Guinea's 2008 Military Coup and Relations
with the United States
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
July 16, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40703
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Guinea's 2008 Military Coup and Relations with the United States
Summary
Guinea is a Francophone West African country on the Atlantic coast, with a population of about
10 million. It is rich in natural resources but characterized by widespread poverty and limited
socio-economic growth and development. While Guinea has experienced regular episodes of
internal political turmoil, it was considered a locus of relative stability over the past two decades,
a period during which each of its six neighbors suffered one or more armed internal conflicts.
Guinea entered a new period of political uncertainty on December 23, 2008, when a group of
junior and mid-level military officers seized power, hours after the death of longtime president
and former military leader Lansana Conté. Calling itself the National Council for Democracy and
Development (CNDD, after its French acronym), the junta named as interim national president
Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, previously a relatively unknown figure.
The junta appointed a civilian prime minister and has promised to hold presidential and
legislative elections by late 2009. However, some observers fear that rivalries within the CNDD,
Dadis Camara's lack of national leadership experience, and administrative and logistical
challenges could indefinitely delay the transfer of power to a democratically elected civilian
administration. Guinea has never undergone a democratic or constitutional transfer of power
since gaining independence in 1958, and Dadis Camara is one of only three persons to occupy the
presidency since that time. Dadis Camara has presented himself as a reformer who is leading a
CNDD crackdown on corruption and international drug trafficking, both of which had grown
significantly under Conté. Junta leaders also initially stated that large international corporate
mineral concession contracts would be reviewed and potentially cancelled or reallocated, and
several contracts were temporarily suspended.
The United States condemned the coup and suspended some bilateral development aid and all
security assistance to Guinea, signaling a hiatus in what had generally been a cordial bilateral
relationship during much of the Conté period. Prior to the coup, U.S. officials had informally
planned a potential budget totaling over $100 million over three years, the bulk of which would
have supported maritime security programs and regional peacekeeping training. The U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID)’s governance and humanitarian assistance programs,
which comprised a substantial portion of the U.S. aid budget in Guinea before the coup, were not
affected by the suspension. Both the African Union (AU) and the regional Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Guinea's membership in response to the coup, but
did not place sanctions on the CNDD. There is significant disagreement within Guinean political
circles and among members of the international community over the relative utility and effects of
suspending aid and, more generally, about what policies should define foreign governments’ and
multilateral bodies’ relations with the junta.
This report analyzes developments since the military’s seizure of power in December 2008,
Guinea’s relations with the United States, and U.S. policy in the wake of the coup. It also
provides background on Guinean history and politics.
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Contents
The Current Situation: Overview................................................................................................. 1
International Reactions to the Coup....................................................................................... 1
U.S. Response to the Coup .................................................................................................... 2
U.S. Interests in Guinea......................................................................................................... 2
Background ................................................................................................................................ 4
The Conté Regime: Final Years ............................................................................................. 5
The December 2008 Coup........................................................................................................... 6
The CNDD ........................................................................................................................... 7
Centralization of Power................................................................................................... 8
Counter-Narcotics Efforts................................................................................................ 9
Anti-Corruption Efforts................................................................................................. 10
Mining Sector Reform................................................................................................... 10
Human Rights and Rule of Law ................................................................................................ 11
Alleged Abuses by CNDD Members During Conté’s Presidency ................................... 12
Press Freedom............................................................................................................... 12
Transition Process ..................................................................................................................... 13
Elections Preparations and Timeline.................................................................................... 13
Parties and Candidates .................................................................................................. 14
Economic Issues ....................................................................................................................... 15
Socio-Economic Conditions ................................................................................................ 15
The Impact of the Coup on Guinea’s Foreign Relations ............................................................. 16
Regional Reactions ............................................................................................................. 16
Impact on Donor Relations.................................................................................................. 17
Multilateral Assistance .................................................................................................. 17
U.S. Assistance and Policy Issues.............................................................................................. 18
Elections and Democracy Promotion................................................................................... 19
Security Assistance and Counter-Narcotics Cooperation ...................................................... 19
Development and Related Assistance .................................................................................. 20
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Guinea ............................................................................................................. 4
Tables
Table 1. Changes to USAID Programs in Guinea as a Result of the Coup .................................. 22
Appendixes
Appendix. Touré and Conté Regimes: Historical Background.................................................... 24
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Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 31
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The Current Situation: Overview
Guinea is a socio-economically impoverished but mineral-rich West African country, about the
size of Oregon, that has experienced regular episodes of political turmoil. Issues of interest to
Congress include stability and governance in West Africa; counter-narcotics in Guinea and
neighboring countries; Guinea’s natural resource wealth and extractive industries; and maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea.1 Over the past two decades, Guinea was considered a locus of
relative stability in a sub-region that has witnessed multiple armed conflicts. Guineans entered a
new period of political uncertainty on December 23, 2008, however, when a group of junior and
mid-ranking military officers seized power a day after the death of longtime president and former
military leader Lansana Conté. Conté had been ill for many years – reportedly a combination of
diabetes, heart problems, and possibly leukemia – and rarely appeared in public.
The junta, calling itself the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD, after its
French acronym), dissolved the legislature, banned political and trade union activity, and
suspended the constitution. The junta spokesman, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, previously a
relatively unknown figure, was subsequently named president, reportedly following a contentious
debate among rival CNDD elements. Dadis Camara is the third person ever to occupy the
presidency in Guinea since it became independent in 1958. The country has never undergone a
democratic or constitutional transfer of state power since that date.2
On December 30, the CNDD appointed a civilian prime minister, Kabiné Komara, a banker and
experienced financial technocrat, but he is perceived as wielding little decision-making power.3
The junta has promised to hold presidential and legislative elections by late 2009. Some
observers, however, fear that a lack of capacity in electoral organization, divisions within the
CNDD, and junta members’ possible unwillingness to leave power may delay or prevent the
transfer of power to a democratically elected civilian administration. Dadis Camara, who presents
himself as a reformer, has moved to crack down on corruption and international drug trafficking,
both of which had grown significantly under Conté. While many Guineans and members of the
international community agree that such reforms are needed, serious concerns have arisen over
the CNDD’s handling of these issues. Additional concerns have arisen over the junta’s adherence
to human rights norms and the rule of law.
International Reactions to the Coup
Donors, including the European Union, the United Nations, France, and the United States,
condemned the coup and called for elections and a return to civilian-led government. The regional
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) each
suspended Guinea’s membership in response to the coup d’état, but did not impose further
1 In 2007, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on Guinea, focusing on governance, stability, and then-
recent political protests.
2Guinea gained independence under the leadership of Ahmed Sékou Touré, a pan-Africanist and self-described
revolutionary socialist. In April 1984, he was succeeded by Col. (later, General) Lansana Conté, who led a junta that
took power in a coup d’état after Touré died while receiving medical treatment in the United States. See Appendix for
background on Guinean history and politics.
3 Agence France Presse (AFP), “Guinea: Military Junta Names Banker as new Prime Minister,” December 30, 2008 via
Open Source.
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punitive measures, such as sanctions, on the CNDD or its members. An International Contact
Group on Guinea was formed in January 2009; members include the ECOWAS Commission and
Chair, the AU Commission and Chair of its Peace and Security Council, the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the European Union, the Mano River Union, the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, the Organization of Francophonie, the U.N. Secretariat, and the permanent
and African members of the U.N. Security Council (including the United States).4 The
International Contact Group has held several meetings in Conakry with the junta, civil society
groups, and political parties, and has urged the CNDD to uphold its agreement to organize
elections by the end of 2009. Guinea’s foreign relations are discussed in further detail below.
U.S. Response to the Coup
The United States condemned the coup and has repeatedly called for “a return to civilian rule and
the holding of free, fair, and transparent elections as soon as possible”5; it does not recognize the
CNDD as the legitimate government of Guinea. The Bush Administration announced in early
January 2009 that the United States would suspend bilateral aid to Guinea, with the exception of
humanitarian and democracy-promotion assistance, in line with congressional directives.6 In
practice, all security assistance has been suspended, while most development assistance and other
non-military aid has been unaffected by the suspension. The United States also signaled its
opposition to the junta by prohibiting the U.S. Embassy’s Chargé d’Affaires from meeting
personally with junta members. The restriction does not apply to other Embassy officials. In a
digital video press conference in Conakry in late January 2009, Phillip Carter, then the State
Department’s Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and a previous U.S.
ambassador to Guinea, warned that a failure to hold elections and restore civilian rule by year’s
end would “jeopardize the United States’ long-term bilateral relationship with Guinea.”7
U.S. Interests in Guinea
U.S. interests and associated policy challenges in Guinea center on democratization and good
governance; counternarcotics; bilateral economic interests and relations; regional peace and
security; and socio-economic and institutional development.8 Ensuring a transition to a
democratically elected, civilian-led government is now the focus of U.S. governance concerns.
Counternarcotics issues are a relatively recent area of engagement, as Guinea, among other
countries in the region, has emerged as a reported transshipment point for cocaine en route from
South America to Europe. This development has implications for U.S. security interests, as some
of the beneficiaries of this trade are believed by analysts to include South American drug
4 Commissions of the AU and ECOWAS, Statement of the Consultative Meeting on the Situation in the Republic of
Guinea, January 30, 2009.
5 AFP, “After Coup, U.S. Halts Aid to Guinea,” January 7, 2009.
6 The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8, Division H, Title VII, section 7008) bars direct assistance “to
the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree,” with the
exception of democracy promotion and humanitarian assistance. The provision is commonly referred to as “Section
508,” a reference to previous appropriations legislation.
7 U.S. Embassy News Digest, January 29, 2009.
8 In 2007, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on Guinea, focusing on governance, stability, and then-
recent political protests.
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syndicates that are the target of U.S. military or law enforcement counternarcotics operations.
Such organizations may include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a U.S.-
designated terrorist entity. Drug trafficking also threatens to undermine U.S. foreign policy goals
in Africa, such as the promotion of good governance and the rule of law, legitimate economic
growth, state institution-building, and other foreign aid program goals set out in the U.S. Foreign
Assistance Framework.
Guinea’s extractive industry sector is of financial and strategic interest to the United States. In
addition to gold, diamonds, uranium, and potential oil and gas reserves, Guinea possesses an
estimated 27% or more of global reserves of bauxite, a key component of aluminum. 9 Guinea
provided 16% of U.S. bauxite and alumina imports between 2004 and 2007,10 and several U.S.-
based resource firms operate in Guinea. The large U.S.-based multinational aluminum firm Alcoa,
for instance, is a major shareholder in the Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, a bauxite mining
and export partnership with the Guinean state, while the much smaller U.S energy firm
Hyperdynamics holds the largest single license for offshore oil exploration.11
A broader U.S. interest in Guinea is the maintenance of political stability and peace, both in
Guinea itself and in the surrounding sub-region. In contrast to Guinea, each of its six neighbors
― most notably Sierra Leone and Liberia ― have suffered armed civil conflicts over the past two
decades. These conflicts were sparked by such factors as adverse socio-economic development
conditions; often volatile ethnic, regional, and leadership rivalries; and corruption and other
abuses of state power and resources. While the Guinean state faces similar challenges, it has
survived multiple threats to its institutional authority and integrity, contrary to the predictions of
some analysts. Reflecting Guinea’s perceived role in regional stability, U.S. security assistance
prior to the coup included military training for participation in peacekeeping missions as well as
programs aimed at bolstering maritime security.
Guinea’s relative stability has had several key implications for the United States. First, Guinea
has not, to date, been the source of a significant challenge to U.S. international peace and security
policies. This is notable in a region where U.S. diplomatic efforts and substantial humanitarian
assistance have at times been devoted to ending or mitigating the effects of conflict. Second,
Guinea has been able to act as a humanitarian partner to the United States by hosting hundreds of
thousands of refugees fleeing conflicts in neighboring states. Guinea was also able to help prevent
a regional spill-over of the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia by repelling attacks on its
territory by factions from Sierra Leone and Liberia backed by former President Charles Taylor of
Liberia. Following these attacks, which took place in 2000 and 2001, the U.S. military trained an
800-person Guinean Ranger unit to shore up border security. At the same time, Guinean
government policy has presented both confluences with and challenges to U.S. objectives in the
region, in the form of Guinean intervention in the civil wars in Liberia and in Guinea-Bissau.12
9 U.S. Geological Survey, 2009 Bauxite and Alumina Survey.
10 Ibid.
11 Further information on Alcoa is available at http://www.alcoa.com/guinea/en/home.asp; see Thomas Pearmain,
“Hyperdynamics Divests of U.S. Oil Assets to Fund Guinea Operations,” Global Insight, May 5, 2009.
12 Former President Conté’s government hosted former Sierra Leonean President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah after he was
deposed by a junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, in 1997. Guinea’s government also reportedly permitted
the Liberian anti-Taylor rebel group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) to maintain rear
bases in southern Guinea, supplied LURD with arms, and periodically provided tactical military assistance to it, such as
cross-border mortar and helicopter air fire support. Guinea also intervened militarily in Guinea-Bissau’s civil war in
1998 on behalf of the late former president, Joao Bernado “Nino” Vieira. On LURD, see CRS Report RL32243,
(continued...)
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Guinean socio-economic and state institutional development are also long-term U.S. policy
objectives. Prior to the coup, Guinea was a recipient of U.S. bilateral aid, notably humanitarian
assistance and funding for the promotion of democracy and good governance. In response to the
coup, the United States suspended all bilateral assistance that did not fall into either of these latter
categories, including military and counternarcotics assistance. U.S. policy issues and interests are
covered in further detail elsewhere in this report.
Background
Figure 1. Map of Guinea
Lansana Conté, who came to power in a military coup in 1984, oversaw some economic and
political reforms, but his critics accused him of stifling Guinea’s democratic development while
allowing corruption and nepotism to flourish. The final years of Conté’s rule were marked by a
(...continued)
Liberia: Transition to Peace, by Nicolas Cook.
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decline in average living standards, the co-option of power by members of Conté’s inner circle of
businessmen and politicians, and increasing signs of public dissatisfaction. Guinea’s health sector
and national infrastructure are very poor, even by regional standards, and Guinean standards of
living are among the worst in the world.13 Conté’s supporters, on the other hand, argued that his
leadership prevented Guinea from experiencing the kind of armed civil conflict and political
instability that have afflicted its neighbors. While Guinea held several general elections under
Conté, democratic gains under his leadership were limited, and power remained concentrated in
his hands. Further aspects of Conté’s rule are discussed in the Appendix, which provides
historical background on Guinea.
The Conté Regime: Final Years
Conté maintained a careful balance between political and military factions, never publicly
cultivated a designated successor, and generally brooked little public opposition to his rule. The
president typically co-opted political opponents and suppressed protests by force or deflated them
with pledges of food and fuel subsidies or policy reforms, which were often only partially
fulfilled. Conté’s final years were beset by growing public discontent with economic stagnation
and high inflation; the slow pace of promised democratic reforms; extensive corruption; and
Conté’s semi-autocratic leadership. This spurred a growing number of formerly rare strikes and
protests, some violent. These protests, together with Conté’s ill health and reclusiveness, also led
to power struggles within the cabinet and Conté’s inner circle. Legislative elections were due to
take place in 2007, but were repeatedly delayed, leaving the National Assembly with an expired
mandate. Divisions and restiveness within the military, often over pay and slow rates of
promotion, also grew.
Particularly notable was a May 2008 uprising led by junior army officers at Camp Alpha Yaya,
the largest military base in Conakry and the headquarters of the army’s elite commando
parachutist unit (known as the BATA). Mutinous troops exchanged fire with members of the
presidential guard, and several people were reportedly killed, and dozens wounded, by stray
bullets.14 After a week of unrest, Conté met with mutiny leaders, and the government agreed to
pay salary arrears of $1,100 to each soldier, sack the defense minister, and grant promotions to
junior officers, ending the uprising.15 Contrary to mutineers’ demands, much of the top military
hierarchy remained in place until Conté's death; they were subsequently dismissed by the CNDD,
key members of which have claimed to have played key roles in the 2008 mutiny.16
Many analysts were concerned about the risk of ethnic or intra-military violence and instability,
as well as the potential impact on Guinea’s fragile neighbors, should Conté die in office. Others,
however, argued that Guineans’ historically strong sense of national identity and social cohesion
meant that such a scenario was unlikely.17 Under either scenario, it was widely agreed that the
13 See e.g. U.N. Development Program (UNDP), “Guinea: 2007/2008 Human Development Report,” at
http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_GIN.html.
14 Kissy Agyeman, “Tension Mounts in Guinea in Wake of Army Revolt,” Global Insight, May 29, 2008.
15 Saliou Samb, “Guinea Settles Army Pay Dispute With Mass Promotion,” Reuters, June 14, 2008.
16 Claude Pivi, a CNDD member and junior officer who was promoted to Minister of Presidential Security in January
2009, styled himself the leader of the Camp Alpha Yaya mutiny. Pivi also led the crackdown on the police uprising,
according to witnesses. After he became president, Dadis Camara stated he had played a key role in the mutiny and in
the negotiations that ended it.
17 Social Science Research Council (SSRC), Policy Approaches to the Current Situation in Guinea, March 2009: 2.
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National Assembly, judiciary, and opposition parties lacked sufficient cohesion, political power,
or popular legitimacy to ensure a constitutional succession.18 A post-Conté military coup was
predicted by many observers, but it was unclear what military faction, if any, might prevail, as the
armed forces were reportedly divided along ethnic and generational fault lines. It was also unclear
whether a military seizure of power would permit a return to civilian rule and constitutional
governance. International concerns over potential instability heightened with reports that
trafficking activities were being facilitated or directly undertaken by highly placed government
officials, members of the military, and Conté associates.
The December 2008 Coup
By 2008, President Conté’s death in office had been anticipated for several years, following his
long struggle with illness. In the early hours of December 23, 2008, his death was announced on
national television. Under Guinea’s constitution, National Assembly Speaker Aboubacar Somparé
should have assumed power as head of state, with presidential elections organized within 60 days.
On television, Somparé – flanked by Prime Minister Ahmed Tidiane Souaré and military chief of
staff Gen. Diarra Camara – requested that the Supreme Court declare the presidency vacant and
install Somparé as interim president.
Instead, within hours, a military junta calling itself the National Council for Democracy and
Development (CNDD) announced that it had taken power in a coup. In a communiqué broadcast
on the national radio and television station, a junta spokesman, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara,
announced that the CNDD had “decided to end the agony of the Guinea people” by seizing power
and aborting Somparé’s constitutional succession.19 The junta dissolved the constitution and the
National Assembly, banned political and union activity, and promised elections within two years.
The coup leaders justified their decision to overthrow the government on the basis that Guinea’s
ruling elite had provided poor leadership. In the broadcast announcing the coup, Dadis Camara
stated that the incumbent regime had permitted the systematic “embezzlement of public funds,
general corruption, impunity established as method of government, and anarchy in the
management of state affairs” leading to “a catastrophic economic situation.” He also cited as
justification a pattern of national poverty, despite the existence of abundant natural resources, the
rise of drug trafficking, and diverse other crimes and patterns of poor governance.20
It was initially unclear whether the CNDD represented the military as a whole, or merely a
faction. In interviews with the international press, Somparé, Prime Minister Ahmed Tidiane
Souaré, and military chief of staff Gen. Diarra Camara condemned the coup “attempt” and
claimed the CNDD did not represent the majority of the armed forces.21 Many feared that the
18 On the other hand, the National Assembly had arguably played the role of a vital check on executive power in
February 2007, when legislators refused to extend a military state of siege that had provided cover for a massive
crackdown on anti-government demonstrators.
19 CNDD, “Communiqué Numéro 1,” Radio-Télévision Guinéenne (RTG), December 23, 2008; see “Guinea” Army
Dissolves Cabinet, Suspends Constitution After President’s Death,” [statement by the Guinean army], Conakry Radio
Guinée Internationale, December 23, 2008 via Open Source.
20"Guinea: Army Dissolves Cabinet...” via Open Source.
21 International television and radio interviews monitored by Arieff in Conakry.
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standoff between the two factions could escalate into violence.22 Instead, on the afternoon of
December 24, reportedly following tense internal negotiations, the CNDD announced that the
junta spokesman Dadis Camara had been chosen as president.23 Dadis Camara paraded into
downtown Conakry, where he was greeted by cheering crowds. Guineans’ positive response to the
CNDD appeared to be due to widespread dissatisfaction with Somparé, senior military staff, and
other figures seen as representing the Conté era, along with relief that the coup had been carried
out without bloodshed.24 Many Guineans also viewed the incumbent government as lacking
legitimacy.25 In a television broadcast on December 25, Prime Minister Souaré and members of
his cabinet, along with the military chief of staff, pledged to support the junta.
The CNDD
As of early 2009, the CNDD had 33 members, including 6 civilians. Military members were
drawn mainly from the Army. The CNDD’s composition is multi-ethnic, but key posts appear
split between ethnic Malinké and Forestiers, a collective term for members of several small
ethnic groups based in southeast Guinea.26 Many believe that several military factions had
envisioned carrying out a coup upon Conté’s death, and that CNDD leaders were able to unite
these factions through negotiation and promises of patronage. While the coup initially united
several disparate elements of the military, many believe the junta could be susceptible to violent
purges or a countercoup.27 The junta’s stability appears to rest on a precarious balance of power
among its key members. In particular, the relationship between Dadis Camara and Defense
Minister Sékouba Konaté is a source of frequent speculation among Guineans and members of
the diplomatic community.28 Konaté, one of the most powerful military officers in Guinea at the
time of the coup (as commander of the elite BATA airborne commando unit), was not included in
the initial list of CNDD members that was broadcast on the evening of December 23, which some
interpret as evidence of tense negotiations during the coup.29
22 Witnesses suggested that the CNDD controlled Camp Alpha Yaya (Conakry’s largest military base) and the main
Radio-Télévision Guinéenne (RTG) offices, while “loyalist” soldiers who did not support the coup initially retained
control of Camp Almamy Samory Touré (where the senior military leadership was based) and a subsidiary RTG
station. On December 24, the CNDD accused the former government of importing mercenaries in a bid to regain
power. (The claim did not appear to be borne out by events.)
23 RFI, “Guinean Putchists Said Still Debating Choice of Leader,” December 23, 2008 and AFP, “Guinea: Analysts Say
Divisions Within Military Explain Attempted Coup,” December 23, 2008, via Open Source.
24 Arieff interviews, Conakry, December 24-26, 2008. While there is little public opinion data available, reports suggest
Assembly Speaker Somparé, Conté’s constitutional successor, was deeply unpopular. In 2005, the International Crisis
Group reported that “Not one person consulted by Crisis Group expressed the desire for Somparé to take over. Once an
ardent member of Sékou Touré’s PDG party, he is often described as a Touré-era holdover, useful to the PUP primarily
because of his tendency toward demagoguery and authoritarianism.” (Stopping Guinea’s Slide, 2005: 8.)
25 In explaining their aversion to a constitutional succession led by Somparé, many pointed out that the National
Assembly’s five-year mandate had expired in late 2007, and that the constitution had been amended in 2001 in a
disputed referendum. For a critical analysis of this argument, see SSRC, Policy Approaches to the Current Situation in
Guinea, March 2009: 2-3.
26 SSRC, Policy Approaches to the Current Situation in Guinea, March 2009: 4.
27 E.g. International Crisis Group, Guinea: The Transition Has Only Just Begun, March 2009: 11; SSRC, Policy
Approaches to the Current Situation in Guinea, March 2009: 4.
28 E.g. Cheikh Yérim Seck, “Jusqu’où Ira Sékouba Konaté?,” Jeune Afrique, March 8-14, 2009.
29 Arieff monitoring of Radio-Télévision Guinéenne broadcasts, December 23, 2008.
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Moussa Dadis Camara: Profile
Moussa Dadis Camara, Guinea’s military leader, was born in 1964 in the remote southeastern Forest Region of
Guinea. He is a member of the Guerzé ethnic group, which accounts for under 10% of Guinea’s population and since
independence has held little influence over Guinean politics. He is also Christian in a country that is at least 85%
Muslim. Dadis Camara graduated from Guinea’s national university and entered the Army in 1990, spending time in
Germany in the 1990s in the course of both civilian and military training courses. As a military officer, he joined the
elite BATA airborne commando unit, serving in the logistics wing. Shortly before Conté’s death, he was promoted to
director of fuel supplies for the Army, a reportedly lucrative and powerful position that helped him build a base of
support among the rank-and-file. He is believed to have played a role in a May 2008 junior officer mutiny.
Centralization of Power
Upon taking power, the CNDD immediately took steps to assert its authority, for instance by
suspending civilian regional administrators and replacing them with military commanders. As the
main public face of the CNDD, Dadis Camara has further sought to centralize power and
neutralize potential opposition, both to the CNDD and to his dominant leadership within it. As
previously noted, the CNDD-appointed civilian prime minister, Kabiné Komara, is viewed as
having little decision-making power, and CNDD members directly control key government
functions. Komara’s cabinet was named in January 2009 by presidential decree, with 10 of 29
cabinet posts held by military officers, most CNDD members.30 Many lack experience in public
affairs. The CNDD also created several new ministerial-level positions and appointed members of
the military or close civilian associates to fill them. Several key ministries, including security,
defense, and finance, and the governor of the Central Bank, have been attached to the presidency.
Some signs of internal dissent within the military have emerged since the CNDD takeover. After
being named president, Dadis Camara ordered 22 generals – nearly the entire senior military
leadership under Conté – into retirement. Many were later arrested, according to news reports,
primarily based on accusations of plotting against the CNDD. In January 2009, two CNDD
officers were sacked for unclear reasons, and in April, as many 20 military officers, including a
CNDD member, were reportedly arrested in a crackdown on an alleged counter-coup attempt.
Many analysts contend that Dadis Camara’s actions since the coup are intended to “exert strong
executive powers.”31 However, this has raised concerns that “a CNDD belief that it alone can
solve the country’s myriad problems” may overestimate the CNDD’s technical and leadership
capacities, and may not reflect the needs and demands of the population.32 Supporters have
argued that “the pitiful state of the country called for an iron hand able to turn things around.”33
In some cases, the CNDD has responded to demands for broad public input into the transition
process. For example, the electoral calendar was proposed by a broad coalition of political parties
and civil society groups and is supported by international donors. At the same time, doubts have
arisen over the CNDD’s willingness to stand by its commitments, particularly with regard to
delegating government functions to civilians and organizing elections according to schedule.
30 Guineenews, “La Liste Complète des Membres du Gouvernement de Kabiné Komara,” January 14, 2009.
31 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report: Guinea, March 2009: 13.
32 International Crisis Group, Guinea: The Transition Has Only Just Begun, March 2009: 8.
33 Elizabeth Cote (Guinea Chief of Party for the International Foundation for Electoral Systems [IFES]), “Guinea's
Opportunity,” March 24, 2009, http://www.ifes.org.
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Counter-Narcotics Efforts
The CNDD has initiated populist moves to crack down on corruption and drug trafficking. These
measures appear designed to signal a break with the Conté regime, enhance the junta's popularity,
and respond to international and domestic concerns that Guinea, among other countries in the
region, had become a transshipment hub for cocaine en route from Latin America to Europe
during the final years of the Conté regime. CNDD actions appear to rely on the “naming and
shaming” of alleged wrongdoers, rather than advancing institutional reform. At least 20 high-
profile individuals, including top Conté officials, senior police officers, the former chief of the
armed forces, and a son and brother-in-law of the late president have been arrested since February
on drug trafficking allegations.34 Dadis Camara personally interrogated alleged traffickers on
national television, in some cases eliciting detailed “confessions.” Many international observers
and Guineans have welcomed the attempt to pursue powerful figures in the former regime.
However, concerns have arisen over a lack of due process in these cases, and some of the arrests
appear to have been politically selective. Few members of the military have been pursued, despite
indications of involvement by members of the military in the drug business.35 Dadis Camara has
promised that accused drug traffickers will receive a fair trial. This may prove difficult, however,
given corruption and a lack of capacity among the Guinean judiciary and the fact that many of
those accused have already been prompted to confess to crimes on television.
CNDD anti-drug efforts have concentrated power in the presidency and sidelined civilian-led
anti-drug agencies in favor of the military.36 The CNDD created a new presidentially-controlled
agency, the State Secretariat for Special Services, to curb drug and human trafficking, money
laundering, and organized crime. It is headed by an active-duty military officer, Capt. Moussa
Tiegboro Camara (no relation to Dadis Camara). While issues targeted by the Secretariat are of
concern to international policy makers, the new agency’s legal mandate and authorities have not
been clearly defined, and the CNDD has not publicly outlined how the agency is meant to interact
with the judiciary or police.37 Tiegboro Camara reportedly relies on a corps of gendarmes and
soldiers for enforcement.38 This has raised due process and human rights concerns, and some
military elements participating in anti-drug efforts have been accused of abuses of power.39
34 Conté’s son Ousmane, a military officer, admitted to involvement in trafficking, but denied being a “kingpin.” See
Rukmini Callimachi, “In TV confessions, curtain lifted on a narcostate,” Associated Press (AP), March 14, 2009; AFP,
“Son of Guinea’s late president confesses to drugs trafficking,” February 26, 2009; Amadou Toure, “Society: ‘Biggest’
drug trafficker’s presence in Conakry: Police DG gives ‘orders’,” Guineenews, May 5, 2007 via BBC Monitoring
Africa; AP, “20 Indicted on Drug Charges in Guinea,” June 13, 2009, among others.
35 For example, Claude Pivi – now Minister for Presidential Security – is widely believed to have connections to the
drug trade, but has not been cited as part of the crackdown. E.g. Guinée58, “La Justice Show du Jurisconsulte Dadis,”
February 25, 2009.
36 The police anti-narcotics bureau, known as OCAD, was criticized in the past for being allegedly infiltrated by drug
traffickers. However, the agency’s track record reportedly improved after a new director was appointed in late 2008.
37 In June, Tiegboro Camara reportedly called on the Guinean population to “burn all armed bandits who are caught
red-handed,” noting that prisons were already overcrowded. Reuters, “Burn Armed Robbers, Says Guinea Crime
Chief,” June 2, 2009.
38 Arieff interview with security specialist, Conakry, February 2009.
39 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Rein in Soldiers,” April 27, 2009.
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Anti-Corruption Efforts
The CNDD has taken a number of populist measures designed to portray the junta as a break with
the Conté government. In particular, the CNDD has announced it will review the mining code and
all current mining and prospecting licenses, conduct an audit of the Conté government and all
foreign companies operating in Guinea, and initiate the privatization of water, energy, and
telecommunications firms.40 The judiciary has not played a lead role in anti-corruption initiatives
under the CNDD, which has so far emphasized making an example of high profile figures from
Conté’s administration rather than initiating institutional reform.
Starting in January, the CNDD established a committee to audit firms and individuals accused of
having embezzled public funds, dodged tax payments, or entered into corrupt government
contracts under Conté. The committee, headed by Defense Minister Sékouba Konaté, has
questioned mining and telecommunications executives, government contractors, businessmen,
and former government officials. Some of the accused were publicly interrogated on national
television, including by Dadis Camara himself. Several had previously been cited during audits of
public institutions carried out by former Prime Minister Lansana Kouyaté, who headed the
government between February 2007 and May 2008.41 Many Guineans welcomed the audits as an
attempt to reign in corruption. At the same time, some have expressed concern that the audits are
extra-judicial and could be politically motivated or extortionary.42
Mining Sector Reform
Guinea’s economy relies heavily on primary commodity exports, notably bauxite (used to
produce aluminum), gold, diamonds, uranium, and iron ore. Guinea is thought to have the world’s
largest bauxite reserves, and joint-venture bauxite mining and alumina operations have
historically provided about 80% of Guinea’s foreign exchange.43 Soon after seizing power, the
CNDD said it would revise the mining code, renegotiate mining contracts, and crack down in
corruption in the mining sector.44 In March, the CNDD auditing committee accused four former
mining ministers of embezzling millions of dollars from the Guinean state. The former ministers
were detained for several days after appearing before the committee; they were released only after
agreeing to repay allegedly stolen funds.45 The CNDD has reportedly stated it hopes to recover an
additional $100 million in back-taxes from mining companies.46
40 Oxford Analytica, “Guinea: Junta under conflicting transition pressures,” April 9, 2009. In Transparency
International’s 2008 Corruption Perception Index, Guinea placed 173 out of 180 countries.
41 Kouyaté was appointed as a reformist to stem nationwide anti-government protests in January-February 2007. See
Appendix for further background.
42 See e.g. Aminata.com, “Les Audits à la Guinéenne: De la parade tout trouvée aux inquiétantes maladresses,”
February 2, 2009. The International Crisis Group expressed concern that “the process is more about getting hard cash
for the new regime than re-introducing the rule of law.” The Transition Has Only Just Begun, March 2009: 6.
43 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Guinea.” The Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea (CBG) is a joint
venture in which 49% of the shares are owned by the Guinean Government and 51% by an international consortium led
by Alcoa and Rio Tinto-Alcan.
44 A revision of mining contracts had been initiated shortly before Conté’s death with the help of international financial
institutions, though no results were publicly announced.
45 The African Union expressed concern over the apparently extra-judicial nature of the arrests. Saliou Samb, “Guinea
Ex-Ministers Freed, Say Will Repay Cash,” Reuters, April 1, 2009; AFP, “African Union Expresses Concern Over
Arrests,” March 26, 2009.
46 GuinéeActu, “Audit des Sociétés Minières en Guinée: L’Etat compte recouvrir plus de 500 milliards GNF,” March
(continued...)
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Dadis Camara has appeared at times to take unpredictable actions related to mining oversight,
such as publicly threatening to close or take over various mining projects. He has also forced
several mining projects to close down for days or weeks at a time. These actions have reportedly
sparked fears among international investors concerned for the security of their assets.47 Analysts
contend that a global fall in primary commodity prices and a decrease in funding available for
foreign direct investment have weakened the junta’s bargaining position, causing some firms to
consider withdrawing entirely from Guinea.48 Recent reports suggest the CNDD may attempt to
ease investor fears, though the junta reportedly “has minimal experience or technical capacity to
review contracts with some of the world’s largest mining firms.”49
Human Rights and Rule of Law
Upon Conté’s death, one veteran observer noted that “the army that General Conté has
bequeathed his country knows little of the role and methods that it would need to employ in a
democratic state respectful of its citizens’ most basic rights.”50 Since the coup, human rights
advocates and members of the international community have expressed growing concern over
violations of human rights and the rule of law, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.51
Military officers accused of plotting against the CNDD and officials accused of corruption or
involvement in drug trafficking have been detained without charge. Security forces have been
accused of looting private homes and businesses in Conakry, as well as other abuses of power.
Human Rights Watch reported in April that “soldiers in groups numbering up to 20 have raided
offices, shops, warehouses, medical clinics, and homes in broad daylight as well as at night…
[and] have stolen cars, computers, generators, medicines, jewelry, cash, mobile phones, and large
quantities of wholesale and retail merchandise, among other items.”52 Victims include both
Guineans and foreigners.
In separate incidents, soldiers raided the homes of a political party leader, Cellou Dalein Diallo
(in January 2009) and a prominent trade union activist, Rabiatou Sera Diallo (in March). In the
former case, the CNDD claimed that the raid was carried out by rogue soldiers; in the second, the
CNDD contended that the raid was carried out during a routine anti-drug operation.53 In May, in
an apparent response to criticism by Human Rights Watch and others, Dadis Camara promised
security sector reform and ordered hundreds of soldiers to publicly commit to ending criminal
behavior.54 However, it is unclear that these statements have had an impact on military behavior.
(...continued)
19, 2009.
47 EIU, Guinea: Country Report, March 2009: 16; Andrea Hotter, “Guinea Ruler Worries Miners,” The Wall Street
Journal, April 16, 2009.
48 Saliou Samb, “Aluminium Slump Adds to Guinea Woes After Coup,” Reuters, February 20, 2009; Ougna Camara,
“La Révision des Conventions Pourrait Nuire au Secteur Minier Guinéen,” Les Afriques, March 4, 2009.
49 Oxford Analytica, “Guinea: Government softens stance toward miners,” May 1, 2009.
50 Gilles Yabi, “Le Pire Cadeau Empoisonné de Conté à Son Pays: Une armée à la fois dangereuse et incontournable,”
AllAfrica.com, January 7, 2009.
51 E.g. International Contact Group on Guinea, “Communiqué,” June 19, 2009.
52 HRW, “Guinea: Rein in Soldiers,” April 27, 2009.
53 Guineeactu.com, “Perquisition Chez la SG de la CNTG : Le Capitaine Tiègboro et Raby s'expliquent,” March 5,
2009.
54 Saliou Samb, “Guinea Soldiers Vow En Masse to End Crime Wave,” Reuters, April 29, 2009; Saliou Samb, “Guinea
(continued...)
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The CNDD has created several new agencies with undefined legal mandates, and has appeared to
sideline the role of the judiciary in upholding the rule of law. The formation of a State Secretariat
in Charge of Disputes sparked protests by human rights advocates and a strike by members of the
Guinean bar association, which contended that “citizens and lawyers are regularly summoned to
the military base… where they appear before the Secretariat or before the president in person as
part of ostensibly judicial procedures.” Bar members termed these proceedings “pseudo-trials.”55
The Secretariat was abolished in June, in apparent response to such criticisms. Advocates have
also raised concerns over an apparent rise in vigilante attacks, particularly after the head of the
newly created State Secretariat for Special Services called on the Guinean population to “burn all
armed bandits who are caught red-handed,” noting that prisons were already overcrowded.56
Alleged Abuses by CNDD Members During Conté’s Presidency
Guinean and international advocates believe some CNDD members may have been responsible
for human rights abuses under Conté. These include individuals who were in a position of
command responsibility during nationwide anti-government protests in January and February
2007, when Guinean security forces allegedly opened fire on demonstrators and committed other
serious abuses against civilians.57 Dadis Camara promised to revive an official inquiry into
alleged abuses by security forces during the protests, which stagnated under Conté; however, little
progress appears to have been made.
The inclusion of Claude Pivi in the CNDD, and his promotion in January to Minister for
Presidential Security, has provoked particular concern. Pivi rose to national prominence in May
2008, when he portrayed himself as the leader of a mutiny by junior army officers. He is a widely
feared figure in Conakry, and is believed by many to have personally overseen the reported
killing of police officers in June 2008 (during a military-led crackdown on a police mutiny in
Conakry) and the torture of a group of civilians the following November.58 Pivi is also believed
by many Guineans and some members of the diplomatic community to have ties to the drug trade.
Press Freedom
Guinea’s media are relatively diverse, and represent a variety of views. However, local media
outlets are largely concentrated in Conakry: newspapers rarely circulate outside the capital, most
private FM radio stations have a small broadcast radius, and internet access is confined to urban
(...continued)
Junta Chief Says to Reform Army, Seeks Help,” Reuters, May 10, 2009.
55 AFP, “Guinée: ‘Graves violations des droits de l'Homme’ (ordre des avocats),” May 15, 2009.
56 Reuters, “Burn Armed Robbers, Says Guinea Crime Chief,” June 2, 2009.
57 See HRW, “Guinea: Plan Elections and Hold Rights Abusers Accountable,” January 21, 2009. An investigation by a
coalition of local human rights organizations concluded that 186 people were killed and over a thousand injured during
the protests. In addition, human rights activists allege that security forces engaged in arbitrary arrests, mistreatment of
detainees, and rape. See Coalition Pour la Défense des Victimes des Evénements de Janvier et Février 2007 en
République de Guinée, Rapport sur les Violations Commises en République de Guinée Pendant les Evénements de
Janvier et Février 2007, November 2007; and HRW, Dying for Change: Brutality and Repression by Guinean Security
Forces in Response to a Nationwide Strike, April 24, 2007.
58 In November 2008, Pivi reportedly ordered the torture of several Cameroonian nationals whom he claimed had
damaged his car; the incident was reported in the Guinean press and by members of the diplomatic community.
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centers. Adult literacy is under 30%.59 Nonetheless, much of the population has access to
shortwave radio, including international news broadcasts focusing on Africa. The CNDD tightly
controls the national television station – the only locally broadcast channel – which often airs
hours of footage of Dadis Camara at a time. State-owned media have reportedly been barred from
covering political party activities.60 While there have been few overt attempts to restrict the
private press since the coup, local journalists report widespread self-censorship and a lack of
access to official information. Dadis Camara has appealed to local journalists to “support” the
CNDD, and is said to have offered money in exchange for favorable coverage. Many journalists
fear retaliation by Presidential Security Minister Claude Pivi, who reportedly harassed and
threatened several local journalists prior to Conté’s death for critical coverage. 61
Transition Process
The CNDD has committed to overseeing democratic elections and a transition to civilian power.
In March, the CNDD publicly announced its acceptance of a timetable for national elections
recommended by a coalition of political parties and civil society groups. At the same time, some
believe the junta’s centralization of power and certain actions by Dadis Camara could indicate an
unwillingness to leave power.
Elections Preparations and Timeline
Legislative and presidential elections are slated to take place, respectively, in October and
December 2009. The International Contact Group on Guinea has urged the junta to abide by this
timetable, which was proposed by a broad coalition of political parties and civil society groups.62
The Obama Administration has expressed support for these planned elections; in its FY2010
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, the Administration stated that “for
the first time ever, Guinea has the opportunity to hold credible elections,” and that “despite
deteriorating political conditions, the United States sees reason for hope.”63
The total budget for legislative and presidential elections is projected to be over $38 million
dollars. As of early July 2009, the United States had pledged $5.3 million, the largest single
contribution. Other pledges have come from the European Union, France, Japan, Germany, and
Spain. In late June, after the International Contact Group on Guinea criticized the CNDD for
failing to provide promised funds, the Guinean government disbursed the equivalent of $3 million
toward the electoral process. The total projected contribution of the Guinean Government is
approximately $9 million. A significant funding shortfall nevertheless continues to exist.64
Some Guineans and international observers are concerned that elections may be delayed due to a
lack of administrative capacity and a possible unwillingness by some junta members to leave
power. Many also fear that the CNDD could seek to influence the outcome of elections and that
59 CIA World Factbook.
60 AFP, “Guinée: Un meeting d’un parti d’opposition empêché dans l’Est,” June 18, 2009.
61 Interview with Guinean media analyst, June 2009.
62 Reports suggest that Guinean political leaders are nevertheless divided as to the appropriate length of the transition.
63 FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, May 2009.
64 As of early July, donor pledges totaled just over $12.76 million. Information provided by USAID, July 6, 2009.
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the military “may try to maintain its influence over the country’s political system.”65 Dadis
Camara has at times publicly suggested he may campaign for president or seek to delay elections.
In early June, the head of the military reportedly declared on television that Guinea was not ready
for presidential elections and that “the people” wanted the vote delayed. Soon after, Dadis
Camara acknowledged that preparations were behind schedule and appeared to question the
agreed-upon timetable.66 In response, the coalition of Guinean political parties and civil society
groups refused to attend a meeting convened by Dadis Camara and sharply criticized a
“considerable delay” in election preparations.67
The organization of elections is being overseen by the Ministry for Territorial Administration and
Political Affairs (MATAP) and the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI).
However, these agencies’ mandates remain unclear.68 Voter registration and the revision of voting
lists, processes that had begun before Conté’s death, were ongoing at the time of writing. Plans to
create a “National Transition Council” (CNT) to oversee constitutional and legal reforms in the
lead-up to elections have stalled.69 Constitutional revisions are expected to be passed either by
presidential decree or via a referendum, which could further delay the time-table for elections.
Parties and Candidates
Conté’s political party, the Party for Unity and Progress (PUP), fractured following the
president’s death, and it is not expected to garner significant support in a popular vote. Parties
expected to compete in elections include a handful of former opposition parties as well as dozens
of new parties formed after Conté’s death. Even long established parties are generally perceived
as having an ethnic or regional base, and as having little organizational capacity beyond their
leaders’ recognition. These leaders’ electoral potential is difficult to assess, since Conté ran
essentially unopposed in Guinea’s most recent presidential election, in 2003, amid an opposition
boycott. Since the CNDD takeover, several youth groups have emerged in support of Dadis
Camara. Some believe these groups may represent a CNDD strategy to overpower traditional
political parties and foster the impression of broad popular support for Dadis Camara to remain in
power. It is unclear what role, if any, such organizations may play in an electoral campaign.
Some political parties and civil society groups have advocated constitutional changes that would,
among other things, reinstitute an age ceiling of 70 years for presidential candidates. A similar
provision was removed from the constitution in 2001 as part of a controversial constitutional
revision that underpinned Conté’s ability to remain in office. Such a change would reportedly
have the effect of disqualifying two prominent politicians, Alpha Condé and Jean-Marie Doré.
65 EIU, Country Report: Guinea, March 2009: 15.
66 French Foreign Affairs Ministry, “Guinée: Point de presse du porte-parole du Quai d’Orsay,” June 18, 2009.
67 AFP, “Guinée: 6 mois après le putsch, ‘la transition dans l’impasse,’ (partis et syndicats),” June 22, 2009.
International Contact Group on Guinea, “Communiqué,” June 19, 2009.
68 Arieff interview with Guinea elections expert, May 2009.
69 Many local politicians and civil society groups had supported the formation of a transitional legislature. In April, the
CNDD issued a decree establishing a 117-member CNT drawn from political parties, unions, civil society, and security
forces. Under the decree, the CNT was vested with only consultative powers and was made formally subordinate to the
CNDD. Due to protests by civil society and political parties, the CNDD agreed to revise the CNT’s structure and
mandate. In its June 19 statement, the International Contact Group criticized the failure to establish a CNT.
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Economic Issues
Guinea has significant mineral resources, including gold, diamonds, uranium, and an estimated
27% or more of global bauxite (aluminum ore) reserves. Guinea may also have oil and gas
reserves, and has significant hydro-electric and agricultural potential. Prior to the coup, Guinea’s
natural resources sector was set to expand, partly in response to increasing global commodity
prices. In early December 2008, the African Development Bank had announced the approval of a
$200 million loan to partly finance a $6.3 billion bauxite mining and alumina refinery project in
Guinea. The project was reportedly expected to be the largest ever investment in the country.70
However, the global economic crisis, perceived political instability, and populist threats by the
junta to close or seize corporate mining projects are reportedly causing mining investment
projects to be delayed or canceled.71 The future of a $6 billion iron ore project, operated by the
multi-national company Rio Tinto, is also uncertain.72
As previously noted, several U.S.-based firms operate in Guinea, notably Alcoa, which owns a
45% share of a partnership that is the majority shareholder in the Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee (CBG), which is co-owned by the government of Guinea. CBG mines bauxite in Guinea’s
southwest and operates a port for drying and shipping bauxite to refineries outside the country.73
The smaller U.S.-based energy company Hyperdynamics holds the largest single license for
offshore oil exploration, though recent reports indicate competition over exploration licenses is
increasing.74 The CNDD has not publicly altered any mining agreements with U.S.-based firms to
date. However, it has reportedly threatened in one instance to review the concession rights of a
U.S.-based company – Global Alumina – unless a planned alumina refinery is completed.75
Socio-Economic Conditions
Despite its resources, living standards in Guinea are among the worst in the world.76 Access to
running water and electricity is rare, even in Conakry and other urban centers. The World Health
Organization lists Guinea as a “country under surveillance” with respect to possible complex
humanitarian emergency needs.77 According to figures released by the United Nations in May
2009, the rate of chronic malnutrition increased over the last two years, from 34.8% to 36.2%;
70 EIU, Guinea: Country Report, March 2009: 17.
71 EIU, Country Report: Guinea, June 2009; Lydia Polgreen, “As Chinese Investment in Africa Drops, Hope Sinks,”
The New York Times, March 25, 2009.
72 The Conté administration had previously challenged Rio Tinto’s control over the venture by unilaterally awarding
the northern half of the concession to BSG Resources Guinea. Neil Ford, “Junta Uncertainty Clouds Guinea Mining
Sector,” African Business, February 1, 2009; Andrea Hotter, “Guinea Mulls Independent Simandou Inquiry: Rio,” Dow
Jones Newswires, March 5, 2009.
73 More information is available at http://www.alcoa.com/guinea/en/home.asp.
74 Gene Kliewer, “Guinea Exploration Under Way in Earnest,” Offshore, June 2008; Africa Energy Intelligence,
“Guinea: Madison on Lookout for Projects,” February 11, 2009.
75 EIU, “Guinea Industry: Captain Camara takes action against mining companies,” June 1, 2009. More information on
Global Alumina’s operations in Guinea is available at http://www.globalalumina.com/about_overview.php.
76 U.N. Development Program statistics at http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_GIN.html.
77 World Health Organization, Africa Weekly Emergency Situation Update, March 23, 2009.
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8.3% of Guinean children are thought to suffer from serious malnutrition.78 The adult prevalence
rate of HIV/AIDS is estimated at 1.6%.79
The CNDD has promised to improve living conditions. However, reports suggest government
finances have been depleted due to corruption and mismanagement, a drop in the collection of
import duties, the recent fall in mineral commodity prices, and the freezing of some foreign aid.80
Most observers project that state revenues will further decline in the near future, due to the global
economic crisis and a decrease since 2008 in bauxite revenues, on which Guinea’s economy
depends. Poor living conditions helped spark nationwide anti-government protests in 2007, and
some analysts fear that the perception of continued economic decline could lead to further unrest.
The Impact of the Coup on Guinea’s Foreign
Relations
Guinea is a member of regional bodies including the African Union (AU), the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Mano River Union (a sub-regional grouping),
and the Sahelo-Saharan regional grouping CEN-SAD. Major donor countries, along with regional
organizations, the United Nations, and the European Commission, publicly condemned the coup
and called for elections and a return to civilian-led government. As discussed above, an
International Contact Group on Guinea has been formed, including representatives of regional
and international organizations. The Contact Group has held several meetings in Conakry with
members of the junta, civil society groups, and political parties, at which it has urged the CNDD
to uphold its agreement to organize elections by the end of 2009.
Regional Reactions
ECOWAS and the AU, both of which have policies against accepting non-constitutional changes
of power, condemned the coup and suspended Guinea’s membership in their organizations,
though neither has moved to impose sanctions.81 Neighboring governments have been cautious in
responding to the coup, particularly as some fear that instability in Guinea could destabilize their
own countries. At the same time, Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi — who currently chairs the
AU — and Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade have publicly argued that the CNDD should be
recognized and supported by the international community.82 The CNDD has engaged in
78 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Information Bulletin May 2009.
79 CIA World Factbook.
80 EIU, “Guinea Economy: Government faces fiscal crisis,” June 1, 2009. The EIU has elsewhere noted that “the poor
quality of fiscal reporting in Guinea makes it difficult to estimate the size of the fiscal deficit” (EIU, Guinea: Country
Report, March 2009: 8).
81 ECOWAS Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance, December 2001, Article 1(b) and (c); and
Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4(p).
82 Qadhafi was appointed head of the AU for 2009. Wade praised the “bloodless” nature of the CNDD coup, and called
on the junta to organize democratic elections. AFP, “Guinée: Le Président Wade réaffirme, depuis Conakry, son
soutien à la junte,” January 7, 2009; Africa Energy Intelligence, “Kadhafi Soutient les Putschistes,” January 28, 2009.
See also WANEP, Transitional Crisis in Guinea; Coup d’Etat: Its Inevitability, Legitimizing Factors & Lessons for
Africa, December 28, 2008: 5-8.
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diplomatic outreach to neighboring states, and has claimed to receive private reassurances of
support from regional leaders.83
Impact on Donor Relations
Major donors include the United States, France, and the EU. As of early July, the United States,
Japan, the EU, France, Germany, and Spain had pledged financial support for Guinea’s elections.
Many donors do not recognize the CNDD, and some, including the United States and the EU,
have suspended selected assistance to the Guinean government pending democratic elections.84 In
February 2009, the European Commission stated of its assistance programs to Guinea that “[n]ew
contracts are, in principle, only signed for humanitarian aid, aid benefiting directly the population
and measures in support of the transition process,” and initiated consultations with Guinea under
the framework of Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement to “determine the appropriate measures to
be taken as far as cooperation is concerned.”85
France, Guinea’s former colonial power, has continued bilateral aid to the Guinean government,
while calling for elections to be held as soon as possible. French aid includes a 2006-2010
bilateral development assistance program worth €100 million ($140.7 million) and a military
cooperation program worth €400,000 ($563,000) over the same period, in addition to programs
related to agriculture and food security, education, water and sanitation, and governance.86 China
has reportedly backed away from expected funding for major infrastructure projects, due to the
global economic slowdown as well as perceived political instability in Guinea.87
Multilateral Assistance
Development assistance and anti-poverty programs administered by multilateral organizations
have been affected by the coup. Following the coup, the World Bank stopped disbursing loans
designated for programs related to health, transportation, education, and other sectors, leaving
$200 million in outstanding loans, while awaiting further assessment of whether disbursements
may continue.88 The International Monetary Fund-led Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiative, which was due to provide additional government financing in 2009, has not advanced
since Conté’s death.89 On the other hand, in May 2009, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
83 Saliou Samb, “Guinea Junta Woos Neighbours to Avoid Isolation,” Reuters, December 31, 2008.
84 EU Business, “EU Imposes Aid Conditions on Guinea Junta,” March 16, 2009. The EU initially stated it would not
suspend aid; see U.N. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), “Guinea: Regional, international
condemnation spreads,” January 12, 2009.
85 European Commission, “Answer given by Mr Michel on behalf of the Commission,” E-0219/09EN, February 2,
2009.The Cotonou Partnerships Agreement, which governs relations between the EU and African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States (ACP), requires that signatories respect human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law,
and thus places political conditions on development cooperation. Article 96 of the Agreement provides for a process of
consultations between signatories when one party asserts that these requirements are not being met.
86 A French government official who spoke to CRS stated that bilateral disbursements to the Guinean government had
not been disrupted, but that France was closely monitoring how funds were spent.
87 Lydia Polgreen, “As Chinese Investment in Africa Drops, Hope Sinks,” The New York Times, March 25, 2009.
88 The World Bank classifies Guinea as one of the world’s 78 poorest countries, which qualifies Guinea for loans
through the Bank’s International Development Association (IDA). IDA lends money (credits) on concessional terms,
meaning that credits have no interest charge and repayments are stretched over 35 to 40 years, including a 10-year
grace period. IDA also provides grants to countries at risk of debt distress.
89 The HIPC Initiative is a comprehensive approach to debt reduction for heavily indebted poor countries pursuing
(continued...)
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allocated a first tranche of $6 million in support of programs in Guinea.90 The United States does
not contribute to the Peacebuilding Fund.
U.S. Assistance and Policy Issues
As previously discussed, the United States condemned the CNDD coup and suspended all U.S.
bilateral assistance to Guinea, with the exception of humanitarian and democracy-promotion
assistance, in line with congressional directives.91 While most programs that require working
directly with central government agencies are subject to the aid suspension, a few are not;
exceptions include some health and education projects. Programs that involve working with
district and municipal administrators who were elected in 2005 local elections are likewise
exempt; the United States held that these elections, “though flawed, were Guinea’s best-
conducted elections ever.”92
U.S. officials have indicated that free and fair elections must take place in order for the aid
suspension – which affects some development and all security assistance – to be lifted. At the
same time, the Obama Administration has stated that “despite deteriorating political conditions,
the United States sees reason for hope” in Guinea.93 The Peace Corps program has not been
suspended following the coup, nor have public diplomacy programs such as educational and
cultural exchanges.
Some argue that the extent and outline of the aid suspension is ill-advised. Some critics contend
that some aid, and security assistance programs in particular, should be continued in the interest
of regional stability.94 There has also been debate over the continuation of democracy and good
governance programs, which have not been suspended to date. Instead, funding related to election
preparation is set to increase given the time-line for holding general elections by the end of 2009.
Detractors are concerned that the continuation of any aid may send a mixed signal and could
prolong the CNDD’s tenure in power.95 A central question for policy makers is to what extent
bilateral programs such as security assistance are primarily designed to enact U.S. policy
priorities, or to serve as incentives for good behavior on the part of the beneficiary government.
(...continued)
IMF- and World Bank-supported adjustment and reform programs. At the time of the coup, the program was on track.
Reaching the HIPC “completion point” would grant Guinea an estimated relief of $2.2 billion and reduce debt service
by approximately $100 million the first year (Arieff interview with IMF official, May 2009). Part of the reason the
program has been halted is that it relies heavily on funds from donors (EIU, Guinea Country Report, June 2009: 18).
90 The Peacebuilding Fund generally provides support to countries emerging from conflict. Most recipients to date have
been African countries, including Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone. More
information is at http://www.unpbf.org/index.shtml.
91 The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8, Division H, Title VII, section 7008) bars direct assistance “to
the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree,” with the
exception of democracy promotion and humanitarian assistance. The provision is commonly referred to as “Section
508,” a reference to previous appropriations legislation.
92 FY2008 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.
93 FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, May 2009.
94 Arieff interviews with members of the donor community, Conakry, March 2009.
95 E.g., Mike McGovern, “Exceptional Circumstances and Coups d’Etat,” SSRC blog African Arguments, February 3,
2009.
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Elections and Democracy Promotion
Both the timeline and administration of elections are issues for the international community. As
discussed above, many continue to question Dadis Camara’s commitment to leaving power.96
Some fear civilian agitation in response to electoral delays: a recent analysis concluded that
Guinea’s political stability “rests on the new military junta keeping its promise to hold
presidential elections soon, otherwise its broad coalition of support could quickly unravel.”97
Others are concerned that the longer the CNDD remains in power, the more vulnerable it might
be to factionalization or a counter-coup.98 At the same time, some new political groups and
members of civil society support a longer transition period leading up to elections, either to seek
more time to organize or to grant the CNDD more time to implement reforms. Some fear that the
electoral period could turn violent, and that elections should not be rushed before appropriate
legal and security frameworks are in place. In June, the army chief of staff reportedly appeared on
national television and instructed the CNDD that “Guinea is not ready to organize presidential
and parliamentary elections this year. The people want you to accept a postponement.”99
U.S. democracy and governance assistance is expected to increase in the lead-up to elections;
these programs are not currently affected by the suspension in U.S. aid. (Democracy and
governance programs in Guinea are funded as part of U.S. development assistance, other aspects
of which will be discussed below.) The Obama Administration’s FY2010 request for democracy
and governance funding represents a significant increase over FY2009: $7.14 million compared
to $2.57 million.100 The United States is the largest single donor to the electoral process, having
pledged $5.3 million (as of July 2009) toward a total electoral budget of over $38 million
dollars.101 U.S. electoral assistance is expected to fund training and technical assistance to
Guinea’s National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), training for electoral agents
including poll workers, training for political parties and candidates, voter education, civil society
and media election monitoring and oversight, and the provision of electoral materials.102 U.S.
officials have not publicly outlined what, if any, criteria might be required with respect to the
continuation or suspension of electoral assistance or democracy and governance programs.
Security Assistance and Counter-Narcotics Cooperation
U.S. security assistance to Guinea prior to the coup focused on ensuring Guinea’s continued
stability in a region scarred by armed conflict, and on Guinea’s reported role as an international
drug trafficking transit hub. In 2002, the U.S. military trained an 800-person Guinean Ranger
battalion following incursions from fighters backed by then-Liberian president Charles Taylor. At
96 AFP, “Guinée: La junte confirme qu'elle ‘ne se présentera pas’ aux elections,” May 10, 2009; The Economist, “He
Sounds Modest. But For How Long?” May 9, 2009; EIU, “Guinea Politics: Soldiering on?” May 11, 2009.
97 Daniel Magnowski and Saliou Samb, “Analysis-Guinea Stability Rests on Election Promise,” Reuters, May 5, 2009.
98 SSRC, Policy Approaches to the Current Situation in Guinea, March 2009: 1.
99 Reuters, “La Guinée N’Est Pas Prête à des Elections en 2009, Selon l'Armée,” June 8, 2009.
100 2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, May 2009.
101 U.S. electoral assistance is expected to be funded from several accounts, including FY 2008 carryover Development
Assistance, FY2009 Development Assistance, and Elections and Political Processes funds, according to USAID. Other
donors that have pledged support for Guinea’s elections are the European Union, France, Japan, Germany, and Spain.
As discussed above, in late June, the Guinean government provided the equivalent of $3 million toward the electoral
process. A significant shortfall in donor funds nonetheless continues to exist.
102 Information provided by USAID.
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the same time, concerns over alleged human rights abuses by the Guinean military have, at times,
restricted military training programs. In appropriations legislation passed in 2008 and 2009,
Congress restricted International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance in Guinea to
“Expanded” IMET, which emphasizes human rights and civilian control of the military.103
All security assistance to Guinea is currently suspended, including military training programs,
counter-narcotics programs, and the provision of maritime security equipment. Prior to the coup,
Defense Department and State Department officials had informally planned a potential budget
totaling over $100 million over three years, starting in FY2009. The bulk of this funding would
have supported maritime and air space security and monitoring capacity-building programs and
regional peacekeeping training under the African Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance Program (ACOTA) and through the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program. The State Department had additionally requested $100,000 for International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) counter-narcotics programs in FY2009, the
first time such funding had been requested for Guinea; the FY2010 budget request is for
$110,000. The Obama Administration has stated that Guinea’s military is “an important element
in ensuring regional stability,” and indicated that if the aid suspension is lifted, U.S. military
assistance will work “to promote maritime safety and security in West Africa” and “will also
focus on counter-narcotics activities.”104
Some believe these priorities are important enough to consider waiving the suspension of some
military assistance programs, particularly as Dadis Camara has appealed for international
assistance in fighting the narcotics trade and other transnational threats.105 The argument has also
been made that training programs aimed at professionalizing Guinea’s armed forces are needed to
ensure that the military will cease to interfere in Guinean politics in the future. Others maintain
that security assistance programs are inappropriate in the context of a military-led government.
Some additionally question the CNDD’s commitment to reforming Guinea’s security sector and
to cracking down on alleged participation by the military in the drug trade.106
Development and Related Assistance
The CNDD has promised to improve living conditions for Guineans, which are among the worst
in the world. However, government finances are reportedly very low due to corruption,
mismanagement, and the suspension of some foreign aid.107 Some argue that development aid
programs should not be suspended at the expense of Guinea’s citizenry. At the same time, the
junta has appointed allies to head key ministries including economy and finance, and at the head
of the customs service and the central bank, which has raised concerns “over their capacity to
provide a credible overall policy strategy” for the Guinean economy.108
103 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8, Division H, Title VII, section 7070).
104 FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification for International Operations, May 2009.
105 Guinéenews, “Le CNDD Demande le Soutien et l’Appui Technique de la Communauté Internationale pour Lutter
Contre le Trafic de Drogue,” February 3, 2009.
106 Arieff interviews with human rights researchers, Conakry, February 2009.
107 EIU, “Guinea Economy: Government faces fiscal crisis,” June 1, 2009. The EIU has noted elsewhere that “the poor
quality of fiscal reporting in Guinea makes it difficult to estimate the size of the fiscal deficit.” EIU, Guinea: Country
Report, March 2009: 8.
108 EIU, Guinea: Country Report, March 2009: 15.
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The majority of programs administered by USAID have been categorized as humanitarian or
democracy and governance assistance, and as such have not been affected by the aid suspension.
Funding for suspended programs has been discontinued in some cases, while in others, it has been
reprogrammed toward non-suspended activities. Health and education programs have been
classified as humanitarian assistance and therefore generally exempted from suspension, even
when they involve working directly with national government counterparts. In practice,
suspended programs mainly include those related to the environment and natural resource sector.
Table I, below, shows changes to USAID programs in Guinea as a result of the coup. Some
changes reflect the non-extension of programs that had been completed at the time of the coup.
A $23 million, three-year USAID-funded umbrella project, known as Projet Faisons Ensemble,
has continued. Considered to be an innovative approach to development assistance in a fragile
state, Faisons Ensemble aims to bolster governance at the local level to achieve better outcomes
in health, education, agriculture, and other sectors. Components that involved working directly
with national government counterparts have been discontinued, with the exception of education
and health programs; funds for these components have been reprogrammed.
It is likely that many of the same goals that defined U.S. development priorities prior to the coup
will continue to be pursued if democratic elections occur, with a significant increase in economic
development funds.109 In its Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, the
Obama Administration stated that “U.S. assistance to Guinea can play an important role in
supporting popular calls for greater democracy, good governance, better social services, and
improved economic opportunity, all of which should bolster stability.”
109 The Administration requested $6.55 million for economic growth programs for FY2010, compared to $1.75 million
requested for FY2010; this funding is on hold pending elections.
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Table 1. Changes to USAID Programs in Guinea as a Result of the Coup
(Programs unaffected by the coup are not shown. )
National
Funding
Government Mission Actions to
Activity Implementer
Budget
To Date
Counterpart Comply with Suspension
Peace and Security
Shared Security: Pilot
Learning
$50,000
$50,000
Yes
Closeout; no extension.
Project that supports
Center for
dialogue between
International
military and civilians,
Business
regional workshops
on conflict
prevention, and
defense and security
forces training.
Governing Justly and Democratically
E-Governance:
Office of the
$530,000
$530,000
Yes
Closeout; no extension.
Modernize
Prime
Government of
Minister;
Guinea infrastructure
GAMA
and capacity in
Concept
information and
communications
technology.
Faisons Ensemble:
Consortium
$7,176,000a $6,166,000
Yes;
these The grantee is instructed
Umbrel a project to
led by
elements
to suspend all work with
support government
Research
have been
national government
performance,
Triangle
suspended.
institutions outside the
decentralization, and
Institute (RTI)
health and education
anti-corruption
sectors. The grantee will
efforts. (Only
continue assistance that
components of
supports other actors in
Faisons Ensemble
advancing Guinea’s
affected by the aid
democratic process.
suspension are listed
in this table.
Funding for suspended
Unaffected elements
activities has been
include programs
reprogrammed for
supporting health,
assistance that remains
education, and
approved.
agriculture.)
Because Faisons Ensemble
is an umbrella project also
covering health and
education – which are
considered humanitarian
assistance and therefore
not subject to suspension
– the project will continue
to engage the national
government in activities
related to these sectors
(funding accounted for
under “Investing in
People”).
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National
Funding
Government Mission Actions to
Activity Implementer
Budget
To Date
Counterpart Comply with Suspension
Investing in People
New Start: Basic
None $1
million
0 N/A USAID/Guinea
will
not
Education
had been
receive these funds.b
budgeted for
FY2009.
Economic Growth
Transboundary
International
$454,000;
Not
No USAID/Guinea
has
Protection of
Center for
also
known.c
suspended support to
Biodiversity and
Research in
supported by
non-regional aspects of
Livelihood
Agroforestry
USAID/EGAT
this program.
Improvement in
(ICRAF) and
and
Guinea and Sierra
Center for
USAID/WA
Leone: Promotes co-
International
management of
Forest
forests by
Research
communities and
(CFOR)
improved agricultural
techniques.
Institutional Capacity
U.S. Forest
$110,000;
Not
Yes USAID/Guinea
has
Building for Natural
Service
central
known.
suspended all work with
Resource
funding from
the National Direction of
Management: Funds a
USAID/WA
Waters and Forests. The
U.S. Forest Service
regional
U.S. Forest Service
Conakry-based
“Steward”
consultant will continue
consultant to build
program to
assistance that focuses on
capacity of the
oversee
the West Africa regional
National Direction of
activities
program.
Waters and Forests
within W.
(DNEF) and local
Africa region
communities for
as a whole.
sustainable
management of
natural resources.
Property Rights and
Associates in
$2,400,000 $1,261,087
Yes
USAID/Guinea
has
Alluvial Diamond
Rural
suspended this program.
Development Pilot
Development
Program: Focus on
(ARD)
land and property
rights aspects of
strengthening
Kimberley Process
certification.
Source: USAID
a. Projet Faisons Ensemble was budgeted at $23 million over three years, starting in 2006. The amount cited in
this table reflects the component of the project related to democracy and governance.
b. Educational programs in Guinea have general y been classified as humanitarian assistance; it is therefore
unclear whether the decision not to fund this program was directly related to the coup.
c. Information not provided by USAID.
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Appendix. Touré and Conté Regimes: Historical
Background
Ahmed Sékou Touré and the Guinean “Revolution” (1958-1984)
Alone among France’s African colonies, Guinea gained independence in 1958 after Guineans
overwhelmingly voted for immediate sovereignty rather than membership in the self-governing
but neocolonial French Community. Ahmed Sékou Touré, a trade unionist and militant anti-
colonialist, spearheaded the movement for independence, which caused France to precipitously
withdraw all aid and remove many physical assets, such as port equipment. After the break with
France, Guinea’s fledgling government received significant technical and economic assistance
from the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries. While adopting a radical anti-Western
public stance, Guinea nevertheless also accepted aid from the United States which, seeking to
counter Soviet influence, sponsored a Peace Corps program and provided other assistance. U.S.
companies also maintained investments in Guinea, notably in the mining sector.
Touré’s Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG) – Guinea’s sole political party at the time –
centralized control over all aspects of political, economic, and cultural life. The economic system
and national educational program were ostensibly designed to eradicate all traces of Western
colonial and neo-colonial influence. External travel for Guineans was restricted, while foreigners’
entry and movements within Guinean territory were strictly monitored. Touré allowed foreign
multinational firms to form joint ventures with the government to mine and process Guinea’s
large bauxite reserves through the use of industrial enclaves largely unlinked to the local
economy. Nonetheless, enormous economic hardship was the norm for nearly all Guineans,
especially after Touré attempted to ban all private trade in the mid-1970s. Broad opposition to
such policies, which was catalyzed by the 1977 “Market Women’s Revolt,” led to an easing of
economic control and other reforms during the late 1970s. After this point, Guinea turned
increasingly toward the West for financial and technical aid.
Touré’s government was strongly nationalist and espoused a non-ethnic, unified Guinean identity.
The Bureau Politique National, the country’s highest decision-making body, included members of
each of Guinea’s major ethnic groupings. At the same time, members of the president’s extended
family held key state positions and reportedly wielded significant power behind the scenes.
Additionally, some government programs disproportionately affected certain regions. For
example, the “demystification” campaign of the mid-1960, which sought to eradicate
“backwards” cultural practices, mainly targeted the diverse ethnic groups of Guinea’s
southeastern Forest region,110 while in 1976 the regime specifically targeted members of the
Fulbe (Peulh) ethnic group after Touré announced that he had discovered a Fulbe “plot” to
destabilize the country. Overall, state-sponsored repression affected Guineans of all ethnicities,
including members of Touré’s own Malinké ethnic group.
The first two decades of Touré’s presidency were marked by increasingly repressive practices as
Touré claimed that France and other neo-colonial powers were engaged in a “permanent plot” to
undermine the Guinean “Revolution.” The government regularly denounced various anti-
110 The many ethnic groups who predominantly reside in the Forest region, of which the largest are Kissi, Guerzé (also
known as Kpelle), and Toma (Loma), have acquired an ethno-regional identity, known in Guinea as Forestier.
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government schemes purportedly led by counter-revolutionary Guineans and conducted regular
purges of the civilian and military bureaucracies. The PDG also instilled a pervasive culture of
surveillance and secrecy. A civilian militia was created for public security and to check the power
of the military. Several thousand Guineans are believed to have disappeared in government
detention under Touré, though precise figures are not available.111 As many as a third of Guinea’s
population (some two million people) fled the country during the Touré era, though many left for
predominantly economic, rather than explicitly political, reasons.112 Many long-time observers
suggest that Guineans, even those born after Touré’s death in 1984, remain deeply influenced by
the PDG regime, similar to the populations of post-socialist states in eastern Europe.113
Guinea under Lansana Conté
Sékou Touré died during heart surgery in the United States in March 1984, leaving no clear
successor and a government with little popular support. In early April, a military junta calling
itself the Military Committee of National Recovery (Conseil Militaire de Redressement National,
CMRN) took power in a bloodless coup. Colonel (later General) Lansana Conté, a senior officer
and former member of the French colonial military, soon emerged as the leader of the CMRN.
The coup leaders suspended the constitution, disbanded Touré’s ruling party (executing several of
its formerly most powerful members), banned all political activity, and ruled by decree. However,
the CMRN also relaxed the level of repression and initiated a few improvements in human rights,
including shuttering the prison block at Camp Boiro, a notorious military base in Conakry that
served as a detention center for Guineans accused by Touré of anti-government activities.
In July 1985, while attending a regional conference, Conté faced a coup attempt by a rival CMRN
member, Diarra Traoré, an ethnic Malinké who had served as Vice President following the coup
but who had later been demoted. The putsch was suppressed by pro-Conté troops. Purges of
putative anti-Conté military elements, including military trials and executions of accused coup
participants, followed, as did vigilante attacks on ordinary Malinkés and looting of their
businesses. Such acts were publicly praised by Conté. These events were seen as lessening the
influence of Malinkés within the military and state institutions, but they also highlighted ethnic
divisions in Guinea and politicized ethnic identity among the President’s fellow Soussou people.
111 There has never been a comprehensive independent investigation into the PDG’s detention practices. The
Association of Camp Boiro Victims, a Conakry-based organization that seeks the rehabilitation of former detainees and
the disappeared, believes as many as fifty thousand Guineans may have died in detention, though international
researchers generally cite a lower number. Amnesty International estimated that 2,900 prisoners had disappeared in
Guinea between 1958 and 1982 (Amnesty International, Emprisonnement, ‘Disparitions’ et Assassinats Politiques en
République Populaire et Révolutionnaire de Guinée, Paris: Editions Francophones d’Amnesty International). One
historian estimates 2,500 disappeared during Touré’s presidency (Maligui Soumah, Guinée de Sékou Touré à Lansana
Conté, Paris: L’Harmattan, p. 21).
112 A. O. Bah et al, “Les Guinéens de l’Extérieur: Rentrer au pays?” Politique Africaine 36 (Dec. 1989): 22.
113 For example, the anthropologist and Guinea expert Mike McGovern has written that “remnants [of Touré’s regime]
persist in bureaucratic habits such as the strict surveillance of foreigners on Guinean territory… and citizens’ habits
such as that of looking to the State to solve all problems, in lowering for example the price of merchandise such as
gasoline and rice, or further in omnipresent rhetoric… considering merchants as greedy saboteurs rather than as
entrepreneurs “naturally” seeking to conserve their operating margins amid market fluctuations. A certain nostalgia for
the Touré era is equally perceptible, even if that period was one of suffering and privations.” “Sékou Touré Est Mort,”
Politique Africaine 107 (Oct. 2007): 134-5.
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As president, Conté steadily consolidated power. In seeking to resurrect the devastated economy,
Conté pursued a pragmatic program of economic liberalization and reforms, including, for
example, currency devaluation, a floating foreign exchange system, allowances for the creation of
agricultural markets, and the privatization of state firms. Though Guinea remained somewhat
economically isolated and strongly nationalist, Conté’s reforms led to improvements in foreign
relations and aid cooperation with donors. This included a moderate rise in U.S. assistance. In
2006, the government authorized Guinea’s first private radio stations, making the country the last
in West Africa to allow private broadcasting. The move ended a state radio monopoly in place
since 1958, and was seen as complying with government agreements to relax regulation of
political expression.
Tenuous Democratization
The ostensible need to ensure state security in the wake of the 1984 coup gave Conté latitude to
extend his control over the state administrative and security apparatus. The president ruled by
decree for nearly a decade. In December 1990, a new constitution, drafted by a transitional
CMRN legislative body, was approved by popular referendum. Though it foresaw a five-year
transition to elections, the constitution gave the president wide-ranging decision-making and
governance powers. It also created the basis for a highly personalized regime based around the
presidency, manned by officials drawn from across Guinea’s ethnic groups but drawing heavily
from the President’s Soussou ethnicity. In 1991, Conté dissolved the CMRN, replacing it with a
Transitional National Recovery Commission, which promulgated laws based on the constitution
and was charged with overseeing a transition to electoral democracy.
In 1992, Conté legalized multi-party politics, but political activity was placed under strict state
regulation. While donor countries, including the United States, provided technical assistance in
support of this process, they did not extensively financially back the transformation or subsequent
elections, due to apprehensions about limitations on popular participation under the system being
created. Guinea’s first presidential election, held in December 1993, was won by Conté, who
garnered 52% of the vote. Conté won re-election in December 1998 and 2003. Guinea has held
two multi-party legislative elections, in 1995 and in 2002. Conté’s ruling Party of Unity and
Progress (PUP) won both, taking 76 and 91 of the 114 seats in each respective election.
Legislative elections were due to take place again in 2007, but were repeatedly delayed, leaving
the National Assembly with an expired mandate.
Most of these elections were characterized by credible reports of irregularities and manipulation
favorable to Conté and the PUP. Varying, though often extensive, levels of political unrest,
election violence, state harassment and detention of opposition leaders, and coercive suppression
of opposition political activities, were common threads. In 1998, the main opposition leader,
Alpha Condé, was imprisoned following the vote. In 2001, a PUP-sponsored referendum aimed at
extending Conté’s time in office was passed by a putative 98% vote margin, amid low turnout and
an opposition boycott, anti-referendum protests, a crackdown by security forces on opposition
parties, and strong international criticism of the effort. It extended the presidential term from five
to seven years and removed term and presidential candidate age limits, among other measures,
extending Conté tenure.
In December 2003, Conté, who did not campaign because of his ill health, was re-elected with a
reported 96.63% of the vote with only nominal opposition, following the Guinean Supreme
Court’s disqualification of six presidential candidates from the race on technical grounds and in
the face of an election boycott by key opposition parties. The European Union reportedly refused
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to support the conduct of the election or deploy election observers because of doubts over the
transparency of the election.114 In 2004, the Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH, in
French) issued a report, titled “Guinea: A Virtual Democracy with an Uncertain Future,” that
sharply criticized the government’s regular suppression of political freedoms and targeting of
opposition groups.115
Regional Instability
Starting in the late 1980s, each of Guinea’s neighbors experienced one or more internal
conflicts—notably Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d’Ivoire. Conté’s government
was an active participant in many of these conflicts, supporting various government and non-
government actors in neighboring countries and reportedly serving as a conduit for arms. For
example, Conté sent troops to neighboring Guinea-Bissau in 1998 to shore up his ally President
Bernardo “Nino” Vieira amid a military uprising, while throughout Liberia’s successive conflicts
(1989-2003), Conté provided backing for groups opposed to his regional nemesis, Charles
Taylor.116
In September 2000, Conté’s support for anti-Taylor rebels, along with ethnic tensions, played into
a series of armed attacks along Guinea’s borders with Sierra Leone and Liberia. These attacks
lasted several months, and terrorized residents of the southeastern Forest region in particular. A
self-described Guinean rebel spokesman whose identity remains unknown claimed responsibility
for the attacks and said they were aimed at forcing Conté to step down. Most observers believe
the attacks were instigated by Liberia’s then-president, Charles Taylor, and carried out by
members of Sierra Leone’s RUF rebel movement, Liberian militias, and some Guinean fighters.
The Guinean military eventually quashed the assailants, using extensive aerial bombardment of
villages suspected of harboring the rebels and the help of hastily formed village militias and
Liberian rebel fighters opposed to Taylor.
Conté meanwhile presided over a weakening of central state structures. In its waning years,
Conté’s government was reportedly divided into factions controlling different areas of the
government, economy, military, and even nominal opposition and civil society groups. NGOs and
international media portrayed a country whose leader was unable “to control the day-to-day
operations of government.”117 Concerns over factionalization in the administration and military
heightened with reports that President Conté, who declined to institutionalize his succession and
who did not often appear in public, was terminally ill. Starting in 2003, the International Crisis
Group warned that Guinea was at serious risk of a civil war or military coup.118
114 IFES, “Of Interest,” Election Profile (Guinea), at http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=402.
115 IRIN, “Guinea: Rights Group Slams ‘Caricature of Democracy,’” April 14, 2004. See also Maligui Soumah,
Guinée: La démocratie sans le peuple, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006.
116 In particular, Conté reportedly provided logistical support and a rear base on Guinean territory for the United
Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO) in the late 1990s, and later supported Liberians United For
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), a rebel faction that proved instrumental in unseating Taylor in 2003.
117 International Crisis Group, Stopping Guinea’s Slide, 2005: 10.
118 International Crisis Group, Guinée: incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne, 2003: i.
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Relations with the Military
Although he arrived in power via a military coup, Conté had a complex relationship with
Guinea’s armed forces. The military benefited from significant socio-economic privileges, but
served as the target of purges and surveillance from a president who feared a military uprising.
Conté faced many coup attempts, notably in 1996, when dissident officers shelled the presidential
palace and briefly detained the president himself. The stand-off was reportedly diffused when the
mutinous troops failed to agree on who should take over power upon Conté’s dismissal. In 2005,
an armed attack on the president’s motorcade was followed by mass arrests.
The Conté era was also marked by repeated military mutinies spurred by demands for higher pay,
more frequent promotions, and an end to the perceived monopolization of military patronage
networks by a small handful of high-ranking officers. In response to these challenges, Conté
cultivated the Presidential Guard (also known as the Bataillon Autonome de Sécurité
Présidentielle, or BASP), an elite force based in Conakry and commanded directly by the
presidency.119 Conté also expended significant state resources on military salaries and benefits
such as subsidized rice for Guinean troops. Numerous officers were forced to retire in late 2005
following the mass promotion of about 1,000 non-commissioned and commissioned officers. In
2007, the government more than doubled army salaries after soldiers rioted in dissatisfaction at
their low salaries following their role in quelling nationwide strikes. These moves were generally
seen as decreasing resources available to such public goods as education and infrastructure. The
International Crisis Group noted that “pay increases, along with waves of recruitment in 2007-
2008, ate into the state’s fragile finances. But far from satisfying the troops, they generated an
expectation that violent protests would bear fruit.”120
Conté’s administration generally refrained from enforcing military discipline in connection with
alleged abuses of civilians, fostering what many Guineans and international observers see as a
culture of impunity. In 2006, Human Rights Watch issued reported that Guinea’s security forces
routinely employed arbitrary arrest, torture, assault and occasionally murder to fight crime and
perceived government opponents.121 An official commission of inquiry into security forces’
killings of demonstrators in 2006 and 2007 had stagnated at the time of Conté’s death in 2008.
The last wave of protests in Conakry before Conté’s death took place in November 2008; at least
four people reportedly died when security forces opened fire with live ammunition.
Growing Pressure for Reform
Popular anger at Conté’s regime grew in the later years of his regime. In mid-2006 and again in
early 2007, a coalition of trade unions organized a series of general strikes in response to long-
standing and widespread public dissatisfaction with economic stagnation, inflation of about 30%,
the slow pace of promised political reform and democratization, and Conté’s semi-autocratic
presidential exercise of power. In January and February 2007, a general strike spiraled into
119 Conté’s personal guard also reportedly included a portion of the roughly 800 elite commandos known as the
Rangers who were trained in border protection by a United States military cooperation program in 2001-2002
(International Crisis Group, Guinée: incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne, 2003: 12; Arieff interview with security
specialist, Conakry, February 2009).
120 International Crisis Group, Guinea: The transition has only just begun, March 2009: 4.
121 HRW, The Perverse Side of Things: Torture, Inadequate Detention Conditions, and Excessive Use of Force by
Guinean Security Forces, April 22, 2006.
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unprecedented nationwide anti-government protests. These protests, which were supported by
major political opposition parties and civil society groups, caused significant political unrest in
urban centers. In response, the military opened fire on protesters and launched a harsh
crackdown, particularly in urban centers and notably in Conakry, the capital. Confrontations
between troops and largely unarmed demonstrators resulted in 186 civilian deaths, while
hundreds were injured, beaten, or extra-judicially detained, and dozens tortured or raped,
according to an investigation by local human rights groups.122 Martial law was imposed in
February, during which time Human Rights Watch reported that security forces in Conakry “went
house-to-house, breaking down doors, and looting everything of value inside, including cell
phones, cameras, and money.”123
In late February, the strikes were brought to an end in talks mediated by Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS). The unions agreed to call off strikes in exchange for several
concessions from Conté, including the appointment of a Prime Minister with some executive
powers from a list of candidates pre-approved by unions and civil society groups. Conté’s
selection of Lansana Kouyaté, a former diplomat, was widely welcomed.
Kouyaté managed a few significant successes, such as an audit of some government institutions
and the renegotiation of a debt-relief agreement with the IMF. His attempts to initiate sweeping
reforms of public institutions, however, stalled. Many attributed his failures to machinations by
Conté’s inner circle, Conté’s refusal to accord to Kouyaté the power to make real changes, and
public’s disillusionment with the prime minister’s perceived pursuit of his own political
agenda.124 Quality of life across Guinea continued to decline, and a promised official probe into
abuses by security forces during the strikes stagnated. The unions, which had enjoyed broad
public support during the strikes, waned in influence due to Kouyaté’s lackluster performance and
rumors of internal splits and corruption among union leaders.125 A presidential decree in May
2008 sacking Kouyaté and replacing him with a close Conté ally and businessman, Ahmed
Tidiane Souaré, met with little protest.
Military Divisions and Restiveness
Conté, a former general, depended on the military to enforce his rule, and closely controlled the
Ministry of Defense and other security agencies. Nevertheless, he faced several alleged putsches,
some attributed to military officers. In 1996, a military mutiny spawned a coup attempt that
reportedly nearly overthrew the president, and in 2005 the president’s motorcade came under fire
as he drove through Conakry. In addition, as his tenure waned, the military became increasingly
divided along ethnic and generational lines, and in recent years there were several military
protests ― some violent ― mostly over pay, working conditions, and military rank promotions.
122 Coalition pour la Défense des Victimes des Evénements de Janvier et Février 2007 en République de Guinée,
Rapport sur les violations commises en République de Guinée pendant les événements de Janvier et Février 2007 (Nov.
2007): 4. See also HRW, Dying for Change: Brutality and Repression by Guinean Security Forces in Response to a
Nationwide Strike, April 24, 2007.
123 HRW, “Guinea: Security Forces Abuse Population Under Martial Law” [press release], February 15, 2007.
124 E.g. International Crisis Group, Guinée: Garantir la poursuite des réformes démocratiques, 2008; Kissy Agyeman,
“President Replaces Consensus Prime Minister in Guinea,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, May 21, 2008; and Michelle
Engeler, “Guinea in 2008: The Unfinished Revolution,” Politique Africaine 112 (Dec. 2008).
125 Arieff interviews, Conakry, February 2009.
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The 2008 Junior Officer Mutiny
Particularly notable was a May 2008 uprising led by junior army officers at Camp Alpha Yaya,
the largest military base in Conakry and the headquarters of the army’s elite commando
parachutist unit (known as the BATA). Mutinous troops demanding back wage payments and rice
subsidy increases took control of Alpha Yaya, took the army chief of staff hostage, and pillaged
shops and private homes in Conakry. They demanded that the chief army quartermaster and the
defense minister be fired and that Guinea's generals, who were reportedly seen by the mutineers
as blocking opportunities for promotion and monopolizing lucrative patronage networks, be
retired.126 Mutiny leader Claude “Coplan” Pivi also told local media that the mutineers sought the
rehabilitation of soldiers who were punished for abuses during the 2007 strikes.127 Mutiny leaders
exchanged fire with members of the presidential guard, and several people were reportedly killed,
and dozens wounded, by stray bullets.128 After a week of unrest, Conté met in person with the
mutineers’ leaders, and the government agreed to pay salary arrears of $1,100 to each soldier,
sack the defense minister, and grant promotions to junior officers, ending the uprising.129 Much
of the top military hierarchy, however, remained in place until Conté's death, but were
subsequently dismissed by the CNDD, key members of which have claimed to have played key
roles in the May 2008 mutiny.130
In mid-June 2008, police officers in Conakry attempted to launch their own mutiny over alleged
non-payment of back-wages and a failure to implement pledged promotions. Military troops led
by Pivi crushed the police uprising, culminating in a bloody shoot-out at a police headquarters in
the upscale Camayenne neighborhood that left at least four police officers dead, according to an
official tally. Pivi’s troops also reportedly laid siege to and looted police facilities throughout
Conakry, and the police counter-narcotics unit was also ransacked and its records destroyed.131
The confrontations reportedly left a rift in relations between the police and the army, and
established Pivi’s reputation as a well-known and much-feared figure in Conakry.132 These events
reportedly allowed junior officers to gain control of substantial portions of state armaments and,
given past incidents of violent military indiscipline, placed in question security conditions in
Conakry. There were also reports that some military elements employed these weapons in
common crimes targeting civilians.133
126 Saliou Samb, “Guinea Meets Soldiers’ Demands To End 2-Day Mutiny,” Reuters, May 27, 2008; RFI, “Guinean
Soldiers Demand Retirement Of Army Generals,” May 29, 2008 via BBC Monitoring.
127 BBC Monitoring, “Guinea: Mutiny leader explains reasons behind action [from Guinéenews]” June 8, 2008.
128 Kissy Agyeman, “Tension Mounts in Guinea in Wake of Army Revolt,” Global Insight, May 29, 2008.
129 Saliou Samb, “Guinea Settles Army Pay Dispute With Mass Promotion,” Reuters, June 14, 2008.
130 Claude Pivi, a CNDD member and junior officer who was promoted to Minister of Presidential Security in January
2009, styled himself the leader of the Camp Alpha Yaya mutiny. Pivi also led the crackdown on the police uprising,
according to witnesses. After he became president, Dadis Camara stated he had played a key role in the mutiny and in
the negotiations that ended it.
131 E.g. Aminata.com, “Affrontements Entre Policiers Et Militaires—La Bande De Pivi Et Des Gardes Présidentielles,”
June 17, 2008; and Pascal Fletcher, “Bauxite-Exporter Guinea Faces Drugs Trade Threat-UN,” Reuters, July 12, 2008.
132 Many Conakry residents believe that Pivi possesses powers that make him bulletproof. Anxiety over Pivi’s activities
peaked in November, when Pivi reportedly ordered the arrest and torture of a group of Cameroonian nationals he
suspected of having damaged his car. (E.g. La Lance newspaper, November 26, 2008.)
133 International Crisis Group, Guinea: The Transition Has Only Just Begun, March 2009: 16.
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Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Nicolas Cook
Analyst in African Affairs
Specialist in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
ncook@crs.loc.gov, 7-0429
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