F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
June 18, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL30563
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), also called the Lighting II, is a new strike fighter being
procured in different versions by the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The F-35 program is the
Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) largest weapon procurement program in terms of total
estimated acquisition cost. Current DOD plans call for acquiring a total of 2,456 JSFs for the Air
Force, Marine Corps, and Navy at an estimated total acquisition cost (as of December 31, 2007)
of about $246 billion in constant (i.e., inflation-adjusted) FY2009 dollars. Procurement of F-35s
began in FY2007. Hundreds of additional F-35s are to be purchased by several U.S. allies.
The administration’s proposed FY2010 defense budget requests a total of about $10.4 billion in
Air Force and Navy research and development funding and procurement funding for the F-35
program, including about $3.6 billion in Air Force and Navy research and development funding
and about $6.8 billion in Air Force and Navy procurement funding. The proposed FY2010 budget
would fund the procurement of 10 F-35As for the Air Force, 16 F-35Bs for the Marine Corps, and
four F-35Cs for the Navy. (Development and procurement of Marine Corps aircraft are funded
through the Navy’s budget.)
The administration’s proposed FY2010 defense budget also proposes to terminate the F-35
alternate engine program, which is intended to develop the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136
engine as an alternative to the Pratt and Whitney F135 engine that currently powers the F-35. The
George W. Bush administration proposed terminating the alternate engine program in FY2007,
FY2008, and FY2009, but Congress rejected these proposals and each year provided funding for
the program’s continuation.
The issues for Congress for FY2010 are whether to approve, reject, or modify the
administration’s funding request for the F-35 program, and whether to approve or reject the
administration’s proposal to terminate the alternate engine program. Congress’ decisions on these
matters will affect DOD capabilities and funding requirements and the tactical aircraft
manufacturing industrial base.
The FY2010 defense authorization bill as reported by the House Armed Services Committee on
June 18, 2009 (H.R. 2647) recommends reducing procurement of F-35s by two aircraft from the
administration’s request, and adding $603 million in funding for the F-35 alternate engine
program. H.R. 2647 as reported by the House contains a number of legislative provisions relating
to the F-35 program, including a provision relating to the alternate engine program. This report
will be updated as events warrant.
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
The F-35 In Brief .................................................................................................................. 1
In General ....................................................................................................................... 1
Air Force Version............................................................................................................ 2
Marine Corps Version ..................................................................................................... 3
Navy Version .................................................................................................................. 4
Engine ............................................................................................................................ 5
Program Origin and Acquisition Milestones .......................................................................... 5
Procurement Quantities ......................................................................................................... 6
Planned Total Procurement Quantities ............................................................................. 6
Annual Procurement Quantities....................................................................................... 7
Program Management ........................................................................................................... 7
International Participation ..................................................................................................... 8
Cost and Funding .................................................................................................................. 9
Sources of Funding ......................................................................................................... 9
Estimated Total Program Acquisition Cost and Prior-Year Funding................................ 10
Estimated Unit Costs..................................................................................................... 10
Manufacturing Locations .................................................................................................... 11
Proposed FY2010 Budget ................................................................................................... 11
FY2010 Funding Request.............................................................................................. 11
Proposed Termination of Alternate Engine Program ...................................................... 12
Issues For Congress .................................................................................................................. 12
Alternate Engine ................................................................................................................. 12
Summary of Arguments For and Against Termination.................................................... 12
Administration Perspective ........................................................................................... 13
GAO Perspective .......................................................................................................... 15
Press Reports ................................................................................................................ 18
Development Status and Readiness for Higher-Rate Production........................................... 22
Administration Perspective ........................................................................................... 22
GAO Perspective .......................................................................................................... 24
Press Reports ................................................................................................................ 26
Affordability and Projected Fighter Shortfalls ..................................................................... 28
Implications for Industrial Base........................................................................................... 29
Legislative Activity for FY2010 ................................................................................................ 30
FY2010 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 2647) ................................................................. 30
House ........................................................................................................................... 30
Figures
Figure A-1. Joint Strike Fighter: Key Performance Parameters .................................................. 35
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Tables
Table 1. Annual F-35 Procurement Quantities.............................................................................. 7
Table 2. FY2010 Funding Request for F-35 Program................................................................. 11
Appendixes
Appendix. JSF Key Performance Parameters............................................................................. 35
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 35
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), also called the Lighting II, is a new strike fighter being
procured in different versions by the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The F-35 program is the
Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) largest weapon procurement program in terms of total
estimated acquisition cost. Current DOD plans call for acquiring a total of 2,456 JSFs for the Air
Force, Marine Corps, and Navy at an estimated total acquisition cost (as of December 31, 2007)
of about $246 billion in constant (i.e., inflation-adjusted) FY2009 dollars. Procurement of F-35s
began in FY2007. Hundreds of additional F-35s are to be purchased by several U.S. allies.
The administration’s proposed FY2010 defense budget requests a total of about $10.4 billion in
Air Force and Navy research and development funding and procurement funding for the F-35
program, including about $3.6 billion in Air Force and Navy research and development funding
and about $6.8 billion in Air Force and Navy procurement funding. The proposed FY2010 budget
would fund the procurement of 10 F-35As for the Air Force, 16 F-35Bs for the Marine Corps, and
four F-35Cs for the Navy. (Development and procurement of Marine Corps aircraft are funded
through the Navy’s budget.)
The administration’s proposed FY2010 defense budget also proposes to terminate the F-35
alternate engine program, which is intended to develop the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136
engine as an alternative to the Pratt and Whitney F135 engine that currently powers the F-35. The
George W. Bush administration proposed terminating the alternate engine program in FY2007,
FY2008, and FY2009, but Congress rejected these proposals and each year provided funding for
the program’s continuation.
The issues for Congress for FY2010 are whether to approve, reject, or modify the
administration’s funding request for the F-35 program, and whether to approve or reject the
administration’s proposal to terminate the alternate engine program. Congress’ decisions on these
matters will affect DOD capabilities and funding requirements and the tactical aircraft
manufacturing industrial base.
Background
The F-35 In Brief
In General
The F-35 was conceived as a relatively affordable 5th-generation strike fighter1 that could be
procured in three highly common versions for the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy,2 so
1 Fifth-generation aircraft incorporate the most modern technology, and are considered to be generally more capable
than earlier-generation (e.g., 4th-generation and below) aircraft. Fifth-generation fighters combine new developments
such as thrust vectoring, composite materials, supercruise (the ability to cruise at supersonic speeds without using
engine afterburners), stealth technology, advanced radar and sensors, and integrated avionics to greatly improve pilot
situational awareness. Currently, only the Air Force F-22 air superiority fighter and the F-35 are considered fifth-
generation aircraft. Russia reportedly has a fifth-generation fighter under development.
Strike fighters are dual-role tactical aircraft that are capable of both air-to-ground (strike) and air-to-air (fighter) combat
(continued...)
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
that the three services could avoid the higher costs of developing, procuring, and operating and
supporting three separate tactical aircraft designs to meet their similar but not identical
operational needs.3
DOD states that the F-35 program “was structured from the beginning to be a model of
acquisition reform, with an emphasis on jointness, technology maturation and concept
demonstrations, and early cost and performance trades integral to the weapon system
requirements definition process.”4
All three versions of the F-35 will be single-seat aircraft with supersonic dash capability and
some degree of stealth. The three versions will vary somewhat in their combat ranges and
payloads (see Appendix). All three are to carry their primary weapons internally to maintain a
stealthy radar signature. Additional weapons can be carried externally. The Air Force states that:
The F-35 program will develop and deploy a family of highly capable, affordable, fifth
generation strike fighter aircraft to meet the operational needs of the Air Force, Navy,
Marine Corps, and Allies with optimum commonality to minimize life cycle costs. The F-35
was designed from the bottom-up to be our premier surface-to-air missile killer and is
uniquely equipped for this mission with cutting edge processing power, synthetic aperture
radar integration techniques, and advanced target recognition. The F-35 also provides “leap
ahead” capabilities in its resistance to jamming, maintainability, and logistic support.5
Air Force Version
The Air Force is procuring the F-35A, a conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) version of the
aircraft. F-35As are to replace Air Force F-16 fighters and A-10 attack aircraft. The F-35A is
intended to be a more affordable complement to the Air Force’s new F-22 Raptor air superiority
fighter (which is replacing the service’s aging F-15 air superiority fighters.) Compared to the F-
22, the F-35A is not quite as stealthy and not as capable in air-to-air combat, but it is still very
capable in both these areas, and is also very capable in air-to-ground combat. The F-35 is more
stealthy and more capable in air-to-air and air-to-ground combat than the F-16. If the F-15/F-16
combination represented the Air Force’s earlier-generation “high-low” mix of air superiority
fighters and more-affordable dual-role aircraft, then the F-22/F-35A combination might be
(...continued)
operations.
2 The program’s operational requirements call for 70% to 90% commonality between all three versions. Many of the
three versions’ high-cost components—including their engines, avionics, and major airframe structural components—
are common.
3 Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated in 2000 that the JSF’s joint approach “avoids the three parallel
development programs for service-unique aircraft that would have otherwise been necessary, saving at least $15
billion.” (Letter from Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen to Rep. Jerry Lewis, June 22, 2000. The text of letter
made available by Inside the Air Force on June 23, 2000.)
4 Department of Defense. Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)[for] F-35 (JSF), December 31, 2007, p. 4.
5 Department of the Air Force Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, United States House of Representatives, Subject: Air Force Programs, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant
General Daniel J. Darnell, Air Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And
Requirements (AF/A3/5) [and] Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy
Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans And Programs (AF/A8) May 20, 2009, p. 10.
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
viewed as the Air Force’s intended future high-low mix of air superiority fighters and more-
affordable dual-role aircraft.6 The Air Force states that:
Both the F-22A and the F-35 represent our latest generation of fighter aircraft. We need both
aircraft to maintain the margin of superiority we have come to depend upon, the margin that
has granted our forces in the air and on the ground freedom to maneuver and to attack. The
F-22A and F-35 each possess unique, complementary, and essential capabilities that together
provide the synergistic effects required to maintain that margin of superiority across the
spectrum of conflict. The OSD-led 2006 QDR Joint Air Dominance study underscored that
our Nation has a critical requirement to recapitalize TACAIR forces. Legacy 4th generation
aircraft simply cannot survive to operate and achieve the effects necessary to win in an
integrated, anti-access environment.7
The Department of the Navy states that:
The commonality designed into the joint F-35 program will minimize acquisition and
operating costs of Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft, and allow enhanced
interoperability with our sister Service, the United States Air Force, and the eight partner
nations participating in the development of this aircraft. This aircraft will give combatant
commanders greater flexibility across the range of military operations. A true fifth generation
aircraft, the F-35 will enhance precision strike capability through unprecedented stealth,
range, sensor fusion, improved radar performance, combat identification and electronic
attack capabilities compared to legacy platforms. It will also add sophisticated electronic
warfare capabilities, as compared to the legacy platforms it will replace, and will tie together
disparate units scattered across the battlefield, in real time.8
Marine Corps Version
The Marine Corps is procuring the F-35B, a short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) version
of the aircraft.9 F-35Bs are to replace Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier vertical/short takeoff and
landing (VSTOL) attack aircraft and F/A-18A, C, and D strike fighters, which are CTOL aircraft.
The F-35B and the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft10 are central to achieving a long-term Marine
6 The term high-low mix refers to a force consisting of a combination of high-cost, high-capability aircraft and lower-
cost, more-affordable aircraft. Procuring a high-low mix is a strategy for attempting to balance the goal for having a
certain minimum number of very high capability tactical aircraft to take on the most challenging projected missions and
the goal of being able to procure tactical aircraft sufficient in total numbers within available resources to perform all
projected missions.
7 Department of the Air Force Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, United States House of Representatives, Subject: Air Force Programs, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant
General Daniel J. Darnell, Air Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And
Requirements (AF/A3/5) [and] Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy
Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans And Programs (AF/A8) May 20, 2009, pp. 7-8.
8 Statement of Vice Admiral David Architzel, USN, Principal Military Deputy, Research, Development and
Acquisition, LTGEN George J. Trautman III, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, [and] RADM Allen G.
Myers, USN, Director of Warfare Integration, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Warfare [sic: Forces]
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [hearing] on [the] Department of the Navy’s Aviation
Procurement Program, May 19, 2009, p. 1.
9 To permit STOVL operations, the F-35B has an engine exhaust nozzle at the rear than can swivel downward, and a
mid-fuselage lift fan connected to the engine that blows air downward to help lift the forward part of the plane.
10 For more on the V-22 program, see CRS Report RL31384, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Corps goal for phasing out the service’s CTOL aircraft and fielding an all-VSTOL Marine Corps
aviation capability. The Marine Corps decided to not procure F/A-18E/F strike fighters11 and
instead wait for the F-35B in part because the F/A-18E/F is a CTOL aircraft. The Department of
the Navy states that:
The F-35B Short Take-off Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant combines the multi-role
versatility and strike fighter capability of the legacy F/A-18 with the basing flexibility of the
AV-8B. Having these capabilities in one aircraft will provide the joint force commander and
the MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force] commander unprecedented strategic and
operational agility.
The Marine Corps’ tactical aviation (TACAIR) fixed-wing platforms, used for direct support
to our ground combat Marines in the fight, are the AV-8B Harrier, the F/A-18 A+/C/D
Hornet and the EA-6B Prowler. These aircraft are approaching the end of their planned
service lives, and the Marine Corps, through careful service life extension programs, has
managed these legacy platforms to bridge our aviation force until future airframes come on
line. The Marines’ F-35B will replace both the AV-8B and F/A-18 A+/C/D, as well as fill a
large portion of the EA-6B mission as part of a networked system of systems. The Marine
Corps intends to leverage the F-35B’s sophisticated sensor suite and very low observable
(VLO), fifth generation strike fighter capabilities, particularly in the area of data collection,
to support the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) well beyond the abilities of today’s
strike and EW assets.12
Navy Version
The Navy is procuring the F-35C, a carrier-suitable CTOL version of the aircraft.13 The F-35C is
also known as the CV version of the F-35, with CV meaning aircraft carrier. The Navy in the
future plans to operate carrier air wings featuring a strike fighter combination of F/A-18E/Fs
(which the Navy has been procuring since FY1997) and F-35Cs. The F/A-18E/F is generally
considered a fourth-generation strike-fighter. (Some F/A-18E/F supporters argue that it is a
“fourth-plus” or “4.5”generation strike fighter because it incorporates some fifth-generation
technology, particularly in its sensors.) The F/A-18E/F incorporates a few stealth features, but the
F-35C is stealthier. The F/A-18E/F is less expensive to procure than the F-35C. In contrast to the
Air Force, which has operated stealthy bombers and fighters for years, the F-35C is to be the
Navy’s first considerably stealthy aircraft. The Department of the Navy states that:
The F-35C carrier variant (CV) complements the F/A-18E/F Block II and EA-18G in
providing survivable, long-range strike capability and persistence over the battlefield. The F-
11 For more on the F/A-18E/F program, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement
and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
12 Statement of Vice Admiral David Architzel, USN, Principal Military Deputy, Research, Development and
Acquisition, LTGEN George J. Trautman III, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, [and] RADM Allen G.
Myers, USN, Director of Warfare Integration, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Warfare [sic: Forces]
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [hearing] on [the] Department of the Navy’s Aviation
Procurement Program, May 19, 2009, pp. 1-2.
13 Features for carrier suitability include, among other things, strengthened landing gear, a strengthened airframe, and
an arresting hook so as to permit catapult launches and arrested-wire landings, as well as folding wing tips for more
compact storage aboard ship.
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35 will give the ESG and CSG commanders a survivable “Day-One” strike capability in a
denied access environment that can not be accomplished by current legacy aircraft. 14
Engine
The F-35 is powered by the Pratt and Whitney F135 engine, which was derived from the F-22’s
Pratt and Whitney F119 engine. Consistent with congressional direction in 1996, DOD
established an alternative engine program with the General Electric/Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine
Team to develop the F136 engine as a second engine to compete with the F135 for JSF
production and operations and support (O&S) contracts. The George W. Bush administration
proposed terminating the alternate engine program in FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009,15 but
Congress rejected these proposals and each year provided funding for the program’s continuation.
Program Origin and Acquisition Milestones
The JSF program began in the early- to mid-1990s.16 Three different designs for the aircraft were
proposed by Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas (the last teamed with Northrop
Grumman and British Aerospace). On November 16, 1996, the Defense Department announced
that Boeing and Lockheed Martin had been chosen to compete in the Concept Demonstration
Phase (CDP) of the program, with Pratt and Whitney providing propulsion hardware and
engineering support. Boeing and Lockheed were each awarded contracts to build and test-fly two
aircraft to demonstrate their competing concepts for all three planned JSF variants.
The competition between Boeing and Lockheed Martin was closely watched: Given the size of
the JSF program and the expectation that the JSF might be the last fighter aircraft program that
DOD would initiate for many years, DOD’s decision on the JSF program was expected to shape
the future of both U.S. tactical aviation and the U.S. tactical aircraft industrial base.
14 Statement of Vice Admiral David Architzel, USN, Principal Military Deputy, Research, Development and
Acquisition, LTGEN George J. Trautman III, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, [and] RADM Allen G.
Myers, USN, Director of Warfare Integration, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Warfare [sic: Forces]
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [hearing] on [the] Department of the Navy’s Aviation
Procurement Program, May 19, 2009, p. 1.
15 See CRS Report RL33390, Proposed Termination of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F136 Alternate Engine, by
Christopher Bolkcom.
16 The JSF program emerged in late 1995 from the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program, which began in
late 1993 as a result of the Clinton administration’s Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy and programs.
The BUR envisaged the JAST program as a replacement for two other tactical aircraft programs that were being
terminated (the A-12 program, which was intended to provide a stealthy new carrier-based attack plane to replace the
Navy’s aging A-6 carrier-based attack planes, and the multi-role fighter [MRF], which was the Air Force had
considered as a replacement for its F-16 fighters).
In 1995, in response to congressional direction, a program led by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) to develop an advanced short takeoff and vertical landing (ASTOVL) aircraft was incorporated into the
JAST program. This opened the way for Marine Corps and UK participation in the JAST program, since the Marine
Corps and the UK were interested procuring a new STOVL aircraft to replace their aging Harrier STOVL attack
aircraft. The name of the program was then changed to Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to focus on joint development and
production of a next-generation fighter/attack plane.
A Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD) for the F-35 program was issued in March 2000 and revalidated
by DOD’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in October 2001.
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In October 2001, DOD selected the Lockheed design as the winner of the competition, and the
JSF program entered the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. SDD contracts
were awarded to Lockheed Martin (for the aircraft) and Pratt and Whitney (for the aircraft’s
engine). General Electric continued technical efforts related to the development of a second
engine source for competition in the program’s production phase.17
The first flights of the F-35A and F-35B occurred in the first quarter of FY2007 and the third
quarter of FY2008, respectively.18 Under the FY2010 budget submission, the first flight of an
optimized design for the F-35A (i.e., a slightly changed design for the F-35A) is scheduled for the
third quarter of FY2009, and the first flight of the F-35C is scheduled for the first quarter of
FY2010. The F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C are scheduled to achieve Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) in March 2013, March 2012, and March 2015, respectively. Note that the scheduled IOC of
the F-35B is a year earlier than that of the F-35A.
Procurement Quantities
Planned Total Procurement Quantities
As of December 31, 2007, the F-35 program included a planned total of 2,456 aircraft—13
research and development aircraft and a planned total of 2,443 production aircraft. The 2,443
production aircraft include 1,763 F-35As for the Air Force and 680 F-35Bs and Cs for the Marine
Corps and Navy, with exact numbers of Bs and Cs to be determined.19 These planned production
totals are subject to review in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that is to be reported to
Congress with the submission of the proposed FY2011 defense budget in February 2010. A June
3, 2009, press report states:
Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz today signaled that the service’s requirement for
1,763 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters is being examined during the comprehensive Quadrennial
Defense Review now under way. Whether the Air Force ultimately buys more or fewer F-
35s than planned depends on that review of military capabilities and requirements, the four-
star general told the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Indeed, the Air Force’s
plan to field a total of 2,250 fighters, both old and new, is also under review, according to
Schwartz.
17 On October 24, 2001, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) held a Milestone B review for the program. (Milestone
B approval would permit the program to enter the SDD phase.) On October 25, 2001, the Secretary of Defense certified
to Congress (in accordance with Section 212 of the FY2001 defense authorization act [H.R. 4205/P.L. 106-398 of
October 30, 2000]) that the program had successfully completed the CDP exit criteria and demonstrated sufficient
technical maturity to enter SDD. On October 26, 2001, the SDD contracts were awarded to Lockheed and Pratt and
Whitney.
18 A Preliminary Design Review (PDR) for the F-35 program was conducted in April 2003, and Critical Design
Reviews (CDRs) were held for the F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C in February 2006 (F-35A and F-35B) and June 2007 (F-
35C).
19 In 1996, preliminary planning estimated over 3,000 F-35s for DOD and the UK: 2,036 for the Air Force, 642 for the
Marines, 300 for the U.S. Navy, and 60 for the Royal Navy. In May 1997, the QDR recommended reducing projected
DOD procurement from 2,978 to 2,852: 1,763 for the Air Force, 609 for the Marines, and 480 for the Navy.
(Quadrennial Defense Review Cuts Procurement in FY1999, 2000, Aerospace Daily, May 20, 1997, p. 280.) In 2003,
the Department of the Navy (DON) reduced its planned procurement of 1,089 F-35s to 680 aircraft as part of the
Navy/Marine Corps Tactical Aviation Integration Plan. (See CRS Report RS21488, Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air
Integration Plan: Background and Issues for Congress, by Christopher Bolkcom and Ronald O'Rourke.)
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“It could end up being less,” he said, adding, “if that’s the case, we will still have a
predominately F-35” force. Still, Schwartz said he expects to have “well over” 1,500 F-35s.20
Annual Procurement Quantities
Procurement of F-35s began in FY2007. Table 1 shows actual F-35 procurement quantities
through FY2009 and requested procurement quantities for FY2010. The figures in the table do
not include 13 research and development aircraft procured with research and development
funding.
Table 1. Annual F-35 Procurement Quantities
(Figures shown are for production aircraft; table excludes 13 research and development aircraft)
Type
FY07 FY08 FY09
FY10
request
F-35A
(USAF)
2 6 7 10
F-35B
(USMC)
0 6 7 16
F-35C
(USN)
0 0 0 4
TOTAL 2 12 14 30
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD data.
DOD plans have contemplated increasing the procurement rate of F-35As for the Air Force to a
sustained rate of 80 aircraft per year by FY2015, and completing the planned procurement of
1,763 F-35As by about FY2034. DOD plans have also contemplated increasing the procurement
rate of F-35Bs and Cs for the Marine Corps and Navy to a combined sustained rate of 50 aircraft
per year by about FY2014, and completing the planned procurement of 680 F-35Bs and Cs by
about FY2025.
Program Management
The JSF program is jointly staffed and managed by the Department of the Air Force and the
Department of the Navy (DON). Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) responsibility alternates
between the two departments. When the Air Force has SAE authority, the F-35 program director
is from DON, and vice versa. The Air Force resumed SAE authority in April 2009.21
20 “Air Force Need For F-35s Under Review,” National Journal’s CongressDailyPM, June 3, 2009.
21 In 2004, appropriations conferees followed a House recommendation to direct DOD to review this alternative
management arrangement. House appropriators believed that “management of program acquisition should remain with
one Service, and that the U.S. Navy, due to its significant investment in two variants of the F-35 should be assigned all
acquisition executive oversight responsibilities.” (H.Rept. 108-553 [H.R. 4613], p. 234) Conferees directed that DOD
submit a report on the potential efficacy of this change. Prior to the release of the DOD report, former Air Force Chief
of Staff General John Jumper was quoted as saying that he also supported putting one service in charge of JSF program
acquisition. (Elizabeth Rees, “Jumper Supports Single Service Retaining JSF Acquisition Oversight,” Inside the Air
Force, August 6, 2004.) However, General Jumper highlighted the significant investment the Air Force was making in
the JSF program in response to the congressional language favoring the Navy. In DOD’s response to Congress, the
report noted the current arrangement ensures one Service does not have a “disproportionate voice” when it comes to
program decisions and that the current system is “responsive, efficient, and in the best interests of the success of the
(continued...)
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International Participation
The F-35 program features a significant amount of international participation, making it DOD’s
largest international cooperative program. Allied participation has been actively pursued by DOD
as a way to defray some of the cost of developing and producing the aircraft, and to “prime the
pump” for export sales.22 Allies in turn view participation the F-35 program as an affordable way
to acquire a fifth-generation fighter, technical knowledge in areas such as stealth, and industrial
opportunities for domestic firms.
Eight allied countries—the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Italy,
Turkey, and Australia—are participating in the F-35 program under Memoranda of Understanding
(MOUs) in the SDD phase of the program and the Production, Sustainment and Follow-On
Development (PSFD) phase of the program . These eight countries have contributed varying
amounts of research and development funding to the program, receiving in return various levels
of participation in the program.23 International partners are also assisting with Initial Operational
Test and Evaluation (IOT&E), a subset of SDD.24 The eight partner countries are expected to
(...continued)
JSF program.” (U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Joint Strike Fighter Management Oversight
[forwarded by] Michael W. Wynne, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, December
20, 2004.)
22 Congress insisted from the outset that the JAST program include ongoing efforts by DARPA to develop more
advanced STOVL aircraft, opening the way for UK participation in the program.
23 International participation in the F-35 program is divided into three levels, according to the amount of money a
country contributes to the program—the higher the amount, the greater the nation’s voice with respect to aircraft
requirements, design, and access to technologies gained during development. The UK is the only “Level 1” partner,
contributing approximately $2 billion to the SDD phase. UK participation began at the outset of the F-35 program. On
December 20, 1995, the U.S. and UK governments signed an MOU on UK participation in the F-35 program as a
collaborative partner in the definition of requirements and aircraft design. This MOU committed the UK government to
contribute $200 million toward the cost of the 1997-2001 Concept Demonstration Phase. (“U.S., U.K. Sign JAST
Agreement,” Aerospace Daily, December 21, 1995, p. 451.) On January 17, 2001, the United States and United
Kingdom finalized the UK’s SDD participation, which equated to approximately 8% of the total SDD phase. Many UK
firms, such as British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce, have strong participation in the program.
Level II partners consist of Italy and the Netherlands, contributing $1 billion and $800 million, respectively. On June
24, 2002, Italy became the senior Level II partner. (“F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Lightning II: International
Partners,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-int.htm, accessed on October 3, 2007.) Italy
wants to have its own F-35 final assembly line, which would be in addition to a potential F-35 maintenance and
upgrade facility. The Netherlands signed on to the F-35 program on June 17, 2002, after it had conducted a 30-month
analysis of potential alternatives.
Australia, Denmark, Norway, Canada, and Turkey joined the F-35 program as Level III partners, with contributions
ranging from $125 million to $175 million. (“Australia, Belgium Enter Joint Strike Fighter Program as EMD Partners,”
Inside the Air Force, April 21, 2000.)
Unlike the SDD phase, PSFD phase does not make any distinction as to levels of participation. Also unlike the bilateral
SDD MOUs, there is a single PSFD MOU for all partner nations. In signing the PSFD MOU, partner nations state their
intentions to purchase the F-35, including quantity and variant, and a determination is made as to their delivery
schedule. PSFD costs will be divided on a “fair-share” based on the programmed purchase amount of the respective
nation. So-called “offset” arrangements, considered the norm in defense contracts with foreign nations, usually require
additional incentives to compensate the purchasing nation for the agreement’s impact to its local workforce. F-35
officials decided to take a different approach, in line with the program’s goal to control costs, to avoid offset
arrangements and promote competition as much as possible. Consequently, all partner nations have agreed to compete
for work on a “best-value” basis and have signed the PSFD MOU.
24 Currently, the UK, Italy, and the Netherlands have agreed to participate in the IOT&E program. UK, the senior F-35
partner, will have the strongest participation in the IOT&E phase. Italy and the Netherlands are contributing a far
smaller amount and will take part only in the coalition concept of operations (CONOPS) validation testing. (Telephone
(continued...)
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purchase more than 700 hundred F-35s, with the United Kingdom being the largest anticipated
foreign purchaser.25 Two additional countries—Israel and Singapore—are security cooperation
participants outside the F-35 cooperative development partnership,26 and sales to additional
countries are possible.27 Some officials have speculated that foreign sales of F-35s might
eventually surpass 3,000 aircraft.28
For several years, press reports have indicated that a number of partner nations have threatened to
withdraw from the program because of frustrations over workshare and technology transfer
issues.29 To more effectively negotiate the terms of their involvement, some European F-35
partners reportedly are attempting to team with others and present a more united position vis-a-vis
Lockheed.30
Cost and Funding
Sources of Funding
The F-35 program has received or currently receives funding from:
• the Air Force, Navy, and Defense-Wide research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) accounts;31
• additional research and development funding from Non-Treasury Funds (i.e.,
financial contributions from the eight other countries participating in the F-35
program);
(...continued)
conversation with OSD/AT&L, October 3, 2007.) Other partner nations are still weighing their option to participate in
the IOT&E program. The benefits to participation are expedited acquisition of aircraft, pilot training for the test cycle,
and access to testing results.
25 Anticipated orders are as follows: UK: 138; Italy: 131; Australia: 100; Turkey: 100; Canada: 88; Netherlands: 85;
Denmark: 48; Norway: 48. (Michael Sirak, “F-35 Nations on Track to Sign New MOU, Says JSF Program Office,”
Defense Daily, November 20, 2006.)
26 DOD offers Foreign Military Sales (FMS)-level of participation in the F-35 program for countries unable to commit
to partnership in the program’s SDD phase. Israel and Singapore are believed to have contributed $50 million each, and
they are “Security Cooperative Participants.” (Selected Acquisition Report. Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition. December 31, 2005.) In October 2008, it was reported that the Bush administration had authorized sale of
the F-35 to Israel. (Caitlin Harrington. “US approves F-35 sale to Israel.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. October 1, 2008) and
that Tel Aviv was prepared to spend as much as $15 billion to procure 25 F-35s. (“Israel Looks to Spend $15 Billion
for CTOL Variant of F-35.” Defense Daily. October 1, 2008.)
27 F-35 program officials have discussed the aircraft with the defense staffs of many other allied countries as
prospective customers, including Germany, Greece, and Spain.
28 See, for example, Marina Malenic, “F-35 Sales Could Double As Countries Look To Replace Aging Fleets, General
Says,” Defense Daily, June 18, 2009: 6.
29 See “Norway Signs Industrial Partnership with Eurofighter Consortium,” Defense Daily, January 29, 2003; Joris
Janssen Lok, “Frustration Mounts Among JSF Partners,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 24, 2004; Thomas Dodd,
“Danish Companies Consider Quitting JSF Programme,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 9, 2004; Tom Kingston,
“Unsatisfied Italy May Cut JSF Participation,” Defense News, May 10, 2004; Lale Sariibrahimoglu, “Turkey may
withdraw from JSF program,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 10, 2004.
30 Tom Kington. “Italy Pushes for Europeanized JSF.” Defense News. October 13, 2008.
31 The Defense-Wide RDT&E funding occurred in FY1996-FY1998.
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• procurement funding from the Air Force and Navy aircraft procurement
accounts,32 and
• MilCon funding from the Air Force MilCon account and the Navy and Marine
Corps MilCon account.
Estimated Total Program Acquisition Cost and Prior-Year Funding
As of December 31, 2007, the total estimated acquisition cost (the sum of development cost,
procurement cost, and military construction [MilCon] cost) of the F-35 program in constant (i.e.,
inflation-adjusted) FY2009 dollars was about $246 billion, including about $47.1 billion in
research and development costs, about $198.4 billion in procurement costs, and about $496
million in MilCon costs.33
In then-year dollars (meaning dollars from various years that are not adjusted for inflation), the
figures from the preceding paragraph become $298.8 billion in acquisition costs, including $44.4
billion in research and development costs, $254.0 billion in procurement costs, and about $521
million in MilCon costs.
Like several other DOD acquisition programs, the JSF has experienced cost growth (and also
schedule slippage). Since 2002, the total estimated acquisition cost of the F-35 program has
increased by roughly $100 billion due primarily to a one-year extension in the program’s SDD
phase, a corresponding one-year delay in the start of procurement (from FY2006 to FY2007),
revised annual quantity profiles, and revised labor and overhead rates. Much of this increased cost
and schedule slippage was incurred to address weight-driven performance issues in the
development of the F-35B.
Through FY2009, the F-35 program has received a total of roughly $44 billion funding in then-
year dollars, including roughly $37 billion in research and development funding, about 6.9 billion
in procurement funding, and roughly $150 million in MilCon funding.
Estimated Unit Costs
The F-35 program as of December 31, 2007 had a program acquisition unit cost (or PAUC,
meaning total acquisition cost divided by the 2,456 research and development and procurement
aircraft) of about $100.1 million in constant FY2009 dollars, and an average procurement unit
cost (or APUC, meaning total procurement cost divided by the 2,443 production aircraft) of about
$81.2 million in constant FY2009 dollars. Between October 2001 and December 2007, the
constant-dollar PAUC and APUC figures have each grown by about 38%.
32 The Navy and Marine Corps are organized under the Department of the Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft
development and procurement costs are funded through the Navy’s RDT&E and aircraft procurement accounts.
33 The procurement cost figure of about $198.4 billion does not include the cost of several hundred additional F-35s
that are to be procured other countries that are participating in the F-35 program. The $198.4-billion figure does,
however, assume certain production-cost benefits for DOD aircraft that result from producing these several hundred
additional F-35s for other countries.
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Manufacturing Locations
Current plans call for the F-35 to be manufactured in several locations. Lockheed will build the
aircraft’s forward section in Fort Worth, TX. Northrop will build the mid-section in Palmdale,
CA, and the tail will be built by BAE Systems in the United Kingdom. Final assembly of these
components will take place in Fort Worth. Italy in 2007 reportedly was working with Lockheed
and the F-35 program office on the potential of establishing a second final assembly and checkout
facility in Italy.34
Proposed FY2010 Budget
FY2010 Funding Request
Table 2 shows the administration’s FY2010 request for Air Force and Navy research and
development and procurement funding for the F-35 program, along with FY2008 and FY2009
funding levels. The funding figures shown in the table do not include procurement funding for
initial spares, MilCon funding, or research and development funding provided by other countries.
Table 2. FY2010 Funding Request for F-35 Program
(Figures in millions of then-year dollars; FY2008 and FY2009 figures shown for reference; figures shown
do not include procurement funding for initial spares, MilCon funding, or research and development
funding provided by other countries;)
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
(request)
Funding Quantity Funding Quantity Funding Quantity
RDT&E funding
Air
Force 1,939.1 — 1,734.3 — 1,858.1 —
Dept.
of
Navy
1,848.9 — 1,744.6 — 1,741.3 —
Subtotal
3,788.0 — 3,478.9 — 3,599.4 —
Procurement funding
Air
Force 1,412.1 6 1,660.6 7 2,349.4 10
Dept. of Navy
1,223.6
6a 1,650.1 7b 4,478.0 20c
Subtotal
2,635.7 12 3,310.7 14 6,827.5 30
TOTAL
6,423.7 12 6,789.6 14 10,426.9 30
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD data. Figures shown do not include procurement funding for initial
spares, MilCon funding,, or research and development funding provided by other countries. Air Force funding for
initial spares was $69.8 million in FY2008 and $60.9 million in FY2009, and $129.7 million is requested for
FY2010. Department of the Navy funding for initial spares was zero in FY2008 and $32.7 million in FY2009, and
$249.0 million is requested for FY2010. International partner funding for research and development was $552.7
million in FY2008 and $250.6 million in FY2009, and is projected to be $114.1 million in FY2010.
34 Michael Sirak, “F-35 Program May Get First International Orders In Third Production Lot in 2009,” Defense Daily
International, June 22, 2007.
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a. Al 6 aircraft are F-35Bs for the Marine Corps.
b. Al 7 aircraft are F-35Bs for the Marine Corps.
c. Includes 16 F-35Bs for the Marine Corps and 4 F-35Cs for the Navy.
The 10 F-35As requested for FY2010 in the Air Force budget have an estimated procurement cost
of $2,220.3 million, or an average of $222.0 million each. These aircraft have received $171.4
million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, leaving another $2,048.8 million to be
funded in FY2010 to complete their estimated procurement cost. The FY2010 Air Force
procurement funding request for the F-35 program also includes $300.6 million in advance
procurement funding for 27 F-35As to be procured in future years, and $129.7 million for F-35A
initial spares, bringing the total FY2010 Air Force procurement funding request for the program
to $2,479.1 million. (Table 2 does not include funding for initial spares, which is why it shows a
total of $2,349.4 million.)
The 16 F-35Bs and four F-35Cs requested for FY2010 in the Department of the Navy budget
have a combined estimated procurement cost of $4,212.1 million, or an average of $210.6 million
each. These aircraft have received $215.0 million in prior-year AP funding, leaving another
$3,997.0 million to be funded in FY2010 to complete their estimated procurement cost. The
FY2010 Department of the Navy procurement funding request for the F-35 program also includes
$481.0 million in advance procurement funding for F-35Bs and Cs to be procured in future years,
and $249.0 million for F-35A initial spares, bringing the total FY2010 Air Force procurement
funding request for the program to $4,727.0 million. (Table 2 does not include funding for initial
spares, which is why it shows a total of $4,478.0 million.)
Proposed Termination of Alternate Engine Program
The administration’s proposed FY2010 budget proposes terminating the F-35 alternate engine
program.
Issues For Congress
Alternate Engine
A key issue for Congress for the F-35 program in FY2010 is the administration’s proposal to
terminate the F-35 alternate engine program, which is intended to develop the General
Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 engine as an alternative to the Pratt and Whitney F135 engine that
currently powers the F-35. As mentioned earlier, the George W. Bush administration proposed
terminating the alternate engine program in FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009, but Congress
rejected these proposals and each year provided funding for the program’s continuation.
Summary of Arguments For and Against Termination
Supporters of the administration’s proposal to terminate the alternate engine program argue the
following:
• Development, testing, and production of the F135 have reached the point where it
is no longer necessary to hedge against the possibility of technical problems in
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the F135 engine by pursing an alternate engine program as a backup. The causes
of F135 test failures in 2007 and 2008 have been identified and fixes are being
implemented.
• Developing and procuring a second engine for the F-35 would add billions of
dollars to the cost of the F-35 program by doubling engine development costs
and halving engine production economies of scale, reducing the number of F-35s
that could be procured within a given total mount of F-35 acquisition funding.
• Procuring a second engine for the F-35 would increase F-35 life-cycle operation
and support (O&S) costs by requiring DOD to maintain two F-35 engine
maintenance and repair pipelines.
Opponents of the administration’s proposal to terminate the alternate engine program argue the
following:
• Given that F-35s in the future are to constitute the vast majority of the country’s
strike fighters, and in light of F135 test failures in 2007 and 2008, it would be
imprudent to have all those strike fighters powered by a single type of engine,
since a problem with that engine could force the grounding of the entire F-35
fleet.
• Having a second engine in production (or ready for production) would permit
DOD to use competition (or the threat of competition) in procuring and
supporting F-35 engines, which will reduce F-35 engine procurement and O&S
costs compared to what would be achievable in a sole-source procurement,
offsetting the additional costs associated with developing, procuring, and
supporting a second engine. Competition (or the threat of competition) would
also promote better engine performance, increased engine reliability, and
improved contractor responsiveness.
• Having two F-35 production lines in operation would permit F-35 engine
production to quickly surged to higher levels if needed to respond to a change in
the strategic environment, and preserve a potential for maintaining effective
competition in the development and procurement of future tactical aircraft
engines, particularly if F-22 and F/A-18E/F production ends.
Administration Perspective
An Office of Management and Budget (OMB) document on proposed FY2010 program
terminations, reductions, and savings states that:
The Administration has decided not to fund the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Alternative Engine
Program (AEP), because it is no longer needed as a hedge against the failure of the main
Joint Strike Fighter engine program. The Department of Defense (DOD) proposed cancelling
the JSF AEP in the President’s 2007 Budget because development of the main engine was
progressing well and analysis indicated that savings from competition would not be offset by
high upfront costs. DOD did not request funding for the program in the 2008 and 2009
Budgets. However, the Congress has rejected the proposed cancellations and has added
funding each year since 2007 to sustain the AEP development....
Because DOD wanted to reduce technical risk in the development of the JSF engine, the
Department has had two contractors developing separate JSF engines. However, in 2007,
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DOD proposed to cancel the contract for the second (alternate) engine because the main
engine program was progressing well, making a second engine program unnecessary.
Moreover, financial benefits, such as savings from competition, have been assessed to be
small, if they exist at all, because of the high cost of developing, producing and maintaining
a second engine. The reasons for canceling the AEP in 2007 remain valid today. Studies by
both the Government Accountability Office and Congressional Budget Office have
questioned the affordability of the current defense program, particularly the high cost of
modernizing tactical aviation.35 Canceling the AEP will result in estimated near-term savings
of over a billion dollars.36
At a May 20, 2009, hearing before the Air and Land Forces subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee on Air Force acquisition programs, a DOD acquisition official stated:
The F-35 acquisition strategy contains provisions for a competitive engine program,
provided funds are available to execute that strategy. Currently, the F135 engine is
completing the development phase and beginning initial low rate production to support the
F-35 aircraft production and test schedule. The F135 experienced two separate low pressure
turbine blade failures, the first in the September 2007 and the second in February 2008. Root
cause analysis determined the problem. The appropriate fixes were identified and are being
incorporated into the remaining test and all future production engines. The engines were
certified for Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing testing in January 2009, and the program
recently completed hover pit testing as it prepares for full vertical landing flight tests later
this year.
The Department did not include funding in the Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget for the
F136 competitive engine. The decision to not include funding for the F136 is consistent with
the Department’s position on this issue for the prior three budget submissions. The decision
this year was reviewed by the Department’s leadership as well as the Administration. The
determination of whether to fund the competitive engine, as it has in the past, was weighed
against the budget priorities of the Department as a whole, the optimum use of taxpayer’s
dollars in executing and preparing for the National defense, and the benefits to the F-35
program. The Department continues to execute appropriated development funding to ensure
that a competitive engine program remains viable while there is funding is available. Since
there is no follow-on procurement funding in Fiscal Year 2010, the Department has delayed
execution of advance procurement funding appropriated in the Fiscal Year 2009
Appropriations Act. The Department’s policy is to execute advance procurement funds only
when associated follow-on procurement funding or a programmed plan that contains full
procurement funding is available.37
At the same hearing, Air Force officials stated the following:
Presidential Budget 10, released earlier this month, cancelled the alternate engine program
for the Joint Strike Fighter, and removed all further funding for the development and
35 The passage at this point has a footnote citing the following two reports: Government Accountability Office, Defense
Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-326SP, March 2009; and Congressional Budget
Office, Long Term Implications of the Fiscal Year 2009 Future Years Defense Program, January 2009.
36 Office of Management and Budget. Terminations, Reductions, and Savings, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal
Year, 2010. Washington, May 2009. p. 38.
37 Statement of Mr. David G. Ahern, Director, Portfolio Systems Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and
Land Forces, May 20, 2009, pp. 6-7.
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procurement of this second engine. The Air Force and Navy are executing the funding
appropriated by Congress in the 2009 budget to continue the F136 program.
The cost to continue F136 engine development is approximately $1.8B through FY15. In
addition, the Department of Defense will have to fund the production of GE engines to get
the suppliers on equal footing in the amount of approximately $2.8B. Continued funding for
the F136 engine carries cost penalties to both F135 and F136 engines for reduced production
line learning curves and inefficient economic order quantities. The department has concluded
that maintaining a single engine supplier provides the best balance of cost and risk. Our
belief is the risks associated with a single source engine supplier are manageable due to
improvements in engine technology and do not outweigh the investment required to fund a
competitive alternate engine.38
GAO Perspective
At a May 20, 2009, hearing before the Air and Land Forces subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee on Air Force acquisition programs, GAO testified on the F-35 program,
stating in the testimony’s summary that:
The department [i.e., DOD] has not asked for funding for the alternate engine program in the
budgets since 2007 arguing that an alternate engine is not needed as a hedge against the
failure of the main engine program and that the savings from competition would be small.
Nonetheless, the Congress has added funding each year since then to sustain its
development. Our prior analysis indicates that competitive pressures could yield enough
savings to offset the costs of competition over the JSF program’s life. To date, the two
contractors have spent over $8 billion on engine development—over $6 billion with the main
engine contractor and over $2 billion with the second source contractor.39
Elaborating on this summary statement, the testimony stated the following:
DOD’s Proposal to Cancel the Alternate Engine Program May Bypass Long-term
Merits
DOD and the Congress have had a continuing debate for several years on the merits of an
alternate engine program to provide a second source and competition for engine procurement
and life cycle support. The alternate engine program was part of the original JSF acquisition
strategy. The department first proposed canceling the alternate engine program in the 2007
budget and has not asked for funding in the budgets since then. The administration does not
believe an alternate engine is needed as a hedge against the failure of the main engine
program and believes savings from competition would be small. The Congress has added
funding each year since 2007 to sustain the alternate engine development, including $465
million for fiscal year 2009. To date, the two contractors have spent over $8 billion on
38 Department of the Air Force Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, United States House of Representatives, Subject: Air Force Programs, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant
General Daniel J. Darnell, Air Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And
Requirements (AF/A3/5) [and] Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy
Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans And Programs (AF/A8) May 20, 2009, p. 11.
39 Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter[:]Strong Risk Management Essential as Program Enters
Most Challenging Phase, Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management. GAO-09-
711T, May 20, 2009, summary page.
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engines development—over $6 billion with the main engine contractor and over $2 billion
with the second source contractor.
The way forward for the JSF engine acquisition strategy entails one of many critical choices
facing DOD today, and underscores the importance of decisions facing the program. As we
noted in past testimonies before this committee, the acquisition strategy for the JSF engine
must weigh expected costs against potential rewards. In each of the past 2 years we have
testified before this committee on the merits of a competitive engine program for the Joint
Strike Fighter.40 While we did not update our analysis we believe it is still relevant and the
same conclusions can be drawn. We reported in 2008 that to continue the JSF alternate
engine program, an additional investment of about $3.5 billion to $4.5 billion in development
and production-related costs, may be required to ensure competition.41 Our earlier cost
analysis suggests that a savings of 9 to 11 percent would recoup that investment. As we
reported last year, a competitive strategy has the potential for savings equal to or exceeding
that amount across the life cycle of the engine. Prior experience indicates that it is reasonable
to assume that competition on the JSF engine program could yield savings of at least that
much. As a result, we remain confident that competitive pressures could yield enough
savings to offset the costs of competition over the JSF program’s life. However, we
recognize that this ultimately will depend on the final approach for the competition, the
number of aircraft actually purchased, and the ratio of engines awarded to each contractor.
Results from past competitions provide evidence of potential financial and nonfinancial
savings that can be derived from engine programs. One relevant case study to consider is the
“Great Engine War” of the 1980s—the competition between Pratt & Whitney and General
Electric to supply military engines for the F-16 and other fighter aircraft programs. At that
time, all engines for the F-14 and F-15 aircraft were being produced on a sole-source basis
by Pratt & Whitney, which was criticized for increased procurement and maintenance costs,
along with a general lack of responsiveness to government concerns about those programs.
For example, safety issues with the single-engine F-16 aircraft were seen as having greater
consequences than safety issues with the twin-engine F-14 or F-15 aircraft. To address
concerns, the Air Force began to fund the development and testing of an alternate engine to
be produced by General Electric; the Air Force also supported the advent of an improved
derivative of the Pratt & Whitney engine. Beginning in 1983, the Air Force initiated a
competition that Air Force documentation suggests resulted in significant cost savings in the
program. In the first 4 years of the competition, when actual costs are compared to the
program’s baseline estimate, results included (1) nearly 30 percent cumulative savings for
acquisition costs, (2) roughly 16 percent cumulative savings for operations and support costs;
and (3) total savings of about 21 percent in overall life cycle costs.
The Great Engine War was able to generate significant benefits because competition
incentivized contractors to improve designs and reduce costs during production and
sustainment. Competitive pressure continues today as the F-15 and F-16 aircraft are still
being sold internationally. While other defense competitions resulted in some level of
40 The passage at this point has a footnote citing the following two prior instances of GAO testimony: Government
Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter[:] Impact of Recent Decisions on Program Risks, Statement of Michael
Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Testimony before the Subcommittees on Air and Land
Forces, and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO-08-
569T, March 11, 2008; and Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:]Analysis of Costs for the Joint
Strike Fighter Engine Program, Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management,
Testimony before the Subcommittees on Air and Land Forces, and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO-07-656T, March 22, 2007.
41 The passage at this point has a footnote stating: “Since that time, Congress appropriated $465 million in the fiscal
year 2009 budget to continue the alternate engine program.”
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benefits, especially with regard to contractor responsiveness, they did not see the same levels
of success absent continued competitive pressures.
Similar competition for the JSF engines may also provide benefits that do not result in
immediate financial savings, but could result in reduced costs or other positive outcomes
over time. Our prior work, along with studies by DOD and others, indicate there are a
number of nonfinancial benefits that may result from competition, including better
performance, increased reliability, and improved contractor responsiveness. In addition, the
long-term effects of the JSF engine program on the global industrial base go far beyond the
two competing contractors.
DOD and others have performed studies and have widespread concurrence as to these other
benefits, including better engine performance, increased reliability, and improved contractor
responsiveness. In fact, in 1998 and 2002, DOD program management advisory groups
assessed the JSF alternate engine program and found the potential for significant benefits in
these and other areas. Table 2 summarizes the benefits determined by those groups.
Table 2: 1998 and 2002 Program Management Advisory Group Study Findings on
the Benefits of an Alternate Engine Program
Beneficial
Marginal No
Value
Factor
assessed 1998 2002 1998 2002 1998 2002
Costs
X
X
Development risk
X
X
reduction
Engine growth
X
X
potential
Fleet readiness
X
X
Industrial base
X
X
Int’l
implications X X
Other
X X
considerationsd
Overal X
X
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
d. Other considerations include contractor responsiveness, improved design solutions, and competition at the
engine subsystem level.
While the benefits highlighted may be more difficult to quantify, they are no less important,
and ultimately were strongly considered in recommending continuation of the alternate
engine program. These studies concluded that the program would maintain the industrial
base for fighter engine technology, enhance readiness, instill contractor incentives for better
performance, ensure an operational alternative if the current engine developed problems, and
enhance international participation.
Another potential benefit of having an alternate engine program, and one also supported by
the program advisory groups, is to reduce the risk that a single point systemic failure in the
engine design could substantially affect the fighter aircraft fleet. This point is underscored by
recent failures of the Pratt & Whitney test program. In August 2007, an engine running at a
test facility experienced failures in the low pressure turbine blade and bearing, which
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resulted in a suspension of all engine test activity. In February 2008, during follow-on testing
to prove the root cause of these failures, a blade failure occurred in another engine, resulting
in delays to both the Air Force and Marine Corps variant flight test programs. 42
Press Reports
A June 1, 2009, press report states:
Funding development of a second engine from within the existing F-35 budget would cut
production by dozens of aircraft and push up program costs, the Joint Strike Fighter’s
program chief warns in an interview with Aviation Week.
The concerns come as Congress is expected to reverse the White House and Pentagon’s
effort to cancel the alternate powerplant.
Forcing the program to fund development of the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 from
within the existing JSF budget would “take 50-80 tails out of the program” over the next five
years, says the program executive officer (PEO), Marine Corps Brig. Gen. David Heinz.
The Defense Department’s fiscal 2010 budget request calls for procurement of 513 F-35s
over five years, an increase of 25 over previous plans, with another 180 expected to be built
for international partners over the same period. This would take annual production “into the
low 200s” by FY ‘15, he says.
Funding the F136 within the existing budget would require cutting six aircraft from the 30
planned in FY ‘10, Heinz says. This would make aircraft in subsequent years more
expensive, pushing back international purchases and compounding the problem because the
partners could not afford early aircraft, he says.
“We would never get to 200 tails [a year]. We would build out to around 100, under-utilize
the tooling and not get down the learning curve,” the PEO says. “I worry about taking tails
out of the program because it will get so expensive the partners will start to pull back.”
Pentagon leadership has not sought to continue the F136, arguing DOD can only afford the
Pratt & Whitney F135 primary engine. But Congress is expected to reinstate the funding.
Lawmakers, with widespread consensus, have ignored the cancellation effort for years and
earmarked money for the alternate.
But before, some of the restored funding has come from within the existing JSF budget,
forcing cuts elsewhere in the program. Former U.S. Air Force leaders have testified on
Capitol Hill that they didn’t so much oppose an alternate engine as they did sacrificing
elsewhere to fund it (Aerospace DAILY, March 7, 2008).
The GE/R-R Fighter Engine Team has defended its lobbying for the F136. “We’ve never
advocated taking the money out of the other parts of the program. Congress needs to decide
where the money comes from,” says Dennis Jarvi, president of Rolls-Royce North America
Defense.
42 Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter[:]Strong Risk Management Essential as Program Enters
Most Challenging Phase, Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management. GAO-09-
711T, May 20, 2009, pp. 4-7.
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The international partners would like a competing engine, and Pentagon efforts to kill the
F136 are “sure to be a major topic” when they meet in Washington later this month, says
Tom Burbage, Lockheed executive vice-president and general manager, F-35 program
integration. “There is support in the international community for the second engine,” he tells
Aviation Week.
Burbage says the second-engine issue is “programmatically complex” because, while
Congress has incrementally funded development of the F136, the Defense Dept. has not
factored production of two engines into its budget planning and not decided how it would
conduct an annual leader/follower competition.
“It’s the clear intent of Congress to have a second engine, but it could have a very substantial
impact,” he says.43
A June 3, 2009, press report states:
The top Joint Strike Fighter official says he unequivocally supports President Barack
Obama’s fiscal 2010 budget request, which does not seek funds for a second JSF engine—
but he is still planning for the F136 and suggests Washington consider the risk otherwise.
Citing the potential for “competitive advantage” from alternate engines for the single-engine
F-35, and noting that there could be an operational risk some day from having just one
engine, Marine Corps Brig. Gen. David Heinz told reporters at the JSF Joint Program Office
June 2 that there might be considerations beyond the financial cost of funding dual
powerplant efforts.
“Do we still believe that’s acceptable?” Heinz asked rhetorically.
Meantime, the general—selected for his second star after his promotion from deputy
program chief—says it would be irresponsible for him not to plan for both engine efforts. “I
have to,” he asserts, adding it would be “downright reckless” not to after Congress has
earmarked funds for the second engine several times already. And besides, military officials
spend a lot of their time planning for things that do not happen, he joked.
Heinz explained to the roundtable of reporters that funding development of a second engine
from within the existing F-35 budget would cut production by 50 or more aircraft and push
up program costs—a point he made to Aviation Week last week (Aerospace DAILY, May
29). But the program executive officer also stressed that economic modeling was difficult,
and that a competition for the engines would likely drive down costs.
Heinz further asserted that the primary Pratt & Whitney F135 engine has yet to truly
compete with the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136, regardless of what Pratt and some
supporters may suggest.
Assuming the program’s planned ramp-up and a 50-50 split engine order during the sixth
low-rate initial production tranche, fiscal 2013 would be the first genuine year of the rivalry.
Such a race could bring technology advancements too, the general notes. “They are just
beginning in that competition,” he says.
43 Graham Warwick and Guy Norris, “Second Engine Could Force F-35 Production Cuts, PEO Warns,” Aerospace
Daily & Defense Report, June 1, 2009: 3.
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Elsewhere, Heinz said authorities are trying to track down and prosecute those responsible
for a cyber breach of the program a few years ago, recently highlighted in news reports. He
would not comment further, saying all the publicity does not necessarily help that effort.
“We are trying to actually capture a few of these individuals,” he says.44
A June 8, 2009, press report states:
The new general in charge of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program last week told reporters
the Defense Department must weigh the operational risks of having a single engine program
for the fifth-generation jet rather than solely looking at the cost implications of procuring two
power plants.
The F-35 Lightning II was conceived to be developed with two engines, the Pratt & Whitney
F135 and the General Electric-Rolls-Royce F136. However, DOD in recent years—including
in its budget request for fiscal year 2010—has zeroed funding for the second power plant.
Each year, Congress has reintroduced full funding for the F136 in its markups of the defense
budget. “I support the president’s budget, but in the future, should there be an engine
incident on the F135 motor, our ability to absorb an incident that may ground a large number
of those motors ... is going to lessen,” Marine Corps Brig. Gen. David Heinz said during a
June 2 briefing at the JSF program office in Arlington, VA, noting that the F-35 will
eventually replace a number of legacy jets, including the F-15 Eagle, the F-16 Viper, the
F/A-18 Hornet and the AV-8B Harrier II.
As such, the military will not have the operational flexibility it has today if an engine
problem leads to the grounding of the F-35 fleet with a single engine, Heinz added.
“I believe part of the debate that has to occur and is occurring is, ‘Is there an operational risk
that we are accepting by having just one engine manufactured?’” he said. “I simply think we
focus too much on the discussion about cost benefit and not operational risk benefit.”
Heinz also continued the rhetoric of his predecessor—Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Davis—
that the true cost savings of having two engines competing in the program have yet to be
revealed. In the 1980s engine wars, per-unit costs reductions reached 20 percent due to
competition, he noted.
“I think that, because of the difference in the development time line, that [the competition]
has not yet occurred,” the Marine Corps one-star said. “Pratt is not truly competing with GE
yet for the market share, because I only have Pratt engines through [low-rate initial
production]-3. We’re going to introduce—if Congress fully funds in the [fiscal year 2010]
budget—four GE motors, but that’s four out of 30 motors that we’ll buy next year, so they’re
just beginning in that competition. I do not believe yet that Pratt feels compelled as though
they are in competition with GE.”
DOD last week awarded JSF prime contractor Lockheed Martin a $2 billion contract to
produce 17 LRIP-3 F-35s. The lot includes the first international orders—two operational
test aircraft for the United Kingdom and one for the Netherlands. In March and April,
Lockheed received $306 million to prepare production for 32 LRIP-4 aircraft. When the
competition truly heats up between Pratt and the GE-Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine team,
Heinz said there will be “much more technology push” between the two, because they will
44 Michael Bruno, “JSF Program Chief Cites Advantages Of Competing Engines,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,
June 3, 2009: 1-2.
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be striving to win more engine buys. The two companies also will try to introduce such
innovations as more efficient blades, fuel savings and thrust growth capability.
Late last month, team officials told reporters there is a “strong business case” to continue the
second engine program, and it will cost roughly $130 million—compared to the $100 billion
total for F-35 engine production—to open the F136 production line.
Further, international partners including the United Kingdom entered into the JSF program
with the expectation that there will be two engines, they contended. If Congress directs the
JSF program office to continue the F136 program, then Heinz will introduce the first four
GE-Rolls-Royce power plants into the F-35’s fourth low-rate initial production lot, the
Marine Corps general said. The engine buys will then ramp up to the point where there will
be a 50-50 split in engine procurement by LRIP-6.
“That would also allow the GE motor to be in operation for about a year in the fleet so I now
have both costing data, I’ve got them to about the same point in quantities, and I’ve got
operational experience with both motors,” Heinz said. “At that point, the services and the
[Joint Program Office] have pretty good information to start competition and to start the
competitive nature to start to drive how much quantity I buy in the next years following
that.”
The true competition, by Heinz’s calculations, will begin in FY-13, he said.
Adding that it would be “reckless” not to plan for the possibility of F136 congressional
funding, Heinz said the Office of the Secretary of Defense should release advance
procurement funding for the second engine if Congress shows their commitment to the
program in its markup of the FY-10 budget. Though such funding has been appropriated in
previous years’ budgets, none of the money thus far has gone to the program office. 45
A June 18, 2009, press report states:
Despite the Obama administration’s official desire to cancel the General Electric/Rolls-
Royce (GE/RR) F136 alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the program and its
customers are privately telling the manufacturers that the engine is needed.
Behind this apparent contradiction, GE and RR people at the show here believe, is the fact
that the F136 has more inherent power potential than the current Pratt & Whitney F135
configuration.
GE program leader Jean Lydon-Rogers confirmed here, for the first time in a formal briefing,
that the F136 was designed, from the start of system development and demonstration in
2004, with a bigger core and greater total airflow than was planned in the pre-SDD stage, to
deal with ncreases in the JSF’s weight.
One result is that the engine could gain 5 percent in thrust (more than 2,000 pounds) with a
simple software change. In the medium term, though, GE and RR believe that the F136 has a
bigger temperature margin than the F135, allowing it to maintain performance in hot-and-
high conditions.
45 Jason Simpson, “Heinz: DOD Must Look At Operational Risks of Having One JSF Engine,” Inside the Navy, June 8,
2009.
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
This will be important for the United Kingdom. Although the F135 is expected to meet
formal key performance parameters, including the short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing F-
35B’s bring-back requirement for the U.S. Marine Corps, Britain’s experience of Harrier
operations under hot, humid and high-level conditions in Afghanistan has led to a tougher
“hot day” definition. GE and RR say that the F136 can deliver more performance under those
conditions.
The program office and customers recognize this issue, according to people associated with
the F136. The problem is that in the past (and still, with this week’s action in the House of
Representatives), Congress has cut aircraft from the program to pay for the F136 (Aerospace
DAILY, June 17), and the program office and customers don’t want to see that happen
either. They want Congress to fund the F136 from other sources. Further complicating the
issue is that the White House has now formally come out in favor of cutting the F136.46
Development Status and Readiness for Higher-Rate Production
Another issue for Congress for the F-35 program in FY2010 concerns the development status of
the F-35 and whether the aircraft is ready to shift into higher rate production.
Administration Perspective
At a May 20, 2009, hearing before the Air and Land Forces subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee on Air Force acquisition programs, a DOD acquisition official stated:
The decision to increase the six-year F-35 production profile by 28 aircraft was driven by the
need to create a more efficient ramp-rate from year to year as we prepare to enter full-rate
production in the 2015 timeframe. Accelerating the 28 aircraft deliveries into the Fiscal
Years 2010-2015 FYDP lowers the unit cost, expedites delivery of aircraft to the warfighter,
and has the added benefit of saving approximately $500 million over the life of the program.
More importantly, appropriately managing the investments in this ramp-rate is critical to
meeting our warfighter requirements at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer. The current
state of the flight test schedule was considered in making this decision. The developmental
flight testing begins in earnest this year, with operational testing not scheduled to begin until
2012. While flight testing is an important part of the program, it is not the only indicator of
performance verification. Design maturity, manufacturing quality metrics, and software
stability are providing confidence through initial structural testing, limited flight envelope
testing, and predicted versus actual performance in the large number of labs and simulators.
The Department believes that the investment now, to achieve a more efficient production
ramp, will yield savings over the long term and ensure the Services receive the warfighting
assets they need to execute their operational requirements.47
At the same hearing, Air Force officials stated the following:
The F-35 is projected to meet all Key Performance Parameters (KPP) and as of 10 May
2009, AA-1 [an F-35 SDD aircraft] has completed 84 test flights, including a deployment to
Eglin AFB. The first system design and development (SDD) Short Take-Off and Vertical
46 Bill Sweetman, “JSF Needs F136, Partners Say At Air Show,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 18, 2009: 2.
47 Statement of Mr. David G. Ahern, Director, Portfolio Systems Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and
Land Forces, May 20, 2009, p. 7.
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Landing (STOVL) aircraft, BF-1, has completed 14 flights. The second SDD STOVL
aircraft, BF-2, had its first flight in February 2009. The Cooperative Avionics Test Bed
(CAT-B) continues to provide unprecedented risk reduction at this stage in a major weapon
system not seen in any legacy program. In December 2008, the Defense Acquisition
Executive (DAE) approved full funding for 7 Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL)
aircraft and engines, plus sustainment and associated equipment as part of the Low Rate
Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 3 acquisition decision memorandum. In addition, the DAE
approved full funding for seven STOVL aircraft plus sustainment and associated equipment
contingent upon successful completion of the F135 Pratt & Whitney lead engine Stress Test,
Flight Test Engine 6 Proof Test and receipt of full STOVL flight clearance, which occurred
on 30 January 2009.48
At a May 19, 2009, hearing before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy aviation procurement programs,
Navy and Marine Corps Officials stated:
Three SDD jets (AA-1, BF-1 and BF-2) are in flight testing. The remaining SDD jets and
ground test articles, plus Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) I and LRIP II aircraft, are in
various stages of production. The SDD jets are setting new standards for quality and
manufacturing efficiencies that improve with each jet. In flight testing, the initial
Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL) aircraft (AA-1) has demonstrated superb
performance and reduced program risk, with 81 sorties (~111 flight hours) flown through
April 20, 2009. BF-1, the first STOVL flight test jet, first flew in June 2008, on the schedule
established two-years prior. BF-1 has flown 14 flights (~13 hours), and is currently on the
hover pit, undergoing vertical engine operations. BF-2 first flew February 2009 and returned
with no flight discrepancies noted. BG-1 static test results are favorable. The F135 engine
has completed 11,300+ test hours on 16 engines through mid-April 2009. Software is 74%
complete, with 13 million lines of code released including Block 0.5 Mission Systems, per
the spiral development plan/schedule and with record-setting code-writing efficiencies.
Software demonstrates stability across multiple Mission System subsystems.
Systems integration testing continues on plan via flight tests, a flying lab and over 150,000
hours of ground labs testing. A fully integrated Mission Systems jet will fly later this year.
The second production lot contract was signed below the cost model prediction. LRIP III
contract negotiations are near complete, and LRIP IV Advance Procurement funding is on
contract. All F-35 variants are projected to meet their respective Key Performance
Parameters. The F-35 plan for incremental blocks of capability balances cost, schedule and
risk.49
48 Department of the Air Force Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, United States House of Representatives, Subject: Air Force Programs, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant
General Daniel J. Darnell, Air Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And
Requirements (AF/A3/5) [and] Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy
Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans And Programs (AF/A8) May 20, 2009, pp. 10-11.
49 Statement of Vice Admiral David Architzel, USN, Principal Military Deputy, Research, Development and
Acquisition, LTGEN George J. Trautman III, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, [and] RADM Allen G.
Myers, USN, Director of Warfare Integration, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Warfare [sic: Forces]
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [hearing] on [the] Department of the Navy’s Aviation
Procurement Program, May 19, 2009, p. 2.
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
GAO Perspective
March 2009 GAO Report
A March 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report providing assessments of major
DOD weapon acquisition programs stated the following about the F-35 program:
Technology Maturity
Five of the JSF’s eight critical technologies are mature. The remaining three—mission
systems integration, prognostics and health management, the radar—are approaching
maturity.
Design Maturity
The program reported that it had released over 90 percent of planned engineering drawings
for each of the three variants indicating that the designs are generally stable. While the
designs appear stable, the late release of design drawings led to manufacturing inefficiencies
from which the program is still recovering.
Production Maturity
The JSF program’s production processes are not mature. While the program collects
information on the maturity of manufacturing processes, a good practice, only about 12
percent of its critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control. Projected labor hours
have increased about 40 percent since 2007. The late release of drawings and subsequent
supplier problems have led to late part deliveries, delaying the program schedule and forcing
inefficient manufacturing processes. Program officials do not expect these inefficiencies to
be fully corrected until 2010, during its third low rate production lot.
The JSF designs are still not fully proven and tested. Flight testing, begun in late 2006, was
only about two percent completed as of November 2008. The program began testing its first
production representative prototype—a short takeoff vertical landing variant flown in
conventional mode—in June 2008. A fully integrated, capable aircraft is not expected to
enter flight testing until 2012, increasing risks that problems found may require design and
production changes and retrofits of completed aircraft.
Other Program Issues
The program continues to experience significant cost increases and schedule delays. A recent
independent cost estimate identified additional funding requirements for system development
of as much as $7.44 billion through fiscal year 2016. This would increase the total
development costs 14 percent from $44.3 billion to $51.81 billion. The estimating team also
projected a three year extension in system development. Separately, the program office has
projected that development costs will increase by approximately $2.43 billion to address cost
overruns on the airframe and engine contracts and to pay for a one-year schedule extension.
The independent cost estimate was higher than the program office estimate because it also
included (1) the alternate engine effort, (2) higher contractor engineering staff levels, (3)
additional software growth, (4) an expanded flight test program, and (5) more labor hours to
manufacture aircraft. Program officials argue that costs will be lower than the independent
estimate because, among other things, they believe the program has made substantial
progress in software development and has invested heavily in advanced simulation labs
intended to reduce risk.
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Despite the program’s continued manufacturing problems and the infancy of the flight test
program, DOD officials want to accelerate production by 169 aircraft between fiscal years
2010 and 2015. This may require up to $33.5 billion in additional procurement funding in
those years. We believe this more aggressive production approach is optimistic and risky.
Program Office Comments
The program noted that JSF’s technical, software, production processes, and testing maturity
are tracking to plan and substantially exceeding standards set in past programs. The
manufacturing fit and quality of the jets are unprecedented and production processes are
improving with each jet. The program’s second prototype test aircraft flew on the schedule
established two-years prior. Software development is 65 percent complete (twelve million
lines) in accordance with the spiral development plan/schedule and with record-setting code-
writing efficiencies. The software demonstrates stability across multiple mission system
subsystems. Systems integration testing continues on schedule through the use of flight tests,
a flying lab, and over 150,000 hours of ground labs testing. A fully integrated mission
systems jet is scheduled to fly in 2009. The latest DOD independent cost estimate increased
little from the one of four years ago. The second production lot contract was signed for a
price below the cost model prediction. The program’s plan for incremental blocks of
capability balances cost, schedule and risk.50
May 2009 GAO Testimony
At a May 20, 2009, hearing before the Air and Land Forces subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee on Air Force acquisition programs, GAO testified on the F-35 program,
stating:
JSF development will cost more and take longer to complete than reported to the Congress in
April 2008, primarily because of contract cost overruns and extended time needed to
complete flight testing. DOD is also significantly increasing annual procurement rates and
plans to buy some aircraft sooner than reported last year. Total development costs are
projected to increase between $2.4 billion and $7.4 billion and the schedule for completing
system development extended from 1 to 3 years....
Manufacturing of development test aircraft is taking more time, money, and effort than
planned, but officials believe that they can still deliver the 9 remaining test aircraft by early
2010. The contractor has not yet demonstrated mature manufacturing processes, or an ability
to produce at currently planned rates. It has taken steps to improve manufacturing; however,
given the manufacturing challenges, DOD’s plan to increase procurement in the near term
adds considerable risk and will be difficult to achieve.
DOD is procuring a substantial number of JSF aircraft using cost reimbursement contracts.
Cost reimbursement contracts place most of the risk on the buyer—DOD in this case—who
is liable to pay more than budgeted should labor, material, or other incurred costs be more
than expected when the contract was signed.
JSF flight testing is still in its infancy and continues to experience flight testing delays.
Nonetheless, DOD is making substantial investments before flight testing proves that the JSF
50 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-09-
326SP, March 2009. p. 94.
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will perform as expected. DOD may procure 273 aircraft costing an estimated $42 billion
before completing flight testing.
Procurement Investments and Progress of Flight Testing
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cumulative
$0.9 $3.6 $6.9 $13.7 $20.6 $31.1 $41.9 $54.3
procurement
(billions of
dollars)
Cumulative
2 14 28 58 101 183 273 383
aircraft
procured
Percentage of
<1% <1% 2% 9% 34% 62% 88% 100%
flight test
program
completed
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data51
Press Reports
A June 2, 2009, press report states:
Joint Strike Fighter officials are refocusing the program on delivering test-ready aircraft
following further delays to completing F-35s for development flight-testing.
The shift will delay the first flight of aircraft still in production by up to three months, but is
expected to enable faster flight-testing to recover some of the slippage.
Aircraft were previously being flown once, then grounded for modifications to incorporate
design changes resulting from analysis and testing.
“There was a lot of emphasis on first flight under past program leadership. The event became
important, not the readiness [for testing],” says Doug Pearson, vice president of the F-35
integrated task force.
“When there was more work to do on the aircraft, it was added after first flight. And over
time, the additions became more than we wished for,” he says. For example, aircraft BF-2
flew once in February and has been in modification since.
New JSF program executive officer Brig. Gen. David Heinz has asked Lockheed Martin to
study the effect of rephasing the work to accomplish the modifications on assembly before
first flight.
The ferry flight to the test center at Edwards Air Force Base in California or Naval Air
Station Patuxent River in Maryland would become the new programmatic milestone. “We
need to get them built, and ready to test, before they fly,” Pearson says.
51 Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter[:]Strong Risk Management Essential as Program Enters
Most Challenging Phase, Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management. GAO-09-
711T, May 20, 2009, summary page.
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Instead of flying all the development F-35s by year’s end, four of the aircraft would slip into
2010, Heinz says, but Lockheed hopes to recover some of the delay by delivering fully
modified aircraft into productive flight-testing.
Aircraft BF-1, the first short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B, is in modification
following hover-pit testing and is expected to return to flight by the end of July.
After around 12 flights from the Fort Worth, Texas, plant to verify design changes and
qualify the aircraft for probe-and-drogue refueling, BF-1 is expected to ferry to Patuxent
River at the end of August to begin STOVL “build down” flight-testing.
Another 12-20 flights at progressively lower altitudes and speeds are expected to culminate
in the first vertical land on the hover pad at Patuxent River in September/October.
“I will be surprised if it goes beyond October,” says Pearson, while describing it as an
aggressive schedule. “There’s a reasonable chance it will happen before the end of
September.”
Aircraft BF-2 is due at Patuxent River in September while BF-4, the first F-35 mission-
system test aircraft, is expected to arrive by year’s end. BF-3 is a loads aircraft and will go
though extensive ground testing before flying.
Aircraft AF-1 and -2, the first production-representative conventional takeoff and landing F-
35As, will be the next aircraft to fly, Pearson says. They are scheduled for delivery to the
Edwards test center in the first quarter of next year.
The first F-35C carrier variant, CF-1, is now scheduled to fly on Dec. 23, a slip of three
months, with the other two test aircraft following early in 2010. All three will go to Patuxent
River.
Because of delays, the bulk of the 5,000-plus development flights will now be conducted in
2010 and 2011, but Pearson still expects to complete operational testing in 2014. The
original schedule was 2013, but this was extended last year.52
A June 8, 2009, press report states:
The Marine Corps short-take-off, vertical-landing (STOVL) variant of the Joint Strike
Fighter is now slated to begin in-flight transition to the aircraft’s lift fan in August, months
later than originally intended, Brig. Gen. David Heinz, JSF program executive officer, said
last week.
There are still tests and modifications that need to be done on the first STOVL test aircraft,
BF-1, before the ramp-down to full vertical flight can begin, Heinz said, adding that the
delay to the aircraft would not have a significant impact on the testing schedule because the
program has a cushion built in to absorb such setbacks. The tests were originally supposed to
take place this spring.
“Today I have programmed for the availability slots a ramp to get to 12 successful sorties per
month per airplane,” he said during a June 2 roundtable with reporters at the JSF program
office in Arlington, VA. “If you take in aggregate every one of those airplanes sliding three
52 Graham Warwick, “JSF Program Refocusing On Test-Ready Aircraft Deliveries,” Aerospace Daily & Defense
Report, June 2, 2009: 1-2. Material in brackets as in original.
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months before you deliver them to the flight test program, that only goes to 12.6 successful
sorties.”
Heinz noted that it is a three-year test program and, at the end of this year, all 12 of the flight
test vehicles for the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force JSF variants will have been
delivered. He said the program has already resourced for six flying days per week while his
schedule calls for using only five.
“First of all, 12.6 is really in the national average,” he said. “The F/A-18E/F program
accomplished about 13.1 ... so I’m not asking this huge leap.”
As it stands now, the BF-1 finished hover-pit testing and is undergoing modifications, which
will end this month. The plane will begin a series of 12 flights transition from conventional
flight to STOVL mode at the end of August, leading to its first full vertical landing about a
month later, the general said.
Heinz said he is not worried about the Pratt and Whitney-built F135 engine, which had high-
cycle fatigue problems in the past year.
“I’m not at all concerned about that,” he said. “We’ve already done all the durability testing
that proves out that that’s going to work for the life of the motor.”
Heinz also pointed to the reliability of the aircraft and the software, which he claimed were
performing very well.
“I’m already achieving on the order of 80 flight hours before a software incident,” he said.
The program has also conducted 99 flights, and “77 of those flights have come back ready to
fly the mission without work, and so that is a good indicator,” he said.
In all, the three JSF variants will fly about 5,000 test sorties over about 10,000 hours during
the testing phase of the program.
BF-1 began hover-pit testing in Fort Worth, TX, in March. Lockheed Martin will send the
aircraft to Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, to begin full vertical flight tests.
The aircraft has flown 14 times in conventional mode.53
Affordability and Projected Fighter Shortfalls
An additional potential issue for Congress for the F-35 program concerns the affordability of the
F-35, particularly in the context of projected shortfalls in both Air Force fighters and Navy and
Marine Corps strike fighters.
Although the F-35 was conceived as a relatively affordable strike fighter, some observers are
concerned that, in a situation of constrained DOD resources, F-35s might not be affordable in the
annual quantities planned by DOD, at least not without reducing funding for other DOD
programs. As the annual production rate of the F-35 increases, the program will require more than
53 Dan Taylor, “Heinz: Transition of JSF to STOVL Mode Will Not Begin Until August,” Inside the Navy, June 8,
2009.
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$10 billion per year in acquisition funding at the same time that DOD will face other budgetary
challenges. The issue of F-35 affordability is part of a larger and longstanding issue concerning
the overall affordability of DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization effort, which also includes
procurement of F-22s (through FY2009, at least), and F/A-18E/Fs (through FY2012, at least).54
Some observers who are concerned about the affordability of the F-35 in the numbers desired by
DOD have suggested procuring upgraded F-16s as complements or substitutes for F-35As for the
Air Force, and F/A-18E/Fs as complements or substitutes for F-35Cs for the Navy. F-35
supporters argue that F-16s and F/A-18E/Fs are less capable than the F-35, and that the F-35 is
designed to have reduced life-cycle operation and support (O&S) costs.
The issue of F-35 affordability occurs in the context of a projected shortfall of up to 800 Air
Force fighters that was mentioned by Air Force officials in 2008,55 and a projected shortfall of
more than 100 (and perhaps more than 200) Navy and Marine Corps strike fighters.56 Observers
concerned about the affordability of the F-35 might argue that an inability to procure F-35s in
desired numbers could contribute to these projected shortfalls. Supporters of the F-35 might argue
that, as a relatively affordable aircraft that can be procured in highly common versions for the Air
Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, the F-35 represents the most economical and cost-effective
strategy for avoiding or mitigating such shortfalls.57 Air Force officials have testified that they
wish to double F-35 purchases over the next five years to alleviate the projected Air Force
shortfall.58
Implications for Industrial Base
Another potential issue for Congress regarding the F-35 program concerns its potential impact on
the U.S. tactical aircraft industrial base. The October 2001 award of the F-35 SDD contract to a
single company (Lockheed) raised concerns in Congress and elsewhere that excluding Boeing
54 For more on this issue, see CRS Report RL33543, Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress.
55 Testimony of Lieutenant General Daniel Darnell, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air, Space and Information Operations,
Plans and Requirements, before an April 9, 2008, hearing on Air Force and Navy aviation programs before the Airland
subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. (Source: Transcript of hearing.)
56 For more on the projected Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F
and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress.
57 There have also been strong differences of opinion over how F-35 costs are calculated and presented. DOD’s
estimate of the total acquisition cost of the F-35 program, for example, shows the overall cost decreasing from $299
billion in December 2006 to $298 billion in December 2007. Some observers suggested that these figures were
misleading, because the largest savings reported by DOD in the December 2007 report were achieved not by
improvements in design or manufacture, but instead by moving costs from one category to another. (David Fulghum,
“Dueling Analyses; Questions Remain About the Fundamental Soundness of Top Pentagon Programs,” Aviation Week
& Space Technology, April 14, 2008.) The GAO offered strong criticism of JSF cost estimates, writing that they were
not comprehensive, not accurate, not well documented, nor credible. (Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike
Fighter[:]Recent Decisions by DOD Add to Program Risks, GAO-08-388, March 2008, summarized on pp. 3-4 and
addressed in detail throughout the report.) In summary, GAO noted that the JSF cost estimates did not include $7
billion for the F136 engine, and that the official JSF cost estimates are at odds with estimates made by three
independent DOD agencies. JSF supporters disputed the GAO’s findings, arguing that the program office’s cost models
are more reliable than those used by other organizations. (Amy Butler, “Cost Question,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, July 14, 2008.) GAO is not the only organization to question the JSF cost estimates. An internal DOD
organization—the Joint Estimate Team or JET—has argued that the JSF program will cost $15 billion more than
official DOD cost projections. (Marcus Weisgerber, “‘Independent’ DOD Assessment Finds JSF Underfunded by $15
Billion,” Inside the Air Force, November 28, 2008.)
58 John Reed, “Air Force Working To More Than Double The Pace Of F-35 Purchases,” Inside the Air Force, July 25,
2008.
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from this program would reduce that company’s ability to continue designing and manufacturing
fighter aircraft.59
Similar concerns regarding engine-making firms have been raised since 2006, when DOD first
proposed (as part of the FY2007 budget submission) terminating the F136 alternate engine
program. Some observers are concerned that that if the F136 were cancelled, General Electric
(GE) would not have enough business designing and manufacturing fighter jet engines to
continue competing in the future with Pratt and Whitney (the manufacturer of the F135 engine).
Others argued that GE’s considerable business in both commercial and military engines was
sufficient to sustain GE’s ability to produce this class of engine in the future.60
Exports of the F-35 could also have a strong impact on the U.S. tactical aircraft industrial base
through export. Most observers believe that the F-35 could potentially dominate the combat
aircraft export market, much as the F-16 has. Like the F-16, the F-35 appears to be attractive
because of its relatively low cost, flexible design, and promise of high performance. Competing
fighters and strike fighters, including France’s Rafale, Sweden’s JAS Gripen, and the European
Typhoon, are positioned to challenge the F-35 in the fighter export market.
Some observers are concerned that by allowing foreign companies to participate in the F-35
program, DOD may be inadvertently opening up U.S. markets to foreign competitors who enjoy
direct government subsidies. A May 2004 GAO report found that the F-35 program could
“significantly impact” the U.S. and global industrial base.61 GAO found that two laws designed to
protect segments of the U.S. defense industry—the Buy American Act and the Preference for
Domestic Speciality Metals clause—would have no impact on decisions regarding which foreign
companies would participate in the F-35 program, because DOD has decided that foreign
companies that participate in the F-35 program, and which have signed reciprocal procurement
agreements with DOD to promote defense cooperation, are eligible for a waiver.
Legislative Activity for FY2010
FY2010 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 2647)
House
The House Armed Services Committee reported H.R. 2647 on June 18, 2009.
59 For more information, see CRS Report RL31360, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): Potential National Security Questions
Pertaining to a Single Production Line, by Christopher Bolkcom and Daniel H. Else.
60 For more information, see CRS Report RL33390, Proposed Termination of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F136 Alternate
Engine, by Christopher Bolkcom.
61 General Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Observations on the Supplier Base, GAO-04-554,
May 2004.
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Program Funding
As of June 19, 2009, the text of the committee’s report on H.R. 2647 (H.Rept. 111-166) was not
posted on the Legislative Information System. The committee’s summary table of actions on
major acquisition programs states that the bill:
• recommends increasing the administration’s request for Air Force RDT&E
funding for the program by $153.5 million;
• recommends increasing the administration’s request for Department of the Navy
RDT&E funding for the program by $153.5 million;
• recommends reducing the administration’s request for Air Force procurement
funding for the program by $67.0 million, and reducing the requested number of
F-35As to be procured by one (from 10 to nine); and
• recommends reducing the administration’s request for Department of the Navy
procurement funding for the program by $122.0 million, and reducing requested
the number of F-35Bs and Cs to be procured by one (from 20 to 19).
The committee’s narrative summary of the bill states:
The committee provides $6 billion [in procurement funding] for 28 F-35s, one less aircraft
each for the Air Force and Navy than the budget request, but twice the number authorized in
FY09. This maintains DOD’s desired year-over-year production rate [increase] of 1.75.
Fifteen F-35Bs are provided for the Marine Corps, [and] four F-35Cs for the Navy
[authorized in the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee] and nine F-35As are
provided for the Air Force (authorized in the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee).62
The committee’s narrative summary of the bill also states:
The committee has provided increased funding for the competitive engine for the JSF in each
of the past three years and is greatly disappointed that the administration chose not to submit
funding for this program in its FY10 budget request. In the future, 90% of the fighters in the
U.S. inventory will run on the JSF engine. We cannot afford to have an engine glitch that
grounds 90% of our fleet.
Accordingly, the committee reduces the overall JSF request by a total of $464 million and
provides an overall increase of $603 million for the competitive engine program, $463
million for continued development and $140 million for procurement. The bill also requires
DOD to include funding for the competitive engine program in future budget requests.
The committee also includes an increase of $129 million for Air Force JSF procurement to
address a budget shortfall in JSF spares and support equipment, one of the Air Force’s top
unfunded requirements for FY10.
Finally, the bill fences 25% of R&D funding for the JSF aircraft until DOD submits its 30-
year aircraft plan and F/A-18 multiyear procurement reports required by the FY09 NDAA,
and obligates all funds for development and procurement of the JSF’s competitive engine.63
62 House Armed Services Committee summary of H.R. 2647, p. 21.
63 House Armed Services Committee summary of H.R. 2647, p. 25.
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Legislative Provisions
H.R. 2647 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee contains a number of legislative
provisions relating to the F-35 program.
Section 242 states:
SEC. 242. INCLUSION IN ANNUAL BUDGET REQUEST AND FUTURE-YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM OF SUFFICIENT AMOUNTS FOR CONTINUED
DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT OF COMPETITIVE PROPULSION SYSTEM
FOR F-35 LIGHTNING II.
(a) Annual Budget- Chapter 9 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
`Sec. 235. Budget for competitive propulsion system for F-35 Lightning II
`(a) Annual Budget- Effective for the budget of the President submitted to Congress under
section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2011 and each fiscal year
thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall include, in the materials submitted by the Secretary
to the President, a request for such amounts as are necessary for the full funding of the
continued development and procurement of a competitive propulsion system for the F-35
Lightning II.
`(b) Future-Years Defense Program- In each future-years defense program submitted to
Congress under section 221 of this title, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the
estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for the F-35 Lighting II, for each fiscal
year of the period covered by that program, include sufficient amounts for the full funding of
the continued development and procurement of a competitive propulsion system for the F-35
Lightning II.
`(c) Requirement to Obligate and Expend Funds- Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal year 2010 or any year thereafter, for research, development, test, and
evaluation and procurement for the F-35 Lightning II Program, the Secretary of Defense
shall ensure the obligation and expenditure in each such fiscal year of sufficient annual
amounts for the continued development and procurement of two options for the propulsion
system for the F-35 Lightning II in order to ensure the development and competitive
production for the propulsion system for the F-35 Lightning II.’.
(b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended
by at the end the following new item:
`235. Budget for competitive propulsion system for F-35 Lightning II.’.
(c) Conforming Repeal- The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L.
110-181) is amended by striking section 213.
Section 232 states:
SEC. 232. ANNUAL COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT ON THE F-35 LIGHTNING
II AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION PROGRAM.
(a) Annual GAO Review- The Comptroller General shall conduct an annual review of the F-
35 Lightning II aircraft acquisition program and shall, not later than March 15 of each of
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
2010 through 2015, submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the results of
the most recent review.
(b) Matters to Be Included- Each report on the F-35 program under subsection (a) shall
include each of the following:
(1) The extent to which the acquisition program is meeting development and procurement
cost, schedule, and performance goals.
(2) The progress and results of developmental and operational testing and plans for
correcting deficiencies in aircraft performance, operational effectiveness, and suitability.
(3) Aircraft procurement plans, production results, and efforts to improve manufacturing
efficiency and supplier performance.
Section 218 states:
SEC. 218. LIMITATION ON OBLIGATION OF FUNDS FOR F-35 LIGHTNING II
PROGRAM.
Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year
2010 for research, development, test, and evaluation for the F-35 Lightning II program, not
more than 75 percent may be obligated until the date that is 15 days after the later of the
following dates:
(1) The date on which the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics submits to the congressional defense committees certification in writing that all
funds made available for fiscal year 2010 for the continued development and procurement of
a competitive propulsion system for the F-35 Lightning II have been obligated.
(2) The date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense
committees the report required by section 123 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417; 122 Stat. 4376).
(3) The date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense
committees the annual plan and certification for fiscal year 2010 required by section 231a of
title 10, United States Code.
Section 214 states:
SEC. 214. SEPARATE PROCUREMENT AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST
AND EVALUATION LINE ITEMS AND PROGRAM ELEMENTS FOR THE F-35B AND
F-35C JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.
In the budget materials submitted to the President by the Secretary of Defense in connection
with the submission to Congress, pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, of
the budget for fiscal year 2011, and each subsequent fiscal year, the Secretary shall ensure
that within the Navy research, development, test, and evaluation account and the Navy
aircraft procurement account, a separate, dedicated line item and program element is
assigned to each of the F-35B aircraft and the F-35C aircraft, to the extent such accounts
include funding for each such aircraft.
Section 133 states:
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SEC. 133. REPORT ON 4.5 GENERATION FIGHTER PROCUREMENT.
(a) In General- Not later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on 4.5 generation
fighter aircraft procurement. The report shall include the following:
(1) The number of 4.5 generation fighter aircraft for procurement for fiscal years 2011
through 2025 necessary to fulfill the requirement of the Air Force to maintain not less than
2,200 tactical fighter aircraft.
(2) The estimated procurement costs for those aircraft if procured through single year
procurement contracts.
(3) The estimated procurement costs for those aircraft if procured through multiyear
procurement contracts.
(4) The estimated savings that could be derived from the procurement of those aircraft
through a multiyear procurement contract, and whether the Secretary determines the amount
of those savings to be substantial.
(5) A discussion comparing the costs and benefits of obtaining those aircraft through annual
procurement contracts with the costs and benefits of obtaining those aircraft through a
multiyear procurement contract.
(6) A discussion regarding the availability and feasibility of F-35s in fiscal years 2015
through fiscal year 2025 to proportionally and concurrently recapitalize the Air National
Guard.
(7) The recommendations of the Secretary regarding whether Congress should authorize a
multiyear procurement contract for 4.5 generation fighter aircraft.
(b) Certifications- If the Secretary recommends under subsection (a)(7) that Congress
authorize a multiyear procurement contract for 4.5 generation fighter aircraft, the Secretary
shall submit to Congress the certifications required by section 2306b of title 10, United
States Code, at the same time that the budget is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31,
United States Code, for fiscal year 2011.
(c) 4.5 Generation Fighter Aircraft Defined- In this section, the term `4.5 generation fighter
aircraft’ means current fighter aircraft, including the F-15, F-16, and F-18, that—
(1) have advanced capabilities, including—
(A) AESA radar;
(B) high capacity data-link; and
(C) enhanced avionics; and
(2) have the ability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced armaments.
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Appendix. JSF Key Performance Parameters
Figure A-1. Joint Strike Fighter: Key Performance Parameters
KPP
KP
STOVL
V
CTOL
CV
JOI
JO N
I T
Radio Fr
Radi
equency Si
o Fr
gnat
equency Si
u
gnat r
u e
r
Ve
V r
e y L
y ow O
o
bse
b
r
se va
v b
a l
b e
l
450 nm
590 nm
600 nm
Comb
Com a
b t
a Ra
t
di
Ra us
di
USM
S C Prof
o ile
USAF Prof
o ile
USN P
US
r
N P of
o ilie
l
Sortie
rti Ge
G neratio
ti n
4 Su
4
r
Su g /
g 3
/ Su
3
s
Su t
s
3 Su
3 S r
u g / 2 S
g
u
/ 2 S s
u t
s
3 Su
3 S r
u g / 2 S
g
u
/ 2 S s
u t
s
< 8 C -17
1 equ
7
i
equ v
i al
v en
al
t
en
t
< 8 C -1
- 7
1 equ
7
i
equ v
i al
v en
al
t
en
t
< 46,000 cu ft
Logist
Logi i
st cs Foot
i
pr
cs Foot
i
pr n
i t
n
loads
l
(
oads 20
2
0 PAA)
loads
l
(
oads 24
2
4 PAA)
243 ST
Mis
i sio
i n Reliability
ilit
95%
93%
95%
Inte
t ro
r pera
r bility
ilit
Mee
e t
e 100% o
% f
o crit
i ic
i al
a , to
l
p
, to -le
l v
e e
v l
e I
l nfor
o matio
i n
o Ex
E c
x hange Requ
e
ir
i ements
Sec
Se ure Vo
e
ic
Vo e a
e n
a d D
d
at
a a
USMC
STOVL Mission
550’
550
N/A
N/A
Perf
Per or
f
m
or a
m nce
a
Sh
S ort
hor Ta
t
ke
Take-O
- ff D
Off Dista
t nce
STOVL Mission
2 x 1K
2 x
JD
1K
A
JD M
A ,
M
N/A
N/A
Perf
Per or
f
m
or a
m nce
a
2 x AIM -120
Wit
Wi h
t Reserv
ser e Fuel
Vert
r i
t cal Lift
f B
t
ri
r ng Back
USN
Maxim
axi u
m m
u A
m
ppr
A
oach S
ppr
peed
oach Speed
N/A
N/A
145 knot
o s
Notes: JSF Joint Program Office: October 11, 2007. PAA = Primary Aircraft Authorized, ST = Short Tons,
Vertical Lift Bring Back = amount of weapons/fuel that can be safely landed with.
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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