Movement
HIV/AIDS Prevalence Rate: 6.7 % (2005)
(NRA/M) took power in early 1986, the
country’s economy was in ruins, with an
HIV/AIDS Deaths: 78,000 (2003)
inflation rate of over 240% and an
Religions: Roman Catholic 42%, Protestant 42%, Muslim 12%,
almost non-existent economic
Indigenous beliefs 4%.
infrastructure. President Museveni is
Language: English (official)
credited with bringing relative political
GDP (purchasing power parity—PPP): $29 billion (2007)
and economic stability to Uganda,
although he has not been able to end the
GDP per capita (PPP): $900 (2007)
conflict in northern Uganda. His
Source: CIA—The World Factbook, 2008.
strategy in the late 1980s and 1990s was
to co-opt his political opponents and, when necessary, to use military means to neutralize rebel
groups. Museveni’s first government included opposition figures who had served in previous
governments and arch critics of the NRM. Despite efforts aimed at achieving national
reconciliation, armed opposition to his government continued for much of the 1980s and 1990s.
Uganda: Political Profile
In May 1996, after a long transition period, President Museveni was elected to a five year term in
direct presidential elections in what was known until 2005 as a “no-party” system. Museveni won
74.2% of the votes, while his opponent, Paul Ssmogerere, former deputy prime minister and
longtime rival of the president, received 23.7%. The elections were declared by international
observers to be free and fair. A national referendum on multiparty politics was held in June of
2000. Museveni prevailed, with 90.7% of Ugandans favoring a no-party government system. The
President stated that multiparty politics could only be introduced once a no-party system had
succeeded in eliminating the threat of a return to sectarian politics. In 2005, Museveni changed
his position on this issue (see below). The NRM remains the dominant party, although some of its
members openly express their opposition and frustration about NRM’s leadership. Some party
leaders are also focused on the issue of succession, while new members of parliament challenge
the old establishment of the ruling party. Despite some serious challenges facing the leadership,
Uganda has made and continues to make important progress on a number of fronts. The East
African country is more stable today than a few years back and the prospect of a final agreement
with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) could lead to lasting peace in Uganda.
Congressional Research Service
1
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
The 2001 Presidential Elections
On March 12, 2001, Uganda again held national elections, and President Museveni won 69.3% of
the votes cast,1 while his closest challenger, Kizza Besigye, received 27.8%. Besigye, a doctor
and Museveni’s one-time ally, was a member of the NRM and Museveni’s personal physician
during the insurgency in the early 1980s. He ran on an anti-corruption platform, vowing to rid the
government of its excesses. He also raised questions about Uganda’s military involvement in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Election observers, both local and international,
declared the elections to be free and fair, although they acknowledged that the electoral process
and management had many weaknesses. The results of the elections were rejected by Besigye on
the grounds that there were discrepancies and inconsistencies in the electoral process. He filed a
petition at the Supreme Court challenging the declaration of Museveni as president-elect and
sought to annul the elections. Besigye subsequently lost the petition and said he would respect the
Supreme Court verdict. In August 2001, Besigye fled Uganda and later surfaced in South Africa.2
The Third-Term Debate and Adoption of a Multi-Party System
Uganda was ruled under a “no-party” system after Museveni took power in 1986. In March 2003,
President Museveni suggested to his National Executive Committee, the leadership organ of the
NRM, that the Movement should consider lifting the ban on a multi-party system. He and his
supporters also urged a review of the two-term limit for a president. According to the Ugandan
constitution at the time, “A person shall not be elected under this Constitution to hold office as
President for more than two terms as prescribed by this article.”3 Under this provision, President
Museveni’s term would have expired in 2006, but many of his supporters argued that without
Museveni, Uganda might plunge into another civil war. Critics of the President contended that
Museveni did not wish to relinquish power. The President holds most executive powers. In
January 2003, President Museveni told a British reporter “we will follow the Constitution because
that is what I fought for. The present Constitution says not more than two consecutive terms.”4
Those ruling party members who criticized the President’s third term proposal were removed
from power, including Eriya Katagaya, the then-First Deputy Prime Minister and a longtime ally
of President Museveni.5 The Vice President also resigned, reportedly to pursue her academic
studies in the United States. In May 2005, the Ugandan parliament voted to approve a referendum
on multi-party politics. On July 28, 2005, Ugandans voted overwhelmingly in favor of a multi-
party system, after almost 19 years of a “no party” system. Reportedly, more than 92% of the
registered voters said yes to a multi-party system, although the polls were boycotted by the Forum
for Democratic Change, an opposition group. In July 2005, the Ugandan parliament voted to
remove the two-term limit on the presidency.
1 Ugandan Elections 2001, online at http://www.uganda-elections.com.
2 Besigye fled into exile a day after he met with visiting U.S. congressional delegation members.
3 The Constitution of Uganda can be found online at http://www.parliament.go.ug/images/constitution_1995.pdf.
4 John Kakande. “Museveni Speaks on 3rd Term.” The New Vision, January 3, 2003.
5 “President Should Listen to Old Friends, Avoid Disaster (Editorial).” The Monitor, May 3, 2002.
Congressional Research Service
2
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
The 2006 Multi-Party Elections
In February 2006, Ugandans voted in the first multi-party elections in almost 26 years. President
Museveni won 59% of the votes, while the leading opposition candidate, Kizza Besigye, won
37% of the votes. The ruling NRM won 202 seats in parliamentary elections, while the opposition
Forum for Democracy Coalition won 40 seats. The election results show a decline in support for
President Museveni from his 74% and 69% victories in the 1996 and 2001 elections, respectively.
Meanwhile, Besigye’s 37% share represented a 10% gain over his 2001 vote share. International
election observers did not condemn the election results nor did they fully endorse the electoral
process. According to the European Union election monitoring group report, “Uganda’s first
multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections since 1980 have demonstrated significant
improvements in comparison to previous elections.” According to the same report, “Despite a
number of problems experienced by voters on election day, EU Chief Observer Max van den
Berg, who spent the day traveling between Kampala, Gulu and Soroti, noted that voters came out
in large numbers, knew that they had a choice between change or continuity, and made this choice
with calm and dignity.” But the elections were marred by intimidation, counting irregularities,
voter name deletions, and show of force by the government. Harassment by authorities and the
trial of the opposition candidate, Besigye, were seen as part of the overall strategy to secure
victory. Kizza Besigye was charged and imprisoned soon after his return to Uganda to run as a
candidate for president. He was charged with rape, terrorism, and treason. He was released from
prison in January 2006 and challenged President Museveni in the February 2006 presidential
election.
The Situation in Northern Uganda
While much of the country has remained stable since the NRM took power in 1986, civil war has
ravaged northern Uganda for over 20 years. The situation has been characterized as one of the
world’s worst humanitarian crises, where civilians, particularly children, are the most affected,
according to the United Nations and numerous reports by non-governmental organizations. The
conflict and the humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda have killed tens of thousands of civilians
due to deliberate targeting of children by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (see below),
although the actual number of those killed is unknown.
According to a report by the Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda
(CSOPNU), a coalition of 50 Ugandan and international groups, more than two million civilians
have been affected. An estimated 90% of the population in the northern region of Acholiland,
particularly in the districts of Gulu, Kitigum, and Pader, have been displaced; and some estimate
that 80% of the forces in the LRA are the abducted children from these areas. For the past two
decades, the victims in this conflict have largely been civilians, although the conflict began as an
effort to overthrow the Museveni regime. The victims reportedly were abused routinely by
security forces and the government failed to provide adequate protection to civilians, particularly
children in northern Uganda, according to several reports.
The LRA abducted more than 20,000 children over the past decade for forced conscription and
sexual exploitation.6 According to the United Nations “the most disturbing aspect of this
6 Uganda Complex Emergency. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), July 2003.
Congressional Research Service
3
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
humanitarian crisis is the fact that this is a war fought by children on children - minors make up
almost 90% of the LRA’s soldiers. Some recruits are as young as eight and are inducted through
raids on villages. They are brutalized and forced to commit atrocities on fellow abductees and
even siblings. Those who attempt to escape are killed. For those living in a state of constant fear,
violence becomes a way of life and the psychological trauma is incalculable.” Although the
situation in northern Uganda has improved significantly over the past year since the beginning of
the peace talks between the LRA and the Government of Uganda, the U.N. Security Council
reported in May 2007 that “the LRA has not released any children, women or non-combatants
from its ranks.” Similarly, the U.N.S.C. report voiced deep concern over “the absence of any
concrete signs regarding the release of children associated with various forces, especially local
defense units and LRA.” The U.N.S.C. report also stated that government security forces continue
to occupy schools in abandoned communities, thereby significantly delaying the reopening of
schools.
The LRA: Early Years
In 1985, the Milton Obote regime was ousted in a military coup by General Tito Lutwa Okello and other military
officers from northern Uganda. The coup came at a time when the NRM attacks against the Obote regime threatened
Obote’s hold on power. In 1986, the NRA defeated the Okello regime, forcing the military and their supporters to
flee to northern Uganda. Shortly afterward a rebel alliance was formed, the Uganda People’s Democratic Army
(UPDA). The UPDA began attacks against government military installations primarily in northern Uganda. The same
year, Alice Lakwena, an Acholi spiritual healer, emerged as the dominant leader of the rebel alliance. Lakwena’s
faction, the Holy Spirit Movement, initially dominated the alliance and also began to make its move in Southern Sudan.
After a devastating battle with the Ugandan military in Jinja, 60 miles from the capital of Kampala, in which a large
number of the rebel alliance members were killed or captured, Lakwena fled to Kenya. By the late 1980s and early
1990s, UPDA was no longer active. One of Lakwena’s key members and reportedly a relative, Joseph Kony, then in
his early 20s, emerged as the leader of the remaining forces and emerged as the LRA leader. A major military strategy
shift took place in the early 1990s with the emergence of Kony. Kony’s group began to primarily target civilians in
northern Uganda and forged a strong alliance with the government of Sudan.
The overall impact of the crisis in northern Uganda is not clear, although day to day life for many
in this region has changed significantly. The economy in northern Uganda has been devastated,
especially in light of the fact that much of the population is displaced internally and some have
left the region. According to various sources, there are an estimated 1.5-1.7 million internally
displaced people in northern Uganda. Children who are not in internally displaced persons camps
often leave their homes at night to sleep in hospitals or churches, although over the past year
conditions have improved. These children are known as “Night Commuters.” Education for many
of these children seems out of reach, since many are unable to stay in one place to attend school.
According to a World Vision report, Pawns of Politics:
The north has suffered insecurity, manifested by violence against civilians, abductions and
displacement. This insecurity has resulted in death, loss of property, and disruption of
development activities. Children are losing vital educational opportunities; they are at greater
risk for contracting HIV/AIDS and other STDs; and they are forced into child prostitution,
child soldiering, and other forms of bondage.7
As a result of the war and perceived ethnic bias and marginalization, the NRM government is
unpopular in northern Uganda. In the 2006 elections, opposition candidate Besigye reportedly
won 80% of the votes in Gulu. Over the past year, the Government of Uganda has expanded
civilian protection and significantly increased its budget for reconstruction and development in
7 The Pawns of Politics: Children, Conflict and Peace in Northern Uganda. World Vision, 2004.
Congressional Research Service
4
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
northern Uganda. More than 400,000 displaced persons have also returned to their homes over the
past year.
Regional Implications
Under the leadership of Joseph Kony, the LRA has conducted military operations in northern
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Southern Sudan. The regional impact of
the northern Uganda crisis has been particularly hard for Southern Sudan, in part because of its
geographic proximity and also due to the government of Sudan’s support for the LRA rebels. In
Southern Sudan, the LRA allied with the government of Sudan to attack the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA), the liberation movement fighting then successive Sudanese
governments, according to U.S. and regional officials. Southern Sudanese civilians have been
victims of LRA attacks. The LRA was given protection, facilities for training, and supplies by the
government of Sudan to wage war in northern Uganda and Southern Sudan, according to South
Sudan, U.S., and regional officials. The LRA targeted civilians in Eastern and Western Equatoria
and in the Juba region, the regional capital. The LRA leadership and its troops had a permanent
presence in Southern Sudan under the protection of the government of Sudan. In the Juba region,
LRA forces used schools and other government facilities to train and house their troops.8
In late 2005, the LRA intensified its attacks targeting civilians in Southern Sudan, especially in
Yei and Juba areas. However, the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005
between the government of Sudan and the SPLM has threatened the survival of the LRA as a
force in Southern Sudan. The takeover of the government in Southern Sudan by the SPLM has
made LRA activities very difficult. The CPA has a provision in the Security Agreement that all
foreign groups must be forced out of Sudan. The late leader of Southern Sudan, Dr. John Garang,
had the LRA and foreign terrorist groups in mind when he insisted on this provision.9 In 2005,
some LRA units went into DRC, reportedly looking for a new home after the SPLM took power.
Military clashes in DRC reportedly led to the killing of 8 Guatemalan United Nations
peacekeepers in the DRC. The Congolese government acknowledges the presence of LRA forces
in Garamba National Park in 2007. In early November 2007, President Joseph Kabila stated that
LRA forces will be forced to leave DRC once a peace agreement is reached between the LRA and
the government of Uganda. He also made it clear that the LRA will be expelled from DRC if they
failed to reach an agreement.10
Attempts to End the Conflict
A number of attempts in the past at a negotiated settlement with the LRA failed, in large part due
to LRA intransigence and due to the government of Uganda’s inconsistent positions. The first
serious effort was launched by former Ugandan government minister Betty Bigombe in the early
1990s with the full support of President Museveni. In 1993, Bigombe made contact with the LRA
leadership and the LRA initially expressed interest in a negotiated settlement. Prior to this effort,
the government of Uganda launched what was known as the Operation North campaign.
Operation North campaign was designed to deny the LRA support in the North and to arm the
8 The author visited Juba last year and other towns in Southern Sudan over the past decade where LRA has been active.
9 Ted Dagne interviewed Dr. John Garang on a number of occasions during the Security Arrangement negotiations.
10 Ted Dagne met with President Kabila and discussed issues related to Uganda and DRC in November 2007.
Congressional Research Service
5
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
civilian population with bows and arrows, known then as the Arrow Group. The operation failed
and created strong animosity between the government and elements in northern Uganda. The
Bigombe initiative ended when President Museveni threatened to use force against the LRA and
demanded its surrender. Other initiatives, both local and regional, failed to produce tangible
results. Bigombe was once again engaged in an effort to bring an end the conflict in northern
Uganda. In late 2004-2005, contacts were made with the leadership of the LRA and the LRA also
had appointed two senior commanders, Vincent Otti and Sam Kolo, as negotiators in this new
initiative. The peace initiative stalled in 2005 when Kolo defected to the government side and the
government of Uganda began its military campaign. Resolution of the conflict through military
means has not been successful, in part due to ineffective operations against the LRA and an
apparent lack of will by the government to end the conflict through a negotiated settlement.
In October 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for five top LRA
leaders, including Kony. Some observers, while supportive of the ICC prosecution of these
leaders, maintain that the ICC action could hinder peace efforts. Other observers argue that
despite the ICC process, the parties were able to reach important agreements for the first time in
decades. Moreover, many LRA members and leaders have returned to Uganda under a
government amnesty program. According to the peace agreement, traditional justice “shall form a
central part of the alternative justice and reconciliation framework.”
Peace Initiative
After a series of failed peace efforts, the Government of South Sudan appears to have made some
significant strides in brokering the conflict. Following months of talks in Juba, Sudan, the two
parties signed a formal cessation of hostilities agreement on August 26, 2006. Under the
agreement, LRA insurgents were expected to gather at assembly points in southern Sudan. The
deadline for assembly was extended after ceasefire observers reported that both sides violated the
agreement in October. The Ugandan army has admitted to approaching a rebel safe haven in
Sudan, claiming it was escorting journalists and diplomats on a fact-finding mission. Meanwhile,
LRA soldiers, claiming they feared attack by the Ugandan forces, violated the agreement by
leaving a designated assembly point in southern Sudan. Many observers remain skeptical that all
of the remaining LRA insurgents will comply with the terms of the agreement.
President Museveni has offered amnesty if the rebels accept a peace agreement. According to
media reports and U.S. officials, there is support among many civilians in northern Uganda for
reconciliation rather than revenge against the LRA leaders. Nevertheless, unless the ICC’s Chief
Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, accepts a local judicial solution, the indicted insurgents would
have to accept asylum in a country not bound by the Rome Treaty. The ICC has announced that it
will not consider any amnesty proposal until after the successful completion of a peace
agreement.
Following speculation that the Ugandan government was going to yield to the LRA’s demand that
ICC arrest warrants be annulled, President Museveni announced on July 19, 2007, that warrants
for the top LRA leaders will remain in place until a peace agreement has been reached: “We are
not going to ask the ICC to lift the arrest warrants. If [the LRA leaders] don’t conclude the peace
talks they could be arrested and taken to the ICC or get killed. If they conclude the peace deal,
that is when the government can write to the ICC to say we have found an alternative solution.”
Congressional Research Service
6
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
In August 2007, he stated that if the parties agreed to resolve their differences peacefully, the
issue of accountability could be addressed through local and traditional mechanisms.11
The Ugandan Government’s continued negotiations with the LRA reached the critical question of
how Agenda No. 3 (Reconciliation and Accountability), reached in June, 2007, should be
concluded. The past year has yielded two other agreements mandating the cessation of hostilities
and the withdrawal of LRA forces from northern Uganda. In February 2008, the Government of
Uganda and the LRA reached several agreements. The parties agreed on a Permanent Ceasefire,
amended the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, and the Agreement on
Comprehensive Solutions (see Appendix). The LRA leadership moved into the Garamba
National Park in the DRC and has not given indication of signing the agreement since April 2008.
In late October, the LRA sent a delegation to Kampala for the first time in almost two decades to
meet with senior Ugandan officials. Moreover, the LRA delegation went to northern Uganda to
consult with its constituency as the parties get closer to concluding the peace talks.
Operation Lightning Thunder
In late 2008, the governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Southern Sudan, and
Uganda launched a major military operation against the LRA forces. The operation forced LRA
forces to disperse into other parts of DRC but failed to achieve its military objective of defeating
the LRA. In retaliation, the LRA killed an estimated 1,000 people in the DRC and Southern
Sudan. More that 180,000 people were displaced in the DRC. The joint military operation was
the first major coordinated attack against the LRA.
Social and Economic Profile
Economic Conditions
Uganda is blessed with fertile soils, regular rainfall, and sizable deposits of copper and cobalt. Its
largest sector is agriculture, which employs 78% of the workforce and accounted for about 90%
of export earnings and 23.4% of Uganda’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Coffee exports make
up half its export earnings and Uganda is Africa’s largest coffee producer. Other major exports
include cotton, tea, and to a lesser extent, maize. Crop production has been hampered by security
concerns in the northern and western regions of Uganda. To stabilize the economy, Museveni
adopted a policy of reducing inflation while simultaneously increasing production and export
earnings. Uganda raised producer prices on export crops, increased the prices of imported
petroleum products, and boosted civil service wages.
Long periods of forced displacement in northern Uganda have seriously disrupted agricultural
productivity in the region, but USAID reports that recent security improvements have allowed a
number of farmers to return home and resume normal cultivation. According to USAID officials
in Uganda, the restoration of normal farming practices is essential to the recovery process.
Throughout FY2007, USAID contributed significant funds to the U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) to distribute farm equipment and seeds
11 Ted Dagne met with President Museveni in Uganda in August 2007 and discussed a wide range of issues.
Congressional Research Service
7
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
to Ugandan farmers prior to the Spring 2007 planting season. In 2006-2007, food production was
better than expected, in part due to good weather conditions.
The industrial sector has also expanded, with real output growth approaching 10% a year.
Industry constituted 20.4% of GDP in 2004/2005. The main industries include the processing of
coffee, cotton, tea, sugar, tobacco, edible oils, dairy products, and grain milling as well as
brewing. Other ventures include vehicle assembly and the manufacture of textiles and metal
products. According to the Economic Intelligence Unit (05/2009):
As the 2008/09 financial year enters its final quarter, the authorities have lowered the
economic growth projection to 6.2% from 8.1% originally forecast in the budget. This is a
fall of 3 percentage points compared with growth of 8.9% in 2007/2008.
Obstacles to economic growth remain. Uganda’s heavy reliance on coffee exports makes it
vulnerable to international commodity price fluctuations and poor weather conditions.
Privatization initiatives pose a problem as they are seen by many to be a scramble for previously
state-owned property. Another problem plaguing Uganda’s economy is corruption. Uganda relies
upon international donors for 41% of its national budget. Those donors, in particular Ireland,
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, have become increasingly critical of governance
issues and a rise in defense spending.
The late-June discovery of an oil reserve in the fields of western Uganda much larger than
initially estimated has many speculating about the potential implications for Uganda’s economy.
The oil was discovered in an exploratory mission by oil and gas groups Heritage and Tullow. The
oil reserve is located in the Albertine Basin, close to Uganda’s border with the Democratic
Republic of Congo.
HIV/AIDS
In the 1980s and early 1990s, Uganda was one of the African countries most devastated by the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Over the past decade, however, Uganda has made significant progress in
the fight against HIV/AIDS, and the Museveni government is widely credited for implementing a
sweeping reform to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic. According to USAID, the prevalence of
HIV has dropped over 50% in the last fifteen years. Today the overall prevalence rate is 6.7%.
Moreover, prevalence among pregnant women declined significantly. Despite these impressive
declines, HIV/AIDS is still a serious problem in Uganda. An estimated 91,000 Ugandans died in
2005, and there are over one million orphans from the AIDS crisis. Uganda’s HIV/AIDS
prevention program known as ABC (Abstinence, Be Faithful, or Use Condoms) is credited for the
reduction in HIV infections and has been viewed by the U.S. Administration as a model for the
rest of sub-Saharan Africa. In 2007, the United States provided $188 million to support Uganda’s
fight against HIV/AIDS (see table below for a summary of U.S. assistance to Uganda).
Regional Relations
Uganda is a member of the East African Community and enjoys friendly relations with fellow
members Kenya and Tanzania. Uganda has at times had tense relations with two of its other
neighbors, Rwanda and, more recently, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), resulting from
its 1998 troop deployment into eastern Congo. While the Ugandan government claimed the troop
presence was aimed at discouraging attacks from Ugandan rebels based in the region, there were
Congressional Research Service
8
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
widespread allegations of natural resource exploitation, and Uganda eventually removed its
troops under international pressure in 2003. In 2005, Museveni threatened to send troops back to
the region when LRA forces moved from Sudan to the DRC if Congo failed to deny them
sanctuary, although the current peace talks may avert further contention.
Ugandan Troops in Somalia
Approximately 1,800 Ugandan troops have been stationed in Somalia since early 2007 in an
effort to increase security and put a stop to the violent conflict in Mogadishu. The Ugandan troops
(members of the Uganda People’s Defense Forces) are the only AU forces currently serving the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Other AU countries (Nigeria, Burundi, Ghana
and Malawi) that pledged a combined total of 6,500 troops to AMISOM have attributed their
delayed deployment to logistical and financial issues. In January 2008, Burundi deployed an
estimated 850 peacekeeping troops to Somalia. The Peace and Security Council of the African
Union announced in mid-July that Ugandan troops would remain in Somalia for another six
months. Army Spokesman, Major Felix Kulayigye, announced the extension and argued that it
does not make sense to withdraw Ugandan troops simply because the Reconciliation Congress is
underway. In mid-September 2 Ugandan peacekeeping troops were killed in Mogadishu, bringing
the number of peacekeeping troops killed in Somalia to eight since March 2008.
U.S.-Uganda Relations
Relations between Washington and Kampala are warm. Over the years, successive American
administrations have supported the Museveni government as a reformist regime and a staunch
ally of the United States. The Clinton Administration championed the Museveni regime, and
President Clinton visited Uganda during his 1998 tour of Africa. Relations cooled, however, when
Ugandan troops intervened in the Congo in 1998. Clinton Administration officials were also
critical of Uganda and Rwanda when the two former allies clashed in eastern Congo in 1999 and
2000.
The Bush Administration restored good relations with Kampala. Former Secretary of State Colin
Powell visited Uganda during his four-nation trip to Africa in 2001. Secretary Powell met with
President Museveni and opposition leaders to discuss a wide range of issues, including Sudan and
DRC. He praised Museveni for lowering Uganda’s HIV-AIDS infection rate. In 2001, Uganda
withdrew several battalions from the DRC and by May 2003, almost all of Uganda’s troops had
been withdrawn. President Museveni has also been a leading ally of the United States in the fight
against international terrorism and was one of the first African leaders to pledge support in the
war against Iraq. Despite the healthy relationship between the United States and Uganda,
numerous NGOs and politicians have insisted that the Bush Administration do more. On June 14,
2007, 44 members of the House and Senate wrote to President Bush urging him to dispatch a
special envoy to Juba to facilitate negotiations between the Government of Uganda and the LRA.
The letter underscored the many obstacles to the peace process in Uganda, reiterating the
importance of U.S. involvement. In October 2007, President Bush assured President Museveni of
his commitment to support Uganda on a wide range of issues, including fighting HIV/AIDS and
Congressional Research Service
9
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Malaria. The two leaders discussed regional security issues, including the crises in Sudan and
Somalia.12
U.S. Assistance
The United States provides significant humanitarian and development assistance to Uganda. In
FY2007, the United States provided $332.1 million to Uganda, and $419 million for FY2008. In
FY2009, Uganda is expected to receive $389.3 million. The Obama Administration has requested
$428.9 million for FY2010. In 2007, the Millennium Challenge Corporation approved a $10
million Threshold program to support anti-corruption activities. Moreover, Uganda is eligible for
trade benefits, including textile and apparel benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity
Act (AGOA).
Approximately half of all U.S. non-food aid in Uganda is directed at ameliorating the crisis in the
north. USAID continues its support for the displaced children and orphans in Uganda. The
Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (DCOF) assists war-affected children in northern and
western Uganda by rebuilding traditional community and family structures and working to fight
the spread of HIV/AIDS. The DCOF funded programs such as the Community Resilience and
Dialogue (CRD), which focused on aiding abducted children between 2002-2005. The CRD
rehabilitated 7,000 abducted children and reunified and resettled 5,700 with their families. U.S.
funding for northern Uganda is expected to reach $106.3 million in FY2007. The United States
provided $87.9 million in 2006 and $77.9 million in 2005. In addition to humanitarian assistance
in northern Uganda, the United States has increased development assistance from $18.4 million in
2005 to $51.2 million in 2007. In 2007, USAID opened an office in Gulu, northern Uganda.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Uganda
($ in thousands)
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
Account
Actual
Actual
Actual
Estimate
Request
CSH
15,160 20,648 33,960 39,851 31,778
DA
27,967 23,414 28,445 27,600 35,150
FMF 1,984
—
—
—
GHAI
122,741 145,000 210,660 255,000 255,000
IMET
293 340 283 477 500
NADR-TIP —
—
150
INCLE
350
P.L. 480 Title II
64,410
58,770
22,839
23,000
Source: Department of State.
Acronyms. CSH: Child Survival and Health; DA: Development Assistance; FMF: Foreign Military Financing;
GHAI: Global Aids Initiative; IMET: International Military Education and Training; NADR-TIP: Nonproliferation,
Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related programs. INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement.
12 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071030-1.html. President Bush Meets with President Museveni
of Uganda.
Congressional Research Service
10
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Appendix. Ceasefire Agreement
Congressional Research Service
11
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
12
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
13
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
14
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
15
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
16
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
17
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
18
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
19
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
20
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
21
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
22
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
23
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
24
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
25
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
26
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
27
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
28
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
29
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
30
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
31
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Congressional Research Service
32
Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda
Author Contact Information
Ted Dagne
Specialist in African Affairs
tdagne@crs.loc.gov, 7-7646
Congressional Research Service
33