Afghanistan: Politics, Government Formation
and Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 26, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21922
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Afghanistan: Politics, Government Formation and Performance
Summary
The central government’s limited writ and widespread official corruption are helping sustain a
Taliban insurgency, and have fed pessimism about the Afghanistan stabilization effort. However,
President Hamid Karzai has been able to confine ethnic disputes largely to political debate and
competition by engaging in some non-democratic compromises with major faction leaders,
combined with occasional moves to weaken them. This strategy has enabled Karzai to focus on
trying, with only mixed success to date, to win over remaining members of his Pashtun
community, some of which have begun to lean toward or tolerate Taliban insurgents. Karzai has
faced substantial loss of public confidence, in large part due to widespread official corruption, but
his opponents—divided by ethnicity and personal ambition—were unable to form a strong
electoral coalition, and Karzai is considered a favorite for re-election on August 20, 2009.
Winning Pashtun support for the Afghan government is predicated, at least in part, on the success
of efforts over the past few years to build local governing structures. New provincial councils will
be elected on August 20 as well, although their roles in local governance and their relationships to
appointed governors, remains unclear and inconsistent across Afghanistan The trend toward
promoting local governing bodies is to accelerate, according to the Obama Administration’s
review of U.S. strategy, the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009. The core of the
new strategy is a so-called “civilian surge” that will virtually double, to about 900, the number of
U.S. civilian personnel to deploy to Afghanistan to help build its governing and security
institutions, particularly at local levels, and to increase economic development efforts.
Under an FY2009 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32), the Administration is required to
develop “metrics” by which to judge progress in Afghanistan, including the performance and
legitimacy of the Afghan government and its efforts to curb official corruption. Small amounts of
U.S. funds are tied to Afghanistan’s performance on such metrics. The Administration review did
not emphasize building democracy in Afghanistan, although that goal appears implicit within its
recommendations.
For further information, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Contents
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape .......................................................................... 1
Karzai and His Opponents..................................................................................................... 2
The Opposition ............................................................................................................... 2
Government Performance............................................................................................................ 4
Dealing With Regional Faction Leaders ................................................................................ 5
Official Corruption................................................................................................................ 6
Expanding Local Governance................................................................................................ 7
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils................................................................. 7
Security Benefits of Local Governance Programs ............................................................ 8
Overall Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................ 8
Democracy, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues ................................................. 10
2009 Elections .......................................................................................................................... 10
Outlines of the Presidential Contest ..................................................................................... 11
U.S. Policy and Interests in the Election ........................................................................ 13
Figures
Figure 1. Afghanistan Ethnic Groups......................................................................................... 18
Tables
Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process....................................................................... 15
Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations ........................................................................... 16
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 18
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 18
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Afghanistan: Politics, Government Formation and Performance
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape
U.S. policy has been to extend the authority and encourage the reform of Afghanistan’s central
government. The policy has been predicated on the observation that weak and corrupt governance
is causing some Afghans to acquiesce to, or even support outright, Taliban insurgents as providers
of security and impartial justice.
Although democracy promotion, per se, was not a major feature of the Obama Administration
strategy announcement, Afghanistan has taken significant steps toward democracy since the fall
of the Taliban in November 2001. Karzai’s is the first fully elected government in Afghan history,
although there were parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah (the last were in
1969, before his reign was ended in a 1973 military coup). Presidential, parliamentary, and
provincial elections, and adoption of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap
established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn,
Germany on December 5, 2001, (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the Taliban had fallen. The political
transition process is depicted in the table below.
Elections have given citizens a say in governance, but have not produced harmony among
Afghanistan’s many communities. Since its formation in late 2001, Karzai’s government has
come to be progressively dominated by ethnic Pashtuns, who are about 42% of the population and
traditionally have governed Afghanistan. A table on major Pashtun clans is provided below, as is a
map showing the distribution of Afghanistan’s various ethnicities.
Non-Pashtuns generally accept the right of the Pashtun community to hold the top position in
Afghanistan, and it was only during a few brief periods that non-Pashtuns have led Afghanistan
(including the 1992-1996 presidency of the mujahedin government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a
Tajik). However, other ethnicities do want to be included at high levels of the central government
and to have a measure of control over how government programs are implemented in their
geographic regions. Currently, of the major security ministries and organizations, only the
National Directorate for Security (NDS, the Intelligence directorate) is still headed by a non-
Pashtun (Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik). Attempting to maintain the fragile consensus among the
various ethnicities, the other security ministries (Defense, Interior) tend to have non-Pashtuns in
key deputy or subordinate positions. In the Defense Ministry, the chief of staff is a Tajik
(Bismillah Khan), who reports to a Pashtun Defense Minister (Abdul Rahim Wardak).
Afghanistan’s non-Pashtun communities have said that they will not rebel against their
diminution in the upper levels of government, but would keep their competition peaceful.
Some believe that assisting the transition to democracy—but also competing with it—are
traditional Afghan patterns of decisionmaking, which have some democratic and representative
elements. At the national level, the loya jirga, or traditional Afghan assembly consisting of about
1,000 delegates from all over Afghanistan, has been used to ratify some major decisions (the
constitution, long term defense relations with the United States, Karzai’s leadership) in the post-
Taliban period. At the local level, shuras, or jirgas (consultative councils) composed of local
notables, are key mechanisms for making authoritative local decisions or dispensing justice.
1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
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Afghans turn often to these local mechanisms to adjudicate disputes rather than use the national
court system. Some estimates say that 80% of cases are decided in the informal justice system.
Karzai and His Opponents
In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the National Assembly (parliament)—particularly the 249 seat
elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People)—has become the key institution for the
non-Pashtun ethnic minorities to exert influence on Karzai. To the chagrin of many Afghans who
want to build a democratic Afghanistan governed by technocrats and newly emerging political
figures, many seats in the lower house are held by personalities and factions prominent in
Afghanistan’s recent wars, many of whom are non-Pashtuns from the north and the west. These
figures constitute about one third of the Wolesi Jirga; the remainder of the body is divided among
pro-Karzai deputies and technocratic “independents” of varied ethnicities. The factions in the
lower house are not strictly organized according to Afghanistan’s 90 registered political parties,
and the various non-Pashtun ethnicities are not monolithic in opposition to Karzai.
Karzai has not formed his own party, but his core supporters in the Wolesi Jirga are former
members of the conservative Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party; and supporters of Abd-i-Rab
Rasul Sayyaf—a prominent Islamic conservative mujahedin party leader.2 Another base of
Karzai’s support in parliament is the contingent from Qandahar (Karzai’s home province) and
Helmand provinces, including several Karzai clan members. One clan member in the body is his
cousin Jamil Karzai, and another is relative by marriage Aref Nurzai. Karzai’s elder brother,
Qayyum, was in the lower house representing Qandahar until his October 2008 resignation due to
health reasons, although Qayyum continues to represent his brother informally domestically and
abroad, including at 2008 and 2009 meetings to explore negotiated settlements with “moderate”
Taliban figures. Other pro-Karzai Pashtuns are former militia and Taliban leaders, including
Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who led the Afghan component of the failed assault on Osama
bin Laden’s purported redoubt at Tora Bora in December 2001; Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who,
by some accounts, helped Osama bin Laden escape Tora Bora; and Mullah Abdul Salam (“Mullah
Rocketi”), from Zabol. (Salam has filed to run for president in 2009.)
The Opposition
Although the “opposition” to Karzai is fluid and amenable to deals and compromises with him,
those who can be considered opposition are mainly ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara)
who were in an alliance against Taliban rule that was called the “Northern Alliance.” Leaders of
these groups, and particularly Tajiks, view as a betrayal Karzai’s firing of many of the non-
Pashtuns from the cabinet—such as former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Tajik,
dismissed in 2006).
The main ethnic opposition grouping is now called the United Front (UF). It was formed in April
2007 by Wolesi Jirga Speaker Yunus Qanooni and former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani
(both, like Abdullah, are prominent ethnic Tajik Northern Alliance figures and former associates
of the legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masood). It is broader than the Tajik-
dominated Northern Alliance in that it includes some Pashtuns, such as at least two prominent
Soviet-occupation era security figures Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi (Khost Province) and Nur ul-
2 Sayyaf led the Ittihad Islami (Islamic Union) mujahedin party during the war against the Soviet occupation.
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Haq Ulumi, who chairs parliament’s defense committee. Both of Karzai’s Vice Presidents joined
the UF when it was formed. The UF advocates amending the constitution to give more power to
parliament and to empower the elected provincial councils (instead of the President) to select
governors and mayors. Fearing Pashtun consolidation, the UF has been generally opposed to
Karzai’s overtures to Taliban fighters to end their fight and join government—an initiative that is
now backed by the Obama Administration as a means of combating the Taliban insurgency. Yet,
as discussed below in the context of the 2009 presidential elections, the UF is not always
cohesive.
Even before the formation of the UF, the lower house opposition first showed its strength in
March 2006, following the December 19, 2005 inauguration of parliament, by requiring Karzai’s
cabinet to be approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition leverage. However,
Karzai rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. One of those defeated
was a female nominee for Minister of Women’s Affairs, leaving Afghanistan without any women
ministers. (The post had been held by a female since it was established in 2002.) In May 2006,
the opposition compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the highest judicial
body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief justice.
Parliament approved his new Court choices in July 2006, all of whom are trained in modern
jurisprudence.
In May 2007, the UF achieved a majority in parliament to oust Karzai ally Rangin Spanta as
Foreign Minister. Karzai refused to replace him, instead seeking a Supreme Court ruling that
Spanta should remain, on the grounds that his ouster was related to a refugee issue (Iran’s
expulsion of 100,000 Afghan refugees), not a foreign policy issue. The Court has, to date,
supported Karzai, and Spanta remains Foreign Minister.
Karzai and the UF have often competed for the support of the “independents” in the lower house.
Among them are several outspoken women, intellectuals, and business leaders, such as the 39
year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), a leading critic of war-era faction leaders. In May 2007
the lower house voted to suspend her for this criticism for the duration of her term. Others in this
camp include Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, editor of Woman
Mirror magazine; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions
parliamentary powers and has established a “complaints tent” outside the parliament building to
highlight and combat official corruption. (He is running for president in the 2009 elections.) U.S.-
based International Republican Institute (IRI) has helped train the independents; the National
Democratic Institute (NDI) has assisted the more established factions.
Karzai has relatively fewer critics in the 102 seat Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders), partly
because of his bloc of 34 appointments (one-third of that body). He engineered the appointment
of an ally as Speaker—Sibghatullah Mojadeddi—a noted Islamic scholar and former mujahedin
party leader who headed the post-Communist mujahedin government for one month (May 1992).3
He has since 2003 headed an effort to reconcile with Taliban figures (Peace and Reconciliation
Commission, or “PTSD” program). Karzai also appointed Northern Alliance military leader
Muhammad Fahim to the body, perhaps to compensate for his removal as Defense Minister,
although he resigned after a few months and later joined the UF. (He is now Karzai’s primary
running mate in the 2009 elections.) There is one Hindu, and 23 women; 17 are Karzai appointees
and 6 were selected in their own right.
3 The mujahedin party he headed during the anti-Soviet war was the Afghan National Liberation Front.
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The upper house tends to be more Islamist conservative than the lower house, advocating a legal
system that accords with Islamic law, and restrictions on press and Westernized media broadcasts.
In late 2008, the body approved a resolution opposing a U.S.-Afghan plan to establish local
security organs to help keep Taliban infiltrators out of Afghan communities. The plan, now
termed the “Afghan Public Protection Force,” is being tested in Wardak provinces south of Kabul.
On less contentious issues, the executive and the legislature have worked well. During 2008,
parliament passed a labor law that brings Afghan labor law more in line with international labor
laws, a mines law, a law on economic cooperatives, and a convention on tobacco control. It also
confirmed several Karzai nominees, including the final justice to fill out the Supreme Court. In
2009, as discussed further below, the National Assembly approved a Shiite Personal Status Law.
Both houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by the Ministry of Finance, are staffed
by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a “secretariat.” There are 18 oversight committees, a research
unit and a library.
Government Performance4
U.S. policy has been to help expand Afghan institutions and to urge reforms such as merit-based
performance criteria and weeding out of the rampant official corruption. Afghan ministries are
growing their staffs and technologically capabilities, although they still suffer from a low
resource and skill base, and corruption is fed in part by the fact that government workers receive
very low salaries. The anti-corruption and governmental performance aspect of U.S. policy is to
be enhanced as a result of the Obama Administration’s strategy review, as announced March 27,
2009, which concluded that more needed to be done to promote the legitimacy and effectiveness
of the Afghan government at both the Kabul and local levels. As a consequence of the review, the
Administration is attempting to identify or recruit about 430 U.S. civilian personnel—and many
additional civilians from partner countries will join them—to advise Afghan ministries, and
provincial and district administrations.
The Administration also plans to develop metrics to assess progress in building Afghan
governance; the proposed metrics are, according to Undersecretary of Defense Michelle
Flournoy, to be briefed to Congress in May 2009. Some in Congress have said they oppose firm
conditionality of any U.S. aid to Afghanistan on Afghanistan’s performance on such metrics, or
linkage to any timelines of progress in the U.S. stabilization effort. However, the Administration
is required to develop metrics to assess progress in Afghanistan in P.L. 111-32, an FY2009
supplemental appropriation.
There has also been a growing perception that Karzai’s government is weak in its administrative
ability. The former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, who is of Afghan origin
(a Pashtun) was reported in May 2009 to be negotiating with Karzai about becoming a strong
chief executive officer if Karzai is re-elected; these talks came after Khalilzad declined to run
against Karzai in the upcoming election. The Obama Administration did not take a firm position
on the Khalilzad idea during Karzai’s May 2009 visit to the United States, but some in the
4 Some information in this section is from the State Department reports on human rights in Afghanistan for 2007.
March 11, 2008 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100611.htm; the International Religious Freedom Report,
released September 19, 2008. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/2007/90225.htm; and Defense Department “Report on
Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” June 2008.
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Administration are said to believe that a high ranking position for Khalilzad in the Afghan
government could further confuse the channels of communication between the Obama
Administration and the Karzai government. (Khalilzad’s political activities in Afghanistan are
discussed further below.)
Dealing With Regional Faction Leaders
The Obama Administration review did not specifically outline any new measures to sideline
regional strongmen, who are often referred to as “warlords.” Karzai has at times indulged and at
other times move against regional strongmen, but he has been hesitant to confront them outright
to the point where their followers go into armed rebellion. His choice of Muhammad Fahim, the
military chief of the Northern Alliance/UF faction, as first Vice Presidential running mate in the
August 2009 elections is likely to reignite concerns that Karzai continues to rely on faction
leaders rather than promote officials who are politically neutral. Karzai argues that the faction
leaders have significant followings and that compromises with them is needed to keep the
government intact as he focuses on fighting “unrepentant” Taliban insurgents.
In 2008, some observers cited Karzai’s handling of prominent Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostam
as evidence of political weakness. Dostam is often referred to as a “warlord” because of his
command of partisans in his redoubt in northern Afghanistan (Jowzjan and Balkh provinces), and
he is widely accused of human rights abuses of political opponents in the north. To try to separate
him from his militia, in 2005 Karzai appointed him to the post of chief of staff of the armed
forces. On February 4, 2008, Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to
reports that he attacked an ethnic Turkmen rival, but Karzai did not order his arrest for fear of
stirring unrest among Dostam’s followers. To try to resolve the issue without stirring unrest, in
early December 2008 Karzai purportedly reached an agreement with Dostam under which he
resigned as chief of staff and went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the dropping any case
against him.5 In June 2009, Karzai reappointed Dostam as military chief of staff and Dostam
continues to be consulted by leading Afghan politicians in advance of the August election.
Dostam views himself as a competitor with another strong figure in the north, Balkh Province
governor Atta Mohammad. Mohammad is a Tajik but, under a compromise with Karzai, is in
control of a province that is inhabited mostly by Uzbeks – a source of irritation for Dostam and
other Uzbek leaders. Mohammad views himself as relatively independent of Kabul’s writ, and a
Dostam reportedly is hoping that, by supporting Karzai in the election, Dostam will be able to
convince Karzai to remove Mohammad from Balkh after the election.
Another strongman that Karzai has sought to weaken, while keeping him politically satisfied, is
prominent Tajik political leader and former Herat governor Ismail Khan. In 2006, Karzai
appointed him Minister of Energy and Water, taking him away from his political base in the west.
Others say that Karzai’s strategy has been unsuccessful because some strong governors, such as
Ghul Agha Shirzai of Nangarhar, are using their positions to siphon off customs duties at border
crossings, undermining the revenue flow to the central government.
5 CRS e-mail conversation with National Security aide to President Karzai. December 2008.
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In February 2007, both houses passed a law giving amnesty to so-called “warlords.”Karzai
altered the draft to give victims the right to seek justice for any abuses; Karzai did not sign a
modified version in May 2007, leaving the status unclear.
Official Corruption
During the Bush Administration, U.S. officials generally refrained from publicly criticizing
Karzai when, in the interests of political harmony, he has purportedly tolerated corruption.
However, President Obama and his senior aides, including the special representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, have been somewhat more publicly
critical of Karzai’s shortcomings than were Bush Administration officials. The Obama
Administration strategy review highlights the need to reduce official corruption. The FY2009
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32) withholds 10% of about $90 million in State
Department counter-narcotics funding subject to a certification that the Afghan government is
acting against officials who are corrupt or committing gross human rights violations.
Partly as a result of what many Afghans view as a “predatory” central government, some
Afghans—and many international donors—are said to be losing faith in the government and in
Karzai’s leadership. Some observers, such as former Coordinator for Counter-Narcotics and
Justice Reform Thomas Schweich, in a July 27, 2008 New York Times article, have gone so far as
to assert that Karzai, to build political support, is deliberately tolerating officials in his
government who are allegedly involved in the narcotics trade. The New York Times reported
allegations (October 5, 2008) that another Karzai brother, Qandahar provincial council chief
Ahmad Wali Karzai, has protected narcotics trafficking in the province. Some Afghans explain
Ahmad Wali Karzai’s activities as an effort to ensure that his constituents in Qandahar have
financial means to sustain themselves, even if through narcotics trade, before there are viable
alternative sources of livelihood. Another brother, Mahmoud Karzai, has apparently grown
wealthy through real estate and auto sales ventures in Qandahar and Kabul, purportedly by
fostering the impression he can influence his brother, President Karzai. Mahmoud Karzai held a
press conference in Washington, D.C. on April 16, 2009 denying allegations of corruption.
Observers who follow the issue say that most of the corruption takes place in the course of
performing mundane governmental functions, such as government processing of official
documents, in which processing services routinely require bribes in exchange for action.6 In other
cases, Afghan security officials are said to sell U.S./internationally provided vehicles, fuel, and
equipment to supplement their salaries. Other observers who have served in Afghanistan say that
Karzai has appointed some provincial governors to “reward them” and that these appointments
have gone on to “prey” economically on the populations of that province. Several high officials,
despite very low official government salaries, have acquired ornate properties in west Kabul since
2002, according to Afghan observers. Transparency International, a German organization that
assesses governmental corruption worldwide, ranked Afghanistan in 2008 as 176th out of 180
countries ranked in terms of government corruption. Because of the corruption, only about 10%
of U.S. aid is channeled through the Afghan government, although Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke said in May 2009 that empowering Afghan
governance requires raising that to about 40% or 50%. Currently, the Ministry of Health, and the
6 Filkins, Dexter. “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government.” New York Times, January 2, 2009.
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Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and a few others qualify to have U.S. funds
channeled through them.
To try to address the criticism, in August 2008 Karzai, with reported U.S. prodding, set up the
“High Office of Oversight for the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy” with the power to
investigate the police, courts, and the attorney general’s office, and to catalogue the overseas
assets of Afghan officials. Karzai himself declared his assets on March 27, 2009. In October
2008, Karzai replaced the ministers of Interior, of Education, and of Agriculture with officials,
particularly the new Interior Minister (former Soviet-era official Muhammad Hanif Atmar)
believed to be dedicated to reform of their ministries and weeding out of official corruption.
However, Atmar’s appointment incurred further UF concern because Atmar, a Pashtun, replaced a
Tajik (Zarrar Moqbel) in that post. In his public appearances during his visit to the United States
in May 2009, Karzai repeatedly stressed what he said were efforts by him and his government to
remove corrupt officials and combat official corruption.
Some of Karzai’s anti-corruption steps have been recommended in studies within the State
Department, the Afghan government, and the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime which is
responsible for assisting Afghanistan on counter-narcotics. The Afghan government committed
itself to anti-corruption efforts in the so-called “Afghanistan Compact” adopted at an international
meeting in London on February 1, 2006, and it ratified the U.N. Convention Against Corruption
in August 2008.
Expanding Local Governance
In part to address the flaws of the Afghan central government, U.S. policy shifted somewhat in
2008 toward promoting local security and governance solutions. The Afghan government asserts
that it itself is promoting local governance as the next stage in Afghanistan’s political and
economic development, although some say that this is part of an effort by Karzai to improve his
re-election prospects by developing a local networks of supporters. A key indicator of this Afghan
shift came in August 2007 when Karzai placed the selection process for local leaders (provincial
governors and down) in a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)—and out
of the Interior Ministry.
The IDLG, with advice from India and other donors, is also in the process of empowering
localities (Afghanistan has 22,000 villages) to decide on development priorities by forming
Community Development Councils (CDC’s). Thus far, there are about 21,000 CDC’s established
and they are eventually to be elected. The IDLG does not envision that the local leaders being
elected will conflict with any district leaderships elected when Afghanistan finally does hold (still
delayed) district elections. Some accounts say that the efforts to expand local governance has
been hampered by corruption and limited availability of skilled Afghans.
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils
Many believe that the key to effective local governance is the appointment of competent
governors. In March 2008 Karzai replaced the weak and ineffective governor of Helmand
(Asadullah Wafa) with Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman Province and who the U.N. Office
of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) said in an August 2008 report is taking relatively effective action
to convince farmers not to grow crops other than poppy. A subsequent UNODC report in
February 2009 said his efforts are likely to result in a reduction of cultivation in Helmand in
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2009. However, there are reports Karzai wants to replace him with the former governor, Sher
Mohammad Akhundzadeh, who is accused of human rights abuses when he was governor during
2002-2005 but who remains powerful in the province. The UNODC report said that improving
governance in some provinces had contributed to the increase to 18 “poppy free” provinces (out
of 34), from 13 in the same report in 2007. Ghul Agha Shirzai has been effective in curbing
cultivation in Nangarhar, although Shirzai reportedly has also not remitted all the customs duties
collected at the Khyber Pass/Torkham crossing to the central government. Another four provinces
might move into that category in 2009, according to UNODC.
Governing Qandahar is a sensitive issue in Kabul because of Karzai’s active interest in his home
province. The governor of Qandahar was changed (to former General Rahmatullah Raufi,
replacing Asadullah Khalid) after an August 7, 2008 Taliban assault on the Qandahar prison that
led to the freeing of several hundred Taliban fighters incarcerated there. Karzai changed that
governorship again in December 2008, naming Canadian-Afghan academic Tooryalai Wesa as
governor, perhaps hoping that his ties to Canada would assuage Canadian reticence to continuing
its mission in Qandahar beyond 2011.
One problem noted by governance experts is that the role of the elected provincial councils is
unclear. The elections for the provincial councils in all 34 provinces will be held on August 20,
2009, concurrent with the presidential elections. The last provincial council elections were held
concurrent with the parliamentary elections in September 2005. In most provinces, the provincial
councils do not act as true legislatures, and they are considered weak compared to the power and
influence of the provincial governors. However, in Qandahar, where Ahmad Wali is chair of the
provincial council, he is in many ways more powerful than Qandahar governor Tooryalai Wesa,
who is not politically or personally close to President Karzai. Still, the provincial councils play a
major role in choosing the upper house of the National Assembly (Meshrano Jirga) – in the
absence of district councils (no elections held or scheduled), the provincial councils choose 2/3 of
the 102 seat Meshrano Jirga. The councils elected in August 2009 will likely select new
Meshrano Jirga representatives after the lower house elections planned for 2010.
Security Benefits of Local Governance Programs
The IDLG is also the chief implementer of the “Social Outreach Program” which provides
financial support (about $125 – 200 per month) and other benefits to tribal and local leaders in
exchange for their cooperation with U.S./NATO led forces against the Taliban insurgency. The
civilian aspects of the program are funded partly by USAID.
A more widely debated security aspect of the program is the Afghan Public Protection Force,
referred to above. Afghan officials say it is not a resurrection of the traditional tribal militias
(“arbokai”) that provided local security—and often clashed with each other—before and during
Afghanistan’s recent wars, but that the local forces formed under the program are under the
authority of the Interior Ministry. More information on this program is provided in CRS Report
RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman.
Overall Human Rights Issues
The Obama Administration review did not specifically delineate a U.S. policy on Afghanistan’s
human rights practices, although this issue could be deemed addressed implicitly by the
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Administration’s statement that policy is intended to make the Afghan government more
“accountable.” On human rights issues, the overall State Department judgment is that the
country’s human rights record remains poor, according to the Department’s report for 2008
(issued February 25, 2009). The security forces are widely cited for abuses and corruption,
including torture and abuse of detainees.
There has been some backsliding in recent years on media freedoms, which was hailed during
2002-2008 as a major benefit of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. A press law was passed in
September 2008 that gives some independence to the official media outlet, but also contains a
number of content restrictions, and requires that new newspapers and electronic media be
licensed by the government. Prior to the new law, Afghanistan’s conservative Council of Ulema
(Islamic scholars) has been ascendant. With the Council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of
Information and Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that they are
too risque, although the programs were restored in August 2008 under a compromise that also
brought in some Islamic-oriented programs from Turkey. At the same time, there have been a
growing numbers of arrests or intimidation of journalists who criticize the central government or
local leaders. On the other hand, freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the
Taliban with their elections to the parliament (numbers in the table below), their service at many
levels of government, including a governorship (Bamiyan Province), and their growing presence
in the judiciary (67 female judges), the press, and the private sector. Wearing the burqa (head-to-
toe covering) is no longer required but many women still wear it.
The September 2008 International Religious Freedom report says the Afghan government took
limited steps during the year to increase religious freedom. Still, members of minority religions,
including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court
declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of blasphemy in May 2007. In October 2007, Afghanistan
resumed enforcing the death penalty after a four-year moratorium, executing 15 criminals. One
major case incurring international criticism has been the January 2008 death sentence, imposed in
a quick trial, against 23-year-old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material
critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20 years in
prison; a judgment upheld by another court in March 2009. He still might receive a Karzai
pardon.
A positive development is that Afghanistan’s Shiite minority, mostly from the Hazara tribes of
central Afghanistan (Bamiyan and Dai Kundi provinces) can celebrate their holidays openly, a
development unknown before the fall of the Taliban. Some Afghan Shiites follow Iran’s clerical
leaders politically, but Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. The Minister of Justice is a Shiite, the first of that sect to hold that post.
The Afghan government tried to further accommodate Shiite demands in 2009 by enacting
(passage by the National Assembly and signature by Karzai in March 2009) a “Shiite Personal
Status Law,” at the request of Shiite leaders. The law was intended to provide a legal framework
for members of the Shiite minority in family law issues. However, the issue turned controversial
when international human rights groups and governments—and Afghan women in a
demonstration in Kabul—complained about provisions that would appear to sanction marital rape
and which would allow males to control the ability of females in their family to go outside the
home. President Obama publicly called these provisions “abhorrent.” In early April 2009, taking
into account the outcry, Karzai sent the law back to the Justice Ministry for review, saying it
would be altered if it were found to conflict with the Afghan constitution. On April 19, 2009,
Karzai said on CNN that his government’s review of specific provisions of the law, which was
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long and highly detailed, had been inadequate, and Karzai reiterated during his U.S. visit in May
2009 that the controversial provisions would be removed. Revised legislation will have to again
go through the full legislative process. There was further unrest among some Shiite leaders in late
May 2009 when they learned that the Afghan government had dumped 2,000 Iranian-supplied
religious texts into a river when an Afghan official complained that the books insulted the Sunni
majority.
Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2 in the State Department’s June 16, 2009, Trafficking in
Persons report for 2009 on the grounds that it does not fully comply with minimum standards for
the elimination of trafficking in persons, but is making significant efforts to do so. Afghanistan
has established anti-trafficking offices in the offices of the Attorney General in all 34 provinces.
Democracy, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues
USAID has spent about $440 million (FY2002-2008) to build democracy in Afghanistan, and an
additional $68 million to promote “rule of law,” and to assist Afghanistan’s elections. About $900
million in democracy and governance aid is to be provided in FY2009, including through the
FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32). Of this FY2009 funding, about $175 million is to be
provided for election support for the 2009 elections. These funds are being used for the election
process itself as well as for voter registration and education and election security support
functions. The total cost of the Afghan elections in 2009 are to be about $200 million, with other
international donors contributing funds to close the gap left by the U.S. contribution.
Substantial FY2009 aid is being extended to the IDLG for its operations and to support the Social
Outreach Program discussed above. In FY 2009, according to a September 25, 2008 State
Department fact sheet, USAID is providing $8.5 million to support the IDLG and to fund the
Social Outreach Program and a separate “Governor’s Performance Fund” intended to promote
good governance. Another $95 million is going to the IDLG to help it construct new district
centers and rehabilitate fifty provincial and district offices. For comprehensive tables on U.S. aid
to Afghanistan, by fiscal year and by category and type of aid, see CRS Report RL30588,
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
2009 Elections
The 2009 presidential and provincial elections represent another important step in Afghanistan’s
political development, but it now appears that the elections will produce little change. The
provincial elections component has been receiving little attention in international media, in part
because of their unclear.
Afghan leaders appear to have put aside their differences over the date of the election. On
February 3, 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) set August 20, 2009 as
the election date—a change from a date mandated by Article 61 of the Constitution as April 21,
2009—in order to allow at least 30 days before Karzai’s term expires on May 22, 2009. The IEC
decision on the latter date cited Article 33 of the Constitution as mandating universal accessibility
to the voting—and saying that the April 21 date was precluded by difficulties in registering
voters, printing ballots, training staff, advertising the elections, and the dependence on
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international donor funding, in addition to the security questions.7 This decision caused the UF
bloc to say it would not “recognize” Karzai’s presidency after May 22.
In response to the UF criticism that he seeks to prolong his term and use his incumbency to his
advantage, Karzai issued a February 28, 2009 decree directing the IEC to set the elections in
accordance with all provisions of the constitution. However, observers say Karzai’s decree was
largely political because it is widely recognized that Afghan authorities would not be ready to
hold elections by the April 21 date. The IEC reaffirmed on March 4, 2009 that the election must
be held on August 20, 2009.
Karzai’s maneuvers and the official decision did not stop the UF from insisting that Karzai step
down on May 22 in favor of a caretaker government. Karzai argued that the Constitution does not
provide for any transfer of power other than in case of election or death of a President. The
Afghan Supreme Court backed that decision on March 28, 2009. The Obama Administration
publicly backed both the IEC and the Supreme Court rulings even though such backing would be
viewed as an Obama Administration endorsement of Karzai. Ambassador Holbrooke has said on
several occasions that the United States is strictly neutral.
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public
appears to be high. Registration (updating of 2005 voter rolls) began in October 2008 and was
completed as of the beginning of March 2009. About 15.6 million total Afghans updated their
registration information, according to NATO. However, there were also reports of some
registration fraud, with some voters registering on behalf of women who do not, by custom, show
up at registration sites. U.S./NATO military operations in some areas, including in Helmand in
January 2009, were conducted to secure registration centers.
Outlines of the Presidential Contest
Politically, Karzai has benefitted from the August 2009 date because it provides time for the
infusion of U.S. troops (about 21,000 additional due by August 2009, plus about 3,000 partner
combat troop contributions) to secure the Pashtun areas which will be the source of many Karzai
votes. With the August date set, candidates filed to run during April 24-May 8, 2009.
The conventional wisdom among observers is that the two-round election virtually assures victory
by an ethnic Pashtun. In the election-related political deal-making,8 Karzai obtained an agreement
from Muhammad Fahim (a Tajik), formerly his antagonist and a UF member, to run as his first
vice presidential running mate. Karzai, Fahim, and incumbent second Vice President Karim
Khalili registered their ticket on May 4, 2009, just before Karzai left to visit the United States for
the latest round of three way strategic talks (U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan). The Fahim choice was
criticized by human rights and other groups because of Fahim’s long identity as a mujahedin
commander/militia faction leader, but the selection, and Fahim’s acceptance, was viewed as a
major political coup for Karzai by splitting off a major figure from the UF bloc.
7 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat. February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
8 Some of the information in this section obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide. December
2008.
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Anti-Karzai Pashtuns attempted, unsuccessfully, to coalesce around one challenger. Former
Interior Minister Ali Jalali (who resigned in 2005 over Karzai’s compromises with faction
leaders), and former Finance Minister (2002-2004) and Karzai critic Ashraf Ghani, tried to forge
a single ticket, but did not reach agreement. In the end, Ghani registered his candidacy, but
without Jalali or strong representation from other ethnicities in his vice presidential slots. He has
appeared frequently in U.S. media broadcasts saying Karzai has failed to establish legitimate and
successful governance, but he has spent much time in the United States and Europe and might
lose support among some average Afghans who might view him as a global technocrat who is not
necessarily in touch with day to day problems in Afghanistan. Ghani may show strength in the
east of Afghanistan, the seat of his Ahmedzai clan, but is unlikely to draw substantial support in
the south, the base of Pashtun support for Karzai. One press report says Ghani is making
extensive use of the internet for advertising and fundraising, and that he is in talks with political
consultant James Carville to possibly advise his campaign.9
As noted above, the UF was not successful in forging a united front to challenge Karzai.
Burhanuddin Rabbani (Afghanistan president during 1992-1996), the elder statesman of the UF
bloc, reportedly insisted that an ethnic Tajik (the ethnic core of the UF) head the UF ticket.
Observers in Kabul say the UF had always leaned toward former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah to its slate, and Dr. Abdullah did register to run. His running mates are Dr. Cheragh Ali
Cheragh, a Hazara who did poorly in the 2004 election, and a little known Pashtun, Homayoun
Wasefi. Some reports in May 2009 said that Ghani and Abdullah might still forge a joint ticket,
which would require one of them to drop out of the presidential slot and substitute as a
replacement vice presidential running mate, but no agreement has been announced. Another
problem for the UF is that Ahmad Zia Massoud (currently one of Karzai’s Vice Presidents) did
not win support of the bloc to head its ticket. Massoud is the brother of Ahmad Shah Masoud (see
above), who was killed purportedly by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks on the
United States, and Ahmad Zia has support among followers of his slain brother.
Karzai’s prospects were further enhanced when several prominent Pashtuns did not run. Ghul
Agha Shirzai, a member of the powerful Barakzai clan, reportedly reached an arrangement with
Karzai the week of the registration period that headed off his candidacy. Anwar al-Haq Ahady, the
former Finance Minister and Central Bank governor, did not run. Nor did Bush Administration
U.S. Ambassador to U.N., Afghan-born Zalmay Khalilzad himself run; he organized a conference
of Karzai opponents in Dubai in early March 2009 and was, up until the last minute, said to be
trying to build support for a candidacy or to unify anti-Karzai factions. As noted above, he is now
discussing with Karzai a position in his post-election cabinet/government if Karzai is re-elected.
Because his ticket appears to unite major ethnic groups and demonstrates splits within the
Tajik/UF grouping , Karzai is now viewed as a clear favorite for re-election. Despite his position
of strength, Karzai has agreed to public debates with his main rivals. According to a recent
International Republican Institute poll, Karzai has about 30% support, but Dr. Abdullah has only
7% in the same poll, and Ghani is polling lower than that. Karzai’s public support has been
undermined by perceptions of ineffectiveness and corruption, but many Afghan voters apparently
see many of Afghanistan’s problems as beyond Karzai’s control. Karzai has in some measure
used some U.S. policy setbacks to bolster his electoral prospects, for example by railing against
civilian casualties resulting from U.S./NATO operations, most notably an August 21, 2008,
9 Mulrine, Anna. “Afghan Presidential Candidate Takes a Page From Obama’s Playbook.” U.S. News and World
Report, June 25, 2009.
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airstrike that some Afghans said killed 90 civilians (the incident is in dispute) near Herat city.
Some observers say that Karzai’s main potential opponents are basing their election strategy on
creating the impression that the Obama Administration prefers that Karzai not be re-elected. Even
if this impression took hold, it is not certain that Afghan voters would cast their ballots on this
basis.
Other significant candidates, of the 44 slates that registered by the May 8 deadline and were
approved to run on June 15, 2009, are shown in the box below.
Other Candidates
Abd al-Salam Rocketi ("Mullah Rocketi) - A Pashtun, reconciled Taliban figure, member of the lower house of
parliament. May do unexpectedly well if Taliban sympathizers participate, but some believe he might drop out later
and endorse Karzai.
Hedayat Amin Arsala – A Pashtun, was a Vice President during 2001-2004. He is a prominent economist and
perceived as close to the former royal family.
Abd al Jabbar Sabit - A Pashtun, was fired by Karzai in 2007 for considering run against Karzai in the election.
Shahnawaz Tanai - A Pashtun. Served as Defense Minister in the Communist government of Najibullah (which was
left in place after the Soviets withdrew in 1989) but led failed coup against Najibullah in April 1990.
Mirwais Yasini. Another strong Pashtun candidate. 48-year-old deputy speaker of the lower house of parliament but
also without wel known non-Pashtun running mates.
Haj Nasrullah Baryalai. Pashtun tribal leader from Jalalabad. Some say he is a candidate to watch, although he attracts
little attention outside Afghanistan.
Ramazan Bashardost. A Hazara, mentioned above, running on platform of anti-corruption and improving government
services.
Frozan Fana and Shahla Ata. The two women candidates in the race. Fana is the wife of the first post-Taliban aviation
minister who was killed during an altercation at Kabul airport in 2002. These two candidates are widely given almost
no chance of winning.
U.S. Policy and Interests in the Election
Some believe that U.S. policy requires a new Afghan president untainted by corruption among
associates. Others believe that Karzai’s opponents might not necessarily perform better if they are
elected, and would similarly favor their clansmen and other inner circle members. Others say that
Karzai continues to deserve U.S. support because he has held the various ethnicities together
despite the major strains of the Taliban insurgency.
No matter the implications for the U.S. stabilization mission, the Obama Administration has
decided that trying to affect the outcome of the election would be counterproductive or
inappropriate. U.S. officials say the United States is completely neutral in the election.
Ambassador Timothy Carney is heading the U.S. election support effort at U.S. Embassy Kabul
and his mission is, in part, to ensure that the United States is even-handed in the elections. Still,
some leading Karzai supporters criticized the attendance by Ambassador Karl Eikenberry at news
conferences of the major candidates in mid-June, as the campaign period formally kicked off.
U.S. policy is said to increasingly be accommodating the likelihood of a Karzai re-election.
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A major fear among experts is that the election will be marred by violence, or by real or perceived
fraud. Some believe that if many candidates enter the race, there will be small percentages
separating each candidate, magnifying the effect of any fraud. If the election is derailed by un-
ending fraud charges or the grave security situation, it is possible that Afghan leaders could
convene a loya jirga to select a president. Some believe that this process could lead to the
emergence of a Karzai opponent, and would confront the Obama Administration with a decision
on whether to exert influence on behalf of a challenger at such a meeting.
Another fear among some experts is that Afghan voters will end up selecting a non-Pashtun as
President. While such an outcome could represent a legitimate outcome of a democratic process,
some believe that Afghanistan’s Pashtuns—who view it as their right to rule Afghanistan—will
not accept that outcome and would rise in rebellion.
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Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim Administration
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key
security positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai
reaffirmed as leader by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional
Afghan assembly).
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong
presidency, a rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance
presidential power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men
and women equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are
not “un-Islamic”; allows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter
7, Article 15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential,
provincial, and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-
hereditary position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for 5-year term, held Oct. 9, 2004.
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia
Masud, a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud,
who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the Sept. 11 attacks, and Karim
Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter,
Northern Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female
ran, got about 1%. Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq got 11.7%; and Dostam won
10%. Funded with $90 million in international aid, including $40 million from U.S.
(FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106).
Parliamentary Elections
Elections held Sept. 18, 2005 on Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
stood as individuals, not part of party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower
house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house
(Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). Voting was for one candidate only, although
number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to
33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11
seats each. The body is 28% female (68 persons), in line with the legal minimum of 68
women - two per each of the 34 provinces. Upper house appointed by Karzai (34
seats, half of which are to be women), by the provincial councils (34 seats), and
district councils (remaining 34 seats). There are 23 women in it, above the 17
required by the constitution. Because district elections (400 district councils) were
not held, provincial councils selected 68 on interim basis. 2,815 candidates for
Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5
million registered. Funded by $160 million in international aid, including $45 million
from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 109-13).
Provincial Elections/
Provincial elections held Sept. 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections.
Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial
District Elections
council sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats
are 420, of which 121 held by women. l3,185 candidates, including 279 women. Some
criticize the provincial election system as disproportionately weighted toward large
districts within each province. District elections not held due to complexity and
potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Cabinet
Full-term 27 seat cabinet named by Karzai in December 2004. Heavily weighted
toward Pashtuns, and created new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. Rahim Wardak
named Defense Minister, replacing Northern Alliance military leader Mohammad
Fahim. Qanooni not in cabinet, subsequently was selected Wolesi Jirga Speaker.
Northern Alliance figure Dr. Abdullah replaced as Foreign Minister in March 2006.
Cabinet reshuffle in October 2008 including appointment of Muhammad Hanif Atmar
as Interior Minister.
Next Elections
Presidential and provincial elections to be held Aug. 20, 2009. Parliamentary, district,
and municipal elections to follow in 2010. Each election to cost $200 million.
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Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations
Clan/Tribal
Location Example
Confederations
Durrani
Qandahar
Popalzai
Qandahar
Hamid Karzai, President of
Afghanistan; Jelani Popal,
head of the Independent
Directorate of Local
Governance
Alikozai Qandahar
N/A
Barakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Ghul Agha Shirzai
(Governor, Nangarhar
Province)
Achakzai Qandahar,
Helmand
Noorzai
Qandahar
Noorzai brothers, briefly in
charge of Qandahar after the
fall of the Taliban in
November 2001
Ghilzai
Paktia, Paktika and Khost
Mullah Omar
Ahmadzai
Paktia, Paktika, Khost
Mohammed Najibullah
(pres.1986-1992)
Ashraf Ghani, Finance
Finance Minister 2002-2004
Taraki
Nur Mohammed Taraki
(leader 1978-1979)
Kharoti
Hafizullah Amin (leader,
September - December1979)
Zadran
Paktia, Khost
Pacha Khan Zadran (see
text) ; Insurgent leader
Jalaludin Haqqani
Kodai
Mangal
Paktia, Khost
Ghulab Mangal (Governor of
Helmand Province)
Orkazai
Shinwari
Nangarhar province
Fasl Ahmed Shinwari, former
Supreme Court Chief Justice
Mandezai
Sangu Khel
Sipah
Wardak
Wardak Province
Abdul Rahim Wardak
(Pashtu-speaking
(Defense Minister)
Non-Pashtun)
Afridis
Tirah, Khyber Pass, Kohat
Zaka khel
Jawaki
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Clan/Tribal
Location Example
Confederations
Adam khel
Malikdin, etc
Yusufzais
Khursan, Swat, Kabul
Akozais
Malizais
Loezais
Khattaks
Kohat, Peshawar, Bangash
Akorai
Terai
Mohmands
Near Khazan, Peshawar
Baizai
Alimzai
Uthmanzais
Khawazais
Wazirs Mainly
in
Waziristan
Darwesh khel
Bannu
Source: This table was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information, Research Specialist, CRS. Louis Dupree, and
Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, Edited by: Shah Muhammad Rais, Pashtunistan, 2003. S. Iftikhar Hussain, Some Major
Pukhtoon Tribes Along The Pak-Afghan Border, Area Studies Center, University of Peshawar, Pakistan, 2000.
Brigadier Haroon Rashid, The History of the Pathans, Vol 1: The Sarbani Pathans, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2002. N/A
indicates no example is available.
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Figure 1. Afghanistan Ethnic Groups
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Acknowledgments
The table of major Pashtun tribes was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist CRS.
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