V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft: Background
and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
June 10, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL31384
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft that takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter and flies
forward like an airplane. Department of Defense (DOD) plans call for procuring a total of 458 V-
22s—360 MV-22s for the Marine Corps; 50 CV-22 special operations variants for U.S. Special
Operations Command, or USSOCOM (funded jointly by the Air Force and USSOCOM); and 48
HV-22s for the Navy.
Through FY2009, a total of 181 V-22s have been procured—155 MV-22s for the Marine Corps,
and 26 CV-22s for USSOCOM. These totals include several V-22s that have been procured in
recent years through wartime supplemental funding that has been provided in addition to DOD’s
regular (aka “base”) budget.
The proposed FY2010 budget requests about $2.3 billion funding for the procurement of 30 MV-
22s for the Marine Corps and about $575 million in funding for the procurement of five CV-22s
for USSOCOM.
For FY2010, the V-22 program poses potential a number of potential oversight issues for
Congress, including the aircraft’s reliability and maintainability.
As part of its proposed FY2009 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 2346/S. 1054), the
administration requested $1.83 million in procurement funding and $3.9 million in research and
development funding for the V-22 program. The House Appropriation Committee’s report on
H.R. 2346 (H.Rept. 111-105 of May 12, 2009, pages 19 and 26) recommends rejecting both of
these funding requests. The Senate Appropriation Committee’s report on S. 1054 (S.Rept. 111-20
of May 14, 2009, pages 39 and 48) recommends approving both of these funding requests.
On May 21, 2009, a hearing before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee to
review the V-22 program was adjourned after a few minutes with the intent of being resumed in
about two weeks. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft: Background and Issues for Congress

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
The V-22 In Brief .................................................................................................................. 1
Intended Missions ................................................................................................................. 2
Key Contractors .................................................................................................................... 3
Total and Annual Procurement Quantities.............................................................................. 3
Multiyear Procurement (MYP) for FY2008-FY2012 ............................................................. 4
Estimated Total Program Cost ............................................................................................... 4
Prior-Year Funding................................................................................................................ 5
FY2010 Funding Request...................................................................................................... 5
Request for MV-22s ........................................................................................................ 5
Request for CV-22s ......................................................................................................... 6
Program History in Brief ....................................................................................................... 6
Deployment to Iraq ............................................................................................................... 7
Anticipated 2009 Deployment to Afghanistan........................................................................ 8
Foreign Military Sales........................................................................................................... 8
Issues For Congress .................................................................................................................... 8
Aircraft Reliability and Maintainability ................................................................................. 8
Other Potential Issues.......................................................................................................... 10
Legislative Activity in 2009 ...................................................................................................... 14
FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2346/S. 1054) .......................................... 14
FY2010 Defense Authorization and Appropriation Bills ...................................................... 14
May 21, 2009, Hearing on V-22 Program ............................................................................ 14

Figures
Figure 1. MV-22 Osprey.............................................................................................................. 2

Tables
Table 1. Annual V-22 Procurement Quantities ............................................................................. 4

Appendixes
Appendix A. V-22 Program History........................................................................................... 17
Appendix B. General Arguments Made by Supporters and Opponents of the V-22 ..................... 23

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 24
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V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft that takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter and flies
forward like an airplane. V-22 are currently being procured by the Marine Corps and (in smaller
numbers) by the Air Force. The V-22 has been the Marine Corps’ top aviation priority for many
years.
The proposed FY2010 budget requests funding for the procurement of 30 MV-22s for the Marine
Corps and five CV-22s for the Air Force.
As part of its proposed FY2009 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 2346/S. 1054), the
administration requested $1.83 million in procurement funding and $3.9 million in research and
development funding for the V-22 program. The House Appropriation Committee’s report on
H.R. 2346 (H.Rept. 111-105 of May 12, 2009, pages 19 and 26) recommends rejecting both of
these funding requests. The Senate Appropriation Committee’s report on S. 1054 (S.Rept. 111-20
of May 14, 2009, pages 39 and 48) recommends approving both of these funding requests.
On May 21, 2009, a hearing before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee to
review the V-22 program was adjourned after a few minutes with the intent of being resumed in
about two weeks.
Background
The V-22 In Brief
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft that takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter and flies
forward like an airplane. For taking off and landing, the aircraft’s two wingtip-mounted engine
nacelles are rotated (i.e., tilted) upward, so that the rotors function like a helicopter’s rotor blades.
For forward flight, the nacelles can be rotated 90 degrees forward, so that the rotors function like
an airplane’s propellers. The Navy states that the V-22 “performs VTOL [vertical takeoff and
landing] missions as effectively as a conventional helicopter while also having the long-range
cruise abilities of a twin turboprop aircraft.”1
The MV-22 is designed to transport 24 fully-equipped Marines at a cruising speed of about 250
knots (about 288 mph), exceeding the performance of the Marine Corps CH-46 medium-lift
assault helicopters that MV-22s are to replace. The CV-22 has about 90% airframe commonality
with the MV-22; the primary differences between the two variants are in their avionics. The CV-
22 is designed to carry 18 troops, with auxiliary fuel tanks increasing the aircraft’s combat radius
to about 500 miles.
Figure 1 shows a picture of an MV-22 with its engine nacelles rotated at about a 45-degree angle,
or roughly half way between the upward VTOL position and the forward-flight position.

1 U.S. Navy Fact File, “V-22A Osprey tilt rotor aircraft,” available at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?
cid=1200&tid=800&ct=1&page=1.
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V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft: Background and Issues for Congress

Figure 1. MV-22 Osprey

Source: Military-Today.com: http://www.military-today.com/helicopters/bellboeing_v_22_osprey.jpg.
Intended Missions
The V-22 is a joint-service, multi-mission aircraft. The Navy, which is the lead service for the V-
22 program, states that “the Marine Corps version, the MV-22A, will be an assault transport for
troops, equipment and supplies, and will be capable of operating from ships or from
expeditionary airfields ashore. The Navy’s HV-22A will provide combat search and rescue,
delivery and retrieval of special warfare teams along with fleet logistic support transport. The Air
Force CV-22A will conduct long-range special operations missions.”2 Specific CV-22 missions
include “long range, high speed infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply to Special Forces teams in
hostile, denied, and politically sensitive areas.”3
Marine Corps leaders believe that the MV-22 provides significant operational advantages
compared to the CH-46, particularly in terms of speed in forward flight. The V-22 has been the
Marine Corps’ top aviation priority for many years.4

2 U.S. Navy Fact File, “V-22A Osprey tilt rotor aircraft,” available at
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1200&tid=800&ct=1&page=1.
3 United States Special Operations Command, Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates, February 2008, Procurement,
Defense-Wide, Exhibit P-40 Budget Item Justification Sheet, page 1 of 13 (overall document page 59 of 192).
4 See, for example, Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2010 Budget, May 2009, p.
5-11
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Key Contractors
The V-22 was developed and is being produced by Bell Helicopter Textron of Fort Worth, TX,
and Boeing Helicopters of Philadelphia, PA. The aircraft’s engines are produced by Allison
Engine Company of Indianapolis, IN, a subsidiary of Rolls-Royce North America. Fuselage
assembly is performed in Philadelphia, PA. Drive system rotors and composite assembly is
performed in Fort Worth, TX, and final assembly and delivery is performed in Amarillo, TX.
Total and Annual Procurement Quantities
Department of Defense (DOD) plans call for procuring a total of 458 V-22s—360 MV-22s for the
Marine Corps; 50 CV-22 special operations variants for U.S. Special Operations Command, or
USSOCOM (funded jointly by the Air Force and USSOCOM); and 48 HV-22s for the Navy.5
Through FY2009, a total of 181 V-22s have been procured—155 MV-22s for the Marine Corps
and 26 CV-22s for USSOCOM. These totals include several V-22s that have been procured in
recent years through wartime supplemental funding that has been provided in addition to DOD’s
regular (aka “base”) budget. No HV-22s have yet been procured for the Navy.
Table 1 shows annual procurement quantities of MV-22s and CV-22s funded through DOD’s
regular (aka “base”) budget. The table excludes the several V-22s that have been procured in
recent years through wartime supplemental funding as replacements for legacy helicopters lost as
a result of wartime operations.








5 Like some other tactical aviation, the total number of V-22 aircraft planned for procurement has decreased over time.
In 1989 the Defense Department projected a 663-aircraft program with six prototypes and 657 production aircraft (552
MV-22s, 55 CV-22s, and 50 HV-22s). As projected in 1994, however, the program comprised 523 production aircraft
(425 MV-22s, 50 CV-22s, and 48 HV-22s). The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released May 19, 1997,
recommended accelerated procurement of 458 production aircraft.
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Table 1. Annual V-22 Procurement Quantities
(Excludes V-22s procured through wartime supplemental funding)
FY MV-22 CV-22 Total
1997 5
0
5
1998 7
0
7
1999 7
0
7
2000 11
0
11
2001 9
0
9
2002 9
0
9
2003 11
0
11
2004 9
2 11
2005 8
3 11
2006 9
2 11
2007 14
2
16
2008 19
5
24
2009 30
6
36
2010 (requested)
30
5
35




Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD data.
Notes: Figures shown exclude several additional V-22s procured in recent years with wartime supplemental
funding.
Multiyear Procurement (MYP) for FY2008-FY2012
V-22s are currently being procured under a $10.4-billion, multiyear procurement (MYP)
arrangement covering the period FY2008-FY2012. The MYP contract , which was awarded on
March 28, 2008, covers the procurement of 167 aircraft—141 MV-22s and 26 CV-22s. DOD
expects the multiyear contract to save $427 million when compared to the use annual
contracting.6
Estimated Total Program Cost
DOD in February 2008 estimated the total acquisition cost of a 458-aircraft V-22 program at
about $53.3 billion in then-year dollars, including about $9.9 billion for research and
development, about $43.1 billion for procurement, and $262 million for military construction
(MilCon). The program was estimated to have a program acquisition unit cost, or PAUC (which is
total acquisition cost divided by the number of aircraft), of about $116.3 million and an average
procurement unit cost, or APUC (which is procurement cost divided by the number of aircraft), of
about $94.5 million.

6 Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Awards $10.4 Billion V-22 Multiyear Deal,” Inside Washington Publishers, March 28,
2008, online at http://www.insidedefense.com.
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When translated into constant FY2009 dollars, these figures become about $54.8 billion in total
acquisition cost, including about $12.5 billion for research and development and about $42.0
billion for procurement. The PUAC is about $119.5 million, and the APUC is about $92.1
million.
The figures in the preceding two paragraphs are “objective” cost figures, meaning lower costs
that DOD hopes to achieve. There are also higher “threshold” cost figures, meaning costs that
DOD hopes to not exceed. The threshold cost figures for the program, when translated into
constant FY2009 dollars, become about $60.0 billion in total acquisition cost, including about
$13.7 billion for research and development and about $46.2 billion for procurement. The PUAC
is about $131.5 million, and the APUC is about $101.4 million.7
Prior-Year Funding
In then-year dollars, the V-22 program from FY1982 through FY2008 received a total of about
$25.7 billion in funding, including about $9.5 billion for research and development, about $15.9
billion for procurement, and about $191 million for MilCon. These figures exclude wartime
supplemental funding that has been provided in addition to DOD’s regular (aka “base”) budget.
As mentioned earlier, this supplemental funding has, among other things, funded the procurement
of several V-22s.
FY2010 Funding Request
The proposed FY2010 budget requests funding for the procurement of 30 MV-22s for the Marine
Corps and another 5 CV-22s for USSOCOM.
Request for MV-22s
Procurement funding for the MV-22s is in the Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN) appropriation
account, which funds the procurement of Navy and Marine Corps Aircraft.
The Navy estimates the procurement cost of the 30 MV-22s requested for FY2010 at $2,359.0
million, or an average of about $78.6 million each. These 30 aircraft have received $143.2 million
in prior-year advance procurement funding, leaving another $2,215.8 million requested in the
APN account for FY2010 budget to complete their cost. The APN account also requests $84.3
million in advance procurement funding for V-22s that the Navy wants to procure in future fiscal
years, and $35.8 million in funding for initial spares for MV-22s, bringing the total FY2010 APN
funding request for MV-22s to $2,335.6 million.

7 Source: DOD Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) report for V-22 program, February 29, 2008. Figures translated
into constant FY2009 dollars by CRS using DOD’s budget authority deflator for procurement excluding pay, fuel, and
medical, as presented in Table 5-7 (page 43) of the DOD document National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2009.
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Request for CV-22s
Procurement funding for CV-22s is divided between the Aircraft Procurement, Air Force (APAF)
appropriation account and the USSOCOM portion of the Procurement, Defense-Wide (PDW)
appropriation account.
The Air Force estimates the APAF-funded portion of the procurement cost of the five CV-22s
requested for FY2010 at $460.4 million, or an average of about $92.1 million in APAF funding
for each. These five aircraft have received $23.1 million in prior-year APAF advance procurement
funding, leaving another $437.3 million request in the APAF account for FY2010 to complete the
APAF-funded portion of their cost. The APAF account also requests 13.8 million in advance
procurement funding for CV-22s that the Air Force wants to procure in future fiscal years, and
$123.7 million in initial spares for CV-22s, bringing the total FY2010 APAF funding request for
CV-22s to $574.8 million.
The FY2010 DPW account requests an additional $114.6 million in procurement funding for CV-
22s. If this $114.6 million is added to the $460.4-million estimated APAF cost from the previous
paragraph, it would bring the total procurement cost of the five aircraft to $575 million, or an
average of $115 million each.
Program History in Brief
The V-22 program began in the early 1980s.8 The aircraft experienced a number of development
challenges relating to affordability, safety, and program management. Crashes of prototypes
occurred in June 1991 (no fatalities) and July 1992 (seven fatalities). Two additional crashes
occurred in April 2000 (19 fatalities) and December 2000 (4 fatalities). The V-22’s development
challenges were a topic of considerable oversight and debate during the 1990s.
The acquisition program baseline (APB) for the V-22 has been revised numerous times over the
program’s history. The V-22 program has undergone restructuring to accommodate
recommendations from outside experts and DOD managers.
The George H.W. Bush administration proposed terminating the V-22 program in 1989 as part of
its proposed FY1990 budget, and continued to seek the cancellation of the program through 1992.
Congress rejected these proposals and kept the V-22 program alive. The Marine Corps’ strong
support for the program was a key reason for Congress’s decision to keep the program going.

8 The V-22 is based on the XV-15 tilt-rotor prototype which was developed by Bell Helicopter and first flown in 1977.
The Department of Defense began the V-22 program first under Army leadership, but with the Navy and Marine Corps
later taking the lead. The V-22 program was given Milestone 0 approval in December 1981 as the Joint Services
Aircraft program, and Milestone I approval in December 1982, at which time the program’s acquisition strategy was
approved. A preliminary design contract for the aircraft was awarded in April 1983 to a Bell-Boeing industry team,
which was the only competitor for the program. The aircraft was designated the V-22 Osprey in January 1985. The
program was given Milestone II approval in April 1986, initiating system development and demonstration. A full-scale
development (FSD) contract was awarded in May 1986.
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The MV-22 achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in June 2007. The first deployment of
MV-22s began in September 2007, with the deployment of 10 aircraft to Al Anbar province in
Iraq.9
The first deployment of CV-22s, which involved four aircraft sent to Mali, was completed in
December 2008. The CV-22 achieved IOC in March 2009.10
For a longer discussion of the history of the V-22 program, see Appendix A.
Deployment to Iraq
In September 2007, the Marine Corps deployed 10 MV-22s from VMM-263, a Marine Medium
Tiltrotor Squadron, to Al Anbar province in Iraq. During the first three months of deployment, the
squadron had completed more than 2,000 air support requests while logging more than 2,000
combat flight hours and maintaining an average mission-capable rate11 of 68%.12 The Marine
Corps has lauded the extended range, speed, and payload that the Osprey possesses in comparison
to helicopters it is intended to replace as instrumental to the success of time-critical interdiction
and medical evacuation missions during the deployment.13
In December 2008, four CV-22s returned from their first operational deployment, participating in
a multinational in the African country Mali. Those involved in this deployment report
successfully self-deploying the squadron to a remote and austere location and conducting
simulated long-range, air-drop, and extraction missions.14

9 The first MV-22 prototype flow in helicopter mode in March 1989. The first forward-facing flight occurred in
September 1989. The MV-22 completed Critical Design Review (CDR) in December 1994. The first low-rate initial
production (LRIP) contract was awarded in June 1996, and the first delivery of an LRIP aircraft occurred in May 1999.
Technical evaluation (TECHEVAL) began in July 1999 and was completed in September 1999. Operational evaluation
(OPEVAL) began in November 1999 and was completed in July 2000.
In January 2001, an MV-22 squadron commander was relieved of duty after admitting to falsifying maintenance
records, and three Marines were found guilty of misconduct in September 2001. In April 2001, a blue ribbon panel
formed by Secretary of Defense William Cohen recommended continuing with the V-22 program in restructured form.
Phase II of the MV-22’s OPEVAL began in March 2005 and was completed in June 2005. The program was given
Milestone III approval, permitting full-rate production, in October 2005.
10 In August 1995, the V-22 contract was modified to include the CV-22 as a special operations version of the aircraft.
The CV-22 completed CDR in December 1998. CV-22 flight testing began in February 2000 and was completed in
October 2007. A production contract for long lead items for the CV-22 was awarded in June 2000. CV-22 Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) began in June 2006.
11 An aircraft’s mission capable rate is the percentage of time an aircraft is available for to fly scheduled sorties.
12 Gareth Jennings, “USMC Details Osprey Operational Availability Rates in Iraq,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, February
20, 2008, online at http://www.janes.com.
13 Michael Fabey, “Ospreys Proving Mettle in Counter-IED, Medevac Missions,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,
January 31, 2008, p. 4.
14 1st Lt. Lauren Johnson. “CV-22s Complete First Operational Deployment.” Air Force News. December 3, 2008.
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Anticipated 2009 Deployment to Afghanistan
In April 2009, it was reported the Marine Corps anticipates shifting the MV-22 squadron currently
deployed in Iraq to Afghanistan sometime in 2009.15
Foreign Military Sales
To date, there have been no sales of the V-22 to foreign military forces. The Marine Corps’
deployment of MV-22s to Iraq, however, has reportedly sparked interest in the V-22 among
Norway, Israel, and Japan.16
Issues For Congress
For FY2010, the V-22 program poses potential a number of potential oversight issues for
Congress, including the aircraft’s reliability and maintainability.
Aircraft Reliability and Maintainability
A March 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on major DOD acquisition
programs stated the following in its entry on the V-22 program:
The V-22 is being procured in blocks. The program office considers the MV-22 critical
technologies to be mature and its design stable. However, MV-22 Block B aircraft, the full-
rate production configuration deployed to Iraq, have experienced reliability problems. These
aircraft fell short of their mission capability goal (the ability to accomplish any one mission),
due in part to component reliability problems with parts such as gearboxes and generators.
The aircraft fell well short of its full-mission capability goal (the ability to accomplish all
missions), primarily due to a complex and unreliable de-icing system. During the Iraq
deployment, the V-22’s less than 400 hour engine service life fell short of the 500-600 hours
estimated by program management. The program office noted that the contract does not
require a specific service life to be met. Also, pending modifications to the program’s engine
support contract with Rolls Royce could result in increased support costs in the future. 17
At a May 19, 2009, hearing on Navy and Marine Corps aviation procurement programs before the
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee,
Navy and Marine testified that:
The MV-22B Osprey is now combat-tested and ready for deployment anywhere throughout
the world. As our premier medium lift assault support platform, the Osprey brings
unprecedented range, speed and survivability to the Warfighter, in a platform that far exceeds

15 Dan Taylor, “Marines: V-22 Ospreys Leaving Iraq for Good in Coming Weeks,” Inside the Navy, April 20, 2009.
See also and Zachary M. Peterson, “Conway: Marines, V-22 Osprey Ready to Move to ‘Fight’ in Afghanistan,” Inside
the Navy
, March 16, 2009.
16 Unattributed, “What’s Ahead in Aerospace & Defense: Osprey Export,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, Vol.
226, No. 35, May 19, 2008, p. 1.
17 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-
326SP, March 2009, p. 142.
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the capabilities of the CH-46E it is replacing. The MV-22B has been supporting our Marines
in combat continuously since October 2007, with the third successive squadron recently
completing a highly successful seven month rotation in support of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM just last month. In Iraq, Osprey squadrons have logged over 9,000 flight hours,
carried over 40,000 passengers, and lifted over two million pounds of cargo while flying
every mission profile assigned by the Multi-National Force-West Commander.
As we continue to explore the tremendous capabilities of tilt-rotor aircraft and look forward
to employing Osprey both aboard ship and in new theaters of operation, we are learning
valuable lessons with respect to reliability and maintainability. Like other types of aircraft in
the early operational phase of their lifecycles, the MV-22 has experienced lower-than-desired
reliability of some components and therefore higher operations and support costs. With the
cooperation and support of our industry partners, we are tackling these issues head on, with
aggressive logistics and support plans that will increase the durability and availability of the
parts needed to raise reliability and concurrently lower operating costs of this aircraft.18
A May 2009 defense trade press article based on Marine Corps testimony at an earlier (May 14)
hearing before the House Armed Services Committee stated:
Reliability issues with the V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft remain a top concern for Navy
officials, but the Marine Corps’ top general said last week that the aircraft’s availability is
not any worse than any other new aircraft program.
“We have had ... some reliability issues in terms of the availability of the aircraft,” Marine
Commandant Gen. James Conway told the House Armed Services Committee May 14, “but
I would suggest not greater than other new aircraft, especially new aircraft that [operate in]
such an austere environment.”
In January, Lt. Gen. George Trautman, deputy commandant for aviation, told Inside the Navy
that V-22 availability is currently below 70 percent, which is “not where I want it to be.” He
said he would like to see the aircraft top 80 percent readiness.
However, Conway said the V-22 has been performing well and the Marine Corps was
“pleased” with what it was seeing in Iraq, and that availability problems would be worked
out in time.
“We’re working those issues, and we are very optimistic about the future of this aircraft,” he
said. 19
An April 2009 trade press article stated:
A recent Government Accountability Office report claims that the engines of V-22 Osprey
titlrotor aircraft in Iraq are managing a service life of 400 flight hours, but the program
manager told Inside the Navy last week that, since the report was completed, crews have

18 Statement of Vice Admiral David Architzel, USN, Principal Military Deputy, Research, Development and
Acquisition, LTGEN George J. Trautman III, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, [and] RADM Allen G.
Myers, USN, Director of Warfare Integration, before the Seapower and Expeditionary Warfare [sic: Forces]
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [hearing] on [The] Department of the Navy’s Aviation
Procurement Program, May 19, 2009, pp. 7-8.
19 Dan Taylor, “Conway to HASC: V-22 Availability Levels Need Improvement,” Inside the Navy, May 18, 2009.
Bracketed material as in the original.
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found a way to add 100 hours to the service life by using pressure washers to remove sand
and grit from the motors.
The March 30 report, titled: “Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Weapons
Programs,” states that V-22s in Iraq achieved engine service lives that “fell short of the 500-
600 hours estimated by program management.”
However, Col. Matt Mulhern, the program manager, told Inside the Navy in an April 7 phone
interview that the program knew going in that the engines would have a shortened service
life because of the harsh conditions in theater, and regular washing of the sand and grit from
the engines has bumped up the service life closer to 500 hours.
“We knew they were going to have a hard time over there because every engine over there
has a hard time,” he said. “We instituted some compressor washers and some high-pressure
turbine washers, so we bought back about 100 hours just by doing that. We went from about
380 hours on wing to about 480 hours on wing.”
He noted that the V-22 fleet as a whole is averaging about 600 hours, and they would be
averaging about 1,300 hours if the 12 V-22s in Iraq were removed from the equation....
Addressing the recent brief grounding of the V-22 fleet due to loose bolts discovered in six
Ospreys—all but one were stationed in Iraq—Mulhern said he is “comfortable” the program
has the problem under control, although the case is not closed until an investigation
determines why it happened.
“We’ve developed an inspection so we can catch this before it’s a safety item,” he said.
“We’re going to run engineering investigations on them. That’s still ongoing and probably
will be for a while, and depending on what we find there, we’ve got to work out the fix. The
fix could be something on the production line on the way we build it, it could be a redesign
of some nature, it could be a technique we apply on the flight line or something.”
He said it was “hard to say” how long the investigation would take, but the program will
have a good idea of the findings in a few weeks after getting all the parts back, which are
expected in the next week or so.20
Other Potential Issues
The March 2009 GAO report quoted above also stated that:
Planned upgrades to the aircraft could affect the aircraft’s ability to meet its requirements. A
limited-coverage, ramp-mounted defensive weapon was installed on aircraft deployed to
Iraq. The program plans to incorporate a mission-configurable, belly-mounted defensive
weapon system that will provide fuller coverage. For missions requiring the new weapon,
however, the interior space needed to integrate the system will reduce the V-22’s troop
carrying capability below its key performance parameter of 24 troops, as well as reduce its
internal cargo capacity. The program also plans to integrate an all-weather radar into the V-

20 Dan Taylor, “Mulhern: Program Adds 100 Flight Hours to Osprey Engine Life in Iraq,” Inside the Navy, April 13,
2009. An internet site on military and space affairs that calls itself “G2mil,” and which states that it is “authored by
Carlton Meyer, a former Marine Corps officer” (http://www.g2mil.com/) includes a section (http://www.g2mil.com/
scandal.htm) with more than 25 postings dating back to 2001 that are highly critical of the V-22 program. A posting
dated June 2009 (http://www.g2mil.com/V-22repairs.htm) contains highly critical comments regarding the
maintainability of the V-22 program.
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22. This radar and an effective de-icing system are essential for self-deploying the V-22
without a radar-capable escort and deploying the V-22 to areas such as Afghanistan, where
icing conditions are more likely to be encountered. However, expected weight increases from
these and other upgrades, as well as general weight increases for heavier individual body
armor and equipment may affect the V-22’s ability to maintain key performance parameters,
such as speed, range, and troop carrying capacity.
While the program office reports a stable design, changes can be expected in order to to
integrate planned upgrades. Issues with the aircraft’s internal cargo handling capability were
identified during Iraq operations and led to significant delays. Program officials state that
revised techniques and procedures reduced these delays. External cargo carriage missions
were rarely assigned to V-22s in Iraq, as mission tasking during this period required minimal
external lift support. In addition, most external loads cannot be carried at speeds that
leverage the high-speed capability of the V-22. The program is adding forward firing
countermeasures to enhance the aircraft’s survivability; modifying the engine air particle
separator to prevent engine fires and enhance system reliability; and improving the
environmental control system.
The Navy and Marine Corps conducted training for the V-22’s shipboard deployment and
identified challenges related to this operating environment. Design changes are already being
made to some of the ships on which the V-22 will deploy to help ensure effective operations
on the flight deck and in the hangar deck during maintenance. The changes will also provide
increased space for V-22 spare parts.
Production Maturity
In March 2008, the V-22 program signed a $10.4 billion multiyear production contract with
Bell Boeing for the production of 167 aircraft through 2012, even though aircraft continue to
be conditionally accepted with deviations and waivers relating to components such as brakes,
landing gear, hydraulic hoses, de-icing systems, and radar altimeters. The demand for spare
parts for deployed aircraft and the acceleration of CV-22 production could both pose
challenges for ramping up V-22 production from 11 in 2005 to 36 in 2009. For example,
lessons learned from the initial Iraq deployment stated that the lead time for and lack of
availability of MV-22 repair parts led to high cannibalization rates.21
An April 2009 trade press article stated that Colonel Matt Mulhern, the V-22 program manager,
did not agree with GAO’s assessment regarding challenges the V-22 program would face in
increasing the program’s production rate to 36 aircraft in 2009:
“I’m not sure I agree with that conclusion,” he said. “The acceleration that we had of CVs—
we added five CVs as part of the [FY-09 supplemental war spending bill]—we have found
places in the production line to accommodate those. They shouldn’t have a huge impact on
the production line.”
Regarding the spare parts, the GAO said that “the lead time for and lack of availability of
MV-22 repair parts led to high cannibalization rates.”
Mulhern agreed there has been “cannibalization” or the removal of parts from an aircraft for
use on another that needs them, but said it was to be expected in a young program.

21 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-
326SP, March 2009, p. 142.
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“That’s true, we didn’t have all the parts we wanted, so in some cases we’d cannibalize,” he
said. “But it wasn’t to the point that we had to stop operating.”
He pointed out that 85 percent of the total flight hours have come in the last four years of the
program, and “the supply system lags typically about two years,” he said.
“The fact that we’re flying 700-hour months with 12 airplanes there means we got most of
them right,” the colonel said. “We didn’t get them all right. We recognize we’ve got some
challenges that we’ve got to work on. That’s fairly normal in the life of a program. I think
we’ve been a lot more successful than a lot of people thought we would be.”
He said there are “programs in place” to improve component reliability.22
A May 2009 trade press article stated that:
The V-22 Osprey, which is due to deploy to Afghanistan this fall, remains largely untested in
its tactical assault support role, Marines who used the tiltrotor aircraft in Iraq told service
officials five months ago, according to internal documents.
The assault support mission calls for moving people and supplies in and around the
battlefield. Marine Commandant Gen. James Conway and Lt. Gen. George Trautman, the
service’s top aviation official, have recently touted the Osprey’s assault support capabilities.
“Our third tiltrotor squadron just wrapped up successful combat operations in Iraq while we
were still there,” Conway told reporters at an April 29 press conference. “The squadrons
performed as we expected. They did it without incident or fanfare and through every type of
assault support mission required.”
In a May 6 teleconference from Iraq, Trautman told bloggers and reporters the V-22
“completed every assigned mission and it did so flying faster, farther, and with safer flight
profiles than any other assault support aircraft in the history of military operations.”
But Marines who used the V-22 in Iraq have told the Marine Corps Center for Lessons
Learned that the Osprey has not yet cut its teeth in the assault support mission. In December,
the center interviewed members of the third squadron to use the V-22 in Iraq, VMM-266, at
Al Asad airbase in Iraq. Personnel from supporting units were also interviewed. Inside the
Pentagon reviewed a summary of the findings, dated this month.
“However, Osprey operators also expressed the view that the tiltrotor capability has not been
fully explored or exploited in [Operation Iraqi Freedom] due to the lack of opportunities to
participate in assault support missions at the tactical level,” the summary states. “The current
low level of insurgent activity has contributed to the lack of rigorous testing of the aircraft’s
assault support role.”
“I think that this is nothing more than Marines being Marines and wanting to do everything,
but when the situation on the ground has changed so drastically, there is a bit of frustration,”
said Marine spokesman Maj. Eric Dent. But the service “can readily accept” that kind of
frustration, which is tied to peace in Anbar province, he said.

22 Dan Taylor, “Mulhern: Program Adds 100 Flight Hours to Osprey Engine Life in Iraq,” Inside the Navy, April 13,
2009. Bracketed material as in the original.
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“We don’t ‘create’ missions or tactical opportunities to get a check in a particular box,” he
said.
A Pentagon official who supports the V-22 described Marine generals’ comments about
assault support missions as a bit of “spin.” There is a difference between doing logistics
missions like transporting howitzer munitions from one location to another and flying 24
Marines into an attack, though both roles are considered assault support, the official said. A
true battle test of the V-22 has not happened yet, the official said. But the official concurred
that is due to low levels of insurgent activity in Iraq.
In Iraq, the only weapon the V-22 sported was a small-caliber machine gun mounted on its
rear ramp. But the Marines plan to give it heavier firepower before it deploys to Afghanistan,
where armed insurgents hide in mountains and hills. Troutman said the service is upping the
ramp-mounted gun to a 50-caliber while also working with Air Force Special Operations
Command and BAE Systems to develop a 360-degree gun to hold off unexpected threats in
an objective area. The new fire-suppression weapon would fire tracers to put the enemy’s
head down, letting the V-22 use its “incredible” speed, power and acceleration to leave threat
area, he said.
“As all of you know, assault support airplanes are not offensive platforms,” Troutman added.
“They take a defensive posture when they encounter a threat.” This interim defensive
weapon system is going to be “precisely ... what makes sense in the Afghan environment,”
he said.
The Marines interviewed in December said the V-22 repeatedly demonstrated how its range
and speed can “shrink the battlefield,” a point Conway underscored in his press conference.
“One of my commanders in Iraq compared it [to] being able to turn Texas into a place the
size of Rhode Island,” Conway said.
Infantrymen also suggested that they needed additional practice deploying on and off the
aircraft during periods of brownout caused by the tiltrotor’s powerful downwash, according
to the summary.
Marines interviewed also called for more avionics technicians in the maintenance
department, due to the technical complexity of the V-22 compared with old CH-46
helicopters. On a related note, it was recommended the rotation of deployed aircraft not
exceed one year. If this rotation time line is not possible, the maintenance officer advocated
establishing a depot-level type maintenance capability in theater.
VMM-263 originally deployed with 10 aircraft. Later, two more aircraft were deployed to
bring the squadron up to its full complement of 12. The squadron commander told
interviewers that 12 was the right number to accomplish the assigned mission in Iraq.
The squadron generally praised the Desert Talon training exercise, which is set in the
Arizona desert and used to prepare for the Iraq deployment.
In addition to touting the V-22’s speed and range, the squadron was pleased with the
Osprey’s ability to maintain communications with controlling agencies at greater ranges than
lower flying helicopters. “The ability to maintain line of sight communications facilitated the
command and control capabilities of the controlling agency,” the summary says. But Marines
in the V-22 must use satellite communications due to the aircraft’s increased operational
range, the squadron told interviewers.
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Several squadron leaders also told interviewers that injured Marines could receive quicker
medical care if the V-22 were assigned a casualty evacuation mission, in addition to its
assigned mission of standby tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel.23
Legislative Activity in 2009
FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2346/S. 1054)
As part of its proposed FY2009 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 2346/S.1054), the
administration requested $1.83 million in procurement funding and $3.9 million in research and
development funding for the V-22 program. The House Appropriation Committee’s report on
H.R. 2346 (H.Rept. 111-105 of May 12, 2009, pages 19 and 26) recommends rejecting both of
these funding requests. The Senate Appropriation Committee’s report on S. 1054 (S.Rept. 111-
20 of May 14, 2009, pages 39 and 48) recommends approving both of these funding requests.
FY2010 Defense Authorization and Appropriation Bills
The administration’s proposed FY2010 defense budget was submitted to Congress in early May.
The FY2010 defense authorization and appropriation bills may be marked up in June and July.
May 21, 2009, Hearing on V-22 Program
A May 21, 2009, hearing before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee to
review the V-22 program was adjourned after a few minutes with the intent of being resumed in
about two weeks. The chairman of the committee, Representative Edolphus Towns, stated the
following:
Good morning. Thank you all for being here.
We had hoped to conduct today a thorough examination of the Defense Department’s V-22
Osprey, an aircraft with a controversial past, a troubled present, and an uncertain future.
However, the Defense Department has evidently decided to stonewall our investigation. On
May 5, 2009, I wrote to Secretary of Defense Gates to request information on the Osprey,
including copies of two reports on the performance of the Osprey in Iraq, called “Lessons
and Observations.” I also requested a list of all V-22 Ospreys acquired by the Defense
Department, including their current locations and flight status.
However, to this date, the Defense Department has failed to provide this information, despite
repeated reminders from the Committee. This is simply unacceptable.
General Trautman, I want you to carry this message back to the Pentagon: We will pursue
this investigation even harder than we have so far. We will not be slow-rolled. We will not
be ignored.

23 Christopher J. Castelli, “Marines Tout V-22, But See It As Untested in Tactical Assault Support,” Inside the
Pentagon
, May 14, 2009. Bracketed material as in the original.
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I intend to conduct a full investigation of the Osprey, not just an investigation of the
information that you want me to see. We hope you will provide it voluntarily, but if you do
not, we will compel your compliance.
To ensure a thorough investigation and to allow the Defense Department additional time to
provide us with these records, we will continue this hearing in two weeks and I am asking
the witnesses to return to present their testimony at that time. This hearing is now adjourned,
to be resumed in two weeks at the call of the chair.
Thank you.24
On May 22, 2009, it was reported that:
The Pentagon is denying the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee’s
accusations that it is stonewalling lawmakers’ requests for information about the V-22
Osprey.
“The Department of Defense coordination process is highly complex,” Pentagon
spokeswoman Cheryl Irwin told InsideDefense.com. “We are diligently working to fulfill
this request and will have it to the proper officials in order that the hearing process can
continue.”
House Oversight Committee Chairman Edolphus Towns (D-NY) yesterday accused the
Pentagon of stonewalling his request for V-22 documents and vented his displeasure by
abruptly ending a hearing after mere minutes, telling a three-star Marine Corps general to
return in two weeks.
Towns said the panel had hoped to conduct a “thorough examination” of the V-22 program,
which he said has “a controversial past, a troubled present, and an uncertain future.” But the
Defense Department has “evidently decided to stonewall our investigation,” he complained.
The panel’s ranking Republican, Rep. Darrell Issa (CA), also complained about DOD’s
failure to provide the documents, stressing the committee needs such information well in
advance of any hearing. In a statement released later, he faulted a “bureaucratic failure of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense,” not the Marine Corps.
After about three minutes, Towns ended the hearing. He said it would be continued in two
weeks to give DOD additional time to provide the records. The witnesses were not invited to
speak during the brief hearing nor did they attempt to do so. After the hearing, Lt. Gen.
George Trautman, the Marine Corps’ top aviation official and one of a handful of witnesses
who had been scheduled to testify, declined to speak to reporters.
Later that day, Marine Corps spokesman Maj. Eric Dent told InsideDefense.com the service
understands Towns’ decision to postpone the hearing. But the Marine Corps was

24 Source: Text of opening statement of Representative Edolphus Towns, as posted on the committee’s website.
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20090521101314.pdf. The listed witnesses for the hearing were Mr. Mike
Sullivan, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office; Mr. Dakota L. Wood,
Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Lieutenant General George Trautman, Deputy
Commandant for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps; and Lieutenant Col Karsten Heckl, Commander, Marine Medium
Tiltrotor Squadron 162 (VMM-162). See also Christopher J. Castelli, “Committee Accuses DOD of Stonewalling on V-
22 Documents, Ends Hearing Abruptly,” InsideDefense.com (DefenseAlert – Daily News), May 21, 2009; and Geoff
Fein, “House Oversight Committee Chair Claims DoD ‘Stonewalling’ V-22 Investigation,” Defense Daily, May 22,
2009: 2-3.
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disappointed “that we did not get the opportunity to discuss with the committee the Osprey’s
remarkable performance in Iraq over the past 19 months,” he added. The V-22 program has
nothing to hide, according to Dent.
“As we were today, we remain prepared to discuss every aspect of the Osprey program with
Congress,” he said. “We are fully committed to openness and transparency; in fact, we've
been working hand-in-hand with the Government Accountability Office for the past year in
its own review of the Osprey program.”...
Dent insisted the Marine Corps is making a good-faith effort to address the request.
“We forwarded, at the committee’s request, more than 500 pages of maintenance records,
after-action reports, and additional information on every MV-22 we have,” he said.
“Essentially, this was an aircraft-by-aircraft daily record of location and maintenance
discrepancies. Collecting this information was a monumental task. Although we cannot
speak to why the committee did not receive the information the Marine Corps prepared, we
must emphasize that we have a process by which information, including classified material
that was asked for by the committee, must be vetted before being released.”


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Appendix A. V-22 Program History
This appendix discusses the history of the V-22 program, particularly with regard to the
development of the V-22 and management of the V-22 program.
Early Development
The first of six MV-22 prototypes was flown in the helicopter mode on March 19, 1989, and as a
fixed-wing airplane on September 14, 1989. Prototype aircraft numbers three and four
successfully completed the Osprey’s first Sea Trials on the USS Wasp (LHD-1) in December
1990.
The fifth prototype crashed on June 11, 1991, on its first flight, because of incorrect wiring in a
flight-control system; the fourth prototype crashed on July 20, 1992, while landing at Quantico
Marine Corps Air Station, VA, killing seven people and destroying the aircraft. This accident was
caused by a fire resulting from hydraulic component failures and design problems in the engine
nacelles.25
Flight tests were resumed in August 1993 after changes were incorporated in the prototypes.
Flight testing of four full-scale development V-22s began in early 1997 when the first pre-
production V-22 was delivered to the Naval Air Warfare Test Center in Patuxent River, MD. The
first Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Flight took place on February 5, 1997.
The first of four low-rate initial production (LRIP) aircraft, ordered on April 28, 1997, was
delivered on May 27, 1999. Osprey number 10 completed the program’s second Sea Trials, this
time from the USS Saipan (LHA-2), in January 1999.
Operational evaluation (OPEVAL) testing of the MV-22 began in October 1999 and concluded in
August 2000. On October 13, 2000, the Department of the Navy announced that the MV-22 had
been judged operationally effective and suitable for land-based operations. On November 15,
2000, the Marine Corps announced that the Osprey had successfully completed sea trials and had
been deemed operationally effective and suitable for both land and sea-based operations.
Successfully completing OPEVAL should have cleared the way for full rate production. This
decision was to have been made in December 2000, but was postponed indefinitely, because of a
mixed report from DOD’s director of operational test and evaluation, and two fatal accidents.
On April 8, 2000, another Osprey crashed near Tucson, Arizona, during an exercise simulating a
noncombatant evacuation operation. All four crew members and 15 passengers died in the crash.
An investigation of the accident found that the pilot was descending in excess of the
recommended flight envelope which may have caused the aircraft to experience an environmental
condition known as “power settling” or “vortex ring state.” According to Lt. Gen. Fred McCorkle,
the pilot was descending more than a thousand feet per minute. The recommended descent rate is

25 Former Secretary of Defense Cheney tried to terminate the program in 1989-92, but Congress continued to provide
funds for development of the V-22. The George H. Bush Administration’s FY1990 budget requested no funds for the
program. In submitting that budget to Congress on April 25, 1989, Defense Secretary Cheney told the House Armed
Services Committee that he “could not justify spending the amount of money ... proposed ... when we were just getting
ready to move into procurement on the V-22 to perform a very narrow mission that I think can be performed ... by
using helicopters instead of the V-22.”
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800 feet per minute.” Following a two-month suspension of flight testing, the Osprey
recommenced OPEVAL in June 2000, with pilots flying a slightly tighter flight envelope. A July
27, 2000 report by the Marine Corps Judge Advocate General (JAG) (which had access to all
non-privileged information from the safety investigation) confirmed that a combination of
“human factors” caused the crash.
This mishap appears not to be the result of any design, material or maintenance factor
specific to tilt ... rotors. Its primary cause, that of an MV-22 entering a Vortex Ring State
(Power Settling) and/or blade stall condition is not peculiar to tilt rotors. The contributing
factors to the mishap, a steep approach with a high rate of descent and slow airspeed, poor
aircrew coordination and diminished situational awareness are also not particular to tilt
rotors.26
A DOD Inspector General study concluded that the V-22 would not successfully demonstrate 23
major operational effectiveness and suitability requirements prior to the December 2000
OPEVAL Milestone III decision to enter full rate production in June 200127. The Marine Corps
agreed with DOD’s assessment of the deficiencies, but said that they had been aware of these
deficiencies before the beginning of OPEVAL. Furthermore, the Marine Corps said that they had
an approved plan designed to resolve the deficiencies prior to the Milestone III decision.
On November 17, 2000, DOD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation issued a mixed
report on the Osprey; saying although “operationally effective” the V-22 was not “operationally
suitable, primarily because of reliability, maintainability, availability, human factors and
interoperability issues.” The report recommended that more research should be conducted into the
V-22’s susceptibility to the vortex ring state blamed for the April 8, 2000 crash.
On December 11, 2000, an MV-22 Osprey crashed near Jacksonville, NC, killing all four Marines
on board. This was the fourth Osprey crash since 1991 and the third lethal accident. The aircraft’s
pilot, Lt. Col. Keith M. Sweeney was the program’s most experienced pilot and was in line to
command the first squadron of Ospreys. The aircraft’s copilot, Maj. Michael Murphy was second
only to Sweeney in flying time on the Osprey.28 The Marine Corps grounded the Osprey fleet
pending a mishap board investigation. On April 5, 2001, the Marine Corps reported that the crash
was caused by a burst hydraulic line in one of the Osprey’s two engine casings, and a software
malfunction that caused the aircraft to accelerate and decelerate unpredictably and violently when
the pilots tried to compensate for the hydraulic failure.29 The Marine Corps report called for a
redesign of both the hydraulics and software systems involved.30

26 V-22 JAGMAN Executive Summary, United States Marine Corps, Division of Public Affairs, July 27, 2000, p.1.
27 Audit Report: V-22 Osprey Joint Advanced Vertical Aircraft. Report No. D-2000-174. Office of the Inspector
General. Department of Defense. August 15, 2000.
28 James Dao, “Marines Ground Osprey Fleet After Crash Kills Four,” New York Times, December 12, 2000.
29 An un-redacted version of JAG investigation into the April 2000 V-22 crash indicates that investigators found three
“noteworthy” maintenance “areas of concern”, including the Osprey’s hydraulics system. A Naval Safety Center
presentation to the Blue Ribbon Panel brought to light several previously unreported maintenance problems—including
hydraulics failures—that caused engine fires or other problems during the Osprey’s operational testing.
30 Mary Pat Flaherty, “Osprey Crash Blamed on Leak, Software,” Washington Post, April 6, 2001.
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Maintenance and Parts Falsifications
In December 2000, an anonymous letter was mailed to the media by someone claiming to be a
mechanic in the Osprey program. The letter claimed that V-22 maintenance records had been
falsified for two years, at the explicit direction of the squadron commander. Enclosed in the letter
was an audio tape that the letter’s author claimed was a surreptitious recording of the squadron
commander directing maintenance personnel to lie about the aircraft until the V-22 LRIP decision
was made. On January 20, 2001, it was reported that the V-22 squadron commander admitted to
falsifying maintenance records. The Marine Corps subsequently relieved him of command and
reassigned him to a different position. At a May 1, 2001 hearing, members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee expressed their concern that false data might impede DOD’s ability to
accurately evaluate the V-22 program and identify problem areas and potential improvements.
The Department of Defense’s Inspector General (IG) conducted an investigation. On September
15, 2001, it was reported that three Marines were found guilty of misconduct and two were
reprimanded for their actions.
In June 2005, a U.S. grand jury indicted a company that had supplied titanium tubing for the V-22
program. The indictment charged the company with falsely certifying the quality of the tubes. The
V-22 test program was halted for 11 days in 2003 because of faulty tubes. Replacing deficient
tubes cost the V-22 program $4 million. Navy officials do not believe that these deficient tubes
caused fatal mishaps.31
Reviews and Restructuring
On April 19, 2001, a Blue Ribbon panel formed by then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen to
review all aspects of the V-22 program, reported its findings and recommendations.32 These
findings and recommendations were also discussed during congressional testimony on May 1,
2001. The panel recommended that the program continue, albeit in a restructured format. The
panel concluded that there were numerous problems with the V-22 program—including safety,
training and reliability problems—but nothing inherently flawed in basic tilt-rotor technology.
Because of numerous safety, training, and reliability problems, the V-22 was not maintainable, or
ready for operational use.
The panel recommended cutting production to the “bare minimum” while an array of tests were
carried out to fix a long list of problems they identified with hardware, software, and
performance. Cutting near-term production was hoped to free up funds to pay for fixes and
modifications. Once the changes had been made and the aircraft was ready for operational use,
the Panel suggested that V-22 out-year purchases could be made in large lots using multi-year
contracts to lower acquisition costs. Program officials estimated that the minimal sustainable
production rate is 12 aircraft per year, which would be less than half the Ospreys once planned for
FY2002.33 In P.L. 107-107 Sec.123, Congressional authorizers codified the Blue Ribbon Panel’s

31 Louise Story. “Maker of Tubes for Osprey Aircraft is Indicted.” New York Times. June 8, 2005. Christopher J.
Castelli. “Former Supplier of Hydraulic Tubing for V-22 Osprey Faces Indictment.” Inside the Navy. June 13, 2005.
32 This panel was chaired by retired Marine General John R. Dailey and included retired Air Force General James B.
Davis, Norman Augustine, and MIT professor Eugene Covert.
33 Adam Hebert, “Minimal Sustainable Rate Will Dramatically Cut Near-Term V-22 Buys,” Inside the Air Force, April
20, 2001.
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recommendation to produce V-22s at the minimum sustainable rate until the Secretary of Defense
can certify that the Osprey is safe, reliable, maintainable, and operationally effective.
DOD appears to have taken managerial and budgetary steps to incorporate the Blue Ribbon
Panel’s recommendations. For example, DOD’s FY2001 supplemental funding request asked for
a reduction of $475 million in procurement and an increase of $80 million in R&D funds. The
additional R&D funding was to be used to support initial redesign and testing efforts to address
deficiencies, logistics, flight test, and flight test support for V-22 aircraft. The reduction in
procurement funding reflected the need to reduce production to the minimum rate while the
aircraft design changes are being developed and tested.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s FY2002 budget amendment, unveiled June 27, 2001, included a
request for the procurement of 12 Ospreys. DOD comptroller Dov Zakheim and Marine Corps
Commandant Gen. James Jones both stated that the procurement of 12 aircraft in FY2002 would
allow them to sustain the V-22 subcontractor base while simultaneously addressing the Osprey
program’s needs.34 V-22s were procured at a rate of 11 per year from FY2002 to FY2006.
Following the Blue Ribbon panel’s recommendations, former DOD Undersecretary for
Acquisition Edward “Pete” Aldridge assumed acquisition authority for the V-22 program.
Undersecretary Aldridge changed the V-22 program’s status from an ACAT 1C program—which
gives the Department of the Navy the highest required authority for production decisions—to an
ACAT 1D program. Under the latter category, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) will decide
if and when the program is ready to enter full rate production. Other ACAT 1D programs, for
example, include the F-22 Raptor and the now-cancelled RAH-66 Comanche helicopter.35
A NASA-led review of the V-22 program, released November 6, 2001, concluded that there were
no known aero-mechanical phenomena that would stop the tilt-rotor aircraft’s development and
deployment. The study focused on several aero-mechanics issues, including Vortex Ring State,
power problems, auto-rotation, and hover performance.36
In a December 21, 2001 memo to the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy, and the
Commander, Special Operations Command, Undersecretary of Defense Aldridge gave his
authorization for the V-22 to resume flight testing in the April 2002 time frame. Secretary
Aldridge expressed support for range, speed, and survivability goals of the V-22. He noted,
however that the program still had numerous technical challenges to overcome, and emphasized
that the V-22 must demonstrate that “1) it can meet the needs of the warfighter better than any
other alternative, 2) it can be made to be reliable, safe, and operationally suitable, and 3) it is
worth its costs in contributing to the combat capability of U.S. forces.” Secretary Aldridge
approved the flight test program under the condition that the production rate be slowed to the
minimum sustaining level, that it be comprehensive and rigorous, and that the restructured
program is fully funded in accordance with current estimates.37 Undersecretary Aldridge

34 DOD News Briefing, Wed. June 27, 2001, 1:30PM and Kerry Gildea, “New V-22 Plan Sustains Lower Tier
Contractors, Jones Reports,” Defense Daily, May 15, 2001.
35 “Navy Loses Osprey Authority,” Washington Post, May 22, 2001 and Hunter Keeter, “Aldridge Maneuvers V-22
Acquisition Authority Away from Navy,” Defense Daily, May 22, 2001 and Linda de France, “V-22 Osprey Production
Authority Transferred from Navy to DoD,” Aerospace Daily, May 22, 2001.
36 Christopher Castelli, “ NASA Review Panel Endorses Resumption of V-22 Flight Tests,” InsideDefense.com,.
November 14, 2001.
37 “Text: Aldridge Memo on V-22,” Inside the Navy, January 7, 2002.
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estimated that the V-22 would require at least two years of flight testing before DOD could
conclude that the aircraft is safe, effective, and “worth the cost.”38
Mechanical adjustments slowed the V-22 test schedule, and the MV-22 took its first test flight on
May 29, 2002. The Air Force CV-22 resumed flight tests on September 11, 2002. Flight tests were
designed to explore both technical and operational concerns. Technical concerns include flight
control software and the reliability and robustness of hydraulic lines. Operational concerns
explored included whether the Osprey is too prone to Vortex Ring State to make it a safe or
effective aircraft, whether this potential problem is further exacerbated by multiple Osprey’s
flying in formation, and how well the V-22 handles at sea.39
The principal differences between the aircraft that were grounded in 2000 and the aircraft that
began testing 17 months later (called “Block A” aircraft) are re-routed hydraulic lines, and an
improved caution and warning system.40 Technical glitches were experienced during tests.
Hydraulic failures, for example, continued during the reinstated flight test program, once on
August 4, 2003, (due to a mis-installed clamp) and again on September 5, 2003. In June 2004 a V-
22 was forced twice to make an emergency landing. During one landing, the aircraft suffered a
“Class B” mishap (one causing between $200,000 and $1 million in damage).41 An investigation
revealed that the V-22 suffered from widespread problems with an engine component that
required replacement every 100 flight hours.42
In conjunction with resuming flight testing, the Navy Department modified certain V-22
requirements. For instance, the V-22 is no longer required to land in helicopter mode without
power (also known as “autorotation”), protection from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
has been eliminated. The V-22 is no longer required to have an “air combat maneuvering”
capability; instead it must demonstrate “defensive maneuvering.” Also, the requirement that
troops be able to use a rope or rope ladder to exit the cabin at low altitudes has been eliminated.43
Also concurrent with the resumption of V-22 flight testing, DOD began an in-depth study of
alternatives to pursue in case the aircraft does not pass muster. Options reportedly include
purchasing the S-92, or upgrading CH-53, or EH101 helicopters.44
After one calendar year and 466 hours of flight testing, DOD reviewed the Osprey’s progress. On
May 15, 2003, Thomas Christie, DOD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E),
graded Bell-Boeing’s improvements to the Osprey’s hydraulics as “reasonable and appropriate”
and “effective.”45 Christie also at that time approved of the testing that had been completed and
was satisfied with what had been learned about the V-22’s susceptibility to Vortex Ring State. On

38 Tony Capaccio, “Textron-Boeing V-22 Needs Two years of Testing, Aldridge Says,” Bloomberg.com, October 16,
2001.
39 Thomas Ricks, “V-22 Osprey to Face Make or Break Tests,” Washington Post, December 25, 2002, p. 14.
40Jefferson Morris, “Pilot: Resumption of V-22 Testing To Be Treated Like First Flight,” Aerospace Daily, April 29,
2002.
41 Christopher Castelli. “Navy Convenes Mishap Board to Investigate Latest V-22 Incident.” Inside the Navy. July 5,
2004.
42 Christian Lowe. “V-22 Ospreys Require New Engine Component Every 100 Hours.” Navy Times. July 16, 2004.
43 Joseph Neff, “Eased Standards ‘Fix’ Osprey,” Raleigh News & Observer, May 19, 2002, p.1.
44 “Aldridge Makes Progress Check on MV-22 at NAS Patuxent River,” Defense Daily, February 11, 2003.
45 Tony Capaccio, “Boeing-Textron B-22 Gets Favorable Review From Pentagon Tester,” Bloomberg.com, May 19,
2003.
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May 20, 2003, the Defense Acquisition Board also reviewed the program and approved of the
flight test program’s progress.
Marine Corps officials recommended increasing the production rate in FY2006 from the
minimum sustainable rate of 11 to 20 aircraft. However, in an August 8, 2003, memorandum,
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Michael Wynne announced that this acceleration
“presents more risk than I am willing to accept.” Instead, Wynne restructured the planned
procurement, reducing the FY2006 purchase to 11 aircraft. “For subsequent years’ procurement
planning, production rates should increase by about 50% per year for a total of 152 aircraft
through FY09,” according to the August 8th memo. Wynne directed that the savings resulting
from the reduced procurement (estimated at $231 million) be invested in improving the V-22’s
interoperability, by funding the Joint Tactical Radio System, Link 16 and Variable Message
Format communication. Wynne also directed that a multi-year procurement (MYP) of the V-22 be
accelerated. While some suggest that this restructuring will more quickly deliver high-quality
aircraft to the Marines and Special Operations Forces, others fear that slowing procurement will
inevitably raise the platform’s cost.
In December 2004 the V-22 budget and schedule were restructured again. Program Budget
Decision 753 (PBD-753) cut 22 aircraft from the V-22’s production schedule and $1.3 billion
from the budget between FY2006 and FY2009.
On June 18, 2005, the MV-22 program completed its second round of operational evaluation
(OPEVAL) flight. The test program was marked by two emergency landings, a Class B mishap, a
small fire in an engine compartment, and problems with the prop-rotor gear box. However, Navy
testers recommended that DOD declare the V-22 operationally suitable, and effective for military
use. This recommendation was based, in part, on observations that the MV-22 had complied with
the objectives of P.L. 107-107 Sec.123: hydraulic components and flight control software
performed satisfactorily, the aircraft was reliable and maintainable, the MV-22 operated
effectively when employed with other aircraft, and the aircraft’s downwash did not inhibit ground
operations.46
On September 28, 2005, the V-22 program passed a major milestone when the Defense
Acquisition Board approved it for military use and full rate production.47 The MV-22 continues
testing to assess survivability and to develop tactics. The CV-22 is in developmental test and
evaluation. The program continues to experience technical and operational challenges, and
mishaps. For example, an inadvertent takeoff in March 2006 caused wing and engine damage in
excess of $1 million. An engine component has been replaced because its failure in flight has
caused seven unexpected flight terminations. In October 2005, a V-22 experienced engine damage
during flight due to icing. An engine compressor failure during the V-22’s first overseas
deployment (July 2006) forced the aircraft to make a precautionary landing before reaching its
destination. An engine fire on December 7, 2006, caused more than $1 million to repair, and the
Marine Corps grounded all of its V-22s in February 2007 after it was found that a faulty computer
chip could cause the aircraft to lose control during flight.

46 “Letter of Observation in Support of MV-22 Program Compliance with Section 123 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002.” Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force. Department of the
Navy. February 18, 2005.
47 Andy Pasztor. “Pentagon Clears Full Production for Osprey Aircraft.” Wall Street Journal. September 29, 2005.
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V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix B. General Arguments Made by
Supporters and Opponents of the V-22

This appendix presents general arguments by supporters and opponents of the V-22.
Arguments Made By Supporters
Supporters of the V-22 could argue one or more of the following:
• The V-22 is needed to replace aging military helicopters that are costly to
maintain and operate safely and effectively. While there may be new helicopters
that could replace and improve on today’s military helicopters, none of them
would match the Osprey’s capabilities.
• When landing on hostile shores in a third-world conflict (typically lacking
important infrastructure such as airfields and roads), the V-22 would be critical
for the transport of Marines from ship to shore. Senior DOD officials have
testified that the V-22 would have, for example, made a significant contribution
to the war on terrorism in Afghanistan.
• The Osprey has been rigorously tested and its accident rate is consistent with
other aircraft development programs. While some technical problems have been
encountered, leading experts have testified that there are no technological
barriers to the employment of tilt-rotor technology. Engineering-level
modifications have put the Osprey program back on track. The completed
OPEVAL demonstrates that the V-22 program has resolved all of the concerns
expressed by the Blue Ribbon Panel and by Congress.
• The V-22 also has potential value for civil aviation, law enforcement, and foreign
sales by the U.S. aerospace industry.48 The development of tilt-rotor aircraft for
the armed services could have significant spin-off effects for civil aviation and
U.S. technology, giving the U.S. aerospace industry a major competitive
advantage in the international market.49
Arguments Made by Opponents
Opponents of the V-22 could argue one or more of the following:

48 Sen. Ted Stevens et al., “Continuation of the V-22 Aircraft Program,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record,
daily edition, April 19, 1989, pp. S4507-S4509.
49 The potential civil application of tilt-rotor technology is also considered by some a good reason to pursue the V-22
program. A February 1988 study by the FAA and NASA concluded that tilt-rotors could help relieve airport congestion
by diverting commuters and short-distance passengers to vertiports in urban centers. The importance of U.S. production
of a tilt-rotor aircraft for civilian purposes was the subject of a hearing on July 17, 1990, by the House Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology’s Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation, and Materials. In 1992, Congress
enacted legislation (H.R. 6168) directing the Secretary of Transportation to establish a “civil tilt-rotor development
advisory committee” to evaluate the feasibility and viability of developing civil tilt-rotor aircraft and infrastructure
necessary to incorporate tilt-rotor aircraft into the national transportation system.
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• For the kinds of ship-to-shore operations in which the Marines are most likely to
be involved in coming years, the V-22’s greater speed and range will often not be
critical. Consequently, these ship-to-shore operations can be performed
adequately by less expensive helicopters. Although the Osprey can lift three
times more dead weight than can the CH-46, the Osprey is three times heavier
and five times more expensive than the CH-46. The V-22’s performance,
moreover, should be compared to that of contemporary helicopters such as the
EH-101, rather than to the performance of the CH-46, which is a 1970s-era
helicopter. When compared to contemporary helicopters, the capabilities of the
V-22 are not as impressive.50
• Marine assault missions in an opposed landing would coordinating V-22
operations with the operations of aircraft having less speed and range, which in
practice will reduce the V-22’s advantages in these two areas. The Osprey’s
hypothetical contribution to the war in Afghanistan is questionable due to the
high altitude of that country and the Osprey’s inability to improve greatly over
helicopter performance in high-altitude operations.
• The Osprey’s operational capabilities and operational concepts are open to
question. A January 12, 2001, presentation by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to the V-22 Blue Ribbon Panel, for example, said that the V-22’s
cabin may not be large enough to carry 24 combat-equipped Marines, and that
the severe rotor down wash might impede the ability of troops to exit the aircraft
and move into combat positions. Also, to avoid entering Vortex Ring State,
Osprey’s will have to descend slowly, which will make them vulnerable to
ground fire in combat situations.
• Studies suggest that tilt-rotor aircraft are more susceptible than traditional
helicopters to airflow instabilities that can cause Vortex Ring State.51 Our
understanding of the kinds of airflow anomalies that have caused mishaps in V-
22 flight testing is still very immature.

Author Contact Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610





50 See, for example, Everest Riccioni, “Osprey or Albatross?,” Defense News, January 27, 2004.
51 Michael Dornheim, “Tiltrotor Wake ‘More Complex’ Than Classic Vortex Ring State,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology
, July 15, 2002.
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