Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 29, 2009
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
RS21968
CRS Report for Congress
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Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks

Summary
Iraq’s political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, is increasingly
characterized by peaceful competition rather than violence, but sectarianism and ethnic and
factional infighting continue to simmer. Some believe that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, in a
strong position politically following the January 31, 2009, provincial elections, is increasingly
authoritarian, seeking to ensure that he holds power after the planned January 30, 2010 national
elections. Maliki is widely assessed as gaining control of the security services and building new
security organs loyal to him personally. However, he has not been able to forge consensus on key
outstanding legislation considered crucial to political comity going forward, such as national
hydrocarbon laws.
Internal dissension within Iraq aside, as it left office, the Bush Administration was optimistic that
the passage of key laws in 2008, coupled with the provincial elections, would sustain recent
reductions in violence. Based partly on the relative absence of violence of the January 31, 2009
provincial elections, in February 2009 the Obama Administration announced and has begun
implementing a reduction of the U.S. troop presence (to about 35,000 – 50,000 U.S. forces by
August 2010). Some forms of violence have since increased in some areas of Iraq, particularly
those where different ethnicities and sects live in close proximity, but these attacks have not
reignited large scale sectarian violence. However, there are concerns that violence will escalate as
the United States draws down its forces and is no longer as deeply involved in mediating and
containing political disputes. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and
Security, by Kenneth Katzman.

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Contents
Overview of the Political Transition ............................................................................................ 1
January 2005 National Assembly and Provincial Elections .................................................... 1
Permanent Constitution ......................................................................................................... 1
December 15, 2005, Elections ............................................................................................... 2
Benchmarks, Reconciliation, and Provincial and Future Elections ............................................... 3
The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi Government: 2008-2009....................................... 3
January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections and Implications........................................................ 4
Outcomes and Implications ................................................................................................... 5
Maliki Post-Provincial Elections ..................................................................................... 6
Elections Going Forward................................................................................................. 8

Tables
Table 1. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates) ......................................... 9
Table 2. Election Results (January and December 2005) ............................................................ 10
Table 3. Assessments of the Benchmarks................................................................................... 11

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 13

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Overview of the Political Transition
Iraq has largely completed a formal political transition from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein
to a plural polity that encompasses varying sects and ideological and political factions. After the
fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, the United States set up an occupation structure,
reportedly based on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions and not
produce democracy. In May 2003, President Bush, reportedly seeking strong leadership in Iraq,
named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to head a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA), which
was recognized by the United Nations as an occupation authority. Bremer discontinued a tentative
political transition process and instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi advisory
body: the 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). After about one year of occupation, the
United States handed sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. It
was headed by a Prime Minister, Iyad al-Allawi, leader of the Iraq National Accord, a secular,
non-sectarian faction. Allawi is a Shiite but many INA leaders were Sunnis, and some of them
were formerly members of the Baath Party. The president of this interim government was Ghazi
al-Yawar, a Sunni tribal figure who spent many years in Saudi Arabia.
January 2005 National Assembly and Provincial Elections
A series of elections in 2005 produced the full-term government that is in power today. In line
with a March 8, 2004, “Transitional Administrative Law” (TAL, interim constitution), the first
post-Saddam election was held on January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly (which formed an executive), four-year term provincial councils in all 18 provinces
and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). According to the “proportional
representation/closed list” election system, voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a
coalition of parties, or persons); 111 entities were on the national ballot, of which nine were
multi-party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17
Assembly seats, and only one seat on the 51 seat Baghdad provincial council. That council was
dominated (28 seats) by representatives of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, then at odds with U.S. forces, also
boycotted, leaving his faction relatively under-represented on provincial councils in the Shiite
south and in Baghdad. The resulting transitional government placed Shiites and Kurds in the
highest positions—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was President and
Da’wa (Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was Prime Minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker,
deputy president, a deputy prime minister, and six ministers, including defense.
Permanent Constitution
The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum
by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On
May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting committee was appointed, but with only two Sunni Arabs
(15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005, the talks
produced a draft, providing for: a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether
Kirkuk (Tamim province) will join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designation of Islam “a main
source” of legislation;1 a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); families choosing which

1 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html.
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courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only primary education mandatory (Article
34); and having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme court (Article
89). Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much discretion to male family
members. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority,
CPA) applicable until amended (Article 126), and established a “Federation Council” (Article
62), a second chamber with size and powers to be determined in future law (not adopted to date).
The major disputes—still unresolved—centered on regional versus centralized power. The draft
permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions”— reaffirmed in
passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions. Article 117 allows “regions” to organize
internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding the Kurds’ peshmerga militia (allowed by the
TAL). Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current
fields” in proportion to population, and gave regions a role in allocating revenues from new
energy discoveries. Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage of national
hydrocarbons legislation. Sunnis dominate areas of Iraq have few proven oil or gas deposits, and
favor centralized control of oil revenues, whereas the Kurds want to maintain maximum control
of their own burgeoning oil sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to
defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11, 2005) providing for a
panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election government
took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another two months (under the same rules as the
October 15 referendum.) The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no”
vote, respectively, but the constitution was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55%
“no,” missing the threshold for a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
December 15, 2005, Elections
In the December 15, 2005, elections for a four-year national government (in line with the
schedule laid out in the TAL), each province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a
“Council of Representatives” (COR)— a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the
275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that
would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole nation. There were 361
political “entities,” including 19 multi-party coalitions, competing. As shown in the table, voters
chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged
dominant. The COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, but political infighting caused the
Shiite bloc “United Iraqi Alliance” to replace Jafari with another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-
Maliki, as Prime Minister.
On April 22, 2006, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president. His two deputies are
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq al-
Hashimi, leader of the broad Sunni-based coalition called the Accord Front (“Tawafuq”—within
which Hashimi leads the Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Accord figure, the hardline Mahmoud
Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), became COR speaker. Maliki won COR approval
of a 37-member cabinet (including two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots
(Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 2006, due to
infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four were
women.
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Benchmarks, Reconciliation, and Provincial and
Future Elections
The 2005 elections were considered successful by the Bush Administration but—possibly
because they took place in the context of ongoing insurgency and sectarian conflict—the
elections did not resolve the Sunni Arab grievances over their diminished positions in the post-
Saddam power structure. In August 2006, the Administration and Iraq agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, might achieve political reconciliation. Under
Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on eighteen
political and security benchmarks—as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15, 2007
and then September 15, 2007—were required for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. President Bush used the waiver provision. The law also
mandated an assessment by the GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the
benchmarks have been met, as well as an outside assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).
As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of many of the major legislative benchmarks—and
the dramatic drop in sectarian violence attributed to the U.S. “troop surge”—the Bush
Administration asserted that political reconciliation was advancing. However, U.S. officials
maintained that the extent and durability of reconciliation would depend on the degree of
implementation of adopted laws, on further compromises among ethnic groups, and on continued
attenuated levels of violence. Iraq’s performance on the “benchmarks” is in the table below.
The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi Government: 2008-2009
The passage of key legislation in 2008 and the continued calming of the security situation have
enhanced Maliki’s political position since early 2008. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki
against the Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs ultimately pacified the city,
weakened Sadr politically, and caused some Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as more even-handed
and non-sectarian than previously thought. This contributed to a decision by the Accord Front to
return to the cabinet in July 2008 after a one year boycott. Other cabinet vacancies were filled
subsequently, mostly by independents, essentially putting an end to the political reversals of 2007,
when Maliki appeared weakened substantially by the pullout of the Accord Front, the Sadr
faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi from the cabinet, leaving it with 13
vacant seats out of a 37 seat cabinet.
Maliki’s growing strength caused concern even among Maliki’s erstwhile political allies. They
see him as increasingly building a following in the security forces, and creating new security
organs loyal to him and his faction. The Kurds, who had been a key source of support for him,
began to criticize his leadership because of his formation of government-run “tribal support
councils” in northern Iraq, which the Kurds see as an effort to prevent them from gaining control
of disputed territories that they want to integrate into their Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG). Other support councils were created in southern Iraq. ISCI, the longstanding main ally of
Maliki’s Da’wa Party, began to politically distance itself from the Da’wa Party, and accused him
of surrounding himself with Da’wa veterans to the exclusion of other decision-makers. The
competition prompted reports in late 2008 that several major factions were considering
attempting to bring about a “no-confidence” vote against Maliki. The December 2008 resignation,
under pressure, of Sunni COR Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, who was perceived as blocking
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a no confidence motion against Maliki and several of his allies in the cabinet, was one outward
indicator of the dissension.
Maliki’s growing control of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) has created restiveness among the
Sunni “Sons of Iraq” fighters who Maliki has refused to fully integrate wholesale into the Iraqi
Security Forces. The 90,000 fighters nationwide cooperated with U.S. forces against Al Qaeda in
Iraq and other militants. Some of the Sons are increasingly resentful that only 5,000 have been
integrated into the ISF, and that the remainder have not yet been given the civilian government
jobs they were promised. Others complain that their payments have been delayed, which the
government claims is due to cash shortfalls resulting from the sharp fall in oil prices in late 2008.
There are reports that a growing number of these Sunni fighters are quitting the program or
returning to insurgent activity, although this purported trend is difficult to confirm.
January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections and Implications
The Obama Administration, as did the Bush Administration, looked to the January 31, 2009,
provincial elections to consolidate the reconciliation process. Under a 2008 law, provincial
councils in Iraq choose the governor and provincial governing administrations in each province,
making them powerful bodies that provide ample opportunity to distribute patronage and guide
provincial politics.
The elections had been planned for October 1, 2008, but were delayed when Kurdish restiveness
over integrating Kirkuk and other disputed territories into the KRG caused a presidential veto of
the July 22, 2008, election law needed to hold these elections. The draft law provided for equal
division of power in Kirkuk (between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until its status is finally
resolved, prompting Kurdish opposition to any weakening of their dominance in Kirkuk.
Following the summer COR recess, the major political blocs agreed to put aside the Kirkuk
dispute and passed a revised provincial election law on September 24, 2008, providing for the
elections by January 31, 2009. The revised law put off provincial elections in Kirkuk and the
three KRG provinces, and stripped out provisions in the vetoed version to allot 13 total reserved
seats (spanning six provinces) to minorities. However, in October 2008, the COR adopted a new
law restoring six reserved seats for minorities: Christian seats in Baghdad, Nineveh, and Basra;
one seat for Yazidis in Nineveh; one seat for Shabaks in Nineveh; and one seat for the Sabean sect
in Baghdad.
In the elections, in which there was virtually no violence on election day, about 14,500 candidates
vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-dominated provinces of Iraq. About 4,000
of the candidates were women. The average number of council seats per province is about 30,2
down from a set number of 41 seats per province (except Baghdad) in the 2005-2009 councils.
The new Baghdad provincial council has 57 seats. This yielded an average of more than 30
candidates per council seat, which some see as enthusiasm for democracy in Iraq. However, the
reduction in number of seats also meant that many incumbents were not re-elected.
Voters were able to vote only for a party slate, or for an individual candidate (although they also
had to vote for that candidate’s slate as well). This procedure encourages voting for slates, and
strengthened the ability of political parties to choose who on their slate will occupy seats allotted

2 Each provincial council has 25 seats plus one seat per each 200,000 residents over 500,000.
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for that party. This election system was widely assessed to favor larger, well organized parties,
because smaller parties might not meet the vote threshold to obtain any seats on the council in
their province.3 This was seen as likely to set back the hopes of some Iraqis that the elections
would weaken the Islamist parties, both Sunni and Shiite, that have dominated post-Saddam
politics.
About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible to vote, which was run
by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election-related violence was minimal,
although five candidates and several election/political workers were killed. There were virtually
no major violent incidents on election day. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) took the lead in
defending polling places, with U.S. forces as back-up. Turnout was about 51%, somewhat lower
than some expected, and some voters complained of being turned away at polling places because
their names were not on file. Other voters had been displaced by sectarian violence in prior years
and were unable to vote in their new areas of habitation.
The vote totals were finalized on February 19, 2009, but were not certified until March 29, 2009.
Within fifteen days of that (by April 13, 2009) the provincial councils began to convene under the
auspices of the incumbent provincial governor, and to elect a provincial council chairperson and
deputy chairperson. Within another 30 days after that (by May 12, 2009) the provincial councils
elected (by absolute majority) a provincial governor and deputy governors. The term of the
provincial councils is four years from the date of first convention.
Outcomes and Implications
Some of the primary outcomes of the elections appear to be evident based on the results for the
the two main Shiite parties, whose fates differed dramatically. In the mostly Shiite southern
provinces, ISCI (Shahid Mihrab list) and Maliki’s Da’wa “State of Law Coalition” offered
competing lists. Maliki’s post-election political position apparently has been enhanced by the
strong showing of his list. Any discussions of a possible vote of no confidence against Maliki are
likely derailed, based on the election results, although some Sunni deputies did introduce such a
motion in the COR in late February 2009. With 28 out of the 57 total seats, the Maliki slate is in
effective control, by itself, of the Baghdad provincial council (displacing ISCI). Da’wa also
emerged very strong in most of the Shiite provinces of the south, including Basra, where it won
an outright majority (20 out of 35 seats).
The apparent big loser in the elections was ISCI, which had been favored because it is well
organized and well funded. ISCI favors more power for the provinces and less for the central
government; centralization is Maliki’s preferred power structure. ISCI did not win in Najaf
province, which it previously dominated and which, because of Najaf’s revered status in Shiism,
is considered a center of political gravity in southern Iraq. It won seven seats there, the same
number that was won by the Maliki slate. ISCI won only 3 seats on the Baghdad province
council, down from the 28 it held previously, and only five in Basra. Some observers believe that
the poor showing for ISCI was a product not only of its call for devolving power out of Baghdad,
but also because of its perceived close ties to Iran, which some Iraqis believe is exercising undue
influence on Iraqi politics.

3 The threshhold for winning a seat is: the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats up for election.
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The unexpected strength of secular parties such as that of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi,
appeared to show that voters favored slates committed to strong central government and “rule of
law,” as well as to the concept of Iraqi nationalism. This trend was also reflected in the strong
showing of a single candidate in Karbala province. The figure, Yusuf al-Habbubi, is well thought
of in the province for even-handedness. His boasts of close ties to Saddam’s elder son Uday
(killed in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003) did not hurt him politically, even though most
Karbala residents are Shiites repressed by Saddam’s government. Still, because al-Habbubi is a
single candidate, he only won his own seat on the Karbala provincial council and did not become
governor of the province.
Although Maliki’s coalition was the clear winner in the elections, the subsequent efforts to form
provincial administrations demonstrated that he still needed to strike bargains with rival factions,
including Sadr, ISCI, and even the Sunni list of Saleh al-Mutlaq (National Dialogue Front) that
contains many ex-Baathists. The provincial administrations that took shape, mostly in line with
set deadlines above, are in the table below.
Maliki Post-Provincial Elections
Because of Da’wa’s showing in the provincial elections, Maliki remains well positioned in the
run-up to the next parliamentary elections, to be held on January 30, 2010. While he has reached
compromise with political competitors in various provinces, he has also reportedly been using the
security forces to politically intimidate his opponents. One politician in Diyala Province, for
example, was arrested in May 2009 on orders from Maliki. 4 He also has ordered the ISF to arrest
numerous political opponents in southern Iraq, including many Sadrists.
Maliki has also derived political strength from the U.S. concessions in the U.S.-Iraq “status of
forces agreement” (SOFA, referred to as the Security Agreement) that passed the COR on
November 27, 2008, over Sadrist opposition, and notwithstanding Sunni efforts to obtain
assurances of their future security. The pact took effect January 1, 2009, limiting the prerogatives
of U.S. troops to operate in Iraq and setting a timetable of December 31, 2011, for a U.S.
withdrawal. President Obama, on February 27, 2009, outlined a U.S. troop draw-down plan that
comports with the major provisions of the SOFA. The first major milestone is the June 30, 2009
withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq’s cities, which is being implemented by the United
States, although U.S. troops will still be close by to assist the ISF in emergencies. Maliki has
hailed this interim milestone as a “victory” and declared it a national holiday.
On the other hand, Maliki is not unchallenged, and his position could weaken as the United States
draws its troops down in Iraq. The performance of the ISF in the face of a smaller U.S. presence
will be key to whether Maliki retains his strong pre-eminence. As an example of his opponent’s
efforts to weaken him, the COR was able to achieve a majority to approve Ayad al-Samarrai, a
Sunni Arab critic of Maliki, on April 20, 2009. He had been the leading candidate in the several
previous attempts to select the new Speaker. Since taking office, Samarrai has strengthened the
COR’s oversight role and launched a COR investigation of corruption in the Trade Ministry that
forced the minister, Abdul Falah al-Sudani, to resign on May 14, 2009. (He was subsequently
arrested.) The new COR assertiveness is said to focus on the performance of Oil Minister Hussein
Shahristani, viewed as a Maliki ally and an opponent of the Kurds and their drive to control their

4 Shadid, Anthony. “In Iraq, A Different Struggle for Power.” Washington Post, June 25, 2009.
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own oil resources. Earlier, the COR successfully eliminated from the 2009 budget the funding for
the pro-Maliki tribal support councils (see above) and for funds to reconcile with ex-Baathists.
The infighting between Maliki and his critics has also had the effect of stalling movement on
remaining crucial legislation, such as those discussed in the benchmark table below. Some note
that efforts to rein in official corruption are failing because no comprehensive anti-corruption law
has been passed. Also not passed are laws on the environment, those governing other elections,
consumer protections, intellectual property rights, building codes, and a new national flag.
Sunni Participation and Integration
The provincial elections did, to a large extent, further U.S. goals to bring Sunni Muslims ever
further into the political structure. Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 provincial elections and had
been poorly represented in some mixed provinces, such as Diyala and Nineveh. It was also hoped
that the elections would help incorporate into the political structure the tribal leaders
(“Awakening Councils”) who recruited the Sons of Iraq fighters. These Sunni tribalists offered
election slates and showed strength at the expense of the established Sunni parties, particularly
the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). The main “Iraq Awakening” tribal slate came in first in Anbar
Province, according to the final results. The established, mostly urban Sunni parties, led by the
IIP, had been struggling in 2008 as the broader Accord Front (Tawafuq) fragmented. In the
provincial elections, one of its component parties—the National Dialogue Council—ran on slates
that competed with the IIP in several provinces.
However, further prospects for turmoil were created because Sunni Arabs wrested control of the
Nineveh provincial council from the Kurds, who won control of that council in the 2005 election
because of the broad Sunni Arab boycott of that election. A Sunni list (al-Hadba’a) won a clear
plurality of the Nineveh vote and subsequently took control of the provincial administration there.
Al-Hadba’a is composed of hardline Sunni Arabs who openly oppose Kurdish encroachment in
the province and who are committed to the “Arab and Islamic identity” of the province. Nineveh
contains numerous territories inhabited by Kurds and which have been a source of growing
tension between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the central government in
Baghdad. Kurds and Arabs in the province have narrowly avoided clashes in May 2009 when
Kurdish security forces prevented the new governor of the province and other Arab security
officials from entering territory where Kurds live.
Another mixed province, Diyala, was hotly contested between Shiite and Sunni Arab and Kurdish
slates, reflecting the character of the province as another front line between the Kurds and the
central government. The provincial version of the Accord Front narrowly beat out the Kurds for
first place in the province, but has subsequently allied with the Kurds and with ISCI to set up the
provincial administration. There continues to be substantial friction between Sunni and Shiite
Arabs in that province, in part because Sunni militants drove out many Shiites from the province
at the height of the civil conflict during 2005-2007.
Some Sunni Arabs are likely to try to become Iraq’s President in the next government, sensing
that the Kurds are now a weakening part of the central government. President Talabani has said in
March 2009 that he will not be available to continue as President at that time, in part because of
widely publicized health problems that have required occasional treatment outside Iraq.
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Weakening of Sadr
Other U.S. officials saw the elections as key opportunity to move Moqtada al-Sadr’s faction
firmly away from armed conflict against the mainstream Shiite parties. Sadr’s conflict with
Maliki surged in the March 2008 Basra offensive discussed above. Sadr announced in October
2008 that he would not field a separate list in the provincial elections but support Sadrists on
other lists. Sadr’s faction, represented mainly in the “Independent Liberals Trend” list, filed
candidate slates in several provinces mostly in the south. The slate did not come close to winning
outright control of any councils, although it won enough seats in several southern provinces to,
through deal making, gain senior positions in a few southern provinces. The relatively poor
showing of the Sadrists was viewed as reflecting voter disillusionment with parties that continue
to field militias—which many Iraqis blame for much of the violence that has plagued Iraq since
the fall of Saddam Hussein. Although Sadr is considered weakened politically in the wake of the
provincial elections, some worry that this weakness could also cause his faction to return to
armed struggle, particularly as U.S. forces draw down.
Elections Going Forward
Some observers maintain that the success of the provincial elections could be determined by
subsequent contests. There was to be a referendum by July 31, 2009, on the U.S.-Iraq status of
forces agreement. The COR is considering legislation that would hold the referendum but delay it
until January 30, 2010, at which time it would be conducted simultaneous with national elections.
The elections for the Kurdistan National Assembly, which selects a president of the KRG, are to
be held on July 25, 2009. The KRG is also attempting to develop a draft KRG constitution that
would be voted on that day, although some Kurds are said to believe a separate KRG constitution
is not necessary because Iraq as a whole has a constitution. By July 31, 2009, district and sub-
district elections are to take place. Moreover, as noted, Iraq has set a date to hold the next national
parliamentary elections on January 30, 2010.
Several other possible elections in Iraq are as yet unscheduled. Because the three Kurdish
controlled provinces and the disputed province of Kirkuk did not hold provincial elections with
the rest of Iraq on January 31, 2009, elections are required in those provinces at some point,
presumably subsequent to a settlement of the Kirkuk dispute. Under the election law that set the
provincial elections, a parliamentary committee was to make recommendations on resolving this
dispute, to be issued by March 31, 2009. That deadline was not met. The U.N. Assistance
Mission—Iraq (UNAMI) is continuing its efforts to forge a grand settlement of Kirkuk and other
disputed territories, and a UNAMI report circulated in April 2009 reportedly recommended a
form of joint Baghdad-Kurdish control of Kirkuk. It is not yet clear whether this report will be the
basis of an agreed settlement. If so, UNAMI’s recommendation is that the constitutionally
mandated referendum on Kirkuk’s status would be a vote on whether to adopt that agreed
settlement. There could also be a vote on amendments to Iraq’s 2005 constitution if and when the
major factions agree to finalize the recommendations of the constitutional review commission
(CRC).



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Table 1. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)
Baghdad - 55 regular seats, plus
State of Law (Maliki) – 38% (28 seats); Independent Liberals Trend (pro-Sadr) –
one Sabean and one Christian set-
9% (5 seats); Accord Front (Sunni mainstream) – 9% (9 seats); Iraq National
aside seat
(Al awi) – 8.6%; Shahid Mihrab and Independent Forces (ISCI) – 5.4% (3 seats) ;
National Reform list (of former P.M. Ibrahim al-Jafari) – 4.3% (3 seats)
Basra – 34 regular seats,
State of Law – 37% (20); ISCI – 11.6% (5); Sadr – 5% (2); Fadhila (previously
plus one Christian seat
dominant in Basra) – 3.2% (0); Al awi – 3.2% (0); Jafari list – 2.5% (0). New
Governor : Shiltagh Abbud (Maliki list); Council chair: Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)
Nineveh – 34 regular seats, plus
Hadbaa – 48.4%; Fraternal Nineveh – 25.5%; IIP – 6.7%; Hadbaa has taken
one set aside for Shabaks, Yazidis, control of provincial council and administration, excluding the Kurds. Governor
and Christians
is Atheel al-Nujaifi of Hadbaa.
Najaf – 28 seats
State of Law – 16.2% (7); ISCI – 14.8% (7); Sadr – 12.2% (6); Jafari – 7% (2);
Allawi – 1.8% (0); Fadhila – 1.6% (0). Council chairman: Maliki list
Babil – 30 seats
State of Law – 12.5% (8); ISCI- 8.2% (5); Sadr – 6.2% (3); Jafari – 4.4% (3); Al awi
– 3.4%; Accord Front – 2.3% (3); Fadhila – 1.3%. New Council chair: Kadim
Majid Tuman (Sadrist)
Diyala – 29 seats
Accord Front list – 21.1%; Kurdistan Alliance – 17.2%; Allawi – 9.5%; State of
Law – 6 %. New council leans heavily Accord, but allied with Kurds and ISCI.
Muthanna – 26 seats
State of Law – 10.9% (5); ISCI – 9.3% (5); Jafari – 6.3% (3); Sadr – 5.5% (2);
Fadhila – 3.7%.
Anbar – 29 seats
Iraq Awakening (Sahawa – Sunni tribals) – 18%; National Iraqi Project Gathering
(established Sunni parties, excluding IIP) – 17.6%; Allawi – 6.6%; Tribes of Iraq –
4.5%.
Maysan – 27 seats
State of Law – 17.7% (8); ISCI – 14.6% (8); Sadr – 7; Jafari – 8.7% (4); Fadhila –
3.2%; Allawi – 2.3%. New Governor: Mohammad al-Sudani (Maliki); Council
chair: Hezbollah Iraq
Dhi Qar – 31 seats
State of Law – 23.1% (13); pro-Sadr – 14.1% (7); ISCI – 11.1% (5); Jafari – 7.6%
(4); Fadhila – 6.1%; Allawi – 2.8%. New governor – Maliki list; Council chair:
Sadrist
Karbala – 27 seats
List of Maj. Gen. Yusuf al-Habbubi (Saddam era local official) – 13.3% (1 seat);
State of Law – 8.5% (9); Sadr – 6.8% (4); ISCI – 6.4% (4); Jafari – 2.5% ; Fadhila –
2.5%.
Salah Ad Din – 28 seats
IIP-led list – 14.5%; Al awi - 13.9%; Sunni list without IIP – 8.7%; State of Law –
3.5%; ISCI – 2.9%. New council leans Accord/IIP
Qadissiyah – 28 seats
State of Law – 23.1% (11); ISCI – 11.7% (5); Jafari – 8.2% (3); Al awi – 8%; Sadr –
6.7% (2); Fadhila – 4.1%. New governor: Salim Husayn (Maliki list)
Wasit – 28 seats
State of Law – 15.3% (13); ISCI – 10% (6); Sadr – 6% (3); Al awi – 4.6%; Fadhila –
2.7%. New governor: Shi te independent; Council chair: ISCI
Source: UNAMI translation of results issued February 2, 2009, by the Independent Higher Election Commission
of Iraq; Vissar, Reidar. The Provincial Elections: The Seat Allocation Is Official and the Coalition-Forming Process
Begins. February 19, 2009.


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Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks

Table 2. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Bloc/Party
Seats
Seats
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 85 seats after departure of Fadilah (15
seats) and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz
al-Hakim has 30; Da’wa Party (25 total: Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13);
140 128
independents (30).
Kurdistan Alliance - KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Al awi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni parties for Dec.
40 25
vote.
Iraq Accord Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP,
— 44
Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General
People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7); independents (4).
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan.
— 11
2005 vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Al awi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (smal Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Notes: Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10
million)/ December: 75% (12 million).
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Table 3. Assessments of the Benchmarks
July 12,
Subsequent Actions and Assessments - May 2008 Administration
Benchmark
2007
GAO
Sept. 14, 2007
report, June 2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq
Admin.
(Sept. 07) Admin. Report
Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports
Report
(and various press sources)
1. Forming Constitutional Review
(S)
unmet
S
CRC filed final report in August 2008 but major issues remain unresolved and
Committee (CRC) and completing review
satisfactory
require achievement of consensus among major faction leaders.
2. Enacting and implementing laws on De-
(U)
unmet
S
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12, 2008. Allows about 30,000
Baathification
unsatisfact.
fourth ranking Baathists to regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three
party ranks would receive pensions. Could al ow for judicial prosecution of al

ex-Baathists and to firing of about 7,000 ex-Baathists in post-Saddam security
services, and bars ex-Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs. Some
reports suggest some De-Baathification officials using the new law to purge
political enemies or settle scores.
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that
U
unmet
U
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over KRG-central government
ensure equitable distribution of resources
disputes; only framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being
distributed equitably, and 2009 budget maintains 17% revenue for KRG. Kurds
also getting that share of oil exported from newly producing fields in KRG area.
Some U.S. assessments say factions unlikely to reach agreement on these laws
in the near term.
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form
S
partly met
S
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshold (petition by
semi-autonomous regions
33% of provincial council members) to start process to form new regions, but
main blocs agreed that law would take effect April 2008. November 2008:
petition by 2% of Basra residents submitted to IHEC (another way to start
forming a region) to convert Basra province into a single province “region.
Signatures of 8% more were required by mid-January 2009; not achieved.
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to
S on (a)
overall
S on (a) and (c)
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted February 13,
establish a higher electoral commission, (b)
and U on
unmet; (a)
2008, took effect April 2008. Implementing election law adopted September 24,
provincial elections law; (c) a law to specify
the others
met
2008, provided for provincial elections by January 31, 2009. The law provided
authorities of provincial bodies, and (d) set
open list/proportional representation voting, which allows voting for individual
a date for provincial elections
candidates; 25% quota for women (although vaguely worded); and banned
religious symbols on ballots.
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
no rating
unmet
Same as July
Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 Iraq-held detainees passed
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
February 13, 2008. Of 23,000 granted amnesty, about 6,300 released to date.
19,000 detainees held by U.S. being transferred to Iraqi control under SOFA.
7. Enacting and implementing laws on
no rating
unmet
Same as July
Basra operation, discussed above, viewed by Bush Administration as move
militia disarmament
against militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as
condition for their parties to participate in provincial elections. Law on militia
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July 12,
Subsequent Actions and Assessments - May 2008 Administration
Benchmark
2007
GAO
Sept. 14, 2007
report, June 2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq
Admin.
(Sept. 07) Admin. Report
Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports
Report
(and various press sources)
demobilization stalled.
8. Establishing political, media, economic,
S
met
met
No change. “Executive Steering Committee” works with U.S.-led forces.
and services committee to support U.S.
“surge”
9. Providing three trained and ready
S
partly met
S
No change. Eight brigades assigned to assist the surge. Surge now ended.
brigades to support U.S. surge
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with
U
unmet
S to pursue
No significant change. Still some U.S. concern over the Office of the
authorities to make decisions, without
extremists U on
Commander in Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the
political intervention, to pursue all
political
ISF - favoring Shiites. Still, some politically motivated leaders remain in ISF. But,
extremists, including Sunni insurgents and
interference
National Police said to include more Sunnis in command jobs and rank and file
Shiite militias
than one year ago.
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
U
unmet
S on military, U
Bush Administration interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce
providing even-handed enforcement of law
on police
law even-handedly. Tribal support councils not even-handed.
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad
S
partly met
S
No change. Ethno-sectarian violence has fallen sharply in Baghdad.
will not provide a safe haven for any
outlaw, no matter the sect
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
Mixed. S
unmet
same as July 12
Sectarian violence continues to drop; Shiite militias weaker. But, tribal support
eliminating militia control of local security
on (a); U
councils could be considered a government-sanctioned militia, and they are
on (b)
stronger than previously.
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security
S
met
S
Over 50 joint security stations operated in Baghdad at the height of U.S. troop
stations
surge. Now closed in advance of June 30, 2009, deadline for U.S. troops to
cease patrolling Iraqi cities. U.S. troops will ring cities, including Baghdad.
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating U
unmet
U
Continuing but slow progress training ISF, which is expected to secure Iraq by
independently
the end of 2011 under the SOFA, which requires U.S. troops to be out by then.
Obama Administration officials say ISF will meet the challenges.
16. Ensuring protection of minority parties
S
met
S
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution.
in COR
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in
S
partly met
S
About 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was spent.
2007 capital budget for reconstruction.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not
U
unmet
U
Some governmental recriminations against some ISF officers still observed.
falsely accusing ISF members
Source: Compiled by CRS
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Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks


Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612




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