Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background
and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
July 16, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL31673
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The Air Force F-22 fighter, also known as the Raptor, is the world’s most capable air-to-air
combat aircraft. Procurement of F-22s began in FY1999, and a total of 187 have been procured
through FY2009, including 24 in FY2009.
The administration wants to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft, and the administration’s
proposed FY2010 budget does not request funding for the procurement of additional F-22s in
FY2010. The administration argues, among other things, that 187 F-22s will be sufficient in
conjunction with other U.S. tactical aircraft, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), to meet
operational demands for U.S. tactical aircraft.
Supporters of the F-22 want to continue procuring the aircraft in FY2010 and subsequent years.
They argue, among other things, that Air Force officials have stated that 243 to 250 F-22s would
be needed to meet operational demands at a moderate level of operational risk.
The issue of F-22 procurement has emerged as one of the highest-profile items of debate on the
FY2010 defense budget. The White House on July 13 vowed to veto any bill that supports the
acquisition of F-22s beyond the 187 that have been procured through FY2009.
The issue for Congress is whether to approve the administration’s request to end F-22
procurement at 187 aircraft, or reject that proposal and provide funding in FY2010 for the
procurement of additional F-22s in FY2010 and/or subsequent years. Additional issues for
Congress for the F-22 program include the reliability and maintainability of in-service F-22s, the
F-22 modernization program, and the potential sale of F-22s to Japan.
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on the
FY2010 defense authorization bill (H.R. 2647), recommends authorizing $368.8 million in
FY2010 advance procurement funding for the procurement of 12 F-22s in FY2011. The report
recommends $12.7 million in procurement funding for modification of in-service F-22s—a
reduction of $338.0 million from the administration’s request. Section 131 of the bill would
repeal a provision limiting the obligation of FY2009 F-22 advance procurement funding. Section
132 would require the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a plan for the preservation and
storage of unique tooling related to the production of hardware and end items for F-22s. Section
1237 would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on issues relating to
the potential sale of F-22s to Japan.
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) on the
FY2010 defense authorization bill (S. 1390), recommends authorizing $1.75 billion for the
procurement of seven F-22s in FY2010. Section 122 of the bill would repeal a provision limiting
the obligation of FY2009 F-22 advance procurement funding. Section 123 would require the
Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on issues relating to the potential sale of F-
22s to Japan.
On July 16, 2009, Representative John Murtha, the chairman of the Defense subcommittee of the
House Appropriations Committee, issued a press release stating that the subcommittee had
completed its markup of the FY2010 defense appropriations bill. The release stated that the bill as
marked by the subcommittee up includes an additional $369 in advance procurement funding for
the procurement of 12 F-22s.
Congressional Research Service
Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 2
The F-22 In Brief .................................................................................................................. 2
Program Origin and Milestones ............................................................................................. 3
F-22 Contractors, Employment, and Production Line Shutdown ............................................ 4
Contractors ..................................................................................................................... 4
Employment ................................................................................................................... 4
Production Line Shutdown .............................................................................................. 5
Procurement Quantities ......................................................................................................... 6
Planned Total Procurement Quantity ............................................................................... 6
Annual Procurement Quantities....................................................................................... 8
Costs and Funding ................................................................................................................ 8
Estimated Total Program Cost and Prior-Year Funding .................................................... 8
Legislated Limits on F-22 Costs...................................................................................... 9
FY2009 Funding for Procurement of F-22s ................................................................... 10
FY2010 Funding for Procurement of F-22s ................................................................... 11
F-22 Modernization Program .............................................................................................. 11
GAO Assessment of F-22 Program...................................................................................... 12
Potential Sale of F-22s to Japan........................................................................................... 13
Issues For Congress .................................................................................................................. 15
Procuring Additional F-22s ................................................................................................. 15
OSD and Air Force Views ............................................................................................. 15
Summary of Arguments ................................................................................................ 18
Reliability and Maintainability of In-Service F-22s ............................................................. 22
July 10, 2009, News Report .......................................................................................... 22
Rebuttals to July 10, 2009, News Report ....................................................................... 24
F-22 Modernization Program .............................................................................................. 30
Potential Export to Japan..................................................................................................... 31
Summary of Arguments ................................................................................................ 31
Additional Discussion of Factors to Consider ................................................................ 33
Legislative Activity in 2009 ...................................................................................................... 37
FY2010 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 2647/P.L. 110-329)............................................. 37
Request ......................................................................................................................... 37
House ........................................................................................................................... 37
Senate ........................................................................................................................... 39
FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bill................................................................................... 42
House ........................................................................................................................... 42
FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32)..................................... 42
Request ......................................................................................................................... 42
House ........................................................................................................................... 42
Senate ........................................................................................................................... 42
Conference.................................................................................................................... 43
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Tables
Table 1. Planned Total Number of Production F-22s .................................................................... 7
Table 2. Annual Procurement Quantities of Production F-22s ...................................................... 8
Table 3. FY2009 Funding for Procurement of F-22s .................................................................. 10
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 43
Congressional Research Service
Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The Air Force F-22 fighter, also known as the Raptor, is the world’s most capable air-to-air
combat aircraft. Procurement of F-22s began in FY1999, and a total of 187 have been procured
through FY2009, including 24 in FY2009.
The 24 F-22s procured in FY2009 include 20 aircraft that were fully funded in the FY2009
defense appropriations act (Division C of H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008) and
four additional aircraft whose procurement cost was recently completed in the FY2009
supplemental appropriations act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32 of June 24, 2009).1
The administration wants to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft, and the administration’s
proposed FY2010 budget does not request funding for the procurement of additional F-22s in
FY2010. The administration argues, among other things, that 187 F-22s will be sufficient in
conjunction with other U.S. tactical aircraft, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), to meet
operational demands for U.S. tactical aircraft.
Supporters of the F-22 want to continue procuring the aircraft in FY2010 and subsequent years.
They argue, among other things, that Air Force officials have stated that 243 to 250 F-22s would
be needed to meet operational demands at a moderate level of operational risk.
The issue of F-22 procurement has emerged as one of the highest-profile items of debate on the
FY2010 defense budget. The White House on July 13 vowed to veto any bill that supports the
acquisition of F-22s beyond the 187 that have been procured through FY2009.2
The issue for Congress is whether to approve the administration’s request to end F-22
procurement at 187 aircraft, or reject that proposal and provide funding in FY2010 for the
procurement of additional F-22s in FY2010 and/or subsequent years. Additional issues for
Congress for the F-22 program include the reliability and maintainability of in-service F-22s, the
F-22 modernization program, and the potential sale of F-22s to Japan. Congress’ decisions on this
issue could affect DOD capabilities and funding requirements, the U.S. tactical aircraft industrial
base, and U.S. relations with Japan and other countries.
1 As part of its action on the FY2009 defense appropriations act, Congress funded the procurement of 20 F-22s in
FY2009 and also provided $523.0 million in advance procurement funding for the procurement of 20 additional F-22s
in FY2010. In late 2008, DOD released enough of the advance procurement funding to purchase long leadtime items
for four F-22s. As part of its action on the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act, Congress provided $600 million to
complete the procurement cost for these four aircraft. These four aircraft are now recorded as having been procured in
FY2009, along with the 20 F-22s that were fully funded in the FY2009 defense appropriations act.
2 See, for example, R. Jeffrey Smith, “Obama Vows A Veto In Dispute Over F-22s,” Washington Post, July 14, 2009:
2.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Background
The F-22 In Brief
The F-22, known more formally as the F-22A,3 is the world’s most capable air-to-air combat
aircraft. It also has an air-to-ground (i.e., attack) capability.4 The F-22 incorporates a high degree
of stealth, supercruise,5 thrust-vectoring for high maneuverability,6 and integrated avionics that
fuse information from on-board and off-board sensors.
The F-22 and the multi-service F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) are considered the world’s first
two fifth-generation tactical aircraft. Fifth-generation aircraft incorporate the most modern
technology, and are considered to be generally more capable than earlier-generation (e.g., fourth-
generation and below) aircraft. The F-22 is intended to replace the Air Force’s aging F-15 air
superiority fighters, while the F-35A (the Air Force version of the F-35) is intended to replace the
service’s aging F-16 fighters and A-10 attack aircraft. The F-22 is a bit more stealthy than the F-
35, and more capable than the F-35 in air-to-air combat. The F-35A is intended to be a more
affordable complement to the F-22, and is a strike fighter—a dual-role aircraft with significant
capability in both air-to-ground (strike) and air-to-air (fighter) operations.7 If the F-15/F-16
combination represented the Air Force’s earlier-generation “high-low” mix of air superiority
fighters and more-affordable dual-role aircraft, then the F-22/F-35A combination might be
viewed as the Air Force’s intended future high-low mix of air superiority fighters and more-
affordable dual-role aircraft.8 The Air Force states that:
Fifth generation fighters like the F-22A and the F-35 are key elements of our Nation’s
defense and ability for deterrence. As long as hostile nations recognize that U.S. airpower
can strike their vital centers with impunity, all other U.S. Government efforts are enhanced,
which reduces the need for military confrontation....
Both the F-22A and the F-35 represent our latest generation of fighter aircraft. We need both
aircraft to maintain the margin of superiority we have come to depend upon, the margin that
has granted our forces in the air and on the ground freedom to maneuver and to attack. The
F-22A and F-35 each possess unique, complementary, and essential capabilities that together
3 The F-22 is referred to more formally as the F-22A, meaning the first version of the F-22. As no other versions of the
F-22 are currently planned, this CRS report refers to the aircraft as the F-22.
4 Although the F-22 was originally conceived as an air superiority fighter with minimal air-to-ground capability, the Air
Force subsequently placed more emphasis on F-22’s air-to-ground capability. In September 2002, in recognition of the
aircraft’s air-to-ground capability, the F-22 was redesignated the F/A-22, with the A standing for attack. In December
2005, the Air Force changed the aircraft’s designation back to F-22.
5 Supercruise is the ability to cruise at supersonic speeds without using engine afterburners. The F-22 is expected to
have a level speed of about Mach 1.7 using afterburners and a cruise speed of about Mach 1.5 without afterburners.
6 The F-22’s two Pratt & Whitney F-119 turbofan engines are equipped with thrust-vectoring nozzles.
7 For more on the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
8 The term high-low mix refers to a force consisting of a combination of high-cost, high-capability aircraft and lower-
cost, more-affordable aircraft. Procuring a high-low mix is a strategy for attempting to balance the goals of having a
certain minimum number of very high capability tactical aircraft to take on the most challenging projected missions and
of being able to procure tactical aircraft sufficient in total numbers within available resources to perform all projected
missions.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
provide the synergistic effects required to maintain that margin of superiority across the
spectrum of conflict....
The F-22A Raptor is the Air Force’s primary air superiority fighter, providing unmatched
capabilities for air supremacy, homeland defense and cruise missile defense for the Joint
team. The multi-role F-22A’s combination of speed, stealth, maneuverability and integrated
avionics gives this remarkable aircraft the ability to gain access to, and survive in, high threat
environments. Its ability to find, fix, track, and target enemy air- and surface-based threats
ensures air dominance and freedom of maneuver for all Joint forces.9
Program Origin and Milestones
The F-22 program was initiated in the early 1980s with the aim of developing a highly capable
successor to the F-15 that would be capable of defeating all known and projected enemy fighters,
including those being developed at the time by the Soviet Union.10 The F-22 program was given
Milestone I approval in October 1986. The first flight of an F-22 prototype occurred in August
1990,11 and the first flight of a development version of the aircraft occurred in September 1997.12
The program was granted approval for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in August 2001, and
the first LRIP F-22 was delivered in June 2003. The F-22 achieved Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) in December 2005.13
9 Department of the Air Force Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, United States House of Representatives, Subject: Air Force Programs, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant
General Daniel J. Darnell, Air Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And
Requirements (AF/A3/5), Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ), [and] Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy Chief
of Staff for Strategic Plans And Programs (AF/A8), May 20, 2009, pp. 7-8.
10 In the early 1980s, the Air Force began to develop a stealth aircraft called the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF),
which was then expected to enter service in the 1990s as the replacement for the F-15. The ATF program was initiated
in response to advances in Soviet combat aircraft that were expected to occur in the 1990s. A naval variant of the ATF
that could operate from aircraft carriers—the NATF—was initiated as the replacement for the Navy’s F-14 fighter, but
the NATF program was subsequently terminated.
11 To help control ATF costs, DOD used competitive prototypes for ATF airframes, engines, and avionics. The Air
Force selected two teams of contractors to develop ATF airframe prototypes: Lockheed teamed with Boeing and
General Dynamics; and Northrop teamed with McDonnell Douglas. On October 31, 1986, the Air Force awarded each
team a $691-million fixed-price contract to build two prototypes. Lockheed’s prototype was designated the YF-22,
while Northrop’s was designated the YF-23. The prototypes were powered by new-design engines. One YF-22
prototype and one YF-23 prototype were powered by Pratt & Whitney’s F119 engine, while the other YF-22 prototype
and YF-23 prototype were powered by General Electric’s F120 engine. The Air Force announced in 1989 that the full-
scale development phase would be delayed to allow more time for development of engines and avionics. Each
contractor team reportedly spent over $1 billion in company funds to develop competing their prototypes, which were
flight-tested and evaluated in late 1990.
12 On April 23, 1991, the Air Force selected the Lockheed’s YF-22 design, as powered by Pratt & Whitney’s F119
engine, for development as the F-22. Air Force Secretary Donald Rice stated that the choice was based on confidence
in the ability of the Lockheed team and Pratt & Whitney to produce the aircraft and its engine at projected costs. Rice
emphasized the importance of the Lockheed team’s management and production plans, and added that the YF-22
offered better reliability and maintainability. Neither design was judged significantly more maneuverable or stealthy
than the other. On August 2, 1991, contracts totaling $11 billion were awarded to Lockheed and Pratt & Whitney for
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) of the F-22, then including 11 development/prototype aircraft.
13 On December 12, 2005, the Air Force’s Air Combat Command declared that the first squadron of 12 F-22s—27th
Fighter Squadron of the 1st Fighter Wing, based at Langley Air Force Base (AFB)—had achieved Initial Operational
Capability (IOC). On January 21, 2006, the F-22 flew its first operational sorties, taking part in an on-going air
superiority mission over the United States.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Lockheed Martin in the past has studied the idea of a fighter-bomber version of the F-22 called
the FB-22, but the Air Force currently has no program to develop or acquire such an aircraft.14
F-22 Contractors, Employment, and Production Line Shutdown
Contractors
The major contractors for the F-22 program are Lockheed Martin of Marietta, GA, and Fort
Worth, TX, along with Boeing of Seattle, WA, for the F-22’s airframe; and United Technologies
of East Hartford, CT (the parent firm of engine maker Pratt & Whitney) for the F-22’s F119
engines.
A map provided by Lockheed shows a total of roughly 1,040 F-22 suppliers in 44 states (all but
Alaska, Hawaii, North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wyoming).15
Employment
Lockheed states that the F-22 program in 2009 supports a total of 8,800 direct jobs at Lockheed’s
Marietta, GA, and Fort Worth, TX, locations, and at Boeing and Pratt & Whitney. Lockheed
estimates, on the basis of purchase order receipts, that the F-22 program supports an additional
16,200 supplier jobs in 44 states around the country. Lockheed combines these two figures to
estimate that the F-22 supports a total of about 25,000 direct jobs. Using a multiplier of 2.8 to
estimate jobs elsewhere in the economy that are indirectly supported by these 25,000 jobs,
Lockheed estimates that an additional 70,000 jobs are indirectly supported by the F-22 program.
14 The FB-22, which would employ a delta wing (i.e., a triangular shaped wing), would have double the F-22’s range
and a significantly larger internal payload. Some observers have estimated that the FB-22 could carry up to 30 250-lb
Small Diameter Bombs. (Richard Whittle, “F-22 Bomber Studied,” Dallas Morning News, July 30, 2002; Frank Wolfe,
“Sambur: F-22 Must Prove Itself Before FB-22 Becomes Formal Program,” Defense Daily, March 4, 2002.) These
potential improvements in range and internal payload would likely result in reduced performance compared to the F-22
in other areas, such as acceleration and maneuverability.
Some Air Force leaders in the past have expressed some enthusiasm for the FB-22 idea. In 2002, Secretary of the Air
Force James Roche reportedly favored the FB-22 as the potential platform of choice for providing better close air
support for tomorrow’s ground forces. (Ron Laurenzo, “Roche Envisions Close Air Support F-22,” Defense Week, July
1, 2002.) Roche suggested in testimony to Congress in 2003 that up to 150 FB-22s could be procured, with full-rate
production achievable by FY2011, if development funds were committed in FY2004. (Lorenzo Cortes, “Air Force
Issues Clarification on FB-22, FY’11 Delivery Date Possible,” Defense Daily, March 10, 2003.) Some Air Force
leaders in the past have said the FB-22 could serve as a bridge between the current bomber force and a next-generation
long-range bomber. Other Air Force leaders have reportedly shown less enthusiasm in the FB-22 concept. Air Force
acquisition chief Marvin Sambur said in 2002 that the F-22A’s difficulties would have to be solved before the FB-22
could be considered. (Bill Sweetman. “Smarter Bomber,” Popular Science, June 25, 2002.)
Some observers argue that the FB-22 could be developed and produced economically by reusing the F-22’s cockpit,
engines, computer systems, production methods, and materials. Other observers argue that redesigning an aircraft to
perform a new mission is difficult and usually expensive. Some observers estimate that developing the FB-22’s
modified airframe could cost up to $1 billion. Other observers have questioned the potential cost effectiveness
attractiveness of a medium-range bomber with a payload smaller than that of current long-range bombers.
15 Lockheed map entitled “F-22 Raptor[:] The 2009 Industrial Base,” provided to CRS by e-mail on July 13, 2009. The
map shows four states with no suppliers (North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wyoming) and does not depict
two other states (Alaska and Hawaii).
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Lockheed combines the figures of 25,000 and 70,000 to estimate that a total of 95,000 jobs are
supported either directly or indirectly by the F-22 program.16
A map provided by Lockheed shows roughly 25,800 direct F-22-related jobs in 44 states.
According to the map, states with more than 1,000 direct F-22-related jobs include California
(6,532 jobs), Texas (3,526), Georgia (2,821), Connecticut (2,205), New Hampshire (2,197),
Washington (1,491), and Florida (1,025). The map shows several states with a few hundred to
several hundred direct F-22-related jobs each, and a number of states with fewer than 100 (in
some cases fewer than 25) direct F-22-related jobs each. The map shows four states—North
Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming—as having no direct F-22-related jobs in
2009. The map does not depict Alaska or Hawaii.17
Production Line Shutdown
The administration’s FY2010 defense budget submission states that the 20 F-22s procured in the
regular (aka “base”) FY2009 defense budget are to be delivered to the Air Force between January
2011 and December 2011, with one or two aircraft being delivered each month.18 Lockheed states
that the four additional F-22s funded in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act will be built
after these 20 aircraft.19 If the four additional F-22s are delivered to the Air Force in monthly
quantities of one or two aircraft, the last of these four aircraft might be delivered in February or
March of 2012.
If no additional F-22s are procured in FY2010 and/or subsequent years, then the earlier parts of
the F-22 production line (including F-22 suppliers who provide materials or components that are
delivered during the earlier stages of the F-22 assembly process) will begin to shut down prior to
the delivery of the final four F-22s, when those four aircraft act move beyond the earlier parts of
the production line. The administration’s FY2010 budget submission, for example, shows that
although the 20 F-22s funded in the regular FY2009 defense budget are to be delivered starting in
January 2011, the F119 engines for these aircraft are to be delivered starting in February 2010—
11 months earlier.20
The administration’s FY2010 budget submission states that the $95.2 million in FY2010
procurement funding requested for the F-22 program “includes $64M [i.e., $64 million] to
continue production line shutdown activities, which preserve necessary assets for long-term F-22
fleet sustainment.”21 The use of the word “continue” in this statement suggests that under the
16 Source: Lockheed e-mail to CRS, July 13, 2009.
17 Lockheed map entitled “F-22 Raptor[:] The 2009 Industrial Base,” provided to CRS by e-mail on July 13, 2009.
18 Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, Fiscal Year (FY)
2010 Budget Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, Vol. 1, May 2009, Exhibit P-21, Production Schedule, F-22
(Raptor). The 20 aircraft are to be delivered in monthly quantities of 2, 2, 1 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2.
19 Lockheed e-mail to CRS, July 15, 2009.
20 Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, Fiscal Year (FY)
2010 Budget Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, Vol. 1, May 2009, Exhibit P-5A, Procurement History and
Planning, F-22 (Raptor).
21 Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, Fiscal Year (FY)
2010 Budget Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, Vol. 1, May 2009, Exhibit P-40, Budget Item Justification, F-
22 (Raptor).
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
proposed FY2010 budget, some F-22 production line shutdown activities are anticipated to occur
in FY2009.
Lockheed states:
Since further orders have not yet been placed beyond the four aircraft in the FY09
Supplemental, F-22 Advanced Procurement suppliers are beginning to adjust their workforce
and phasing out their F-22 production capability. Suppliers that will first experience the
absence of continuing production work beyond the 4 aircraft authorization begin with raw
material suppliers of titanium and other long lead raw materials, followed by forging houses
and other long lead components. As production jobs and capability decline, the ability to
recover those critical skills becomes increasingly expensive, particularly where F-22
comprises a large share of their overall business.22
The Air Force in 2007 estimated that of about 1,000 first-tier F-22 suppliers, roughly 110, or
about 11%, were also F-35 suppliers. The Air Force believes this figure probably has not changed
significantly since 2007. The Air Force believes the percentage of F-22 suppliers that are also F-
35 suppliers is not higher than about 11% because the F-35 program involves significant
international participation and thus features a large number of foreign suppliers.23 On this basis, it
would appear that if F-22 production ends, most F-22 suppliers would not be supported by F-35
production.
Procurement Quantities
Planned Total Procurement Quantity
Since the submission to Congress in early 2005 of the FY2006 budget, DOD plans have called for
procuring a total of about 187 F-22s—a figure that includes:
• 179 production aircraft;
• 6 Production Representative Test Vehicle (PRTV) II aircraft; and
• 2 Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) aircraft funded with
research and development funding.24
The figure of 179 production aircraft includes four F-22s whose procurement cost was recently
completed in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act. Prior to the funding of the four
additional aircraft, the planned total was 183 F-22s, including 175 production aircraft.
The Air Force originally envisaged a production run of 750 F-22s. The figure was reduced to 648
in 1991. DOD’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) reduced the planned number of production F-
22s to 438 (plus four pre-production versions, later reduced to two), which was enough to support
four F-22 fighter wings in a total Air Force force structure of 20 wings (13 active; seven
22 Lockheed e-mail to CRS, July 15, 2009.
23 Source: E-mail from Air Force Office of Legislative Liaison to CRS on July 15, 2009.
24 Some DOD documents show slightly different planned procurement totals, such as 184 (a figure that includes one
replacement test aircraft) or 181 (a figure that that includes 172 production aircraft and 9 non-production aircraft). The
most commonly cited figure is 183.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Reserve/National Guard). The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reduced the planned
number of production F-22s to 339, which was enough to support three F-22 fighter wings in a
20-wing force structure (12 active; eight Reserve/National Guard). Table 1 shows planned total
numbers of F-22s in the budget submissions for FY1999 to the present.
Table 1. Planned Total Number of Production F-22s
As shown in budget submissions for FY1991 to the present
Budget
Planned number of
Planned total
submission
production F-22s
number of F-22sa
FY1991 648
n/a
FY1992 648
n/a
FY1993 442
n/a
FY1994 442
n/a
FY1995 442
n/a
FY1996 442
n/a
FY1997 442
n/a
FY1998 341
n/a
FY1999 339
n/a
FY2000 339
n/a
FY2001 333
n/a
FY2002 333
339
FY2003 333
339
FY2004 270
276
FY2005 271
277
FY2006 172
179
FY2007 176
183
FY2008 175
183
FY2009 175
183
FY2010 175b 183b
Source: Prepared by CRS based on Air Force information paper of July 8, 2009, provided to CRS on July 9,
2009 (for FY1991-FY1998), and DOD budget submissions (for FY1999-FY2010).
a. This total includes production F-22s from the previous column, plus 6 Production Representative Test
Vehicle (PRTV) II aircraft, plus (beginning in FY2006) 1 or 2 EMD aircraft funded with research and
development funding.
b. The proposed FY2010 budget was submitted to Congress in early May 2009, prior to the completion of
action on the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act, and consequently does not reflect the four
additional F-22s whose procurement cost was completed in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act. If
these four aircraft had been included in the FY2010 budget submission, the submission would have shown
179 production F-22 and a total of 187 F-22s.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Annual Procurement Quantities
Table 2 shows annual procurement quantities for the 179 production F-22s procured through
FY2009. The 64 F-22s procured in FY2007-FY2009 include 20 F-22s per year that were
procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement, plus the four additional F-22s
whose procurement cost was completed in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act.
Table 2. Annual Procurement Quantities of Production F-22s
FY Quantity
FY99 2
FY00 0
FY01 10
FY02 13
FY03 21
FY04 22
FY05 24
FY06 23
FY07 20a
FY08 20a
FY09 24a
Total through FY09
179
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD data.
a. The 64 F-22s procured in FY2007-FY2009 include 20 F-22s per year that were procured under a multiyear
procurement (MYP) arrangement, plus four additional F-22s in FY2009 whose procurement cost was
completed in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act.
Costs and Funding
Estimated Total Program Cost and Prior-Year Funding25
As of December 31, 2007, DOD estimated the total acquisition cost (meaning the sum of research
and development cost, procurement cost, and military construction [MilCon] cost) of an 183-
aircraft F-22 program about $64.5 billion in then-year dollars (meaning dollars across various
years that are not adjusted for inflation). This figure includes about $30.4 billion in research and
development costs, about $33.5 billion in procurement costs, and $650 million in MilCon costs.
Of the program’s total estimated acquisition cost of $64.5 billion in then-year dollars, more than
$62 billion has been provided through FY2009.
25 Figures in this section are taken from the December 31, 2007, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for the F-22
program.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
As of December 31, 2007, the 183-aircraft F-22 program had a Program Acquisition Unit Cost (or
PAUC, which is the program’s total acquisition cost divided by the total number of aircraft
acquired [including non-production aircraft]) of $350.8 million in then-year dollars, and an
Average Unit Procurement Cost (or APUC, which is the program’s total procurement cost divided
by 175 production aircraft) of $191.6 million in then-year dollars.
Legislated Limits on F-22 Costs
The F-22 program since FY1998 has operated under legislated limits on total engineering and
manufacturing development (EMD) cost and on total production cost. The limit on EMD cost was
repealed as part of action on the FY2002 defense budget, leaving in place the limit on total
production cost.26 The limit on total production cost is adjustable for inflation after September 30,
1997, and for changes in federal, state, and local laws enacted after September 30, 1997. For
26 The history of the legislated limits is as follows:
• Section 217 of the FY1998 defense authorization act (H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85 of November 18,
1997) limited the total cost of the F-22 program’s engineering and manufacturing development
(EMD) phase to $18.688 billion, and the total cost of the F-22 program’s production phase to
$43.4 billion. The section stated that both of these figures could be adjusted for inflation after
September 30, 1997, and for changes in federal, state, and local laws enacted after September
30, 1997.
• Section 8125 of the FY2001 defense appropriations act (H.R. 4576/P.L. 106-259 of August 9,
2000) limited the combined cost of the F-22 program’s EMD and production phases to
$58.0282 billion. The section stated that figure could be adjusted for inflation as under Section
217 of the FY1998 defense authorization act (i.e., for inflation and for changes in federal,
state, and local laws). In an apparent reference to Section 217 of the FY1998 defense
authorization act (see above), Section 8125 also stated that “This section supersedes any
limitation previously provided by law on the amount that may be obligated or expended for
engineering and manufacturing development under the F-22 aircraft program and any
limitation previously provided by law on the amount that may be obligated or expended for
the F-22 production program.”
• Section 219 of the FY2001 defense authorization act (H.R. 4205/P.L. 106-398 of October 30,
2000 – the conference report on H.R. 4205 [H.Rept. 106-945 of October 6, 2000] enacted the
provisions of H.R. 5408), which was signed into law after the FY2001 defense appropriations
act (see above) – amended Section 217 of the FY1998 defense authorization act by permitting
the cost limit on the F-22 program’s EMD phase to be increased by not more than 1.5% if the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, after consulting with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, determines that the increase is necessary
in order to ensure adequate testing. In an apparent reference to Section 8125 of the FY2001
defense appropriations act (see above), Section 219 also stated that the individual cost limits
on the EMD and production phases of the F-22 program established by Section 217 of the
FY1998 defense authorization act shall continue to apply “without regard to any provision of
law establishing a single limitation on amounts obligated and expended for engineering and
manufacturing development and for production for that program.”
• Section 213 of the FY2002 defense authorization act (S. 1438/P.L. 107-107 of December 28,
2001) repealed the limit on the total cost of the F-22 program’s EMD phase established by
Section 217 of the FY1998 defense authorization act, leaving in place Section 217’s limit on
the total cost of the F-22 program’s phase. Section 213 also repealed Section 8125 of the
FY2001 defense appropriations act, and repealed the part of Section 219 of the FY2001
defense authorization act that stated (in an apparent reference to Section 8125) that the
individual cost limits on the EMD and production phases of the F-22 program established by
Section 217 of the FY1998 defense authorization act shall continue to apply “without regard to
any provision of law establishing a single limitation on amounts obligated and expended for
engineering and manufacturing development and for production for that program.”
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
FY2009, the adjusted limit on total production cost is $37.6432 billion in then-year dollars.27 The
187-aircraft F-22 program appears to be more than $3 billion below this cap.28
FY2009 Funding for Procurement of F-22s
Table 3 summarizes FY2009 funding for the procurement of F-22s.29
Table 3. FY2009 Funding for Procurement of F-22s
In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth
Request
Appropriation
Adjusteda
FY2009 defense appropriations act (Division C of H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008)
Procurement 3,054.2
2,907.2
2,897.8
Advance procurement
0
523.0
521.6
FY2009 supplemental appropriations act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32 of June 24, 2009)
Procurement 600.0
600.0
n/a
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD data.
a. Funding levels in the FY2009 defense appropriations act were adjusted by DOD after enactment.
The George W. Bush administration wanted to end procurement of F-22s at 183 aircraft, and
consequently did not request any advance procurement funding in FY2009 for F-22s to be
procured in FY2010.
Congress, in acting on the FY2009 budget request, provided $523.0 million in advance
procurement funding for the procurement of 20 additional F-22s in FY2010. After enactment of
the FY2010 defense budget, DOD adjusted this figure to $521.6 million, which is what appears in
the FY2009 column of the FY2010 budget request. Section 134 of the FY2009 defense
authorization act (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417of October 14, 2008) prohibits obligating more than
$140.0 million of FY2009 advance procurement funding for the F-22 program until the President
certifies to the congressional defense committees that procurement of F-22s is in the national
interest, or that the termination of the F-22 production line is in the national interest. The
certification was to have been made not earlier than January 21, 2009 (the first full day of
President Obama’s term in office), and not earlier than March 1, 2009. The Senate Armed
Services Committee states in its report (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) on the FY2010 defense
authorization bill (S. 1390) that the President made no such certification.30
At a November 19, 2008, hearing before the Air and Land Forces subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee, subcommittee members criticized John Young, the DOD acquisition
27 Source: Air Force information paper of July 8, 2009 provided to CRS on July 9, 2009.
28 As stated in the previous section, as of December 31, 2007, the 183-aircraft F-22 program had a total estimated
procurement cost of $33.5 billion in then-year dollars. The four additional F-22s whose procurement cost was
completed with $600 million in funding in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act would increase that figure to
something above $34 billion in then-year dollars.
29 (The F-22 program also includes procurement funding for purposes other than procuring F-22s, such as modification
of in-service F-22s, as well as research and development funding and military construction funding.)
30 S.Rept. 111-35, page 15.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
executive, for not obligating the FY2009 advance procurement funds to purchase long-lead items
for an additional 20 F-22s. Young testified that DOD was complying with provisions in the
FY2009 defense authorization act, but some subcommittee members disagreed strenuously, and
urged Young to immediately disburse sufficient funds for the advance procurement of long-lead
time items for 20 F-22s. Subsequent to the hearing, DOD released funds sufficient for purchasing
long-lead items for four Raptors.31
FY2010 Funding for Procurement of F-22s
The Obama administration wants to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft, and consequently has
not requested funding in FY2010 for the procurement of additional F-22s. The administration has
requested $95.2 million in FY2010 procurement funding for the F-22 program, but this funding is
requested for activities associated with completing a 187-aircraft program and shutting down the
F-22 production line, not for procuring additional F-22s.
F-22 Modernization Program
The Air Force in 2003 established a program to modernize its F-22s. The program includes
upgrades to the aircraft’s air-to-ground and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities. In November 2008, DOD officials stated that modernizing F-22s would cost an
estimated $8 billion that was not accounted for in the F-22 program of record.32 The Air Force
testified in May 2009 that:
Similar to every other aircraft in the U.S. inventory, there is a plan to regularly incorporate
upgrades into the F-22A to ensure the Raptor remains the world’s most dominant fighter in
the decades to come. The F-22A modernization program consists of two major efforts that,
together, will ensure every Raptor maintains its maximum combat capability: the Common
Configuration program and a pre-planned product improvement (P3I) program (Increments 2
and 3). We are currently in year six of the planned 13-year program.
As of 1 May 2009, the Air Force has accepted 139 F-22A aircraft, out of a programmed
delivery of 187. Most of these aircraft include the Increment 2 upgrade, which provides the
ability to employ Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) at supersonic speeds and enhances
the intra-flight data-link (IFDL) to provide connectivity with other F-22As. The Air Force
will upgrade the F-22A fleet under the JROC-approved Increment 3 upgrade designed to
enhance both air-to-air and precision ground attack capability. Raptors from the production
line today are wired to accept Increment 3.1, which when equipped, upgrades the APG-77
AESA radar to enable synthetic aperture radar ground mapping capability, provides the
ability to self-target JDAMs using on-board sensors, and allows F-22As to carry and employ
eight Small Diameter Bombs (SDB). The Air Force will begin to field Increment 3.1 in
FY11. Future F-22As will include the Increment 3.2 upgrade, which features the next
generation data-link, improved SDB employment capability, improved targeting using multi-
31 Source: Transcript of hearing. See also Caitlin Harrington, “Pentagon Limits F-22 Buys Over Budget Concerns,”
Jane’s Defense Weekly, November 21, 2008. See also Jason Sherman and Marcus Weisgerber, “Congress Plans F-22A
Hearing This Week, Wants $140 Million Released,” Inside the Air Force, November 14, 2009; Jason Sherman and
Marcus Weisgerber, “DOD Partially Funds F-22, Leaves Final Production Decision To Obama,” Inside the Pentagon,
November 13, 2009.
32 Bettina H. Chavanne. “DOD Acquisition Czar Outlines F-22 Reservations.” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report.
November 21, 2008.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
ship geo-location, automatic ground collision avoidance system (Auto GCAS) and the
capability to employ our enhanced air-to-air weapons (AIM-120D and AIM-9X). Increment
3.2 should begin to field in FY15.
The current F-22A modernization plan will result in 34 Block 20 aircraft used for test and
training, 63 combat-coded Block 30s fielded with Increment 3.1, 83 combat-coded Block 35s
fielded with Increment 3.2, and 3 Edwards AFB-test coded aircraft. Consideration is also
being given to upgrade the 63 Block 30s to the most capable Block 35 configuration.33
GAO Assessment of F-22 Program
A March 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing major DOD weapon
acquisition programs stated the following about the F-22 program (including both production and
modernization):
Technology Maturity
One of the F-22A modernization program’s three critical technologies-processing memory-is
mature. The two remaining technologies-stores management system and cryptography-are
approaching maturity, and have been tested in a relevant environment. The maturity of these
technologies has not changed in the past year. According to program officials, the current F-
22 production and modernization plans do not commit to incorporating new technology into
developmental increments until the underlying technologies have been tested in a relevant
environment and do not commit to fielding these technologies until they have been proven in
developmental and operational testing. The number and mix of technologies identified by
program officials have changed since the modernization effort began, reflecting changes in
program direction, priorities, and work content. Some of these have been deferred to future
modernization efforts, which the Air Force plans to undertake in a separate major defense
acquisition program.
Design Maturity
The design of the first increment of the F-22A modernization program appears stable, almost
2 years after its critical design review. The program office reported that all expected
engineering drawings have been released. According to program officials, they did not plan
to release drawings at the design review because most of the design consisted of software
changes or modifications of existing hardware. Even though the design of the first increment
appears stable, additional design work may be necessary, and the program still needs to
demonstrate two of its critical technologies in operational environments. In addition, the
program is just beginning developmental and operational testing for a number of capabilities.
According to the program office, two developmental test aircraft and six operational test
aircraft are being modified in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to prove out technologies before
fielding or production incorporation.
Other Program Issues
33 Department of the Air Force Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, United States House of Representatives, Subject: Air Force Programs, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant
General Daniel J. Darnell, Air Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And
Requirements (AF/A3/5), Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ), [and] Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy Chief
of Staff for Strategic Plans And Programs (AF/A8), May 20, 2009, pp. 8-9.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
According to the F-22 program office, implementation of the modernization program’s three
increments has been delayed by 3 years because of numerous budget decreases and program
restructurings. Since fiscal year 2002, the F-22A’s modernization budget has been decreased
by over $450 million. Nearly $200 million of the reductions can be attributed to program
restructuring by the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In fiscal year 2008,
the conference report accompanying the Defense Appropriation Act recommended $611
million in research and development funds for the F-22A modernization program, about
$132 million less than requested by the Air Force. The 2009 Defense Appropriation Act
appropriated an additional $523 million for advance procurement for 20 additional aircraft.
However, the 2009 Defense Authorization Act limited the obligation of the advance
procurement funds to $140 million pending a certification by the President that the
procurement of F-22A fighter aircraft is in the national interest of the United States or that
the termination of the production line for F-22A fighter aircraft is in the national interest of
the United States.
The current F-22A multiyear procurement contract for 60 aircraft will end the program’s
planned procurement when the final aircraft is delivered in 2011. Program officials reported
that some contractors are already beginning to cease their F-22-related efforts and would
need to be replaced if additional aircraft are purchased. According to the program officials, a
decision on additional F-22 purchases needs to be made by in early 2009 to avoid losing
additional contractors. Further, program officials stated, it is unclear how new aircraft would
affect future modernization efforts. The additional aircraft could be configured the same as
previous production models (Increment 2), or they could possibly be produced as the newest
increment available (Increment 3.1).
Program Office Comments
The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.34
Potential Sale of F-22s to Japan
Japan’s fighter force includes, among other aircraft, about 200 F-15s and two squadrons of aging
F-4 Phantoms. To replace the F-4s, Japan reportedly wants to purchase 40 to 50 new fighters.
Japan reportedly would prefer to purchase F-22s as the replacements, but is considering five other
candidate aircraft types as well: the F-35, a version of the F-15 designated the F-15FX, the F/A-
18E-F Super Hornet (a strike fighter that has been procured for the U.S. Navy since FY1997), the
Eurofighter Typhoon (an aircraft built by European consortium), and the Dassault Rafale.35
34 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-
326SP, March 2009, p. 80.
35 Bradley Perrett, “Japan To Drop Arms Export Ban,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, May 27, 2009: 1-2; Bradley
Perrett, “Japan Likely To Delay F-X Order,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 10, 2009: 5. Another article –
Christopher Drew, “House Panel Votes To Keep The F-22 Jet Fighter Alive,” New York Times, June 18, 2009 –
mentions a Japanese interest in purchasing “as many as 40 F-22s.”
An upgraded version of the F-15 Eagle featuring some added stealth features and other improvements, and called the
Silent Eagle, has been offered for sale by Boeing, the aircraft’s manufacturer. (See, for example, Amy Butler, “Boeing
Unveils New, Stealthy Silent Eagle F-15,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, March 18, 2009: 1-2; Graham
Warwick, “Boeing Studies Levels Of Stealth Available To Sell Silent Eagle,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June
11, 2009: 1-2; David A. Fulghum, “Japanese Prove Patient For U.S. Tacair Opportunities,” Aerospace Daily & Defense
Report, June 23, 2009: 1-2; Amy Butler, “Donley Focuses On International Cooperation, Industrial Base Issues,”
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 17, 2009: 1-2; Amy Butler and Graham Warwick, “F-15 Silent Eagle Flight-
test Dates Slip,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 24, 2009: 1-2.)
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reportedly recommended the F-35 over the F-22 and other
candidates in a meeting with Japan’s defense minister on May 1, 2009, but Japan reportedly still
would prefer to purchase the F-22.36 To facilitate a purchase of F-22s, Japan reportedly is willing
to contribute $300 million toward the cost of developing an export version of the aircraft,37 and
reportedly is willing to pay about $290 million for each F-22, or roughly twice the procurement
cost of F-22s procured for the U.S. Air Force.38
Congress since FY1998 has prohibited the use of appropriated funds to approve or license the
sale of the F-22 to any foreign government through a provision in the annual defense
appropriations act known as the Obey Amendment.39 Congress from time to time has
reconsidered the prohibition on foreign sales of the F-22.
36 Marcus Weisgerber, “Gates Tells Japan No Dice on F-22A, Buy Joint Strike Fighter Instead,” Inside the Air Force,
May 8, 2009; Bradley Perrett, “Japan To Drop Arms Export Ban,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, May 27, 2009:
1-2; David A. Fulghum, “Japanese F-22 Campaign Lives On, Despite Persistent Hurdles,” Aerospace Daily & Defense
Report, June 4, 2009: 3; Bradley Perrett, “Japan Likely To Delay F-X Order,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June
10, 2009” 5; “Missile Worry,” June 15, 2009: 1. The second of these articles states that Japan is seeking to acquire 20
to 60 aircraft, as opposed to 40 to 50. See also David A. Fulghum and John M. Doyle, “Japan Wobbles On New Fighter
As Washington Ponders F-22 Future,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 19, 2009: 1-2; David A. Fulghum,
“Japanese Prove Patient For U.S. Tacair Opportunities,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 23, 2009: 1-2.
37 David A. Fulghum and John M. Doyle, “House Defense Appropriations Chair Lends Support To More F-22s,”
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 25, 2009: 1-2.
38 David A. Fulghum, “Converging Problems Argue For More F-22s, Officials Says,” Aerospace Daily & Defense
Report, July 10, 2009: 3.
39 The provision states: “None of the funds made available in this Act may be used to approve or license the sale of the
F-22 advanced tactical fighter to any foreign government.” (In Section 8067 of the FY2006 defense appropriations act,
the aircraft’s designation was changed to F/A-22. For a discussion of this designation, see footnote 4. The aircraft’s
designation reverted to F-22 in Section 8058 of the FY2007 defense appropriations act.) The table below summarizes
occurrences of the provision in annual defense appropriation acts since FY1998.
Sections in annual defense appropriation acts prohibiting sale of F-22 to foreign governments
Fiscal Year
Bill/Public Law
Section
1998
H.R. 2266/P.L. 105-56
8118
1999
H.R. 4103/P.L. 105-262
8097
2000
H.R. 2561/P.L. 106-79
8092
2001
H.R. 4576/P.L. 106-259
8087
2002
H.R. 3338/P.L. 107-117
8088
2003
H.R. 5010/P.L. 107-248
8077
2004
H.R. 2658/P.L. 108-87
8075
2005
H.R. 4613/P.L. 108-287
8074
2006
H.R. 2863/P.L. 109-148
8067a
2007
H.R. 5631/P.L. 109-289
8058
2008
H.R. 3222/P.L. 110-116
8060
2009
H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329
8059
Source: Compiled by CRS based on conference reports.
a. In Section 8067 of the FY2006 defense appropriations act, the aircraft’s designation was changed to F/A-22. For
a discussion of this designation, see footnote 4. The aircraft’s designation reverted to F-22 in Section 8058 of the
FY2007 defense appropriations act.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Issues For Congress
Procuring Additional F-22s
A key issue for Congress for FY2010 for the F-22 program is whether to approve the
administration’s request to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft, or provide funding in FY2010
for the procurement of additional F-22s in FY2010 and/or subsequent fiscal years.
OSD and Air Force Views
The issue of whether to end F-22 procurement at 183 (now 187) aircraft has in the past been a
topic of apparent disagreement between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Air
Force leaders, with OSD supporting a total of 183 (now 187), and Air Force officials supporting
procurement of substantially more than 183 (now 187).40 Disagreement on the issue appeared to
come to a head in June 2008, when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates asked the Secretary of the
Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff to resign. It was reported in press articles, and later
confirmed by the former Air Force Secretary, Michael Wynne, that their reluctance to support a
total of 183 F-22s was the key factor leading to their resignations.41
Air Force leaders and officials from other military services currently support ending F-22
procurement at 187 aircraft on the grounds that procuring more would reduce funding for other
programs and 187 is enough to meet operational needs under emerging U.S. military strategy. On
July 9, 2009, U.S. Marine Corps General James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that a recently completed DOD study
concluded that a force of 187 F-22s would be sufficient, in conjunction with other U.S. forces, to
meet the needs of a U.S. military strategy that is emerging in the current Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). Cartwright said this emerging strategy focuses on preparing for future conflicts
similar to those in Iraq and Afghanistan while also having forces sufficient to fight a single major
regional peer competitor. Such a strategy, he said, would be in contrast to the defense-planning
standard first established in the early 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, of having forces
sufficient to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.42 Cartwright also testified
40 The figure of 187 aircraft includes the four F-22s funded in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations bill. Prior to
this, the apparent disagreement between OSD and Air Force officials was whether to end F-22 procurement at 183
aircraft or procure substantially more than 183.
41 See, for example: “Wynne speaks out; Tell-all interview covers Iraq withdrawal, nuclear report, procurement and
more.” Air Force Times. July 21, 2008. and John T. Bennett. “Wynne Talks About His Tenure, Termination.” Defense
News. July 14, 2008.
42 A July 9, 2009 press report states:
The Defense Department has completed a new analysis that affirms a requirement for 187 F-22A fighters, the vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said today – a finding he said fits with a developing war-planning strategy
that assumes the U.S. military must be prepared to fight one major theater war at a time.
Gen. James Cartwright, during his confirmation hearing for a second two-year term as vice chairman, told the
Senate Armed Services Committee the new study dovetails with Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ decision –
which the Marine Corps general said he supports – to cap the production of the fighter at 187 aircraft, a proposal
some in Congress want to roll back.
“There is a study in the Joint Staff that we just completed and partnered with the Air Force that said: Proliferating
within the U.S. military fifth-generation fighters from all three services is going to be more significant than having
them based solely in just one service, because of the way we deploy and because of the diversity of our
(continued...)
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
that a desire to preserve funding for procurement of EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft
(an electronic warfare version of the Navy’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet strike fighter) was a key
factor behind DOD’s decision to propose ending F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft.43
(...continued)
deployments,” Cartwright said, referring to plans to field the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to the Air Force, Marine
Corps and Navy.
Press officials for the Joint Staff and the Air Force could not say, by press time today, exactly what study
Cartwright was referring to....
Cartwright said another factor that influenced the decision to limit the total F-22A buy was the need to support
regular requests from combatant commanders for electronic warfare capabilities and, more specifically, the need
to keep Boeing’s F/A-18 aircraft assembly line – which produces an electronic warfare variant of the combat
aircraft – hot, he said.
Beyond the study, Cartwright explained how Pentagon leaders are adjusting their thinking about the need for
tactical fighter aircraft in light of a major strategy revision now under way.
“The military requirement right now [for the F-22A] is associated with the strategy that we are laying out in the
Quadrennial Defense Review,” Cartwright said. “And it is a departure from the two-major-theater-war construct
that we have adhered to in the past and in which this aircraft grew up.”
“The strategy that we are moving towards is one that is acknowledging ... that the more likely conflicts are going
to be similar to the ones we're in in Iraq and Afghanistan,” he said. “But [also] that we do need to have a capability
against a major peer competitor and that we believe that the sizing construct demands that we have fifth-
generation fighters across all services rather than just one. And that the numbers of those fighters probably does
not need to be sufficient to take on two nearly simultaneous peer competitors. We don't see that as the likely, we
see that as the extreme.” ...
Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), an ardent supporter of the Raptor which is assembled in his state, said
Cartwright’s assertion that the requirement for F-22As does not exceed 187 was “not in accord” with statements
made by key Air Force leaders.
“You realize that is contrary to the opinion of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. [Norton] Schwartz?”
Chambliss asked Cartwright.
On May 19, Schwartz told the House Armed Services Committee that 243 F-22As “is the right number” while 187
“the affordable force.”
“I do not realize that,” Cartwright parried. “He has said in several meetings with me and certainly in meetings with
the chiefs that [187] has been the number he has espoused.”
Chambliss then asked about Gen. John Corley, the commander of Air Combat Command who is slated to retire
this summer. In a June 9 letter to Chambliss, Corley said the Air Force needs between 250 and 381 F-22As.
“He and I have spoken about that,” Cartwright said. “He was speaking in the context of the two-major-theater-war
context.”
(Jason Sherman, “Cartwright: New Tactical Air Assessment, War-Planning Strategy Affirm Need For 187 F-
22As,” InsideDefense.com (DefenseAlert – Daily News), July 9, 2009. Bracketed material as in the original. The
article was reprinted in the July 10, 2009, issue of sister publication Inside the Air Force under the title
“Cartwright: Tacair Study, Military Strategy Affirm Need For 187 F-22As.”)
43 A July 9, 2009, press report states:
The need for more F/A-18G electronic warfare aircraft played heavily in the decision to halt F-22 production at
187 jets, says U.S. Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Cartwright told the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 9 that he was one of the “most vocal and ardent
supporters” of ending the Raptor program at 187. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the decision, along
with about 50 other program cuts, in early April.
Cartwright, appearing before the panel for a confirmation hearing as part of his nomination for a second stint as
vice chairman, said the Joint Staff and Air Force had just concluded a study on sizing the F-22 fleet.
He said the study concluded it was more important to focus on fielding fighters for all three services “because of
how we deploy.” It ultimately endorsed ending the F-22 program at 187 jets and fielding more F-35s and both
models of the F-18 fighter.
Cartwright said the latter jet’s Growler model, designed for electronic warfare tasks, became a key part of the
(continued...)
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
A July 15, 2009, news item stated that the DOD study referred to by Cartwright was not so much
a formal analysis as a pair of briefings by DOD’s Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E)
office and the Air Force.44
In the past, Air Force officials have stated that a total of 381 F-22s would be sufficient to meet
operational demands at a low level of risk. In early 2009, prior to the submission of the proposed
FY2010 defense budget, they reportedly were of the view that a total of 243 to 250 would be
sufficient to meet operational demands with a moderate level of risk.45 These statements may
relate to a defense-planning standard of having forces sufficient for fighting two nearly
simultaneous regional conflicts.
(...continued)
decision to halt the F-22 program.
That’s because the military’s war fighting commanders, in conversations with Cartwright, all expressed a desire
for more aerial EW capability. And right now, that means more Growlers.
Cartwright said Pentagon brass have three priorities for tactical aircraft: field fifth-generation fighters; “keep a hot
production line”; and keep open the F-18 production line, largely to maintain the flow of new Growlers.
The latter is key, he told the panel, because a hot F-18 line means “we can also produce front-line fighters” - the
F/A-18 E and F models - for traditional fighter aircraft missions.
(John T. Bennett, “Cartwright Talks F-22, Advocates JROC Changes,” DefenseNews.com, July 9, 2009. A similar
article was published on page 12 of the July 13, 2009, issue of the print version of the publication, Defense News,
under the headline “U.S. Tactical Air Debate Heats Up.”)
44 The news item stated:
It now turns out that a recent “study” touted by Pentagon leadership as the justification for terminating the F-22
fighter isn’t really a study at all, but a series of briefings by DOD’s Program Analysis and Evaluation shop and the
Air Force. That word comes from the Pentagon’s top spokesman, Geoff Morrell, who told the Daily Report late
Tuesday that the study, ah, whatever it is, is “not so much a ‘study’” as “work products.” Joint Chiefs of Staff vice
chairman Gen. James Cartwright told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week, “There is a study in the
Joint Staff that we just completed and partnered with the Air Force” which, he said, nailed the F-22 requirement at
187 aircraft—not the 243 that the Air Force says is the minimum requirement. Asked to describe the nature and
timing of this study, Morrell told the Daily Report , “What I think General Cartwright was referring to … is two
different work products”—one by the PA&E shop and one by the Air Force—“and not so much a ‘study.’”
Morrell said work on the F-22 issue was done by “both entities” and that each was likely “informed by the other,”
but they didn’t amount to “formal studies,” and they had no formal name, such as the last known DOD analysis of
fighter requirements, “Joint Air Dominance,” dating to about 2004. Cartwright, in his testimony before the
committee, wasn’t clear about how many studies had been done, but said that 187 F-22 s would be enough for a
one-war strategy. He assured SASC chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) that he’d get whatever justifying analysis
exists to the committee right away. However, Morrell said yesterday that “I don’t know that it has been provided,
yet.” Defense Secretary Robert Gates has been claiming a rigorous analytical basis for stopping the F-22 since
early this year. Congress has been pressing the Pentagon for a vetted analysis of F-22 requirements since 2007,
when then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England was directed to provide, within a year, a comprehensive
tacair plan that would specifically explain how the number of F-22s had been determined. According to various
members of Congress, he never complied with this directive. (John A. Tirpak, “Not So Much A Study,” AirForce-
Magazine.com Daily Report, July 15, 2009. See also John M. Doyle and David A. Fulghum, “Senate Shelves
Debate On Capping F-22 Buy For Now,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, July 16, 2009: 1-2, which
references the AirForce-Magazine.com news item.)
45 See, for example, Amy Butler, “USAF Chief Notes F-22s Are Needed, Defends Capabilities,” Aerospace Daily &
Defense Report, February 18, 2009; “Obama Dilemma,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, March 2, 2009: 1; Marcus
Weisgerber, “Air Force To Ask Gates For More F-22A Raptors In Coming Weeks, Inside the Air Force, February 20,
2009; Jason Sherman, “Pentagon Seeks F-22 Cost Proposals To Extend Production Into FY-10,” Inside the Pentagon,
March 12, 2009; Amy Butler, “Future U.S. Fighter Force To Include Reaper UAVs,” Aerospace Daily & Defense
Report, April 8, 2009: 1-2; Marcus Weisgerber, “House Panel Votes to Continue F-22A Production Beyond 187
Aircraft,” InsideDefense.com (DefenseAlert – Daily News), June 17, 2009.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Some Air National Guard (ANG) leaders have expressed support for procuring additional F-22s
for the purpose of replacing some of the ANG’s existing fighters.
Summary of Arguments
Supporters of ending F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft could argue one or more of the following:
• A total of about 183 F-22s has been planned by DOD since 2005. A total of 187
F-22s will be sufficient, in conjunction with other U.S. forces (including
numerous F-35s), to counter highly capable enemy aircraft and surface-to-air
missile systems that U.S. forces might encounter in a future conventional conflict
against another country, such as China, that might field significant numbers of
such aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems. A recently completed DOD study
concluded that a force of 187 F-22s would be sufficient, in conjunction with
other U.S. forces, to meet the needs of emerging U.S. military strategy, which
focuses on preparing for future conflicts similar to those in Iraq and Afghanistan
while also having forces sufficient to fight a single major regional peer
competitor.
• A total of 187 F-22s is supported by current Air Force leaders and officials from
other military services in light of constraints on Air Force funding and the need to
fund other Air Force programs. Procuring additional F-22s would reduce funding
for other programs, such as the F-35, F/A-18E/F, and EA-18G aircraft programs,
which could create operational risks for the U.S. military. DOD in coming years
needs to focus on improving its capabilities for irregular warfare operations, and
the F-22 is not a key program for improving those capabilities. Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates testified in February 2008 that “the reality is we are
fighting two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the F-22 has not performed a
single mission in either theater.”46
• Although the F-22 achieved IOC in December 2005, in-service F-22s continue to
experience relatively low mission-capable rates, and are expensive to maintain.
(See “Reliability and Maintainability of In-Service F-22s” below.) Procuring
additional F-22s would add to total F-22 fleet maintenance costs, reducing
funding available for other Air Force programs.
• The projected Air Force fighter gap of up to 800 aircraft by 2024 that Air Force
officials identified in 2008 testimony47 is open to question, because it is strongly
influenced by assumptions on threats and whether the United States will fight
alone or as part of a coalition.48 Even if such a fighter gap does emerge,
procuring F-22s is not necessarily the most cost-effective way to address it –
46 Jen DiMascio. “Gates: F-22 Production Increase Could Hurt More Affordable JSF.” Defense Daily. February 7,
2008.
47 See, for example, the testimony of Lieutenant General Daniel Darnell, Deputy Chief of Staff Air, Space and
Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, at an April 9, 2008, hearing before the Airland subcommittee of the
Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on the FY2009 Budget for Air Force and Navy aviation programs.
(Source: Transcript of hearing.)
48 For a press article that presents this perspective, see William Matthews. “Coming up short; Is the Air Force’s
‘Fighter-gap’ truth or spin?” Armed Forces Journal International. July 2008. p. 26.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
other potential options for addressing the shortfall would include procuring less
expensive aircraft, such as F-35s, upgraded F-15s, or upgraded F-16s.
• The Air National Guard (ANG) can perform the air sovereignty alert (ASA)
mission sufficiently in the future with the F-35. Shifting to a future ANG fighter
force composed of a single aircraft type (F-35s) will permit economies in the
operation and support of ANG fighters. The ANG’s existing inventory of F-15s
and F-16s can be maintained until it is replaced by F-35s through careful
management of individual aircraft use and (if necessary) service life extensions.
• Although a total of 381 F-22s would be needed to permanently attach a certain
number of F-22s to each of the Air Force’s 10 Air Expeditionary Forces
(AEFs),49 certain Air Force aircraft—including bombers and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft—are too few in number to be
permanently attached to each of the AEFs and are instead assigned to AEFs on an
as-needed basis. The same can be done with F-22s. If F-22s are to be used
infrequently, organizing them outside the AEF scheme and using them on an as
needed basis would be appropriate.
• In light of Congress’s annual prohibition since FY1998 on sales of the F-22 to
any foreign government, there would be little value in procuring additional F-22s
for the U.S. Air Force for the purpose of keeping the F-22 production line open
until a modified version of the F-22 could be made ready for a potential sale to
Japan.
• F-22 procurement funding at this point is better spent on modernizing the 187 F-
22s, so as to maximize their utility and realize a better return on the investment
made in developing and procuring these aircraft.
Supporters of procuring more than 187 F-22s could argue one or more of the following:
• A force of 187 F-22s would be inadequate to meet operational demands at an
acceptable level of risk. Although Air Force and other DOD officials have stated
this year that the service cannot afford to procure more than 187 F-22s, Air Force
officials in the past have stated that they believe a total of 381 F-22s would be
sufficient to meet operational demands at a low level of risk, and that a total of
243 to 250 would be sufficient to meet operational demands with a moderate
level of risk. The recently completed DOD study referred to by General James
Cartwright in his July 9, 2009, testimony reportedly is not so much a formal
analysis as a pair of briefings by DOD’s Program Analysis and Evaluation
(PA&E) office and the Air Force. In a letter dated June 9, 2009, General John
Corley, the Commander of the Air Force’s Air Combat Command, stated: “At Air
Combat Command we have held the need for 381 F-22s to deliver a tailored
package of air superiority to our Combatant Commanders and provide a potent,
globally arrayed asymmetric deterrent against potential adversaries. In my
opinion, a fleet of 187 F-22s puts execution of our current national military
strategy at high risk in the near to mid-term. To my knowledge, there are no
studies that demonstrate 187 F-22s are adequate to support our national military
49 The AEF is the primary organizational unit that the Air Force uses to rotate equipment and personnel among training,
maintenance, and operational assignments.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
strategy. Air Combat Command analysis, done in concert with Headquarters Air
Forces, shows a moderate risk force can be obtained with an F-22 fleet of
approximately 250 aircraft.”50 In light of the QDR now in progress, it is
premature for DOD to declare that 187 F-22s would be sufficient. DOD has
deferred a number of other defense program questions to the QDR; it is
inconsistent for DOD to not do so with the F-22. Until the final report on the
QDR is issued next year—and then reviewed by Congress—it is not certain
whether future U.S. defense strategy will (or should) drop the defense-planning
standard that has been in place since the early 1990s of being prepared to fight
two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.
• Procuring additional F-22s could help mitigate a projected fighter shortfall of up
to 800 aircraft by 2024 that Air Force leaders identified in 2008 testimony.
Procuring additional F-22s would also provide a hedge against the risk of
unexpected age-related problems developing in the Air Force’s legacy force of F-
15 fighters. The breaking apart of an F-15 in flight in November 2007 suggests
that these risks are not fully known and are potentially catastrophic.51
• Procuring additional F-22s could begin a needed recapitalization of the ANG’s
inventory of aging F-15 and F-16 fighters, which is responsible for providing
homeland aerial defense for the United States and is primarily responsible for
executing the ASA mission as part of the national defense strategy. The F-22’s
speed and detection ability gives it a unique capability for defending the country
against seaborne cruise missiles. Given the age of ANG F-15s and F-16s and the
costs and technical uncertainties associated with possibly attempting to extend
their service lives, it would not be prudent to wait until F-35 production ramps up
50 Letter dated June 9, 2009, from General John D. W. Crowley, USAF, Commander, Air Combat Command, to
Senator Saxby Chambliss, available online at http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/2009/
June%202009/June%2017%202009/HighRisk.aspx. The full text of the letter states:
Thank you for your letter and the opportunity to comment on the critical issue of F-22 fleet size. At Air Combat
Command we have held the need for 381 F-22s to deliver a tailored package of air superiority to our Combatant
Commanders and provide a potent, globally arrayed asymmetric deterrent against potential adversaries.
In my opinion, a fleet of 187 F-22s puts execution of our current national military strategy at high risk in the near
to mid-term. To my knowledge, there are no studies that demonstrate 187 F-22s are adequate to support our
national military strategy. Air Combat Command analysis, done in concert with Headquarters Air Forces, shows a
moderate risk force can be obtained with an F-22 fleet of approximately 250 aircraft.
While OSD [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] did not solicit direct input from Air Combat Command, we
worked closely with our Headquarters in ensuring our views were available. We realize the tough choices our
national leadership must make in balancing current warfighting needs against the fiscal realities our Nation faces.
The F-22, a critical enabler of air dominance, plays a vital role and indispensable role in ensuring joint freedom of
action for all forces and underpins our ability to dissuade and deter. Thank you for your continued support of the
US Air Force and Air Combat Command.
See also Marina Malenic, “Top Air Force General Warns of ‘High Risk’ In Halting F-22 Procurement,” Defense Daily,
June 17, 2009: 4-5.
51 On November 2, 2007, an F-15 broke apart during a training mission, and the entire F-15 fleet was grounded until the
cause could be determined. An investigation discovered that the event was caused by the failure of a structure (the
“longeron”) that holds together the F-15 cockpit and fuselage, and that longerons in other F-15s were suspect. The F-15
fleet was grounded a second time on November 28, 2007, when a more sensitive test found that the longeron problem
was evident in more F-15s than previously believed. (Michael Sirak, “Moseley: Questions Remain Over F-15C Crash
As F-15Es Returning to Flight,” Defense Daily, November 19, 2007; Gayle Putrich, “F-15s Ordered Out of the Air
Again; Could Help USAF Make Case for More F-22s,” Defense News, December 3, 2007; “USAF Orders F-15s
Grounded ... Again,” Air Safety Week, December 3, 2007.)
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
before beginning to recapitalize the ANG fighter force. A recapitalized ANG
fighter force consisting of two types of aircraft (F-22s procured now and F-35s
procured later) can be operated and supported economically because it will take
advantage of operation and support facilities created for the Air Force’s future
fighter force of F-22s and F-35s.52
• As the Air Force continues to gain operating experience with F-22s, the aircraft’s
mission-capable rate will increase, and F-22 maintenance costs per flight hour
will come down. F-22 mission-capable rates are increasing. (See “Reliability and
Maintainability of In-Service F-22s” below.) Although the F-22 is an expensive
aircraft to operate, the F-22’s capabilities are worth the costs.
• Allocating F-22s to the AEFs on an as needed basis would obviate the principal
benefit of the AEF system, which is to provide predictability and stability for
airmen.
• Procurement of F-35s has only recently begun, and has not yet increased to
planned higher annual rates. Until production of the F-35 has been successfully
demonstrated at these planed higher annual rates, it would be imprudent to shut
down the F-22 production line, which is the only other U.S. production line for a
fifth-generation aircraft.
• Congress could reconsider the current prohibition on sales of the F-22 to foreign
governments, so procuring additional F-22s for the U.S. Air Force could be of
value in keeping the F-22 production line open until a modified version of the F-
22 could be made ready for a sale to Japan.
52 A letter from Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt III, USAF, Director, Air National Guard, to Saxby Chambliss,
undated but perhaps from June or early-July 2009 (posted on InsideDefense.com), states the following (emphasis as in
the original):
Thank you for your inquiry and the opportunity for me to discuss what I believe to be a serious threat to the Air
National Guard’s ability to fulfill our Nation’s highest strategic priority; defending the homeland. The ANG has
proudly performed the bulk of this mission, while simultaneously participating in overseas contingency
operations, with aircraft that are rapidly nearing the end of their service life. While I believe our Nation has the
capacity to recapitalize the ANG, I am not aware of any plan that commits to doing so. As such, we are in need of
an immediate solution in order to ensure that America’s most cost effective force can continue to perform its most
important mission.
While a variety of solutions abound, I believe the nature of the current and future asymmetric threats to our
Nation, particularly from seaborne cruise missiles, requires a fighter platform with the requisite speed and
detection to address them. The F-22’s unique capability in this arena enables it to handle a full spectrum of threats
that the ANG’s current legacy systems are not capable of addressing. I am fond of saying that “America’s most
important job should be handled by America’s best fighter.”
Indeed, I am keenly aware of the severe strain that our current economic situation has placed on the Department of
Defense as it attempts to modernize for an ever evolving threat environment. Given this reality, finding more
efficient ways to protect our Nation’s interests at home and abroad is the new imperative. Many say this will mean
making tough choices, but I believe we can maintain our vitality by making smart choices; leveraging the cost
effective and dual use nature of the ANG is the answer. Basing F-22s (and eventually F-35s) at strategic ANG
locations through the United States while simultaneously making them available to rotationally support worldwide
contingency operations is the most responsible approach to satisfying all of our Nation’s needs.
Again, thank you for your inquiry and your continued support of the Air National Guard.
For a news report discussing the letter, see John M. Donnelly, “Top Air National Guard General Backs F-22
Production,” CQ Today, July 9, 2009. For an additional news report discussing ANG support for procuring more F-22s,
see John M. Donnelly, “Jet Supporters Flout Veto Threat,” CQ Today, July 14, 2009.)
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
• Although the F-22 modernization program will maximize the utility of existing
F-22s, it will not mitigate operational risks that can arise from not having enough
F-22s to conduct operations in multiple locations at the same time.
Reliability and Maintainability of In-Service F-22s
A second issue for Congress for the F-22 program concerns the reliability and maintainability of
in-service F-22s. In February 2009, it was reported that the F-22’s mission capable rate (MCR),
one measure of an aircraft’s reliability and maintainability, was a disappointing 60%. Critics of
the F-22 noted that a 60% MCR is unacceptable by the Air Force’s own standards. Air Force
leaders defended the F-22, arguing that the aircraft was experiencing typical growing pains.53
July 10, 2009, News Report
On July 10, 2009, it was reported that the F-22
has recently required more than 30 hours of maintenance for every hour in the skies, pushing
its hourly cost of flying to more than $44,000, a far higher figure than for the warplane it
replaces, confidential Pentagon test results show.
The aircraft‘s radar-absorbing metallic skin is the principal cause of its maintenance troubles,
with unexpected shortcomings – such as vulnerability to rain and other abrasion –
challenging Air Force and contractor technicians since the mid-1990s, according to Pentagon
officials, internal documents and a former engineer.
While most aircraft fleets become easier and less costly to repair as they mature, key
maintenance trends for the F-22 have been negative in recent years, and on average from
October last year to this May, just 55 percent of the deployed F-22 fleet has been available to
fulfill missions guarding U.S. airspace, the Defense Department acknowledged this week.
The F-22 has never been flown over Iraq or Afghanistan....
“It is a disgrace that you can fly a plane [an average of] only 1.7 hours before it gets a critical
failure” that jeopardizes success of the aircraft’s mission, said a Defense Department critic of
the plane who is not authorized to speak on the record....
But other defense officials – reflecting sharp divisions inside the Pentagon about the wisdom
of ending one of the largest arms programs in U.S. history – emphasize the plane’s
unsurpassed flying abilities, express renewed optimism that the troubles will abate and say
the plane is worth the unexpected costs.
Skin problems – often requiring re-gluing small surfaces that can take more than a day to dry
– helped force more frequent and time-consuming repairs, according to the confidential data
drawn from tests conducted by the Pentagon’s independent Office of Operational Test and
Evaluation between 2004 and 2008.
53 “F-22 Raptor Plagued by Stealth Maintenance Woes,” National Journal’s Congress Daily PM, February 20, 2009;
Marcus Weisgerber, “F-22A Stealth Maintenance Issues Part of the Learning Process,” Inside the Air Force, February
27, 2009; Marcus Weisgerber, “Lockheed: F-22A Raptor Meets All Key Performance Parameters,” Inside the Air
Force, January 30, 2009.
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Over the four-year period, the F-22’s average maintenance time per hour of flight grew from
20 hours to 34, with skin repairs accounting for more than half of that time – and more than
half the hourly flying costs – last year, according to the test and evaluation office.
The Air Force says the F-22 cost $44,259 per flying hour in 2008; the Office of the Secretary
of Defense said the figure was $49,808. The F-15, the F-22’s predecessor, has a fleet average
cost of $30,818.
‘Compromises’
Darrol Olsen, a specialist in stealth coatings who worked at Lockheed’s testing laboratory in
Marietta, Ga., from 1995 to 1999, said the current troubles are unsurprising. In a lawsuit filed
under seal in 2007, he charged the company with violating the False Claims Act for ordering
and using coatings that it knew were defective while hiding the failings from the Air Force.
He has cited a July 1998 report that said test results “yield the same problems as documented
previously” in the skin’s quality and durability, and another in December that year saying,
“Baseline coatings failed.” A Lockheed briefing that September assured the Air Force that
the effort was “meeting requirements with optimized products.”
“When I got into this thing ... I could not believe the compromises” made by Lockheed to
meet the Air Force’s request for quick results, said Olsen, who had a top-secret clearance. “I
suggested we go to the Air Force and tell them we had some difficulties ... and they would
not do that. I was squashed. I knew from the get-go that this material was bad, that this
correcting it in the field was never going to work.”
Olsen, who said Lockheed fired him over a medical leave, heard from colleagues as recently
as 2005 that problems persisted with coatings and radar absorbing materials in the plane’s
skin, including what one described as vulnerability to rain. Invited to join his lawsuit, the
Justice Department filed a court notice last month saying it was not doing so “at this time” –
a term that means it is still investigating the matter, according to a department spokesman.
[David G. Ahern, a senior Pentagon procurement official who helps oversee the F-22
program,] said the Pentagon could not comment on the allegations. Lockheed spokeswoman
Mary Jo Polidore said that “the issues raised in the complaint are at least 10 years old,” and
that the plane meets or exceeds requirements established by the Air Force. “We deny Mr.
Olsen’s allegations and will vigorously defend this matter.”
There have been other legal complications. In late 2005, Boeing learned of defects in
titanium booms connecting the wings to the plane, which the company, in a subsequent
lawsuit against its supplier, said posed the risk of “catastrophic loss of the aircraft.” But
rather than shut down the production line – an act that would have incurred large Air Force
penalties – Boeing reached an accord with the Air Force to resolve the problem through
increased inspections over the life of the fleet, with expenses to be mostly paid by the Air
Force.
[Pierre Sprey, a key designer in the 1970s and 1980s of the F-16 and A-10 warplanes,] said
engineers who worked on [the F-22] told him that because of Lockheed’s use of hundreds of
subcontractors, quality control was so poor that workers had to create a “shim line” at the
Georgia plant where they retooled badly designed or poorly manufactured components.
“Each plane wound up with all these hand-fitted parts that caused huge fits in maintenance,”
he said. “They were not interchangeable.”
Polidore confirmed that some early parts required modifications but denied that such a shim
line existed and said “our supplier base is the best in the industry.”
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
The plane’s million-dollar radar-absorbing canopy has also caused problems, with a stuck
hatch imprisoning a pilot for hours in 2006 and engineers unable to extend the canopy’s
lifespan beyond about 18 months of flying time. It delaminates, “loses its strength and
finish,” said an official privy to Air Force data.
In the interview, Ahern and Air Force Gen. C.D. Moore confirmed that canopy visibility has
been declining more rapidly than expected, with brown spots and peeling forcing $120,000
refurbishments at 331 hours of flying time, on average, instead of the stipulated 800 hours.
There has been some gradual progress. At the plane’s first operational flight test in
September 2004, it fully met two of 22 key requirements and had a total of 351 deficiencies;
in 2006, it fully met five; in 2008, when squadrons were deployed at six U.S. bases, it fully
met seven.
“It flunked on suitability measures – availability, reliability, and maintenance,” said [Thomas
Christie, the top weapons testing expert from 2001 to 2005,] about the first of those tests.
“There was no consequence. It did not faze anybody who was in the decision loop” for
approving the plane’s full production. This outcome was hardly unique, Christie adds.
During his tenure in the job from 2001 to 2005, “16 or 17 major weapons systems flunked”
during initial operational tests, and “not one was stopped as a result.”
“I don't accept that this is still early in the program,” Christie said, explaining that he does
not recall a plane with such a low capability to fulfill its mission due to maintenance
problems at this point in its tenure as the F-22. The Pentagon said 64 percent of the fleet is
currently “mission capable.” After four years of rigorous testing and operations, “the trends
are not good,” he added.
Pentagon officials respond that measuring hourly flying costs for aircraft fleets that have not
reached 100,000 flying hours is problematic, because sorties become more frequent after that
point; Ahern also said some improvements have been made since the 2008 testing, and
added: “We're going to get better.” He said the F-22s are on track to meet all of what the Air
Force calls [the F-22’s] KPP[s] – key performance parameters – by next year.
But last Nov. 20, John J. Young Jr., who was then undersecretary of defense and Ahern’s
boss, said that officials continue to struggle with the F-22’s skin. “There’s clearly work that
needs to be done there to make that airplane both capable and affordable to operate,” he
said.54
Rebuttals to July 10, 2009, News Report
On July 14, it was reported that Lockheed on July 13 had
circulated an unsigned document on Capitol Hill saying that the plane has “performed
extremely well” and that its maintenance problems are abating. The paper was a response to
a report in The Washington Post last week [the July 10 news report cited above] disclosing
that the Defense Department had calculated the hourly flying cost for an F-22 at $49,808 and
that tests last year showed that the mean time between critical failures during an F-22 flight
was 1.7 hours.
54 R. Jeffrey Smith, “Premier U.S. Fighter Jet Has Major Shortcomings,” Washington Post, July 10, 2009: 1, 4. The
phrase in brackets “[an average of]” appears in the original; the other bracketed material was inserted by CRS for
clarity. Bracketed material that identifies people being quoted reproduces wording used elsewhere in the article.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Lockheed’s document confirmed that “structural retrofit repairs” are still being made to F-
22s and said the plane’s canopy has been redesigned because of problems in maintaining its
transparency. But it said that the new canopies will meet requirements and that maintenance
downtime is diminishing. Responding to criticism that the plane has never flown over
Afghanistan and Iraq, the company said, “The best weapon may be the one that isn't used but
instead deters a conflict before it begins.”
A separate document circulated by the Air Force in response to the report confirmed that
Defense Department tests showed that 30 hours of maintenance were needed for every hour
of F-22 flying time and said the F-22 fleet’s “mission capable rate” – a measure of its
readiness to meet military requirements – improved from 62 percent to 68 percent between
2004 and 2008.
A spokeswoman for the Office of the Secretary of Defense said last week that this rate
measures only the readiness of planes that are not in depots for repair and noted that the F-22
program and the Air Force traditionally focus on a separate measure of the fleet’s availability
for missions. That availability, she said, was improving but stood at 55.9 percent for the past
five months.55
On July 14, 2009, Senator Saxby Chambliss inserted into the Congressional Record a document
he described as an Air Force rebuttal to points made in the July 10, 2009, article cited above.
Below is the document as printed in the Congressional Record:56
55 R. Jeffrey Smith, “Obama Vows A Veto In Dispute Over F-22s,” Washington Post, July 14, 2009: 2.
56 Congressional Record, daily edition, pp. S7463-S7467.
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F-22 Modernization Program
A third potential issue for Congress for the F-22 program concerns cost effectiveness of the F-22
modernization program. Supporters of the program could argue that upgrading the F-22’s air-to-
ground and ISR capabilities will expand the aircraft’s mission flexibility and thereby realize a
greater return on the significant investment made in developing and procuring the aircraft. Air
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Force officials have emphasized the F-22’s potential to execute many of the ISR missions that
UAVs have performed in support of counter insurgency and low-intensity conflicts.57
Skeptics could argue that upgrading the F-22’s air-to-ground and ISR capabilities is not critical in
light of the substantial air-to-ground capability of the F-35, which is to be procured in large
numbers, and the ISR capabilities of other existing or planned DOD systems, including
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). They could argue that resolving instability problems with the
F-22’s advanced avionics has been a significant contributor to the program’s development cost,
and that adding a new feature such as an air-to-ground radar or new communications capabilities
could jeopardize the progress that has been made in the F-22’s avionics software. They could
argue that controlling the F-22’s electronic emissions is a key component of making the aircraft
elusive to enemy defenses, and that if the upgrades make the F-22 less stealthy, the benefits of
these modifications might not be worth the risks.
Potential Export to Japan
A fourth issue for Congress for FY2010 for the F-22 program concerns the potential export of the
aircraft to Japan. As mentioned earlier, Congress from time to time has reconsidered the legislated
prohibition on foreign sales of the F-22. Some Members reportedly have expressed interest in
2009 in reconsidering the prohibition.58
Summary of Arguments
Supporters of selling F-22s to Japan could argue one or more of the following:
• Selling F-22s to Japan would enable Japan to effectively counter highly capable
combat aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems that have been or will likely be
deployed by regional neighbors such as Russia and China. The F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter is less capable in countering these highly capable enemy fighters and
surface-to-air missile systems.59 The U.S. Air Force is procuring F-22s because it
57 See, for example, Michael Bruno. “Air Force ISR Chief Foresees Downplaying ‘F’ in F-22, F-35.” Aerospace Daily
& Defense Report. June 22, 2007. Although the F-22 may have effective on-board sensors and the ability to receive
additional information from other ISR platforms, it has limited ability to transmit targeting information to other
platforms or command and control (C2) assets. This restricted communications capability was intended to make the F-
22 more elusive to enemy defenses. In August 2008, it was reported that Air Force officials wanted to reprogram $85
million to accelerate an upgrade that would enable the F-22 to more effectively share information with other aircraft.
(Marcus Weisgerber, “Air Force Loots to Shuffle $85 Million to Accelerate F-22A Mods,” Inside the Air Force.
August 8, 2008.)
58 See, for example, Marcus Weisgerber, “Rep. Granger Would Take Another Shot At Repealing F-22A Export Ban,”
Inside the Air Force, March 27, 2009; Tony Capaccio, “Inouye Wants To Study Possibility Of Lockheed F-22 Export
Model,” Bloomberg.com, June 4, 2009; Sam Lagrone, “U.S. Senator Talks of Selling F-22s to Allies,” Defense News,
June 8, 2009; Michael Bruno, “F-22 Concerns Persist In Senate,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,” June 10, 2009:
3; Marcus Weisgerber, “Murtha, Young to Discuss F-22 Exports with Obey,” InsideDefense.com (DefenseAlert – Daily
News), June 24, 2009; David A. Fulghum and John M. Doyle, “Japanese Officials Could Be Offered A $290 Million F-
22,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 26, 2009: 1-2.
59 For an example of an article that presents this argument, see David A. Fulghum, “Converging Problems Argue For
More F-22s, Officials Says,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, July 10, 2009: 3. The article states in part:
Japan’s F-15J force, once top of the line, is now “outclassed by the new generation of Chinese fighters” such as
the Su-30MKK, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force Gen. Richard Myers (ret.), tells
Aviation Week.
(continued...)
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does not believe that a force composed entirely of F-35s will be sufficient to
effectively counter highly capable enemy aircraft and surface-to-air missile
systems. Improving Japan’s ability to effectively counter highly capable enemy
aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems would enhance regional deterrence,
contributing to regional stability, and reduce requirements for U.S. forces in the
region.
• Selling F-22s to Japan would demonstrate U.S. support for Japan as a high-
priority U.S. ally more powerfully than would selling F-35s to Japan.
• Selling F-22s to Japan would maximize interoperability between Japanese and
U.S. Air Force front-line fighters defending the western approaches to Japan.
• Concerns about a sale of F-22s to Japan creating a risk of inadvertent technology
transfer can be mitigated by selling Japan an export version of the F-22 that lacks
highly sensitive technologies. Japan reportedly is willing to contribute $300
million toward the cost of developing an export version of the F-22.60 Although
an export version of the F-22 would take time to develop, it could be delivered to
Japan more quickly than could the F-35, production of which is only beginning,
and thus permit Japan to improve its fighter force sooner than would be possible
with the F-35.61 Agreeing on the configuration of an export version of the F-35
can pose its own challenges.62
• Producing F-22s for Japan could reduce the cost of any F-22s that are produced
at the same time for the U.S. Air Force by more fully spreading the fixed
overhead costs associated with F-22 production, and could reduce the cost of any
F-22s that are later produced for the U.S. Air Force by moving F-22 production
further down the production learning curve.
• Producing F-22s for Japan could increase or preserve U.S. jobs related to F-22
production.
Opponents of selling F-22s to Japan could argue one or more of the following:
(...continued)
Moreover, China’s air defenses, which include variants of Russian-made, long-range SA-10s and SA-20 (S-300
family) missiles, can only be penetrated by the fast, high-flying, stealthy Raptor.
Japan’s Defense Ministry has studied the problem closely and, at least internally, has produced “a very impressive
tactical rationale” for buying the F-22 if its sale is approved by the U.S. Congress. Myers predicts that any
resistance within the U.S. Air Force to selling Raptor technology to Japan, “an incredibly staunch ally,” will be
isolated and not critical.
Such considerations are pressing because tensions are growing over Japan’s far-flung island empire, some of it
mineral rich, that stretches to within 125-150 miles of China. That distance, interestingly enough, is the range of
the Raptor’s advanced radar, compared to 56 miles for the F-15. Japan feels it must be prepared to defend its area
of responsibility from a new generation of regional threats – including China’s increasingly sophisticated fighter
force, which boasts the J-10 – that can carry its new, small-radar-signature, air-launched cruise missiles. Japan
also needs a precision bombing capability if any of its islands are occupied.
60 David A. Fulghum and John M. Doyle, “House Defense Appropriations Chair Lends Support To More F-22s,”
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 25, 2009: 1-2.
61 For an article presenting this argument, see David A. Fulghum and John M. Doyle, “House Defense Appropriations
Chair Lends Support To More F-22s,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 25, 2009: 1-2.
62 See, for example, David A. Fulghum, “U.S. JSF Sales to Israel Getting More Complicated,” Aerospace Daily &
Defense Report, February 24, 2009.
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• Japan does not need the F-22 to be able to effectively counter highly capable
enemy aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems. Like the U.S. Navy and U.S.
allies in Europe, Japan can effectively counter highly capable enemy combat
aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The
U.S. Navy, which cannot always count on the presence of Air Force F-22s, plans
to counter enemy aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems in the future with a
combination of F-35s and earlier-design F/A-18E/Fs. U.S. allies in Europe,
including the United Kingdom, plan to rely on F-35s to effectively counter highly
capable enemy aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems. The F-35 is more
affordable than the F-22, so Japan could purchase more F-35s than F-22s for a
given amount of funding, and thus provide one-for-one replacements for a larger
portion of its fighter force than would be possible through an equal-cost purchase
of F-22s.
• Selling F-35s to Japan would sufficiently demonstrate U.S. support for Japan as a
high-priority U.S. ally.
• Selling F-35s to Japan would maintain substantial interoperability between
Japanese and U.S. tactical aircraft, particularly since the F-35, unlike the F-22, is
to be purchased in large numbers by multiple U.S. military services.
• Selling F-22s to Japan could prompt a destabilizing regional arms race in
northeast Asia, which would not be in the U.S. interest. Even absent an arms
race, selling F-22s to Japan could complicate U.S. relations with China and
Russia, and perhaps also with South Korea – a U.S. ally that has maritime
territorial disputes with Japan, and whose relationship with Japan is influenced
by memories of Japan’s 40-year annexation of the Korean peninsula.
• Even with a financial contribution from Japan, developing an export version of
the F-22 could require a substantial expenditure of U.S. funds. The F-35, in
contrast, was designed from the beginning with sales to other countries in mind,
so a version suitable for Japan could be developed at relatively little additional
cost. Removing highly sensitive technologies from F-22s sold to Japan would
make the aircraft less capable, and thus closer in capability to the F-35.
• Producing F-35s for Japan could reduce the cost of F-35s that are produced at the
same time for the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy by more fully
spreading the fixed overhead costs associated with F-35 production, and could
reduce the cost of any F-35s that are later produced for these three services by
moving F-35 production further down the production learning curve.
• Producing F-35s for Japan could increase or preserve U.S. jobs related to F-35
production.
Additional Discussion of Factors to Consider
The following sections provide further discussion of some factors relating to a potential sale of F-
22s to Japan.63 The sections were authored primarily by Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in
Asian Affairs (echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov; 7-7748).
63 The material in this section previously appeared in CRS Report RS22684, Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan, by
(continued...)
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Japan’s Defense Policy
For the United States, its alliance with Japan provides a platform for U.S. military readiness in
Asia. About 53,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan and have the exclusive use of 89 facilities
throughout the archipelago. Okinawa, hosting 37 of the facilities, is the major U.S. forward
logistics base in the Asia-Pacific region. Echoing his predecessors, President Obama has labeled
the U.S.-Japan alliance the “cornerstone of East Asian security.” High-level U.S.-Japan bilateral
initiatives since 2001 declared an expanded commitment to security cooperation by outlining
major command changes and calling for greater interoperability between the two militaries.64
Several of the agreements have stalled, however, due to resistance to base realignment by local
host governments and political gridlock in Tokyo.
Japan faces a challenging regional context: both direct and potential security threats, as well as
suspicion from other states that changes to Tokyo’s defense policy indicate a return to its
militarist past. North Korea poses a particularly acute and proximate threat to Japan, heightened
by Pyongyang’s ballistic missile and nuclear explosive device tests in 2006. Historical enmity and
contemporary competition for influence with China makes Beijing’s military modernization
worrisome for Japanese defense planners. The Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF, the official
name for Japan’s military) has detected periodic Chinese military activities in areas surrounding
Japan’s outlying islands, including submarine incursions close to Okinawa and a fleet of warships
near a disputed gas field. Tokyo also faces difficult relations with South Korea because of Korean
distrust based on the memory of Japan’s 40-year annexation of the peninsula and some territorial
disputes.
Technology Transfer
Air Force leaders have consistently described the F-22 as the world’s most technologically
advanced and capable fighter aircraft. Protecting U.S. intellectual property in F-22 technologies
and denying adversaries access to these technologies are high national security priorities.
It is unclear whether the United States and Japan could agree on the terms and conditions for
selling F-22s to Japan. Japan would likely want version of the F-22 that is the same as, or similar
to, the version flown by the U.S. Air Force. Japan might also want to license or co-manufacture
the aircraft, which would create manufacturing jobs in Japan and permit Japan to acquire F-22
engineering and design knowledge.65 U.S. officials, on the other hand, might want to sell Japan a
version of the F-22 that is less capable than what Japan might prefer, in part to protect key F-22
technologies, and might not support licensing or co-production.
(...continued)
Christopher Bolkcom and Emma Chanlett-Avery. In addition to the factors discussed here, Congress in the late 1980s
debated and denied a DOD request to co-develop a fighter aircraft with Japan based on the F-16. Some of the issues
considered during that debate may be relevant today. For a discussion of those issues, see CRS Report 90-309 F,
Japanese FSX Fighter Controversy, by Richard Grimmett (out of print; available upon request).
64 See CRS Report RL33740, The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests, by Emma Chanlett-
Avery and CRS Report RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
65 Japan has traditionally placed great value on developing industrial defense “autonomy,” that is, indigenous weapons
production, although this imperative has relaxed somewhat in recent years, in part to cooperate with the United States
on missile defense. (Richard J. Samuels, “Give & Take; The Outlook for U.S.-Japan Defense Industrial Cooperation,”
Armed Forces Journal. February 1, 2006.)
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The potential for technology transfer touches upon both military and economic concerns. Unlike
some countries, Japan does not have a track record of re-exporting technology that it acquires
through import. However, an inadvertent leak of U.S. technology or knowledge could also be a
threat. The leak of secret data associated with the Aegis weapon system by Japanese military
personnel in 2002 is an example of this potential danger.66 Japan is a military ally, but also
considered by some to be an economic rival. Many of the F-22 technologies or industrial
processes could have commercial application. Some may be concerned that F-22 technology or
knowledge could find their way into a myriad of Japanese products, to the competitive detriment
of U.S. industry.
A second proliferation issue relates to the effect an F-22 sale could have on other countries. Other
countries in the region could perceive the F-22 as causing an imbalance of military power in favor
of Japan, and inciting them to seek their own advanced aircraft or defensive systems. Once Japan
sets the precedent of F-22 export, other countries might pressure U.S. policy makers to sell them
F-22s. Israel, for example, has reportedly expressed interest in the F-22.
Interoperability and Interdependence
Bilateral agreements aim to expand the benefits of the alliance by increasing the interoperability
of the U.S. and Japanese militaries, therefore multiplying their collective capability. Several joint
facilities are planned, including an air operations coordination center at Yokota Air Base, to be
operational by 2010. Japan’s acquisition of the F-22 would boost interoperability because both
militaries could use identical, state-of-the-art equipment. Because of the U.S. security guarantee
to Japan, Japan’s possession of the F-22s may allow the United States to rotate its own aircraft out
of the region when necessary. Similarly, by fielding the F-22, Japan could make up for the deficit
of 198 Raptors the U.S. Air Force says it needs but cannot afford.
Despite these ambitions, however, achieving true interoperability is a difficult task.
Constitutional, legal, and normative constraints limit SDF participation in many of the operations
and training that traditionally integrate different national forces (see section below). Increasing
the sophistication of bilateral training requires funding and facilities, currently under pressure
because of SDF’s budget requirements. Language barriers and differences in military doctrine
also present challenges. In addition, localities affected by the noise of military bases, particularly
those hosting aircraft, have been vocally opposed to many of the U.S. troop realignment
proposals.
Regional Security
China and South Korea have voiced concern about Japan’s intention to upgrade its military
capabilities, largely grounded in suspicions that Japan will inch toward returning to its pre-1945
militarism. Some analysts caution that selling the F-22s to Japan could destabilize the region,
possibly even sparking an arms race, and contribute to an image of Japan becoming America’s
proxy in the region. The sale could complicate the U.S. effort to manage its relationship with
China. South Korea has already registered its unease at Japan acquiring F-22s, and at one point
66 “High Barriers for Introduction of F-22,” Asahi News. June 4, 2007. From the Daily Summary of Japanese Press,
U.S. Embassy Public Affairs Section.
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suggested that it may seek a deal to purchase the aircraft in order to match Japan’s capabilities.67
Although the Lee Myung-bak government has made moves to strengthen U.S.-South Korean
alliance, the Seoul-Washington relationship has been strained at times over the past several years,
and some South Koreans chafe at indications that the United States prioritizes defense ties with
Japan above those with Korea.
Japanese defense officials have pointed to China’s acquisition of increasingly sophisticated air
capabilities to justify their request for the F-22s, asserting that China’s modern air fleet will soon
dwarf Japan’s. Despite the relatively strong state of relations between Tokyo and Beijing, the two
nations remain wary of each other’s intentions. Although the risk of military confrontation is
considered small, there is the potential that territorial disputes over outlying islands could escalate
into armed clashes, or that conflict could break out in the Taiwan Strait between the United States
and China, which could involve Japan. For this reason, some U.S. and Japanese commentators
have supported the sale of F-22s to Japan as necessary to maintain the “Taiwan balance.”
Japanese Restraints
Japan faces an array of legal and budgetary concerns about enhancing its military, raising
questions about whether Tokyo could follow through on an F-22 sale. Article 9 of the Japanese
constitution, drafted by American officials during the post-war occupation, outlaws war as a
“sovereign right” of Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.” Although Article 9 states that
“land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained,” the Japanese
SDF is in practice a well-funded and well-equipped military. Constitutional concerns do not
appear to be significant for the purchase of the F-22, but provide a sense of the overall context
and challenges to acquiring advanced weapons systems in a country with a strong pacifist
sentiment.
Under a self-imposed ban on exporting arms, Japan cannot in principle participate in joint
development that requires it to export weapons parts and research data to other countries. This
ban has been loosened to allow Japan to work on missile defense with the United States, but the
issue remains contentious. Japan’s aversion to military export led to Tokyo’s decision not to
participate in the international consortium to co-develop the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
A second legal issue that could generate debate in Japan, and therefore affect the sale, is the
question of whether the F-22 is an offensive weapon; under the current interpretation of the
Japanese constitution, the SDF is only allowed to possess defensive capability. Military aircraft
are almost inherently flexible weapon systems and can be difficult to classify as “offensive” or
“defensive.” They can be used in primarily defensive roles, such as defending indigenous
airspace from attack, or to attack an adversary’s homeland or air forces. When the F-22 program
was threatened by congressional budget cuts, advocates argued that its offensive capabilities
mandated its continuation. Consistent emphasis on the F-22s’ ability to penetrate contested
airspace and destroy enemy defenses could lead many to believe that the Raptor is primarily an
offensive weapon.
At $44 billion (2007), Japan’s defense budget is among the largest in the world.68 However,
Japanese leaders are under pressure to stem government spending, and many ministries face
67 In 2008, South Korea purchased 39 F-15ks and plan to buy 21 F-15K level aircraft between 2010-2012.
68 According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data.
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budget cuts as part of ongoing fiscal reform. Overall, Japan’s defense budget has steadily if
modestly declined over the past several years. Defense spending in Japan has traditionally been
capped at 1% of GDP; most leaders are wary of surpassing that symbolic benchmark, although
the cap is not a law. Tokyo’s defense expenditures include ongoing host nation support for U.S.
forces stationed in Japan (totaling $110 billion from 1978-2007)69 and an estimated $20 billion
for the realignment of U.S. troops in the region. Based on these burdens, some analysts have
voiced concerns that the SDF runs the risk of becoming a “hollow force” because of its
insufficient procurement system. Budget pressure is likely to remain high in Japan due to the
demographic reality of an aging and shrinking population with a shortage of workers.
Legislative Activity in 2009
FY2010 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 2647/P.L. 110-329)
Request
The administration has not requested funding in FY2010 for the procurement of additional F-22s.
The administration has requested $95.2 million in FY2010 procurement funding for the F-22
program, but this funding is requested for activities associated with completing a 187-aircraft
program and shutting down the F-22 production line, not for procuring additional F-22s. The
administration has also requested $350.7 million in FY2010 procurement funding for the
modification of in-service F-22s, as well as additional research and development funding and
military construction (MilCon) funding for the F-22 program.
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on the
FY2010 defense authorization bill (H.R. 2647), recommends authorizing $368.8 million in
FY2010 advance procurement funding for the procurement of 12 F-22s in FY2011, with the
funding to be transferred from funding requested for the Defense Environmental Cleanup
program. The recommendation was approved by a vote of 31 to 30 at the full committee’s markup
of the bill.70 The committee’s report states, in the section on the Defense Environmental Cleanup
program, that:
the committee believes that the need to sustain the F–22 production line warrants an
additional transfer from Defense Environmental Cleanup of $368.8 million. The committee
recommends that the Secretary of Energy also derive this decrease from among sites that are
projected to meet regulatory milestones ahead of schedule in fiscal year 2010, or that are at
greatest risk of being unable to execute P.L. 111-5 [the American Recovery and
69 CIA World Factbook; Japan. CIA (2007-03-15).
70 The vote reportedly occurred at about 2:30 am in the morning on June 17, after more than 16 hours of debate on
various provisions of H.R. 2647. (See, for example, William Matthews, “F-22 Funds Approved in Wee-Hours Vote,”
DefenseNews.com, June 17, 2009; Marcus Weisgerber, “House Panel Votes to Continue F-22A Production Beyond 187
Aircraft,” InsideDefense.com (DefenseAlert – Daily News), June 17, 2009; William Matthews, “F-22 Fights Divides
Gates, U.S. Lawmakers,” DefenseNews.com, June 18, 2009; Emelie Rutherford, “HASC-Passed Bill Calls For More F-
22s, Study On Exporting To Japan,” Defense Daily, June 18, 2009.
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Reinvestment Act of 2009] and fiscal year 2010 funding as planned in fiscal year 2010.
(Page 586)
The report also recommends $12.7 million in procurement funding for modification of in-service
F-22s—a reduction of $338.0 million from the administration’s request. The committee’s report
states:
The committee notes that $523.0 million was authorized and appropriated for the advance
procurement of 20 F–22As for fiscal year 2009, that the Department of the Air Force will
procure only four additional F–22As, and that the Department of the Air Force plans to
obligate only $185.0 million of that amount, leaving $338.0 million that could be applied to
meet fiscal year 2010 F–22A modification requirements. (Page 100)
Regarding the projected shortfall in Air Force fighter aircraft, the committee’s report states:
The committee notes that for the past year, the Department of the Air Force has informed
Congress that it requires 2,200 fighter aircraft, and that the Department projects a shortfall in
its fighter aircraft inventory that would begin in fiscal year 2017 and grow to approximately
800 aircraft by 2024. The committee believes that such a shortfall will adversely affect the
ability of the active duty forces and air reserve forces to meet future requirements for both air
expeditionary forces and for the air sovereignty alert mission in the United States.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the
Chief of the Air National Guard and the Chief of the Air Force Reserve, to provide a report
to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2010. The report should include
statements from both the Chief of the Air National Guard and the Chief of the Air Force
Reserve describing their separate and independent views to Congress, as applicable. The
report should address the so-called ‘‘fighter gap’’ issue in the long- and short-term with
alternative solutions including but not limited to: accelerated procurement of fifth generation
fighters such as the F-22 and F-35; an interim procurement of so-called “4.5 generation”
fighters; and fleet management options such as service life extension programs. The report
must include a detailed analysis of the effect that any shortfalls will have on the Air National
Guard and the air sovereignty alert mission specifically, including the loss of Air National
Guard flying missions throughout the United States and the resultant loss of Air National
Guard pilot and maintenance capability. (Page 101)
Section 131 of H.R. 2647 would repeal Section 134 of the FY2009 defense authorization act (S.
3001/P.L. 110-417 of October 14, 2008), which prohibits obligating more than $140.0 million of
FY2009 advance procurement funding for the F-22 program until the Obama administration
certifies to the congressional defense committees that procurement of F-22s is in the national
interest, or that the termination of the F-22 production line is in the national interest. The
certification was to be made by March 1, 2009.
Section 132 of H.R. 2647 would require the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a plan for the
preservation and storage of unique tooling related to the production of hardware and end items for
F-22s that would (1) ensure that the Secretary preserves and stores such tooling in a manner that
allows the production of such hardware and end items to be restarted after a period of idleness;
(2) identify, with respect to the supplier base of such hardware and end items, the costs of
restarting production; and (3) identify any contract modifications, additional facilities, or funding
that the Secretary determines necessary to carry out the plan. The provision also states that none
of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by the bill or otherwise made available for FY2010
for the Aircraft Procurement, Air Force appropriation account for F-22s may be obligated or
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expended for activities related to disposing of F-22 production tooling until a period of 45 days
has elapsed after the date on which the Secretary submits the report to Congress.
Section 1237 of H.R. 2647 would require Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of State and in consultation with the Secretary of the Air Force, to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on the potential sale of F-22s to Japan. The report is to include assessments
of (1) the cost of developing an exportable version of the F-22, (2) whether an exportable version
of the F-22 is technically feasible and executable, and the timeline for achieving such an
exportable version; (3) the potential strategic implication for allowing the sale of the F-22s to
Japan; (4) the impact of foreign military sales of the F-22 on the U.S. aerospace and aviation
industry; and (5) any changes to existing law needed to allow foreign military sales of the F-22 to
Japan.
The committee’s report contains additional views of several members of the committee on
various issues relating to the bill. The F-22 program is discussed in these additional views on
pages 672 and 677-678 of the report.
The above provisions and funding levels were not altered by any floor amendments when the full
House considered, amended, and passed H.R. 2647.
A June 24, 2009, statement of administration policy on H.R. 2647 as reported in the House states:
F-22 Advance Procurement: The Administration strongly objects to the provisions in the
bill authorizing $369 million in advanced procurement funds for F-22s in FY 2011. The
collective judgment of the Service Chiefs and Secretaries of the military departments
suggests that a final program of record of 187 F-22s is sufficient to meet operational
requirements. If the final bill presented to the President contains this provision, the
President’s senior advisors would recommend a veto.71
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) on the
FY2010 defense authorization bill (S. 1390), recommends authorizing $1.75 billion for the
procurement of seven F-22s in FY2010. The recommendation was approved by a vote of 13 to 11
at the full committee’s markup of the bill.72 The committee’s report states:
The budget request included $95.2 million in Aircraft Procurement, Air Force (APAF), for
the F–22A aircraft program, including $64.0 million for shutting down the production line.
The committee recommends an increase of $1.75 billion to purchase an additional seven F-
22A aircraft in fiscal year 2010. The committee also directs that the production shutdown
costs be applied to other program requirements.
71 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 2647
- National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, p. 1. Emphasis as in original.
72 S.Rept. 111-35, p. 276, which states that the roll call vote was as follows: “In Favor: Senators Kennedy, Byrd,
Lieberman, Begich, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Thune, Martinez, Wicker, Burr, Vitter and Collins. Opposed:
Senators Levin, Reed, Akaka, Nelson of Florida, Nelson of Nebraska, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill, Udall of Colorado,
Hagan, and McCain.”
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
The Air National Guard is charged with providing homeland aerial defense for the United
States and is primarily responsible for executing the air sovereignty alert (ASA) mission as
part of the National Defense Strategy. In carrying out this mission on a daily basis, the Air
National Guard relies on more than 1,600 Air National Guard men and women who operate
legacy F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft. The committee has been informed that the projected
retirements of these legacy aircraft with which the Air National Guard currently executes the
ASA mission will leave the Guard short of the required number of aircraft to execute this
mission. Additionally, the Government Accountability Office has commented that ‘‘unless
the Air Force modifies its current fielding schedules or extends the service lives of its F-15s
and F-16s ... it will lack viable aircraft to conduct ASA operations at some of the 18 current
ASA sites after fiscal year 2015.’’
The committee is concerned that no plan has been developed to fill this shortfall, either
through modernizing legacy aircraft or buying new aircraft. Of specific concern is the fact
that 80 percent of the F-16s will be gone in 8 years and since the majority of the ASA
mission is accomplished by these F-16s, this will negatively impact the Air National Guard’s
ability to execute the ASA mission.
In a recent letter, the Director of the Air National Guard commented, ‘‘While a variety of
solutions abound, I believe the nature of the current and future asymmetric threats to our
Nation, particularly from seaborne cruise missiles, requires a fighter platform with the
requisite speed and detection to address them. The F-22’s unique capability in this arena
enables it to handle a full spectrum of threats that the Air National Guard’s current legacy
systems are not capable of addressing ... basing F-22 (and eventually F-35s) at strategic Air
National Guard locations throughout the United States while simultaneously making them
available to rotationally support worldwide contingency operations is the most responsible
approach to satisfying all of our Nation’s needs.’’
For these reasons, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a plan,
including force structure and basing requirements, for executing the ASA mission over the
next 2 decades. The Secretary shall deliver that plan to the congressional defense committees
no later than March 1, 2010. The plan shall give full consideration toward: (1) stationing the
additional F-22s procured in fiscal year 2010 at strategic Air National Guard locations; (2)
creating new or expanding current Active/Guard associate units in which both active-duty
and Air National Guard personnel could operate these additional aircraft, as well as F-22s
and F-35s procured in the future; and (3) transitioning earlier model F-22s as well as F-35s
procured in the future to the Air National Guard at the first possible opportunity. (Pages 24-
25; ellipses as in original)
The committee’s report also recommends rejecting the administration’s request for $350.7 million
in procurement funding for modification of in-service F-22s, and reducing by $32.3 million the
administration’s request for F-22 procurement funding that was to be used for purposes other than
procuring new F-22s.
Section 122 of S. 1390 would repeal would repeal Section 134 of the FY2009 defense
authorization act (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417 of October 14, 2008), which prohibits obligating more
than $140.0 million of FY2009 advance procurement funding for the F-22 program until the
Obama administration certifies to the congressional defense committees that procurement of F-
22s is in the national interest, or that the termination of the F-22 production line is in the national
interest. The certification was to be made by March 1, 2009.
Section 122 also states that “Subject to the provisions of appropriations Acts and applicable
requirements relating to the transfer of funds, the Secretary of the Air Force may transfer amounts
authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2009 by section 103(1) for aircraft procurement for
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
the Air Force and available for advance procurement for the F-22A fighter aircraft within that
subaccount or to other subaccounts for aircraft procurement for the Air Force for purposes of
providing funds for other modernization priorities with respect to the F-22A fighter aircraft.”
Regarding Section 122—as well as the committee’s recommendation to reject the
administration’s request for $350.7 million in procurement funding for modification of in-service
F-22s, and the committee’s recommendation to reduce by $32.3 million the administration’s
request for F-22 procurement funding that was to be used for purposes other than procuring new
F-22s—the committee’s report states:
In section 134 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-
417), Congress authorized $523.0 million in funds for F-22A advance procurement, but
prohibited obligation of more than $140.0 million of that amount until the President certified
to the congressional defense committees that: (1) the procurement of F-22A fighter aircraft is
in the national interest of the United States; or (2) the termination of the production line for
F-22A fighter aircraft is in the national interest of the United States. The certification was
required to be submitted before March 1, 2009.
The President made no such certification. The Department has determined that, since the
President did not make a determination under section 134 of P.L. 110-417, the remaining
$383.0 million is unavailable for obligation.
The President’s budget request includes a proposal to terminate production for the F-22A
and includes no funds for additional F-22A aircraft. The budget request also includes a
request for $95.2 million to fund various activities related to the F-22A production line, and
$350.7 million to purchase and install various modifications for the F-22A fleet.
The committee recommends a provision [Section 122] that would: (1) repeal section 134 of
P.L. 110-417 to lower the fence around the $383.0 million that might have been used for
advance procurement; and (2) allow the Secretary of the Air Force to reallocate those funds
for other priorities. Lowering that fence would allow the Secretary to use these fiscal year
2009 funds to pay for fiscal year 2010 F-22A funding needs. The committee believes that,
subsequent to action on the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32) the Air
Force should have $383.0 million available for such purposes.
Therefore, the committee recommends a decrease of $383.0 million to Aircraft Procurement,
Air Force, with $350.7 million of that amount applied to the F-22A modifications request,
and $32.3 million applied to the full funding line. (Pages 14-15)
Section 123 would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State
and in consultation with the Secretary of the Air Force, submit to the congressional defense
committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on potential foreign military sales of the F-22A
fighter aircraft. The report is to include assessments of (1) the cost of developing an exportable
version of the F-22; (2) whether an exportable version of the F-22 is technically feasible and
executable, and the timeline for achieving such an exportable version; (3) the potential strategic
implication for allowing the sale of the F-22s to Japan; (4) the impact of foreign military sales of
the F-22 on the U.S. aerospace and aviation industry; and (5) any changes to existing law needed
to allow foreign military sales of the F-22 to Japan. The committee’s report summarizes Section
123 on page 15.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bill
House
On July 16, 2009, Representative John Murtha, the chairman of the Defense subcommittee of the
House Appropriations Committee, issued a press release stating that the subcommittee had
completed its markup of the FY2010 defense appropriations bill. The release stated that the bill as
marked by the subcommittee up includes an additional $369 in advance procurement funding for
the procurement of 12 F-22s.73 This appears similar to the House Armed Services Committee’s
recommendation for the FY2010 defense authorization bill (H.R. 2647—see above), which
provides $368.8 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding for the procurement of 12 F-
22s in FY2011.
FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32)
Request
As part of its proposed FY2009 supplemental appropriations bill, the administration requested
$600 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of four F-22s for which
Congress had provided advance procurement funding in the FY2009 defense appropriations act.
(As discussed earlier in this report, Congress, as part of its action on the FY2009 defense budget,
provided $523 million in advance procurement funding for the procurement of 20 F-22s in
FY2010. In late 2008, DOD released enough of this funding to fund the procurement of long-lead
time items for four of these 20 F-22s.)
House
The House Appropriations Committee report (H.Rept. 111-105 of May 12, 2009) on the FY2009
supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 2346) recommended approving the administration’s
request for $600 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of four F-22s
(see page 21).
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee report (S.Rept. 111-20 of May 14, 2009) on the FY2009
supplemental appropriations bill (S. 1054) recommended $498 million in procurement funding to
complete the procurement cost of four F-22s—a reduction of $102 million from the
administration’s request. The report also recommended an additional $45 million in procurement
funding for the F-22 program for “Full funding for fiscal year 2009,” and recommended reduction
of $147 million in procurement funding for the F-22 program so as to “Delete shut-down
funding” (see page 43).
73 Press release of July 16, 2009, entitled “Murtha Unveils FY10 Defense Appropriations Bill,” posted on the website
of Representative John Murtha.
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Conference
The conference report (H.Rept. 111-151 of June 12, 2009) on the FY2009 supplemental
appropriations bill (H.R. 2346) recommended approving the administration’s request for $600
million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of four F-22s (see page 93).
The conference report also stated:
The Air Force has informed the Congress that funding in the amount of $45,000,000 is
required for the F-22 Raptor program to avoid a work stoppage in material processing and
fabrication activities during fiscal year 2009. The conferees direct the Secretary of the Air
Force to use $45,000,000 from within the funds provided to ensure that work proceeds on
schedule. None of the funds provided in this Act shall be used to finance activities to shut-
down the F-22A production line. Funds may be used to explore options to develop an export
variant of the F22A. (Page 97)
The four F-22s whose procurement cost was completed by H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32 are recorded as
having been procured in FY2009, along with the 20 F-22s procured in the FY2009 defense
appropriations act (Division C of H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008).
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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