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Š‘›Š’—DZȱŽ˜›–ǰȱŽŒž›’¢ǰȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
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Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Š‘›Š’—DZȱŽ˜›–ǰȱŽŒž›’¢ǰȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
ž––Š›¢ȱ
After instability during the late 1990s, Bahrain undertook substantial political reforms, but the
Shiite majority continues to simmer over the Sunni-led government’s perceived manipulation of
laws and regulations to maintain its grip on power. In late 2008, tensions again manifested as
large demonstrations and some arrests of Shiite opposition leaders. Smaller but frequent incidents
of violence continue.
Underlying the unrest are lingering Bahraini government fears that Iran is supporting Shiite
opposition movements, possibly in an effort to install a Shiite led, pro-Iranian government on the
island, which some Iranian political leaders believe should never have become formally
independent of Iran. With few options other than relying on a tacit U.S. security umbrella,
Bahrain has sought to accommodate Iran’s power and interests, in part by signing new energy
agreements with Iran.
Bahrain’s stability has long been a key U.S. interest; it has hosted U.S. naval headquarters for the
Gulf for over 60 years. These facilities—along with the U.S. designation of Bahrain as a “Major
Non-NATO Ally”—imply a U.S. security guarantee to Bahrain, but such a U.S. commitment is
not formal or explicit. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade
agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). This
report will be updated.

˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ

Š‘›Š’—DZȱŽ˜›–ǰȱŽŒž›’¢ǰȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
˜—Ž—œȱ
The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights....................................................................... 1
General Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................... 3
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Economic Relations.............................................................................. 3
U.S. Arms Transfers .................................................................................................................. 5
Other Anti-Terrorism Cooperation ............................................................................................ 5
Economic Relations .................................................................................................................. 5
Relations with Iran and Other Regional Issues ............................................................................... 6
Arab-Israeli Issues..................................................................................................................... 7

’ž›Žœȱ
Figure 1. Bahrain............................................................................................................................. 8

Š‹•Žœȱ
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain................................................................................................. 7

˜—ŠŒœȱ
Author Contact Information ............................................................................................................ 8

˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Śȱ

Š‘›Š’—DZȱŽ˜›–ǰȱŽŒž›’¢ǰȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
‘Žȱ˜•’’ŒŠ•ȱ›žŒž›ŽǰȱŽ˜›–ǰȱŠ—ȱ ž–Š—ȱ’‘œŗȱ
The Al Khalifa family, which is Sunni Muslim, has ruled Bahrain since 1783, when the family’s
arrival ended a century of domination by Persian settlers. Bahrain became independent from
Britain in August 1971 after a 1970 U.N. survey determined that its inhabitants preferred
independence to Iranian control. It is led by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (about 62 years old),
who succeeded his father, Shaykh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa, upon his death in March 1999.
Educated at Sandhurst Military Academy in Britain, King Hamad was previously commander of
the Bahraini Defense Forces (BDF). His son, Salman bin Hamad, about 43 years old, is Crown
Prince. He is U.S.-and U.K.-educated and, as head of the “Economic Development Board,” is
considered a proponent of rapid reform and accommodation with Bahrain’s Shiite majority (about
70% of the 430,000 person citizenry2). The King’s uncle (the brother of the late ruler), Prime
Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, along with hardliners in the royal court and several
ministries, are perceived as skeptical of reform and seeking to repress Shiite Bahrainis.
King Hamad and the Crown Prince have tried to accommodate some Shiite grievances without
risking the regime’s grip on power. In taking that stance, the leadership has failed to alleviate
Shiite unrest or dissatisfaction. The minor political reforms under the King’s father—the
December 1992 establishment of a 30-member appointed Consultative Council to comment on
proposed laws and its June 1996 expansion to 40 members— did not quiet both Shiite and Sunni
demands for the restoration of an elected national assembly (provided for under the 1973
constitution but abolished in August 1975). There was daily anti-government violence during
1994-1998, although the unrest gradually took on a Shiite sectarian character. As Hamad’s first
reform steps after taking over, he changed his title to “King,” rather than “Amir” and implying
more accountability, and held a referendum (February 14, 2002) on a new “national action charter
(constitution).” Elections were held in October 2002 for a 40-seat “Council of Representatives”
(COR).
Members of the Al Khalifa family hold all strategic ministry positions and about half of all
ministerial slots. However, the elected COR and the all-appointed Shura Council—which is of
equal size as the COR—constitute a National Assembly (parliament) that serves as at least a
partial check on government power. The COR can propose (but not actually draft) legislation and
question ministers, although not in public session. It can, by a two-thirds majority, vote no-
confidence against ministers and the Prime Minister and override the King’s veto of approved
legislation, although none of these actions has occurred since the COR was formed. The Shura
Council is formally limited to amending draft legislation and, in concert with the COR, reviewing
the annual budget, but these powers do provide the Shura Council with the ability to block action
by the COR.

1 Much of the information in this section is from State Department reports: 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices (February 25, 2009); Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2006 (April 5, 2007); the
International Religious Freedom Report for 2008 (September 19, 2008); and the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2008
(June 4, 2008).
2 The Shiite community in Bahrain consists of the more numerous “Baharna,” who are of Arab ethnicity and descended
from Arab tribes who inhabited the area from pre-Islamic times. Shiites of Persian ethnicity are less numerous, and
arrived in Bahrain over the past 400 years. They speak Persian and generally do not integrate with the Baharna or with
Sunni Arabs.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
ŗȱ

Š‘›Š’—DZȱŽ˜›–ǰȱŽŒž›’¢ǰȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
In the 2002 election, many Shiite Shiite opposition “political societies” (formal parties are
banned), including Al Wifaq, (the largest political society, led by Shaykh Ali al-Salman),
boycotted the elections on the grounds that the Shura Council is the same size as the elected
COR. The Shiite groupings asserted that this structure gives the government the opportunity to
appoint Shura Council who will serve as a brake on actions of the elected COR, and thereby
dilute popular will. The government has tended to appoint generally more educated and pro-
Western members to the Shura Council. The 2002 boycott lowered turnout (about 52%) and
helped Sunnis win two-thirds of the COR seats. Of the 170 total candidates, 6 were women, but
none were elected.
Sunni-Shiite tensions escalated again in the run-up to the November 25, 2006, parliamentary and
municipal elections, aggravated by the Shiite perception that a once-repressed Shiite majority has
come to power in Iraq through U.S.-backed elections. In the fall of 2006, some Shiite protests
occurred in Bahrain, particularly after allegations—some of which were publicly corroborated by
a government adviser (Salah al-Bandar) in August 2006 in a report to an outside human rights
organization—that the government was adjusting election districts so as to favor Sunni
candidates. It was also alleged that the government issued passports to Sunnis in an attempt to
shift the demographic balance to the Sunnis’ advantage.
In the November 2006 elections, Wifaq and the National Democratic Action Association
participated, raising voter turnout to 72%. The opposition led by Wifaq won 18 seats, virtually all
those it contested. Sunni Islamists (Salafists and Muslim Brotherhood candidates) together won
another 8 seats. Only one woman won (she was unopposed) out of 18 female candidates (down
from 31 female candidates in the 2002 elections). As evidence of continued friction, Wifaq
subsequently boycotted the speakership contest, and incumbent COR Speaker Khalifa al-
Dhahrani was re-elected Speaker. The King named a new Shura Council with 17 Sunnis, 18
Shiites, one Jew and one Christian (both women). Ten total women were appointed to the body. In
a nod to the increased Shiite strength, the government appointed a Shiite as deputy prime minister
and another (who is close to Wifaq) as a Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. In the cabinet, there
were six Shiites and one female minister (Minister of Social Affairs), although a Shiite woman,
Health Minister Nada Haffadh, resigned in October 2007 following allegations of corruption in
her ministry by conservatives who oppose women occupying high ranking positions. Two other
women, including the president of the University of Bahrain, have ministerial rank. In April 2008,
Huda Azar Nunu, a female attorney and the only Jew in the Shura Council, was named
ambassador to the United States.
The resentments over the governments handling of the 2006 election carry over to the current
period, and the government and its opposition are already positioning themselves for the fall 2010
parliamentary elections. In December 2008, the government made numerous arrests of Shiite
demonstrators and accused some of being part of a foreign-inspired “plot” to destabilize Bahrain.
Some were accused off undergoing guerrilla or terrorist training in Syria. On January 26, 2009,
the government arrested three leading Shiite activists, including the handicappped Dr. Abduljalil
Alsingace, and Mr. Hassan Mushaima, both leaders of Al Haq (Movement of Freedom and
Democracy). Alsingace has visited the United States several times to highlight the human rights
situation in Bahrain. They were tried during February-March 2009 but, along with other Shiite
activists, were pardoned and released in early April 2009. It is not clear which, if any, of the
major Shiite movements will participate in the 2010 elections and, if so, whether they would ally
or compete against each other.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Řȱ

Š‘›Š’—DZȱŽ˜›–ǰȱŽŒž›’¢ǰȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
Ž—Ž›Š•ȱ ž–Š—ȱ’‘œȱ œœžŽœȱ
Beyond the politically-motivated discrimination against Shiites, which includes basing Islamic
studies curricula in schools on Sunni jurisprudence and excluding Shiite teachings, State
Department reports note problems for non-Muslims and for opponents of the government. (About
half of the approximately 235,000 expatriates living in Bahrain are non-Muslim.) Bahrain allows
freedom of worship for Christians, Jews, and Hindus although the constitution declares Islam the
official religion.
The Baha’i faith, declared blasphemous in Iran and Afghanistan, has been discriminated against
in Bahrain as well. A Baha’i congregation was repeatedly denied an official license. However, the
State Department human rights report for 2008 (February 2009) said the Baha’i community now
gathers and operates openly. The government requires licenses for churches to operate, and has in
the past threatened to shutter un-licensed churches serving Indian expatriates.
On labor issues, Bahrain has been credited with significant labor reforms, including a 2002 law
granting workers, including non-citizens, the right to form and join unions. The law holds that the
right to strike is a legitimate means for workers to defend their rights and interests, but their right
is restricted in practice, including a prohibition on strikes in the oil and gas, education, and health
sectors. There are about 50 trade unions in Bahrain. On human trafficking, Bahrain was elevated
in the 2008 Trafficking in Persons report to “Tier 2 Watch List,” from Tier 3 in the 2007 report,
because it is “ making significant efforts” to comply with the minimum standards for elimination
of trafficking, but has not shown results, to date.
According to the State Department, the United States seeks to accelerate political reform in
Bahrain and empower its political societies through several programs, including the “Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI).” Economic Support Funds (ESF) were provided in FY2008 to help
build an independent judiciary and strengthen the COR. Other U.S.-funded programs focus on
women’s empowerment, media training, educational opportunities, and civil society legal reform.
MEPI funds have been used to fund AFL-CIO projects with Bahraini labor organizations, and to
help Bahrain implement the U.S.-Bahrain FTA. In May 2006 Bahrain revoked the visa for the
resident program director of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and has not allowed the
office to reopen. Still, NDI is conducting programs to enhance parliamentary capabilities through
a local NGO.
ǯǯȬŠ‘›Š’—ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱŠ—ȱŒ˜—˜–’ŒȱŽ•Š’˜—œřȱ
Defense issues remain a key feature of U.S.-Bahrain relations, although Iraq is no longer a
strategic threat to the region. Iran, on the other hand, is considered a growing threat. A U.S.
Embassy in Manama, Bahrain’s capital, opened in September 1971. In large part to keep powerful
neighbors in check, Bahrain has long linked its security to the United States, and U.S. efforts to
address threats from Iraq and Iran have benefitted from access to Bahraini facilities. February
2008 marked the 60th anniversary of a U.S. naval command presence in Bahrain; MIDEASTFOR
(U.S. Middle East Force), its successor, NAVCENT (naval component of U.S. Central
Command), and the Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in June 1995) have been headquartered there. The

3 Information in this section obtained from a variety of press reports, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA).
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
řȱ

Š‘›Š’—DZȱŽ˜›–ǰȱŽŒž›’¢ǰȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
Fifth Fleet headquarters is a command facility that now covers over 100 acres, and about 1,000
U.S. personnel, mostly Navy, are assigned there. Some smaller U.S. ships (minesweepers) are
docked there, but the Fifth Fleet also consists of a Carrier Battle Group, an Amphibious Ready
Group, and various other ships.
The naval headquarters currently coordinates the operations of over 20 warships performing
support missions for U.S. and allied naval operations related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
including interdicting the movement of terrorists, arms, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-
related technology and narcotics across the Arabian Sea. These operations are part of the ongoing
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan that ousted the Taliban after the September
11 attacks; Bahrain hosted about 4,000 U.S. military personnel during major combat of OEF. In
recognition of the relationship, in March 2002, President Bush (Presidential Determination 2002-
10) designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),” a designation that facilitates U.S.
arms sales.
When the September 11 attacks occurred, the United States already had equipment and personnel
in place in Bahrain. There were about 1,300 U.S. military personnel in Bahrain during the 1990s
to contain Iraq, under a 10-year defense pact signed on October 28, 1991, seven months after the
war to liberate Kuwait from Iraq, and renewed in October 2001. The pact enabled the United
States to access Bahrain’s air bases and to pre-position strategic materiel (mostly U.S. Air Force
munitions). It also requires consultations with Bahrain if its security is threatened, and it
expanded exercises and U.S. training of Bahraini forces.4 Bahrain allowed the United States to fly
combat missions from its bases in both OEF and the war to oust Saddam Hussein in March-April
2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF), and it was the only Gulf state to deploy its own forces to
provide aid to Afghanistan. During OEF and OIF, Bahrain publicly deployed its U.S.-supplied
frigate warship (the Subha) to help protect U.S. ships, and it sent ground and air assets to Kuwait
in support of OIF.
Bahrain’s participation in OIF came despite domestic opposition in Bahrain to that war. U.S.
force levels in Bahrain increased to about 4,500 for OIF (mostly additional U.S. Air Force
personnel). Because of its limited income, Bahrain has not contributed funds to Iraq
reconstruction, but it attended the “Expanded Neighbors of Iraq” regional conference process
which last met in Kuwait on April 22, 2008. On October 16, 2008, Bahrain’s first post-Saddam
Ambassador to Iraq (Saleh Ali al-Maliki) presented his credentials in Baghdad, in line with King
Hamad’s pledge to President Bush in March 2008.
Earlier, Bahrain was part of the allied coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, hosting
17,500 troops and 250 combat aircraft at Shaykh Isa Air Base. Bahraini pilots flew strikes over
Iraq during the war, and Iraq fired nine Scud missiles at Bahrain during the war, of which three
hit facilities there. Bahrain hosted the regional headquarters for U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq
during 1991-1998, and the U.S.-led Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that enforced a U.N.
embargo on Iraq during 1991-2003.

4 Details of the U.S.-Bahrain defense agreement are classified. Some provisions are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S.
Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects
(U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March
2002, p. 27.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Śȱ

Š‘›Š’—DZȱŽ˜›–ǰȱŽŒž›’¢ǰȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
ǯǯȱ›–œȱ›Š—œŽ›œȱ
Congress and successive Administrations, citing Bahrain’s limited income, have supported
military assistance to Bahrain’s small BDF of about 11,000 personnel. It is eligible to receive
grant “excess defense articles” (EDA). The United States transferred the FFG-7 “Perry class”
frigate Subha as EDA in July 1997. In 1996, the United States gave Bahrain a no-cost five-year
lease on 60 M60A3 tanks; title subsequently passed to Bahrain. Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) was suspended for Bahrain in FY1994 but restarted in appreciation of Bahrain’s support in
OEF and OIF. Recent FMF has been provided to help Bahrain maintain U.S.-origin weapons, to
enhance inter-operability with U.S. forces, to augment Bahrain’s air defenses, to support it’s F-16
fleet, and to improve counter-terrorism capabilities.
Despite limited funds, Bahrain has purchased some U.S. systems. In 1998, Bahrain purchased 10
U.S.-made F-16Cs from new production, worth about $390 million. In 1999, the United States
sold Bahrain 26 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to arm the F-16s,
although some Members were concerned that the AMRAAM sale could promote an arms race in
the Gulf. Section 581 of the FY1990 foreign operations appropriation act (P.L. 101-167) made
Bahrain the only Gulf state eligible to receive the STINGER shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile,
and the United States has sold Bahrain about 70 Stingers since 1990. (This authorization has been
repeated in subsequent legislation.) To allay congressional concerns about possible U.S.
promotion of missile proliferation in the region, an August 2000 sale of 30 Army Tactical Missile
Systems (ATACMs, a system of short-range ballistic missiles fired from a multiple rocket
launcher) included an agreement for joint U.S.-Bahraini control of the weapon. Among recent
sales notified to Congress by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) are a sale, worth
up to $42 million, of 180 “Javelin” anti-armor missiles and 60 launch units; a sale, worth up to
$252 million, of nine UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters; and a sale, notified August 3, 2007, of six
Bell search and recovery helicopters, valued at about $160 million. Under the State Department’s
“Gulf Security Dialogue,” begun in 2006 to counter Iran, a total of about $20 billion worth of
U.S. weapons might be sold to the Gulf monarchy states, although only a small portion is
reportedly slated for Bahrain.
‘Ž›ȱ—’ȬŽ››˜›’œ–ȱ˜˜™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ
The State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2008 (released April 2009) credits
Bahrain for having “actively monitored terrorism suspects” and for achieving convictions of five
men accused of membership of a terrorist organization—the first use of a 2006 counterterrorism
law. The report, however, notes that Bahrain has not completely overcome legal constraints that
have sometimes hampered its ability to detain and prosecute suspected terrorists. Bahrain also
continues to host the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA/FATF)
secretariat and cooperates with U.S. efforts against terrorism financing and money laundering.
Œ˜—˜–’ŒȱŽ•Š’˜—œȱ
Like the other Gulf states, Bahrain is affected by the international financial crisis of 2008-9, but
perhaps to a lesser extent than the wealthier states of Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Bahrain
did not experience the construction and real estate “bubble” to the degree that this occurred in, for
example, UAE, and the bursting of which is now harming the economies of UAE and some of the
other Gulf states. Bahrain has the lowest oil and gas reserves of the Gulf monarchy states,
estimated respectively at 210 million barrels of oil and 5.3 trillion cubic feet of gas. Bahrain has
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
śȱ

Š‘›Š’—DZȱŽ˜›–ǰȱŽŒž›’¢ǰȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
diversified its economy by emphasizing banking and financial services (about 25.5% of GDP). At
current rates of production (35,000 barrels per day of crude oil), Bahrain’s onshore oil reserves
will be exhausted in 15 years, but Saudi Arabia shares equally with Bahrain the 300,000 barrels
per day produced from the offshore Abu Safa field. The United States buys virtually no oil from
Bahrain; the major U.S. import from it is aluminum. To encourage further reform and signal U.S.
appreciation, the United States and Bahrain signed an FTA on September 14, 2005. Implementing
legislation was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169).
Ž•Š’˜—œȱ ’‘ȱ ›Š—ȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž›ȱŽ’˜—Š•ȱ œœžŽœȱȱ
Bahrain perceives Iran as willing and able to support Shiite groups against Bahrain’s Sunni-
dominated government, a concern that has been heightened by the Shiite-Sunni sectarian violence
in Iraq. In December 1981, and then again in June 1996, Bahrain publicly accused Iran of trying
to organize a coup by pro-Iranian Bahraini Shiites (the Islamic Front for the Liberation of
Bahrain, IFLB).
Bahrain’s fears are amplified by lingering suspicions, sometimes fed by Iranian actions, that Iran
never accepted the results of the 1970 U.N. survey giving Bahrain independence rather than
integration with Iran. Those findings were endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 278,
which was ratified by Iran’s parliament. After these official determinations, Bahrain had
considered the issue closed, after over a century of Persian contestation of Bahraini sovereignty.
Those contests included an effort by Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran in the 1930’s to deny Bahrain the
right to grant oil concessions to the United States and Britain.
In recent years, Bahrain’s leadership—and other countries in the region—have reacted strongly
against statements by Iranian editorialists and advisers to Iranian leaders appearing to reassert
Iran’s claim. One such example was a July 2007 Iranian newspaper article reasserting the Iranian
claim to Bahrain. However, that article, along with the Bahraini Crown Prince’s November 3,
2007 comment that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon (Iran claims it is developing only civilian
nuclear power), did not mar the visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad on November 17, 2007,
which resulted in a preliminary agreement for Bahrain to buy 1.2 billion cubic feet per day of
Iranian gas via an undersea pipeline to be built. However, this deal has been suspended after
comments in March 2009 by former Iranian parliament speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, now an
advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, referring to Bahrain as Iran’s 14th province. Iran’s Foreign
Ministry immediately tried to limit any diplomatic damage by asserting respect for Bahrain’s
sovereignty and independence, but some Arab governments sharply criticized the Nateq Nuri
comments. Morocco broke relations with Iran as a response.
Still, as shown by Bahrain’s willingness to explore major energy projects with Iran, Bahrain does
not seek to antagonize Iran. Bahrain conducts relatively normal trade with Iran and hosts Iranian
economic investments. In March 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice sanctioned Future Bank,
headquartered in Bahrain, because it is controlled and partially owned by Iran’s Bank Melli. The
sanctions, under Executive order 13382 (anti-proliferation), prevent U.S. citizens from
participating in transactions with Future Bank and require the freezing of any U.S.-based bank
assets.
˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ
Ŝȱ

Š‘›Š’—DZȱŽ˜›–ǰȱŽŒž›’¢ǰȱŠ—ȱǯǯȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ
ȱ
›Š‹Ȭ œ›ŠŽ•’ȱ œœžŽœȱ
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain participated in the 1990-1996 multilateral Arab-Israeli talks,
and it hosted a session on the environment (October 1994). Bahrain did not follow Oman and
Qatar in exchanging trade offices with Israel. In September 1994, all GCC states ceased enforcing
secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel while retaining the ban on direct trade (primary boycott).
However, in conjunction with the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Bahrain dropped the primary boycott and
closed boycott-related offices in Bahrain. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY1994/1995 (P.L. 103-236, Section 564(1)) banned U.S. arms transfers to countries that
maintain the Arab boycott of Israel, but successive administrations have waived the ban for all the
GCC states on national interest grounds. Islamist hardliners in Bahrain have accused the
government of trying to “normalize” relations with Israel, citing the government’s sending a
delegate to the November 27, 2007 summit on Middle East peace in Annapolis, the Foreign
Minister’s meeting with Israeli officials at U.N. meetings in September 2007, and by proposing
(in October 2008) a “regional organization” that would group Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the Arab
states. That proposal has not been implemented to date. Bahrain generally defers to Saudi Arabia
on the Arab-Israeli dispute and has not taken a leading role in recent Arab-led efforts on the
January 2009 Hamas-Israel war in Gaza and its aftermath, the effort to reconcile Hamas and
Fatah to rebuild Palestinian unity, or to formulate a unified response to the new government in
Israel that does not explicit endorse a “two-state” solution to resolve the Israel-Palestinian
dispute.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain
($ in millions)

FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09 (Est.)
FMF
90.0 24.6 18.847 15.593 14.998 3.968 19.5
IMET
0.448 0.600

0.649 0.651 0.616 0.619 .650
NADR
1.489
2.761
.776
1.24
.800
“Section 1206”
5.3
24.54

Notes: IMET = International Military Education and Training Funds, used mainly to enhance BDF military
professionalism and promote U.S. values. NADR = Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related
Programs, used to sustain Bahrain’s counterterrorism capabilities and interdict terrorists. Section 1206 are DOD
funds used to train and equip Bahrain’s coastal patrol forces and develop its counter terrorism assessment
capabilities. (Named for a section of the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act.)
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Figure 1. Bahrain

Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html.


ž‘˜›ȱ˜—ŠŒȱ —˜›–Š’˜—ȱ

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612




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