Defense: FY2010 Authorization and
Appropriations
Pat Towell, Coordinator
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
July 17, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40567
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
Summary
For the Department of Defense (DOD) in FY2010, the Administration requested a total of $663.8
billion in discretionary budget authority. This includes $533.8 billion for the so-called “base
budget”—all DOD activities other than combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—and $130.0
billion for what are termed “overseas contingency operations,” including those in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Administration also requested $75.9 billion in supplemental DOD
appropriations for FY2009 to cover war costs. Combined with the $65.9 billion “bridge fund” for
FY2009 emergency war funding included in the Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY2008
(P.L. 110-252), bringing the total appropriated for FY2009 war costs to $141.8 billion.
The Administration’s DOD request, made public May 7, 2009, incorporated recommendations by
Defense Secretary Robert Gates concerning funding for several major weapons programs, which
Gates had announced April 6. While DOD had been organized for decades to focus primarily on
preparing for conventional warfare with cutting edge weapons like the Air Force’s F-22 fighter,
Gates said, U.S. forces are superior to potential adversaries by a big enough margin that DOD can
set less technologically ambitious goals for the next-generation of conventional weapons. This
would allow DOD to focus more resources and attention on equipment better suited to the type of
operations underway in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gates said.
The FY2010 national defense authorization bills drafted by the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees generally supported this shift in policy, which the Obama Administration’s budget
request reflected. However, both committees added to their respective bills authorization to
continue production of the Air Force’s F-22 fighter, which the Obama Administration—like the
preceding Bush Administration—had planned to terminate. On June 25, the House passed by a
vote of 389-22 its version of the FY2010 national defense authorization act H.R. 2647, which
would authorize a total of $534.0 billion for the DOD base budget—$264.8 million more than
requested—and $130 billion, as requested for war costs. The bill also would authorize $16.5
billion for defense-related nuclear activities of the Energy Department, which is $83.3 million
more than requested. On July 2, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the
authorization bill, S. 1390, which would authorize $534.6 billion for the DOD base budget,
$129.3 billion for war costs, and $16.4 billion for the Energy Department.The Senate began
consideration of S. 1390 on July 13. An amendment that would remove from the bill
authorization for continued F-22 production is scheduled for a vote on July 20.
On July 16, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its version of the
FY2010 defense appropriations bill, which would appropriate $508 billion for the DOD base
budget (covering all accounts except military construction) and $128.3 billion for FY2010 war
costs. The House Appropriations Committee is scheduled to consider that bill on July 22. The
subcommittee bill would provide funds to continue F-22 production.
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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
Contents
Most Recent Developments......................................................................................................... 1
Overview of the Administration’s FY2010 Request ..................................................................... 1
War Costs ............................................................................................................................. 3
Status of Legislation.................................................................................................................... 3
Comparison and Context ............................................................................................................. 4
Defense Priorities: Budget and Strategy....................................................................................... 8
Background: Strategic Direction............................................................................................ 9
Strategic Processes.............................................................................................................. 10
Issues for Congress ............................................................................................................. 11
Assessing Challenges and Requirements: Conventional, Irregular—or Hybrid? ............. 11
Institutionalizing New Capabilities................................................................................ 14
Characterizing the Nature and Scope of Risk................................................................. 15
Clarifying the Concept of Deterrence for the 21st Century.............................................. 16
Evaluating the Impact of Growing “Partnership” on DOD Requirements ....................... 16
Conducting a Comprehensive Strategic Review............................................................. 17
April 6 Announcements............................................................................................................. 17
Quality of Life Issues .......................................................................................................... 18
End-Strength Increase ................................................................................................... 18
Health Care and Family Support ................................................................................... 19
Preparing for “The Wars We’re In”...................................................................................... 20
Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) .................................................... 20
Developing Partner Capacity (Section 1206) ................................................................. 21
Army Brigade Combat Teams ....................................................................................... 22
Special Operations Forces ............................................................................................. 23
Helicopter Crew Training.............................................................................................. 23
Shipbuilding ....................................................................................................................... 24
Aircraft Carriers............................................................................................................ 24
DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyers.............................................................................. 25
CG(X) Cruiser .............................................................................................................. 26
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) .......................................................................................... 27
LPD-17, Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), and Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)........... 27
Aircraft ............................................................................................................................... 28
Tactical Combat Aircraft (F-35, F-22, F/A-18) .............................................................. 28
F-22 Raptor................................................................................................................... 29
Air Mobility (KC-X, C-17) ........................................................................................... 30
Acquisition Reform (VH-71, CSAR-X)......................................................................... 31
Missile Defense .................................................................................................................. 32
Theater Defenses (THAAD, SM-3, Aegis) .................................................................... 32
Ground-Based National Missile Defense ....................................................................... 33
Boost-Phase Defenses (Airborne Laser and KEI)........................................................... 33
Congressional Perspectives ........................................................................................... 34
Ground Combat Systems (FCS and EFV)............................................................................ 34
Congressional Perspectives ........................................................................................... 35
Acquisition Process............................................................................................................. 36
Acquisition Workforce ........................................................................................................ 38
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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
Congressional Perspectives ........................................................................................... 40
Strategic and Nuclear Forces ............................................................................................... 41
Ballistic Missile Submarines ......................................................................................... 41
Long-Range Bomber..................................................................................................... 41
Other Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 42
Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to Date .............................................................. 43
FY2010 Congressional Budget Resolution .......................................................................... 43
National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647, S. 1390) ................................................... 43
Ballistic Missile Defense. .............................................................................................. 44
Shipbuilding. ................................................................................................................ 45
Combat Aircraft. ........................................................................................................... 46
Ground Combat Systems............................................................................................... 48
Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan ...................................................................................... 49
Military Personnel Policy: End-Strength, Pay Raise ...................................................... 51
DOD Civilian Employees: NSPS, A-76 ......................................................................... 51
Concurrent Receipt. ...................................................................................................... 52
Detainees, Military Commissions, Guantanamo Bay ..................................................... 52
FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bill................................................................................... 54
Appendix: Program Funding Tables .......................................................................................... 56
Tables
Table 1. DOD Base Budget Request Discretionary Budget Authority, FY2009-2010.................... 2
Table 2. Status of FY2010 Defense Authorization Bills, H.R. 2647/S. 1390 ................................. 4
Table 3. Status of FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bills.............................................................. 4
Table 4. Actual and Projected DOD Base Budgets Compared with 4% of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) ......................................................................................................................... 5
Table 5. DOD Discretionary Budget Authority, FY1998-FY2009 ................................................ 5
Table 6. FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, House and Senate Action by Title,
H.R. 2647, S. 1390................................................................................................................. 53
Contacts
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 70
Key Policy Staff........................................................................................................................ 70
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 71
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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
Most Recent Developments
On July 16, 2009, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its version of the
FY2010 defense appropriations bill, providing $508 million for all DOD base budget accounts
except military construction, which is funded in another bill. The defense bill also provides
$128.3 billion for war costs. According to the subcommittee’s press release, the bill’s $636.3
billion total is $3.8 billion less than the President’s request.
On June 25, the House passed by a vote of 389-22 its version of the FY2010 national defense
authorization act H.R. 2647, which would authorize a total of $534.0 billion for the DOD base
budget—$264.8 million more than requested—and $130 billion, as requested for war costs. The
bill also would authorize $16.5 billion for defense-related nuclear activities of the Energy
Department, which is $83.3 million more than requested.
On July 2, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the authorization bill, S.
1390 which would authorize $534.6 billion for the DOD base budget, $129.3 billion for war
costs, and $16.4 billion for the Energy Department. The Senate took up the bill on July 13.
For the Department of Defense (DOD) in FY2010, the Administration requested a total of $663.8
billion in discretionary budget authority. This includes $533.8 billion in discretionary budget
authority for the so-called “base budget”—all DOD activities other than combat operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan and associated activities—and $130.0 billion for what are termed “overseas
contingency operations,” including operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Overview of the Administration’s FY2010 Request
The President’s FY2010 request of $533.7 billion for the DOD base budget is $20.4 billion higher
than the total of $513.3 billion the Obama Administration cites as the total appropriated for the
DOD base budget in the regular FY2009 appropriations process.1 In an April 6 press conference,
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said this nominal increase of 4% would amount to an increase
in real purchasing power of 2%, taking into account the cost of inflation.2 (See Table 1.)
1 Office of Management and Budget, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise, Feb. 26, 2009, Table
S-7, “Funding Levels for Appropriated (“Discretionary”) Programs by Agency,” p. 130. Based on data published by the
House Appropriations Committee summarizing amounts appropriated for FY2009 (Congressional Record, September
24, 2008, Part I, pp.H291-94) the total discretionary appropriation for DOD in FY2009 was $512.7 billion. The Obama
Administration’s February 26 FY2010 budget document, which provided only gross funding totals for Cabinet
agencies, did not contain sufficient information to account for the fact that the Administration’s total for the FY2009
DOD base budget is higher by some $600 million.
2 Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, Budget Briefing , April 6, 2009
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.
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Table 1. DOD Base Budget Request
Discretionary Budget Authority, FY2009-2010
(amounts in billions of dollars)
FY2009Enacted
FY2010 Requested
(Excluding War
(Excluding War
Percentage
Funds)
Funds)
Change
Military Personnel 124.9
136.0
+8.9%
Operations and Maintenance
179.1
185.7
+3.7%
Procurement 101.7
107.4
+5.6%
Research and Development
79.5
78.6
-1.1%
Military Construction
21.9
21.0
-4.1%
Family Housing
3.2
2.0
-38.0%
Other 3.2
3.1
-1.1%
Total 513.5
533.8
+4.0%
Source: Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Budget Briefing, p. 16,
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_BudgetBriefing.pdf
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, H.R. 1, P.L. 111-5), also known
as the “economic stimulus” package, provided an additional $7.5 billion in DOD appropriations
for FY2009, bringing the FY2009 discretionary appropriations for the Pentagon to a total of
$520.7 billion. Compared with this amount, the FY2010 request would amount to an increase of
$13.0 billion, a nominal increase of 2.5% (not adjusted for inflation).
Comparison of the FY2010 DOD base budget request with the corresponding appropriation for
FY2009 is complicated by the fact that the Administration is funding in the FY2010 base budget
several activities that were covered by war cost supplemental appropriations bills in FY2009 and
prior years. In an April 7 conference call with Internet defense reporters, Sec. Gates said the total
amount of funding shifted into the base budget was about $13 billion, which included ongoing
cost of expanding the Army and Marine Corps, increased funding for medical research and
quality-of-life improvements for military personnel.3
Setting aside those funds allocated to costs that were not included in the FY2009 DOD base
budget (for the sake of an apples-to-apples comparison), President Obama’s FY2010 request for
the DOD base budget includes about $520.7 billion, which is roughly $7.4 billion more than was
appropriated for DOD in the regular appropriations process. If, moreover, the $7.4 billion
provided to DOD in FY2009 by the economic stimulus package is added to the regular FY2009
appropriations, the FY2009 appropriation and the FY2010 request are roughly the same.
Comparison of President Obama’s FY2010 DOD base budget request with the FY2010 budget
projected by the Bush Administration is uncertain because the budget outline made public on
February 26 listed only an aggregate total for the DOD base budget, without specifying whether
or not that sum included each of several elements of DOD funding that might or might not
reasonably be included and which could affect the total by several billions of dollars. In his April
3Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Gen. James Cartwright with
Internet Security Writers, April 7, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4398.
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7 conference call with reporters, Secretary Gates said that the comparable Bush Administration
projection of the FY2010 DOD base was $524 billion. By that standard, President Obama’s
FY2010 request is nearly $10 billion higher. However, since the Obama request includes about
$13 billion for programs that the Bush Administration did not fund in the DOD base budget, the
Obama request is about $3 billion lower than the Bush projection, on an apples-to-apples basis.
In the fall of 2008, DOD reportedly drew up a projected FY2010 base budget request that was
$57 billion higher than the request the Bush administration had projected in February 2008.4 But
that larger request, details of which were not published, was not subjected to the regular budget
review process within the executive branch.
War Costs
To fund the war in FY2010, the Administration requested $130 billion or 8% below the proposed
FY2009 level. Secretary of Defense Gates stated that this war funding request did not include
about $13 billion for activities that are expected to persist beyond the Afghanistan and Iraq wars
but which had been included in earlier war-funding bills. According to Secretary Gates, the
funding shifted to the base budget would include funding for increased strength levels in the
Army and Marine Corps, additional funding for helicopter support, more funds for Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Special Operations forces, airlift, and funds to train and equip
other countries.5
If Gates had not transferred the $13 billion worth of programs from supplemental funding into the
base budget, on an apples-to-apples basis the FY2010 request would be equivalent to $13 billion
higher or a total of $143 billion, which would be above the FY2009 total. This may raise
questions about whether the proposed level adequately reflects troop levels in 2010 based on the
Administration’s plans to decrease troop levels in Iraq and assuming that the President approves a
DOD request for an additional 9,000 troops above earlier increases. This question could also be
tied to a debate about the Administration’s plans to increase troop levels and raise the U.S.
involvement in Afghanistan.
FY2009 War Cost Supplemental Appropriations
For congressional action on the Administration’s FY2009 supplemental appropriations request for war costs, see CRS
Report R40531, FY2009 Spring Supplemental Appropriations for Overseas Contingency Operations, coordinated by Stephen
Daggett and Susan B. Epstein. Congressional action on authorization of the FY2009 supplemental funds and on both
authorization and appropriation of the FY2010 war cost request is covered in this report.
Status of Legislation
Although the Administration’s detailed budget request was not transmitted to Congress until May
7, 2009, Congress began acting on the annual defense authorization bill only about a month later
than it typically does. The House Armed Services Committee reported its version of the bill (H.R.
2647) on June 18, 2009 and it was passed by the House on June 25. The Senate Armed Services
4 Tony Capaccio, "Pentagon Seeks $57 Billion More in 2010, says Jonas," Bloomberg.com, October 2, 2008.
5 DOD, Transcript, “Remarks by Secretary Gates at the Army War College,” April 16, 2009;”
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4404.
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Committee reported its version of the bill (S. 1390) on July 2 and the Senate began debating the
bill on July 13.
Table 2. Status of FY2010 Defense Authorization Bills, H.R. 2647/S. 1390
Conference
Report
1) Committee Markup
Approval
House
House
Senate
Senate
Conf.
Public
2) House 3) Senate Report Passage Report Passage Report House Senate Law
H.Rept.
S. 6/25/09
H.Rept.
6/25/09
S.Rept.
2647-6/16/09
111-166
389-22
111-35
The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee reported its version of the FY2010 defense
appropriations bill on July 16. The House Appropriations Committee reportedly is scheduled to
take up the bill on July 22.
Table 3. Status of FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bills
Subcommittee
Conference Report
Markup
Approval
House
House
Senate
Senate
Conf.
Public
House Senate Report
Passage
Report
Passage
Report
House Senate Law
7/16/09
Comparison and Context6
In recent years, some senior military officers7, as well as research groups and advocacy
organizations, have argued that defense spending needs to be substantially higher in the next few
years to avoid drastic cuts in major weapons programs or in the size of the force. Many have
called for a baseline defense budget, not including war-related costs, pegged to about 4% of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—an amount that would be anywhere from $62 to $169 billion
per year higher over the next few years than the Administration plan.
6 Prepared by Stephen Daggett, Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget.
7 During a Pentagon press briefing on November 17, 2008, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen
said he thought that spending 4% of GDP on defense was, “about right.” See DOD News Transcript, “Department of
Defense News Briefing with Admiral Michael Mullen at the Pentagon, Arlington, VA,” November 17, 2008,
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4318.
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Table 4. Actual and Projected DOD Base Budgets Compared with
4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
(amounts in billions of dollars)
FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014
actual/projected DOD base
budget
513.3 533.7 541.8 550.7 561.1 574.5
Gross
Domestic
Product 14,291 14,902 15,728 16,731 17,739 18,588
DOD base budget as
percentage of GDP
3.59% 3.58% 3.44% 3.29% 3.16% 3.09%
4%
of
GDP
571.6 596.1 629.1 669.2 709.6 743.5
amount by which 4% of GDP
exceeds actual/projected
58,3 62.4 87.3 118.5 148.5 169.0
DOD base budget
Source: Actual/projected DOD base budget figures from Office of Management and Budget, A New Era of
Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise, February 26, 2009, Table S-7. “Funding Levels for Appropriated
(‘Discretionary’) Programs by Agency,” p. 130; Gross Domestic Product estimates from Ibid., Table S-8,
“Comparison of Economic Assumptions,” p. 132.
Sen. James M. Inhofe and Rep. Trent Franks—members, respectively, of the Senate and House
Armed Services committees—summarized the case for such an increase in identical joint
resolutions (S.J.Res. 10 and H.J.Res. 3) introduced on Feb. 12, 2009 which call for a base defense
budget equal to at least 4% of GDP. The fundamental case for meeting the 4% target is that, since
the end of the Cold War, DOD’s budget and force structure have declined significantly while the
tempo of operations has increased—to include sustained combat operations—and the geographic
scope of operations has broadened.8
These arguments for a substantial increase in the defense budget, however, come at a time when,
by historical standards, military spending seems very robust. Between FY1998, when the post-
Cold War decline in defense spending hit bottom, and FY2009, the baseline Department of
Defense budget, not including war costs, increased by almost 40% above inflation (see Table 4).
Adjusting for inflation, the FY2009 baseline DOD budget was more than $100 billion, or about
20%, greater than the average during the Cold War (measured from the end of the Korean War in
FY1954 through FY1990). Funding for weapons acquisition (procurement plus R&D) in FY2009
was more than $45 billion—or about one-third— higher than the annual Cold War average.
Table 5. DOD Discretionary Budget Authority, FY1998-FY2009
(amounts in billions of current year and constant FY2009 dollars)
Current Year Dollars
Constant FY2009 Dollars
Total DOD
Base DOD
Supplemental
Total DOD
Base DOD
Supplemental
FY1998
260 257 3 359 355 4
FY1999
275 266 9 370 358 12
FY2000
287 279 9 377 366 11
8 Senator Inhofe elaborated on this argument in a Senate floor speech on February 12, 2009. See Congressional Record,
February 12, 2009, pp. S-2246-48.
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Current Year Dollars
Constant FY2009 Dollars
FY2001
316 297 19 403 379 24
FY2002
345 328 17 428 407 21
FY2003
437 365 72 526 439 87
FY2004
468 377 91 544 438 106
FY2005
479 400 79 535 447 88
FY2006
535 411 124 579 445 134
FY2007
601 432 169 633 455 178
FY2008
667 480 187 683 491 191
FY2009
662 510 152 662 510 152
Source: FY2001-FY2009 current year dol ar figures from Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Supplemental
Request: Summary Justification, April 2009, Figure 1, p. 1. FY1998-FY2000 total DOD from Office of Management,
Budget Public Budget Database, supplemental amounts by CRS. Deflators from Department of Defense, National
Defense Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2009, March 2008; Data thru FY2007 are actual amounts. Figures for FY2009
include requested additional FY2009 supplemental appropriations and rescissions.
The apparent disconnect between the size of the budget and the appeals for more money appears
even more striking when amounts that have been appropriated for war costs are added to the
equation. On top of a baseline DOD budget that grew from $255 billion in FY1998, in FY2009
prices not adjusted for inflation, to $528 billion in FY2009, supplemental appropriations for war-
related costs climbed from $19.4 billion in FY2001, as an initial response to the 9/11 attacks, to
$63 billion in FY2003, the year of the Iraq invasion, to an estimated $189 billion in FY2008.
While large portions of the supplementals have been consumed by war-related operating costs,
substantial amounts have also been devoted to buying new equipment, particularly for the Army
and the Marine Corps. Although the bulk of this acquisition has been for force protection,
communications, and transportation, the effect has been to modernize much of the basic
equipment stock of both services, in effect augmenting their baseline budgets. The fact that so
large a level of spending appears to the military services to be so inadequate has several
explanations—and the policy implications are, accordingly, matters of varying interpretation.
Following are some of the contributing factors.9
• Future baseline budgets are widely expected to decline: The Administration plan
to cut the deficit in half by the end of President Obama’s first term includes limits
on defense as well as non-defense spending. White House budget projections
accommodate an increase of about 5% above inflation in the FY2009 DOD
budget, but project a cumulative decline of about 3% between FY2009 and
FY2012. Many unofficial projections of the deficit situation are less sanguine
than the Administration’s, so many analysts expect, at best, a flat baseline
defense budget for the foreseeable future. Increased costs in part of the budget,
9 These issues were discussed in testimony before the House Budget Committee by Stephen A. Daggett, CRS Specialist
in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget, on February 4, 2009. See prepared testimony on the House Budget Committee
website at http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2009/02.04.2009_Daggett_Testimony.pdf with supporting charts at
http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2009/02.04.2009_Daggett_charts.pdf. Daggett’s analysis was summarized in the April
2009 edition of Air Force magazine, "The Cost of the Force," Air Force, April 2009, pp. 37-39, http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2009/April%202009/0409cost.pdf.
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therefore, will necessarily come at the expense of resources available in other
areas.
• Supplemental appropriations are expected to decline: Although plans to withdraw
from Iraq are uncertain, the military services expect that supplemental
appropriations will come down within a few years. Costs for training and
equipment maintenance that have been covered in supplementals will, then,
migrate back into the baseline budget at the expense of other programs, and
money to further upgrade ground forces will have to be found elsewhere.
• Costs of military personnel have grown dramatically in recent years: Since the
end of the 1990s, Congress has approved substantial increases in military pay and
benefits, including pay increases of ½ percent above civilian pay indices in seven
of the past eight years, three rounds of “pay table reform” that gave larger raises
to personnel in the middle grades, increased housing allowances to eliminate on
base and off-base disparities, DOD-provided health insurance for Medicare-
eligible military retirees (known as “TRICARE” for Life), concurrent receipt of
military retired pay and veterans disability benefits that had earlier been offset,
elimination of a reduction in retiree survivor benefits that had occurred at age 62,
and large increases in enlistment and reenlistment bonuses and special pays.
Although bonuses and some other payments may decline in the future, most of
the past increases in pay and benefits have been built into the basic cost of
personnel. CRS calculates that uniformed personnel now cost 40% more, per
capita, after adjusting for inflation, than in FY1999.
• Operating costs continue to grow above base inflation: Historically, military
operation and maintenance budgets, which pay for everything from personnel
training, to weapons repairs, to facility operations, to health care, have increased
relative to the size of the force by about 2.7% per year above inflation. These
increases are not as large as in some areas of the civilian economy, such as health
care, but they do not reflect gains in productivity that are common in other
sectors of the economy. Continued growth in operating costs, which is now
widely seen as a fact of life in defense planning, erodes the availability of
resources for weapons modernization and other priorities.
• Increasing generational cost growth in major weapons programs: It is generally
expected that new generations of weapons will be more expensive than the
systems they replace as weapons technology advances. The rate of generational
cost growth, however, is becoming a matter of increasing concern within the
Defense Department. New stealthy aircraft, multi-mission ships, advanced space
systems, and networked missiles, guns, and vehicles appear to be getting more
expensive than their predecessors at a greater rate than in the past. Unless
budgets increase more rapidly than costs, trade-offs between the costs of new
weapons and the size of the force may be required.
• Poor cost estimates: The difficulties engendered by accelerating intergenerational
weapons cost growth are exacerbated by poor cost estimation. The Government
Accountability Office has documented frequent, substantial increases in costs of
major defense systems compared to original development estimates. A side-effect
of inaccurate cost projections is an increased instability in the overall defense
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budget, which entails inefficient production rates for major weapons programs
and increased costs due to changing production plans.10
• New requirements based on the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan: The wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan have led to very large increases in equipment requirements for
ground forces, particularly for force protection, communications, and
transportation. National Guard combat units that earlier were equipped with older
systems cascaded from active units are now seen as part of the rotation base that
require equally modern equipment. Full sets of current equipment are expected to
be available not only for next-to-deploy units, but also for units as they begin to
reset from overseas rotations. A key lesson of the war is that what used to be
called “minor procurement” for ground forces was substantially undercapitalized.
• A broader range of national security challenges: A common presumption before
9/11 was that forces trained and equipped for traditional conflicts between
national armies would be able to cope with what were seen as less demanding
other challenges such as stability operations. Now Secretary Gates and other
prominent defense leaders maintain that forces must be designed not only for
traditional conflicts, but for insurgencies and other irregular wars, support of
allies, threats of catastrophic attacks by non-state actors with weapons of mass
destruction, and entirely new kinds of disruptive attacks on specific U.S. and
allied vulnerabilities. The effect has been to broaden requirements without,
necessarily, an attendant offsetting reduction in older force goals. When these
factors are taken as a whole, it is not so surprising that military planners discover
some shortfalls.
But, for Congress, it may not be so obvious that the principle answer to all these problems is
simply to provide more money for defense. More money is one alternative. Other alternatives
may include backing away from plans to add 92,000 active duty troops to the Army and Marine
Corps; shifting resources among the military services to reflect new challenges rather than
allocating them roughly the same proportions every year; reviewing requirements for expensive
new technologies in view of the presence or absence of technologically peer or near peer
competitors; and shifting resources from military responses to global threats toward non-military
means of prevention.
Defense Priorities: Budget and Strategy
Secretary Gates stated that the budget decisions that he announced on April 6, 2009, were
intended to “reshape the priorities of America’s defense establishment.”11 Those decisions
focused almost exclusively on “means”, rather than on desired “ends” based on policy decisions,
or “ways” designed to utilize given means to achieve desired ends. That emphasis on resources,
together with the relatively broad scope of the announced programmatic decisions, raises key
questions about the relative weight of strategy and budget in driving defense priorities.
10 For GAO’s more recent annual overview of defense acquisition cost growth, see U.S. Government Accountability
Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-326SP, March 30, 2009.
11 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.
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Background: Strategic Direction
Secretary Gates stressed that the April 6 announcement reflected a line of strategic thinking
dating back 18 months, and captured in the June 2008 National Defense Strategy, other
Department of Defense official documents, and speeches and statements.12 This continuum of
strategic thought appears to be based on several major premises:
• The “wars we’re in”—Iraq and Afghanistan—are broadly indicative of the kinds
of challenges that the United States is most likely to face in the future. Those
challenges include preparing for “hybrid warfare,” in which both state and non-
state actors blend cutting-edge technologies (usually associated with state-based
militaries) with irregular approaches and/or non-conventional approaches usually
associated with guerrilla groups. Recent examples of hybrid warfare cited by
DOD officials include Hezbollah’s operations against Israel in 2006 and the use
of sophisticated Explosively-Formed Penetrators by insurgents in Iraq.13
• DOD should enhance and better institutionalize the capabilities required to meet
these sorts of challenges by adjusting investments and by rebalancing the force
accordingly.14
• While conventional challenges persist, the nation’s current and projected
advantages allow room for assuming greater risk in that area. On April 6,
Secretary Gates echoed the 2008 National Defense Strategy: “Although U.S.
predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for
the medium term given current trends.”15
• DOD is operating in a resource-constrained environment, in which “running up
the score” in one area—maintaining unnecessary redundancy—requires a
decision not to do something else.
• Partnerships—with other U.S. Government agencies and with international
friends and allies—will play an increasingly important role in the preparation for,
and execution of, future operations.
12 See for example Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Gen. James
Cartwright with Internet Security Writers, April 7, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4398. Key sources include Department of Defense,
National Defense Strategy, June 2008; Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare (IW)”, December
1, 2008; Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, speech at Kansas State University, “Landon Lecture”, November 26,
2007, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199; Secretary of Defense Robert M.
Gates, remarks to U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, July 15, 2008, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262; Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy:
Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs, January 2009, pp. 28-40.
13 See for example Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4399. On “hybrid warfare”, see for example Frank
Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007.
14 For example, see Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6,
2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=134: “We must rebalance this department’s
programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we
are most likely to face in the years ahead…”
15 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009,
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341; and DoD, National Defense Strategy, June 2008,
p.21.
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Strategic Processes
The decisions Secretary Gates announced April 6, timed to inform the FY 2010 budget request,
were somewhat off cycle with Congressionally-mandated defense strategic review processes. This
lack of synchronization raises some questions about the extent to which the decisions were
strategically informed.
In theory, national security strategy issued by the White House sets the parameters for the
national defense strategy issued by DOD as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
process, and defense strategy in turn shapes budget choices. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
established the permanent requirement for the President to submit a national security strategy
report to Congress annually. That report is ordinarily due on the date the President submits the
budget for the following fiscal year, but in the first year of a new Administration, it is due 150
days after the President takes office.16 The due date this year would fall on June 19, 2009. In turn,
legislation requires that DOD conduct a QDR during the first year of every Administration, with a
requirement to submit a report based on that review to Congress in the year following the year in
which the review is conducted, but not later than the President submits the budget for the next
fiscal year.17 The due date for this QDR would fall in early February 2010. The QDR is intended
to be a rigorous, inclusive review process that weighs assessments of the strategic environment,
requirements, and gaps and overlaps in current capabilities. Further, by law, the QDR report must
include “a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the United States.” That
defense strategy, in turn, is required to be “consistent with the most recent national security
strategy.”18
In practice, the Obama Administration appears to be broadly on track with the prescribed strategy
cycle. However, that cycle may not be well-adapted for informing budget priorities in the first
year of a new Administration. The most recent National Security Strategy (NSS) was issued by the
Bush Administration in March 2006. Senior Administration officials have noted that the Obama
Administration is unlikely to publish a new NSS in time to help shape the 2010 QDR (or in time
for submission by the June deadline). However, officials have indicated that an ongoing national
security review process—led by the National Security Council and intended to establish priorities
and produce classified, internal guidance to departments and agencies—would likely set
parameters for the QDR process.19 DOD issued the most recent National Defense Strategy in June
2008, under the signature of Secretary Gates, as a stand-alone document, separately from a QDR
process.20 Secretary Gates has stressed repeatedly that the 2008 NDS will undergird the 2010
QDR process. On April 23, 2009, DOD announced the start of the 2010 QDR process.21 Senior
16 See Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, P.L. 99-433, §603.
17 The permanent requirement to conduct a QDR was introduced by the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2000, October 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, which amended Title 10 of U.S. Code. See Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part
I, Chapter 2, §118. Subsequent legislation amended parts of the mandate, see the NDAA for FY2002, December 28,
2001, P.L. 107-107, §921; and the Bob Stump NDAA for FY2003, December 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314, §922 and 923.
18 See Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 2, §118 (b) (1).
19 See Christopher J. Castelli, “Senior Official: QDR Will Take Cues from NSC Review,” Inside Defense, April 23,
2009; and Christopher J. Castelli, “NSC Crafting Classified, National Security Planning Guidance, Inside Defense,
March 19, 2009.
20 DOD had established a precedent for such separation by issuing the previous NDS in 2005, at the beginning of the
QDR process that yielded the February 2006 QDR Report.
21 Department of Defense News Release, “DoD Begins QDR, NPR Processes,” April 23, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12627
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officials have indicated that the process is expected to conclude by the end of the summer, with
the intent that its findings would be used to inform budget decision-making for FY2011.22
DOD officials have stated that, despite the absence of a concurrent QDR or NDS process, the
budget decisions announced on April 6 were developed over the course of three months, in a
rigorous, inclusive way that included “not only the chiefs and secretaries of the Services, but also
the [Combatant] Commanders.”23 DOD has reportedly continued the practice launched under the
previous Administration, following the 2006 QDR, of holding frequent, inclusive sessions with
senior DOD civilian and military leaders, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider strategic priorities, specific programs and
initiatives, and Departmental processes.
Senior DOD leaders have also stated that the scope of the April 6 decisions was not
comprehensive, and that several categories of issues were deferred to the forthcoming QDR
process. Secretary Gates indicated that he had deferred consideration of some specific issues—
including amphibious capabilities, a follow-on bomber, and strategic (nuclear) requirements—for
which sufficient “analysis and understanding” had not yet been available. Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright added that some broader and more fundamental
issues had also been deferred to the QDR—including “how to shift and manage risk,” including,
for example, how to think about potential trade-offs between very different sets of capabilities.”24
Issues for Congress
Secretary Gates’ April 2009 announcement of defense budget decisions raises a series of
fundamental strategic and process questions, with implications for both policy and
resourcing.
Assessing Challenges and Requirements: Conventional, Irregular—or Hybrid?
In multiple fora, Secretary Gates has underscored the need to “display a mastery of irregular
warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat.”25 Experts disagree about
how to define those categories of warfare, but most experts use “conventional” or “traditional” to
refer to warfare between state employing organized military forces; and “irregular” to refer to
warfare among state and non-state actors, with an emphasis on “asymmetric” or non-conventional
approaches.26
22 Christopher J. Castelli, “Gates Poised to Sign Key Guidance for QDR, NPR,” Inside Defense, April 23, 2009.
23 See Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Gen. James Cartwright
with Internet Security Writers, April 7, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4398; Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense
Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4399; and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,
Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.
24 See Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4399.
25 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008. The Department of Defense Directive 3000.07,
“Irregular Warfare (IW)”, December 1, 2008, stated that IW “is as strategically important as traditional warfare.”
26 The Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare (IW)”, December 1, 2008, defined IW as: “A
violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular
(continued...)
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To date, most of the debates among defense experts, both practitioners and observers, have
framed the fundamental question as a zero-sum balance between irregular and conventional
capabilities.27 The outcome of these debates could have significant implications for both policy
direction, and for the execution of the military services’ fundamental responsibilities under Title
X of U.S. Code to organize, man, train and equip the force. The conventional/irregular debates
have unfolded most prominently in ground forces circles, in discussions of the lessons of the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan and their applicability to future contingencies. But air, naval, and space
forces also play key roles in irregular warfare—a point Secretary Gates underscored on April 6
with his announcement of increased support for manned and unmanned intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and for Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). The future course of
the conventional/irregular debates is likely to have a major impact on all the military services, in
terms of both the balance within each service between irregular and conventional capabilities; and
possible trade-offs among the services, between ground-based “irregular” capabilities and
“conventional” air and maritime capabilities.
The debates over strategic priorities and the allocation of investments among the range of
potential challenges have addressed several distinct sets of questions:
• Which future scenarios are the “most likely” and which are the “most
dangerous”? To date, there is greater agreement about the answers to those
questions than about the policy approaches those answers imply. For example, in
the field of homeland defense, many agree that the most likely threat to the
homeland may be the limited use of biological agents, and that the most
dangerous threat may be a nuclear strike on an American city. Yet some argue
that resources should be directed primarily to the more likely threat, while others
insist that the truly catastrophic nature of the most dangerous threat argues for
making that the priority.
• What is the appropriate role for DOD in irregular warfare (IW), in the
overlapping field of counterinsurgency (COIN), and in preventing or countering
weak or failing states?28 Some defense experts argue that a substantial or even the
primary role in such contingencies rightfully belongs to civilian experts, rather
than to those in uniform. One reason, they note, is that civilian agencies have far
more appropriate expertise. Another reason, they add, is that by focusing on IW
and COIN, the military risks the erosion of its dominance in conventional
warfighting arenas—such as “long-range strike, global logistics, space-based
capabilities and missile defense”—and, in general, its ability to respond to major
conventional aggression.”29 Other defense experts argue that while substantial
(...continued)
warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other
capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”
27 See, notably, Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Petraeus Doctrine,” The Atlantic, October 2008. Some civilian practitioners
and observers have long expressed concerns about the term “irregular warfare”—in particular, a reluctance to use any
term including the word “warfare” as an umbrella for a number of civilian activities. Some DoD senior officials have
argued for tweaking the terminology in the interests of interagency cooperation. See for example Christopher J.
Castelli, “Irregular Warfare Term Stirs Debate as DoD Prepares QDR,” Inside Defense, April 16, 2009.
28 Experts disagree about the conceptual relationship between IW and COIN. Most suggest that COIN and IW overlap
but are not isomorphic; some suggest that one is a subset of the other.
29 Michael J. Mazarr, “The Folly of ‘Asymmetric War’,” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2008, pp. 33-53.
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civilian participation in irregular warfare contingencies might be preferred, U.S.
government civilian agencies do not have the capacity to meet current
requirements. Unless and until those agencies develop such capacity, they add,
only military forces can provide the capabilities and capacity needed to meet the
irregular challenges the nation faces.30
• How fungible are military capabilities along the spectrum of conventional-to-
irregular conflict? For many analysts, the key issue is the extent to which COIN
and irregular contingencies can be regarded as “lesser included” cases of major
combat operations. Many proponents of focusing on conventional warfare argue
that forces organized, trained and equipped to prosecute “higher-end” combat are
capable of adapting to the requirements of IW, at not too high a cost.31 Some
proponents adjust—and strengthen—this argument by adding the provision that
forces oriented toward the “higher-end” should also have some measure of
training and preparation for the “lower-end”, without impinging on the
development of their higher-end capabilities, in order to further reduce the risk
should they be required to shift to irregular missions. Proponents of a stronger
emphasis on irregular warfare argue, in turn, that irregular contingencies require
a qualitatively different mindset and array of capabilities—including addressing
the “human, psychological, and political dimensions of war”—for which higher-
end capabilities such as advanced technologies are no substitute. Some add that
in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. military forces well-prepared for
conventional contingencies largely faltered when confronted with irregular
challenges.32 The Army’s Future Combat System vehicle program illustrates a
third perspective on fungibility—the attempt to stretch a “mid-range” capability
to meet both conventional and irregular challenges. Critics of that approach
suggested that it introduced the operational risk of a loss of sufficient capability
at both far ends of the spectrum.
However, some analysts have sharply questioned the bifurcation of strategic challenges into
“conventional” and “irregular” categories, arguing instead that the most likely future form of
warfare is “hybrid”. Defense expert Frank Hoffman writes, “Hybrid threats incorporate a range of
different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations,
terrorist acts (including indiscriminate violence and coercion), and criminal disorder.”33 The term
“hybrid warfare” applies both to the use of irregular approaches by state actors, and the
acquisition and use of sophisticated technologies by non-state actors—and proponents of the
concept argue that both scenarios are increasingly likely. What could make hybrid warfare
potentially hard to counter is its simultaneous employment of a mix of conventional and irregular
30 See for example John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton, “Dirty Windows and Burning Houses: Setting the Record
Straight on Irregular Warfare,” The Washington Quarterly, April 2009, pp.91-101.
31 See for example Gian P. Gentile, “Think Again: Counterinsurgency”, Foreign Policy Online, January 2009, available
at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4631. Gentile writes, “The Army must organize itself around
the principle of fighting with the knowledge that if called on, it can easily shift to nation-building and
counterinsurgency, as it has done in Iraq. But doing the opposite—building an Army that is great at building schools
and negotiating with tribal sheikhs but is unprepared to fight at the higher end of the conflict spectrum—will only
ensure that most of the blood and guts will be ours.”
32 See H.R. McMaster, “The Human Element: When Gadgetry Becomes Strategy,” World Affairs, Winter 2009, pp. 31-
43.
33 See Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict,” Strategic
Forum, Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, No.240, April 2009.
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approaches by the same group of actors—whether state or non-state actors—in a single
battlespace.
The very qualities that make hybrid warfare hard to counter in practice may also make it hard to
conceptualize in theory. In the rhetoric of some senior DOD officials, the term “hybrid” seems to
be used interchangeably with “irregular”. In other cases, officials seem to characterize hybrid
challenges as the arithmetic sum of conventional and irregular “parts.” In his January 2009
Foreign Affairs article, Secretary Gates indicated that the problem may be more complex. He
wrote:
When thinking about the range of threats, it is common to divide the “high end” from the
“low end,” the conventional from the irregular...In reality...the categories of warfare are
blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes. One can expect to see more tools and tactics
of destruction—from the sophisticated to the simple—being employed simultaneously in
hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.34
A rigorous future analysis might pursue this insight further, examining whether hybrid warfare
includes qualitatively new dimensions—with possibly very significant implications for the way
U.S. military forces organize, train and equip to meet such challenges.
Institutionalizing New Capabilities
Secretary Gates has repeatedly stressed the need for DOD to institutionalize the capabilities
developed to date, often on the fly, to meet the kinds of challenges exemplified by “the wars
we’re in.” Many of the programmatic adjustments announced on April 6 were apparently
designed to better “balance” the force. From a cost perspective, traditional “high-end” capabilities
including sophisticated platforms are likely to cost significantly more than some “lower-end”
capabilities.35
While program changes may be necessary for such rebalancing, they are unlikely to prove
sufficient. As Secretary Gates has suggested repeatedly, the greater challenge may prove to be
changing mindsets, approaches, and career path choices, for example through adjustments to
organization, training, doctrine, and personnel policies.36 A key issue, looking ahead, is what non-
34 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs, January
2009, pp. 28-40. Explaining his budget recommendations at the Air War College on April 15, Secretary Gates made a
similar argument: “Another underlying theme in the budget recommendations is the need to think about future conflicts
in a different way. To recognize that the black-and-white distinction between irregular war and conventional war is an
outdated model. We must understand that we face a more complex future than that, a future where all conflict will
range along a broad spectrum of operations and lethality. Where near-peers will use irregular or asymmetric tactics and
non-state actors may have weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated missiles as well as AK-47s and RPGs. This
kind of warfare will require capabilities with the maximum possible flexibility to deal with the widest possible range of
conflict.” Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Speech at the Air War College, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base,
Montgomery, AL, April 15, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1344.
Secretary Gates made similar remarks on April 16 at the Army War College, and on April 17 at the Naval War College.
35 In order to make the point that “rebalanced” budget priorities do not signal a decrease in DOD’s investment in
traditional warfighting capabilities, Secretary Gates has stated a number of times that about half the DOD budget
supports traditional warfighting, about 40% of the budget supports “dual-purpose capabilities that work in any
scenario,” and about 10% supports capabilities for “irregular or hybrid” warfare. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,
Interview with Judy Woodruff, The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, April 7, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4397.
36 See for example Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice
(continued...)
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programmatic changes, including their long-term cost implications, might be required to
complement programmatic changes in support of further “institutionalization.”
Characterizing the Nature and Scope of Risk
The 2008 National Defense Strategy stated that DOD would continue to focus investments on
building capabilities to meet irregular challenges, while “examining areas where we can assume
greater risk.”37 Many observers have suggested that Secretary Gates’ April 6 announcement
signaled willingness to assume some additional risk in conventional warfighting arenas.
Most experts agree that risk assessment is critical to defining requirements and making budgetary
decisions, but the debates about risk are sometimes imprecise because “risk” can mean a number
of different things. For example, it can indicate: readiness to accept a lesser margin of superiority,
because one is confident that the mission can still be achieved; readiness to accept a higher cost,
in terms of blood and treasure, in the execution of a mission; readiness to accept a greater
likelihood that a particular contingency will occur; and readiness to accept a greater degree of
uncertainty in general.
To assess the magnitude and prudence of the risks inherent in the April 6 decisions, Congress may
wish to consider:
• How confident are U.S. defense and intelligence agencies in their assessments of
how long it might take potential competitors to develop specific conventional
military capabilities?
• To what extent do DOD’s risk assessments incorporate assumptions about the
intent of potential adversaries regarding the use of such capabilities?
• If production of a highly sophisticated system is ended or slowed, how quickly
could the defense industrial base reconstitute the capacity—both the physical
infrastructure and the dedicated, skilled and trained workforce—to restart
production, should the need arise?
For example, Secretary Gates announced the decision to focus on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as
the U.S. fifth-generation fighter while ending production of the F-22 at 187 aircraft. He addressed
one key assumption—the projected timelines of potential peer competitors for developing fifth-
generation fighters—by noting that Russia would likely achieve initial operating capability by
about 2016, and China by about 2020.38 Unstated were any assumptions made about broader
Russian or Chinese intent regarding the utilization of such a capability, or whether any such
assumptions had any bearing on DOD decision-making. Also unstated was any characterization
of the kinds of risks DOD believes it is assuming—less superiority, a smaller margin of error,
(...continued)
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4399; and Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy:
Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs, January 2009; and remarks by Secretary Gates at the
House Armed Services Committee hearing on the priorities of the Department of Defense in the new Administration,
January 27, 2009.
37 See Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008, pp. 21-2.
38 Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4399.
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greater likely costs in terms of lives— through greater reliance on the F-35, rather than the more
capable F-22.
Clarifying the Concept of Deterrence for the 21st Century
In the 21st century, a broad consensus has emerged among practitioners and observers about the
need to prepare to deter a wider variety of adversaries than before. The consensus generally
accepts that deterrence still relies on demonstrated U.S. military capabilities, and adversaries’
belief in our willingness to use them. It also recognizes that some categories of adversaries, such
as terrorists, may not be readily amenable to deterrence.39
To assess the full significance of Secretary Gates’ budget recommendations, it may help to
consider:
• What kinds of military capabilities would be of most use in deterring non-
traditional adversaries?
• What demonstrations would be necessary to ensure that, from the perspective of
non-traditional adversaries, such U.S. capabilities pose credible deterrent threats?
• What decision-making calculus—perhaps including risks, costs, and benefits—
are various categories of non-traditional potential adversaries likely to use? How
do they think?
A more coherent concept of 21st century deterrence could allow Congress to better evaluate the
extent, if any, to which the April 6 decisions might restrict the U.S. government’s flexibility in
deterring non-traditional potential adversaries.
Evaluating the Impact of Growing “Partnership” on DOD Requirements
The “continuum” of strategic thinking that Secretary Gates referred to, in announcing defense
budget decisions on April 6, has included a strong emphasis both on “whole-of-government”
approaches that mobilize all relevant U.S. agencies for national security activities, and on
international partnerships. A key issue is the extent to which assumptions about growth in
interagency and/or international partner capacity have shaped DOD’s own requirements, or
should shape them in the future.
Secretary Gates has repeatedly called for strengthening the civilian capacity and capabilities of
the U.S. government, and also for closer integration of civilian and military efforts. What is less
clear is whether DOD’s own “slice of the pie,” in terms of resources and requirements, ought to
shrink, as civilian capabilities grow. The NDS does suggest that, in some instances, enhanced
civilian capabilities might lead to a reduction in DOD’s requirements. For example, “having
permanent civilian capabilities available and using them early could also make it less likely that
military forces will need to be deployed in the first place.”40 At the same time, Secretary Gates
39 The 2008 NDS highlights cases in which “the value is not in the destruction of a target but the attack and the very
means of attack, as in terrorism.” Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2009, p.12.
40 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008, p.17. See also Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,
remarks to U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, July 15, 2008, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262.
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has consistently argued that even with a growth in civilian capacity, the U.S. military will still
“need to institutionalize and retain these non-traditional capabilities.”41
In the international arena, Secretary Gates has argued that fostering the capacity and capabilities
of international partners is critically important—that such efforts are “arguably as important if not
more so than the fighting the United States does itself.”42 What is less clear is whether concerted
investment in building international partner capacity is simply intended to make combined efforts
more effective, or whether it might also lead to a reduction in U.S. requirements.
Conducting a Comprehensive Strategic Review
In April, DOD launched the formal Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process, and senior
DOD officials have indicated that the QDR will be based broadly on the 2008 National Defense
Strategy. The early issuance of the NDS, and the April 6 defense budget announcement, raise key
questions about what the real scope of the pending QDR will be, including the extent to which
major strategic priorities and approaches will be revisited and rigorously assessed.
On the model of the 2001 and 2006 QDRs, the pending review may also address DOD’s Force
Planning Construct (FPC), the short-hand description of what missions the total force must be
prepared to carry out simultaneously, which DOD uses to shape the force. The 2001 QDR
introduced the familiar “1-4-2-1” shorthand: the force must be able to defend the homeland (1);
deter aggression forward, in four regions of the world (4); swiftly defeat aggression in two
overlapping major conflicts (2); and win one of them decisively (1).43 The 2006 QDR introduced
a “refined FPC”, which framed both “surge” and “steady state” requirements in three areas—
homeland defense; IW/ war on terror; and conventional operations, together with various forms of
deterrence.44 One issue is the extent to which the April 6 programmatic decisions may shape a
new FPC by placing constraints on what the total force might be expected to execute
simultaneously.
April 6 Announcements
On April 6, 2009, roughly a month before the details of the FY2010 budget were released,
Secretary Gates announced several key recommendations all of which were incorporated into the
Administration’s FY2010 budget request released May 7. Gates said this “unorthodox” procedure
was warranted by the scope and significance of the decisions and by his desire to publicize them
as elements of his effort to change DOD’s strategic direction.
41 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, speech at Kansas State University, “Landon Lecture”, November 26, 2007,
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199.
42 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs, January
2009, pp. 28-40.
43 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 2001, pp. 17-21.
44 See Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2006, pp. 35-39. Some observers
charged that the “refined FPC” added nuance at the expense of crisp clarity.
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Quality of Life Issues
To improve the quality of life for military personnel and their families, Gates announced four
recommendations which, in sum, required $13 billion in the FY2010 base budget for activities
that previously had been funded in supplemental appropriations bills.
End-Strength Increase45
Secretary Gates recommended that the FY2010 budget complete the ongoing expansion of the
Army and Marine Corps, halt further personnel reductions in the Air Force and Navy (possibly at
end-strength levels of 330,000 and 329,000 respectively), and fund these end strength levels at a
cost of $11 billion.
Until recently, the Army had a permanent active component end strength of 482,400 while the
active component Marine Corps had a permanent end strength of 175,000. As recently as the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), DOD maintained that these strengths were adequate.
However, the reality of fighting a multi-front war for more than five years with an all volunteer
force eventually compelled the administration to reexamine its end strength position. Having
resisted previous congressional calls to permanently increase the end strength for the Army and
the Marine Corps, on January 19, 2007 DOD announced that it would seek approval to increase
the permanent end strength of both services.
As reflected in both the FY2008 President’s budget request and the FY2008 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), the Army’s revised authorization cap is 547,400 by 2012, an increase
of 65,000 over the previous baseline of 482,400. The Marine Corps’ revised authorization cap is
202,000 by 2011, an increase of 27,000 over the previous baseline of 175,000.
In reality, both services should easily achieve their authorization levels by the end of FY2009,
three years earlier than required for the Army and two years earlier than required for the Marine
Corps. Through intense recruiting and retention efforts, the Army ended FY2008 at a strength of
543,645 while the Marine Corps ended the year at a strength of 198,505.
The Air Force has been drawing down personnel for the past several years to fund equipment
modernization programs. At the end of FY2004, the Air Force had a personnel strength of
376,600 with a plan to reduce by 60,000 personnel and achieve an end strength of 316,600 by the
end of FY2009. However, on June 8, 2008, the Secretary of Defense announced the end of the Air
Force drawdown. While the FY2009 NDAA authorized and funding the Air Force at 317,050,
DOD is committed to stabilizing the Service at a strength of approximately 330,000. This
represents only a slight increase from the Air Force’s strength on September 30, 2008 of 327,379.
The Navy, on the other hand, has been downsizing by 8,000 to 10,000 personnel a year for the
past 6 to 7 years, attempting to reach a goal of 329,000, the number required to sustain 313 ships
and approximately 3,800 aircraft. The Navy ended FY2008 with a personnel strength of 332, 228
and projected a FY2009 end strength of 326,323.
45 Prepared by Charles A. Henning, Specialist in Military Manpower Policy
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Health Care and Family Support46
Secretary Gates stated his intention to provide increased funding for troops and their families by
requesting increases of:
• $400 million above the FY2009 level for medical research and development;
• $300 million above the FY2009 level for programs addressing the wounded, ill
and injured, traumatic brain injury, and psychological health; and
• $200 million above the FY2009 level for improvements in child care, spousal
support, lodging, and education.
Existing programs that previously had been funded through supplementals would be funded in the
base defense budget in FY2010. Secretary Gates stated that the department would spend over $47
billion on healthcare in FY2010.
In his April 6 statement, Secretary Gates did not mention any proposals to include cost saving
proposals in the FY10 budget submission. The earlier pre-decisional budget document released
by the White House on March 6, 2009 did not reference any such proposal either. However, in an
April 7 press conference, Secretary Gates stated that the Defense Health Program request would
be fully funded in the FY2010 budget request, unlike previous years in which legislative
proposals for cost savings had been included in the budget as offsets to budgetary needs.
Secretary Gates further stated his intention to work with Congress to enact legislation to better
control health care spending.
In its FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009 budget submissions, the DOD proposed increases in Tricare
enrollment fees, deductibles, and pharmacy co-payments for retired beneficiaries not yet eligible
for Medicare. These actions were justified by DOD as necessary to constrain the growth of health
care spending as an increasing proportion of the overall defense budget in the next decade.
Congress has passed legislation each year to prohibit the proposed fee increases.47
Study Groups Recommend Various Benefit Reforms
Congress sought advice on how to constrain military health care cost growth in crafting the FY
2007 National Defense Authorization Act. The FY2007 national defense authorization48 required
the establishment of a DOD Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care, composed of
military and civilian officials with experience in health-care budget issues, to examine and report
on efforts to improve and sustain defense health care over the long term including the
“beneficiary and Government cost sharing structure required to sustain military health benefits.”
Another provision of the same act (section 713) required the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) in cooperation with the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to prepare an audit of the
costs of health care to both DOD and beneficiaries between 1995 and 2005.
46 Prepared by Don J. Jansen, Analyst in Military Health Care Policy.
47 For additional information, see CRS Report RS 22402, Increases in Tricare Costs: Background and Options for
Congress, by Don J. Jansen.
48 Section 711 of P.L. 109-364.
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The Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care submitted its final report in December
2007.49 It found that existing cost-sharing provisions jeopardize long-term taxpayer support and
recommended phased-in changes in enrollment fees and deductibles that would restore cost-
sharing relationships that existed when Tricare was created. For instance, this would mean that
average enrollment fees for the average under-65 retiree family would gradually rise from $460
per year to $1,100 per year.
In July, 2008, the Presidentially directed Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
(QRMC) issued its report on deferred and noncash compensation for members of the uniformed
services. The QRMC recommended that Tricare Prime50 premiums for single retirees under age
65 be set at 40% of Medicare Part B premiums (which vary by the enrollee’s adjusted gross
income). Tricare Standard/Extra51 premiums for single retirees would be set at 15% of Part B
premiums. Family rates would be set at twice the single rate regardless of family size. Tricare
deductibles would be linked to Medicare rates with copayments waived for preventative care and
prescription drug payments limited to no more than two thirds of the average copayment faced by
civilians at retail pharmacies. In addition, the QRMC recommended that health care for retirees
under age 65 be financed through accrual accounting in order to illuminate how current manning
decisions will affect future costs.
In January, 2009, DOD’s Military Health System Senior Oversight Committee (SOC) issued a
report responding to the recommendations of the Task Force on the Future of Military Health
Care. The SOC response rejected some of the Task Force’s specific cost-sharing
recommendations, but did state that “DOD will continue to ask for congressional authority to
charge fees and copays in an effort to maintain both a generous health care benefit and a fair and
reasonable cost-sharing arrangement between beneficiaries and DOD.”52 If the Obama
Administration decides to pursue this option, details might be included in the official budget
submission expected in May or in the DOD’s national defense authorization legislative package.
Preparing for “The Wars We’re In”
Asserting that DOD is culturally conditioned to focus on preparation for conventional combat
against forces similar to our own, Secretary Gates said a second set of his recommendations were
intended to institutionalize within the defense establishment capabilities that are vital to waging
irregular warfare, as U.S. forces currently are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR)53
Secretary Gates, himself a former Director of Central Intelligence, has indicated his intention to
increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support to the warfighter by some $2
49 Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care Final Report, December 2007 (available at
http://www.dodfuturehealthcare.net/images/103-06-2-Home-Task_Force_FINAL_REPORT_122007.pdf).
50 Tricare Prime is DOD’s HMO-like health plan option.
51 Tricare Standard and Tricare Extra are DOD’s fee-for-service and preferred provider type health plan options.
52 Department of Defense Military Health System Senior Oversight Committee, “Response to the Recommendations of
the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care,” January 2009, p. 103.
53 Prepared by Richard A. Best Jr., Specialist in National Defense, Christopher Bolkcom, Specialist in Military
Aviation, and Allan Hess, National Defense Fellow.
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billion within the base budget. This initiative reflects the expanding use of ISR systems,
especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in Iraq and Afghanistan to locate targets that can be
attacked with minimal damage to innocent civilians or property. DOD notes that “the number of
deployed UAS [unmanned aerial systems] has increased from approximately 167 aircraft in 2002
to over 6,000 in 2008, while defense investment in UAS capabilities has dramatically grown from
$284 million in Fiscal Year 2000 to $2.5 billion in Fiscal Year 2008.”54
Gates recommended funding to field and sustain 50 continuous orbits of Predator-class and the
more capable Reaper-class UAVs, along with manned ISR platforms, such as the turbo-prop
aircraft used by Army brigade-level commanders in Iraq (as part of Task Force Odin), to provide
situational awareness—locating adversaries and even IEDs. The Gates initiative is designed to
include the acquisition of key tactical ISR systems in the base budget rather than in
supplementals. Reliance on supplemental funding is seen as resulting in insufficient ISR
resources to meet ongoing operational demands in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Gates also announced plans for more extensive R&D on ISR systems, with emphasis on systems
that provide links between warfighters and national systems. No details were provided.
The day after Gates set forth his ISR recommendations, the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), Dennis Blair, announced that his office and DOD have agreed on a plan to deploy new
imagery satellites whose design will evolve from current satellites and increase the use of
commercially available imagery. Current satellites are approaching the end of their operational
lifespan; a previous replacement approach (known as Future Imagery Architecture) was cancelled
in 2005 as a result of technical difficulties and cost-overruns and thus new systems are required.
Media reports indicate, however, that some Members favor an alternative approach to the one
approved by the DNI, one based on new systems that the Administration currently judges to be
technologically immature. Although Blair’s announcement did not mention the cost of the
satellite program (which will be funded in the classified National Intelligence Program (NIP)),
some media accounts suggest that costs of the new systems will approach $10 billion.55
Developing Partner Capacity (Section 1206)56
In his April 6 statement, Secretary Gates said he was recommending an increase of $500 million
“to boost global capacity efforts....training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counter
terrorism and stability operations.” Such an increase in funding for building global partnership
capacity under “Section 1206” of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L.
109-163, as amended, would require Congress to once again raise the authorized limit. The
current authorized amount is $350 million. Some expect that DOD may also propose extending
Section 1206 authority to allow support of a wider array of partner nation security forces than
currently is permitted.
Both the proposed increase in the Section 1206 authorized funding level and an expansion of the
types of foreign security personnel eligible for Section 1206 assistance would be consistent with
54Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, January 2009, p. 25.
55 Andy Pasztor and Siobhan Gorman, “Satellite Proposals Gain Traction After North Korea’s Launch,” Wall Street
Journal, April 5, 2009.
56 Prepared by Nina Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs.
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DOD’s original proposal for building global partnership capacity legislation in 2005. At that time,
DOD requested authority, beginning in FY2006, to spend up to $750 million per fiscal year to
assist foreign military and security forces, including armies, guard, border security, civil defense,
infrastructure protection, and police forces.
From the start, Section 1206 authority has been highly controversial, with some policymakers
judging that the Secretary of State should retain authority over foreign military and security force
training. As a result of disagreements over bestowing a new, global “train and equip” authority on
DOD, Congress substantially scaled back DOD’s request in 2005 action. As originally enacted in
P.L. 109-163, Section 1206 spending authority was limited to $200 million per year and only
foreign military forces were eligible for assistance. The new Section 1206 authority also
contained several restrictions, making it subject to existing human rights and other restrictions
elsewhere in law.
Congress has amended Section 1206 authority twice. In the FY2007 NDAA (P.L. 109-364),
Congress raised the authorized spending limit to $300 million. P.L. 109-364 also amended
Section 1206 to require the concurrence of the Secretary of State for all expenditures.57 In action
on the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-417), Congress extended Section
1206 authority through FY2011, raised the spending limit to $350 million, and made those funds
available across fiscal years, and included maritime security forces among those eligible to
receive assistance. It rejected the Bush Administration’s proposal to make Section 1206 authority
permanent, to extend eligibility to broad array of foreign police and other security forces, and to
increase the funding cap to $750 million.58
Army Brigade Combat Teams59
Secretary Gates proposed reducing from 48 to 45 the number of active duty Brigade Combat
Teams the Army will create as it reorganizes its combat force from 10 divisions (each numbering
between 10,000 and 18,000 soldiers) to a larger number of brigades, each comprising between
3,000 and 5,000 troops. Unlike older brigades, which typically have to borrow various specialists
from other units in order to deploy overseas, the new Brigade Combat Teams are intended to be
organizationally independent, including on their rosters all the personnel they would need for
deployment. By reorganizing its force into a larger number of smaller units, the Army hoped to
give soldiers more time at their home bases between deployments (called “dwell time”).
Moreover, since the new units are self-sufficient, the Army also hoped to eliminate the use of
Stop Loss orders, which require personnel to remain on active duty after the end of their
enlistment when their particular skills are needed.
The Army began restructuring from a division-centric organization to brigade-centric units
shortly after September 11, 2001. The original concept, as outlined in the FY2006 Quadrennial
57The original legislation called only for the Secretaries of Defense and State to jointly formulate any Section 1206
program and for the Secretary of Defense to coordinate program implementation with the Secretary of State. This
provision remains in current law.
58 For further information, see CRS Report RS22855, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2006: A Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces, by Nina M.
Serafino.
59 Prepared by Charles A. Henning, Specialist in Military Manpower Policy.
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Defense Review (QDR) was to transform the active Army into 42 Brigade Combat Teams and 75
Modular Support Brigades. In 2007, when a decision was made to add 65,000 soldiers to the
Army’s force structure (increasing active duty end strength from 482,400 to 547,400), six Brigade
Combat Teams and eight Modular Support Brigades were added to the planned brigade-centric
reorganization. At that point, the plan was to create 48 Brigade Combat Teams and 83 Modular
Support Brigades by 2013.
The Army currently has 43 Brigade Combat Teams, with the 44th scheduled for activation in
August, 2009.
Special Operations Forces60
Secretary Gates recommended increasing by 2,800 or 5% the number of personnel assigned to
Special Operations Forces, which are units trained to perform small-scale, often clandestine
military operations. How the proposed personnel increase will be spread among the Services and
a target date for completing the expansion were not announced. Gates also recommended
unspecified increases in the purchase of transport and aerial refueling aircraft that are adapted to
special operations missions.61
The FY2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) increased the number of active duty Special
Forces Battalions by one-third and established a 2,600-strong Marine Corps Special Operations
Command, a capability that did not previously exist in the Marine Corps. Today, there are
approximately 55,000 special operations personnel in the four military services.
The qualification and training requirements for special operations personnel are lengthy and have
a high failure rate. As a result, manning an enlarged force structure for special operations
personnel takes more time than manning conventional combat units.
Helicopter Crew Training
Secretary Gates recommended adding to the base budget $500 million to increase the number of
helicopters that could be deployed, with most of the funds intended to increase the number of
Army helicopter pilots recruited and trained.
Gen. Martin Dempsey, USA, chief of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is
reported to have said the additional funds would address the complaints of U.S. commanders in
Afghanistan, who say they have the helicopters they need but not enough trained personnel to fly
and maintain them. Currently, the Army trains about 1,200 helicopter pilots annually, but it needs
nearly 1,500, Dempsey reportedly said, adding that an additional $500 million would allow him
to close the gap in two years.62
60 Prepared by Charles A. Henning, Specialist in Military Manpower Policy.
61 For additional information, see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and
Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert
62 Amy Butler, “Army Shifts Focus to Helo Pilot Training,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 20, 2009.
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Shipbuilding63
Navy shipbuilding plans have emerged in recent years as a matter of particular congressional
concern. The ship-procurement rate for the last 17 years has been well below the average annual
rate that would be needed over the long term to achieve and maintain the Navy’s planned 313-
ship fleet. Many observers believe the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan is unaffordable.
Certain Navy shipbuilding programs in recent years have experienced significant cost growth,
construction delays, and construction deficiencies. Members of Congress who track Navy
shipbuilding have expressed growing concern and frustration about the situation.
Secretary Gates linked various shipbuilding proposals to different aspects of his overall strategic
vision, justifying some of them in terms of conventional force modernization requirements, others
in terms of acquisition reform, and still others in terms of his effort to institutionalize within DOD
thinking a higher priority for irregular warfare. His proposed actions concerning Navy ships did
not go as far as some observers had expected or speculated in terms of proposed reductions or
cutbacks. In particular, Secretary Gates did not propose a near-term and permanent reduction in
the size of the Navy’s aircraft carrier force from 11 ships to 10, and he did not propose the
cancellation of second and third Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. Some of Gates’ proposed
actions simply confirmed existing Navy plans for certain shipbuilding programs, or were
consistent with recent press reports about emerging Navy plans for those programs.
The following section discuss in more detail Secretary Gates’ recommendations concerning
various classes of vessels under development or under construction.
Aircraft Carriers
Instead of proposing a near-term and permanent reduction in the size of the carrier force from 11
ships to 10, Gates proposed that the schedule for procuring new carriers be stretched out
somewhat, to a rate of one carrier every five years. The previous schedule called for procuring
one carrier approximately every 4.5 years (a combination of four- and five-year intervals). The
stretching out of the carrier procurement schedule, Gates said, would place carrier procurement
“on a more fiscally sustainable path.” Gates stated that his proposed schedule would permit the
Navy to maintain an 11-carrier force through about 2040, after which the force would decrease to
10 ships.64
In announcing the proposal to stretch out the carrier procurement schedule (and his proposals
regarding the CG(X) cruiser, the 11th LPD-17 amphibious ship, and the Mobile Landing Platform
ship), Gates stated, “The healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America’s existing
battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several major surface combatants
and other maritime programs.”
63 Prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs.
64Reducing the carrier force in the near term and permanently from 11 ships to 10 could have involved
cancelling the mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul scheduled in FY2013 for the aircraft carrier Abraham
Lincoln (CVN-72), and retiring the Lincoln in 2015, at about age 26, instead of keeping the ship in
operation to about age 50.
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Although the Navy under Gates’ proposed carrier-procurement schedule is generally to maintain
an 11-carrier force through 2040, the force is projected to temporarily drop to ten ships for a 33-
month period in 2012-2015. This temporary drop has been projected for years and is not a result
of Gates’ proposed carrier-procurement schedule. The drop will occur because the aircraft carrier
Enterprise (CVN-65) is scheduled to retire in 2012 at age 51, and its replacement, the Gerald R.
Ford (CVN-78), is not scheduled to enter service until 2015.
Current law (10 U.S.C. 5062(b)) requires the Navy to maintain a force of not less than 11
operational aircraft carriers, so the Navy needs a legislative waiver from Congress to permit the
carrier force to drop temporarily to ten ships during the scheduled 33-month period in 2012-2015.
The Navy asked for this waiver in FY2008 and FY2009; Congress did not grant it. The Navy
plans to ask for it again in FY2010. The Navy argues that keeping the Enterprise in service for an
additional three years would require more than $2 billion in ship maintenance costs and ship
operating and support costs and will result in only one additional six- or seven-month deployment
by the ship. The Navy also argues that it will maximize the operational availability of its ten
operational carriers during the 33-month period by rescheduling certain maintenance actions
planned for those ships. Those who question whether the legislative waiver should be granted
argue that potential delays in completing the construction of CVN-78 could extend the 33-month
gap to perhaps 45 months, or longer, making it potentially more necessary and more cost effective
to spend the money needed to keep Enterprise in operation to 2015. If Congress does not grant the
legislative waiver, the Navy would need to begin scheduling the maintenance funding needed to
keep the ship in operation. Some portion of that funding might be needed in FY2010.
Secretary Gates’ proposal for shifting carrier procurement to one ship every five years will defer
the procurement of the next aircraft carrier, CVN-79, by one year, from FY2012 to FY2013. Such
a one-year deferral could increase the cost of both CVN-79 and Virginia-class submarines under
construction at that shipyard. A one-year deferral in the procurement date of CVN-79 could also
reduce the amount of advance procurement funding that is to be requested for the ship in
FY2010.65
DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyers
Secretary Gates stated that the proposed FY2010 budget “will include funds to complete the buy
of two navy destroyers in FY10. These plans depend on being able to work out contracts to allow
the Navy to efficiently build all three DDG-1000 class ships at Bath Iron Works in Maine and to
smoothly restart the DDG-51 Aegis Destroyer program at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard
in Mississippi. Even if these arrangements work out, the DDG-1000 program would end with the
third ship and the DDG-51 would continue to be built in both yards.” He added that “If our efforts
with industry are unsuccessful, the department will likely build only a single prototype DDG-
1000 at Bath and then review our options for restarting production of the DDG-51. If the
department is left to pursue this alternative, it would unfortunately reduce our overall
procurement of ships and cut workload in both shipyards.”
Gates’ proposal regarding destroyer procurement was one of several program actions that he cited
after saying, of DOD’s acquisition and contracting processes: “The perennial procurement and
65 Aircraft carrier procurement is discussed further in CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft
Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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contracting cycle—going back many decades—of adding layer upon layer of cost and complexity
onto fewer and fewer platforms that take longer and longer to build must come to an end,” he told
reporters April 6. “There is broad agreement on the need for acquisition and contracting reform in
the Department of Defense. There have been enough studies. Enough hand-wringing. Enough
rhetoric. Now is the time for action.”
Soon after Gates’ news conference, it was reported that the Navy had reached an agreement with
Bath Iron Works and Northrop to have Bath build all three DDG-1000s. Under the agreement,
Northrop will build the first two DDG-51s to be procured under the DDG-51 restart, and Bath
would build the third DDG-51.
The Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget will request about $1 billion in funding to complete the cost
of the third DDG-1000, which was authorized but only partially funded in FY2009, and
additional funding for the procurement of the first DDG-51. (This is what Gates meant when he
stated that the proposed FY2010 budget “will include funds to complete the buy of two navy
destroyers in FY10.”) The FY2011 budget is to include funding for the procurement of two more
DDG-51s.
Secretary Gates’ proposal on destroyers appears to endorse, to some degree at least, the proposal
announced by the Navy in July 2008 to halt DDG-1000 procurement and restart DDG-51
procurement. This proposal was the subject of considerable debate in Congress last year, with
supporters of the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 making arguments in favor of their own ships.
Gates’ April 6 news conference left unclear the status of a January 2009 proposal made by the
then-DOD acquisition executive, John Young, to begin procuring in FY2012 a ship called the
Future Surface Combatant (FSC) that could be based on either the DDG-51 design or the DDG-
1000 design. Gates stated that under his proposal, “the DDG-1000 program would end with the
third ship,” but depending on how the term “DDG-1000 program” is defined, that statement
might or might not preclude an FSC based on the DDG-1000 design. The status of the FSC
proposal following Gates’ April 6 news conference is a potentially important issue for Congress
to learn more about.66
CG(X) Cruiser
Gates proposed a delay in the start of the CG(X) cruiser program “to revisit both the requirements
and acquisition strategy” for the program. The Navy wants to procure CG(X)s to replace its 22
Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruisers, which are projected to reach their retirement age of 35 years
between 2021 and 2029.
In announcing this proposal (and his proposals on the aircraft carrier procurement schedule and
on delaying procurement of the 11th LPD-17 amphibious ship and the Mobile Landing Platform
ship), Gates said, “The healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America’s existing battle
fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several major surface combatants and
other maritime programs.” Gates’ proposed delay is broadly consistent with press reports since
66 Procurement of DDG-1000 and DDG-51 destroyers is discussed further in CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-1000
and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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late-2008 that the Navy plans to defer the procurement of the first CG(X) from FY2011 to about
FY2017.67
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
Secretary Gates recommended continuation of the planned procurement of Littoral Combat Ships
(LCSs) which he described as, “a key capability for presence, stability, and counterinsurgency
operations in coastal regions.” This was one of several recommendations he made after stating:
“Our contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and a bureaucratic
constituency similar to conventional modernization programs. I intend to use the FY10 budget to
begin this process.”
Gates said the FY2010 budget would request funding for three more LCSs, and that a total of 55
LCSs are planned. Both elements of this statement are consistent with prior Navy planning and
represent no change to the program: The LCS program was scheduled to increase from two ships
in FY2009 to three ships in FY2010 as part of a plan to ramp up the annual LCS procurement rate
to an eventual level of five or more ships per year, and the Navy has planned a total of 55 LCSs
since 2006.
The LCS program was restructured in 2007 following revelations of significant cost growth and
construction problems. The program continues to be a program of particular oversight focus for
Congress. The Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee, for example, held a hearing on March 10, 2009, to review the status of the program.68
LPD-17, Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), and Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
Laying the groundwork for a potentially dramatic change in DOD planning, Gates proposed
deferring from FY2010 to FY2011 the procurement of two ships intended to support amphibious
landings, saying he wanted to, “assess costs and analyze the amount of these capabilities the
nation needs.”
Gates drew the point more sharply during a speech to the Naval War College on April 17, citing
amphibious landings as one example of areas in which he wanted the QDR to be “realistic about
the scenarios where direct U.S. military action would be needed.” As recently as 1991, he
acknowledged, the threat of a large-scale amphibious assault by U.S. Marines on the coast of
Kuwait played a useful role in tying down Iraqi forces while the actual U.S.-led attack came
overland from Saudi Arabia. But Gates added: “We have to take a hard look at where it would be
necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious action again. In the 21st century, how
much amphibious capability do we need?”69
Pending analysis of that issue by the QDR, Gates recommended deferring the planned funding in
FY2010 of an 11th San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship and the first Mobile Landing
67 The CG(X) program is discussed further in CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background,
Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
68 The LCS program is discussed further in CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:
Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
69 DOD News transcript: “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode
Island,” April 17, 2009 accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4405.
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Platform—a ship intended to function as a pier on which cargo ships could transfer their loads to
amphibious landing craft.
Procurement of LPD-17s has been a topic of congressional interest in recent years. Gates’
proposal could increase the cost of the 11th LPD-17 and the MLP in then-year dollars, if not also
in real (inflation-adjusted) dollars. The FY2010 budget will request roughly $770 million in
funding needed to complete the cost of the 10th LPD-17, which was authorized but only partially
funded in FY2009.70
Secretary Gates did not recommend any change in planned procurement of Joint High Speed
Vessels (JHSVs), high-speed sealift ships the production of which is just beginning. He
announced that, “to improve our inter-theater lift capability,” pending delivery of the first JHSV,
DOD would charter two existing ships of this kind, in addition to two it currently has under
charter. The chartered ships of this type all have been foreign-built.
Aircraft71
As with his shipbuilding recommendations, Secretary Gates cited different rationales for his
various recommendations about aircraft programs, justifying some of them in terms of the need to
affordably modernize U.S. conventional forces and citing others as necessary steps toward
acquisition reform.
Tactical Combat Aircraft (F-35, F-22, F/A-18)
Secretary Gates basically reaffirmed the existing plan for fighter procurement, except for a slight
reduction in the number of F/A-18-type planes for the Navy to be funded in FY2010. He thus
rejected a vigorous campaign by proponents of the Air Force’s F-22 to continue production of that
aircraft which supporters maintain has a uniquely potent blend of speed and stealthiness. Instead,
Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Gen. James E. Cartwright, called for a force made
up of the planned 187 F-22s, plus thousands of the cheaper and less stealthy F-35s, and several
hundred missile-armed Reaper and Predator UAVs. The UAVs would replace many of the 250
older fighters, mostly F-16s, that Gates plans to retire.72 This marks the first time that senior DOD
officials have identified UAVs as major components of the U.S. combat force rather than as
support equipment.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
Secretary Gates recommended buying 30 F-35s in FY2010, an increase from the 14 funded in
FY2009, with an increase in funding from $6.9 billion to $11.2 billion. He called for buying 523
F-35s in FY2010-14 and a total of 2,443 of the aircraft over the program’s life. This procurement
profile matches the current F-35 program of record for FY09 and FY10, although $11.2 billion is
70 LPD-17 procurement is discussed further in CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
71 Prepared by Christopher Bolkcom, Specialist in Military Aviation and Allan Hess, National Defense Fellow.
72 DOD News Transcript, “Media Roundtable of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and General James Cartwright,
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Selected Reporters, April 7, 2009, accessed at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4399.
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higher than the $8.4 billion originally planned for FY2010. Purchasing 513 aircraft over the five
year defense plan is a slight increase (28 aircraft) over the current program, but the projected total
purchase of 2,443 remains the same as previously planned.73
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in March that DOD sought to increase
the 5-year purchase plan by 169, and criticized the $33 billion effort as creating “very significant
financial risk” in part due to a lack of flight testing prior to procuring large numbers of the
aircraft.74 Congress has waged an ongoing debate with DOD over funding a second engine type
as an alternative power plant for the JSF, which Congress has supported.75
F-22 Raptor
Secretary Gates recommended no further procurement of F-22s, thus ending the program at 187
planes—the 183 funded thus far plus four planes requested in the FY2009 supplemental
appropriation.
Ending production at 183 matches the program of record for the F-22 Raptor; the four additional
aircraft requested are intended to replace combat aircraft losses. In follow-on comments, Gates
stated that advice from Combatant Commanders and the Air Force indicated “no military
requirement for F-22s beyond....187.” Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, stated
during his confirmation hearings in 2008, that his personal position was that the right number of
F-22 aircraft was greater than 183 but less than the 381 that the Air Force had been arguing for.
However, he has since avoided any public statements on the matter.76 Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, said in December 2008 that the Air Force had discussed
with him a plan to purchase 60 additional aircraft, but deferred further discussions to the new
Presidential administration.77
On April 13, 2009 the Air Force’s civilian and military leadership, acknowledging the difficult
budget environment and new risk assessments by DOD, formally endorsed Secretary Gates’
proposal to complete F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft.78 Congress has generally supported the F-
22 in the past. In FY2009, Congress added to the budget request $523 million that could be used
for advanced procurement of an additional lot of F-22s should the administration choose to do
so.79
73 For further analysis on the F-35, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
74 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating Procurement before Completing
Development Increases the Government's Financial Risk, GAO-09-303, March 12, 2009,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09303.pdf.
75 See CRS Report RL33390, Proposed Termination of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F136 Alternate Engine, by
Christopher Bolkcom.
76 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Nomination Hearing, US Air Force Chief of Staff, 110th
Cong., 2nd sess., July 22, 2008.
77 U.S. Department of Defense, "DOD News Briefing with Adm. Mullen From the Pentagon," press release, December
10, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4330.
78 Michael Donley and Norton Schwartz. “Moving Beyond the F-22.” Washington Post. April 13, 2009.
79For further analysis on the F-22, see CRS Report RL31673, Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RS22684, Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan, by Christopher
Bolkcom and Emma Chanlett-Avery.
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F/A-18s
Secretary Gates recommended buying 31 F/A-18 Super Hornets for the Navy in FY2010, without
specifying the mix of models. FY2009 Navy budget documents indicate a planned FY2010
request for 18 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and 22 EA-18G Growlers—a version of the plane
modified for electronic warfare-- in all, a total of 40 aircraft. If, as most observers believe,
Secretary Gates includes EA-18Gs in his recommendation for a revised FY-10 purchase, then 31
aircraft represent a reduction of nine Super Hornets and Growlers from the previous DOD
budget.80
Congress has generally funded the F/A-18 as requested, with some modification to the mix of
“E,” “F,” and “G” models to be procured.
Air Mobility (KC-X, C-17)
Secretary Gates recommended that the Air Force remain on its current schedule to develop a new
aerial refueling tanker (KC-X) to replace the KC-135, which is the Air Force’s top acquisition
priority. A contract to develop and build the KC-X was awarded to Northrop Grumman in
February 2008, but after the GAO upheld a formal protest by competitor Boeing, Secretary Gates
cancelled the competition and called for a “cooling off” period, deferring all program decisions to
a new presidential administration.81 Before Gates’ April 6th announcement, it was unclear when
the competition would restart, with some sources claiming it might be delayed up to five years.82
While some in Congress support a “split” buy, i.e., having both companies build new tankers,
Secretary Gates remains opposed, citing high costs and potential problems the Air Force might
encounter by maintaining two separate training programs and logistics operations for the tanker
fleet.83
Congress has expressed strong support for replacing the aging KC-135 fleet, but has disagreed
with DOD on how this might best be accomplished. Over the past three legislative sessions,
Congress urged DOD to increase the proposed rate of KC-X production and has created a Tanker
Replacement Transfer Fund to give DOD flexibility in using procurement, O&M, and R&D funds
to support KC-X acquisition.84
Secretary Gates recommended ending procurement of the C-17 Globemaster III long-range cargo
jet after production of the 205 planes already in service or funded. Ending production at 205
aircraft matches the program of record for the C-17 Globemaster III. Potential questions may
arise over what analysis was used for this conclusion. In 2008, the incoming commander of
United States Transportation Command, General Duncan McNabb, stated that the strategic airlift
requirement (33.95 million ton miles/day (MTM/D)) set by mobility studies in 2005 could be met
80 For further analysis on these aircraft, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement
and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
81 U.S. Department of Defense, "DOD Announces Termination of KC-X Tanker Solicitation," press release, September
10, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12195.
82 Josh Rogin, "Obama Seeks to Delay Tanker, Cancel Bomber," CQ Today, March 9, 2009.
83 U.S. Department of Defense, "DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates From the Pentagon," press release, March
18, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4381.
84 For further analysis of this issue see CRS Report RL34398, Air Force Air Refueling: The KC-X Aircraft Acquisition
Program, by Christopher Bolkcom.
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with 205 C-17s, 52 modernized C-5Bs, and 59 C-5As.85 The Mobility Capability Requirements
Study (MCRS), a study due to be delivered to DOD in May 2009, was intended to analyze
strategic airlift requirements based on several scenarios, and to inform airlift procurement
decisions. With the C-17 program completed at 205, the results of this newest study may put more
focus on the planned number of C-5 aircraft to be modernized.
FY2007 was the last year C-17s were procured in the annual budget, and congress funded the 12
aircraft requested. DOD has requested, and Congress has provided 25 C-17s in subsequent war-
time supplemental appropriations.86
Acquisition Reform (VH-71, CSAR-X)
Two high-profile helicopter programs would be terminated under Secretary Gates’
recommendations who justified both proposals as part of his effort to reform DOD’s acquisition
process.
He recommended terminating the VH-71 helicopter, intended to transport the President and other
senior officials, on the basis of its troubled acquisition history and large cost overruns. While
post-9/11 security concerns gave the program a certain “urgency,” the long timelines for delivery
of fully capable helicopters (slated for initial deployment in 2017) work against that argument.87
President Obama recently added to the discussion by declaring the VH-71 “...an example of the
procurement process gone amuck” and stated that he was satisfied with the current helicopter
fleet.88 Gates also decided against purchasing the first lot of less capable “Increment 1” aircraft,
stating they would only last five to ten years, although it is unclear why their useful life would be
so much less than other models of helicopters.
Over the past three legislative sessions, Congress has expressed concern over noteworthy cost
increases, schedule delays, and foreign influence on the program. Over this time period, Congress
cut approximately $300 million of the $2 billion from the Navy’s R&D accounts for the VH-71.
Secretary Gates also recommended terminating the Air Force Combat Search and Rescue
helicopter (CSAR-X) and called for reviewing the requirement the aircraft was designed to meet.
His rationale for terminating the CSAR-X helicopter program jibes with a commonly held belief
that the process by which DOD defines the requirements a new weapon is supposed to meet does
not adequately force the military services to make hard decisions or trade off capabilities among
themselves. The debate over whether search and rescue (SAR) missions require a specialized
aircraft has been in progress for several years and was most recently raised by former Pentagon
85 “Modernized” C-5s are those modified under the Reliability Enhancement Re-engining Program (RERP). For a
discussion of the RERP, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Advance Questions for General
McNabb, US Transportation Command, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., July 22, 2008.
86 For further analysis of this program see CRS Report RS22763, Military Airlift: C-17 Program Background, by
Christopher Bolkcom and CRS Report RL34264, Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of C-5 Modernization and
C-17 Acquisition Issues, by Christopher Bolkcom.
87CRS Report RS22103, VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
88 The White House, "Remarks by the President in question and answer session at the closing of the Fiscal
Responsibility Summit," press release, February 23, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-
the-President-in-question-and-answer-session-at-the-closing-of-the-Fisc/
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Acquisition Chief John Young.89 In an interview in November 2008, Mr. Young stated that DOD
“...[has] a lot of assets that can be used in rescue missions with planning, so I don’t necessarily
just automatically rubber-stamp the CSAR-X requirement.” The Air Force countered that it has
twice won approval for a dedicated CSAR aircraft from the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC), the high-level DOD panel that approves the requirements a new weapons
program is supposed to meet. The service argued that CSAR was a critical shortfall at the
beginning of combat operations in Afghanistan in 2001, that specially-trained CSAR forces were
used far more often than recognized, and that using non-specialized forces for CSAR missions
would result in increased U.S. casualties. Further statements by Secretary Gates indicate that
DOD might also consider making CSAR a joint capability, thereby changing the organization and
acquisition process for any dedicated assets.
Over the past three legislative sessions, Congress cut $309 million from the $849 million
requested in Air Force R&D for the CSAR-X. Congress also used $185 million of these funds to
support the HH-60 helicopter, which the Air Force currently uses for CSAR mission.
Missile Defense90
Secretary Gates recommended that DOD restructure the ballistic missile defense (BMD) program
to focus more on rogue-state and theater ballistic missile threats and maintain and improve
existing long-range BMD capabilities. Overall, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget
would be reduced by about $1.4 billion.91
These recommendations seem to align with Gates’ broader strategic thinking about the types of
foreign threats the United States is most likely to face (e.g., “hybrid warfare”, where U.S. troops
could be threatened by state and non-state actors armed with short-range ballistic missiles).
Additionally, Gates’ stated objective is to adjust DOD investments and rebalance the overall
force, especially in the resource constrained era he acknowledges. This seems to reflect his
argument that the United States should focus more attention on shorter range BMD investments.
Gates also wants to improve our existing U.S. long-range BMD system without necessarily
acquiring more of that same capability pending DOD review of the need for additional
interceptors and whether more future-oriented programs could better supplement the overall
BMD capability.
Theater Defenses (THAAD, SM-3, Aegis)
To accelerate deployment of defenses against theater ballistic missiles—those without
intercontinental range—Secretary Gates recommended adding to the FY2010 budget $700
million to field more SM-3 (Standard Missile 3) and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense) BMD interceptors, and about $200 million more to convert six additional Aegis ships to
89 All references in this paragraph come from an investigation by the reporting staff of Aviation Week and Space
Technology, an aerospace trade journal. See Michael Fabey, "Young Opinion on CSAR Questioned," Aerospace Daily
& Defense Report, January 28-30, 2009.
90 Prepared by Stephen A. Hildreth, Specialist in Missile Defense.
91 For additional analysis of the missile defense issue see CRS Report RS22120, Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical
Overview, by Steven A. Hildreth and CRS Report RL33240, Kinetic Energy Kill for Ballistic Missile Defense: A Status
Overview, by Steven A. Hildreth.
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provide BMD capabilities. He added that this would basically fund the maximum production
capacity of the production lines for the SM-3 and THAAD, which are coming out of the testing
phase and moving into full-rate production.
Ground-Based National Missile Defense
Secretary Gates recommended not increasing the current number of long-range ground-based
interceptors deployed in Alaska, as had been planned. Currently, there are slightly more than two
dozen of these interceptors deployed in Alaska and California in the event of missile attacks
against the United States from North Korea or Iran. Gates said it was important “to robustly fund
continued research and development to improve the capability we already have to defend against
long-range missile threats.”
In response to questions about plans to construct a third missile defense site in Europe, Joint
Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Gen. James Cartwright, USMC, said there are “sufficient funds in
’09 that can be carried forward to do all of the work that we need to do at a pace that we’ll
determine as we go through the program review, the quadrennial defense review, and negotiations
with those countries.”92 Further details were not offered.93
Gates also recommended cancelling the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program94 because of its
significant technical challenges and the fresh need to look at the requirements for that system.
The MKV is seen by some as enhancing the capability of long-range interceptors for mid-course
BMD in the future.
Boost-Phase Defenses (Airborne Laser and KEI)
Secretary Gates recommended various program changes regarding boost-phase defense (i.e.,
efforts aimed at destroying attacking ballistic missiles shortly after they launch). He said the
United States has good mid-course and terminal BMD capabilities, but that we need to first figure
out what the United States requires concerning boost-phase BMD research and development
before proceeding further. In this regard, Gates recommended cancelling the second ABL
(Airborne Laser) prototype aircraft and shifting the focus of that program to further research and
development. He said the ABL program is not ready for production, that it has “significant
affordability and technology problems, and the program’s proposed operational role is highly
questionable.” Also, in response to a question about whether there might be changes in the BMD
acquisition process, Gen. Cartwright, said that “what will change is we’re going to start to shift
and understand in that first phase what the leverage and potential opportunities are in the boost-
phase, focus on the threats....and start to reassess what it is and what we can do in the boost-phase
for long-range.”
The status of the KEI (Kinetic Energy Interceptor) was left somewhat unclear by Gates
announcement.95 The KEI program is designed to provide a boost-phase BMD capability. At the
92 DOD transcript, “News Briefing With Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, April 6, 2009,
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396
93 For further analysis of this issue, see CRS Report RL 34051 Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by
Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek.
94 The MKV program is an effort to equip a single interceptor missile to destroy several incoming warheads.
95 Like ABL, the KEI is intended to destroy attacking missiles in the first few minutes after they are launched; but the
(continued...)
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briefing with Secretary Gates, Gen. Cartwright only offered to place the KEI program in the
context of reiterating the need to find the right balance between mid-course and terminal BMD
systems and the need to review more precisely the requirements for boost-phase R&D in general.
Congressional Perspectives
In response to Gates’ recommendations, several senators wrote to the Secretary expressing their
approval of the increases to THAAD and SM-3, but voicing concern about the overall cut to
MDA funding, stating that it could “undermine our emerging missile defense capabilities to
protect the United States against a growing threat.”96 At a media roundtable on April 7, 2009,
Secretary Gates said “perhaps we can persuade them that all is not as bad as they seem to think”
if he could show them the proposed changes to THAAD and SM-3, the sustained work on long-
range systems for mid-course BMD, and the continued work on R&D for the boost-phase.
Congress has long been strongly supportive of BMD programs directed at defending U.S. forces
deployed overseas, such as THAAD and SM-3. Gates’ recommendations in this year’s budget
seem to align with those interests, as well as some congressional interest in using those same
terminal BMD systems to address existing current Iranian missile capabilities that could reach as
far as NATO’s southern flank. Some view such an approach as complementing the proposed
European missile defense site, or even serving as an alternative.
Although Congress has provided most of the funds requested for boost-phase BMD programs in
recent years, some criticism has been leveled by various congressional defense committees and in
some bill language. The ABL program has been particularly controversial. Similarly, although
Congress has continued to fund deployment of long-range interceptors in Alaska, many in
Congress have registered on-going concerns over the capabilities of that system and raised
questions over the adequacy of the testing program for it. Gates’ proposal would halt the
continued deployment of those long-range interceptors and seek instead to “robustly fund
continued research and development to improve the capability we already have.” Congress has
also expressed some concern over the MDA acquisition process in recent years, but whether this
issue is addressed in the FY2010 defense budget request remains unclear.
Ground Combat Systems (FCS and EFV)97
On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates announced that he intended to significantly
restructure the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, the Army’s plan to modernize its
entire suite of combat equipment. DOD plans to accelerate the spin out of selected FCS
technologies to all brigade combat teams (BCTs) but will recommend cancelling the manned
ground vehicle (MGV) component of the program. The MGV was intended to field eight separate
tracked combat vehicle variants built on a common chassis that would eventually replace combat
(...continued)
KEI program would use a very fast missile to do the job, rather than a laser.
96 The April 6 letter, signed by Senators Joseph Lieberman, John Kyl, Lisa Murkowski, Mark Begich, Jeff Sessions,
and James Inhofe, can be viewed at http://lieberman.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=311225&&.
97 Prepared by Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces.
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vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank, the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the M-109
Paladin self-propelled artillery system.98
Secretary Gates said he was concerned that there were significant unanswered questions in the
FCS vehicle design strategy and that despite some adjustments to the MGVs, that they did not
adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Secretary Gates was also critical that the FCS program did not include a role for
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles that have been used successfully in current
conflicts. After re-evaluating requirements, technology, and approach, DOD will re-launch the
Army’s vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process.
There are a number of policy implications flowing from Secretary of Defense Gate’s decision to
restructure the FCS program. In essence, the Army was told to “go back to the drawing board” on
this almost decade-old program once described as the “centerpiece” of Army modernization.
Because the Army has focused exclusively on FCS for well over a decade, there has probably
been little thought given to alternatives to the eight MGVs that were to be developed under the
FCS program. DOD officials expressed misgivings that the Army had neither taken into account
“the lessons learned of the operational realities in Iraq and Afghanistan” in the design of FCS
MGVs nor carefully considered whether “one class of vehicles could in fact cover the range of
operations that we envision are going to be the reality of the future.”99 Another point of
contention is that the FCS program did not adequately address the role of MRAPs—a vehicle that
the Army considers interim protection for soldiers in combat. MRAPs, while providing excellent
protection to soldiers, are transport vehicles and are not fighting vehicles like the Abrams,
Bradleys, Strykers, or the proposed FCS MGVs, so determining a more permanent role for these
vehicles may prove challenging. Another implication will likely be developmental timelines.
Should a decision eventually be made to develop and procure new non-MGV-based variants to
replace the Abrams, Bradley, and Paladins, there will likely be questions raised about a decade
long or greater development and procurement cycle, as was the case of the FCS program. There
might also be resistance to an all-encompassing “systems of systems” FCS-like developmental
effort for Army vehicle modernization, although commonality between platforms to reduce costs
and improve maintainability and support could likely be viewed favorably.
Secretary Gates left unchanged the current plan to continue development and production of the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), an amphibious armored combat vehicle for the Marine
Corps. But he said a decision on the future of that program, like the future of planned amphibious
landing ships, would await the results of the QDR.100
Congressional Perspectives
Congress has generally viewed the FCS program with a degree of skepticism due to its ambitious
scope, significant price tag, and heavy reliance on theoretical and unproven technologies. In
addition, the FCS program’s reliance on defense industry lead systems integrators (LSIs) to
98 For further analysis of FCS see CRS Report RL32888, The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and
Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert
99 U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates and Gen. James Cartwright with Military Bloggers,” April 7, 2009.
100 The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle is discussed further in CRS Report RS22947, The Marines’ Expeditionary
Fighting Vehicle (EFV): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
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develop and manage much of the program has also come under significant congressional
scrutiny.101 Congress has been supportive of the Army’s recent decision to focus the FCS program
on “spinning out” sensor and unmanned aerial and ground systems, and networking technology to
its Infantry Brigade Combat Teams and might be expected to support DOD’s decision to
accelerate these efforts. Congress has also been concerned about the development of the FCS
Network, including complimentary programs to develop new software-programmable radios and
satellites to accommodate the vast amounts of information needed by FCS-equipped units. In this
regard, Congress has legislated a number of studies and testing requirements to insure that the
FCS Network will be fully functional and not vulnerable to either attack or disruption. Secretary
Gates did not mention restructuring the FCS Network, so it is possible that work on the network
not related to FCS manned ground vehicles will continue with a commensurate level of
congressional oversight.
The decision to not fund the development of FCS MGVs could be a more contentious issue in
Congress. One combat vehicle in the FCS MGV family—the Non-Line-of- Sight Cannon
(NLOS-C)— is a congressionally-mandated program,102 requiring the Army to produce a total of
18 NLOS-C Initial Production Platforms by the end of 2011. One possible point of contention
could be the necessity to build all 18 of these NLOS-Cs if DOD does not intend to procure
additional NLOS-Cs. Other potential issues include the possible resumption and continuation of
the M-1 Abrams and M-2 Bradley lines if the Army does not indentify successors during the re-
evaluation of its vehicle modernization program. In regards to the Army’s re-evaluation of its
vehicle modernization program, Congress might be expected to play a significant role in this
process, as it not only may provide them with an opportunity to shape Army capabilities and force
structure, but could also ensure that the eventual acquisition of any new ground combat systems is
in line with proposed acquisition reform measures.
Acquisition Process103
Secretary Gates called for stopping programs that significantly exceed budget, ensuring that
requirements are reasonable and technology adequately mature, and ensuring that programs begin
with realistic cost estimates and receive a stable budget. He also called for an end to
“requirements creep”—the practice of adding to a system, after development has been initiated,
capabilities that were not initially planned for.
Addressing programs with significant cost growth, Secretary Gates called for a number of
systems to be canceled, including the VH-71 presidential helicopter and the Air Force Combat
Search and Rescue X (CSAR-X) program. Regarding requirements and technology maturity, he
called for the cancellation of programs where he questioned the validity of their requirements and
the maturity of the technology, such as the Future Combat System and missile defense’s Multiple
Kill Vehicle (MKV). This is consistent with prior statements, in which he argued that in recent
101 For further analysis of the LSI issue see CRS Report RS22631, Defense Acquisition: Use of Lead System Integrators
(LSIs) - Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Valerie Bailey Grasso
102 See Section 216 of the FY 2003 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314) and Section 8121 of the FY
2003 Department of Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-248).
103 Prepared by Moshe Schwartz, Analyst in Defense Acquisition.
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years, weapon systems have added unnecessary requirements and proceeded with immature
technology, resulting in higher costs, longer acquisition schedules, and fewer quantities.104
These issues have long been recognized as weaknesses in the current acquisition process and have
been recurring themes at congressional hearings and in DOD reports. To date, the various
acquisitions reform efforts that have been pursued over the last 30 years, some of which sought to
address these same issues, have been unable to reign in cost growth and schedule extension.105 In
Fiscal Year 2009, both DOD and Congress are again focusing attention and resources on
acquisition reform, particularly as it relates to the acquisition of major weapon and information
technology (IT) systems. Current efforts appear to be focused on improving the current
acquisition system, not creating a fundamentally new acquisition system.
Prior to Gates’ press conference, DOD began taking steps toward reforming the acquisition
process. In July 2008, John Young, then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, in consultation with senior Army officials, cancelled the Armed Reconnaissance
Helicopter (ARH) program because of cost growth and schedule slippage.106 On December 8,
2008, DOD revised one of the regulations governing its acquisition process (DOD Instruction
5000.2), to require competitive prototyping of new systems and to place more emphasis on
systems engineering and technical reviews in evaluating a program. In addition, on March 1,
2009, DOD revised another of its regulations—Instruction, Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (CJCSI 3170.01G)—in order to streamline the process by which
requirements are established and establish a new committee, the Joint Capability Board, to review
and, if appropriate, endorse requirements before they are submitted to the Joint Requirement
Oversight Council (JROC).
In Congress, Senators Carl Levin and John McCain, chairman and ranking minority member
respectively of the Senate Armed Services Committee, sought to address these and other issues by
introducing the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (S. 454). Subsequently,
Representatives Ellen O. Tauscher and John M. Spratt, Jr., members of the House Armed Services
Committee, introduced the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (H.R. 1830), which
mirrors the original version of the Senate bill. Secretary Gates welcomed the Levin-McCain bill
and promised to work with Congress to reform the acquisition system. S. 454 was placed on the
Senate legislative calendar on April 2, 2009; H.R. 1830 was referred to the House Committee on
Armed Services on March 31, 2009. Rep. Ike Skelton, chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee introduced the Weapons Acquisition System Reform Through Enhancing Technical
Knowledge and Oversight Act of 2009 (H.R. 2101), which was referred to the Armed Services
Committee on April 27, 2009. In addition, The House committee also established a Defense
Acquisition Reform Panel to focus on acquisition reform.
104 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming The Pentagon For A New Age,” Foreign Affairs, January
2009
105 See: CRS Written Statement submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Defense Acquisition Reform, by:
Moshe Schwartz, March 3, 2009.
106 Department of Defense, "DoD Announces Non-Certification Of Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Program," press
release, October 16, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12288. A review of the program
was required by law because breached limits on cost increases and schedule slips mandated by the so-called Nunn-
McCurdy Amendment, a provision of law enacted in 1982 and amended several times since. What was remarkable
about Young’s ARH decision is that most programs that breached the Nunn-McCurdy limits have been continued by
DOD.
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Acquisition Workforce107
DOD has fielded, by all accounts, the most technologically advanced and superior military force
in the world, supplied by a most sophisticated acquisition system. However, at the same time,
DOD has experienced significant problems managing the costs, schedule, and performance of this
acquisition system. These problems have occurred despite continued efforts to reform defense
acquisition policies, personnel, and processes.
The package of decisions Secretary Gates announced April 6 marked a significant policy change
and an apparent end to the former Bush Administration’s reliance on private sector contractors to
perform work previously performed by defense acquisition personnel. In his words, his
recommendations mark, “a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition,
and contracting.”108 Together with announcements made by President Obama, it appears to signal
the beginning of a new era of examination of DOD’s use of private contractors and service
contracts.109
Specifically, Gates recommended increasing the size of DOD’s acquisition workforce by
converting 11,000 contractors to full-time government employees and by hiring 9,000 additional
government acquisition professionals by 2015, starting with 4,100 in FY2010. He also
recommended reducing service contractors from our current 39% of the DOD workforce to the
pre-2001 level of 26% and replacing them with full-time government employees. “Our goal is to
hire as many as 13,000 new civil servants in FY2010 to replace contractors and up to 30,000 new
civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years,” he said.
Gates’ decision to reduce the size of the contractor workforce appears to reverse a contracting
boom that had escalated under the Bush Administration’s Presidential Management Agenda’s
focus on “competitive sourcing.”110 These changes in policy and direction are potentially
significant because the DOD acquisition workforce had been significantly downsized from 1996-
1999 due to congressionally mandated reductions as well as recommendations from DOD
experts.
From FY1996 through FY1999, Congress directed the Clinton Administration to reduce the size
of the DOD acquisition workforce, which was defined as the employees who participated in the
development and procurement of weapons, equipment, and provisions for the military services.111
107 Prepared by Valerie Bailey Grasso, Specialist in Defense Acquisition.
108 U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Budget Recommendation Statement. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,
April 6, 2009.
109 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Memorandum For The Heads Of Executive Departments and
Agencies on Government Contracting. March 4, 2009.
110Under this policy, many agencies were required to meet privatization goals regardless of the impact on costs or
quality of services.
111 In the FY1996 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-106), Congress directed the Administration to reduce the
workforce by 15,000 people by October 1, 1996, and by a total of 25% (compared to the 1995 figure) over a period of
five years. The act also required the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on ways to restructure functions among
DOD’s acquisition departments and agencies. In the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201), Congress
directed the Administration to reduce the workforce by an additional 15,000 people by October 1, 1997, and stipulated
that this reduction was to be in the form of actual acquisition personnel, not just acquisition positions. In the FY1998
(continued...)
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These congressional mandates reflected a view in the Congress that the workforce had not been
downsized in proportion to the decline in the defense procurement budget.
In an April 7 media roundtable discussion, Secretary Gates contended that the number of DOD’s
private acquisition contractors had grown because the department’s acquisition workforce had
been “slashed in the nineties,” that the Defense Contract Management Agency went from 27,000
professionals to about 9,000, and that the number of DOD employees involved in procurement
went from 500,000 or 600,000 to less than half that number. However, he did not define which
functions were “inherently governmental”—and thus, by policy, should not be delegated to
private contractors—except for “the oversight of the process.” 112
Most experts agree that the size of the federal acquisition workforce, in general, and the DOD
acquisition workforce, in particular, has remained relatively flat or has declined since 2001. Some
policymakers have raised questions as to whether DOD has the right mix of acquisition workforce
personnel trained and equipped to oversee large-scale contracts. Given concerns about the size of
federal spending under the economic stimulus bill, some question whether the Obama
Administration can bring in the appropriate quantity and quality of acquisition workforce
personnel to support the significant amounts of contracting under the economic stimulus bill.
Further, while there is general agreement that the federal government needs to increase its in-
house capability to oversee and manage contracts, it is not entirely clear what specific skills sets
are needed to meet the challenge, and how many of those functions considered “inherently
governmental” are being performed by private sector contractors. According to Shay Assad, DOD
Senior Acquisition Executive and Director for Procurement and Acquisition Policy, DOD has
conducted “extensive assessments of the federal workforce’s’ gaps and capabilities.”113 DOD
plans to hire about 800 pricing specialists and cost-estimators as part of the acquisition
workforce; about 9,000 contract oversight personnel; and about 11,000 systems engineering
personnel.114
(...continued)
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-85), Congress directed the Administration to reduce the workforce by an
additional 25,000 people by September 30, 1998, but permitted the Secretary of Defense to waive a portion of this
reduction if the Secretary certified to Congress. These concerns include the failure of DOD to develop effective
acquisition strategies to field weapons systems and effectively provide oversight and accountability for service
contracts and contractors, particularly with the broader policy questions raised in the awarding and managing of
contracts for the reconstruction and follow-on work performed in Iraq. s by June 1, 1998 that such reductions would
adversely impact military readiness and acquisition efficiency. The act also required DOD to submit a report to
Congress by April 1, 1998 that provides a plan for future acquisition policy, including future opportunities to
restructure and streamline DOD’s acquisition organizations, workforce and infrastructure. In the FY1999 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 105-261), Congress directed the Administration to reduce the workforce by 25,000 acquisition
personnel by October 1, 1999, lowering it to 12,500 personnel if the Secretary of Defense certifies that such a reduction
would cause an adverse effect on military readiness or management of the acquisition system.
112 U.S. Department of Defense. Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and General James
Cartwright, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Selected Reporters, April 7, 2009. The Office of Management and
Budget defines an "inherently governmental function" as one, “so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate
performance by Government employees.” OMB Policy Letter 92-1, Subject: “Inherently Governmental Functions,”
September 23, 1992.
113 Newel, Elizabeth. Pentagon Workforce Could Benefit from Wall Street Layoffs, Government Executive.com, April
8, 2009, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0409/040809e1.htm.
114 Mr. Assad’s remarks from a breakfast, “Acquisition and Reform in the Age of Stimulus and Bailout,” hosted by
Government Executive at the National Press Club, April 8, 2009.
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Congressional Perspectives
Congress has expressed increasing concerns with the management of the DOD acquisition
system. Congressional interest in reducing the size and associated costs of the DOD acquisition
workforce had been energized, over the past two decades, by a number of blue-ribbon
commissions empanelled by the Secretaries of Defense. The May 1995 report of the DOD
Commission on Roles and Missions, for example, noted that while private-sector defense
contractors had undertaken large-scale reorganizations adjusting to a reduced level of defense
spending, little corresponding reduction had been made in the number of DOD acquisition
organizations or personnel.115 In addition, in March 1998, the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics asked the Defense Science Board to examine DOD’s
acquisition organizations and workforce, and develop a set of recommendations that would lead
to “better, cheaper, and faster acquisitions.” The Board recommended that the size of the DOD
acquisition workforce be substantially reduced.116
Congress subsequently expressed concern over the failure of DOD to develop effective
acquisition strategies to field weapons systems and effectively provide oversight and
accountability for service contracts and contractors, particularly with the broader policy questions
raised in the awarding and managing of contracts for the reconstruction and follow-on work
performed in Iraq.
Policymakers will examine Secretary Gates’ announcement and may question how the
Administration will balance potentially competing priorities:
• Given that DOD has an integrated acquisition workforce which includes both
contractors and federal acquisition workforce personnel, DOD will need to
quickly determine what functions are “inherently governmental” and should be
performed only by federal acquisition workforce personnel, and what functions
are appropriate for performance by contractor personnel.
• While the Obama Administration has a goal of increasing the size of the
acquisition workforce, quantity is but one factor—quality is another important
factor. The Obama Administration must ensure that tradeoffs of quality over
quantity do not occur. The acquisition workforce must have sufficient education
and training to meet the challenge and must take care to do it carefully and
deliberately. New hires must be capable of developing the knowledge, skills,
abilities, and ethical standards of the federal acquisition workforce, and must be
willing and able to represent the interests of the federal government.
• Secretary Gates’ did not address the role of the ongoing work of the House
Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform, nor did he
address the use of certain problematic contracting vehicles such as “cost-
reimbursement” contracts. While having additional acquisition workforce
personnel may improve contract performance, DOD has to closely examine the
115 U.S. Department of Defense. Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the
Armed Forces, in accordance with Section 954(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994.
Washington, 1995, pp. 3-16 and 3-17.
116 U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. Report of
the Defense Science Board, Acquisition Workforce Sub-Panel of the Defense Acquisition Reform Task Force on
Defense Reform , March 1998.
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use of large, executable, contract vehicles and their role in improving contracting
decisions, reducing costs, and addressing waste, fraud, abuse, and contract
mismanagement.
Strategic and Nuclear Forces117
Secretary Gates said on April 6 that requirements for long-range and nuclear strike forces would
be examined in the light of the QDR, a concurrent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and the state
of arms control negotiations with Russia occasioned by the expiration in December 2009 of the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and the Soviet Union,
signed in 1991.118
Ballistic Missile Submarines
Secretary Gates recommended that the Navy begin in FY2010 developing replacements for the
Navy’s 14 Trident missile-launching submarines, which entered service between 1984 and 1997.
The Navy initially planned to keep Trident submarines in service for 30 years, but has now
extended that time period to 42 years. This extension reflects the judgment that ballistic missiles
submarines would have operated with less demanding missions than attack submarines, and
could, therefore, be expected to have a much longer operating life than the expected 30 year life
of attack submarines. Therefore, since 1998, the Navy has assumed that each Trident submarine
would have an expected operating lifetime of at least 42 years—two 20-year operating cycles
separated by a two-year refueling overhaul.119
The Navy has initiated studies into options for a replacement for the Trident—one would be a
new, dedicated ballistic missile submarine and another would be a variant of the Virginia class
attack submarine. According to Admiral Stephen Johnson, USN, the Navy would have to begin
construction of a new class of missile submarines by 2019 so that they could begin to enter the
fleet as the Tridents begin to retire. Congress approved the Navy’s request for $10 million in the
FY2009 budget to begin conceptual design work on the replacement for the Trident submarine.
Long-Range Bomber
Secretary Gates recommended the Air Force not “pursue a development program for a follow-on
Air Force bomber until we have a better understanding of the need, the requirement and the
technology.” This would put on hold the Air Force plan to develop a new strategic bomber for
introduction into service in 2018.120
117 Prepared by Amy F. Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy.
118 Issues raised by the post-START arms control talks are analyzed in CRS Report R40084, Strategic Arms Control
After START: Issues and Options, by Amy F. Woolf. Broader issues involved in U.S. strategic force modernization are
analyzed in CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, by Amy F.
Woolf.
119 “SSBN Ohio-class FBM Submarines.” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/ssbn-726-
recent.htm.
120 This program is further analyzed in CRS Report RL34406, The Next Generation Bomber: Background, Oversight
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Anthony Murch.
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According to former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne, the Air Force is seeking a new bomber
with not only stealth characteristics and long range but also “persistence,” that is, “the ability to
stay airborne and be on call for very long periods.”121 The Air Force’s effort to develop a new
bomber was delayed by a dispute over whether the program should stand alone or be merged with
DOD’s effort to acquire a weapon system capable of Prompt Global Strike (PGS), that is, the
ability to quickly attack a distant target. While a new bomber could perform some of the PGS
missions, other systems, such as hypersonic aircraft and missiles also could be part of the a
portfolio of systems intended to strike targets anywhere in the world. In May 2006, the Air Force
decided to keep the bomber program separate from PGS reportedly because the PGS mission
placed a premium on very high speed while some bomber missions require an airplane that can
survive sophisticated anti-aircraft defenses and “loiter” near potential targets for some time.122
By May 2007, the Air Force had decided that the next-generation bomber would be manned and
subsonic and would incorporate some stealth characteristics.123 The service reportedly decided not
to develop an aircraft capable of supersonic speed or unmanned operation in order to hold down
the cost of the program and to ensure the versatility of the plane. In October 2008, Air Force
Secretary Michael Donley said the new bomber would be capable of carrying nuclear weapons.124
Secretary Gates’s decision to review the premises of the program may call those earlier choices
into question.
Other Recommendations
Secretary Gates made two additional recommendations:
• He called for terminating the $26 billion Transformational Satellite (TSAT)
program, an effort to greatly expand DOD’s high-speed connectivity with a
network of communication satellites linked to users by laser communication. In
its place, Gates recommended buying two additional copies of the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites that currently support DOD’s high-
speed communications network.
• He called for expanding the number of cyber experts DOD trains annually from
80 to 250 by FY2011.
121 Rebecca Christie, “Air Force to Step Up New Bomber Search in Next Budget,” Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2006.
122 Martin Matishak, “Long-Range, Prompt Global Strike Studies Will Remain Separate,” InsideDefense.com, June 16,
2006.
123 Michael Sirak, “Air Force Identifies Manned, Subsonic Bomber as Most Promising 2018 Option,” Defense Today,
May 2, 2007.
124 Carlo Munoz, “Donley: Next Generation Bomber Will Be Nuclear Capable by 2018,” Inside the Air Force, October
31, 2008.
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Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to
Date
FY2010 Congressional Budget Resolution
The conference report on the annual congressional budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 13) includes a
recommended ceiling on FY2010 budget authority and outlays for the “national defense” function
of the federal budget that matches President Obama’s request. The budget resolution’s ceilings on
budget authority and outlays for national defense and other broad categories (or functions) of
federal expenditure are not binding on the Appropriations committees, nor do they formally
constrain the authorizing committees in any way.
However, the budget resolution’s ceilings on the so-called “050 function”—the budget accounts
funding the military activities of DOD and the defense-related activities of the Department of
Energy and other agencies—have in the past indicated the general level of support in the House
and Senate for the President’s overall defense budget proposal.
The House version of the budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 85 ), adopted April 2, set the FY2010
budget authority ceiling for the 050 “national defense” function at $562.0 billion and provided a
separate allowance of $130.0 billion—the amount requested for war costs—under function 970
(“overseas deployments and other activities”). Those two ceilings add up to $692.0 billion. The
Senate version of the budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 13 ), also adopted April 2, set the budget
authority ceiling for the 050 national defense function at $691.7 billion and did not set a separate
ceiling for overseas deployments. In the reports accompanying their respective resolutions, the
House and Senate Budget committees each indicated that the ceilings recommended were
intended to accommodate President Obama’s FY2010 DOD budget request.
The conference report on the final version of the budget resolution (H.Rept. 111-89) follows
House version’s pattern of setting separate ceilings for a national defense base budget and for
overseas deployments. The House adopted the joint resolution April 29 by a vote of 233-193. The
Senate adopted it the same day by a vote of 53-43.
National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647, S. 1390)
The House version of the FY2010 defense authorization bill, H.R. 2647, was reported by the
House Armed Services Committee on June 18, 2009 (H.Rept. 111-166) and passed by the House
June 25 with relatively few changes. It would authorize $550.5 billion for the base budget (i.e.,
non-war costs) of DOD and defense-related programs of the Energy Department, which is $348.0
million more than the President requested. For war costs, the House bill would authorize $130
billion, as requested, but would redistribute some funds within that total bringing the total
authorized by the bill to $680.5 billion.
On July 2, 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported S. 1390 (S.Rept. 111-35) which
would authorize $551.1 billion for the DOD base budget and related Energy Department
programs, $864.8 million more than the President requested. The Senate bill would authorize
$129.3 billion, for war costs, which is $740 million less than the request, bringing the total
authorized by S. 1390 to $680.3 billion. The Senate bill also would require the Administration to
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cut a total of $500 million (to reflect unspecified “management efficiencies”) from the total DOD
authorization, thus reducing the bill’s total authorization to $679.8 billion.
Funding levels authorized by H.R. 2647 as passed by the House and by S. 1390 as reported by the
Senate Armed Services Committee are summarized in Table 6. Funding levels authorized for
selected programs are summarized in the Appendix in Tables A-1 through A-4.
Following are highlights of the versions of the FY2010 defense authorization bill passed by the
House and taken up July 13 by the Senate:
Ballistic Missile Defense.
The aspect of the House bill that was most extensively debated, both in the Armed Services
Committee and on the House floor, was its approval of the Obama Administration’s $9.3 billion
missile defense program, which would slow or terminate some technologically advanced systems
while increasing the planned procurement of Aegis and THAAD interceptors designed to cope
with near-term threats. Several Republican-sponsored amendments that would have increased
funding for various missile defense programs were rejected by the House committee, during its
markup of the bill, and on the House floor.
The Senate committee bill also supported the Administration’s principal missile defense
decisions.
Ground-Based Interceptors.
Both bills support Secretary Gates’ proposals to cap the number of Ground-based Interceptors
(GBI) deployed in Alaska and California at 30, instead of deploying a total of 44. Secretary
Gates, Missile Defense Agency chief Lt. Gen. Patrick J. O’Reilly and other military commanders
have said that 30 operationally effective GBIs are sufficient given the current and prospective
threat over the next five years or so from Iran and North Korea. Secretary Gates has said that the
cap at 30 would be revised upward if the threat assessment changes. Others, however, believe the
threat of long-range ballistic missile attack from Iran and North Korea is more imminent and
question whether 30 deployed GBIs are sufficient.
Boost-phase Interception.
Both bills also support the Administration’s proposal to cancel the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV)
and Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) programs and to construction of a second Airborne Laser
(ABL) prototype aircraft (although the existing ABL plane would be retained for research). The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has faulted each of these programs for significant
technical, cost and operational challenges. Some missile defense supporters contend that
cancelling the KEI and relegating the ABL to a research program will leave the country without
an active program to destroy attacking ballistic missiles in their boost-phase or shortly after their
launch. Sec. Gates has said that the requirement for a boost-phase BMD program is being looked
at as part of the current BMD Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), expected to
be completed later this year.
Meanwhile, the Administration has said it wants to pursue an Ascent Phase BMD program
designed to destroy attacking missiles shortly after their rocket motors burn out in the boost-
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phase. Because this effort is new, few details are available. H.R. 2647 would require the Defense
Secretary to report to Congress the details and strategy behind the Ascent Phase effort.
European Missile Defense Site
The Obama Administration has not fully endorsed going forward with the Bush Administration’s
plan to deploy in Europe a radar in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland that are
intended to intercept missiles launched from Iran at Europe or the United States. According to
Secretary Gates, unspent funds appropriated in FY2009 for the so-called “third site” (the other
two being the GBI sites in Alaska and California) plus an additional $50.5 million requested in
the FY2010 budget would allow the project to go forward if the Polish and Czech parliaments
ratify basing agreements reached with the United States in 2008. But the Administration has also
said that the proposed third site is one of several options on the table for dealing with potential
missile attacks from Iran.
The House bill would authorize a total of $343.1 million from funds available for fiscal years
2009 and 2010 to develop missile defenses in Europe either to continue with research,
development, test and evaluation of the proposed radar and interceptor site in Poland and the
Czech Republic pending Czech and Polish ratification of the agreements, or to develop an
alternative integrated missile defense system to protect Europe from threats posed by all types of
ballistic missiles, subject to certain conditions. H.R. 2647 also provides, subject to appropriations
and as consistent with U.S. national security interests stated in the BMD agreement reached with
Poland, funds for deployment of a U.S. Army Patriot missile battery in Poland by 2012.
The Senate committee bill would authorize the $50 million requested in FY2010 for work on the
European system.
Shipbuilding.
Both bills supported the Administration’s budget proposal for major shipbuilding programs.
However, the Senate Armed Services committee was more critical than its House counterpart of
the Navy’s management of its shipbuilding program for surface combatant ships. S. 1390 includes
a provision that would require the Navy to prepare an detailed acquisition strategy for purchasing
surface combatants, supported by a battery of analyses. The Senate committee’s bill also would
repeal a provision of the FY2008 national defense authorization act (P.L. 110-181) that would
require that future cruisers, destroyers and large amphibious landing ships be nuclear-powered.125
Surface Combatants: DDG-1000 and DDG-51 destroyers, CG(X) cruiser.
Both bills accept the decision, recommended by senior Navy leaders in 2008 and embraced by the
Obama Administration, to buy only three guided missile destroyers of the DDG-1000-class,
instead of the seven ships that had been planned, and to resume procurement of DDG-51 class
destroyers, 62 of which are in service or under construction. Accordingly, they would authorize,
as requested, $1.08 billion to complete the third DDG-1000, $539 million to continue
development of that class and $1.91 billion for three DDG-51s. The House bill would add $100
125 For background, see CRS Report RL33946, Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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million to the $329.0 million requested for components to be used in DDG-51s to be funded in
future budgets.
Both bills would authorize, as requested, $340.0 million to continue development of the CG(X)
class of cruisers to replace existing Aegis cruisers which are slated for retirement beginning in the
early 2020s. However, the Senate committee bill would allow the Navy to spend only half those
funds until the service produces the surface combatant acquisition plan (and supporting analyses)
that the bill requires. S. 1390 also would add $50 million to the portion of the CG(X)-related
R&D budget that funds development of the very powerful radar planned for the CG(X).
Aircraft Carriers
As requested, both bills would temporarily waive a law requiring the Navy to keep 11 carriers in
service, thus allowing the number of flattops to drop to 10 between 2013, when the Enterprise is
slated for retirement after 48 years of service, and 2015, when the Gerald R. Ford is scheduled to
enter the fleet. The older ship would have required a very expensive overhaul if it had to be kept
in service during those two years.
The House Armed Services Committee questioned Secretary Gates’ recommendation to slow the
rate at which future carriers are built to replace those being retired, a policy that would
permanently reduce the carrier force from 11 ships to 10 after 2040. The House committee added
to H.R. 2647 a provision (Section 122) requiring the Navy to submit a report on the effects of
funding a new carrier at the proposed slower rate of one ship every five years instead of the
previous plan under which some future carriers would have been funded only four years apart.
The provision also bars the Navy from spending funds authorized by the bill in a way that would
make it impossible to fund the next two carriers four years apart, as had been planned.
Littoral Combat Ships
Both bills would authorize construction of three additional Littoral Combat Ships, as requested.
H.R. 2647 also included a provision, requested by the Administration, that would liberalize the
cost-cap of $460 million per LCS set by existing law, by allowing the cap to be adjusted for
inflation and by excluding certain costs. However, the House committee also added to that bill a
provision (Section 121) authorizing the Navy to compile a technical data package that would
allow it to put the contracts for these ships up for bid by other contractors if the two shipyards
currently building LCS ships would not contract to build the FY2010 ships within the limits of
the revised cost cap.
Combat Aircraft.
Both bills concur in Secretary Gates’ recommendations to terminate development of the CSAR-X
combat rescue helicopter and the VH-71 presidential helicopter and to end procurement of C-17
wide-body cargo jets. But each bill rejects several of Gates’ recommendations concerning combat
aircraft.
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F-22 Raptor
By a vote of 31-30, the House Armed Services Committee added to the Administration’s request
an authorization of $368 million to buy long lead-time components that would allow procurement
in FY2011 of 12 additional F-22 fighters. H.R. 2647 would fund the F-22 add-on without
increasing the total amount authorized by cutting $368.8 million from the $5.5 billion requested
for environmental cleanup of Energy Department sites associated with the nuclear weapons
program. The bill also would require (Section 132) the preservation of unique tooling that would
be needed to resume F-22 production.
The Senate Armed Services Committee voted 13-11 to include in S. 1390 authorization of $1.75
billion to purchase seven additional F-22s in FY2010. Of that total, $32.3 million was money
appropriated for F-22 procurement in FY2009 but not spent by the Obama administration.
Secretary Gates maintained in April that the 187 F-22s previously funded, taken together with
other aircraft, including F-35 Joint Strike fighters and armed Reaper aerial drones now entering
service in significant numbers, is a large enough force. But F-22 supporters contend that Gates’
view unduly minimizes the combat advantages of the F-22 over the F-35. Many senior Air Force
officials have maintained for years that the service needs 381 F-22s, that. buying only 250 of the
planes would put U.S. strategy at “moderate risk” and that capping the force at 187 planes poses a
“high risk” to U.S. strategy.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
Rejecting a position taken by both the Bush and Obama administrations, both bills would add to
the budget request authorization of funds to continue developing an alternate engine for the
single-engine F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
H.R. 2647 would add a total of $603 million to continue developing the alternate engine and
prepare for its production, offsetting that increase by cutting from the request two of the 30 F-35s
requested (a $308 million reduction) and approving only two-thirds of a proposed management
reserve fund for the program (a further reduction of $156 million).
The. Senate Armed Services Committee included in S. 1390 an increase of $438.9 million to
continue development of the alternate engine, offsetting that addition by cutting the proposed
management reserve by $156 million, the same amount the House bill cut from that request.
Retirement of Older Jets
The House bill would delay Secretary Gates’ plan to retire 249 older combat jets, most of which
are assigned to Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units. It would shift from other parts of
the Air Force budget request $344.6 million to continue operating those planes. The bill (Section
1047) would also prohibit their retirement until 90 days after the secretary of the Air Force
submits to the Senate and House Armed Services committees a report detailing how the Air Force
will fill the gaps left by the retirement of those planes and what missions it will assign to the
bases and personnel associated with the aircraft. H.R. 2647 also would require (Section 133) the
Secretary of Defense to report on alternative plans to prevent a prospective shortfall in Air Force
fighters (as the service retires old planes more quickly than it fields new F-35s) by purchasing so-
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called “4.5 generation” fighters, that is, types currently in service, such as F-16s and F/A-18s, that
are equipped with improved radars and other upgrades.
The Senate committee directed the Air Force to develop a plan for defending U.S. airspace for the
next 20 years including, as one option, the use of F-22s assigned to Air National Guard units. This
so-called “air sovereignty alert” mission currently is assigned to Guard units flying some of the
older fighters slated for retirement under the Administration’s plan.
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
The House and Senate Armed Services committees each took steps to put pressure on DOD to
sign a multi-year contract for additional F/A-18E/F fighters, in order to reduce a prospective
shortfall in carrier-based fighters.
The House bill would increase from $51.4 million to $159.4 million the amount authorized for
long lead-time components for the planes that could be funded in FY2011 and it directed the
Congressional Budget Office to compare, in terms of cost and effectiveness, the purchase of new
F/A-18E/Fs with the refurbishing of older model F/A-18s. It also added to the bill a provision
(Section 1051) expressing the sense of Congress that the Navy should field at least 10 carrier air
wings, each equipped with at least 44 strike fighters.
The Senate Armed Services Committee, predicting that ongoing DOD studies would make the
case for a signing a multi-year contract to buy new F/A-18E/Fs rather than furbishing older
planes, argued that the Navy should buy 18 of the planes in FY2010 – as earlier planned – rather
than reducing the production run to nine planes, as the Administration’s budget proposed.
Accordingly, S. 1390 would authorize $1.57 billion for 18 F/A-18E/Fs, an increase of $560
million over the request.
Ground Combat Systems
Future Combat Systems (FCS)
The House and Senate Armed Services committees both endorsed Secretary Gates’
recommendation to terminate development of eight new kinds of manned ground combat vehicles
as part of the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. The House committee denied
$426.8 million requested for termination costs, arguing that unspent FCS funds appropriated for
FY2009 would cover the cost of ending the program. The Senate committee cut $381.8 million of
the FCS termination request and authorized the remaining $45 million to continue developing
“active protection systems”—small weapons mounted on tanks and other combat vehicles to
intercept approaching missiles.
The House Armed Services Committee also offered specific recommendations for how the Army
should modernize its combat vehicle fleet in the absence of FCS, taking into account the large
amounts spent to modernize existing vehicles in recent years. The committee recommended that
current fleet of M-1 tanks, Paladin cannons and Stryker armored combat vehicles should be given
upgrades – including some technologies developed as part of FCS, such as the “active defense
system” intended to shoot down approaching anti-tank missiles. Two other types of armored
carriers -- Bradleys and the older M-113s – should be candidates for replacement by new
vehicles, the committee said.
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The Senate Armed Services Committee included in S. 1390 provisions requiring the Army to
create two new programs -- one to develop a new self-propelled cannon and one to develop a
family of other ground combat vehicles – and to report on its plans to acquire those new systems.
The bill also would require DOD to contract with a non-governmental organization to assess the
research needed to develop technologies that would be required by a new generation of ground
combat vehicles. Anticipating that some ongoing studies relevant to these issues might be
completed before Congress concludes action on the FY2010 defense authorization bill, the Senate
committee directed the Secretary of the Army to update the congressional defense committees by
September 8, 2009 on the Army’s plans for developing new combat vehicles.
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
Both bills would authorize, as requested, $293.5 million to continue development of the Marine
Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), an armored amphibious troop carrier designed to
carry Marines ashore from transport ships more than 20 miles offshore.
The House Armed Services Committee, which has criticized the EFV design as being too
vulnerable to so-called improvised explosive devices (IEDs) insisted that the Marines explore
various modifications that would give troops inside an EFV at least the same level of protection
against IEDs as they would have riding in the heaviest Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected
(MRAP) vehicles. The committee directed the Secretary of the Navy to give the congressional
defense committees a report on EFV survivability options.
Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan
The House Armed Services Committee directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to
assess the array of programs in the departments of State and Defense, all of which are intended to
improve the military forces of certain partner nations – a goal the Obama Administration refers to
as “building partnership capacity.”
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund
Neither bill would authorize $700 million requested in FY2010 for a Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Fund, from which DOD could draw funds to improve the counterinsurgency capability of
Pakistani security forces and provide limited humanitarian assistance to Pakistani citizens as part
of the training exercises for Pakistani forces that would be paid for from this fund. The secretaries
of State and Defense and the relevant congressional committees had agreed the funds for this
fund would be provided through the international affairs function of the budget rather than
through the DOD budget. The House Armed Services Committee directed the Secretary of
Defense to provide the House and Senate Armed Services committees by April 10, 2010 a
detailed report on the organization and operation of this fund.
‘Section 1206’ Authority
The Administration requested that Congress increase from $350 million to $400 million the limit
on the amount of available funds DOD could spend to “train and equip” foreign military forces
under authority provided by Section 1206 of the national defense authorization act for FY2006, as
amended (P.L. 109-163).
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The House bill left the limit unchanged, however the House committee said that, under current
circumstances, it supported the policy of vesting this authority in DOD. Initially, the House
committee said, it had viewed this as a type of foreign aid properly managed by the State
Department. But now, it agreed with the current arrangement under which the Secretary of
Defense decides which projects to fund, contingent on the concurrence of the Secretary of State.
S. 1390, on the other hand, would reduce authorized spending for Section 1206 programs that
begin on or after October 1, 2009 to $75 million in each FY2010 and FY2011. The Senate Armed
Services Committee explained this reduction as a means to ensure that Section 1206 funding
served its intended purpose, i.e., to provide a means to address emerging needs, not a substitute
for security assistance under the State Department Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority.
The committee emphasized the temporary nature of Section 1206 authority and urged the Obama
Administration to review existing DOD and State Department security assistance authorities in
order to reconcile and “de-conflict” them and to improve their effectiveness.”
In related legislation, the FY2010-FY2011 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (H.R. 2410)
would create a new “Security Assistance Contingency Fund” for the State Department with
purposes that would overlap those of Section 1206. As reported to the House on June 4 (H.Rept.
111-136) and passed by the House on June 10, H.R. 2410 (Section 841) would authorize the
Secretary of State “to conduct a program to respond to contingencies in foreign countries or
regions by providing training, procurement, and capacity-building of a foreign country’s military
forces and dedicated counterterrorism forces in order for that country to (1) conduct
counterterrorist operations; or (2) participate in or support military and stability operations in
which the United States is a participant.”
‘Section 1207’ Authority
The Administration had requested renewal of so-called “Section 1207” authority under which
DOD could transfer up to $100 million to the State Department for security and stabilization
assistance. The House bill (Section 1201) would extend “Section 1207” authority through
FY2010 but would reduce to $25 million the amount that could be transferred. The House
committee urged the State Department to develop the capacity to carry out these missions without
tapping DOD resources.
S. 1390 authorized the requested authority to transfer up to $100 million from DOD to the State
Department.
‘Section 1208’ Authority
The House bill would increase (Section 1202) from $35 million to $50 million the amount the
commander of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) could spend under so-called “Section
1208” authority to assist foreign forces or individuals supporting U.S. special operations forces
combating terrorism. But the House committee warned against using this authority to fund a
major “train and equip” effort that would not be managed under “Section 1206” authority and,
thus, would ensure not be overseen by the secretaries of Defense and State.
Striking a similar note, the Senate Armed Services Committee also warned against using funds
under this authority to develop long-term relationships with particular countries rather than to
support military operations by SOCOM to combat terrorism. The committee included in S. 1390 a
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provision that would make more stringent existing requirements that DOD notify the
congressional defense committees prior to expending funds under Section 1208 authority. The
committee criticized recent notifications as “inadequate.”
Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP)
The House bill (Section 1212) would reauthorize through FY2010 the Commanders’ Emergency
Response Program (CERP), which allows field commanders to quickly fund local humanitarian
relief and reconstruction projects. But the bill would reduce the total amount authorized for the
program from $1.5 billion to $1.3 billion, reflecting the House committee’s unhappiness with
what it calls inadequate justification by DOD of the budget request.
S. 1390 would trim the CERP request to $1.4 billion, cutting $100 million from the $1.2 billion of
the request that was slated for use in Afghanistan. The Senate bill also would allow the Secretary
of Defense to transfer $100 million from that fund to the State Department in order to support the
Afghan government’s National Solidarity Program which supports thousands of small
development projects in that country. The Senate Armed Services Committee expressed doubts
that DOD could adequately manage and oversee the expenditure of so large an amount in
Afghanistan and that Afghanistan could usefully absorb the funds.
Military Personnel Policy: End-Strength, Pay Raise
Both bills would authorize, as requested, a total end-strength of 1.41 million personnel for active-
duty members of the four armed forces, an increase of 40,227 over the FY2009 level. This total
includes limits of 547,400 for the Army and 202,100 for the Marine Corps, which mark the
achievement by those two services three years earlier than planned of a decision to increase their
combined end-strengths by a total of 92,000 personnel over their FY2007 levels. The House bill
would authorize the Army to increase by an additional 40,000 active-duty personnel over the
course of FY2011-12. The Senate bill would authorize an additional 30,000 active-duty Army
personnel over the same period.
Both bills also would authorize a 3.4% increase in basic pay for military personnel, which is one-
half of a percentage point above the Administration’s request. This would be the eleventh
consecutive year that Congress has given the military a pay raise that equals or exceeds the Labor
Department’s Employment Cost Index (ECI), a measure of private sector wage growth.
DOD Civilian Employees: NSPS, A-76
The House bill would freeze implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS)
and the parallel Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System, both of which are pay-for-
performance systems affording managers more flexibility in hiring and determining compensation
for employees than the federal government’s General Schedule.
S. 1390 also would freeze NSPS and would eliminate it unless the Secretary of Defense certifies
that termination would not be in the best interest of DOD and provides a specific schedule for
making changes “to improve the fairness, credibility and transparency” of NSPS.
Both bills would impose a moratorium on so-called “A-76” competitions to determine whether
jobs currently performed by federal employees should be out-sourced to private contractors.
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Concurrent Receipt.
H.R. 2647 would fund an initial increment of an initiative, proposed by President Obama, to
expand the number of disabled military retirees entitled to “concurrent receipt” of both their
military retired pay and disability-based stipends from the Department of Veterans Affairs. Since
2001, Congress has taken several steps to liberalize a general policy (the roots of which date from
1891) requiring disabled military retirees to forego an amount of their retired pay equal to the
amount of any veterans disability stipend.
Under congressional budget rules, the cost of the Administration proposal would have to be offset
by a either a reduction in already-mandated expenditures or an increase in revenue. A funding
offset large enough to cover the cost of the President’s concurrent receipt proposal through
FY2010 was provided by a bill (H.R. 2990) the House passed June 24 by a vote of 404-0. The
text of H.R. 2990 was incorporated into the defense authorization bill by H.Res. 572, the rule
governing floor action on the defense bill, which the House adopted June 24 by a vote of 222-
202.
S. 1390 takes no action on the concurrent receipt issue.
Detainees, Military Commissions, Guantanamo Bay
The Senate Armed Services Committee’s bill would make several changes to the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-366), which codified rules under which military tribunals
could try non-U.S. citizens who had been detained in the course of the war against terrorism.
Some key provisions of S. 1390 include the following:
• Military commissions would have jurisdiction over “alien unprivileged enemy
belligerents,” a class of persons defined somewhat differently from “alien
unlawful enemy combatants,” the class of persons subject to military
commissions under current law.
• The list of offenses for which an eligible person could be tried by a military
commission is unchanged from current law, but the Senate committee bill would
require that alleged offenses occurred “in the context of and associated with
armed conflict.”
• Confessions allegedly elicited through cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,
would be inadmissible even if they were made prior to the enactment of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. § 2000dd), which bars the use of
such confessions only if they were made after its enactment.
• In the case of hearsay evidence, the party offering the evidence would have the
burden of demonstrating that it is reliable, whereas under current law, the
opponent has the burden of proving that it is unreliable.
• The prosecutors’ obligation to disclose exculpatory information would include
mitigating evidence, and the obligation would extend to all information that is
known or reasonably should be known to any government officials who
participated in the investigation and prosecution of the case.
The Senate committee bill also would prohibit the use of contract employees to conduct
interrogations of individuals detained during hostilities.
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The House-passed version of the authorization bill does not address military commissions.
However, it has several provisions dealing with the treatment of detainees. These would:
• require a report on how the reading to detainees of their “Miranda rights” may
affect military operations in Afghanistan, including any effects on intelligence
collection through interrogations;
• require DOD to videotape or otherwise electronically record strategic intelligence
interrogations of persons in its custody, under its effective control, or under
detention at a DOD theater-level detention facility;
• require the President to prepare a plan for the disposition of each detainee held at
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. It would prohibit the release or transfer of
such non-citizen detainee to the United States, its territories, or possessions until
120 days after the President has submitted the plan to the congressional defense
committees; and
• require that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) be notified
whenever a detainee comes into U.S. custody or under U.S. control at the
detention facility at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. The ICRC would have
access to such detainees within 24 hours after submitting a request to visit a
detainee.
Table 6. FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act,
House and Senate Action by Title, H.R. 2647, S. 1390
(amounts in millions of dollars)
House-
Senate-
Administration
Passed
Reported
Request
H.R. 2647
S. 1390
National Defense Authorization – Base Budget
Procurement 105,819.3
105,198.2
107,216.8
Research, Development, Test &
78,634.3 79,654.5 79,900.7
Evaluation
Operation and Maintenance
156,444.2
157,276.6
155,557.0
Military Personnel
136,016.3
135,723.8
135,616.3
Other Authorizations
33,915.1
33,011.9
33,538.6
Subtotal, DOD (non-MilCon) – Base
510,829.2 510,865.0 511,829.4
Budget
Military Construction 13,111.1
13,635.3 12,738.2
Family Housing
1,958.7
1,958.7
2,308.7
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
7,876.3
7,666.3
7,876.3
Prior year savings
--
-85.3
-112.5
Subtotal, MilCon, Family Housing,
22,946.0 23,175.0 22,810.7
BRAC – Base Budget
Total, DOD – Base Budget
533,775.3
534,040.0
534,640.1
Atomic Energy Defense Programs
16,424.0
16,507.3
16,424.0
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House-
Senate-
Administration
Passed
Reported
Request
H.R. 2647
S. 1390
Total Base Budget, National Defense
550,199.3 550,547.3 551,064.1
Authorization (Budget Function 050)
Overseas Contingency Operations
Procurement 23,741.2
24,416.0
24,370.1
Research, Development, Test &
310.3 410.3 310.3
Evaluation
Operation and Maintenance
80,793.5
80,718.7
80,239.9a
Military Personnel
13,586.3
13,586.3
13,586.3
Other Authorizations
10,163.7
9,463.7
9,348.4
Military Construction 1,405.0
1,405.0 1,405.0
Total, DOD Overseas Contingency
130,000.0 130,000.0 129,260.0
Operations
Management Efficiencies
---
---
-500.0
Error correction
-120.0
Grand Total, National Defense
680,199.3 680,427.3 679,824.1
Authorization
Sources: House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 2647, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-166, June 18, 2009; Senate Armed Services Committee,
Report to Accompany S. 1390, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, S.Rept. 111-35, July
2, 2009.
a. The Senate Armed Services Committee includes in this line $7.46 billion requested by the administration
and authorized by both bills for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. This table, like the House Armed
Services Committee’s summary chart, includes that program in the line entitled, “Other Authorizations.”
FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bill
The FY2010 defense appropriations bill marked up July 16 by the House Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee would challenge the Obama Administration’s proposals to terminate or reduce
funding for several major weapons programs. The full Appropriations Committee is scheduled to
take up the bill on July 22.126
Paralleling the House-passed version of the companion defense authorization bill (H.R. 2647), the
subcommittee added to the Administration’s request $369 million for long lead-time components
that would permit DOD to purchase a dozen additional F-22 fighters in FY2011. Also like the
counterpart authorization committee, the defense subcommittee challenged the Administration
plan by adding to the budget $560 million to continue development of an alternative engine for
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, offsetting that cost by dropping from the request two of the
budgeted 30 F-35s, a reduction of $532 million.
126 This section is based on the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee press release, “Murtha Unveils FY10
Defense Appropriations Bill,” July 16, 2006.
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President Obama and Secretary Gates have said several times, in unusually explicit terms, that the
President would veto any defense bill that funds either additional F-22s or continued development
of the alternate engine for the F-35.
The House Defense Subcommittee bill also would add to the budget funds for several other
aircraft and shipbuilding programs, including the following:
• nine F/A-18E/F fighters ($495 million), in addition to the nine requested, plus
$108 million to fund a multi-year contract for additional planes;
• three C-17 cargo planes ($674 million);
• $400 million to make operational five VH-71 executive helicopters, a program
Secretary Gates had cancelled.
• one Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in addition to the three requested; and
• a second high-speed transport ships (Intra-Theater Connector Ships) in addition
to the one requested.
These increases would be offset, in part, by reductions to the budget including:
• $1.9 billion from the $5.5 billion requested for Mine-Resistant, Ambush-
Protected (MRAP) vehicles, a reduction the subcommittee said was warranted by
MRAP funding that was added to the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act
(P.L. 111-32);
• $211 million requested for termination of the Army’s Future Combat Systems
(FCS) program;
• $200 million from the $3.2 billion requested for the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), a reduction the subcommittee said was justified by
that agency’s chronic pattern of not spending its entire annual budget; and
• $100 million that was requested to fund the closure of the detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
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Appendix: Program Funding Tables
Table A-1. Congressional Action on FY2010 Missile Defense Funding: Authorization
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Program Element
FY2009
FY2010
House-
Senate
PE Number
Title
Estimate
Request
Passed
Committee
RDT&E Missile Defense Agency
0603175C
Ballistic Missile Defense
119.3 109.8 109.8 109.8
Technology
0603881C
Ballistic Missile Defense
956.7 719.5 719.5 719.5
Terminal Defense
Segment
0603882C
Ballistic Missile Defense
1,507.5
982.9
982.9
982.9
House and Senate concur in administration
Midcourse Defense
proposal to deploy 30 interceptor missiles
Segment
in Alaska and California rather than 44 as
earlier planned.
0603883C
Ballistic Missile Defense
400.8
186.7
186.7
186.7
House and Senate concur in administration
Boost Defense Segment
proposal to reorganize Airborne Laser as
an R&D program rather than one aimed at
deployment.
0603884C
Ballistic Missile Defense
767.6
636.9
636.9
641.9
Senate adds $5 mn for airborne infrared
Sensors
technology
0603886C
Ballistic Missile Defense
385.5
–
–
–
House and Senate concur in administration
System Interceptor
proposal to cancel Kinetic Energy
Interceptor.
0603888C
Ballistic Missile Defense
911.7 966.8 966.8 966.8
Test & Targets
0603890C
Ballistic Missile Defense
402.8 369.1 344.1 369.1
Enabling Programs
0603891C
Special Programs - MDA
175.7
301.6
301.6
301.6
CRS-56
Program Element
FY2009
FY2010
House-
Senate
PE Number
Title
Estimate
Request
Passed
Committee
0603892C
AEGIS BMD
1,113.7
1,690.8
1,690.8
1,660.8
Senate cuts $30 mn as excess to what can
be spent
0603893C
Space Tracking &
208.9 180.0 180.0 180.0
Surveillance System
0603894C
Multiple Kill Vehicle
283.5
–
–
–
House and Senate concur in administration
proposal to cancel Multiple Kill Vehicle,
0603895C
Ballistic Missile Defense
24.7 12.5 12.5 12.5
System Space Programs
0603896C
Ballistic Missile Defense
288.3 340.0 340.0 340.0
Command and Control,
Battle Management and
Communications
0603897C
Ballistic Missile Defense
55.8 48.2 48.2 48.2
Hercules
0603898C
Ballistic Missile Defense
69.7 60.9 61.4 60.9
Joint Warfighter Support
0603904C Missile
Defense
106.0 86.9 91.9 86.9
Integration & Operations
Center (MDIOC)
0603906C
Regarding
Trench 3.0 6.2 6.2 6.2
0603907C
Sea-Based X-Band Radar
146.7 174.6 174.6 174.6
(SBX)
0603908C BMD
European
362.0
–
–
–
The House authorized $50 million, as
Interceptor Site (Poland)
requested, for a missile defense site in
Europe and also stipulated (Sec. 226) that a
0603909C BMD
European
Mid-
76.5
–
–
–
total of $343.1 million made available in
Course Radar (Czech
FY1009 and FY2010 (comprising $50
Republic)
million authorized in this bill and funds
0603911C BMD
European
-- 50.5
50.5 50.5
authorized for FY2009) could be spent
Capability
either on the currently planned system –
with a radar in the Czech Republic and
0603912C BMD
European
27.0
–
–
–
interceptor missiles in Poland – or on an
Communications
alternative system that would be at least as
Support
cost-effective and technical y reliable as the
planned system.
CRS-57
Program Element
FY2009
FY2010
House-
Senate
PE Number
Title
Estimate
Request
Passed
Committee
0603913C Israeli
Cooperative
--
119.6
140.1
144.6
House adds $20.5 mn; Senate adds $25 mn.
Programs
0901585C Pentagon
Reservation
19,7
19.7
19.7
19.7
0901598C
Management HQ - MDA
81.2
57.4
57.4
57.4
Subtotal R&D, Missile Defense
8,474.6 7,120.5 7,121.6 7,120.5
Agency
Military Construction, Missile Defense Agency
Aegis BMD Facility Expansion
–
24.5
24.5
24.5
BMDS European Interceptor Site
42.6
–
–
–
(Poland)
BMDS European Mid-Course Radar
108.6
–
–
–
(Czech Republic)
Minor
Construction
3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7
Planning
&
Design
14.9 2.0 2.0 2.0
Subtotal Military Construction,
169.5 30.2 30.2 30.2
Missile Defense Agency
Base Realignment and Closure
160.0 86.6 86.6 86.6
The House approved the BRAC funding
(BRAC), Missile Defense Agency
request for MDA, but it also made an
unallocated reduction of $350 milion to the
total $2.39 billion BRAC request for
Defense Agencies (of which MDA is one).
Procurement, Missile Defense Agency
THAAD, Block 5 Fielding
104.8
420.3
420.3
420.3
Aegis, Block 5 Fielding
56.8
168.7
168.7
168.7
Subtotal Procurement, Missile
161.6 589.0 589.0 589.0
Defense Agency
Total, Missile Defense Agency
8,965.7
7,826.3
7,827.4
7,826.4
Army and Joint Staff R&D
CRS-58
Program Element
FY2009
FY2010
House-
Senate
PE Number
Title
Estimate
Request
Passed
Committee
0604869A Patriot/MEADS
429.8 569.2 568.2 569.2
Combined Aggregate
Program (CAP)
0203801A Missile/Air
Defense
37.7 39.3 39.3 39.3
Product Improvement
Program
0102419A
Aerostat Joint Program
355.3
360.1
238.1
340.1
Senate cuts $20 mn due to program delay
Office (JLENS)
0605126J
Joint Theater Air and
55.3 96.9 75.9 96.9
House
cuts
$21
mn.
Missile Defense
Organization
Subtotal R&D, Army, Joint Staff
878.1
1,065.4
921.5
1,045.4
Procurement, Army
C49100
Patriot/PAC-3
1,026.0
393.1
393.1
398.1
Senate adds $5 mn for C2 mods
C50001
Patriot/MEADS
31.0 16.4 16.4 16.4
Subtotal, Procurement, Army
1,057.0
409.5
409.5
414.5
Total Missile Defense R&D, MilCon,
10,900.8 9,301.3 9,158.4 9,286.3
Procurement, All Agencies
Sources: House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 2647, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-166, June 18,
2009; Senate Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany S. 1390, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, S.Rept. 111-35, July 2, 2009.
Notes: The defense authorization act generally does not determine the final amount provided for a program or project. The authorization bill authorizes the appropriation
of funds, but the amount available is determined by the appropriations. An appropriations bill may provide more than or less than the amount authorized, may provide
funds for a program for which no funds are authorized, and may provide funds for a “new start” for which funding has never been authorized.
CRS-59
Table A-2. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Army and Marine Corps Programs: Authorization
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Request
House-Passed
Senate Committee
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
Army Aircraft
Light Utility Helicopter 54 326.0 9.4 54 326.0 9.4 54 326.0 9.4
UH-60 Blackhawk
79 1,357.1 33.5 79 1,357.1
33.5 79 1,357.1 33.5
Helicopter (Base
Budget)
UH-60 Blackhawk
4
74.3
--
4
74.3
--
4
74.3
--
Helicopter (OCO)
CH-47 Chinook
35 860.1 10.8 35 882.1
10.8 35 882.1 10.8
Helicopter (Base
Budget)
CH-47 Chinook
4 141.2 -- 4 141.2 -- 4 141.2 --
Helicopter (OCO)
CH-47 Helicopter Mods
--
102.9
--
--
86.9
--
80.9
--
AH-64 Apache Helo
-- 426.4
164.1 -- 428.4
164.1 --
431.9
164.1
Mods (Base Budget)
AH-64 Apache Helo
--
315.3
--
--
315.3
--
--
315.3
--
Mods (OCO)
Army and USMC Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles
M-2 Bradley Mods (Base
-- 526.4 88.6 -- 526.4
88.6 --
526.4 88.6
Budget)
M-2 Bradley Mods (OCO)
--
243.6
--
--
243.6
--
--
243.6
--
M-1 Abrams tank Mods
--
369.4
101.7
--
369.4
101.7
--
369.4
101.7
Stryker Armored
--
388.6
90.3
--
334.6
90.3
--
388.6
140.3
Senate adds $50 mn in R&D
Vehicle
CRS-60
Request
House-Passed
Senate Committee
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
Future Combat System
--
327.9
2,553.0
--
327.9
2,226.0
--
327.9
2,171.3
House denied $326.8
million and Senate denied
$381.8 million requested in
R&D to terminate
development of FCS
manned ground vehicles
and N-LOS cannon, on
grounds that previously
appropriated funds could
cover termination costs.
USMC Expeditionary
--
--
293.5
--
--
293.5
--
--
293.5
Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
Army and USMC Wheeled Vehicles
HMMWV, Army and
1,824
290.9
--
1,824
295.9
--
1,824
290.9
--
USMC (Base Budget)
HMMWV, Army (OCO)
8,444
1,456.1
--
8,444
1,456.1
--
8,444
1,456.1
--
Family of Medium
3,889 1,158.5 5.7 3,889 1,158.5 5.7 3,889 1,158.5 15.7
Tactical Vehicles (Base
Budget)
Family of Medium Tactical
1,643 461.7
---
1,643
261.7
--
1,643
461.7
--
Vehicles (OCO)
Family of Heavy Tactical
-- 812.9 7.5 -- 812.9 7.5 -- 812.9 17.5
Vehicles (Base Budget)
Family of Heavy Tactical
--
623.2
--
--
623.2
--
--
623.2
--
Vehicles (OCO)
MRAP Vehicle (OCO)
1,080
5,456.0
--
1,080 5,456.0
--
1,080
5,456.0
--
Radios and Other Tactical Electronic Devices
Joint Tactical Radio
-- --
876.4
-- --
876.4
--
--
867.4
System (JTRS)
CRS-61
Request
House-Passed
Senate Committee
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
SINCGARS Family (Base
--
135.0
--
--
--
--
--
60.0
--
HASC denied funds for
Budget and OCO)
SINCGARS radios on
grounds that they would
not be compatible with the
JTRS radios planned for
future procurement. Senate
cut $75 million in OCO for
unjustified program growth.
WIN-T Ground Forces
-- 557.7
180.6 -- 555.7
165.6 --
557.7 180.6
Tactical Network (Base
Budget and OCO)
FBCB2 digital combat
--
515.0
--
--
693.9
--
--
336.0
--
Senate cut $179 million in
Information network
OCO as unjustified
(Base Budget and OCO)
program growth.
Night vision equipment
--
863.9
--
--
801.8
--
--
763.9
--
Senate cut $100 million in
--various (Base Budget
Army base procurement
and OCO)
due to contractor delays
Sources: House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 2647, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-166, June 18,
2009; Senate Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany S. 1390, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, S.Rept. 111-35, July 2, 2009 and text
of S. 1390, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Note: The defense authorization act general y does not determine the final amount provided for a program or project. The authorization bill authorizes the appropriation
of funds, but the amount available is determined by the appropriations. An appropriations bill may provide more than or less than the amount authorized, may provide
funds for a program for which no funds are authorized, and may provide funds for a “new start” for which funding has never been authorized.
CRS-62
Table A-3. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Shipbuilding Programs: Authorization
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Request
House-Passed
Senate Committee
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
CVN-21 Carrier
-- 739.3 173.6 -- 739.3 173.6 -- 739.3 173.6
CVN-21 Carrier (long-lead
-- 484.4 -- -- 484.4 -- -- 484.4 --
components)
Virginia Class Submarine
1 1,964.3 154.8 1 1,964.3 165.8 1 1,964.3 165.8
Virginia Class Submarine
-- 1,959.7 -- -- 1,959.7 -- -- 1,959.7 --
(long-lead components)
Carrier Refueling Overhaul
-- 1,775.4 -- -- 1,775.4 -- -- 1,775.4 --
CG(X) missile defense
-- -- 150.0 -- -- 150.0 -- -- 150.0
cruiser
DD(X)/DDG-1000
-- 1,084.2 539.1 -- 1,084.2 539.1 -- 1,084.2 539.1
Destroyer
DDG-51 Destroyer
1 1,912.3 -- 1 1,912.3 -- 1 1,912.3 --
DDG-51 Destroyer (long-
-- 329.0 -- -- 429.0 -- -- 329.0 --
lead components)
LCS Littoral Combat Ship
3 1,380.0 360.5 3 1,380.0 360.5 3 1,380.0 360.5
LPD-17 Amphibious Ship
-- 872.4 -- -- 872.4 -- -- 872.4 --
LPD-17 (long-lead
-- 184.6 -- -- 244.6 -- -- 184.6 --
components)
Intratheater Connector,
1 178.0 8.4 1 178.0 8.4 1 178.0 8.4
Navy
Outfitting
-- 391.2 -- -- 391.2 -- -- 391.2 --
Service Craft
-- 3.7 -- -- 3.7 -- -- 3.7 --
LCAC Service Life Extension
3 63.9 -- 3 63.9 -- 3 63.9 --
CRS-63
Request
House-Passed
Senate Committee
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
Completion of Prior Year
-- 454.6 -- -- 304.6 -- -- 454.6 --
Shipbuilding
National Defense Sealift Fund
T-AKE Cargo Ship
2 940.1 -- 2 940.1 -- 1 540.1 --
Senate cuts $400 million to delay
2nd ship pending outcome of QDR
Army
Joint High Speed Vessel,
1 183.7 3.1 1 183.7 3.1 1 183.7 3.1
Army
Sources: House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 2647, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-166, June 18,
2009; Senate Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany S. 1390, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, S.Rept. 111-35, July 2, 2009 and text
of S. 1390, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Note: The defense authorization act general y does not determine the final amount provided for a program or project. The authorization bill authorizes the appropriation
of funds, but the amount available is determined by the appropriations. An appropriations bill may provide more than or less than the amount authorized, may provide
funds for a program for which no funds are authorized, and may provide funds for a “new start” for which funding has never been authorized.
CRS-64
TableA-4. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force Aircraft Programs: Authorization
(amounts in millions of dollars)
House Committee
Request
Recommendation
Senate
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
F-35 Joint
10 2,048.8 1,858.1 9 2,115.8 2,011.6 10 2,048.8
1,999.5
To fund continued development of an
Strike
alternative engine for the Joint Strike
Fighter, AF
Fighter, over the Administration’s
objections, the House made a net
F-35 Joint
20 3,997.1 1,741.3 19 3,873.1 1,894.8 20 3,997.1 1,882.7
addition of $255 million to the total of
Strike
$10.4 billion requested for the
Fighter, Navy
program. The House cut from the
F-35 Joint Strik
-- 781.6 -- -- 799.6 -- --
781.6 --
request two planes and associated
Fighter, long-le
spare parts (-$308 million) and part of
components (A
a requested R&D management reserve
and Navy
(-$156 million) to partly offset
increases that included $590 million to
continue work on the alternate
engine. The Senate added $219.5
million each to Navy and AF R&D for
alternate engine development, offset
by cuts of $78 million in each account
from management reserves.
F-22 Fighter,
-- 95.1 569.3 -- 95.1 569.3 7 1,812,7
569.3
The House added funds for
AF
components that would allow
procurement of 12 F-22s in FY2011;
F-22 Fighter
--
--
--
--
368.8
--
--
--
--
but it largely offset the cost by cutting
(long-lead
the amount requested to modify
components)
existing F-22s, which reduction HASC
F-22 Fighter
--
350.7 -- -- 12.7 -- -- -- --
said could be made up for by unspent
Mods
FY2009. funds for F-22. The Senate
added funds for 7 aircraft in FY2010,
cut $350.7 million for mods and
directed that FY2009 mod funds be
used for FY2010 requirements.
EA-18G
22 1,632.4 55.4 22 1,688.4 55.4 22
1,632.4 55.4
The
House
added $108 million for
Aircraft,
components that would support a
Navy
multiyear contract to purchase
CRS-65
House Committee
Request
Recommendation
Senate
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
F/A-18E/F
9 1,060.9 127.7 9 1,168.9 127.7 18 2,129.5 127.7
additional F/A-18E/F and EA-18G
Fighter, Navy
aircraft beginning in FY2011. The
Senate added $560 million for 9
additional F/A-18s.
F/A-18
-- 484.1 -- -- 484.1 -- --
484.1 --
Aircraft
variant Mods
F-15 Fighter
-- 92.9 311.2 -- 143.4 313.2 --
92.9 311.2
Mods
A-10 Attack
-- 262.5 9.7 -- 319.6 9.7 -- 262.5 9.7
Plane Mods
B-1B
-- 128.1 148.0 -- 128.1 148.0 -- 128.1 130.1
Bomber
Mods
B-2A
-- 284.0 415.4 -- 284.0 415.4 -- 284.0 415.4
Bomber
Mods
C-130 Cargo
12 1,410.2 231.3 12 1,348.2 231.3 12 1,410.2 231.3
Aircraft
variants AF
C-130 Cargo
-- 368.0 -- -- 167.9 -- --
144.9 --
Aircraft
variant
Mods, AF
C-5 Cargo
-- 715.3 95.3 -- 715.3 95.3 --
715.3 95.3
Aircraft
Mods, AF
C-17 Cargo
-- 469.7 161.9 -- 469.7 161.9 -- 469.7 161.9
Aircraft
Mods
CRS-66
House Committee
Request
Recommendation
Senate
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
Joint Cargo
8 319.1 -- 8 319.1 --
8 319.1 --
Aircraft
KC-X
-- -- 439.6
-- -- 439.6 -- -- 439.6
Tanker
Replacement,
AF
C-40
Aircraft
3 154.0 -- 4 259.3 -- 3 154.0 --
V-22 Osprey,
30 2,215.8 89.5 20 2,215.9 89.5 30 2,215.8 89.5
Navy
CV-22
5 437.3 19.6 5 437.3 19.6 5 437.3 19.6
Osprey, AF
V-22 Osprey
-- 98.1 -- -- 98.1 -- -- 98.1 --
variants
Long-lead
components
CV-22
5 114.6 12.7 5 114.6 12.7 5 114.6 12.7
Special Ops
Mods, SOF
CH-53K
-- -- 554.8
-- -- 554.8 -- -- 554.8
Helicopter
VH-71A
-- -- 85.2
-- -- 85.2 -- -- 85.2
Executive
Helicopter
Combat
--
--
89.0
--
--
15.0
--
--
--
House cuts all but $15 million, Senate
Search &
eliminates funds, mandates use of
Rescue
prior year funds.
Helicopter
(CSAR-X)
UH-1Y/AH-
30 835.4 32.8 20 552.9 32.8 20 552.9 32.8
House
and
Senate
both
cut
$282.9
1Z
million to maintain production at
FY2009 level of 10 aircraft.
CRS-67
House Committee
Request
Recommendation
Senate
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
MH-
42 1,436.2 131.1 42 1,436.2 131.1 42 1,436.2 131.1
60R/MH-60S
Helicopter,
Navy
P-8A
6 1,825.0 1,162.4 6 1,825.0 1,162.4 6 1,825.0
1,162.4
Poseidon
Multi-Mission
Maritime
Aircraft
E-2D
2 606.1 364.6 2 511.2 606.1 2 606.1 364.6
Hawkeye
Aircraft,
Navy
P-3/EP-3
-- 577.7 11.9 -- 527.7 11.9 -- 577.7 11.9
Aircraft
Mods
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), Base Budget and OCO
MQ-4 Global
5 802.7 783.1 5 802.7 783.1 5 752.7 783.1
Senate cuts $50 million due to delays.
Hawk
MQ-1
36 955.0 21.6 24 791.6 21.6 24 755.0 25.6
The
House
reduced
the
number
of
Predator
Predators to be funded and shifted all
Predator funding into the part of the
budget funding war costs. Senate cut
$200 million for 12 aircraft to avoid
forward funding.
MQ-9 Reaper
24
650.2
45.0
24
650.2
45.0
24
590.3
45.0
The House shifted some funding for
Reapers into the part of the budget
funding war costs. Senate cut $19.9
million in base budget procurement
for “Gorgon Stare” system and $40
million from the $99 million request
for mods in OCO budget.
CRS-68
House Committee
Request
Recommendation
Senate
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ # $ $
Comments
RQ-7
11 666.2 1.0 11 668.7 1.0 11 666.2 1.0
Shadow
RQ-11
1221
135.1 0.6 1221
135.1 0.6 1221
135.1 0.6
Raven
MQ-8 Fire
5 77.6 25.6 5 77.6 26.5 5 77.6 25.6
Scout
Future
--
--
68.7
--
--
68.7
--
--
68.7
Combat
System UAS
UCAS
-- -- 311.2
-- -- 311.2 -- -- 311.2
Unmanned
Combat
Aerial
System
(Navy)
Tactical
--
--
202.5
--
--
202.5
--
--
288.5
The Senate added $86 million to
Unmanned
deploy in Afghanistan Hummingbird
Aerial
drone helicopters carrying radars
Vehicles
designed to detect individual humans
(Army)
walking.
Sources: House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 2647, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.Rept. 111-166, June 18,
2009; Senate Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany S. 1390, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, S.Rept. 111-35, July 2, 2009 and text
of S. 1390, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Notes: The defense authorization act general y does not determine the final amount provided for a program or project. The authorization bill authorizes the appropriation
of funds, but the amount available is determined by the appropriations. An appropriations bill may provide more than or less than the amount authorized, may provide
funds for a program for which no funds are authorized, and may provide funds for a “new start” for which funding has never been authorized.
CRS-69
Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
Acknowledgments
The annual consideration of appropriations bills (regular, continuing, and supplemental) by
Congress is part of a complex set of budget processes that also encompasses the consideration of
budget resolutions, revenue and debt-limit legislation, other spending measures, and
reconciliation bills. In addition, the operation of programs and the spending of appropriated funds
are subject to constraints established in authorizing statutes. Congressional action on the budget
for a fiscal year usually begins following the submission of the President’s budget at the
beginning of each annual session of Congress. Congressional practices governing the
consideration of appropriations and other budgetary measures are rooted in the Constitution, the
standing rules of the House and Senate, and statutes, such as the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
This report is a guide to one of the regular appropriations bills that Congress considers each year.
It is designed to supplement the information provided by the House and Senate Appropriations
Subcommittees on Defense. For both defense authorization and appropriations, this report
summarizes the status of the bills, their scope, major issues, funding levels, and related
congressional activity. This report is updated as events warrant and lists the key CRS staff
relevant to the issues covered as well as related CRS products.
Key Policy Staff
Area of Expertise
Name
Phone
E-mail
Valerie Grasso
7-7617
vgrasso@crs.loc.gov
Acquisition
Moshe Schwartz
7-1463
mschwartz@crs.loc.gov
Ronald O’Rourke
7-7610
rorourke@crs.loc.gov
Aviation Forces
Pat Towell
7-2122
ptowell@crs.loc.gov
Arms Control
Amy Woolf
7-2379
awoolf@crs.loc.gov
Arms Sales
Richard Grimmett
7-7675
rgrimmett@crs.loc.gov
Base Closure
Daniel Else
7-4996
delse@crs.loc.gov
Pat Towell
7-2122
ptowell@crs.loc.gov
Defense Budget
Stephen Daggett
7-7642
sdaggett@crs.loc.gov
Amy Belasco
7-7627
abelasco@crs.loc.gov
Gary Pagliano
7-1750
gpagliano@crs.loc.gov
Defense Industry
Daniel Else
7-4996
delse@crs.loc.gov
Defense R&D
John Moteff
7-1435
jmoteff@crs.loc.gov
Edward Bruner
7-2775
ebruner@crs.loc.gov
Ground Forces
Andrew Feickert
7-7673
afeickert@crs.loc.gov
Health Care; Military
Richard Best 7-7607
rbest@crs.loc.gov
Richard Best
7-7607
rbest@crs.loc.gov
Intelligence
Al Cumming
7-7739
acumming@crs.loc.gov
Military Construction
Daniel Else 7-4996
delse@crs.loc.gov
Military Personnel
David Burrelli 7-8033
dburrelli@crs.loc.gov
Congressional Research Service
70
Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
Area of Expertise
Name
Phone
E-mail
Charles Henning
7-8866
chenning@crs.loc.gov
Lawrence Kapp
7-7609
lkapp@crs.loc.gov
National Guard & Reserves
Lawrence Kapp
7-7609
lkapp@crs.loc.gov
Steven Hildreth
7-7635
shildreth@crs.loc.gov
Missile Defense
Andrew Feickert
7-7673
afeickert@crs.loc.gov
Naval Forces
Ronald O’Rourke
7-7610
rorourke@crs.loc.gov
Nuclear Weapons
Jonathan Medalia
7-7632
jmedalia@crs.loc.gov
Peace Operations
Nina Serafino
7-7667
nserafino@crs.loc.gov
Readiness Amy
Belasco
7-7627
abelasco@crs.loc.gov
Space, Military
Steven Hildreth 7-2508
shildreth@crs.loc.gov
War Powers
Richard Grimmett
7-7675
rgrimmett@crs.loc.gov
Author Contact Information
Pat Towell, Coordinator
Charles A. Henning
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
Specialist in Military Manpower Policy
ptowell@crs.loc.gov, 7-2122
chenning@crs.loc.gov, 7-8866
Stephen Daggett
Steven A. Hildreth
Specialist in Defense Policy and Budgets
Specialist in Missile Defense
sdaggett@crs.loc.gov, 7-7642
shildreth@crs.loc.gov, 7-7635
Amy Belasco
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
Specialist in Naval Affairs
abelasco@crs.loc.gov, 7-7627
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
Richard A. Best Jr.
Moshe Schwartz
Specialist in National Defense
Analyst in Defense Acquisition
rbest@crs.loc.gov, 7-7607
mschwartz@crs.loc.gov, 7-1463
Catherine Dale
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security
Specialist in International Security Affairs
cdale@crs.loc.gov, 7-8983
nserafino@crs.loc.gov, 7-7667
Andrew Feickert
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
awoolf@crs.loc.gov, 7-2379
Valerie Bailey Grasso
Specialist in Defense Acquisition
vgrasso@crs.loc.gov, 7-7617
Congressional Research Service
71
Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations
Congressional Research Service
72