U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF):
Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
June 22, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21048
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations and the
Administration has given U.S. SOF greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide
counterterrorism operations. U.S. SOF’s growing need for enabling forces that are largely drawn
from conventional forces is a potential policy issue for congressional consideration.
Congressional Research Service
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Overview .............................................................................................................................. 1
Command Structures and Components .................................................................................. 1
Expanded USSOCOM Responsibilities ................................................................................. 1
Army Special Operations Forces ........................................................................................... 2
Air Force Special Operations Forces ..................................................................................... 3
AFSOC Initiatives................................................................................................................. 3
No C-27s for AFSOC? .................................................................................................... 3
Naval Special Operations Forces ........................................................................................... 4
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) ............................................................... 4
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)........................................................................... 4
Current Issues ............................................................................................................................. 5
FY2010 USSOCOM Budget Request .................................................................................... 5
SOF Competition for Support Forces .................................................................................... 6
Issues for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 6
SOF and Adequacy of Support Forces ................................................................................... 6
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 7
Congressional Research Service
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
Background
Overview
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small, elite military units with special training and
equipment that can infiltrate into hostile territory through land, sea, or air to conduct a variety of
operations, many of them classified. SOF personnel undergo rigorous selection and lengthy
specialized training. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) oversees the training,
doctrine, and equipping of all U.S. SOF units.
Command Structures and Components
In 1986 Congress, concerned about the status of SOF within overall U.S. defense planning,
passed measures (P.L. 99-661) to strengthen its position. These actions included the establishment
of USSOCOM as a new unified command. USSOCOM is headquartered at MacDill Air Force
Base in Tampa, FL. The Commander of USSOCOM is a four-star officer who may be from any
service. Commander, USSOCOM reports directly to the Secretary of Defense, although an
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and
Interdependent Capabilities (ASD/SOLIC&IC) provides immediate civilian oversight over many
USSOCOM activities.
USSOCOM has about 54,000 Active Duty, National Guard and Reserve personnel from all four
Services and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four
components, and one sub-unified command.1 USSOCOM’s components are the U.S. Army
Special Operations Command (USASOC); the Naval Special Warfare Command
(NAVSPECWARCOM); the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC); and the Marine
Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC). The Joint Special Operations Command
(JSOC) is a USSOCOM sub-unified command.
Expanded USSOCOM Responsibilities
In addition to its Title 10 authorities and responsibilities, USSOCOM has been given additional
responsibilities. In the 2004 Unified Command Plan, USSOCOM was given the responsibility for
synchronizing DOD plans against global terrorist networks and, as directed, conducting global
operations.2 In this regard, USSOCOM “receives, reviews, coordinates and prioritizes all DOD
plans that support the global campaign against terror, and then makes recommendations to the
Joint Staff regarding force and resource allocations to meet global requirements.”3 In October
1 Information in this section is from “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public
Affairs, February 2009, p. 7. DOD defines a sub-unified command as a command established by commanders of
unified commands, when so authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a
continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may
be established on an area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and
responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise operational control of assigned
commands and forces within the assigned joint operations area.
2 “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public Affairs, February 2009, p. 6.
3 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
1
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
2008, USSOCOM was designated as the DOD proponent for Security Force Assistance (SFA).4 In
this role, USSOCOM will perform a synchronizing function in global training and assistance
planning similar to the previously described role of planning against terrorist networks. In
addition, USSOCOM is now DOD’s lead for countering threat financing, working with the U.S.
Treasury and Justice Departments on means to identify and disrupt terrorist financing efforts.
Army Special Operations Forces
U.S. Army SOF (ARSOF) includes approximately 30,000 soldiers from the Active Army,
National Guard, and Army Reserve who are organized into Special Forces, Ranger, and special
operations aviation units, along with civil affairs units, psychological operations units, and special
operations support units. ARSOF Headquarters and other resources, such as the John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School, are located at Fort Bragg, NC. Five active Special Forces
(SF) Groups (Airborne), consisting of about 1,400 soldiers each, are stationed at Fort Bragg and
at Fort Lewis, WA, Fort Campbell, KY, and Fort Carson, CO. The 7th Special Forces Group
(Airborne) currently stationed at Ft. Bragg will be moving to Eglin Air Force Base, FL by
September 2011 as mandated by the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Act5. Special Forces
soldiers—also known as the Green Berets—are trained in various skills, including foreign
languages, that allow teams to operate independently throughout the world. In December 2005, a
Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) was activated at Ft. Bragg, NC, to provide
combat service support and medical support to Army special operations forces.6
In FY2008, the Army began to increase the total number of Army Special Forces battalions from
15 to 20, with one battalion being allocated to each active Special Forces Group. In August 2008,
the Army stood up the first of these new battalions—the 4th Battalion, 5th Special Forces Groups
(Airborne)—at Fort Campbell, KY.7 Two Army National Guard SF groups are headquartered in
Utah and Alabama. An elite airborne light infantry unit specializing in direct action operations8,
the 75th Ranger Regiment, is headquartered at Fort Benning, GA, and consists of three battalions.
Army special operations aviation units, including the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
(Airborne) headquartered at Fort Campbell, KY, feature pilots trained to fly the most
sophisticated Army rotary-wing aircraft in the harshest environments, day or night, and in adverse
weather.
Some of the most frequently deployed SOF assets are civil affairs (CA) units, which provide
experts in every area of civil government to help administer civilian affairs in operational
theaters. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) is the only active CA unit, and plans call for
4 Information in this section is from testimony given by Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander, U.S. SOCOM, to the
House Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request for the U.S. Special Operations Command, June 4, 2009.
5 Henry Cuningham, “Delays in 7th Group Move Could be Costly,” Fayetteville (NC) Observer, November 7, 2008.
6 “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public Affairs, February 2009, p. 10.
7 Sean D. Naylor, “Special Forces Expands,” Army Times, August 11, 2008.
8 Direct action operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special
operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to
seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive
actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use
of force to achieve specific objectives.
Congressional Research Service
2
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
the brigade to expand from one to four battalions by 2009.9 All other CA units reside in the
Reserves and are affiliated with conventional Army units. Psychological operations units
disseminate information to large foreign audiences through mass media. The active duty 4th
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Group (Airborne) is stationed at Fort Bragg, and two Army
Reserve PSYOPS groups work with conventional Army units.
Air Force Special Operations Forces
The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) includes about 13,000 active and reserve
personnel. AFSOC is headquartered at Hurlburt Field, FL, along with the 720th Special Tactics
Group, the 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW) and the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School
and Training Center.10 The 27th SOW is located at Cannon Air Force Base (AFB), NM. The 352nd
Special Operations Group is at RAF Mildenhall, England, and the 353rd Special Operations
Group, is at Kadena Air Base, Japan. Reserve AFSOC components include the 193rd SOW, Air
National Guard, stationed at Harrisburg, PA and the 919th Special Operations Wing, Air Force
Reserve, stationed at Duke Field, FL. AFSOC’s three active-duty flying units are composed of
more than 100 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft.
AFSOC Initiatives
AFSOC officials expect to have the first CV-22 tilt rotor squadron operational in 2009. 11 This
first AFSOC Osprey squadron will have six aircraft and nine crews. The Osprey will eventually
replace AFSOC’s MH-53 Pave Low helicopters, which were officially retired in 2008.
Reportedly, the Air Force is requesting funding to accelerate the purchase of CV-22s to eight
aircraft per year starting in FY2010, which will enable AFSOC to have their full complement of
50 CV-22s by 2015.12 AFSOC is also accelerating efforts to replace the aging AC-130U gunship
fleet with a lighter version—perhaps a modified version of the C-27B Spartan Joint Cargo
Aircraft (JCA).13 AFSOC is said to be working to increase the number of MQ-1 Predator and
MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) it uses to support special operations missions by
about two-thirds.14
No C-27s for AFSOC?15
AFSOC had been slated to receive 16 C-27 Spartans that were to be converted into a lighter
version of the AC-130U gunship, but DOD removed Army funding for 40 C-27s from its FY2010
budget. AFSOC had planned on getting two of the Army’s C-27s in FY2011 and pay the Army
9 Kevin Maurer, “Newly Formed 95th Civil Affairs Brigade Activates,” Fayetteville Times, August 18, 2006.
10 Information in this section is taken from “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM
Public Affairs, February 2009, p. 27.
11 Nathan Hodge, “AFSOC to Stand Up First Osprey Unit in 2009,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 28, 2008, p. 10.
12 Marina Malenic, “Bell-Boeing Sees V-22 Program Growth, Potential Line Expansion,” Defense Daily, March 16,
2009.
13 John Reed, “AFSOC Quickly Working to Field Next-Generation Light Gunship,” InsideDefense.com, June 27, 2008.
14 John Reed, “AFSOC Working to Increase Drone Fleet by Two-Thirds in POM-10 Build,” InsideDefense.com, July
18, 2008.
15 Sam LaGrone, “AFSOC Plan for C-27s Takes Nosedive,” Air Force Times, May 4, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
3
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
back in FY2015. While this arrangement between AFSOC and the Army has been described as
being “outside the normal budgeting process” it is viewed by some as indicative of how badly
AFSOC wants the C-27 to help replace capabilities resident in its current aging AC-130U fleet.
The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) in its June 17, 2009, summary of H.R. 2647, the
FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, has expressed concern that the JCA program, that
originally provide for 78 C-27Js for the Army and Air Force, has been reduced by DOD to only
38 aircraft for the Air Force. The HASC has asked the Army and Air Force for a report to identify
new C-27J force structure and this report might be expected to include AFSOC requirements for
the C-27J.
Naval Special Operations Forces16
The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) is located in Coronado, CA. NSWC is organized
around 10 SEAL Teams, two SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams, and three Special Boat
Teams. SEAL Teams consist of six SEAL platoons each, consisting of two officers and 16
enlisted personnel. The major operational components of NSWC include Naval Special Warfare
Groups One, Three, and Eleven stationed in Coronado, CA, and Naval Special Warfare Groups
Two and Four and the Naval Special Warfare Development Group in Little Creek, VA. These
components deploy SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams, and Special Boat Teams
worldwide to meet the training, exercise, contingency and wartime requirements of theater
commanders. NSWC has approximately 5,400 total active-duty personnel—including 2,450
SEALs and 600 Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen (SWCC)—as well as a 1,200-person
reserve component of approximately 325 SEALs, 125 SWCC and 775 support personnel. SEALs
are considered the best-trained combat swimmers in the world, and can be deployed covertly
from submarines or from sea and land-based aircraft.
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 17
On November 1, 2005, DOD announced the creation of the Marine Special Operations Command
(MARSOC) as a component of USSOCOM. MARSOC consists of four subordinate units—the 1st
and 2nd Marine Special Operations Battalions, the Marine Special Operations Advisory Group,
and the Marine Special Operations Support Group. MARSOC Headquarters, the 2nd Marine
Special Operations Battalion, the Marine Special Operations School, and the Marine Special
Operations Support Group are stationed at Camp Lejeune, NC. The 1st Marine Special Operations
Battalion is stationed at Camp Pendleton, CA. MARSOC forces have been deployed world-wide
to conduct a full range of special operations activities.
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
According to DOD, the JSOC is “a joint headquarters designed to study special operations
requirements and techniques; ensure interoperability and equipment standardization; plan and
16 Information in this section is from “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public
Affairs, February 2009, p. 18 and the U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command Website, http://www.navsoc.navy.mil,
accessed March 19, 2009.
1717 Information in this section is from “Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command,” USSOCOM Public
Affairs, February 2009, p. 34.
Congressional Research Service
4
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
conduct joint special operations exercises and training; and develop joint special operations
tactics.”18 While not officially acknowledged by DOD or USSOCOM, JSOC, which is
headquartered at Pope Air Force Base, NC, is widely believed to command and control what are
described as the military’s special missions units—the Army’s Delta Force, the Navy’s SEAL
Team Six—as well as the 75th Ranger Regiment, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
and the Air Force’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron.19 JSOC’s primary mission is believed to be
identifying and destroying terrorists and terror cells worldwide.
Current Issues
FY2010 USSOCOM Budget Request
USSOCOM’s FY2010 Budget Request is $8.647 billion—with $5.9 billion in the baseline budget
and $2.7 billion in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget.20 Among other things,
this request is intended to support FY2010 USSOCOM growth of 2,349 military and civilian
personnel allocated as follows:
• U.S. Army Special Operations Command: 1,048 personnel;
• Air Force Special Operations Command: 791 personnel;
• Naval Special Warfare Command: 157 personnel;
• Marine Corps Special Operations Command: 163 personnel;
• Joint Special Operations Command: 62 personnel;
• Theater Special Operations Commands: 139 personnel; and
• Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command: a net reduction of 11
personnel.
In its markup of the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647) authorized $ 9
billion, an increase of $308 million in order to fully support USSOCOM’s
counterterrorism mission as well as, among other things, providing assistance to foreign
forces supporting USSOCOM’s counterterror efforts, a NATO Special Operations
Coordination Center, and the Irregular Warfare Support Program.21
18 USSOCOM website http://www.socom.mil/components/components.htm, accessed March 19, 2008.
19 Jennifer D. Kibbe, “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 83, Number 2, March/April 2004
and Sean D. Naylor, “JSOC to Become Three-Star Command,” Army Times, February 13, 2006.
20 Information in this section is from the United States Special Operations Command FY2010 Budget Highlights, May
21, 2009.
21 House Armed Services Committee, Summary of H.R. 2647, the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, June
17, 2009, pp. 27-28.
Congressional Research Service
5
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
SOF Competition for Support Forces22
There is growing concern by some that when large numbers of conventional forces depart Iraq,
that SOF staying behind may not have adequate logistical and transportation support, as U.S.
conventional support units that provide significant support for SOF, will not be replaced. This
support includes fuel, maintenance, helicopter and ground transportation, as well as facility and
food support services. Support from conventional units—sometimes referred to as “enablers”—
such as engineers, military police, intelligence, signal, and medical units is also in high demand
from SOF units. One concern is that when conventional forces do begin their anticipated large-
scale departure this year, that remote SOF units that rely on nearby conventional force support,
may have to pull out of their operational areas and consolidate near remaining logistical support
units, which could adversely impact SOF missions. A similar dependence by SOF in Afghanistan
on conventional units is also of concern. In the case of Afghanistan, where there are no immediate
plans for force reductions, SOF forces rely on conventional helicopter units for over one half of
their helicopter support. Because of anticipated increased demand for support as the U.S.
increases conventional force levels in Afghanistan, there is concern that support forces will have a
difficult time meeting growing demands, and that SOF operations may suffer. One proposed
solution would be the establishment of additional SOF support units within USSOCOM, but
USSOCOM leadership is said to favor the development of more conventional force support units
that could, in turn, be used to support SOF units and operations.
Issues for Congress
SOF and Adequacy of Support Forces
SOF’s access to support forces and enablers also raises a number of issues for potential
consideration. While USSOCOM does have organic support forces for its components, the
demands of operating in almost 60 countries has likely strained the modest capabilities of these
support forces. In Iraq, the possibility that SOF operations may have to be modified because there
may not be enough support forces or enablers to sustain them after the majority of U.S.
conventional forces depart is particularly troubling. The short-term solution appears to be to
retain support forces and enablers in Iraq to insure adequate support for SOF and increase support
forces and enablers in Afghanistan so that SOF operations are not degraded by the anticipated
introduction of additional U.S. conventional ground forces in Afghanistan. These solutions, while
potentially solving the SOF support problem, would likely create problems for the Army because
they might be unable to reset these forces to support future deployments of Army combat
formations. Longer term solutions could include establishing organic, higher echelon support
forces in USSOCOM, but USSOCOM would prefer that the Services increase their support forces
so that USSOCOM forces could obtain their in-theater support from these units.
22Information in this section is from Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on
Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, “Special Operations Forces: Challenges and Opportunities,”
Roger D. Carstens, Center for a New American Security, March 3, 2009; Lolita C. Baldor, “Iraqi Pullout Raises
Concerns for Elite Forces,” Army Times, March 7, 2009; Sean D. Naylor, “A Duel for the Enablers of U.S. Wars,”
Defense News, March 16, 2009, p. 33.
Congressional Research Service
6
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
While all Services provide a degree of support to their deployed USSOCOM components, a
significant amount of in-theater support to U.S. SOF comes from the Army. In 2009, the total
Army (Active and Reserve) plans to have 85 multi-functional support brigades and 113 functional
support brigades, which would provide a significant amount of logistical and “enabling” support
to land-based deployed U.S. SOF.23 This represents 87% of planned growth, as the Army plans on
a total of 97 multi-functional support brigades and 130 functional support brigades by FY2013 to
achieve 100% planned growth. While the Army likely accounted for support to SOF as well as
other Services in determining this total proposed growth in support brigades, it is not clear if the
current high level of SOF support in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters has changed
requirements. Requirements for support brigades and possibly Army aviation units that, in some
cases, have provided over half of U.S. SOF’s rotary wing support, may have increased since the
Army first developed its support force structure requirements. Given current and potential future
demands from U.S. SOF for logistics support and support from “enablers,” a comprehensive
review of the adequacy of current and planned logistical and enabling forces might be beneficial.
Such a review—possibly involving DOD, the Services, and USSOCOM—might include an
examination of all potential solutions, including the establishment of additional units within
USSOCOM, or establishing new units within the Services from which USSOCOM can draw
support when deployed on operations.
Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
23 U.S. Army Briefing to Congressional Staff Members: GAO Report on Army Modularity, January 16, 2009, p. 10.
Congressional Research Service
7