In its May 2009 budget request for FY2010, the Obama Administration has requested $96.8 million for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). GPOI was established in mid-2004 as a five-year program with intended annual funding to total $660 million from FY2005 through FY2009. (Actual funds allocated to the GPOI program from FY2005 through FY2009 totaled, as of April 2009, some $480.4 million.) The centerpiece of the Bush Administration's efforts to prepare foreign security forces to participate in international peacekeeping operations, GPOI's primary purpose has been to train and equip 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations by 2010. In October 2008, the National Security Council's Deputies Committee approved a five-year renewal of GPOI's mandate. Congressional approval of the FY2010 budget request would provide funding for the first year of this extension.
To date, GPOI also provides support for the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), an Italian "train-the-trainer" training center for gendarme (constabulary police) forces in Vicenza, Italy. In addition, GPOI promotes the development of an international transportation and logistics support system for peacekeepers, and encourages information exchanges to improve international coordination of peace operations training and exercises. Through GPOI, the United States supports and participates in a G* Africa Clearinghouse and a G8++ Global Clearinghouse, both to coordinate international peacekeeping capacity building efforts.
GPOI incorporates previous capabilities-building programs for Africa. From FY1997 to FY2005, the United States spent just over $121 million on GPOI's predecessor program that was funded through the State Department Peacekeeping (PKO) account: the Clinton Administration's African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor, the Bush Administration's African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. (ACOTA is now GPOI's principal training program in Africa.) Some 16,000 troops from ten African nations were trained under the early ACRI/ACOTA programs. Some $33 million was provided from FY1998 to FY2005 to support classroom training of 31 foreign militaries through the Foreign Military Financing account's Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC).
Within a year after GPOI was initiated in late 2004, the Administration began expanding its geographical scope to selected countries in Central America, Europe, and Asia. In 2006 and 2007, the program was further expanded to countries in Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific. GPOI now includes 53 "partner" countries and two partner organizations throughout the world, although the emphasis is still on Africa. According to figures provided by the State Department, almost 57,600 peacekeeper trainees and peacekeeper trainers were trained as of January 31, 2009..
Congress has tended to view the concept of the GPOI program favorably, albeit sometimes with reservations. Over the years, the State Department has addressed various congressional concerns. In a June 2008 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended several further improvements (GAO-08-754).
In its first action on GPOI during the 111th Congress, the House passed legislation authorizing the Secretary of State to carry out and expand GPOI programs and activities (Section 1108 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, H.R. 2410, passed June 10, 2009).
As the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) completes the last of its five planned years in FY2009, the 111th Congress has begun consideration of continued funding through this program for training foreign military and police forces, and for other purposes. For FY2010, the Obama Administration has requested $96.8 million for GPOI.
This request follows the decision of the George W. Bush Administration's White House to continue the program. In October 2008, the National Security Council's Deputies Committee approved a five-year renewal of GPOI's mandate. The Obama Administration affirmed this decision once it took office, according to a State Department official.
Previous Congresses have generally endorsed the concept of this program, but also have questioned whether the program is as well-managed as possible and whether it will achieve its goals. The 111th Congress may wish to consider whether its concerns, stated in past legislation, have been met.
On June 10, 2009, the House passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 (H.R. 2410), which contains a provision authorizing the Secretary of State to carry out and expand GPOI programs and activities (Section 1108).
Established to train 75,000 international peacekeepers by 2010, GPOI was the George W. Bush Administration's signature initiative to build international peacekeeping capacity. (State Department officials express confidence that the goal of 75,000 peacekeepers-trained will be achieved by early 2010.) The Administration launched the five-year $660 million (in FY2005-FY2009 funds) initiative in mid-2004 as a means to alleviate the perceived shortage worldwide of trained peacekeepers and "gendarmes," as well as to increase available resources to transport and sustain them ("Gendarmes," also known as constabulary police or stability police, are police with a combination o f policing and military skills considered vital to the semi-stable environments of peace operations, where the potential for outbreaks of rioting and other violence creates a need for specially-trained police forces.). While the United States has provided considerable support to implement several peace processes and to support peacekeepers in the field from a variety of budget accounts for well over a decade, until GPOI it had provided relatively little funding to build up foreign military capabilities to perform peacekeeping operations.1
In plans for GPOI after 2010, State Department officials state that the program's emphasis would shift from direct training to building the capacity of foreign nations to develop their own peacekeeping infrastructure and capabilities.
As of the end of January 2009, GPOI funds have supported the training of 54,245 military troops as peacekeepers and of 3,350 military personnel to train others in peacekeeping skills. Of those trained, GPOI reports that as of January 30, 2009, some 46,115 troops from 21 countries were deployed to 18 peacekeeping operations and 1 election observer mission, and another 4,860 troops were in the process of being deployed.2 In addition, GPOI has supported the training of 1,932 police trainers from 29 countries at the Italian-run Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Vicenza, Italy.
In addition to training peacekeepers, GPOI supports a variety of institutions specializing in or contributing to peacekeeping operations. These include 22 peace operations training centers around the world, as well as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
GPOI also provides funds for the Transportation Logistics Support Arrangement (TLSA), which has supported troops deploying to several peacekeeping missions,3 and other GPOI deployment equipment funding has supported troops deploying to some of these and other missions.4 In total, as of January 30, 2009, GPOI had contributed $65.4 million to provide equipment to and transport troops deployed to seven missions, according to GPOI officials.
In total, all GPOI-funded activities helped deploy 46,115 troops from 21 countries to 18 peacekeeping operations and 1 election observer mission, as of January 30, 2009, with an additional 4,860 troops about to deploy at that time.
Through FY2008, GPOI funding totaled $374.46 million. GPOI funding for FY2009 totals $105.95 million, plus $3.0 million in State Department International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding. (The Bush Administration's FY2009 request called for $106.2 million in peacekeeping operations funds.)
With these funds, GPOI has provided for the training of 57,595 peacekeepers and peacekeeping trainers as of January 31, 2009.5 (For a breakdown of this number by country, see Table 2, below.)
Before mid-2004, the United States provided peacekeeping capacity-building assistance to foreign militaries primarily under two programs, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) and its predecessor program, and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC). Both ACOTA and EPIC have been subsumed under the GPOI budget line. ACOTA is still the term used to refer to the Africa component of GPOI, however, and is implemented by the State Department's Africa Bureau.
Overall responsibility for GPOI rests with the State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis (PM/PPA). (Information about GPOI is available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi.) PM/PPA works closely with DOD offices to plan and carry out the program.
Impetus for GPOI came from the Department of Defense (DOD), where officials in the Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) worked with the State Department for over a year and a half to develop the proposal. Officials in SO/LIC's section on peacekeeping developed the plan as a means to expand and improve the ACOTA program—with more and better exercises and more equipment—as well as to extend the program beyond Africa to other parts of the world. Policymakers hoped that the availability of peacekeeping training would encourage more countries to participate in peacekeeping operations, enable current donors to provide a greater number of troops, and increase the number of countries which potentially could serve as lead nations, according to some analysts.
The GPOI budget is part of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Peacekeeping (PKO) account, also known as the "voluntary" Peacekeeping account, under the Military Assistance rubric. The PKO account funds activities carried out under Section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA).6 Section 551 authorizes the President to provide assistance for peacekeeping operations and other programs to further U.S. national security interests "on such terms and conditions as he may determine." (This provides some flexibility to the President, but is not tantamount to the discretion that he can exercise when funding is provided "notwithstanding any other provision of law.")
In his September 21, 2004 address to the opening meeting of the 59th session of the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush asserted that the world "must create permanent capabilities to respond to future crises." In particular, he pointed to a need for "more effective means to stabilize regions in turmoil, and to halt religious violence and ethnic cleansing." A similar rationale prompted the Clinton Administration to formulate the ACRI training program in 1996 and underlies the current search for new strategies and mechanisms to prevent and control conflicts.7
To accomplish these ends, the Bush Administration set three major GPOI goals:
Through GPOI, the State Department also promotes the exchange of information among G-88 donors on peace operations training and exercises in Africa. This is accomplished through donors meetings which serve as a "clearinghouse" to facilitate coordination. The first of these State Department meetings was held in Washington, D.C. on October 7-8, 2004.9 The United Kingdom hosted a second meeting in February 2006, the Russian Federation hosted a third in June 2006, Germany hosted a fourth in March 2007, Japan hosted the fifth in April 2008, and Italy is hosting the sixth in April 2009.
Through GPOI, the State Department also supports a G8++ Global Clearinghouse information exchange to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide. The first Global Clearinghouse meetings was held in Washington, D.C., in October 2007,10 and the second in the United Kingdom in December 2008.
For many analysts, a continued effort to improve the peacekeeping skills of African and other military forces is an important step towards controlling devastating conflicts, particularly in Africa. In the mid-1990s, several developed nations provided most of the peacekeepers. The perception that developed nations would not be able to sustain the burden indefinitely, as well as the perception that the interests of those nations in Africa were not sufficient to ensure needed troop commitments there, led international capacity-building efforts to focus on Africa.
As of the end of December 2004, shortly after GPOI first started up, almost 25,000 of the nearly 58,000 military personnel who were participating in the current 17 U.N. peacekeeping operations were from the 22 African troop-contributing nations. (African nations provided over half of the military personnel—roughly 24,000 of 47,000—in the seven U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa.) Africa's military contribution to U.N. peacekeeping at the end of 2004 was over double that at the end of 2000; five of the top ten African contributors, who provided some 98% of the military contribution, received training under the ACRI/ACOTA program. African contributions to the U.N. international civilian police pool (CIVPOL) remained just about the same over those four years: 1,213 in December 2004 (of a total of 6,765 from all nations) compared to 1,088 in December 2000.
African militaries also participate in regional peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). (The first ECOWAS peacekeeping mission was deployed to Liberia in 1990. Subsequent missions were deployed to Liberia once again, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, the Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, and Somalia. The AU deployed its first peacekeepers to Burundi in 2003 and Sudan in 2004. All missions eventually became U.N. operations. Both organizations are trying to develop an African stand-by peacekeeping force, comprised of contributions from five regional organizations, by 2010. Under GPOI, the United States will work to enhance and support the command structures and multilateral staff of ECOWAS and the AU.
A second capability in short supply is the specialized units of police with military skills to handle temporary hostile situations such as unruly crowds.11 Several countries have such forces (e.g., the Italian carabinieri, the French gendarmerie, and the Spanish Guardia Civil, among others). In the United States these forces generally have been referred to in the past as constabulary forces; in the context of peacekeeping and stabilization operations they are currently referred to as "stability police" or gendarme forces. The United Nation refers to such forces as "formed police units" or FPUs.
From 1996 through 2004, the United States provided field and staff training to develop military capabilities for peacekeeping through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor program, ACOTA. Early in FY2005, ACOTA was subsumed under GPOI. Under ACRI/ACOTA, the United States trained some 16,000 troops from 10 African nations:12 Benin, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, and Uganda.13 (It also trained a small number of gendarmes who received the same training as the others.)
The United States also provided non-lethal equipment to the militaries that it trained. This included communications packages, uniforms, boots, generators, mine detectors, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and medical and water purification equipment.
Initially, under ACRI, U.S. soldiers provided field training and oversaw classroom training provided by private contractors. Because of the demand for U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, private contractors also began to conduct field training. By the time GPOI was initiated, private contractors, many of whom reportedly were retired military personnel and reservists, conducted most of the training, while U.S. active duty military officers and non-commissioned officers were much less involved overall, but did provide mentoring. This remains true today.
Funding for ACRI, which like ACOTA was provided under the State Department's Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, totaled $83.6 million during its six fiscal years (FY1997-FY2002). (Additional support for ACRI was provided through the Foreign Military Financing program.) ACOTA was funded at $8 million in FY2003 and $15 million in FY2004.
Other support for classroom training of foreign militaries was provided through the EIPC, a "train the trainer" program which began in FY1998 and was subsumed under the GPOI rubric. EIPC provided assistance to selected countries—some 31 as of early 2005—by designing and implementing a comprehensive, country-specific peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance training and education program to enhance a nation's institutional structure to train and deploy peacekeepers. EIPC funding, provided under the Foreign Military Financing Program, totaled about $31.5 million through FY2004.
GPOI was designed as a program with worldwide reach, but its emphasis was always intended to remain on Africa. In FY2005, only a few hundred peacekeeper trainees were from outside Africa, and thus far the great majority of trainees are Africans. (For a detailed account of the number of trainees from each country, see Table 2 at the end of this report. This table provides the number of trainees trained using the funds from each fiscal year, not the number of trainees actually trained in that fiscal year. Because training is still being conducted with previous fiscal year funds, these numbers will change.) Training in Africa continues to be conducted under the ACOTA program, which is implemented by the State Department's Africa Bureau.
In GPOI's first funding year, during FY2005, some 12,080 African troops from 13 partners were trained using funds initially appropriated for ACOTA under the regular budget and additional funds appropriated for GPOI. This number included pre-deployment training for five battalions from Senegal that were then deployed to specific peacekeeping missions.14 The 12 other ACOTA partners whose troops were trained using FY2005 funds were Benin, Botswana, ECOWAS, Gabon, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, and Zambia.
GPOI's Africa ACOTA component now consists of 24 partners: 22 partner countries and two partner organizations. The states are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. (However, as the State Department has suspended military assistance to Mauritania and Niger, no GPOI assistance is being provided to those countries at this time.) In addition, GPOI provides assistance to the African Union and ECOWAS, which are also partners. This assistance includes sponsoring retired U.S. Army officers contracted as advisors to these institutions.
As of February 23, 2009, GPOI funds have provided training under the ACOTA program for 55,263 peacekeepers, according to the State Department GPOI office. Of these, some 45,606 have been deployed or where in the process of deploying to a UN or other peace operation as of that date. In addition, since FY2005, ACOTA has trained 12,627 more peacekeepers from GPOI partner countries using other PKO funds and funds from the Netherlands. Of those, 12,127 have been deployed or were in the process of deploying as of February 23, 2009.15
In addition, GPOI supports five peace operations training centers in Sub-Saharan Africa. These are located in Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, and South Africa.
In July 2005, the State Department initiated a training and equipping program for countries outside of Africa (informally referred to at the time as the "Beyond Africa" program)16 in order to extend GPOI training to three new regions: Latin America, Europe, and Asia. (As in Africa, some equipment is provided during training, but only that needed for the training itself. Trained troops are not provided with equipment needed for operations until they deploy.) The number of partner countries outside of Africa has grown to 31.
The largest number of partners outside Africa are in Asia/South Asia and the Pacific Islands, where there are 14 partner states. Eleven partner countries are in the Western Hemisphere, six in Europe and Eurasia, and one in the Middle East.
The Latin American program began in Central America, where GPOI funds were initially used to train and equip soldiers from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, as well as to upgrade an existing facility in order to establish a peacekeeping training center in Guatemala. Through this support, Central American countries were able to stand up a battalion of about 600 Central American troops, as part of the Conferencia de Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas (CFAC).
There are now 11 Western Hemisphere partner countries: Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Some 1,867 peacekeepers and trainers from Western Hemisphere partner countries and 5 from Canada (which is not a partner) received GPOI training, as of January 31, 2009. Although Bolivia is a partner country, it has not yet participated in GPOI activities.
GPOI supports eight peace operations training centers in the Western Hemisphere. These are located in Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.
The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) runs major peacekeeping exercises under GPOI auspices. In 2009, the PKO of the Americas will be held in multiple phases geared to the needs of each participant. Events are to be held in March and May at six locations, with additional events in June or July.
In Asia, the first countries to be extended train-and-equip assistance and provided some logistical support were Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Thailand (which was subsequently suspended because of a military coup and reinstated in February 2008). GPOI funds were also used establish and install a communications network among partner countries in the region, called the Peace Support Operations Collaboration Center (PSOCC) in Mongolia.17
Currently, there are 14 partner countries in good standing in these regions: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tonga, and Vietnam. In addition, Fiji is a partner country, but it is currently under sanctions and not eligible for GPOI assistance. India chose not to join GPOI as a partner, but Indian personnel have participated in some GPOI training events through the use of non-GPOI funds. Personnel from Australia, Brunei, Japan, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and Singapore have also participated in GPOI training events, although GPOI did not fund the travel and accommodations for personnel from these countries. In all, some 3,287 peacekeepers and peacekeeping trainers from those regions have been trained using GPOI funds.
GPOI supports peacekeeping operations training centers in five countries in these regions: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Thailand.
In Europe, the first countries whose troops were offered training and other support under GPOI were Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the Ukraine. Bosnia was provided information technology support for its training center and a U.S. instructor with FY2005 funds.
Currently, GPOI has six partner countries in greater Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Romania, Macedonia, and the Ukraine. Some 323 peacekeepers and peacekeeping trainers from this area have participated in GPOI training events, including 13 from France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, which are not partner countries.18
GPOI funds supports peace operations training centers in three countries in Greater Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Ukraine. GPOI also has provided deployment equipment to SEEBRIG, the seven-member multinational South East Europe Brigade, composed of personnel from Albania, Bulgaria, Italy, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey.19
GPOI's first and currently only Middle Eastern partner country is Jordan, which was added in FY2006. Two peacekeepers from Jordan have participated in GPOI training. (One person from Lebanon also participated in GPOI training, but his participation was not funded by GPOI.). GPOI funds support a peacekeeping operation center in Jordan.
Morocco is to be added as a GPOI partner country in FY2009.
When the Bush Administration launched GPOI in 2004, it intended it as a stimulus for increased multilateral efforts to build worldwide peacekeeping capacity, with a focus on Africa. At the time, several countries had their own significant programs supporting peacekeeping in Africa. In addition, through the G8, the major industrialized democracies had indicated increasing support for peace efforts in Africa. In June 2002, the G8 Summit at Kananaskis, Canada, adopted a broad Africa Action Plan that contained sections on conflict resolution and peace-building efforts. The more specific Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations was developed over the next year and presented at the June 2003 Summit at Evian-les-baines, France.20 At their June 2004 summit meeting at Sea Island, GA, G8 leaders adopted a third Africa peacekeeping action plan: Action Plan on Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations.21
European and other countries continue their assistance to African peacekeeping. In addition to the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) conduct bilateral training programs with African militaries. Germany and the UK provided the assistance necessary to launch the regional Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana, which opened in 2004, and Germany is providing continuing assistance. The European Union and other countries, most prominently Canada, Italy, France and the Netherlands, have also assisted the Center.
Italy supports international peacekeeping capacity building efforts with its Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), an international "train the trainer" school for police to learn and transfer peacekeeping policing skills. Italian carabinieri, who are widely viewed as a leading model and have played a prominent role in providing gendarme forces to peacekeeping and stabilization operations22 established CoESPU at Vicenza in March 2005. Italy is providing not only the facility, but also most of the staff . As of mid-2006, some 145 carabinieri were attached to CoESPU, of which about 25 were instructors and training staff. (At the same point, two U.S. military service members were attached to the center, one serving as Deputy Director.23) CoESPU's goal, by 2010, is to train 3,000 mid-to-high ranking personnel at Vicenza and an additional 4,000 in formed units in their home countries.
The United States is CoEPSU's primary foreign supporter. Currently, there is one U.S. service member at CoESPU, serving as the Deputy Director, and the United Sates is considering staffing additional positions through U.S. military personnel, civilian personnel, or contractors. A U.S. contribution of $10 million for the school's operation and training programs was transferred to Italy in late September 2005; its contributions through FY2009 total $15 million. (According to CoESPU officials in 2006, the U.S. contribution covers about one-third the cost of running the school.)24
Several other countries have contributed. Canada, France, and Russia have provided instructors for certain courses.
CoESPU offers high-level courses (for staff officers ranking from Lt. Colonels to Colonels and their civilian equivalents) consisting of four-and-a-half weeks of classes (approximately 150 classroom hours) in international organizations, international law (including international humanitarian law), military arts in peace support operations, tactical doctrine, operating in mixed international environments with hybrid chains of command, and the selection, training, and organization of police units for international peace support operations.
The Center also offers a course for junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (sergeant majors to captains) and their civilian equivalents. This course covers the materials taught in the high-level course with an emphasis on training in the more practical aspects, including checkpoint procedures, VIP security and escorts, high-risk arrests, border control, riot control, election security, and police self-defense techniques.
(The first high-level class graduated 29 officers on December 7, 2005. The first class consisted of officers from Cameroon, India, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, and Senegal. A pilot course for the middle-management level began on January 13, 2006, and seven weeks later graduated about 100 officers. Students for this course were drawn from the same six countries as those at the first-high level course.)
CoESPU also has worked on developing a lessons-learned and doctrine writing capability in order to serve as an interactive resource for Stability Police Units (SPUs). An early intention was to develop a coherent and comprehensive SPU doctrine to promote interoperability in the field, to ensure that doctrine is the basis of training standards and methods, and to respond to questions from SPU commanders in the field, as well as to support pre-mission and in-theater training exercises. Recently, the United Nations has taken on the task of spearheading the development of SPU (or in U.N. terms, Formed Police Unit/FPU) doctrine; CoESPU is supporting this initiative.
Funding for GPOI totaled $374.46 million from FY2005 through FY2008. Initial dedicated funding of $96.7 million in FY2005 was contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447), split between the Department of State (almost 20%) and the DOD (80% as funds to be transferred to State) budgets.25 For FY2006, the State Department allocated $100.4 million to GPOI, which was slightly more than half of the total PKO account, but some $14 million below the President's request.26 For FY2007, the Administration requested $102.6 million for GPOI funding. House and Senate action signaled some discontent with the program.27 The final continuing resolution28 that funded most government operations and programs through FY2007, including GPOI, left the decision on the amount of GPOI funding for FY2007 largely to the State Department, albeit in the context of a reduced availability of funds.29 The State Department's FY2007 GPOI obligations totaled $81 million (i.e., $1 million less than provided for in the House-passed FY2007 Foreign Operations bill, H.R. 5522). (An earlier version of the Continuing Resolution had set the House-passed amount as the level for FY2007 GPOI funding.) For FY2008, Congress fully funded the Bush Administration's budget request for $92.5 million in GPOI funding. (This funding was contained in the omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 [H.R. 2764, Division J; P.L. 110-161, signed into law December 26, 2007]).30 The State Department allocated almost $4 million more.
State Department allocations for GPOI for FY2009 total $105.95 million from PKO funds and an expected additional amount of some $3 million from INCLE funding (see Table 1 and notes, below). The State Department allocated these funds from appropriations in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8, signed into law March 11, 2009). The Bush Administration's FY2009 budget request called for $106.2 million in PKO funds for GOPI.
Table 1. GPOI Obligations, FY2005-FY2009
(in $ millions)
|
Category |
FY2005 |
FY2006 |
FY2007 |
FY2008 |
FY2009 |
Totals |
|
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) |
28.92 |
35.00 |
40.39 |
44.00 |
49.00 |
197.28 |
|
Africa Regional HQ Support: African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) |
10.01 |
9.71 |
7.15 |
7.16 |
9.18 |
43.21 |
|
East Asia and the Pacific |
7.74 |
11.00 |
6.55 |
9.42 |
15.13 |
49.84 |
|
Europe and Eurasia |
5.05 |
6.00 |
4.00 |
5.80 |
4.10 |
24.95 |
|
Near East (i.e., Jordan) |
0 |
0.65 |
1.30 |
1.00 |
1.60 |
4.55 |
|
South & Central Asia |
0.93 |
5.00 |
7.36 |
10.33 |
6.60 |
30.22 |
|
Western Hemisphere |
6.49 |
11.70 |
8.45 |
11.65 |
12.06 |
50.35 |
|
Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) |
15.00 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15.00 |
|
Transportation and Logistics Support Arrangement (TLSA) and Deployment Equipment |
21.99 |
19.77 |
5.79 |
5.69 |
4.81 |
58.05 |
|
Program Management |
0.55 |
1.51 |
0 |
1.39 |
3.48 |
6.93 |
|
Total |
96.66 |
100.36 |
81.00 |
96.44 |
105.95 |
480.38 |
Source: Department of State, as of April 2, 2009.
Notes: Some totals do not add due to rounding. For FY2009, GPOI also includes approximately $3 million in State Department International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds that are not included in this table as a final amount has not been decided.
a. As GPOI was not created until late 2004, FY2005 actuals include funds originally appropriated elsewhere: $14.88 million in Peacekeeping Account (PKO) funds for ACOTA; $1.79 million in Foreign Military Financing for Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC), and an $80 million transfer from DOD.
b. FY2006 funding includes $57 million from FY2006 supplemental appropriations.
In its May 2009 budget request for FY2010, the Obama Administration has requested $96.8 million for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). According to budget request documents, the FY2010 funds "will continue to provide training, equipment, and sustainment of peacekeeping troops," but the program emphasis will shift to "strengthening partner country capabilities to train their own peacekeeping units."31 To that end, GPOI will focus on developing indigenous peacekeeping trainer cadres, peacekeeping training centers, and on other programs, events, and activities to encourage self-sufficiency. Through FY2010 funds, the United States will continue to provide lift and sustainment to peacekeeping troops worldwide, and to support the evaluation of GPOI, including measures of effectiveness. As in previous years, funding for GPOI is requested under the State Department Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account.
In its first action on GPOI during the 111th Congress, the House passed legislation which would authorize the Secretary of State to carry out and to expand GPOI programs and activities. Section 1108 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 (H.R. 2410), as passed by the House on June 10, 2009, specifies eight GPOI functions, including five that GPOI has carried out since its inception32 and three new functions.
In support of this proposed authorization, Section 1108 finds that the United States has "a vital interest in ensuring" that U.N. peacekeeping operations are successful because countries in conflict threaten U.S. national security and economic interests, and because conflicts result in deplorable human suffering. Section 1108 also finds that the United States benefits from U.N. peacekeeping because, in general, the costs of U.N. operations are lower than the potential cost of a similar U.S. peacekeeping operation.33
Of the three new functions that Section 1108 would authorize, two reaffirm the State Department's concept of GPOI's future direction. These functions are (1) "enhancing the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations to plan, train for, manage, conduct, sustain and obtain lessons-learned from" peace operations; and (2) helping partner nations become self-sufficient in developing and sustaining peacekeeping capabilities, as well as in furnishing troops and equipment for and carrying out peace operations (see Section 1108(c)(1)).
The third new GPOI function that Section 1108, as passed by the House, would authorize is financing the refurbishment of helicopters for use in U.N. peacekeeping operations or U.N. Security Council-authorized regional peacekeeping operations. A Sense of Congress statement (Section 1108(c)(2)) would direct the Secretary of State to prioritize helicopter refurbishment, to set a goal of refurbishing no fewer than three helicopters by the end of FY2011, and to seek additional refurbishment funds from other countries.
In the report accompanying H.R. 2410 (H.Rept. 111-136), the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) states that the addition of helicopter refurbishment to GPOI's functions is intended to respond to current critical shortfalls in air assets in ongoing peacekeeping operations in Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Chad, as well as to potential new operations "which would likely face similar shortfalls ... " (p. 167) The bill finds that a shortfall of over 50 helicopters critically hampers those three peacekeeping operations.
H.R. 2410, as reported by the committee and passed by the House, does not authorize a specific funding amount for GPOI programs and activities, including helicopter refurbishment. Instead, Section 1108 would authorize the appropriation of the funds necessary in FY2010 and FY2011 to carry out that section. In H.Rept. 111-136, HFAC encourages appropriators "to allot such funds as may be necessary above the President's request" of $96.8 million in order to refurbish helicopters. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the cost of refurbishing one medium-lift utility helicopter is about $2 million, and that the total cost of implementing GPOI programs and activities over the FY2010-FY2014 period, including the refurbishment of three helicopters by the end of 2011, would be about $195 billion. (H.Rept. 111-136, p. 103).
Over the past few years, the State Department responded to concerns of the 109th and the 110th Congresses to strengthen GPOI. Its steps included producing a strategic plan (the executive summary of which is publically available),34 facilitating procedures to speed planning and implementation, and implementing an evaluation program. As of 2008, Congress requested35 that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigate a number of remaining issues: the GAO expressed several concerns about GPOI performance and management in a June 2008 report.36
Among the points the Congress requested the GAO to address were (1) the extent to which contributing and participating countries maintain records and databases; (2) the quality and sustainability of the training of individuals and units; (3) the extent to which those trained are equipped and remain equipped to deploy in peace operations; (4) participating countries capacity to mobilize those trained; (5) the extent to which trained individuals are deployed; and (6) the extent to which contractors are used and the quality of their results. The committee also requested an assessment of whether GPOI is achieving its goals and recommendations as to whether a country's participation in GPOI "should require reciprocal participation."
In its June 2008 report, the GAO doubted, based on information available to it in its investigation, that GPOI would be able to reach its goal of training 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010. The GAO stated, however, that it could not evaluate information that the State Department subsequently provided to demonstrate that GPOI would reach its goal. As of February 2008, GPOI officials are stating that 75,000 will be trained by early 2010. GPOI officials also state that the program will, as recommended by the GAO, ensure that plans for extending GPOI activities beyond 2010 identify the necessary resources for developing long-term peacekeeping skills and infrastructure in Africa.37 They point to plans to concentrate on building infrastructure in any post-2010 program.
The GAO made several recommendations to improve human rights vetting, program management, and training content. The following bullets note the recommendations and the steps that GPOI is taking to meet them. Congress may wish monitor progress on the GAO recommendations.
Section 1108 of H.R. 2410 calls for a report (within 180 days of enactment) that would provide information related to monitoring progress on these recommendations.
Table 2. GPOI Training Summary, FY2005-First Third, FY2009
(#s trained to standard as of January 31, 2009)
|
Region/Country/ |
Total # |
Total # |
Total # |
|
|
Sub-Saharan Africa |
||||
|
Benin |
4,260 |
195 |
4,455 |
|
|
Botswana |
118 |
47 |
165 |
|
|
Burkina Faso |
2,535 |
161 |
2,696 |
|
|
Burundi |
1,291 |
0 |
1,291 |
|
|
Cameroon |
692 |
101 |
793 |
|
|
ECOWAS |
287 |
2 |
289 |
|
|
Gabon |
1,212 |
161 |
1,393 |
|
|
Ghana |
5,965 |
169 |
6,134 |
|
|
Kenya |
189 |
5 |
194 |
|
|
Malawi |
1,063 |
25 |
1,088 |
|
|
Mali |
880 |
130 |
1,010 |
|
|
Mauritania - Suspended |
284 |
20 |
304 |
|
|
Mozambique |
868 |
161 |
1,029 |
|
|
Namibia |
817 |
71 |
888 |
|
|
Niger – Suspended |
1,041 |
107 |
1,121 |
|
|
Nigeria |
9,463 |
586 |
10,049 |
|
|
Rwanda |
4,789 |
92 |
4,881 |
|
|
Senegal |
7,829 |
435 |
8,264 |
|
|
South Africa |
211 |
114 |
325 |
|
|
Tanzania |
775 |
24 |
799 |
|
|
Uganda |
4,149 |
137 |
4,286 |
|
|
Zambia |
563 |
113 |
676 |
|
|
Sub-Total Africa |
49,254 |
2,856 |
52,110 |
|
|
Asia/South Asia/Pacific Islands/Middle East |
||||
|
Australia |
20 |
0 |
20 |
|
|
Brunei |
47 |
5 |
52 |
|
|
Bangladesh |
190 |
50 |
240 |
|
|
Cambodia |
187 |
29 |
216 |
|
|
Fiji – Suspended |
45 |
2 |
47 |
|
|
India |
83 |
2 |
85 |
|
|
Indonesia |
361 |
72 |
433 |
|
|
Japan |
3 |
0 |
3 |
|
|
Jordan |
2 |
0 |
2 |
|
|
Korea, Republic of |
46 |
6 |
52 |
|
|
Laos |
3 |
0 |
3 |
|
|
Lebanon |
1 |
0 |
1 |
|
|
Malaysia |
322 |
75 |
397 |
|
|
Mongolia |
640 |
77 |
717 |
|
|
Nepal |
372 |
35 |
407 |
|
|
New Zealand |
5 |
0 |
5 |
|
|
Papua New Guinea |
2 |
0 |
2 |
|
|
Philippines |
16 |
0 |
16 |
|
|
Singapore |
12 |
0 |
12 |
|
|
Sri Lanka |
60 |
7 |
67 |
|
|
Thailand |
356 |
35 |
391 |
|
|
Tonga |
113 |
7 |
120 |
|
|
Subtotal Asia/Central Asia/South Asia/the pacific |
2,888 |
402 |
3,290 |
|
|
Greater Europe (Europe and Eurasia) |
||||
|
Albania |
254 |
0 |
254 |
|
|
Bosnia-Herzegovina |
3 |
0 |
3 |
|
|
France |
3 |
0 |
3 |
|
|
Germany |
4 |
0 |
4 |
|
|
Italy |
1 |
0 |
1 |
|
|
United Kingdom |
5 |
0 |
5 |
|
|
Ukraine |
27 |
26 |
53 |
|
|
Subtotal Greater Europe |
297 |
26 |
323 |
|
|
Western Hemisphere |
||||
|
Belize |
55 |
10 |
65 |
|
|
Canada |
5 |
0 |
5 |
|
|
Dominican Republic |
13 |
2 |
15 |
|
|
El Salvador |
215 |
7 |
222 |
|
|
Guatemala |
751 |
16 |
767 |
|
|
Honduras |
255 |
26 |
281 |
|
|
Nicaragua |
445 |
5 |
450 |
|
|
Paraguay |
36 |
0 |
36 |
|
|
Peru |
18 |
0 |
18 |
|
|
Uruguay |
13 |
0 |
13 |
|
|
Subtotal Western Hemisphere |
1,806 |
66 |
1,872 |
|
|
Total |
54,245 |
3,350 |
57,595 |
|
Sources: Compiled from information provided by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, February 18, 2009.
Notes: This table does not include soldiers trained by GPOI-trained trainers. The standard used by evaluators for inclusion was mastery of at least 80% of the coursework and an 80% or better attendance record. NA = Not Available.
This table includes countries that are not GPOI partners but participated in multilateral peacekeeping exercises or received training at GPOI-supported regional training facilities at the request of the host government. These countries include Australia, Brunei, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy Japan, Laos, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, and Singapore. It also includes Cameroon, which is not a GPOI partner (i.e., eligible to receive bilateral assistance). It is listed here as receiving training because it sends students to the Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU).
# Peacekeepers = # soldiers (and occasionally gendarmes) trained in peacekeeping skills in GPOI courses in order to deploy to peacekeeping operations.
# Peacekeeper Trainers = # soldiers trained to train other military personnel in peacekeeping skills for deployment to peacekeeping operations (i.e., soldiers trained under the "train-the-trainer" program).
| 1. |
The term "peacekeeping" is used generically here. It covers the range of activities referred to elsewhere as peace operations, stability operations, or stabilization and reconstruction (S&R)operations. |
| 2. |
These missions include the U.S.-run mission of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), two NATO-run operations, two African missions, 10 United Nations operations, a joint African Union-United Nations mission, and two other operations. The NATO missions are the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) within Operation Enduring Freedom, in Afghanistan, and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The African Union-run operations are AMIS in Sudan and AMISOM in Somalia. The 10 U.N. operations are MINURSO in Western Sahara,, MINUSTAH in Haiti, MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ONUB in Burundi, UNFIL in Lebanon, UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNMIL in Liberia, UNMIS in Sudan, UNOCI in the Ivory Coast, and UNOSIL in Sierra Leone. GPOI trained troops have also contributed to UNAMID, the joint African Union-United Nations operation in Darfur. The other two missions are the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). |
| 3. |
These are AMISOM, AMIS, UNAMID, and UNIFIL. |
| 4. |
These are AMIS, AMISOM, MINUSTAH, UNMIS, and OEF/ISAF. |
| 5. |
Information provided by Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, e-mail of February 23, 2009. |
| 6. |
The State Department's Peacekeeping Operations account (i.e., PKO, also known as the "voluntary" peacekeeping account) funds U.S. contributions to peacekeeping efforts other than assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. U.N. assessed contributions are funded through the State Department's Contributions to International Peacekeeping Account (CIPA). |
| 7. |
For more information on this topic, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, by [author name scrubbed]. |
| 8. |
G8 refers to the "Group of 8" major industrialized democracies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. G8 heads of state, plus representatives from the European Union, meet at annual summits. |
| 9. |
The United States European Command (EUCOM) held two previous "clearinghouse" meetings in May and December 2004. |
| 10. |
This included 46 countries and organizations, according to the State Department. |
| 11. |
Gendarme/constabulary forces are trained in both military and policing skills, but are less heavily armed than soldiers. According to the Clinton Administration's Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71), constabulary tasks include the regulation of peoples' movements when necessary to ensure safety; interventions "to stop civil violence, such as vigilante lynchings or other violent public crimes" and to "stop and deter widespread or organized looting, vandalism, riots or other mob-type action;" and the dispersal of "unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances." (Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations, February 24, 2000, pp 9-10.) Constabulary forces often can deploy more rapidly than other international civilian police because they usually deploy as "formed units" (i.e., in previously formed working groups) instead of as individuals. They also are often equipped with their own communication and logistical support. See CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions, by [author name scrubbed]. |
| 12. |
ACRI provided training in traditional peacekeeping skills where there is an existing cease-fire or peace accord. The more muscular ACOTA, initiated in 2002, has also provided training in the skills needed for African troops to perform peacekeeping tasks in more hostile environments, including force protection, light-infantry operations and small-unit tactics. Information from a State Department official and Col. Russell J. Handy, USAF, Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance: Developing Training Partnerships for the Future of Africa. Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2003, as posted online at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/fal03/handy.html. ACOTA also put greater emphasis on the "train the trainer" aspect. As of 2005, training packages included Command and Staff Operations Skills, Command Post Exercises (i.e., exercises, often computer-based, of headquarters commanders and staff) and Peace Support Operations Soldier Skills field training, according to a State Department fact sheet. |
| 13. |
Military personnel from two of these nations were trained only briefly under ACRI. Training for the Côte d'Ivoire was halted because of a military coup, and for Uganda, because of that country's involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. |
| 14. |
The Senegalese were trained to participate in missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Darfur. |
| 15. |
Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, e-mail of February 23, 2009. |
| 16. |
The Department of Defense transferred the $80 million in P.L. 108-447 (Division J Section 117) supplemental appropriations to be used for GPOI programs in June 2005. Funds became available for obligation in mid-July, 15 days after the State Department notified Congress of its spending plans. |
| 17. |
This project was part of plans for what was formerly referred to as the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN). |
| 18. |
However, GPOI did not pay the individual costs of each of these participants, including travel, per diem, and any other expenses. |
| 19. |
SEEBRIG as an entity does not hold the presidential determination necessary to receive direct GPOI support, but GPOI provides support to SEEBRIG through direct assistance to Romania, which hosted the SEEBRIG headquarters. Original plans were to provide pre-deployment training for troops participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, but were changed when it was determined there was no need for it. |
| 20. |
Texts available at http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/kananaskis/afraction-en.pdf and http://www.g8.gc.ca/AFRIQUE-01june-en.asp. |
| 21. |
Text available at http://www.g8usa.gov/d_061004c.htm. In his September 2004 speech to the United Nations, President Bush referred to Italy as a "joint sponsor" of GPOI, because it co-sponsored with the United States the Sea Island G8 peacekeeping action plan. |
| 22. |
According to Carabinieri officials interviewed by the author, as of mid-November 2004, some 1,300 carabinieri were deployed in missions to Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Albania, and Palestine. |
| 23. |
In 2006, CoESPU officials stated they would like a commitment of five U.S. military service members, one as Deputy Director and others to assist with information, training, and studies and research efforts, including the development of doctrine. Author's interviews at CoESPU, June 2006. |
| 24. |
Author's interviews at CoESPU, June 2006. |
| 25. |
Although the initiative had long been in the works, President Bush approved GPOI in April 2004, two months after the FY2005 budget request was submitted to Congress. To fund the initiative at approximately $100 million in FY2005, the Administration proposed that 80% be DOD funds and the remaining 20% be ACOTA State Department funds. The Armed Services committees did not back GPOI because of concerns that its inclusion in the DOD budget would divert funds from U.S. troops. GPOI's strongest support seemed to come from Senate foreign affairs authorizers and appropriators. Nevertheless, in the end, Congress divided the FY2005 GPOI funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447) as follows. Section 117 of Division J ("Other Matters") provided that "$80 million may be transferred with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense" to the Department of State Peacekeeping Operations account, where it was allocated to GPOI. Division D of H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447 contained $20 million in State Department PKO funding for the ACOTA account and nearly $1.8 million in EPIC Foreign Military Financing funding. Both accounts which are now subsumed under GPOI. |
| 26. |
The Bush Administration requested $114.4 million for FY2006 GPOI funding. The House FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3057 (as reported by the House Appropriations Committee (HAC), H.Rept. 109-152, on June 24 and passed on June 28), contained $96.4 million for GPOI. In its report, the HAC expressed its support for GPOI as a means for the United States to "reduce the emphasis on the use of military troops for these operations." It explained that it had provided $18 million less than the request because it did not expect that all $63 million indicated for equipment and transportation outside of Africa could be obligated and spent in 2006. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee version of the State Department authorization bill for FY2006 and FY2007 (S. 600, S.Rept. 109-35, reported on March 10, 2005, and returned to the calendar on April 26) would have authorized $114.4 million for FY2006 and such sums as may be necessary for FY2007 for GPOI. The House version (H.R. 2601, H.Rept. 109-168, as reported by the House International Relations Committee on July 13, 2005 and passed on July 20) The Senate version of the bill (as reported June 30 and passed July 20), contained $114.0 million for GPOI. does not mention GPOI and does not detail accounts in such a way as to indicate whether GPOI is funded. There was no further action on the bill. In the end, Congress did not dedicate any funds specifically for GPOI (or for any other program in the PKO account) in the conference version of the FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriation bill (H.Rept. 109-265, P.L. 109-102, signed into law November 14, 2005), which funded the PKO account at $175 million—$20.8 million below the Administration's request of $195.8 million. The State Department eventually allocated an estimated $100.4 million for |
| 27. |
The House was disinclined to provide full funding. Senate appropriators expressed discontent with State Department management of the program. They proposed that GPOI funding be transferred to a new FMF program and recommended that the COESPU program be either fully funded by other countries or be transferred to the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) In the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) version of H.R. 5522, the State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Bill for FY2007 (S.Rept. 109-277), approved by SAC on June 29, 2006, funding for GPOI would be transferred from the PKO account to a new program under the Foreign Military Financing Program. S.Rept. 109-277 stated that the State Department "has failed to demonstrate a requisite level of commitment to the program, instead viewing funds provided for GPOI as a funding source for other activities." [The State Department transferred $57 million in GPOI funds to support urgent needs of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur, Sudan, according to a State Department official.] The report also scored the State Department for ignoring committee guidance on GPOI and for its inability "to articulate any plan for the use of fiscal year 2005 funding until calendar year 2006." S.Rept. 109-277, p. 92. |
| 28. |
Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007 (H.J.Res. 20, P.L. 110-5, signed into law February 15, 2007. Amends P.L. 109-289, division B, as amended by P.L. 109-369 and P.L. 109-383.) |
| 29. |
Congress, in effect, reduced the amount of funding available for the GPOI program by funding the overall PKO budget at $223.25 million, while earmarking $50 million for peacekeeping operations in Sudan. Congress thus provided $173.25 million for other (than Sudan peacekeeping) PKO programs in FY2007, i.e., $27.25 million less than the Administration's $200.5 million PKO budget request and the same as the FY2006 PKO budget. State Department plans for FY2007 included spending for two new programs totaling some $31 million, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) and Liberia, that were not included in the FY2006 budget. |
| 30. |
Although the act does not specify funding for GPOI, the Joint Explanatory Statement on the final version of the omnibus appropriations bill specifies that the executive branch is to take into account House and Senate Committee report language on bills incorporated into the omnibus when implementing the legislation. The House Report (H.Rept. 110-197) accompanying the original State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill recommends full funding. |
| 31. |
U.S. Department of State. Summary and Highlights, International Affairs Function 150: Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request. p. 42. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122513.pdf. |
| 32. |
These are "training and equipping peacekeepers worldwide, with a particular focus on Africa"; "carrying out a clearinghouse function to exchange information and coordinate G-8 efforts to enhance peace operations"; "providing transportation and logistics support for deploying peacekeepers"; "developing a cached equipment program to procure and warehouse equipment for use in peace operations globally"; and "providing support to the international Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Italy to increase the capabilities and interoperability of stability police to participate in peace operations.... " See Section 1108(c)(1). |
| 33. |
Section 1108 refers to a 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report's conclusion regarding relative costs. In comparing the cost of an actual U.N. peacekeeping operation in Haiti with the potential cost of a hypothetical similar U.S. operation, the GAO judged that the U.S. operation would cost about twice as much. "A U.S. peacekeeping operation, as illustrated by the specific example in Haiti, is likely to be much more expensive than a UN operation," according to the GAO. Although noting that the particulars of this one example "cannot be generalized across all operations," the GAO added that "many of the cost elements, such as police and military costs are likely to be more expensive for a U.S.-led operation, regardless of location." Government Accountability Office. Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations. GAO-07-998T. June 13, 2007. p. 16. |
| 34. |
U.S. Department of State. Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI): Summary of GPOI Strategy for Fiscal Years 2005-2006. September 4, 2006. |
| 35. |
In action on the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), in Section 1204 of its version of the bill (S. 1547, reported June 5, 2007), called for a GAO study describing and assessing the activities and implementation of the GPOI program. This requirement was retained in the final bill (H.R. 4986, P.L. 110-181, signed into law January 28, 2008). In the SASC report accompanying the Senate version of the bill (S.Rept. 110-77), SASC stated that it wanted to "strengthen the likelihood that GPOI will be administered in such a fashion, and that there will be an expectation, if not a requirement, that GPOI training recipient countries contribute troops to U.N. missions in the near-term, and that GPOI will increase the number of peacekeepers who can remain ready via sustained training and equipping programs." SASC expressed concern as to whether the readiness of GPOI-trained troops "is being monitored or maintained" and noted that program objectives calling for the establishment of an equipment depot for and of a multilateral transportation logistics support arrangement (TLSA) have not been fulfilled. SASC also expressed concern that participation by other G-8 members has not met expectations. |
| 36. |
Government Accountability Office. Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but United States is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements are Needed. GAO-08-754, June 2008. |
| 37. |
Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained. op. cit., p. 35. |
| 38. |
"Mission essential task lists" or METLs in military terminology. |