Instability in Chad
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
June 19, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22798
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Instability in Chad
Summary
The political and security situation in Chad remains volatile. Ethnic clashes, banditry, and
fighting between government forces and rebel groups, both Chadian and Sudanese, have
contributed to a fragile security situation in the east. The instability has forced over 185,000
Chadians from their homes in the past three years. An additional 30,000 fled to neighboring
Cameroon during a February 2008 rebel attack on the capital city. In addition to the internal
displacement, over 323,000 refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan’s
Darfur region have fled violence in their own countries and now live in refugee camps in east and
southern Chad. With Chadian security forces stretched thin, the threat of bandit attacks on the
camps and on aid workers has escalated. The instability has also impacted some 700,000
Chadians whose communities have been disrupted by fighting and strained by the presence of the
displaced. The United Nations and the European Union began deployment of a multidimensional
presence in Chad and the CAR in late 2007 to improve regional security so as to facilitate the safe
and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons. The U.N. mission, known as
MINURCAT, assumed peacekeeping operations from the EU force in March 2009, but it
continues to face logistical challenges in its deployment.
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Instability in Chad
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Political Instability ...................................................................................................................... 1
The Armed Opposition................................................................................................................ 2
Ethnic Conflict............................................................................................................................ 3
Regional Conflict ....................................................................................................................... 3
U.N. Presence and EU Peacekeepers ........................................................................................... 4
Child Soldiers ............................................................................................................................. 5
Oil and the Economy................................................................................................................... 5
U.S.-Chadian Relations ............................................................................................................... 6
Prospects .................................................................................................................................... 7
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 7
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Instability in Chad
Introduction
Chad, a landlocked country roughly twice the size of Texas, has had a turbulent history of
religious and ethnic conflict and intermittent civil war in its 40 years of independence. Bordered
by Libya to the north and Sudan to the east, it is considered to be among the world’s ten poorest
countries, according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development
Index. Persistent conflict has hindered the country’s development, despite significant oil reserves.
One in five children dies before the age of five. Chad also is perceived to be one of the world’s
most corrupt countries.1 Foreign Policy magazine ranked Chad fourth on its Failed States Index.2
Chad at a Glance
Political Instability
Population: 10.3 million
Population Growth Rate: 2.069%
Chad gained its independence from France in 1960.
Gross National Income (GNI): $4.9 billion
The country has been politically unstable since
1965, when a tax protest led northern, Islamic
GNI per Capita: $440
tribes to rebel against the southern, Christian-
Key Exports: Oil, cotton, cattle, gum arabic
dominated government. Years of authoritarian rule
Religions: Muslim 51%, Christian 35%, indigenous
and civil war followed. Chad’s current president,
beliefs 14%
Idriss Déby Itno, a former general, took power by
Language: French and Arabic (official), Sara, and
force when he launched a rebellion against then-
more than 120 indigenous languages and dialects
President Hissein Habré from Sudan in 1989.
Infant Mortality Rate: 98.69 deaths per 1,000 births
Déby’s forces, reportedly aided by Libya and
Sudan and largely unopposed by French troops
Life Expectancy: 47.7 years
stationed in Chad, seized the capital, N’Djamena,
HIV/AIDS Adult Prevalence: 3.5%
in 1990, forcing Habré into exile. Habré has been
Literacy: 25.7% ; male: 40.7%, female 12.8%
sentenced to death in absentia in Chad and is slated
to be tried in Senegal for human rights abuses
Sources: CIA; UNAIDS; World Bank
committed under his regime.3 Déby, named
president in 1991, pledged to create a democratic
multi-party political system.
Chad’s first multi-party presidential elections were held in 1996; legislative elections followed in
1997. Déby won reelection in 2001, and his party won a majority of seats in the 2002 legislative
elections. According to the State Department’s annual human rights reports, Chad’s elections have
all been marked by irregularities and fraud. The opposition boycotted the most recent elections,
held in 2006 after the constitution was amended to allow Déby a third term. The government
initiated a dialogue with the political opposition in 2007; in August, the parties agreed to postpone
the 2007 legislative elections to 2009 to allow a new census and the creation of a more
representative electoral commission. A date for the 2009 elections has yet to be set.
1 Chad ranks 173 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, which
measures business people and country analysts’ perceptions of corruption among public officials and politicians.
2 The magazine uses economic, social, political, and military indicators to rank countries by their “vulnerability to
violent internal conflict and social dysfunction.” Only Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe were considered more unstable.
3 In February 2009, Belgium filed a complaint against Senegal with the International Court of Justice because the
country had yet to begin trial proceedings against Habré. Belgium’s suit was dismissed in May 2009. Senegal has
requested financial assistance from the international community to cover costs associated with a Habré trial.
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Instability in Chad
The February 2008 arrest of several opposition and civic leaders led some to question Déby’s
commitment to dialogue. Seven months later, in September, a commission of inquiry officially
concluded that one of those arrested, Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, a respected former minister
who was the spokesman of the opposition coalition, the Coordination des partis politiques pour la
défense de la Constitution (CPDC), had died in custody. European donors continue to support the
2007 political accord, though. After Déby’s appointment of a new prime minister in April 2008
and the subsequent appointment of four former political opponents to high-level cabinet positions
some observers suggested that the President might be moving toward more inclusive governance.
Others have viewed the appointments as an attempt to divide the opposition.
The Armed Opposition
President Déby’s perceived lack of legitimacy among the opposition has contributed to political
tensions. He has faced several coup attempts, and diverse armed political and regional factions
have been active since the 1990s. Shifting rebel alliances, which include defectors from the
government, gained strength in the east in 2005-2006 and launched a series of raids on strategic
government positions. Inter-communal violence not directly related to the rebellion also
increased. Déby declared a state of emergency in November 2006. Critics charge that he used the
state of emergency, which prohibited public rallies and campaigning and allowed the government
to censor the press, to silence opposition.4
In October 2007, the government signed a peace agreement in Sirte, Libya with the main rebel
groups based in eastern Chad. However, the agreement was not fully implemented, and the
fighting has continued. The Sirte agreement was the latest in a series of failed negotiations to
bring a peaceful settlement to the rebellion.5 In early February 2008, rebel forces advanced on the
capital in an unsuccessful attempt to force Déby from power.6 Hundreds of civilians were
reportedly killed in the fighting, and an estimated 30,000 Chadians fled across the Cameroon
border, ten miles from N’Djamena. Rebel groups later attacked and briefly held several towns in
eastern Chad in June 2008. In August 2008, a Chadian court issued death sentences in absentia
for several rebel leaders. The main armed groups, who have been divided by ethnic and personal
rivalries, agreed in November 2008 to unify their efforts to overthrow Déby.
The new rebel alliance, Union des forces de la résistance (UFR), which currently consists of eight
diverse rebel groups and is led by Timane Erdimi, a nephew of President Déby, launched an
advance in the east in early May 2009. They were repelled by Chadian forces, who pursued them
into Sudanese territory. Many analysts speculate that, like former rebel groupings, the UFR is
prone to infighting and faces a strategic disadvantage against the Chadian military’s air power.7
4 The 2006 state of emergency lasted four months and applied to N’Djamena and select regions in the east, north and
south. It was reissued in October 2007 for 3 regions in the east and north.
5 For example, in December 2006, Déby signed a peace agreement with Mahamat Nour, then-leader of a coalition of 13
rebel groups. Nour was appointed Minister of Defense in March 2007. Fighting between his forces and the national
army resumed in November 2007, and Nour, who was subsequently dismissed from the government, fled to Sudan.
6 The U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a statement drafted by France that condemned the attack and
expressed support for African Union mediation efforts. The Security Council did not agree on a French proposal to use
“all means necessary” to halt the rebellion.
7 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Chad Country Report, June 2009.
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Ethnic Conflict
Chad’s ethnic rivalries are complex and fluid, and they have been compounded by conflict over
land and limited natural resources such as water. Ethnic violence between President Déby’s ethnic
group, the Zaghawa, and the Tama, and both non-Arab, has become an increasing focus of
concern. Conflict within the factionalized Zaghawa tribe also is a factor. The Zaghawa, who
compose less than 3% of Chad’s population, control a majority of government positions. Both
Chad and the Darfur region of Sudan are home to the Zaghawa, elements of which have played
key roles in Chad’s complex inter-ethnic alliances and conflicts and in the Darfur conflict.
Regional Conflict 8
The current conflict in Darfur has displaced more than two million Sudanese and led large
numbers to flee into Chad, generating a humanitarian crisis in the east. Refugee inflows from
Darfur and the CAR have also increased social tensions linked to increasing demand on local
resources, despite the provision of aid to the refugees by international aid groups. The conflict has
also heightened political instability in Chad. Chad and Sudan have periodically accused one
another of sponsoring rebellions against their respective governments. Despite a May 2007 peace
agreement signed by the two countries in Saudi Arabia and another agreement signed in Dakar,
Senegal in March 2008, the accusations have continued. Chad has alleged that Sudan backed the
February 2008 assault on N’Djamena and the June advance in the east. Reports suggest that one
of the Darfur rebel groups may have provided support to the Chadian army during the attack.
Sudan in turn accused Chad of backing Sudanese rebels involved in a May 2008 attack on
Omdurman, a suburb of the Sudanese capitol.9 The two governments renewed diplomatic ties in
November 2008 after mediation by Libya, but allegations of support for each other’s respective
rebel groups continued. Another agreement was signed in Qatar in early May 2009, only days
before a May 2009 advance by Chadian rebels, purportedly staged from Sudan. In response, the
Chadian government reportedly authorized air strikes against rebels within Sudanese territory,
which the Sudanese government in turn characterized as “acts of war.”10 Sudan has threatened to
shoot down Chadian planes if they cross into Sudanese airspace again. Reports suggest that the
Sudanese Air Force bombed a refugee camp in Chad on May 28 as it pursued Sudanese rebels in
the area.11
The United Nations currently maintains 12 refugee camps in eastern Chad and several in the
south. In addition to the estimated 250,000 Sudanese refugees, the camps provide shelter for
some 73,000 refugees from the CAR and as many as 167,000 displaced Chadians.12 The camps,
and the host communities, struggle with shortages of water and firewood. As a result of a 2007
8 Also see CRS Report RL33574, Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement, by Ted
Dagne.
9 Other accusations have been addressed by the respective governments in letters to the President of the U.N. Security
Council. See, for example, S/2008/212, S/2008/222, and S/2008/325.
10 “Sudan Accuses Chad of ‘Acts of War’ with Air Raids,” Reuters, May 15, 2009.
11 “Rights Groups Denounce Deadly Bombing Raids in Chad,” Inter Press Service, June 3, 2009.
12 Refugee and IDP figures provided by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and USAID. Refugee
flows from the CAR increased in early 2009 due to renewed fighting there.
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incident involving French aid workers,13 Chad reportedly tightened its oversight of non-
governmental organizations working in the country and increased travel restrictions. Aid agencies
contend that these restrictions have impeded the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The region
where the camps in the east are located has also been plagued by insecurity and violence, and
some international humanitarian aid compounds have been looted and aid workers threatened or
attacked. Some groups have, at times, had to temporarily suspend operations. The director of the
humanitarian group Save the Children, a French national, was killed in May 2008. The U.N. had
repeatedly pressed the government to allow a peacekeeping force to secure the borders with
Sudan and the CAR. President Déby opposed the proposals until June 2007, when the European
Union offered to provide an EU peacekeeping force (primarily from France, which has been
Chad’s strongest military ally and one of its largest bilateral donors).
U.N. Presence and EU Peacekeepers
On September 25, 2007, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1778, approving the
establishment of a multinational presence in Chad and the Central African Republic to (1)
contribute to the protection of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and civilians in
danger; (2) facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and (3) create favorable conditions
for reconstruction and economic and social development. Based on Resolution 1778, two
multinational bodies, a U.N. mission and a European Union (EU) military force, were created
under a single mandate.14 The U.N. presence, known as the U.N. Mission in the Central African
Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), has been responsible for police training and reinforcing
judicial infrastructure, and is working with Chadian forces to reinforce safety for refugees, IDPs,
and aid agencies in the camps in the east. The EU force, known as EUFOR Chad/CAR (hereafter
EUFOR), was tasked with providing general security for civilians and facilitating the free
movement of humanitarian assistance and personnel. EURFOR was authorized to use military
force, whereas MINURCAT was not under its original mandate.
Some humanitarian officials have expressed concern that having two separate international
missions in Chad complicated perceptions among the local population, as well among the region’s
various rebel groups. At least one rebel group warned that it considered the EU force a “foreign
occupation army,” because it included French forces, whom the rebels do not see as neutral.
The U.N. Security Council extended MINURCAT’s mandate through Resolutions 1834 in
September 2008 and 1861 in January 2009. Logistical challenges have impeded the deployment
of the mission, which was initially authorized to include some 300 police and 50 military liaison
officers, as well as civilian personnel.15 MINURCAT has been training a special local police unit,
Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS) to assume security responsibilities for the camps, and the
first group of trained officers deployed in October 2008. Over 500 DIS personnel were deployed
13 In October 2007, six French aid workers from the charity Zoe’s Ark were arrested in Chad on charges of abduction
and fraud after they attempted to fly 103 Chadian children to Europe. The majority of the children, whom the aid
workers claimed were Darfur orphans, were, in fact, native Chadians, many of whom still had at least one living parent
or guardian. The aid workers were repatriated to France to serve eight-year sentences. Déby later pardoned them.
14 This “dual-mission system,” with a combined U.N.-EU mandate, was the first of its kind. “Chad: Dual Peacekeeping
Mission Seeks to Dispel Confusion,” IRIN, January 11, 2008.
15 As of early July 2008, MINURCAT had recruited 211 U.N. police officers, 175 of whom were deployed. In addition,
24 military liaison officers were deployed. Those personnel numbers had increased to 241 police officers and 46
military liaison officers by March 2009.
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as of January 2009. EUFOR’s deployment of 3,700 troops, originally expected in November
2007, was also delayed by funding and logistical challenges. The rebel advance on N’Djamena in
early February 2008 further delayed deployment, but the force reached initial operating capacity,
with almost half its full force deployed, in March, and as of December 2008 3,300 troops had
deployed.16 Déby criticized EUFOR in June for not engaging the rebel advance, and some aid
groups charge that the force failed to protect them. Under Security Council Resolution 1834, the
Council expressed its intention for EUFOR to transfer authority to a U.N. military component.
That transfer took place on March 15, 2009, when EUFOR’s mandate expired. Under the new
mandate authorized in Resolution 1861, MINURCAT, which had an estimated 2,000 troops in late
March, is authorized to have a military component of 5,200 troops.17 Anticipating continued
deployment delays, due in part to a shortage of helicopter assets, the U.N. Secretary-General has
revised the target to 4,700 soldiers by the end of the year.
Child Soldiers
According to U.N. estimates, there may be as many as 10,000 children used in combat and non-
combat roles by Chadian rebel groups, paramilitary forces, and the national army. The
government denied the existence of child soldiers in its army until May 2007, when it signed an
agreement with UNICEF to end recruitment of persons under age 18 and begin demobilization of
those already within the security forces. According to Human Rights Watch the government has
limited access by international child protection officials to military installations to verify
demobilization.18 Humanitarian officials have also expressed concern regarding the recruitment of
children by rebel groups and local self-defense militias in and around refugee camps.19
Oil and the Economy
Eighty percent of Chad’s population is dependent on subsistence farming and herding, and
droughts and locust infestations continue to affect food production and contribute to a high
malnutrition rate. When Chad began oil production in 2003, Chadians had high expectations that
oil revenues might serve as a catalyst for economic growth and development.20 Corruption, weak
state institutions, and chronic instability, however, threaten to undermine advances made in the oil
sector and could deter future high capital investment projects elsewhere in the region. The Chad-
Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project is a $4 billion initiative, initially backed
by the World Bank, to develop oil fields in southern Chad and export the oil through a 665-mile
pipeline to offshore oil loading facilities on Cameroon’s coast.21 World Bank funding for the
16 The European Union reached an agreement with the Russian Federation in November 2008 for four Russian
transport helicopters to aid EUFOR’s deployment.
17 U.N. officials had initially recommended 6,000 troops, but the Chadian government expressed concerns with a force
of that size. See U.N. Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central
African Republic and Chad,” S/2008/760, December 4, 3008.
18 Human Rights Watch, Early to War: Child Soldiers in the Chad Conflict, July 2007.
19 U.N. Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad,” S/2007/400, July
3, 2007.
20 According to the Bank of Central African States, Chad received $340 million in oil revenues in 2005, and $953
million in 2006. “Chad: Weapons Instead of ARVs,” IRIN, June 30, 2008.
21 In addition to the World Bank, sponsors included ExxonMobile (with 40% of the private equity), Malaysia’s
(continued...)
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project was conditional on a portion of the oil revenues being held in a British bank account from
which Chad could only draw for poverty-reduction projects. In 2006, the World Bank suspended
loans to Chad and froze oil revenue accounts after the government changed its revenue
management law and significantly increased military spending. Chad and the World Bank reached
a compromise in June 2006, allowing the government to use 30% (formerly 20%) of oil revenues
for its own purposes, while the remainder would continue to be used for development programs.
In September 2008, the World Bank announced its withdrawal from the project, citing Chad’s
failure to comply with key aspects of the agreement. Chad has reimbursed the Bank for its loans.
The World Bank continues to engage the Chadian government, however, and reopened its office
in N’Djamena in January 2009. The International Monetary Fund began a new Staff-Monitored
Program with the government focusing on fiscal discipline in April 2009.
U.S.-Chadian Relations
The United States has provided over $512 million in humanitarian assistance to eastern Chad
since the onset of the humanitarian crisis in FY2004, including over $110 million in FY2009.
U.S. foreign policy priorities in Chad have included 1) advancing stability and resolving the
refugee crisis; 2) promoting democracy and respect for human rights; 3) supporting health and
agriculture programs; and 4) strengthening Chadian counterterrorism capabilities and
professionalizing the military.22 The U.S. Agency for International Development’s Mission in
Chad closed in 1995 due to declining funding and security concerns; USAID assistance, much of
which consists of monetized food aid to support health and agriculture initiatives, is coordinated
through its regional office in Kenya. The U.S. Treasury Department has provided technical
assistance to the country’s oil revenue management oversight body to promote transparency.
Despite concerns regarding poor governance, the Bush Administration considered the Déby
government an ally in the war on terror. In 2004, elements of the Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat (GSPC) (now known as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) entered Chadian territory and
met resistance from Chadian forces. Chad is a part of the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism
Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. interagency effort that aims to increase Chad’s border protection and
regional counter-terrorism capabilities, as well as “to promote democratic governance as a means
to discredit terrorist ideology.”23 The United States has also provided security assistance to Chad,
although the FY2008 and FY2009 appropriations legislation has limited some of this training to
that which promotes “democratic values” and respect for human rights. The U.S. government has
discontinued demining assistance due to “institutional weakness and a lack of political will to
address the problem.” Landmines continue to kill hundreds of Chadians annually, and
approximately 80% of the victims are children, according to U.N. Mine Action.
Congress has expressed concern for the ongoing violence and humanitarian crisis in the region
through various legislation and hearings in recent years. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, (H.R. 2410), as passed by the House of Representatives, would
authorize the Secretary of State to use funds from its Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
(...continued)
Petronas (35%), and Chevron-Texaco (25%).
22 U.S. Department of State, International Affairs Congressional Budget Justification, FY2009.
23 Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs James Swann at the Senate Foreign Relations
Africa Subcommittee hearing on Chad and the CAR, March 20, 2007.
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for the refurbishment of helicopters for use in U.N. peacekeeping operations such as
MINURCAT.24
Prospects
Persistent conflict with rebels in the north and east; refugee inflows and instability from the
conflict in Darfur; and ethnic tensions all contribute to concerns for Chad’s future. Under
President Déby, Chad has made limited progress toward democracy. Human rights conditions
remain notably poor, in part due to the actions of state security forces; freedom of expression is
often curtailed; and many critics and observers see the government as lacking in transparency,
accountability, and functional capacities. Reports of human right abuses, including sexual
violence against women, are particularly high in the country’s conflict zones. Some suggest that
prospective increases in state oil revenues and multifaceted international assistance to bolster
political and economic reform could engender more participatory governance and economic
growth in Chad. However, international donor frustration, as evidenced by the World Bank’s
withdrawal from the pipeline project, may affect future assistance and investment. If the Déby
government does not embrace political and economic reforms, popular resentment against those
in power may perpetuate the current instability.
Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
24 For further information, see CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
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