Tactical Aircraft Modernization:
Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
July 9, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33543
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress
Summary
This report provides an overview discussion on the modernization of U.S. military tactical
aircraft, meaning fighter aircraft, strike-fighters, and attack planes. Tactical aircraft are a major
component of U.S. military capability, and account for a significant portion of U.S. defense
spending. In early 2009, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine collectively had an inventory of about
3,500 tactical aircraft.
Current efforts for modernizing U.S. tactical aircraft center on three aircraft acquisition
programs—the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Air Force F-22 fighter program, and
the Navy F/A-18E/F strike fighter program. For discussions of issues relating specifically to the
F-35 program, the F-22 program, or the F/A-18E/F program, see CRS Reports RL30563,
RL31673, and RL30624, respectively.
Air Force officials in 2008 testimony projected an Air Force fighter shortfall of up to 800 aircraft
by 2024. Navy officials have projected a Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall peaking at
more than 100 aircraft, and possibly more than 200 aircraft, by about 2018. On May 18, 2009, the
Air Force announced a combat air forces restructuring plan that would accelerate the retirement
of 249 older Air Force tactical aircraft, including 112 F-15s, 134 F-16s, and three A-10s, so as to
generate savings that can be applied to other Air Force program needs.
A key issue for Congress regarding tactical aircraft is the overall affordability of DOD’s plans for
modernizing the tactical aircraft force. The issue has been a concern in Congress and elsewhere
for many years, with some observers predicting that tactical aircraft modernization is heading for
an eventual budget “train wreck” as tactical aircraft acquisition plans collide with insufficient
amounts of funding available for tactical aircraft acquisition. A May 2009 Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) report examines several potential options for modernizing the U.S. tactical aircraft
force. A second key issue for Congress regarding tactical aircraft concerns the future of the U.S.
industrial base for designing and manufacturing tactical aircraft.
Section 133 of H.R. 2647, the House-passed version of the FY2010 defense authorization bill,
would require the Department of Defense (DOD) to submit a report to Congress on the
procurement of “4.5”-generation tactical aircraft. Section 1047 would prohibit the Air Force from
retiring fighter aircraft in accordance with the combat air forces restructuring plan until 90 days
after the Air Force submits to Congress a report on various aspects of the plan. Section 1051
expresses the sense of Congress regarding Navy carrier air wing force structure.
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees, in their reports (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18,
2009, and S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009, respectively) on the FY2010 defense authorization bill
(H.R. 2647 and S. 1390, respectively), include report language discussing the combat air forces
restructuring plan, the projected Air Force fighter shortfall, and the projected Navy-Marine Corps
strike fighter shortfall.
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Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 2
Tactical Aircraft In General ................................................................................................... 2
Terminology ................................................................................................................... 2
Missions ......................................................................................................................... 2
U.S. Tactical Aircraft............................................................................................................. 3
Types .............................................................................................................................. 3
Numbers ......................................................................................................................... 3
Current Acquisition Programs ............................................................................................... 4
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) ........................................................................................ 4
F-22 Fighter .................................................................................................................... 4
F/A-18E/F Strike Fighter................................................................................................. 5
Projected Tactical Aircraft Shortfalls ..................................................................................... 5
Combat Air Forces Restructuring Plan................................................................................... 5
Issues for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 7
Affordability of Tactical Aircraft Modernization Plans .......................................................... 7
A Longstanding Concern................................................................................................. 7
Potential Tradeoffs .......................................................................................................... 8
Assessing Potential Tradeoffs.......................................................................................... 9
April 2007 GAO Report ................................................................................................ 10
May 2009 CBO Report ................................................................................................. 11
Aircraft Industrial Base ....................................................................................................... 12
Legislative Activity for FY2010 ................................................................................................ 13
FY2010 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 2647/S. 1390) .................................................... 13
House ........................................................................................................................... 13
Senate ........................................................................................................................... 18
Tables
Table 1. Approximate U.S. Tactical Aircraft Inventory in Early 2009 ........................................... 3
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 19
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Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress
Introduction
This report provides an overview discussion on the modernization of U.S. military tactical
aircraft, meaning fighter aircraft, strike-fighters, and attack planes. Tactical aircraft are a major
component of U.S. military capability, and account for a significant portion of U.S. defense
spending. In early 2009, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine collectively had an inventory of about
3,500 tactical aircraft.
Current efforts for modernizing U.S. tactical aircraft center on three aircraft acquisition
programs—the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Air Force F-22 fighter program, and
the Navy F/A-18E/F strike fighter program. Program-specific issues for Congress in FY2010
relating to the F-35, F-22, and F/A-18E/F include the following:
• Whether to approve or reject the administration’s proposal to terminate program
for developing an alternate engine for the F-35.
• Whether to whether to approve the administration’s request to end F-22
procurement at the 187 aircraft that have been procured through FY2009, or
reject that proposal and provide funding in FY2010 for the procurement of
additional F-22s in FY2010 and/or subsequent years.
• Whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2010 funding request for
procurement of nine F/A-18E/Fs, and whether to approve a multiyear
procurement (MYP) arrangement for FY2010-FY2014 for procuring F/A-18E/Fs
(and also EA-18Gs, which are electronic attack versions of the F/A-18E/F).
These program-specific issues, as well as FY2010 legislative activity relating specifically to the
F-35, F-22, and F/A-18E/F programs, are covered in detail in the following CRS reports:
• CRS Report RL30563 on the F-35 program.1
• CRS Report RL31673 on the F-22 program.2
• CRS Report RL30624 on the F/A-18E/F program.3
This CRS report discusses and presents FY2010 legislative activity on issues relating to U.S.
tactical aircraft in general. For several years now, a central issue relating to tactical aircraft in
general has been the overall affordability of the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) plans for
modernizing the tactical aircraft force. A second key issue concerns the future of the U.S.
industrial base for designing and manufacturing tactical aircraft.
1 CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
2 CRS Report RL31673, Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
3 CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Background
Tactical Aircraft In General
Terminology
In general, the term tactical aircraft refers to shorter-ranged combat aircraft that can conduct
missions up to several hundred miles away from their home bases without need for in-flight
refueling. Tactical aircraft tend to perform their missions within a single regional theater of
operations, which is why they are also sometimes called theater-ranged aircraft or simply theater
aircraft. The term strategic aircraft, in contrast, usually refers to larger and longer-ranged Air
Force B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers that are designed to conduct missions involving very long
(including intercontinental) flights to their intended areas of operations (though they can also be
used for missions that take place within a single theater of operations).4
Although the above distinction between tactical and strategic aircraft can suggest that the term
tactical aircraft refers to virtually all types of shorter-ranged aircraft, in practice the term is used
primarily to refer to fighters, strike fighters, and attack planes. Fighters, which usually have an
“F” designation (e.g., F-22), are designed primarily for air-to-air combat, though they can have
some air-to-ground combat capability as well. Strike fighters, which can have either an “F”
designation (e.g., F-35) or an “F/A” designation (e.g., F/A-18E/F), are dual-role aircraft that are
designed to have a substantial capability in both air-to-ground (strike) and air-to-air (fighter)
operations.5 Attack planes, which usually have an “A” designation (e.g., A-10) are designed
primarily for air-to-ground operations.6 The term tactical aircraft is often shortened to tac air (also
spelled tacair).
Air Force tactical aircraft operate from land bases and are conventional takeoff and landing
(CTOL) aircraft. Navy tactical aircraft are CTOL aircraft that have features permitting them to
operate from aircraft carriers.7 Marine Corps aircraft are operated from both Navy ships and land
bases, including expeditionary land bases with short runways. Some Marine Corps tactical
aircraft are short takeoff, vertical landing (VSTOL) aircraft.
Missions
Tactical aircraft are used to perform a variety of missions. Fighters engage primarily in air-to-air
combat so as to establish and maintain air superiority in a theater of operations. Attack planes
focus on air-to-ground combat operations, including close air support (CAS) for friendly ground
4 The Air Force in 1992 implemented a reorganization that replaced its Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Tactical Air
Command (TAC) with a combined new Air Combat Command (ACC).
5 In earlier years, strike fighters were called fighter-bombers.
6 Although DOD uses letter designations (e.g., F, F/A, and A) to identify an aircraft’s primary intended mission, the
designations can be confusing because they are applied somewhat loosely (e.g., the F-35 is a strike fighter, suggesting
that it should have been designated the F/A-35) and because aircraft can be modified over time to perform additional
missions.
7 Examples of such features include strengthened landing gear, a strengthened airframe, and an arresting hook so as to
permit catapult launches and arrested-wire landings, as well as folding wing tips for more compact storage aboard ship.
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forces engaged in battle, battlefield air interdiction (BAI) against enemy forces that are behind the
front lines, and deep interdiction (also known as “deep strike”) against the enemy’s military,
political, and industrial infrastructure. Strike fighters engage in both air-to-air and air-to-ground
operations. Tactical aircraft can also be used for other operations, including surveillance and
reconnaissance operations.
U.S. Tactical Aircraft
Types
The Air Force currently operates new F-22 fighters and the following older aircraft types: F-15
fighters, F-15E strike fighters (a version of the F-15 with enhanced air-to-ground capabilities), F-
16 fighters (which are actually strike-fighters), and A-10 attack aircraft. The Navy currently
operates older F/A-18A through D strike fighters and newer and more capable F/A-18E/F strike
fighters. The Marine Corps’ operates two older types of aircraft: F/A-18 A, C, and D strike
fighters and AV-8B VSTOL attack planes.
Numbers
Table 1, which presents figures from a May 2009 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report,
shows approximate numbers of U.S. tactical aircraft in early 2009. As can be seen in the table,
DOD in early 2009 had a total inventory of about 3,500 tactical aircraft, of which about 2,375
were in the Air Force and about 1,125 were in the Navy and Marine Corps.
Table 1. Approximate U.S. Tactical Aircraft Inventory in Early 2009
Service and aircraft type
Number in
inventory
Air Force
F-22 fighter
135
F-15 fighter
470
F-15E strike fighter
220
F-16 strike fighter
1,200
A-10 attack plane
350
Subtotal Air Force
2,375
Navy and Marine Corps
F/A-18E/F strike fighter (Navy)
380
F/A-18A/B/C/D strike fighter (Navy and Marine Corps)
620
AV-8B VSTOL attack plane (Marine Corps)
125
Subtotal Navy and Marine Corps
1,125
TOTAL all services
3,500
Source: Source: Congressional Budget Office, Alternatives for Modernizing U.S. Fighter Forces, May 2009,
Tables 1-1 and 1-2 on pages 2 and 3, which the CBO report states are based on DOD data. CBO states in a
note to the tables that the inventory figures are approximate and may not reflect recent deliveries or
retirements.
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Current Acquisition Programs
Current efforts for modernizing U.S. tactical aircraft center on three aircraft acquisition
programs—the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Air Force F-22 fighter program, and
the Navy F/A-18E/F strike fighter program.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), also called the Lighting II, is a new strike fighter being
procured in different versions for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The F-35 was
conceived as a relatively affordable 5th-generation strike fighter8 that could be procured in three
highly common versions for the three services, so that the services could avoid the higher costs of
developing, procuring, and operating and supporting three separate tactical aircraft designs to
meet their similar but not identical operational needs. The F-35 program is DOD’s largest weapon
procurement program in terms of total estimated acquisition cost. Current DOD plans call for
acquiring a total of 2,456 JSFs for the three services9 at an estimated total acquisition cost (as of
December 31, 2007) of about $246 billion in constant (i.e., inflation-adjusted) FY2009 dollars.
Procurement of F-35s began in FY2007.
The Air Force is procuring the F-35A, a conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) version of the
F-35, as the replacement for the service’s F-16s and A-10s. The F-35A is intended to be a more
affordable complement to the Air Force’s new F-22s. The Marine Corps is procuring the F-35B, a
short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) version of the F-35, as the replacement for the
service’s F/A-18A, C, and D strike fighters and AV-8B Harrier VSTOL attack planes. The Navy is
procuring the F-35C, a carrier-capable CTOL version of the aircraft, and plans to operate carrier
air wings in the future featuring a combination of F/A-18E/F and F-35C strike fighters. The
administration’s proposed FY2010 budget requests funding for the procurement of 30 F-35s,
including 10 F-35As for the Air Force, 16 F-35Bs for the Marine Corps, and four F-35Cs for the
Navy.
F-22 Fighter
The Air Force F-22 fighter, also known as the Raptor, is the world’s most capable air-to-air
combat aircraft. The F-22 is a 5th-generation aircraft that incorporates a high degree of stealth,
supercruise,10 thrust-vectoring for high maneuverability,11 and integrated avionics that fuse
information from on-board and off-board sensors. Procurement of F-22s began in FY1999, and a
8 Fifth-generation aircraft incorporate the most modern technology, and are considered to be generally more capable
than earlier-generation (e.g., 4th-generation and below) aircraft. Currently, only the F-22 and the F-35 are considered
fifth-generation aircraft. Russia reportedly has a fifth-generation fighter under development.
9 As of December 31, 2007, the F-35 program included a planned total of 2,456 aircraft—13 research and development
aircraft and a planned total of 2,443 production aircraft. The 2,443 production aircraft include 1,763 F-35As for the Air
Force and 680 F-35Bs and Cs for the Marine Corps and Navy, with exact numbers of Bs and Cs to be determined.
These planned production totals are subject to review in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that is to be reported
to Congress with the submission of the proposed FY2011 defense budget in February 2010. Hundreds of additional F-
35s are to be purchased by several U.S. allies.
10 Supercruise is the ability to cruise at supersonic speeds without using engine afterburners. The F-22 is expected to
have a level speed of about Mach 1.7 using afterburners and a cruise speed of about Mach 1.5 without afterburners.
11 The F-22’s two Pratt & Whitney F-119 turbofan engines are equipped with thrust-vectoring nozzles.
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total of 187 have been procured through FY2009, including 24 in FY2009. The administration
wants to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft, and the administration’s proposed FY2010 budget
does not request funding for the procurement of additional F-22s in FY2010. Supporters of the F-
22 want to continue procuring the aircraft in FY2010 and/or subsequent years, toward an eventual
goal of 243 to 250 (or more).
F/A-18E/F Strike Fighter
The F/A-18E/F, also known as the Super Hornet, is a Navy strike fighter. It is larger, more
modern, and more capable than the earlier F/A-18A/B/C/Ds, which are known as Hornets. The
F/A-18E/F is generally considered a fourth-generation aircraft. (Some F/A-18E/F supporters
argue that it is a “fourth-plus” or “4.5”generation aircraft because it incorporates some fifth-
generation technology, particularly in its sensors.) Hornets and Super Hornets currently form the
core of the Navy’s aircraft carrier air wings—of the 70 or so aircraft in each carrier air wing,
more than 40 typically are Hornets and Super Hornets. The Navy has been procuring F/A-18E/F
Super Hornets since FY1997, and has procured a total of 449 through FY2009. The
administration’s proposed FY2010 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine F/A-
18E/Fs.
Projected Tactical Aircraft Shortfalls
Air Force officials in 2008 testimony projected an Air Force fighter shortfall of up to 800 aircraft
by 2024.12 Navy officials have projected a Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall peaking at
more than 100 aircraft, and possibly more than 200 aircraft, by about 2018.13 Some observers
have questioned the Air Force’s projection of an 800-aircraft shortfall, arguing that such
projections are strongly influenced by assumptions concerning military threats posed by other
countries and on whether the United States will fight alone or part of a coalition, and that Air
Force demands for more fighter aircraft are driven partly by organizational constraints rather than
warfighting needs.14
Combat Air Forces Restructuring Plan
On May 18, 2009—11 days after the submission to Congress of the proposed FY2010 defense
budget—the Air Force announced a combat air forces restructuring plan that would accelerate the
retirement of 249 older Air Force tactical aircraft, including 112 F-15s, 134 F-16s, and three A-
10s, so as to generate savings that can be applied to other Air Force program needs. The proposal
plan does not include the retirements of five fighters proposed as part of the FY2010 Air Force
budget submission. An Air Force News Service story on the restructuring plan stated:
12 See, for example, the testimony of Lieutenant General Daniel Darnell, Deputy Chief of Staff Air, Space and
Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, at an April 9, 2008, hearing before the Airland subcommittee of the
Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on the FY2009 Budget for Air Force and Navy aviation programs.
(Source: Transcript of hearing.)
13 For additional discussion of the projected Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall, see CRS Report RL30624,
Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress,
by Ronald O'Rourke.
14 William Matthews, “Coming up short; Is the Air Force’s ‘Fighter-gap’ truth or spin?” Armed Forces Journal
International, July 2008, p.26.
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Following the May 7 roll-out of the fiscal year 2010 budget proposal for the Department of
Defense, Air Force officials announced plans to retire legacy fighters to fund a smaller and
more capable force and redistribute people for higher priority missions.
The Combat Air Forces restructuring plan would accelerate the retirement of approximately
250 aircraft, which includes 112 F-15 Eagles, 134 F-16 fighting Falcons and three A-10
Thunderbolt IIs. This does not include the five fighters previously scheduled for retirement
in FY10.
“We have a strategic window of opportunity to do some important things with fighter aircraft
restructuring,” said Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley. “By accepting some short-
term risk, we can convert our inventory of legacy fighters and F-22 (Raptors) into a smaller,
more flexible and lethal bridge to fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 (Lightning II Joint
Strike Fighter). We'll also add manpower to capabilities needed now for operations across
the spectrum of conflict.”
Under the plan, cost savings of $355 million in FY10 and $3.5 billion over the next five
fiscal years would be used to reduce current capability gaps. Air Force officials would invest
most of the funds in advanced capability modifications to remaining fighters and bombers.
Some would go toward procuring munitions for joint warfighters, including the small
diameter bomb, hard-target weapons and the AIM-120D and AIM-9X missiles. The
remainder would be dedicated to the procurement or sustainment of critical intelligence
capabilities such as the advanced targeting pod as well as enabling technologies for tactical
air controllers and special operations forces.
“We've taken this major step only after a careful assessment of the current threat
environment and our current capabilities,” said Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton
Schwartz. “Make no mistake, we can't stand still on modernizing our fighter force. The Air
Force’s advantage over potential adversaries is eroding, and this endangers both air and
ground forces alike unless there is a very significant investment in bridge capabilities and
fifth-generation aircraft. CAF restructuring gets us there.”
The CAF restructuring plan, which will require appropriate environmental analyses, would
enable Air Force officials to use reassignment and retraining programs to move
approximately 4,000 manpower authorizations to emerging and priority missions such as
manned and unmanned surveillance operations and nuclear deterrence operations.
This realignment would include the expansion of MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper and MC-12
Liberty aircrews; the addition of a fourth active-duty B-52 Stratofortress squadron; and the
expansion of Distributed Common Ground System and information processing, exploitation
and dissemination capabilities for continued combatant commander support in Afghanistan
and Iraq, among other adjustments.
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz have committed the Air Force to initiatives that will
reinvigorate its nuclear enterprise and field 50 unmanned combat air patrols for ongoing
operations by FY11.
“What we're looking for is a force mix that meets the current mission requirements of
combatant commanders while providing a capable force to meet tomorrow’s challenges,”
Secretary Donley said.15
15 “AF Officials Announce Combat Air Forces Restructure Plan,” Air Force News Service, May 20, 2009, available
online at: http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123150197.
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Issues for Congress
Affordability of Tactical Aircraft Modernization Plans
A Longstanding Concern
A key issue for Congress regarding tactical aircraft in general is the overall affordability of
DOD’s plans for modernizing the tactical aircraft force. The issue has been a concern in Congress
and elsewhere for many years, with some observers predicting that tactical aircraft modernization
is heading for an eventual budget “train wreck” as tactical aircraft acquisition plans collide with
insufficient amounts of funding available for tactical aircraft acquisition.
In earlier years, the issue of tactical aircraft modernization affordability was characterized in
terms of the collective affordability of the F-35, F-22, and F/A-18E/F programs. In coming years,
as production of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F winds down, the issue may increasingly be
characterized in terms of the affordability of the F-35 program as DOD seeks to ramp F-35
procurement up to higher annual rates. DOD plans have envisaged increasing F-35 procurement
to 130 aircraft per year by 2014-2015, including 80 F-35As per year for the Air Force by 2015
and 50 F-35Bs and Cs for the Marine Corps and Navy by 2014.
Since the early 1990s, DOD has substantially lowered the potential cost of its tactical aircraft
modernization plans by significantly reducing the planned number of new aircraft to be acquired.
Much of the reduction in the planned number of new aircraft to be acquired resulted from post-
Cold War reductions in planned numbers of Air Force and Navy air wings. Additional reductions
in the planned number of new aircraft to be acquired were accomplished through the Navy-
Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan, which more closely integrated the Navy and Marine
Corps strike fighter inventories, permitting a reduction in planned procurements of Navy and
Marine Corps strike fighters.16 Another major DOD initiative for limiting tactical aircraft
modernization costs is the F-35 program, which seeks to reduce costs for developing, procuring,
and operating U.S. tactical aircraft through the acquisition of a strike fighter that can be procured
in three highly common versions for the three services.
Even with initiatives such as these, however, it is not clear whether DOD’s tactical aircraft
modernization plan will be affordable, particularly in the context of future defense budgets that
might feature little or no real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) growth over current levels, or possibly some
amount of real decline. The projected Air Force fighter shortfall and the projected Navy-Marine
Corps strike fighter shortfall (see “Projected Tactical Aircraft Shortfalls” above) might be viewed
as indications of a continuing challenge regarding the affordability of tactical aircraft
modernization.
16 The Department of the Navy (DON), which includes the Navy and Marine Corps, stated that the integration plan
would permit DON to reduce procurement of F/A-18E/Fs to 460 from 548 (a reduction of 88 aircraft, or about 16%)
and procurement of JSFs to 680 from 1,089 (a reduction of 409 aircraft, or about 38%). The combined F/A-18E/F and
JSF buy would thus be reduced to 1,140 aircraft from 1,637, a reduction of 497 aircraft, or about 30%. See CRS Report
RS21488, Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan: Background and Issues for Congress, by Christopher
Bolkcom and Ronald O’Rourke.
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Potential Tradeoffs
If DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization plans cannot be fully funded without reducing funding
for other DOD programs, policymakers may face one or more of the following series of potential
funding tradeoffs:
• Funding for tactical aircraft acquisition programs vs. funding for non-
aircraft systems that might be able to perform certain missions performed
by tactical aircraft. Examples of such non-aircraft systems include Army and
Navy surface-to-air missile systems, Army and Marine Corps surface-to-surface
missiles, rockets, and artillery, and Navy ship-based guns and land-attack cruise
missiles.
• Funding for tactical aircraft acquisition programs vs. funding for other
aircraft, such as long-range bombers or helicopters, that can perform
certain air-to-ground missions performed by tactical aircraft. Some observers
argue that in light of recent and projected improvements in the regional anti-
access capabilities of China and other countries,17 DOD should place less funding
emphasis on tactical aircraft and more funding emphasis on long-range aircraft
that can operate effectively outside the range of anti-access systems.
• Funding for tactical aircraft acquisition programs against funding for
aircraft intended to perform different missions, such as airlift aircraft, aerial
refueling tankers, electronic attack (aka electronic warfare) aircraft, airborne
warning and control aircraft, and surveillance aircraft. For some observers, the
affordability of DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization plans is a subset of a larger
issue concerning the affordability of DOD’s plans for procuring new aircraft of
all types.
• Funding for tactical aircraft acquisition programs against funding for
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles
(UCAVs), which are armed UAVs. UAVs have played an increasing role in recent
years in surveillance and reconnaissance operations, and UCAVs are now playing
a substantial role in ground-attack operations, particularly for purposes such as
conducting precision attacks on terrorist targets. DOD intends to place an
increased emphasis on UAVs and UCAVs in coming years, particularly as a
means of improving U.S. capabilities for conducting irregular warfare operations
(such as counterinsurgency operations).
• Funding for land-based Air Force tactical aircraft acquisition programs (i.e.,
F-22 an F-35A) vs. funding for sea-based Navy and Marine Corps sea-based
tactical aircraft acquisition programs (i.e., F/A-18E/F and F-35 Bs and Cs).
The relative capabilities and costs of land- and sea-based aircraft for performing
missions under various circumstances have been long discussed and debated.
• Funding for one land-based tactical aircraft (the F-22) against funding for
another (the F-35A), or funding for one sea-based tactical aircraft (the F/A-
17 Anti-access systems are military systems that are designed to keep opposing military forces outside a certain
defensive perimeter. For a discussion of emerging Chinese maritime anti-access systems, see CRS Report RL33153,
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
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18E/F) against funding for another (the F-35B/C). The administration’s
proposal to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft (rather than continuing F-22
procurement until a total of 243 to 250 is reached) and to concentrate future Air
Force tactical aircraft procurement on the F-35A might be viewed as an example
of DOD proposing such a tradeoff.
• Funding for procurement of F-35s, F-22s, and F/A-18E/Fs vs. funding for
service life extensions of existing tactical aircraft or for procuring new and
perhaps upgraded models of older-design tactical aircraft. Potential examples
of the latter might include upgraded F-15s in lieu of additional F-22s, upgraded
F-16s in lieu of some currently planned F-35As, and additional F/A-18E/Fs in
lieu of some currently planned F-35Cs and Bs.
Assessing Potential Tradeoffs
Each of the above potential tradeoffs poses complex questions of comparative costs, capabilities,
and (for service life extensions of older aircraft) technical feasibility. These questions have been
studied and debated in depth for years by various parties in the context of U.S. military goals and
objectives. U.S. military goals and objectives are currently being reviewed in the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), the final report on which is to be submitted to Congress with the
proposed FY2011 budget in early-February 2010. One key issue in the QDR is how much
emphasis to place on preparing for irregular warfare operations (such as counterinsurgency
operations) vs. preparing for conventional interstate conflict, and how various force elements
(such as tactical aircraft) relate to those two potential areas of planning emphasis.
In the post-Cold War era, some observers have questioned the need to procure and operate large
quantities of high-capability tactical aircraft, arguing among other things that such aircraft are not
the most cost-effective forms of airpower for conducting the kinds of counterinsurgency and anti-
terrorism operations that have occupied U.S. military forces in recent years. These observers
would reduce planned procurement of high-capability tactical aircraft in favor of increased
investments in UAVs and UCAVs, special operations helicopters, medical evacuation aircraft, and
training and equipping forward air controllers.18
Other observers argue that large numbers of high-capability tactical aircraft are still necessary
because Russian aircraft and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are available to potential adversaries,
and because some European and Asian companies may soon be able to market advanced aircraft
and SAMs to potential adversaries. In this view, the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of
potential high-threat areas requiring advanced aircraft. Recent acquisitions of advanced fighter
aircraft and surface-to-air missiles by China, and to a lesser degree India, have added to some
observers’ concerns that these countries may effectively challenge U.S. airpower in the future.
18 Most observers who question DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization plan acknowledge that proliferation of advanced
aircraft and air-defense equipment to potential adversaries will require the United States to field some new-generation
high-capability aircraft. They argue, however, that the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq showed that the United States has a
formidable advantage in air-to-air combat. They argue that the stealthy F-117 attack planes used in the Gulf War
constituted a tiny percentage of all tactical aircraft employed against Iraq, and that only a few non-stealthy planes were
shot down, even in the early days of the war. They also argue that cruise missiles and stealthy B-2 bombers and non-
stealthy B-1s equipped with adequate standoff munitions can be used against heavily defended targets, and that
successful development of longer-range and more-accurate and lethal standoff munitions would significantly increase
the combat effectiveness of earlier-generation tactical aircraft.
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Having large numbers of such advanced aircraft, it is argued, will help ensure operational success
in future conflicts with well-armed adversaries.
April 2007 GAO Report
At the request of Representative Neil Abercrombie, the chairman of the Air and Land Forces
subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) examined “DOD’s investment planning for recapitalizing and modernizing its tactical
fighter and attack aircraft force portfolio.” GAO’s report, issued in April 2007, stated:
During the next 7 years, the military services plan to spend about $109.3 billion to acquire
about 570 new tactical aircraft and to modernize hundreds of operational aircraft. Substantial
cost increases, schedule delays, and changes in requirements have significantly reduced
procurement quantities of new aircraft. For example, since its start, the development period
for the F-22A doubled, threat conditions changed, new ground attack and intelligence-
gathering requirements were added, and its unit costs more than doubled, resulting in a
steady decline in the number of aircraft the Air Force can now procure. Similar conditions
and risk of poor outcomes seem to be emerging for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The JSF is
the linchpin for future modernization efforts because of its sheer size and plans to replace
hundreds of operational systems in all three services. However, its development costs have
increased by $31.6 billion since 2004, and procurement and delivery schedules are slipping.
Funding needs and plans for new and legacy aircraft are by nature interdependent. Legacy
systems must be sustained and kept operationally relevant until new systems complete
development and are ready to replace them. If quantities of new aircraft are reduced and/or
deliveries slip further into future years, significantly more as yet unplanned money will be
required to sustain, modernize, and extend the life of legacy systems to ensure that the total
force is both capable and sufficient in numbers. Uncertainty about new systems costs and
deliveries makes it challenging to effectively plan and efficiently implement modernization
efforts and legacy retirement schedules. Over the next seven years, the services are investing
an average of about $1.7 billion per year on legacy modifications, but there are large pent up
demands—billions more—for unfunded requirements and potential life extension programs
identified by program officials. Officials said the time is approaching when hard decisions on
retiring or extending the life of legacy aircraft must be made.
Looking forward, DOD does not have a single, comprehensive, and integrated investment
plan for recapitalizing and modernizing fighter and attack aircraft. Lacking an integrated
DOD-wide view of requirements, it is difficult to determine the extent of capability gaps and
shortfalls, or, alternatively, duplication of capability. Rather, each military service operates
largely within its own stovepipe to plan and acquire the resources needed to fill its individual
force structure construct. In the Air Force’s case, it is the forces deemed necessary to fill its
air and space expeditionary wings; for the Navy, its carrier strike forces; and for the Marines,
its expeditionary forces. Collectively, the services have underperformed to date in terms of
delivering aircraft within desired costs and quantities, and future plans are likely
unaffordable within projected funding levels. Individual service plans are largely dependent
on favorable assumptions about the cost, quantity, and delivery schedules for new
acquisitions and the ability to increase and sustain future funding levels substantially above
current levels. These favorable assumptions are not realistic when juxtaposed with projected
decline in future federal discretionary spending (including defense investment accounts),
continued operational support requirements for the global war on terror, and looming start-
ups of other big-ticket defense items, such as a strategic tanker aircraft and next generation
long-range strike systems, competing for the same funds. Recent efforts to examine joint
requirements on an integrated, DOD-wide basis have not significantly affected service plans
and investments.
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In order to recapitalize and sustain capable and sufficient tactical air forces that reflect what
is needed and affordable from a joint service perspective and that has high confidence of
being executed as planned, GAO is recommending that DOD (1) take decisive actions to
shorten cycle times in developing and delivering new tactical aircraft and (2) develop an
integrated enterprise-level investment strategy for tactical air forces.19
May 2009 CBO Report
At the direction of the Senate Armed Services Committee,20 the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) conducted “a study examining the capabilities and costs of the fighter [i.e., tactical
aircraft] force that would be fielded under the Department of Defense’s fiscal year 2009 plans and
the potential implications for DoD’s long-term budget and inventory levels if planned purchases
of new aircraft are insufficient to maintain fighter inventories at levels called for by current
service requirements.” CBO stated that the study “also compares the advantages, disadvantages,
and costs of seven alternative approaches that DoD might adopt to modernize its fighter forces—
three that satisfy today’s inventory requirements, two that maintain aggregate weapons capacity
with fewer aircraft, and two that replace portions of the fighter force with longer-range aircraft.”21
The report, which was issued in May 2009 and uses the term “fighter force” to refer to the tactical
aircraft force, states:
If realized, the services’ goals for modernizing their fighter forces over the next several
decades would result in a significant increase in capability over that offered by today’s
19 Government Accountability Office, Tactical Aircraft[:] DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment Strategy,
GAO-07-415, April 2007, pp. 2-3.
20 The committee’s report (S.Rept. 110-77 of June 5, 2007) on the FY2009 defense authorization bill (S. 1547) stated:
The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense (DOD) has not adequately studied the potential risks
associated with shortages in U.S. strike fighter aircraft over the next decade. Last year, Navy witnesses testified
before the committee about a potential gap in strike fighters that might develop toward the end of the next decade,
and could reach as high as 50 aircraft. While the uncertainties of the service life of the current F–18s and the
production schedules for the future F–35 were mentioned then, the potential gap now under discussion could be as
high as 220 Navy aircraft by the middle of the next decade. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
recently released a study entitled ‘‘Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint Integrated Investment Strategy,’’ that
reached several interesting conclusions. The report concluded that DOD does not have a single, integrated
investment plan for recapitalizing and modernizing its tactical air forces, and without a joint, integrated investment
strategy, it is difficult to evaluate the efficacy and severity of capability gaps or, alternatively, areas of
redundancy. The GAO report additionally asserts, ‘‘[l]ooking forward over the next 20 years, the Department’s
collective tactical aircraft recapitalization plans are likely not affordable as currently planned.’’
Under the Department’s current plans, the DOD would spend, on average, about $13 billion annually through
2020 developing and purchasing tactical combat aircraft. Over the long-term, that demand for funding will
coincide with increases needed to execute other major Air Force and Navy acquisitions, including space systems,
cargo aircraft, and surface combatants. In the near-term, it will coincide with the funding needed to ‘‘reset’’ and
replace equipment worn out and lost during operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan.
To better understand the challenges DOD faces as it modernizes its fleets of tactical combat aircraft, the
committee directs the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to conduct a study of alternative approaches to
structuring and investing in our Nation’s tactical air forces. The CBO analysis should include alternatives that
address shortfalls in the size and composition of tactical aircraft forces relative to the services’ current and past
stated requirements. CBO should also develop other alternatives that, while not necessarily satisfying all current
requirements, could require less funding to execute than the Department’s current plans. Such options should
include, but not be limited to, the potential for unmanned air systems to bridge part of the looming gap in strike
fighter capability. CBO should provide the committee with a briefing describing interim results by April 2008, and
a final report no later than October 2008. (Pages 135-136)
21 Congressional Budget Office, Alternatives for Modernizing U.S. Fighter Forces, May 2009, preface page.
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forces. Inventories would remain about the same, but the modernized fleets would be
equipped with state-of-the-art aircraft that offer substantial technological advances over
today’s fighters, including increased payload capacity and greater stealth capabilities (and, as
a result, enhanced survivability). Notwithstanding DoD’s emphasis on fielding aviation
forces with greater flight endurance, the distance that newer aircraft could fly without
requiring refueling (“unrefueled ranges”) would not increase to the same extent.
Under DoD’s fiscal year 2009 procurement plans, fighter inventories are likely to fall below
the services’ stated goals in the coming years. Nevertheless, many aggregate capabilities
would remain equal to or improve relative to today’s force because of the enhanced lethality
and survivability that is expected from the new fighters. Some of those improvements might
be offset by the increased capabilities of potential adversaries, however.
Alternative approaches that included purchasing additional F/A-18E/F Super Hornets or
purchasing upgraded versions of so-called legacy aircraft—such as the F-16 Fighting Falcon
and F-15E Strike Eagle, which are still in production but based on older designs—would
offer an opportunity for short-term inventory relief, long-term cost savings, or both, albeit
with lesser capability improvements (especially in terms of survivability) than would be
realized by purchasing JSFs.
Compared with forces equipped solely with fighter aircraft, forces equipped with a mix of
fighters (which are designed for supersonic speed and high maneuverability) and subsonic
attack aircraft (designed, instead, to carry large payloads over long distances) would offer
improved basing flexibility and persistence over the battlefield during air-to-ground
missions. Force structures that replaced some fighters with smaller numbers of attack aircraft
could provide air-to-ground weapons capacities comparable to those of today’s forces and be
fielded at costs similar to those projected for DoD’s plans. Such forces would have fewer
aircraft capable of air-to-air combat, however.22
Aircraft Industrial Base
Another issue for Congress regarding tactical aircraft modernization in general concerns the
implications that decisions on tactical aircraft acquisition programs can have for workloads,
revenues, and employments levels in the U.S. military aircraft manufacturing industry, which
employs thousands of aircraft designers, engineers, and production workers at both major aircraft
manufacturing firms and supporting supplier firms. In addition to affecting employment levels,
decisions on tactical aircraft acquisition programs can have implications for the structure of the
industry. The United States currently has two active prime contractors for the production of
tactical aircraft—Lockheed, the prime contractor for the F-22 and F-35, and Boeing, the prime
contractor for the F/A-18E/F. When F/A-18E/F (and F-22) production winds down, the number of
active U.S. prime contractors for the production of tactical aircraft might be reduced to one
(Lockheed). Some observers have expressed concern about this prospective development on the
grounds that it could reduce the potential for using competition between prime contractors in the
future to spur innovation, constrain prices, and ensure schedule adherence and production quality
in the development and procurement of future U.S. tactical aircraft.
Potential questions for Congress include the following: How many tactical aircraft prime
contractors are needed to support U.S. military needs in the future? What is the value of
22 Congressional Budget Office, Alternatives for Modernizing U.S. Fighter Forces, May 2009, p. xi. Italics as in
original.
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competition at the prime contractor level in the development and procurement of tactical aircraft?
What is the potential for a firm such as Boeing to use its work designing and building other types
of aircraft to preserve key skills that would be needed to compete effectively in the future against
a firm such as Lockheed for the role of prime contractor for the design and production of future
tactical aircraft? How might decisions on tactical aircraft programs affect U.S. export earnings
and the international competitiveness of the U.S. aerospace industry?
Legislative Activity for FY2010
This section presents legislative activity for FY2010 relating to tactical aircraft modernization in
general. For legislative activity relating specifically to the F-35, F-22, or F/A-18E/F programs,
see CRS Reports RL30563,23 RL31673,24 or RL30624, respectively.25
FY2010 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 2647/S. 1390)
House
Section 133 of H.R. 2647 as passed by the House would require DOD to submit a report to
Congress on the procurement of “4.5”-generation aircraft, which the provision defines as F-15s,
F-16s, and F/A-18s that include certain upgrades. The text of the provision states:
SEC. 133. REPORT ON 4.5 GENERATION FIGHTER PROCUREMENT.
(a) In General- Not later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on 4.5 generation
fighter aircraft procurement. The report shall include the following:
(1) The number of 4.5 generation fighter aircraft for procurement for fiscal years 2011
through 2025 necessary to fulfill the requirement of the Air Force to maintain not less than
2,200 tactical fighter aircraft.
(2) The estimated procurement costs for those aircraft if procured through single year
procurement contracts.
(3) The estimated procurement costs for those aircraft if procured through multiyear
procurement contracts.
(4) The estimated savings that could be derived from the procurement of those aircraft
through a multiyear procurement contract, and whether the Secretary determines the amount
of those savings to be substantial.
23 CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
24 CRS Report RL31673, Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
25 CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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(5) A discussion comparing the costs and benefits of obtaining those aircraft through annual
procurement contracts with the costs and benefits of obtaining those aircraft through a
multiyear procurement contract.
(6) A discussion regarding the availability and feasibility of F-35s in fiscal years 2015
through fiscal year 2025 to proportionally and concurrently recapitalize the Air National
Guard.
(7) The recommendations of the Secretary regarding whether Congress should authorize a
multiyear procurement contract for 4.5 generation fighter aircraft.
(b) Certifications- If the Secretary recommends under subsection (a)(7) that Congress
authorize a multiyear procurement contract for 4.5 generation fighter aircraft, the Secretary
shall submit to Congress the certifications required by section 2306b of title 10, United
States Code, at the same time that the budget is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31,
United States Code, for fiscal year 2011.
(c) 4.5 Generation Fighter Aircraft Defined- In this section, the term `4.5 generation fighter
aircraft’ means current fighter aircraft, including the F-15, F-16, and F-18 [sic: F/A-18],
that—
(1) have advanced capabilities, including—
(A) AESA radar;26
(B) high capacity data-link; and
(C) enhanced avionics; and
(2) have the ability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced armaments.
Section 1047 would prohibit the Air Force from retiring fighter aircraft in accordance with the
combat air forces restructuring plan announced by the Air Force on May 18, 2009, until 90 days
after the Air Force submits to Congress a report on various aspects of the plan. The text of the
provision states:
SEC. 1047. COMBAT AIR FORCES RESTRUCTURING.
(a) Limitations Relating to Legacy Aircraft- Until the expiration of the 90-day period
beginning on the date the Secretary of the Air Force submits a report in accordance with
subsection (b), the following provisions apply:
(1) PROHIBITION ON RETIREMENT OF AIRCRAFT- The Secretary of the Air Force
may not retire any fighter aircraft pursuant to the Combat Air Forces restructuring plan
announced by the Secretary on May 18, 2009.
(2) PROHIBITION ON PERSONNEL REASSIGNMENTS- The Secretary of the Air Force
may not reassign any Air Force personnel (whether on active duty or a member of a reserve
component, including the National Guard) associated with such restructuring plan.
(3) REQUIREMENTS TO CONTINUE FUNDING-
26 AESA stands for active electronically scanned array.
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(A) Of the funds authorized to be appropriated in title III of this Act for operations and
maintenance for the Air Force, at least $344,600,000 shall be expended for continued
operation and maintenance of the 249 fighter aircraft scheduled for retirement in fiscal year
2010 pursuant to such restructuring plan.
(B) Of the funds authorized to be appropriated in title I of this Act for procurement for the
Air Force, at least $10,500,000 shall be available for obligation to provide for any
modifications necessary to sustain the 249 fighter aircraft.
(b) Report- The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted to the Committees on Armed
Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate and shall include the following
information:
(1) A detailed plan of how the force structure and capability gaps resulting from the
retirement actions will be addressed.
(2) An explanation of the assessment conducted of the current threat environment and current
capabilities.
(3) A description of the follow-on mission assignments for each affected base.
(4) An explanation of the criteria used for selecting the affected bases and the particular
fighters chosen for retirement.
(5) A description of the environmental analyses being conducted.
(6) An identification of the reassignment and manpower authorizations necessary for the Air
Force personnel (both active duty and reserve component) affected by the retirements if such
retirements are accomplished.
(7) A description of the funding needed in fiscal years 2010 through 2015 to cover operation
and maintenance costs, personnel, and aircraft procurement, if the restructuring plan is not
carried out.
(8) An estimate of the cost avoidance should the restructuring plan more forward and a
description of how such funds would be invested during the future-years defense plan to
ensure the remaining fighter force achieves the desired service life and is sufficiently
modernized to outpace the threat.
(c) Exception for Certain Aircraft- The prohibition in subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the
five fighter aircraft scheduled for retirement in fiscal year 2010, as announced when the
budget for fiscal year 2009 was submitted to Congress.
Section 1051 expresses the sense of Congress regarding Navy carrier air wing force structure.
The text of the provision states:
SEC. 1051. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CARRIER AIR WING FORCE
STRUCTURE.
(a) Findings- Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The requirement of section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, for the Navy to
maintain not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers, means that the naval combat forces of
the Navy also include not less than 10 carrier air wings.
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(2) The Department of the Navy currently requires a carrier air wing to include not less than
44 strike fighter aircraft.
(3) In spite of the potential warfighting benefits that may result in the deployment of fifth-
generation strike fighter aircraft, for the foreseeable future the majority of the strike fighter
aircraft assigned to a carrier air wing will not be fifth-generation assets.
(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) in addition to the forces described in section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, the
naval combat forces of the Navy should include not less than 10 carrier air wings (even if the
number of aircraft carriers is temporarily reduced) that are comprised of, in addition to any
other aircraft, not less than 44 strike fighter aircraft; and
(2) the Secretary of the Navy should take all appropriate actions necessary to make resources
available in order to include such number of strike fighter aircraft in each carrier air wing.
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on H.R.
2647, summarizes Section 133 on page 125 and Section 1051 on page 393. The report
summarizes Section 1047 on page 392, and states further in connection with Section 1047 that:
The committee is concerned about Air Force plans to accelerate the retirement of 249 legacy
fighter aircraft in fiscal year 2010, in addition to the five fighter aircraft previously scheduled
for retirement. The additional aircraft scheduled for retirement are 112 F-15s, 134 F-15s and
3 A-10s. The committee notes that such actions could lead to serious gaps in force structure
and capability since these actions are being taken while replacement aircraft are still being
tested and are not yet available for fielding. Additionally, the committee is concerned that the
Air Force has not identified, for all of the affected bases, the follow-on missions that will
serve to fill force structure and capability gaps.
The committee has identified $143.7 million in unjustified program growth in the Air Force
operation and maintenance administrative budget, specifically service-wide technical
support, service-wide administration, and service-wide other activities. Additionally, the
committee has identified $200.9 million in unexecutable peacetime operations due to
deployments in the Air Force operating forces, air operations budget activity. The committee
recommends that these funds totaling $344.6 be used for the continued operation and
maintenance of the 249 legacy fighters that were slated for retirement during fiscal year 2010
until such time as the reporting requirement above is met. In addition, the committee
recommends that $10.5 million of funds for aircraft procurement be available for obligations
for modifications necessary to sustain the 249 fighter aircraft. (Pages 392-393)
The report states the following regarding the projected Air Force fighter shortfall:
The committee notes that for the past year, the Department of the Air Force has informed
Congress that it requires 2,200 fighter aircraft, and that the Department projects a shortfall in
its fighter aircraft inventory that would begin in fiscal year 2017 and grow to approximately
800 aircraft by 2024. The committee believes that such a shortfall will adversely affect the
ability of the active duty forces and air reserve forces to meet future requirements for both air
expeditionary forces and for the air sovereignty alert mission in the United States.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the
Chief of the Air National Guard and the Chief of the Air Force Reserve, to provide a report
to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2010. The report should include
statements from both the Chief of the Air National Guard and the Chief of the Air Force
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Reserve describing their separate and independent views to Congress, as applicable. The
report should address the so-called ‘‘fighter gap’’ issue in the long- and short-term with
alternative solutions including but not limited to: accelerated procurement of fifth generation
fighters such as the F-22 and F-35; an interim procurement of so-called ‘‘4.5 generation’’
fighters; and fleet management options such as service life extension programs. The report
must include a detailed analysis of the effect that any shortfalls will have on the Air National
Guard and the air sovereignty alert mission specifically, including the loss of Air National
Guard flying missions throughout the United States and the resultant loss of Air National
Guard pilot and maintenance capability. (Page 101)
The report states the following regarding the projected Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter
shortfall:
The committee is concerned regarding the current and forecasted strike-fighter aircraft
inventory of the Department of the Navy. The committee understands that the Department of
the Navy has a fiscal year 2009 strike-fighter inventory shortfall of 110 aircraft and predicts
a fiscal year 2010 shortfall of 152 aircraft, with a potential peak strike-fighter shortfall of 312
aircraft by fiscal year 2018. The committee believes such drastic shortfalls in strike fighter-
inventory are unacceptable.
The committee understands that a variety of factors cause the current and projected strike-
fighter shortfall. Those factors include a fiscal year 2002 decision to reduce F/A-18A
through D inventory by 88 aircraft, a reduction in the program of record quantity for F-
35B/C by 409 aircraft, delays in development of the F-35B/C program, and F/A 18A through
D aircraft reaching forecasted service life sooner than expected.
The committee remains unconvinced that naval strike-fighter shortfalls should be viewed
against the totality of Department of Defense strike-fighter inventory. The capabilities of the
naval strike-fighter force are inherent in the capability of the aircraft carrier as a strike
platform and, as such, force structure requirements for naval aviation must be viewed as
those required to support sufficient carrier air wings (CVW) to match the number of
statutorily mandated aircraft carriers.
The committee supports procurement of additional F/A-18E/F aircraft to mitigate the naval
strike-fighter inventory shortfall and believes that procurement of additional F/A-18E/F
aircraft through a multi-year procurement contract is more cost effective and prudent than
procuring new aircraft through an annual contract or applying $25.6 million of additional
fiscal resources per aircraft to extend the service life of the F/A-18A through D fleet.
Therefore, the committee includes a provision in title I of this Act that would authorize the
Secretary of the Navy to enter into a multi-year procurement contract for the purchase of
additional F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft and also includes a provision in title X of this Act
[Section 1051] that expresses a sense of Congress that the Department of the Navy should
maintain no less than ten carrier air wings with no less than 44 strike-fighters each.
Additionally, the committee directs the Director of the Congressional Budget Office to
submit a report to the congressional defense committees by February 2, 2010, that evaluates
the operational effectiveness and costs of extending and modernizing the service-life of F/A-
18A through D aircraft to 10,000 flight hours versus procuring, either through an annual or
multi-year procurement contract, additional F/A-18E/F aircraft beyond the current program
of record. (Page 61)
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Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) on S. 1390
includes a section on the F/A-18E/F program that states the following regarding the projected
Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall:
The committee has expressed concern that the Navy is facing a sizeable gap in aircraft
inventory as older F/A-18A-D Hornets retire before the aircraft carrier variant (F-35C) of the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is available. The committee raised this issue in the committee
reports accompanying S. 1547 (S.Rept. 110-77) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008 and accompanying S. 3001 (S.Rept. 110-335) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. The committee is disappointed that the Navy has
failed to provide the report comparing single versus multiyear procurement costs mandated
by the second of those committee reports.
Last year, the committee received testimony from the Navy of a projected shortfall in Navy
tactical aviation. The Navy indicated that, under assumptions current at that time, it would
experience a shortfall of 69 tactical aircraft in the year 2017, a number that swells to 125
when requirements of the United States Marine Corps are included. The committee believes
that the Navy’s projection of this shortfall was, however, based on a series of questionable
assumptions.
This year, the Chief of Naval Operations said that the projected gap may be as high as 250
aircraft total for the Department of the Navy. The committee believes that the Navy has
failed to present a budget in fiscal year 2010 that takes effective action to deal with this
substantially increased projected shortfall in the Department of the Navy’s tactical air fleet
and is concerned about the potential risk such a shortfall could pose to national security. The
committee also notes that this shortfall figure is still predicated on an initial operation
capability of the F–35C in 2015 but that achieving this is considered optimistic by many
observers. The Navy’s delay in taking action causes concern that it: (1) is continuing to
accept the substantial security risks associated with the projected shortfall; (2) remains
overly reliant on a potentially costly service life extension program (SLEP) for legacy F/A-
18s as a means to mitigate the gap until the Joint Strike Fighter achieves full operational
capability; and (3) is not adequately considering realistic, fiscally responsible long-range
procurement plans to address the carrier strike aircraft shortfall, such as a multiyear
procurement of F/A-18E/F aircraft as opposed to a series of single year purchases.
The committee is concerned that, in response to possible further delays, expanding costs and
technological immaturity with the JSF, the Navy appears increasingly reliant on its proposal
to extend the life of select legacy F/A-18’s from 8,600 to 10,000 flight hours through a SLEP
currently estimated to cost on average $26.0 million per plane. This life extension would be
in addition to the 2,600-hour service life extension that the Navy already plans for most
legacy F/A-18s. By the Navy’s own testimony, it is unclear how many of the planes are
capable of reaching 10,000 flight hours even with a SLEP. The committee is concerned that
the cost uncertainties of a SLEP achieving an additional 1,400 flight hours make such a plan
risky. In any case, the committee believes such SLEP may be inefficient when compared
with the benefits of procuring new F/A–18E/F’s, which might cost less than $50.0 million
each in 2009 constant dollars under a multiyear procurement acquisition strategy.
Normalizing costs for the expected return in additional service life, a SLEP to achieve the
additional 1,400 hours would cost approximately $18,571 per flight hour gained, versus
$8,333 per flight hour provided by a new F/A–18E/F (at a 6,000 flight hour life, the cost per
flight hour of a new F/A-18E/F would fall even further to $5,814 if those planes are similarly
extended to 8,600 flight hours as have legacy F/A-18s). In light of such costs, the committee
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believes the Navy must more carefully evaluate costs and benefits of new F/A–18E/F
procurements, compared to investing in a SLEP of legacy aircraft.
The committee further notes that new F/A-18E/F models come equipped with improved
technological capabilities over the legacy F/A-18’s, including active electronically scanned
array radar, modernized avionics, advanced aerial refueling system capability, and added
weapon hard points, among other features that would not be part of a SLEP upgrade package
for the older aircraft. These factors would tend to increase the benefit of purchasing new
F/A-18E/Fs compared to conducting a SLEP on legacy aircraft. The Navy projects that the
F/A-18E/F will remain in the fleet until at least 2040, and should be able to use most or all of
the full service life of any newly purchased aircraft.
The committee understands that the Department of Defense intends to review the whole
issue of tactical aircraft forces in the pending Quadrennial Defense Review. The committee
expects the Department to conduct and submit the analysis of multiyear procurement for the
F/A-18 as directed in the committee report last year to include cost differentials between
single year and multiyear procurement strategies and tradeoffs between a SLEP and new
procurements of the F/A-18E/F. The Department should include such information derived
from that analysis in deciding how to implement the results on the ongoing Quadrennial
Defense Review regarding tactical aviation.
The committee expects that the Department’s tactical aviation procurement strategies will be
informed by the Quadrennial Defense Review. In light of the significant increase in the
strike-fighter shortfall testified to before the committee this year, additional actions to
address that shortfall cannot be delayed too long. (Pages 20-22)
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
Congressional Research Service
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