Afghanistan: Government Formation and
Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 5, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21922
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
Summary
The central government’s limited writ and widespread official corruption are helping sustain a
Taliban insurgency, and have fed pessimism about the Afghanistan stabilization effort. However,
ethnic disputes remain confined largely to political debate and competition, enabling President
Hamid Karzai to focus on trying to build Afghan institutions, and on his bid for re-election in
presidential elections slated for August 20, 2009. Karzai has faced substantial loss of public
confidence, in large part due to widespread official corruption, but his opponents—divided by
ethnicity and personal ambition—were unable to form a strong electoral coalition as the
presidential election registration process closed on May 8, 2009.
At the same time, U.S. officials have been shifting away from reliance on building the central
government and toward promoting local governing bodies and security initiatives. That trend is to
accelerate, according to the Obama Administration’s review of U.S. strategy, the results of which
were announced on March 27, 2009. The core of the new strategy is a so-called “civilian surge”
that will virtually double, to about 900, the number of U.S. civilian personnel to deploy to
Afghanistan to help build its governing and security institution, and to increase economic
development efforts. The Administration also says it will develop “metrics” by which to judge the
performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government, including its efforts to curb official
corruption, although the Administration and many in Congress appear reluctant to tie any U.S.
funds or other activities to Afghanistan’s performance on such metrics. The review did not
emphasize building democracy in Afghanistan, although that goal appears implicit within its
recommendations.
For further information, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Congressional Research Service
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
Contents
Post-Taliban Political Transition and Political Landscape ............................................................ 1
Karzai and His Opponents..................................................................................................... 2
The Opposition ............................................................................................................... 2
Government Performance............................................................................................................ 4
Regional Strongmen........................................................................................................ 5
Official Corruption................................................................................................................ 5
Increasing Focus on Local Solutions and Governance ........................................................... 7
Provincial Governors ...................................................................................................... 7
Local Security Programs ................................................................................................. 8
Overall Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................ 8
Funding Issues ...................................................................................................................... 9
2009 Elections .......................................................................................................................... 10
Outlines of the Contest ........................................................................................................ 11
Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 13
Figures
Figure 1. Afghanistan Ethnic Groups......................................................................................... 17
Tables
Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process....................................................................... 14
Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations ........................................................................... 15
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 17
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 17
Congressional Research Service
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
Post-Taliban Political Transition and Political
Landscape
In addition to supporting Afghanistan’s holding of democratic elections and urging adherence to
international standards of human rights, U.S. policy has been to extend the authority and
encourage the reform of Afghanistan’s central government. The policy has been predicated on the
observation that weak and corrupt governance is causing some Afghans to acquiesce to, or even
support outright, Taliban insurgents as providers of security and impartial justice. The United
States provides about 27,000 forces to a 61,000 troop NATO-led coalition there; another 14,000
U.S. troops continue the original post-September 11 counter-terrorism mission in Afghanistan. An
additional 21,000 U.S. forces are in the process of flowing to Afghanistan, as announced in the
context of the March 27, 2009 presentation of the Obama Administration strategy review on
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Although democracy promotion, per se, was not a major feature of the Obama Administration
strategy announcement, Afghanistan has taken significant steps toward democracy since the fall
of the Taliban in November 2001. Karzai’s is the first fully elected government in Afghan history,
although there were parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah (the last were in
1969, before his reign was ended in a 1973 military coup). Presidential, parliamentary, and
provincial elections, and adoption of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap
established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn,
Germany on December 5, 2001, (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the Taliban had fallen. The political
transition process is depicted in the table below.
Elections have not produced complete harmony among Afghanistan’s many communities. Since
its formation in late 2001, Karzai’s government has come to be progressively dominated by ethnic
Pashtuns, who are about 42% of the population and traditionally have governed Afghanistan. A
table on major Pashtun clans is provided below, as is a map showing the distribution of
Afghanistan’s various ethnicities.
Of the major security ministries and organizations, only the National Directorate for Security
(NDS, the Intelligence directorate) is still headed by a non-Pashtun (Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik).
Adhering to a tacit consensus, the other security ministries (Defense, Interior) tend to have non-
Pashtuns in key deputy or subordinate positions. One prominent example is the defense ministry,
in which the chief of staff is a Tajik (Bismillah Khan), who reports to a Pashtun Defense Minister
(Abdul Rahim Wardak). On the other hand, Afghanistan’s non-Pashtun communities have said
that they will not react violently to their progressive diminution in the upper levels of
government, but would keep their competition peaceful.
Some believe that assisting the transition to democracy are traditional Afghan patterns of
authority and decisionmaking, which in many cases have democratic and representative elements.
Some of these processes, such as the loya jirga, or traditional Afghan assembly consisting of
about 1,000 delegates from all over Afghanistan, have been used in the post-Taliban period.
Others note that, at the local level, shuras, or jirgas (consultative councils) composed of local
1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
Congressional Research Service
1
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
notables, are key mechanisms for making authoritative local decisions. Afghans turn often to
these local mechanisms to adjudicate disputes rather than use the national court system. Some
estimates say that 80% of cases are decided in the informal justice system.
Karzai and His Opponents
It is the National Assembly (parliament)—particularly the 249 seat elected lower house (Wolesi
Jirga, House of the People—that is the key institution for the ethnic minorities to exert influence.
To the chagrin of many Afghans who want to build a democratic Afghanistan governed by
technocrats and newly emerging political figures, many seats in the lower house are held by
personalities and factions prominent in Afghanistan’s recent wars, and many of these are non-
Pashtuns who inhabit the north and the west, and Kabul city. The lower house is divided into
three roughly equal coalitions—pro-Karzai deputies, ethnic minority and other some Pashtun
“opposition” figures, and “independents” of varied ethnicities. The factions in the lower house are
not strictly organized according to Afghanistan’s 90 registered political parties.
Karzai has not formed his own party, but his core support in the Wolesi Jirga consists of former
members of the hardline conservative Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party; and supporters of Abd-i-
Rab Rasul Sayyaf—a prominent Islamic conservative mujahedin party leader.2 Another base of
Karzai’s support in parliament is the contingent from Qandahar (Karzai’s home province) and
Helmand provinces, including several Karzai clan members. One clan member in the body is his
cousin Jamil Karzai, and another is relative by marriage Aref Nurzai. Karzai’s elder brother,
Qayyum, was in the lower house representing Qandahar until his October 2008 resignation due to
health reasons, although Qayyum continues to represent his brother informally domestically and
abroad, including at 2008 and 2009 meetings to explore negotiated settlements with “moderate”
Taliban figures. Also pro-Karzai are former Pashtun militia and Taliban leaders, including Hazrat
Ali (Nangarhar Province), who had gained fame for leading the Afghan component of the failed
assault on Osama bin Laden’s purported redoubt at Tora Bora in December 2001; Pacha Khan
Zadran (Paktia) who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin Laden escape Tora Bora; and Mullah
Abdul Salam (“Mullah Rocketi”), from Zabol. (Salam has filed to run for president in 2009.)
The Opposition
The “opposition” is led by ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) who were in an alliance
against Taliban rule that was called the “Northern Alliance.” Leaders of these groups, and
particularly Tajiks, view as a betrayal Karzai’s firing of many of the non-Pashtuns from the
cabinet—such as former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Tajik, dismissed in 2006).
However, as noted above, the bloc says its disputes with Karzai will remain political and
peaceful, and members of the bloc meet occasionally with Karzai to discuss issues and negotiate
understandings.
In April 2007, Wolesi Jirga Speaker Yunus Qanooni and former Afghan president Burhanuddin
Rabbani (both, like Abdullah, are prominent ethnic Tajik Northern Alliance figures and former
associates of the legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masood) organized a broader (it
includes some Pashtuns) opposition bloc called the “United Front” (UF). Joining the bloc were
both of Karzai’s vice presidents, and some Pashtuns prominent in the Soviet-occupation era such
2 Sayyaf led the Ittihad Islami (Islamic Union) mujahedin party during the war against the Soviet occupation.
Congressional Research Service
2
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
as Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi (Khost Province) and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, who chairs parliament’s
defense committee. The UF advocates amending the constitution to give more power to
parliament and to empower the elected provincial councils (instead of the President) to select
governors and mayors. Fearing Pashtun consolidation, the UF has been generally opposed to
Karzai’s overtures to Taliban fighters to end their fight and join government—an initiative that is
now backed by the Obama Administration as a means of combating the Taliban insurgency. Yet
the UF is not always cohesive, as has been shown in the context of the 2009 presidential elections
(discussed below).
Even before the formation of the UF, the lower house opposition first showed its strength in
March 2006, following the December 19, 2005 inauguration of parliament, by requiring Karzai’s
cabinet to be approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition leverage. However,
Karzai rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. One of those defeated
was a female nominee for Minister of Women’s Affairs, leaving Afghanistan without any women
ministers. (The post had been held by a female since it was established in 2002.) In May 2006,
the opposition compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the highest judicial
body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief justice.
Parliament approved his new Court choices in July 2006, all of whom are trained in modern
jurisprudence.
In May 2007, the UF achieved a majority in parliament to oust Karzai ally Rangin Spanta as
Foreign Minister. Karzai refused to replace him, instead seeking a Supreme Court ruling that
Spanta should remain, on the grounds that his ouster was related to a refugee issue (Iran’s
expulsion of 100,000 Afghan refugees), not a foreign policy issue. The Court has, to date,
supported Karzai, and Spanta remains Foreign Minister, although the UF continues to challenge
his legitimacy.
Karzai and the UF have often battled for the support of the many “independents” in the lower
house. Among them are several outspoken women, intellectuals, and business leaders, such as the
39 year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), a leading critic of war-era faction leaders. In May
2007 the lower house voted to suspend her for this criticism for the duration of her term. She
continues to legally challenge the expulsion but, to date, remains barred. Others in this camp
include Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, editor of Woman Mirror
magazine; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions parliamentary
powers and has established a “complaints table” outside the parliament building to highlight and
combat official corruption. U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI) has helped train
the independents; the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has assisted the more established
factions.
Karzai has relatively fewer critics in the 102 seat Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders), partly
because of his bloc of 34 appointments (one-third of that body). He engineered the appointment
of an ally as Speaker—Sibghatullah Mojadeddi—a noted Islamic scholar and former mujahedin
party leader who headed the post-Communist mujahedin government for one month (May 1992).3
He has since 2003 headed an effort to reconcile with Taliban figures (Peace and Reconciliation
Commission, or “PTSD” program). Karzai also appointed Northern Alliance military leader
Muhammad Fahim to the body, perhaps to compensate for his removal as Defense Minister,
although he resigned after a few months and later joined the UF. (He is now Karzai’s primary
3 The mujahedin party he headed during the anti-Soviet war was the Afghan National Liberation Front.
Congressional Research Service
3
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
running mate in the 2009 elections.) There is one Hindu, and 23 women; 17 are Karzai appointees
and 6 were selected in their own right.
The upper house tends to be more Islamist conservative than the lower house, advocating a legal
system that accords with Islamic law, and restrictions on press and Westernized media broadcasts.
In late 2008, the body approved a resolution opposing a U.S.-Afghan plan to establish local
security organs to help keep Taliban infiltrators out of Afghan communities. The plan, now
termed the “Afghan Public Protection Force,” is being tested in Wardak provinces south of Kabul
(see below).
On less contentious issues, the executive and the legislature have worked well. During 2008,
parliament passed a labor law, a mines law, a law on economic cooperatives, and a convention on
tobacco control. It also confirmed several Karzai nominees, including the final justice to fill out
the Supreme Court. In 2009, as discussed further below, the National Assembly approved a Shiite
Personal Status Law. Both houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by the Ministry of
Finance, are staffed by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a “secretariat.” There are 18 oversight
committees, a research unit and a library.
Government Performance4
U.S. policy has been to help expand Afghan institutions and to urge reforms such as merit-based
performance criteria and weeding out of the rampant official corruption. Afghan ministries are
growing their staffs and technologically capabilities, although they still suffer from a low
resource and skill base, and corruption is fed in part by the fact that government workers receive
very low salaries. The anti-corruption and governmental performance aspect of U.S. policy is to
be enhanced as a result of the Obama Administration’s strategy review, as announced March 27,
2009, which concluded that more needed to be done to promote the legitimacy and effectiveness
of the Afghan government at both the Kabul and local levels. As a consequence of the review, the
Administration plans to send about 430 U.S. civilian personnel—and many additional civilians
from partner countries will join them—to advise Afghan ministries, and provincial and district
administrations.
The Administration also plans to develop metrics to assess progress in building Afghan
governance; the proposed metrics are, according to Undersecretary of Defense Michelle
Flournoy, to be briefed to Congress in May 2009. Some in Congress have said they oppose firm
conditionality of any U.S. aid to Afghanistan on Afghanistan’s performance on such metrics, or
linkage to any timelines of progress in the U.S. stabilization effort.
There has also been a growing perception that Karzai’s government is weak in its administrative
ability. The former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, who is of Afghan origin
(a Pashtun) is reported as of May 2009 to be negotiating with Karzai about becoming a strong
chief executive officer if Karzai is re-elected; these talks came after Khalilzad declined to run
against Karzai in the upcoming election. The Obama Administration did not take a firm position
4 Some information in this section is from the State Department reports on human rights in Afghanistan for 2007.
March 11, 2008 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100611.htm; the International Religious Freedom Report,
released September 19, 2008. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/2007/90225.htm; and Defense Department “Report on
Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” June 2008.
Congressional Research Service
4
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
on the Khalilzad idea during Karzai’s May 2009 visit to the United States, but some are said to
believe that a high ranking position for Khalilzad in the Afghan government could further confuse
the channels of communication between the Obama Administration and the Karzai government.
(Khalilzad’s political activities in Afghanistan are discussed further below.)
Regional Strongmen
The Obama Administration review did not specifically outline any new measures to sideline
regional strongmen. Karzai has at times indulged and at other times move against regional
strongmen, but he has been hesitant to confront them outright to the point where their followers
go into armed rebellion. His choice of Muhammad Fahim, the military chief of the Northern
Alliance/UF faction, as first Vice Presidential running mate in the August 2009 elections is likely
to reignite concerns that Karzai continues to rely on faction leaders and refuses to modernize his
governing approach. Karzai argues that these faction leaders have significant followings and that
compromises with them is needed to keep the government intact as he focuses on fighting
“unrepentant” Taliban insurgents.
In 2008, some observers cited Karzai’s handling of prominent Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostam
as evidence of political weakness. Dostam is often referred to as a “warlord” because of his
command of partisans in his redoubt in northern Afghanistan (Jowzjan and Balkh provinces), and
he is widely accused of human rights abuses of political opponents in the north. To try to separate
him from his militia, in 2005 Karzai appointed him to the post of chief of staff of the armed
forces. On February 4, 2008, Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to
reports that his followers attacked and beat an ethnic Turkmen rival, but Karzai did not order his
arrest for fear of stirring unrest among Dostam’s followers. To try to resolve the issue without
stirring unrest, in early December 2008 Karzai purportedly reached an agreement with Dostam
under which he resigned as chief of staff and went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the
dropping any case against him.5 Dostam continues to be consulted by leading Afghan politicians.
Karzai also has weakened prominent Tajik political leader, former Herat governor Ismail Khan,
by appointing him Minister of Energy and Water. On the other hand, some say the province has
now been infiltrated by Taliban—at least in Pashtun areas of the province and neighboring
provinces—because the strong hand of Khan is no longer governing there. Others say that some
strong governors, such as Ghul Agha Shirzai of Nangarhar, continue to siphon off customs duties
at border crossings, undermining the revenue flow to the central government.
In February 2007, both houses passed a law giving amnesty to so-called “warlords.”Karzai
altered the draft to give victims the right to seek justice for any abuses; Karzai did not sign a
modified version in May 2007, leaving the status unclear.
Official Corruption
During the Bush Administration, U.S. officials generally refrained from publicly criticizing
Karzai when, in the interests of political harmony, he has purportedly tolerated corruption.
However, President Obama and his senior aides, including the special representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, have been somewhat more publicly
5 CRS e-mail conversation with National Security aide to President Karzai. December 2008.
Congressional Research Service
5
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
critical of Karzai’s shortcomings than were Bush Administration officials. The Obama
Administration strategy review highlights the need to reduce official corruption and says that
some of the Administration’s forthcoming “metrics” will help determine performance toward that
end.
Partly as a result of what many Afghans view as a “predatory” central government, some
Afghans—and many international donors—are said to be losing faith in the government and in
Karzai’s leadership. Some observers, such as former Coordinator for Counter-Narcotics and
Justice Reform Thomas Schweich, in a July 27, 2008 New York Times article, have gone so far as
to assert that Karzai, to build political support, is deliberately tolerating officials in his
government who are allegedly involved in the narcotics trade. The New York Times reported
allegations (October 5, 2008) that another Karzai brother, Qandahar provincial council chief
Ahmad Wali Karzai, has protected narcotics trafficking in the province. Another brother,
Mahmoud Karzai, has apparently grown wealthy through real estate and auto sales ventures in
Qandahar and Kabul, purportedly by fostering the impression he can influence his brother,
President Karzai. Mahmoud Karzai held a press conference in Washington, D.C. on April 16,
2009 denying allegations of corruption against him.
Observers who follow the issue say that most of the corruption takes place in the course of
performing mundane governmental functions, such as government processing of official
documents, in which processing services routinely require bribes in exchange for action.6 In other
cases, Afghan security officials are said to sell U.S./internationally provided vehicles, fuel, and
equipment to supplement their salaries. Several high officials, despite very low official
government salaries, have acquired ornate properties in west Kabul since 2002. Other observers
who have served in Afghanistan say that Karzai has appointed some provincial governors to
“reward them” and that these appointments have gone on to “prey” economically on the
populations of that province. Transparency International, a German organization that assesses
governmental corruption worldwide, ranked Afghanistan in 2008 as 176th out of 180 countries
ranked in terms of government corruption. Because of the corruption, only about 10% of U.S. aid
is channeled through the Afghan government, although Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke said in May 2009 that empowering Afghan governance requires
raising that to about 40% or 50%. Currently, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development, and a few others qualify to have U.S. funds channeled through
them.
To try to address the criticism, in August 2008 Karzai, with reported U.S. prodding, set up the
“High Office of Oversight for the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy” with the power to
investigate the police, courts, and the attorney general’s office, and to catalogue the overseas
assets of Afghan officials. Karzai himself declared his assets on March 27, 2009. In October
2008, Karzai replaced the ministers of Interior, of Education, and of Agriculture with officials,
particularly the new Interior Minister (former Soviet-era official Muhammad Hanif Atmar)
believed to be dedicated to reform of their ministries and weeding out of official corruption.
However, Atmar’s appointment incurred further UF concern because Atmar, a Pashtun, replaced a
Tajik (Zarrar Moqbel) in that post. Some press reports in March 2009 suggested that the United
States and Britain were urging Karzai to appoint Atmar as a “chief of staff” or similar position to
be able to monitor government corruption at high levels. In his public appearances during his visit
6 Filkins, Dexter. “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government.” New York Times, January 2, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
6
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
to the United States in May 2009, Karzai repeatedly stressed what he said were efforts by him and
his government to remove corrupt officials and combat official corruption.
Some of Karzai’s anti-corruption steps have been recommended in studies within the State
Department, the Afghan government, and the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime which is
responsible for assisting Afghanistan on counter-narcotics. The Afghan government committed
itself to anti-corruption efforts in the so-called “Afghanistan Compact” adopted at an international
meeting in London on February 1, 2006, and it ratified the U.N. Convention Against Corruption
in August 2008.
Increasing Focus on Local Solutions and Governance
In part to address the flaws of the Afghan central government, U.S. policy shifted somewhat in
2008 toward promoting local security and governance solutions. The Afghan government asserts
that it itself is promoting local governance as the next stage in Afghanistan’s political and
economic development. A key indicator of this Afghan shift came in August 2007 when Karzai
placed the selection process for local leaders (provincial governors and down) in a new
Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)—and out of the Interior Ministry. The
IDLG, with advice from India and other donors, is also in the process of empowering localities
(Afghanistan has 22,000 villages) to decide on development priorities. About 30,000 total
positions in Afghanistan are to be elected, under the local governance programs advanced by the
IDLG. These are mostly community development councils that are helping to decide on
development priorities for international donors. The IDLG does not envision that the local leaders
being elected will conflict with any district leaderships elected when Afghanistan finally does
hold (still delayed) district elections. Some accounts say that the efforts to expand local
governance has been hampered by corruption and limited availability of skilled Afghans.
Provincial Governors
Many believe that the key to effective local governance is the appointment of competent
governors. In March 2008 Karzai replaced the weak and ineffective governor of Helmand -
Asadullah Wafa - with Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman Province and who the U.N. Office
of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) said in an August 2008 report is taking relatively effective action
to convince farmers not to grow crops other than poppy. A subsequent UNODC report in
February 2009 said his efforts are likely to result in a reduction of cultivation in Helmand in
2009. However, there are reports Karzai wants to replace him with the former governor, Sher
Mohammad Akhundzadeh, who is accused of human rights abuses when he was governor during
2002-2005 but who remains powerful in the province. The UNODC report said that improving
governance in some provinces had contributed to the increase to 18 “poppy free” provinces (out
of 34), from 13 in the same report in 2007. Ghul Agha Shirzai has been effective in curbing
cultivation in Nangarhar, although Shirzai reportedly has also not remitted all the customs duties
collected at the Khyber Pass/Torkham crossing to the central government. Another four provinces
might move into that category in 2009, according to UNODC.
Governing Qandahar is a sensitive issue in Kabul because of Karzai’s active interest in his home
province. The governor of Qandahar was changed (to former General Rahmatullah Raufi,
replacing Asadullah Khalid) after an August 7, 2008 Taliban assault on the Qandahar prison that
led to the freeing of several hundred Taliban fighters incarcerated there. Karzai changed that
governorship again in December 2008, naming Canadian-Afghan academic Tooryalai Wesa as
Congressional Research Service
7
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
governor, perhaps hoping that his ties to Canada would assuage Canadian reticence to continuing
its mission in Qandahar beyond 2011.
Local Security Programs
The IDLG is also the chief implementer of the “Social Outreach Program” which provides
financial support (about $125 – 200 per month) and other benefits to tribal and local leaders in
exchange for their cooperation with U.S./NATO led forces against the Taliban insurgency. The
civilian aspects of the program are funded partly by USAID.
A more widely debated security aspect of the program is the Afghan Public Protection Force,
referred to above. Afghan officials say it is not a resurrection of the traditional tribal militias
(“arbokai”) that provided local security—and often clashed with each other—before and during
Afghanistan’s recent wars, but that the local forces formed under the program are under the
authority of the Interior Ministry. U.S. commanders say U.S. weapons will not be provided to the
militias, only training, but some weapons may come from the Afghan government. The security
components of the program are partially funded with DoD funds (the Commanders Emergency
Response Program or CERP). The program has begun in Wardak province, although reportedly
with halting cooperation from some tribal leaders in furnishing recruits for the program, and will
also be implemented in Kapisa, Ghazni, and Lowgar in early 2009. Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke told observers in Washington D.C. in April 2009
that the “jury is still out” on the pilot program.
Some see the shift toward new local militias as a reversal of the 2001-2007 programs to disarm
militias nationwide. The upper house of parliament passed a resolution in November 2008
opposing the formation of local militias. In March 2009 press interviews, Karzai indicated that
the program might not be effective in increasing local security.
Overall Human Rights Issues
The Obama Administration review did not specifically delineate a U.S. policy on Afghanistan’s
human rights practices, although this issue could be deemed addressed implicitly by the
Administration’s statement that policy is intended to make the Afghan government more
“accountable.” On human rights issues, the overall State Department judgment is that the
country’s human rights record remains poor, according to the Department’s report for 2008
(issued February 25, 2009). The security forces are widely cited for abuses and corruption,
including torture and abuse of detainees.
There has been some backsliding in recent years on media freedoms, which was hailed during
2002-2008 as a major benefit of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. A press law was passed in
September 2008 that gives some independence to the official media outlet, but also contains a
number of content restrictions, and requires that new newspapers and electronic media be
licensed by the government. Prior to the new law, Afghanistan’s conservative Council of Ulema
(Islamic scholars) has been ascendant. With the Council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of
Information and Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that they are
too risque, although the programs were restored in August 2008 under a compromise that also
brought in some Islamic-oriented programs from Turkey. At the same time, there have been a
growing numbers of arrests or intimidation of journalists who criticize the central government or
local leaders. On the other hand, freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the
Congressional Research Service
8
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
Taliban with their elections to the parliament (numbers in the table below), their service at many
levels of government, including a governorship (Bamiyan Province), and their growing presence
in the judiciary (67 female judges), the press, and the private sector. Wearing the burqa (head-to-
toe covering) is no longer required but many women still wear it.
The September 2008 International Religious Freedom report says the Afghan government took
limited steps during the year to increase religious freedom. Still, members of minority religions,
including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court
declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of blasphemy in May 2007. In October 2007, Afghanistan
resumed enforcing the death penalty after a four-year moratorium, executing 15 criminals. One
major case incurring international criticism has been the January 2008 death sentence, imposed in
a quick trial, against 23-year-old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material
critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20 years in
prison; a judgment upheld by another court in March 2009. He still might receive a Karzai
pardon.
A positive development is that Afghanistan’s Shiite minority, mostly from the Hazara tribes of
central Afghanistan (Bamiyan and Dai Kundi provinces) can celebrate their holidays openly, a
development unknown before the fall of the Taliban. Some Afghan Shiites follow Iran’s clerical
leaders politically, but Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. The Minister of Justice is a Shiite, the first of that sect to hold that post.
The Afghan government tried to further accommodate Shiite demands in 2009 by enacting
(passage by the National Assembly and signature by Karzai in March 2009) a “Shiite Personal
Status Law,” at the request of Shiite leaders. The law was intended to provide a legal framework
for members of the Shiite minority in family law issues. However, the issue turned controversial
when international human rights groups and governments—and Afghan women in a
demonstration in Kabul—complained about provisions that would appear to sanction marital rape
and which would allow males to control the ability of females in their family to go outside the
home. President Obama publicly called these provisions “abhorrent.” In early April 2009, taking
into account the outcry, Karzai sent the law back to the Justice Ministry for review, saying it
would be altered if it were found to conflict with the Afghan constitution. On April 19, 2009,
Karzai said on CNN that his government’s review of specific provisions of the law, which was
long and highly detailed, had been inadequate, and Karzai reiterated during his U.S. visit in May
2009 that the controversial provisions would be removed. Revised legislation will have to again
go through the full legislative process. There was further unrest among some Shiite leaders in late
May 2009 when they learned that the Afghan government had dumped 2,000 Iranian-supplied
religious texts into a river when an Afghan official complained that the books insulted the Sunni
majority.
Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2 in the State Department’s June 4, 2008, Trafficking in
Persons report for 2008 on the grounds that it does not fully comply with minimum standards for
the elimination of trafficking in persons. However, the report says it is making significant efforts
to do so, including by establishing anti-trafficking offices in the offices of the Attorney General in
all 34 provinces.
Funding Issues
USAID has spent about $440 million (FY2002-2008) to build democracy in Afghanistan, and an
additional $68 million to promote “rule of law,” and to assist Afghanistan’s elections. FY2009
Congressional Research Service
9
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
total aid for this category is not yet determined; about $900 million in democracy and governance
aid is to be provided in FY2009, including through a FY2009 supplemental request now under
congressional consideration.
Substantial FY2009 aid is being extended to the IDLG for its operations and to support the Social
Outreach Program discussed above. In FY 2009, according to a September 25, 2008 State
Department fact sheet, USAID is providing $8.5 million to support the IDLG and to fund the
Social Outreach Program and a separate “Governor’s Performance Fund” intended to promote
good governance. Another $95 million is going to the IDLG to help it construct new district
centers and rehabilitate fifty provincial and district offices. For comprehensive tables on U.S. aid
to Afghanistan, by fiscal year and by category and type of aid, see CRS Report RL30588,
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
2009 Elections
The next major political milestone in Afghanistan is the 2009 presidential and provincial
elections. The provincial elections component has been receiving little attention in international
media. On February 3, 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) set August
20, 2009 as the election date—a change from a date mandated by Article 61 of the Constitution as
April 21, 2009—in order to allow at least 30 days before Karzai’s term expires on May 22, 2009.
The IEC decision on the latter date cited Article 33 of the Constitution as mandating universal
accessibility to the voting—and saying that the April 21 date was precluded by difficulties in
registering voters, printing ballots, training staff, advertising the elections, and the dependence on
international donor funding, in addition to the security questions.7 This decision caused the UF
bloc to say it would not “recognize” Karzai’s presidency after May 22.
In response to the UF criticism that he seeks to prolong his term and use his incumbency to his
advantage, Karzai said in late February 2009 that he would run for re-election no matter the date.
To reinforce that assertion, on February 28, 2009, Karzai issued a presidential decree directing the
IEC to set the elections in accordance with all provisions of the constitution. However, observers
say Karzai’s decree was largely political because it is widely recognized that Afghan authorities
would not be ready to hold elections by the April 21 date. The IEC reaffirmed on March 4, 2009
that the election must be held on August 20, 2009.
Karzai’s maneuvers and the official decision did not stop the UF from insisting that Karzai step
down on May 22 in favor of a caretaker government. Karzai argued that the Constitution does not
provide for any transfer of power other than in case of election or death of a President. The
Afghan Supreme Court backed that decision on March 28, 2009. The Obama Administration
publicly backed both the IEC and the Supreme Court rulings even though such backing would be
viewed as an Obama Administration endorsement of Karzai. Ambassador Holbrooke has said on
several occasions that the United States is strictly neutral, and that Ambassador Timothy Carney
would head the U.S. election effort at U.S. Embassy Kabul and ensure that the United States is
even-handed in the elections.
7 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat. February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
Congressional Research Service
10
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public
appears to be high. Registration (updating of 2005 voter rolls) began in October 2008 and was
completed as of the beginning of March 2009. About 15.6 million total Afghans updated their
registration information, according to NATO. However, there were also reports of some
registration fraud, with some voters registering on behalf of women who do not, by custom, show
up at registration sites. U.S./NATO military operations in some areas, including in Helmand in
January 2009, were conducted to secure registration centers.
The elections are expected to cost about $200 million; on March 31, 2009. At a U.N.-led
conference in the Netherlands, the United States committed $40 million of that amount, which is
part of a planned $175 million U.S. funding for elections in FY2009.
Outlines of the Contest
Politically, Karzai has benefitted from the August 2009 date because it gives him more time to
restore his popularity and gives more time for the infusion of U.S. troops (about 21,000 additional
due by August 2009, plus about 3,000 partner combat troop contributions) to secure the Pashtun
areas which will be the source of many Karzai votes. The UF sensed vulnerability on the part of
Karzai and the April 2009 date appeared to suit that faction politically. However, as 2009 has
progressed, the opposition had largely changed its position on the election date because April was
too early to field a candidate that might defeat Karzai. With the August date set, candidates
registered their candidacies during April 24 - May 8, 2009.
The conventional wisdom among observers is that the two-round election virtually assures victory
by an ethnic Pashtun. In the election-related political jockeying,8 Karzai obtained an agreement
from Muhammad Fahim (a Tajik), formerly his antagonist and a UF member, to run as his first
vice presidential running mate. Karzai, Fahim, and incumbent second Vice President Karim
Khalili registered their ticket on May 4, 2009, just before Karzai left to visit the United States for
the latest round of three way strategic talks (U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan). The Fahim choice was
criticized by human rights and other groups because of Fahim’s long identity as a mujahedin
commander/militia faction leader, but the selection, and Fahim’s acceptance, was viewed as a
major political coup for Karzai by splitting the UF bloc.
Anti-Karzai Pashtuns attempted, unsuccessfully, to coalesce around one challenger. Former
Interior Minister Ali Jalali (who resigned in 2005 over Karzai’s compromises with faction
leaders), and former Finance Minister (2002-2004) and Karzai critic Ashraf Ghani, tried to forge
a single ticket, but did not reach agreement. In the end, Ghani registered his candidacy, but
without Jalali or strong representation from other ethnicities in his vice presidential slots. He has
appeared frequently in U.S. media broadcasts saying Karzai has failed to establish legitimate and
successful governance, but he has spent much time in the United States and Europe and might
lose support among some average Afghans who might view him as a global technocrat who is not
necessarily in touch with day to day problems in Afghanistan. Ghani may show strength in the
east of Afghanistan, the seat of his Ahmedzai clan, but is unlikely to draw substantial support in
the south, the base of Pashtun support for Karzai.
8 Some of the information in this section obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide. December
2008.
Congressional Research Service
11
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
As noted above, neither was the UF was not successful in forging a united front to challenge
Karzai. Burhanuddin Rabbani (Afghanistan president during 1992-1996), the elder statesman of
the UF bloc, reportedly insisted that an ethnic Tajik (the ethnic core of the UF) head the UF
ticket. Observers in Kabul say the UF had always leaned toward former Foreign Minister Dr.
Abdullah Abdullah to its slate, and Dr. Abdullah did register to run. His running mates are Dr.
Cheragh Ali Cheragh, a Hazara who did poorly in the 2004 election, and a little known Pashtun,
Homayoun Wasefi. However, Wasefi is not likely to pull many Pashtun votes from Karzai or
Ghani’s slates. Some reports in May 2009 say that Ghani and Abdullah are still discussing a joint
ticket, which would require one of them to drop out of the presidential slot and substitute as a
replacement vice presidential running mate, but no agreement has been announced. Another
problem for the UF is that Ahmad Zia Massoud (currently one of Karzai’s Vice Presidents) did
not win support of the bloc to head its ticket. Massoud is the brother of Ahmad Shah Masoud (see
above), who was killed purportedly by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks on the
United States, and Ahmad Zia has support among followers of his slain brother.
Other Pashtun contenders Ghul Agha Shirzai, a member of the powerful Barakzai clan, and
Anwar al-Haq Ahady, the former Finance Minister and Central Bank governor, did not run.
Shirzai reportedly reached an arrangement with Karzai the week of the registration period that
headed off his candidacy. Nor did Bush Administration U.S. Ambassador to U.N., Afghan-born
Zalmay Khalilzad himself run; he organized a conference of Karzai opponents in Dubai in early
March 2009 and was, up until the last minute, said to be trying to build support for a candidacy or
to unify anti-Karzai factions. As noted above, he is now discussing with Karzai a position in his
post-election cabinet/government if Karzai is re-elected.
Because his ticket appears to unite major ethnic groups and demonstrates splits within the
Tajik/UF grouping , Karzai is now viewed as a clear favorite for re-election. Some observers say
that Karzai’s main potential opponents are basing their election strategy on creating the
impression that the Obama Administration prefers that Karzai not be re-elected. It is not certain
that, even if this impression took hold, that Afghan voters would cast their ballots on this basis.
On the other hand, as noted, Karzai’s popularity has been undermined by perceptions of
ineffectiveness and corruption and it is possible he might be defeated at the polls. Karzai has in
some measure used some U.S. policy setbacks to bolster his electoral prospects. He has railed
against civilian casualties resulting from U.S./NATO operations. Following an August 21, 2008,
airstrike that some Afghans said killed 90 civilians (the incident is in dispute) near Herat city, the
Afghan cabinet called for bringing foreign forces under Afghan law, replacing an 2001 interim
“status of forces agreement” with the coalition. Afghanistan and the United States conducted a
joint investigation of the incident. Another major incident occurred in Farah Province in early
May 2009, on the eve of Karzai’s visit to the United States.
Other significant candidates, of the 45 slates that registered by the May 8 deadline are shown in
the box below.
Other Candidates
Abd al-Salam Rocketi ("Mullah Rocketi) - A Pashtun, reconciled Taliban figure, member of the lower house of
parliament. May do unexpectedly well if Taliban sympathizers participate, but some believe he might drop out later
and endorse Karzai.
Hedayat Amin Arsala – A Pashtun, was a Vice President during 2001-2004. He is a prominent economist and
perceived as close to the former royal family.
Congressional Research Service
12
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
Abd al Jabbar Sabit - A Pashtun, was fired by Karzai in 2007 for considering run against Karzai in the election.
Shahnawaz Tanai - A Pashtun. Served as Defense Minister in the Communist government of Najibullah (which was
left in place after the Soviets withdrew in 1989) but led failed coup against Najibullah in April 1990.
Mirwais Yasini. Another strong Pashtun candidate. 48-year-old deputy speaker of the lower house of parliament but
also without wel known non-Pashtun running mates.
Haj Nasrullah Baryalai. Pashtun tribal leader from Jalalabad. Some say he is a candidate to watch, although he attracts
little attention outside Afghanistan.
Ramazan Bashardost. A Hazara, mentioned above, running on platform of anti-corruption and improving government
services.
Conclusion
Some believe that U.S. policy requires a new Afghan president untainted by corruption among
associates. Others believe that Karzai’s opponents might not necessarily perform better if they are
elected, and would similarly favor their clansmen and other inner circle members. Still, U.S.
policy is said to increasingly be accommodating the likelihood of a Karzai re-election, in large
part because of the apparent disarray among his opponents.
A major fear among experts is that the election will be marred by violence, or by real or perceived
fraud. Some believe that if many candidates enter the race, there will be small percentages
separating each candidate, magnifying the effect of any fraud. If the election is derailed by un-
ending fraud charges or the grave security situation, it is possible that Afghan leaders could
convene a loya jirga to select a president. Some believe that this process could lead to the
emergence of a Karzai opponent if the Obama Administration exerts influence on behalf of a
challenger. Others say any U.S. interference in any Afghan process could produce a backlash
against the United States.
Another fear among some experts is that Afghan voters will end up selecting a non-Pashtun as
President. While such an outcome could represent a legitimate outcome of a democratic process,
some believe that Afghanistan’s Pashtuns—who view it as their right to rule Afghanistan—will
not accept that outcome and would rise in rebellion.
Congressional Research Service
13
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim Administration
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key
security positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai
reaffirmed as leader by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional
Afghan assembly).
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong
presidency, a rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance
presidential power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men
and women equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are
not “un-Islamic”; allows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter
7, Article 15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential,
provincial, and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-
hereditary position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for 5-year term, held Oct. 9, 2004.
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia
Masud, a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud,
who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the Sept. 11 attacks, and Karim
Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter,
Northern Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female
ran, got about 1%. Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq got 11.7%; and Dostam won
10%. Funded with $90 million in international aid, including $40 million from U.S.
(FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106).
Parliamentary Elections
Elections held Sept. 18, 2005 on Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
stood as individuals, not part of party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower
house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house
(Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). Voting was for one candidate only, although
number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to
33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11
seats each. The body is 28% female (68 persons), in line with the legal minimum of 68
women - two per each of the 34 provinces. Upper house appointed by Karzai (34
seats, half of which are to be women), by the provincial councils (34 seats), and
district councils (remaining 34 seats). There are 23 women in it, above the 17
required by the constitution. Because district elections (400 district councils) were
not held, provincial councils selected 68 on interim basis. 2,815 candidates for
Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5
million registered. Funded by $160 million in international aid, including $45 million
from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 109-13).
Provincial Elections/
Provincial elections held Sept. 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections.
Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial
District Elections
council sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats
are 420, of which 121 held by women. l3,185 candidates, including 279 women. Some
criticize the provincial election system as disproportionately weighted toward large
districts within each province. District elections not held due to complexity and
potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Cabinet
Full-term 27 seat cabinet named by Karzai in December 2004. Heavily weighted
toward Pashtuns, and created new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. Rahim Wardak
named Defense Minister, replacing Northern Alliance military leader Mohammad
Fahim. Qanooni not in cabinet, subsequently was selected Wolesi Jirga Speaker.
Northern Alliance figure Dr. Abdullah replaced as Foreign Minister in March 2006.
Cabinet reshuffle in October 2008 including appointment of Muhammad Hanif Atmar
as Interior Minister.
Next Elections
Presidential and provincial elections to be held Aug. 20, 2009. Parliamentary, district,
and municipal elections to follow in 2010. Each election to cost $200 million.
Congressional Research Service
14
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations
Clan/Tribal
Location Example
Confederations
Durrani
Qandahar
Popalzai
Qandahar
Hamid Karzai, President of
Afghanistan; Jelani Popal,
head of the Independent
Directorate of Local
Governance
Alikozai Qandahar
N/A
Barakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Ghul Agha Shirzai
(Governor, Nangarhar
Province)
Achakzai Qandahar,
Helmand
Noorzai
Qandahar
Noorzai brothers, briefly in
charge of Qandahar after the
fall of the Taliban in
November 2001
Ghilzai
Paktia, Paktika and Khost
Mullah Omar
Ahmadzai
Paktia, Paktika, Khost
Mohammed Najibullah
(pres.1986-1992)
Ashraf Ghani, Finance
Finance Minister 2002-2004
Taraki
Nur Mohammed Taraki
(leader 1978-1979)
Kharoti
Hafizullah Amin (leader,
September - December1979)
Zadran
Paktia, Khost
Pacha Khan Zadran (see
text) ; Insurgent leader
Jalaludin Haqqani
Kodai
Mangal
Paktia, Khost
Ghulab Mangal (Governor of
Helmand Province)
Orkazai
Shinwari
Nangarhar province
Fasl Ahmed Shinwari, former
Supreme Court Chief Justice
Mandezai
Sangu Khel
Sipah
Wardak
Wardak Province
Abdul Rahim Wardak
(Pashtu-speaking
(Defense Minister)
Non-Pashtun)
Afridis
Tirah, Khyber Pass, Kohat
Zaka khel
Jawaki
Congressional Research Service
15
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
Clan/Tribal
Location Example
Confederations
Adam khel
Malikdin, etc
Yusufzais
Khursan, Swat, Kabul
Akozais
Malizais
Loezais
Khattaks
Kohat, Peshawar, Bangash
Akorai
Terai
Mohmands
Near Khazan, Peshawar
Baizai
Alimzai
Uthmanzais
Khawazais
Wazirs Mainly
in
Waziristan
Darwesh khel
Bannu
Source: This table was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information, Research Specialist, CRS. Louis Dupree, and
Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, Edited by: Shah Muhammad Rais, Pashtunistan, 2003. S. Iftikhar Hussain, Some Major
Pukhtoon Tribes Along The Pak-Afghan Border, Area Studies Center, University of Peshawar, Pakistan, 2000.
Brigadier Haroon Rashid, The History of the Pathans, Vol 1: The Sarbani Pathans, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2002. N/A
indicates no example is available.
Congressional Research Service
16
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
Figure 1. Afghanistan Ethnic Groups
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Acknowledgments
The table of major Pashtun tribes was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist CRS.
Congressional Research Service
17