Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring
Countries
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
May 20, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34261
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Summary
Russian oil and natural gas industries have become key players in the global energy market,
particularly in Europe and Eurasia. Another trend has been the increasing concentration of these
industries in the hands of the Russian government. This latter phenomenon has been accompanied
by an increasingly authoritarian political system, in which former intelligence officers play key
roles.
Russian firms have tried to purchase a controlling stake in pipelines, ports, storage facilities, and
other key energy assets of the countries of central and eastern Europe. They need these assets to
transport energy supplies to lucrative western European markets, as well as to secure greater
control over the domestic markets of the countries of the region. In several cases where assets
were sold to non-Russian firms, Russian firms cut off energy supplies to the facilities. Russia has
also tried to build new pipelines to circumvent infrastructure that it does not control. Another
objective Russia has pursued has been to eliminate the energy subsidies former Soviet republics
have received since the fall of the Soviet Union, including by raising the price these countries pay
for natural gas to world market prices.
It is not completely clear whether the pursuit of Russian foreign policy objectives is the primary
explanation for the actions of its energy firms. Few would disagree in principle that the
elimination of subsidies to post-Soviet countries is a sound business decision, even if questions
have been raised about the timing of such moves. Even the pursuit of multiple pipelines can be
portrayed as a business decision. On the other hand, many countries of the region are concerned
that Russia may use their energy dependency to interfere in their domestic affairs or to force them
to make foreign policy concessions. Countries of the region also fear that by controlling energy
infrastructure in their countries, Russian energy firms are able to manipulate the internal political
situation by favoring certain local businessmen and politicians. However, the current global
economic crisis has hurt Russia’s energy firms and Russia’s international clout, as energy prices
have tumbled.
Bush Administration officials repeatedly criticized what they view as Russian efforts to use its
energy supplies as a political weapon. The Obama Administration, like its predecessor, has urged
European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian energy. The United States has strongly
advocated the building of multiple pipelines from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe.
Members of Congress have also expressed concern about the impact on European countries of
their dependence on Russian energy. In the 111th Congress, committees have held hearings that
have touched on the issue. Congress has also passed resolutions that refer to worrisome aspects of
Russian energy policy. Related CRS products include CRS Report RL33212, Russian Oil and
Gas Challenges, by Robert Pirog, and CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy
Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin.

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Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Russia’s Oil and Gas Industries and Russian Foreign Policy ........................................................ 1
Gazprom............................................................................................................................... 2
Russian Oil Companies ......................................................................................................... 3
Russia’s Objectives: Exploiting Dependency or Just Good Business? .................................... 4
Selected Recent Cases................................................................................................................. 7
Ukraine................................................................................................................................. 7
Moldova ............................................................................................................................. 10
Georgia ............................................................................................................................... 11
Baltic States ........................................................................................................................ 12
Belarus ............................................................................................................................... 13
Armenia.............................................................................................................................. 14
U.S. Policy................................................................................................................................ 14
U.S. “Pipeline Diplomacy”.................................................................................................. 15
Obstacles to U.S.-Supported Pipelines........................................................................... 17
Other Policy Issues ............................................................................................................. 19
Congressional Response...................................................................................................... 20

Figures
Figure 1. Pipeline Map.............................................................................................................. 22

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 22

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Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Introduction
In recent years, Members of Congress, Administration officials, and analysts have noted the
dependence of many European countries on Russian energy. They have expressed concern that
Russia is using this energy dependence as part of a larger effort to limit the sovereignty and pro-
Western orientation of vulnerable neighboring countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.
In addition to bolstering the sovereignty of these countries, the United States has also had a vital
interest in keeping strong ties with NATO and EU member states. Some observers believe that
these relations could be harmed in the long term if many of these states became too dependent on
Russian energy.
In 2004, the European Union depended on Russia for 29% of its natural gas consumption and
26% of its oil.1 However, this figure conceals the fact that this dependence is unequally
distributed. Some EU countries, many of them in central and eastern Europe, are dependent on
Russia for most or all of the oil and natural gas they consume. For example, the Baltic states are
entirely dependent on Russia for natural gas. Non-EU countries bordering Russia are also
overwhelmingly or entirely dependent on Russian oil and natural gas.2 Moreover, EU countries
are likely to become more dependent on natural gas supplied by Russia in the future, as deposits
in the North Sea decline. In 2006, 42% of the EU’s natural gas imports came from Russia and
33% of its oil imports.3
This report begins with a brief discussion of the Russian oil and gas industries, including their
efforts to purchase energy infrastructure in central and eastern Europe and reduce energy
subsidies to neighboring countries. A second section deals with the impact of recent Russian
energy policy on neighboring countries, all of them formerly part of the Soviet Union, de facto or
de jure, and all heavily dependent on Russian energy imports. Many of these countries are
concerned about what they see as Russian efforts to manipulate that dependency to achieve
political goals. A final section deals with U.S. efforts to promote the energy security of these
countries and on Congress’s response to the issue.4
Russia’s Oil and Gas Industries and Russian
Foreign Policy
Russian oil and natural gas industries are increasingly important players in the global energy
market, particularly in Europe and Eurasia. Russia has by far the largest natural gas reserves in
the world, possessing over 30% of the world’s total. It is the second largest oil producer and is
eighth in the world in reserves, with at least 10% of the global total. Another key trend has been

1 “EU Energy Policy Data,” European Commission Document SEC(2007)12, January 10, 2007.
2 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Country Brief: Russia, April 2007, from the EIA
website http://www.eia.doe.gov.
3 EU Energy and Transport in Figures, Statistical Pocketbook 2009, at
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/statistics/doc/2009_energy_transport_figures.pdf
4 This report focuses on Russian oil and natural gas industries, due to their central importance to the countries
concerned. Other energy issues, such as Russia’s nuclear power industry, as well as electricity and coal exports, are not
dealt with in this report.
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the concentration of these industries in the hands of the Russian government in the past decade.
This latter phenomenon has been accompanied by an authoritarian political system under the tight
control of President Vladimir Putin, a former officer of the Soviet KGB intelligence service. Both
the leadership of Russian oil and gas firms and the Russian government are dominated by former
members of the Russian intelligence service, now called the Federal Security Service (FSB), or
are personally close to Putin, or both. For example, the head of the state oil company Rosneft is
Igor Sechin, Putin’s deputy chief of staff and formerly from the FSB. The head of the Russian oil
pipeline monopoly Transneft is a former FSB officer who served with Putin in East Germany in
the 1970s. Key posts at the state-controlled natural gas monopoly Gazprom are staffed by former
KGB/FSB men.
In late 2007, Putin designated First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev (whose functions
included overseeing Gazprom) as his successor. Medvedev was elected president of Russia in
March 2008, in a vote viewed by many observers as not free and fair. Medvedev, although a close
Putin associate, is not a former FSB officer. After Medvedev took office, Putin took the post of
Prime Minister.
The personal and political fortunes of Russia’s leaders are tied to the energy firms, as Russia’s
economic revival is due in large part due to the massive revenues generated by energy exports.
However, many experts believe that the Russian leadership’s state-oriented approach may be
counterproductive for Russia in the long run, as output growth in Russian oil and gas fields is
stagnating, despite rising international demand. They say Russia’s oil and gas industries will
likely need foreign investment and expertise, more efficient management, as well as less
government regulation and taxation. The current global economic crisis has hurt Russia’s energy
firms, Russia’s economy, and Russia’s international clout, as energy prices have tumbled.
Gazprom
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the largest firm in Russia has been the state-
controlled natural gas monopoly Gazprom. (The Russian government holds just over 50% of its
shares.) It has a monopoly on gas pipelines in Russia. It controls nearly 90% of Russian gas
production and over a quarter of the world’s reserves of natural gas. Its impact within Russia is
even more significant. It is the single largest contributor to the Russian government’s budget,
providing about 25% of tax receipts. It also controls banks, industrial holdings, farms, and media
outlets.
Gazprom has been useful domestically to Russian leaders. It provides most of its production at a
loss (at prices much lower than those in Europe) to Russian companies and consumers, who often
cannot or will not pay, thereby helping to ease social pressures. In exchange for subsidizing
Russian domestic consumers, Gazprom receives a virtual monopoly on exports to richer
customers abroad. Two-thirds of Gazprom’s revenue comes from European customers. Many
experts say Gazprom needs to substantially increase domestic prices for gas if it is ever to become
a viable business. Russia has agreed to gradually increase some domestic gas prices to bring them
closer to world market levels by 2011. The move was taken in response to EU criticisms of the
price subsidy in negotiations over Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).5

5 EIA Country Brief: Russia, April 2007, from the EIA website http://www.eia.doe.gov.
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Gazprom’s key current gas fields are in decline, its infrastructure is aging, and substantial
investment will be needed just to maintain current, nearly stagnant production levels. Most
foreign observers believe Gazprom could use foreign investment to provide expertise and capital.
In late 2005 Russia abolished the “ring fence” that barred foreigners from owning Gazprom
shares. Foreign ownership of Gazprom shares is modest; the largest foreign investor is the
German firm E.ON, with a 6% stake.6
However, Gazprom’s actions in other areas appear to point toward more state control and not
toward more foreign investment. For example, in 2006, Gazprom bought out half of the interest
of Shell and other foreign companies in the Sakhalin-2 gas field project at a very low price after
the Russian government found alleged environmental problems in Shell’s management of the
project. In June 2007, the Russian-British TNK-BP oil firm was forced to sell its Kovytka gas
field in Siberia cheaply to Gazprom, after Gazprom refused to approve an export route for the
gas.
Russian Oil Companies
In the 1990s, the Russian government did not have a large stake in Russian oil production. The
major oil companies were controlled by politically well-connected businessmen, dubbed
oligarchs. This policy changed in 2003, when Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of the giant Yukos oil
firm, was arrested on tax evasion and other charges. However, most observers believe that the real
reason for the arrest was that President Putin believed Khodorkovsky was showing unacceptable
signs of political independence from the Kremlin. Yukos was hit with government claims for back
taxes and declared bankrupt. In 2004, its key oil field assets were bought very cheaply by the
Russian state-owned oil firm Rosneft. The Yukos affair is not the only example of this trend. In
2005, Gazprom bought another major oil company, Sibneft, from oligarch Roman Abramovich, at
a cut-rate price. The firm is now called Gazprom Neft. After the move, the Russian government
controlled over 30% of Russia’s oil production.7
In 2006, Putin said that the state would not take control of additional Russian oil companies.
However, the strengthening of state control over the industry may be conducted by other means.
The Russian government has placed pressure on foreign oil companies to sell their stakes in
lucrative Russian oil fields to Russian state firms. The non-state oil firms that remain, such as
Lukoil, are careful to retain close connections to Russian political leaders, in order to retain
control of their businesses.
Despite increasing direct and indirect state control, Russian oil firms continue to seek ties to
foreign oil companies, provided that they are satisfied with a minority stake. ConocoPhillips has a
10% share in Lukoil. State-owned Rosneft floated shares on the London Stock Exchange in 2006.
BP, the Malaysia state firm Petronas, and China’s NCPC bought shares accounting for 7.5% of
Rosneft’s total capital.
In addition to increasing control over oil production, the government controls Russia’s oil and
refined product pipelines, through the state firm Transneft. This monopoly gives the Russian
government leverage against Russian private firms, foreign investors and foreign countries, if

6 “France Wants Stake in Russia Gas Giant,” Reuters news agency, October 10, 2007.
7 “Peter Finn, “Russian Giant Expands Control of Oil,” Washington Post, September 29, 2005, D06.
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needed. For example, Transneft is the largest shareholder in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium
(CPC). The CPC pipeline carries oil from Kazakhstan to the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the
Black Sea. This gives Russia a near monopoly on the transport of Kazakh oil destined for western
markets. Other members include ExxonMobil and Chevron, which are involved in the
exploitation of the Kazakh oil fields. In addition, Moscow has presented the Western oil
companies with repeated financial demands, and threatening them with legal proceedings for
allegedly unpaid taxes to Russia if they do not comply.8
Russia’s Objectives: Exploiting Dependency or Just Good
Business?
Through its energy firms, Moscow has pursued several objectives in recent years. Russia has tried
to purchase a controlling stake in pipelines, ports, storage facilities, and other key energy assets of
the countries of central and eastern Europe. Russia needs these assets to transport energy supplies
to Western European markets, as well as to secure greater control over the domestic markets of
the countries of the region. In several cases where energy infrastructure was sold to non-Russian
firms, Russia cut off energy supplies to the facilities.
Russian firms have attempted to buy energy infrastructure in western European countries,
provoking unease in the EU. The EU has pressed Russia to open up its pipelines to western firms
and to provide stronger protections for foreign investment in Russia’s energy sector. Russia has
flatly rejected EU demands that it ratify the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, which enshrines these
principles. EU efforts to include the key components of the Energy Charter into a new Russia-EU
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) have also been stymied. The EU Commission has
proposed an EU energy policy that would prohibit energy-producing companies from owning
distribution networks. It would also bar foreign companies from investing in EU distribution
networks, unless that country permitted such investment in its own networks. Russia has strongly
criticized the Commission proposal.
EU countries have also been concerned about Russian actions to coordinate export policy with
other natural gas-producing countries such as Algeria, evoking the specter of a cartel, or “gas
OPEC.” Russia has also hinted that the bulk of Russian energy exports could be provided to
China instead of Europe in the future, once new pipelines to Asia are completed. However, it is
unclear whether the EU can adopt an effective common policy on the Russian energy question.
Central and eastern European countries within the EU want the EU to take a stronger stance
against dependence on Russia for energy.
On the other hand, energy companies and other influential voices in countries such as Germany
and Italy have forged close links with Moscow in order to secure access to Russian energy
supplies and opportunities to invest in Russian energy projects. They assert that a mutual
dependence exists between Russia and consuming countries. They note that roughly two-thirds of
Russia’s export revenues and half of its state budget comes from oil and gas exports. They insist
that the current system of gas pipelines and long-term gas supply contracts gives Russia little
choice but to sell its gas exports to Europe.9 Many European countries are less dependent on oil

8 For more on Russia’s oil and natural gas industries, see CRS Report RL33212, Russian Oil and Gas Challenges, by
Robert Pirog.
9 For more on EU energy policy, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by
(continued...)
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supplies from Russia, as they can draw on a more flexible global oil market, with the oil delivered
from tankers.
Facing difficulties in securing control of energy infrastructure in central and eastern Europe,
Russia has tried to bypass countries in the region entirely where possible. It is expanding the use
of the Baltic Pipeline system and its oil terminal at the port of Primorsk and reducing the use of
oil terminals in the Baltic states, such as Butinge in Lithuania and Ventspils in Latvia. In addition,
Russia is considering pipeline projects involving Murmansk and other ports in northern Russia.
Gazprom has started preliminary work on the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP), also known
as Nord Stream, which would transport natural gas from Russia to Germany via a pipeline under
the Baltic Sea starting as early as 2012, bypassing the states of central and eastern Europe. It
would have a capacity of 55 billion cubic meters per year.
In November 2007, Gazprom and the Italian firm ENI signed an agreement to build a “South
Stream” gas pipeline that would run from Russia to Turkey, through the Balkans, with branches to
Austria and Italy. Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary have also signed on to the project. It was
originally projected to have a capacity of 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. Russia hopes to
complete South Stream in 2015. South Stream would bypass Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, and other
central European countries. In May 2009, ENI and Gazprom agreed to expand South Stream’s
capacity to 63 bcm per year.
Another possible project is Yamal-Europe 2. This long-proposed pipeline, which would parallel a
currently-operating one, would run through Belarus and Poland, bypassing Ukraine. The pipeline
is unlikely to be built, as the Russian government and Gazprom have rejected Belarusian
proposals to reactivate the Yamal-Europe 2 plans. However, if Nord Stream does not come to
fruition, it is at least possible the Yamal-Europe 2 plan could be reactivated.
By seeking a range of transit routes through the region, Russia may be trying to reduce the
leverage that transit countries, including those in central and eastern Europe, have in negotiations
with Russian energy firms. Experts note that the capacity of these new routes, if built, would
likely outstrip Russia’s capacity to produce oil and gas to fill them, allowing Russia to allocate
scarce production to “favored” transit countries. Russia may also be trying to reduce the
attractiveness of other routes for oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan and Central Asia to Europe
and Asia that would bypass Russia.10
Another objective Russia has pursued has been to eliminate the energy subsidies former Soviet
republics have received since the fall of the Soviet Union, including by gradually raising the price
these countries pay for natural gas to world market prices.11 These actions may be seen as
paralleling the reduction of subsidies to Russian domestic consumers. However, Russia has also
used the withdrawal of price subsidies and the unpaid energy debts of countries in the region as
leverage to try to secure key energy infrastructure in those countries.

(...continued)
Paul Belkin.
10 Vladimir Socor, “South Stream; Gazprom’s New Mega-project,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, June
25, 2007.
11 Keith C. Smith, “Russian Energy Pressure Fails to Unite Europe,” CSIS Euro-Focus, January 24, 2007.
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It is not clear whether the pursuit of Russian foreign policy objectives is always the primary
explanation for the actions of its energy firms. Few would disagree in principle that the
elimination of subsidies to post-Soviet countries is a sound business decision, even if questions
have been raised about the timing of such moves. In support of their actions, Russian leaders
point to the fact that Russian allies such as Armenia and Belarus have also been subject to energy
price hikes. The pursuit of multiple pipelines can also be portrayed as a business decision,
although some analysts disagree about its wisdom. They assert that Russia would do better to
invest in boosting production rather than building pipelines that it may not be able to fill as its
current oil and gas fields decline.
On the other hand, many countries of central and eastern Europe are concerned that Russia may
use their energy dependency to interfere in their domestic affairs or force them to make foreign
policy concessions. Gazprom’s increases in energy prices to Georgia and Ukraine came after
elections brought to power pro-Western leaders in what were termed respectively the “Rose” and
“Orange” Revolutions, in reference to their campaign symbols. Analysts have asserted that
Russian leaders feared so-called “color revolutions” elsewhere in the former Soviet countries that
could reduce Russia’s influence, and even perhaps threaten Russia’s own authoritarian regime.
Countries of the region also fear that by controlling energy infrastructure in their countries,
Russia is able to manipulate the internal political situation by favoring certain local businessmen
with participation in local business ventures of Gazprom or other Russian energy firms. These
businessmen are in a position to assume a powerful political role themselves or bribe politicians
to do Moscow’s bidding.12
Critics of Russian policy say Moscow’s motives become even clearer when viewed in the context
of other actions to apply pressure to neighboring states. For example, Moldova’s economy was
seriously harmed by a wine import ban Russia imposed, ostensibly for health reasons from 2005
to 2007. Georgia has been hurt by Russian immigration restrictions and a wine ban. Both
countries have also faced problems with Russian support for breakaway regions on their
territories. Russia’s August 2008 military assault on Georgia and its subsequent recognition of the
independence of breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia sent a powerful signal to
Russia’s neighbors about the costs of angering Moscow. NATO and EU member Estonia suffered
from cyberattacks that may have been instigated by Russia, in the wake of a controversy over the
removal of a Soviet-era military statue from Estonia’s capital in April 2007. Russia’s critics also
point to Russia’s “National Security Strategy to 2020,” released in May 2009, which states that
“the resource potential of Russia” is one of the factors that has “expanded the possibilities of the
Russian Federation to strengthen its influence on the world arena.”13
While Moscow is often charged with using energy policy to pursue foreign policy goals, it may
also at times use foreign policy issues to benefit its energy firms. In January 2008, the Russian
natural gas monopoly Gazprom reached an agreement with Serbia to buy NIS, the Serbian
national oil company at what some observers believed to be a below-market price. Gazprom may
have been able to achieve this in part due to Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica’s
appreciation for Moscow’s strong opposition to independence for Serbia’s Kosovo province.

12 Testimony of Zeyno Baran before a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on “Central and Eastern Europe:
Assessing the Transition,” June 25, 2007.
13 The text of the National Security Strategy can be found at the website of the Russian National Security Council at
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html
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Selected Recent Cases
The countries discussed in this report have all faced the impact of Russian energy policy. All are
heavily or entirely dependent upon Russia for their natural gas and oil imports. They face
common issues of cost (transition to world market prices), reliability of supplies, and Russian
efforts to control downstream infrastructure such as pipelines, refineries, and domestic
distribution networks. The countries differ in their geopolitical orientation. Ukraine, Moldova,
and Georgia are non-EU, non-NATO countries that have had a pro-Western orientation that
Moscow opposes. The Baltic states are EU and NATO members, but Russia maintains a strong
hold on their energy sectors. On the other hand, Belarus has been Russia’s most loyal supporter in
Europe, while Armenia has been a strong ally of Moscow in the south Caucasus region.
Ukraine
Although it possesses modest oil and natural gas reserves of its own, Ukraine is dependent upon
Russia for most of its oil and natural gas, both from Russia’s own oil and natural gas fields and
from Russian-controlled pipelines from Ukraine’s suppliers in Central Asia, especially gas from
Turkmenistan. In 2006, half of Ukraine’s energy consumption came from natural gas. Sixty-six
percent of Ukraine’s domestic natural gas consumption came from Russia. In 2006, Russian oil
imports accounted for 78% of Ukraine’s oil consumption. 14 Most Ukrainian homes are heated by
natural gas. Ukraine’s steel and other heavy industries, which play a key role in Ukraine’s
exports, are highly inefficient users of energy. However, Ukraine’s vulnerability to Russian
pressure has been mitigated by the fact that the main oil and natural gas pipelines to central and
western Europe transit its territory. Ukraine’s gas pipeline system has a capacity of 120 billion
cubic meters per year. Ukraine owns the sections of the pipelines that run through its territory as
well as large gas storage facilities. Ukraine has received transit fees from Gazprom, paid partly in
gas and partly in cash. According to a 2006 report of the International Energy Agency, 84% of
Russia’s gas exports and 14% of Russian oil exports pass through Ukraine.15
Energy issues have played a key role in Russian-Ukrainian relations since the breakup of the
Soviet Union in 1991. Russian firms supplied energy to Ukraine at prices far below market rates.
In the early 1990s, these firms cut off supplies to Ukraine at times due to unpaid energy debts.
Energy sales have been conducted by non-transparent intermediary institutions, offering the elites
of both countries opportunities to profit.
Until recently, Ukrainian foreign policy tried to strike a balance between improving ties with the
West, including nominal support for Euro-Atlantic integration, while not offending Moscow.
However, in 2005 Viktor Yushchenko was elected President of Ukraine, overcoming the previous
regime’s attempts at electoral fraud, in what was termed the “Orange Revolution.” Russian
leaders, who had strongly backed his opponent, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, reacted
angrily to Yushchenko’s victory. Yushchenko, Ukraine’s first clearly pro-Western leader, said
Ukraine would conduct serious reforms so that it could join NATO and the European Union as
soon as it was ready.

14 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Country Brief: Ukraine, August 2007; and Country
Brief: Russia, May 2008, both from the EIA website http://www.eia.doe.gov.
15 International Energy Agency, Ukraine Energy Policy Review 2006; from the IEA website at
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2006/ukraine2006.pdf
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Soon after Yushchenko took office, Gazprom started to demand a sharp increase in the price of
natural gas that it supplied to Ukraine. By the end of 2005, Gazprom demanded a price increase
for its natural gas from $50 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) to $230 per tcm, the current market
price. When Ukraine rejected this proposal, Russia cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine on
December 31, 2006. Ukraine then diverted to its own use some of the gas that Gazprom intended
for European customers. After western European governments protested sharply, Gazprom
resumed gas deliveries on January 2. Two days later, the Russian government and Gazprom
reached an agreement with Ukraine for ensuring gas supplies to Ukraine. The agreement called
for gas to be purchased by Ukraine through an intermediary firm, RosUkrEnergo. This firm paid
for gas from Central Asia at a price lower than market levels, and adds gas from Russia at market
prices, and provided it to Ukraine at an average price of $95 per tcm. The agreement also
provided for higher transit fee payments to Ukraine (now entirely in cash rather than partly in
gas).
Perhaps more troubling for Ukraine, the accord called for the creation of UkrGazEnergo, a joint
venture between RosUkrEnergo and the Ukrainian state-controlled gas firm Naftogaz that grants
the former access to one-half of Ukraine’s domestic market. Ukraine’s intelligence service
reportedly believes the owners of RosUkrEnergo are using their control over energy supplies to
secure ownership of energy intensive industries such as fertilizer plants and a titanium plant.16
Some analysts are concerned about possible involvement of organized crime groups in
RosUkrEnergo, as well as corrupt links with Russian and Ukrainian officials. The U.S. Justice
Department reportedly investigated the firm.17 Nominally, Gazprom owns 50% of RosUkrEnergo,
Ukrainian businessman Dimitry Firtash owns 45%, and another Ukrainian businessman owns 5%.
In 2005, Ukranian Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, who was an important player in the
natural gas industry in the 1990s, called for the elimination of RosUkrEnergo as a middleman.
She was dismissed by Yushchenko in September 2005, in a move that some observers believed
was aimed in part at appeasing Gazprom and its supporters within the Ukrainian government.
Yanukovych’s party won Ukraine’s March 2006 parliamentary elections, and Yanukovych once
again become Prime Minister. Gazprom’s discussions with the Yanukovych government in late
2006 went more smoothly than those of the previous year. In 2007, Russia and Ukraine agreed on
a moderate increase in the natural gas price. The two sides agreed to gradually increase the price
of Russian natural gas to Ukraine over the next five years, until it reaches the world market price.
Some observers have seen Gazprom’s tough attitude toward Ukraine in the 2005 negotiations and
its relatively benign stance in 2006 as evidence that Russia has manipulated the gas issue to
undermine Yushchenko. In September 2007, Putin appeared to verify this view when he said that
Russia had no desire to provide cheap energy to “Orange” forces.18
On September 30, 2007, Ukraine held closely contested parliamentary elections. On October 2, as
the vote count showed a narrow victory by “Orange” parties, Gazprom announced that it would
reduce gas supplies to Ukraine, if Ukraine did not pay outstanding debts to Gazprom by the end

16 Roman Kupchinsky, “Russia/Ukraine: Pipeline Conflict Resurfaces,” Radio-Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline,
June 28, 2007.
17 Glenn R. Simpson and David Crawford, “Supplier of Russian Gas Draws Investigation,” Wall Street Journal, April
21, 2006, 1. For background on the gas crisis, see CRS Report RS22378, Russia’s Cutoff of Natural Gas to Ukraine:
Context and Implications, by Jim Nichol, Steven Woehrel, and Bernard A. Gelb.
18 The Times of London, September 15, 2007, 4.
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of the month. Gazprom officials hinted that Ukraine’s energy debts could be solved if it turned
over shares in the gas pipeline system to Gazprom as payment. However, the crisis was resolved
when the Ukrainian government agreed to provide gas in Ukrainian storage facilities as payment.
Gazprom and the outgoing Yanukovych government agreed to a natural gas price of $179.50 per
thousand cubic meters (tcm) for 2008, a 38% increase over 2007, but still well short of world
market levels. Nevertheless, the percentage increase was double that given to neighboring
Moscow ally Belarus.
In December 2007, Yuliya Tymoshenko was elected by the new Ukrainian parliament as Prime
Minister. She has vowed to remove RosUkrEnergo and UkrGazEnergo from Ukraine’s gas
market. In January 2008, Prime Minister Tymoshenko took a first step in this direction by sharply
reducing the amount of gas UkrGazEnergo could sell to Ukrainian consumers. The role of
middlemen in the Ukrainian gas market may also be reduced by market forces. RosUkrEnergo’s
profits are based on selling cheap Central Asian gas at higher prices to Ukraine. In March 2008,
Gazprom agreed with Central Asian gas supplies to pay “European prices” for their gas in 2009.
Gazprom reduced gas supplies to Ukraine by 50% on March 3-5, 2008, over disagreement on the
price Ukraine should pay for gas delivered in January and February 2008. Ukrainian gas company
officials warned that they might divert gas intended for Western Europe to offset Gazprom’s
supply cut. The two sides reached agreement on March 5 and supplies were restored. On March
12, the two sides agreed to eliminate UkrGazEnergo from the domestic gas trade, but gave
Gazprom direct access to the most lucrative part of Ukraine’s domestic market – supplies to large
enterprises. The agreement said the fate of RosUkrEnergo would be determined by future
negotiations. However, Tymoshenko appeared dissatisfied with parts of the accord. She remained
determined to eliminate RosUkrEnergo as soon as possible. The Ukrainian government made
significant unilateral changes to the agreement, including barring RosUkrEnergo from the
profitable practice of re-exporting Central Asian gas from Ukraine to other markets.
On January 1, 2009, the state-controlled Russian natural gas firm Gazprom halted gas supplies to
Ukraine after the two sides failed to reach agreement on several issues, including a debt allegedly
owed by Ukraine to Gazprom and the price that Ukraine would pay for gas supplies for 2009. The
cut-off was supposed to affect only supplies for Ukraine; Russia continued to send gas through
Ukraine destined for other European customers. However, within a few days, Russia accused
Ukraine of diverting these supplies for its own use, and by January 6 cut off all deliveries through
Ukraine to the rest of Europe. The European Union sharply criticized the cut-off, calling for a
rapid resumption of supplies, but refused to take sides in what it termed a commercial dispute.
Many large European countries (including Ukraine) did not suffer greatly from the cut-off,
despite frigid temperatures, due in part to substantial amounts of gas in underground storage
facilities. However, some countries, particularly in the Balkans, were hit hard. Negotiations
between Russia and Ukraine repeatedly broke down, with each side accusing the other of bad
faith and trying to enlist European support for its views. Finally, on January 18, Russia and
Ukraine reached an agreement, and gas supplies to Europe resumed on January 20th.
According to the agreement, RosUkrEnergo was eliminated as a middleman in the gas trade. In
the first quarter of 2009, Ukraine was charged $450 per tcm, more than double what it paid in
2008 for gas. However, Ukraine was able to avoid this price increase by using supplies it had in
storage until the gas price declined in the second quarter to $271 per tcm, as the sharp drop in oil
prices was reflected in natural gas prices. The poor financial situation of Naftogaz and its
customers, as well as the devastating impact of the global economic crisis on Ukraine, could lead
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to further gas crises this year, as Gazprom has threatened to cut off supplies again if it is not paid
the full amount it is owed each month. Gazprom can also fine Naftogaz if it does not buy a
minimum amount of gas. However, Russia has so far declined to impose such fines. The tariffs
charged by Ukraine for Russian gas transit to Europe will remain at current below market levels
for 2009, but will be reset to full market rates in 2010.
Russia pursued a long-standing goal of ownership of Ukraine’s natural gas pipelines and storage
facilities, as well as its local gas distribution network. In February 2007, Putin announced that he
and Prime Minister Yanukovych had agreed on joint Russian-Ukranian control of Ukraine’s
natural gas assets, in exchange for a Ukrainian stake in Russian natural gas fields. However, this
statement provoked a strongly negative reaction in Ukraine, and the parliament quickly approved
a law banning any transfer of control of the pipelines by a vote of 430-0. Russia has tied possible
support for upgrading Ukraine’s pipeline network to greater Gazprom ownership of Ukraine’s
pipeline system.
Prime Minister Putin sharply criticized as “ill-considered and unprofessional” a March 23, 2009,
agreement between the EU and Ukraine that would provide EU assistance to help modernize
Ukraine’s gas pipeline system in exchange for greater transparency by Ukraine in how the system
is run. Additional funding for the project is expected to come from the World Bank, European
Investment Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Russian officials
said that any agreement about Ukraine’s pipelines should include Russia. Russia’s anger may be
caused by fears that the EU plan could foil Russia’s efforts to secure control of Ukraine’s
pipelines in exchange for modernizing the network.
Balked in its efforts to control Ukraine’s pipelines, Russia is also working on ways to bypass
Ukraine’s gas transport system, at least in part. It is developing new energy export routes through
the Baltic Sea (Nord Stream) and the Balkans (South Stream) to western Europe by 2012 in the
case of Nord Stream and 2015 in the case of South Stream. If successful, these efforts could
reduce Ukraine’s leverage over Russia on energy issues. Indeed, some observers believe the May
2009 deal between the Italian firm ENI and Gazprom to double the capacity of South Stream was
a response to the March 2009 EU-Ukraine pipeline agreement.
Moldova
Moldova is the poorest country in Europe, according to the World Bank. It is entirely dependent
upon Russia for its energy resources, and also as a market for the wine and agricultural products
that are its main exports. In 2005, Russia restricted wine and other agricultural imports from
Moldova, allegedly over health concerns, dealing a very heavy blow to the country’s economy.
Russia has stalled on implementing pledges to end its embargo on Moldovan wine, still citing
health concerns. In addition, Russia has supported a breakaway regime in the Transnistria region
of the country, including by deploying 1,500 troops there.
In part due to its vulnerable position, Moldova has tried to balance ties between Moscow and
Western countries. However, since 2003, Moldovan leaders, despairing of striking a deal with
Moscow over the Transnistria problem, have sought greater engagement with the West, irritating
Russia. Perhaps even more irksome to Moscow, in 2005, Moldova, with EU help, began to
tighten its customs policies to stop profitable smuggling operations from Transnistrian territory.
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Powerful groups in Ukraine and Russia have profited from the Transnistria regime’s activities.
Russia provides subsidies to Transnistria, which include grants and loans as well as subsidized
energy. In return, Russian firms have received stakes in Transnistrian businesses.19
Russia has pressured Moldova on the issue of energy supplies. On January 1, 2006, the Russian
government-controlled firm Gazprom cut off natural gas supplies to Moldova, after Moldova
rejected Gazprom’s demand for a doubling of the price Moldova pays for natural gas. Gazprom
restored supplies on January 17, in exchange for a price increase from $60 per 1,000 cubic meters
to $110. Moldova also agreed to give Gazprom, already the majority shareholder, Transnistria’s
13% stake in MoldovaGaz, which controls Moldova’s natural gas pipelines and other
infrastructure (Moldova had earlier ceded majority control to Gazprom in exchange for settling
Moldova’s gas debts). As a result of the agreement, Gazprom now holds 63.4% of MoldovaGaz’s
shares and has control of Moldova’s domestic gas infrastructure. It is planned that the price
Moldova will pay for gas will be increased until it reaches the price paid by EU member states in
2011. Moldova paid $318 per 1,000 cubic meters in early 2009. However, the global economic
crisis has since resulted in a drop in the price of Moldova’s gas supplies. Gas supplies to Moldova
were cut off during the January 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis, and were restored afterwards.
Georgia
Georgia began to follow a clearly pro-Western orientation after the “Rose Revolution” of
November 2003, which swept out of power political forces with close ties to Russia after they had
tried to use electoral fraud to win legislative elections. Mihael Saakashvili won presidential
elections in early 2004. Georgia is seeking NATO membership. Georgian-Russian relations
deteriorated in the wake of the Rose Revolution. Russia has many ways to pressure Georgia,
including supporting the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and disrupting
economic ties between Georgia and Russia, including in the energy sphere.
In late 2005, Gazprom announced substantial increases in the price of gas shipped to Georgia. In
the winter of 2005-2006, unknown saboteurs bombed gas pipelines in Russia, temporarily cutting
off supplies to Georgia. Gazprom announced in November 2006 that it would cut off gas supplies
to Georgia by the end of the year unless Georgia agreed to a 100% price hike or sold its main gas
pipeline to Gazprom.
However, Georgia’s geographical position neighboring energy-rich Azerbaijan has allowed it to
counter Russian pressure more effectively than other countries. Georgia is a transit state for a
pipeline completed in mid-2006 carrying one million barrels per day of Azerbaijani oil to the
Turkish port of Ceyhan (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or BTC pipeline). Another pipeline completed
in early 2007 initially carries 2.2 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani natural gas to Georgia and
Turkey, lessening their dependence on Russia as a supplier. Another pipeline carries oil from
Baku to the Georgian port of Supsa.20

19 International Crisis Group, “Moldova’s Uncertain Future,” August 17, 2006, from the ICG website
http://www.crisisgroup.org.
20 For more on Georgia, see CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests, CRS Report RL30679, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and
Implications for U.S. Interests, and CRS Report 97-727, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests,
all by Jim Nichol.
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The August 2008 Russian military assault on Georgia resulted in temporary interruptions of some
oil and gas pipeline shipments, but these were soon resumed. Gazprom also continues to supply
Georgia with natural gas. Nevertheless, the conflict demonstrates Russia’s ability to disrupt
pipeline routes through Georgia to European customers, by military means if necessary.
Baltic States
The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are members of NATO and the EU. They have
often had difficult relations with Moscow. About 90% of their oil comes from Russia, and 100%
of their natural gas. They faced Soviet energy supply cutoffs in the early 1990s, as they were
trying to achieve independence and shortly thereafter. They pay world market prices for their
energy supplies.
In the past few years, the main concern in the Baltic states has been Russian efforts to increase
control over the energy infrastructure in their countries. Gazprom has a large equity stake in
domestic natural gas companies of each of the three Baltic countries.21 When Russian takeover
efforts have failed, Russia has cut off energy supplies to Baltic energy facilities. One striking case
involves the Mazeikiai oil complex in Lithuania. Mazeikiai includes a large refinery, the Butinge
maritime terminal, and a pipeline. It is the largest enterprise in Lithuania (accounting for about
10% of Lithuania’s GDP) and provides vitally-needed tax revenue. In 1999, the U.S. firm
Williams International bought a large stake in Mazeikiai and also received the operating rights. In
response, the Russian oil firm Lukoil, which supplied the oil to the refinery, slowed deliveries to a
trickle, making Mazeikiai unprofitable. This led Williams, which had financial problems of its
own, to sell its stake to Yukos in 2002.
Under Yukos, the refinery became profitable again. However, when Yukos later fell afoul of
Russian authorities, and was driven into bankruptcy, Yukos attempted to sell its stake in
Mazeikiai. The Polish oil firm PKN Orlen agreed to buy out Yukos, despite an effort by the
Russian government-controlled oil company Rosneft to purchase the refinery. At the end of July
2006, the Russian government-owned oil transport company Transneft announced that the part of
the Druzhba oil pipeline that supplies Mazeikiai was temporarily shutting down for repairs
following an oil leak. Transneft later said that it would not reopen the pipeline, due to its
unprofitability. Transneft has blocked Lithuania’s efforts to secure supplies from Kazakhstan
through Transneft’s pipelines. Critics charged that once again Russia was manipulating energy
supplies to punish Lithuania for seeking to diversify ownership in its energy sector.22
Another example of a Russian company using its control over energy supplies in an effort to
strong-arm a Baltic country into handing over key infrastructure occurred in January 2003. The
Russian-government controlled Transneft oil pipeline company cut off all oil shipments to the
Latvian oil terminal at the port of Ventspils, after having decreased shipments in late 2002. The
move was a large blow to Latvia, as Ventspils has been important to Latvia’s economy. Transneft
diverted the oil shipments to its own Baltic Pipeline System and the Russian port of Primorsk,
which it controls. Transneft claims that there is no demand for using Ventspils, a claim viewed

21 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Baltic Sea Regional Fact Sheet, July 2006, from the
EIA website http://www.eia.doe.gov.
22 Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 3, Issue 161, August 18, 2006.
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with skepticism by outside observers. Most saw the move as a power play by Transneft to secure
a controlling share of the firm Ventspils Nafta, which operates the oil terminal.23
Estonia has also felt the effects of Russian pressure on its energy supply. On May 2, 2007,
Russia’s state railway monopoly halted delivery of oil products and coal to Estonia in the midst of
a political furor over the relocation of a Soviet war memorial statue from a square in central
Tallinn, Estonia’s capital.24
Belarus
Belarus, under the authoritarian leadership of President Aleksandr Lukashenko, has been
Moscow’s most loyal ally in Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Belarus’s unreformed,
largely Soviet-style economy is heavily dependent on cheap Russian natural gas and oil. Gazprom
long supplied Belarus with energy at Russian domestic prices, providing a large indirect subsidy
to the Lukashenko regime.
However, in 2006, it appeared that Russia had decided to reduce its subsidies to Lukashenko. In
late 2006, Gazprom strongly pressured Belarus to sell to it control of the Beltransgaz natural gas
firm (which controls the pipelines and other infrastructure on Belarusian territory) and other key
Belarusian energy firms, or face the quadrupling of the price Belarus would pay for Russian
natural gas. Gazprom threatened a cut-off in supplies on January 1, 2007, if Belarus did not agree
to pay the higher price. Just hours before the deadline, however, the two sides reached an
agreement that averted a gas shutoff. Belarus agreed to pay more than double what it paid in
2006. Belarus’s natural gas prices were scheduled to rise steadily, reaching world market levels in
2011. Belarus also agreed to sell Gazprom a majority stake in Beltransgaz. Gazprom is paying for
its share in installments until 2010.
After settling the gas dispute, the two countries were soon embroiled in conflict over oil supplies.
In addition to receiving cheap natural gas, Belarus has also benefitted from inexpensive and duty-
free crude oil supplies that are processed at Belarusian refineries. Belarus then sold the bulk of
these refined products to EU countries at a hefty profit. In January 2007, Russia moved to sharply
reduce this subsidy to the Belarusian economy. Russia imposed a tariff on oil exports to Belarus.
Belarus retaliated by increasing transit fees for Russian oil supplies to Western Europe. When
Russia refused to pay, Belarus cut off oil supplies to Western European countries, angering their
governments.
Belarus and Russia ended the crisis by agreeing that Belarus would raise its export duty on crude
and refined oil products to Western Europe to match that imposed by Russia. Russia would then
exempt Belarus from most of the new Russian oil export duty. Perhaps most significantly, Belarus
agreed to hand over to Russia 70% of the proceeds that it receives from its exports of refined oil
products to the Western market. This figure was increased to 85% in 2009. The drop in support
from Moscow has caused Lukashenko to cut some government spending and to look to Western

23 Keith C. Smith, “Russian Energy Pressure Fails to Unite Europe,” CSIS Euro-Focus, January 24, 2007 from the
CSIS website http://www.csis.org/europe.
24 Russian authorities cited track repairs and a shortage of wagons. RFE/RL, Newsline, May 3, 2007.
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banks for loans.25 Increased capacity at its oil terminal at Primorsk may also lead to Russia
reducing its use of the Druzhba pipeline, which runs through Belarus.
Belarus continues to ask Russia to moderate future energy prices. Belarus paid about $148 per
bcm for gas in the first quarter of 2009, far below that charged to Ukraine. Belarus also wants
Moscow to increase the transport fees it pays to Belarus for use of its pipelines to Europe, so far
without success. To hedge his bets, Lukashenko has called for diversification of Belarus’s energy
supplies by imports from such countries as Venezuela, Iran, and Azerbaijan, as well as
development of coal reserves and a nuclear power plant within Belarus.
The world economic crisis has eased Belarus’s energy burden somewhat. Gas prices paid by
Belarus since the second quarter of 2009 have dropped due to the fact that market rates for gas are
tied to those for crude oil, which have plummeted in recent months. However, the crisis may
increase Belarus’s economic dependency in Russia in other ways. Belarus’s foreign exchange
reserves have dwindled as the government has tried to defend the Belarusian rubel, leading it to
request and receive a $2 billion stabilization loan from Russia. Further loans from Russia may
come with conditions that may prove unacceptable to Minsk, such as a demand to sell key firms
to Russian buyers, such as Belarus’s oil refineries.
Armenia
Armenia and Russia have close political and military ties, in large part due to Armenia’s desire
for support in its struggle with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.
However, in early 2006, Russia informed Armenia that it would sharply increase the price it
would have to pay for gas. In May 2006, Armenia agreed to relinquish various energy assets to
Russian firms as partial payment for this price increase. Some critics have alleged that Russia
now has virtual control over Armenia’s energy supplies.
In October 2006, Armenian officials announced that Gazprom would assume effective
management control of an Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline. According to some experts, this
acquisition may indicate Russia’s intent to block use of Armenia as a pipeline route independent
of Russian control. Some of the gas will be used to generate electricity for Iran and Georgia, but
the remainder may satisfy all Armenia’s other consumption needs, removing its dependence on
Russian gas transported via Georgia.26
U.S. Policy
The United States has repeatedly criticized what it has viewed as Russian efforts to use its energy
supplies as a political weapon. During the January 2006 natural gas standoff between Russia and
Ukraine, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack criticized Russia for using “energy for
political purposes.” He stressed that while the Administration supported a gradual increase in
prices to market levels, it disagreed with a “precipitous” increase and cutoff. Secretary of State

25 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Belarus, March 2007.
26 For more on Armenia, see CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests, and CRS Report RL30679, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and
Implications for U.S. Interests, both by Jim Nichol.
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Condoleezza Rice likewise on January 5 stated that Russia had made “politically motivated
efforts to constrain energy supply to Ukraine.”27 In May 2006, Vice President Dick Cheney
criticized Russia’s tactics of “supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation”
against vulnerable countries in the region as “blackmail” and intimidation.”28
In testimony before Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Administration in June
2007, Administration officials cast doubt on the reliability of Russian oil and natural gas supplies
to Europe and criticized Moscow’s “nationalistic interventions in its energy sector.”29 On October
23, 2007, Secretary Rice noted that “we respect Russia’s interests, but no interest is served if
Russia uses its great wealth, its oil and gas wealth, as a political weapon, or that if it treats its
independent neighbors as part of some old sphere of influence.”30 A State Department spokesman
reiterated U.S. opposition to the use of energy supplies as a political weapon after a March 3-5,
2008 gas supply incident between Gazprom and Ukraine.
The Obama Administration has also expressed concerns about European energy security. On
January 22, 2009, after the resolution of the second major Russia-Ukraine gas crisis, a State
Department spokesman said the conflict “underscores the need for transparent, market-oriented
arrangements for the sale and shipment of natural gas and the importance of diversifying energy
supplies.31 In April 2009, the Obama Administration appointed Richard Morningstar as State
Department Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy.
While the United States has been active on the issue of Eurasian energy supplies, skeptics might
argue that key U.S. interests are not at stake, given the fact that the problem is one of European
dependence, not that of the United States. Moreover, the EU and other European countries will
have to be the main players in finding a solution (if they have the will to do so), with the United
States playing a secondary role.
U.S. “Pipeline Diplomacy”
The United States has urged European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian energy
supplies. The United States has strongly advocated the building of multiple pipelines to supply
energy from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe. These projects include the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline), which carries one million barrels per day of Azerbaijani oil to the
Turkish port of Ceyhan. Another important project supported by the United States has been the
South Caucasus Gas Pipeline (SCGP), which taps Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas field.

27 The State Department. Statement, January 1, 2006; Daily Press Briefing, January 3, 2006; Secretary Condoleezza
Rice, Remarks at the State Department Correspondents Association’s Breakfast, January 5, 2006.
28 “Vice President’s Remarks at the Vilnius Conference,” May 4, 2006, from the White House website
http://www.whitehouse.gov.
29 Testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe of Gregory Manuel, Special Advisor to
the Secretary of State and International Energy Coordinator, Matthew Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
European Affairs, and Steven Mann, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs,
June 25, 2007.
30 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Opening Remarks at the Office of the Historian’s Conference on U.S.-Soviet
Relations in the Era of Détente, 1969-1976,” from the State Department website, http://www.state.gov.
31 “Statement on Agreement to Restore Gas Flows to Europe,” January 22, 2009, http://useu.usmission.gov
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In the longer term, through about 2020, the United States supports expanding the SCGP. The
United States also supports the Nabucco pipeline, an EU-sponsored project that would supply
natural gas from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe through Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria,
Romania, Hungary and Austria. It is hoped that the pipeline could start pumping gas by 2014. An
international conference on Nabucco, held in Budapest on January 26-28, 2009, appeared to
enhance the project’s prospects. The European Commission pledged 250 million Euro, the
European Investment Bank 2 billion Euro, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development said it would provide an undetermined amount of financing.
In May 2008, the EU held a summit with leading transit and supplier nations in Transcaucasia and
Central Asia in Prague. The summit agreed to expedite gas and oil supply routes via a “Southern
Corridor.” The summit set the objective of signing an intergovernmental agreement on Nabucco
by the end of June 2009. However, the Central Asian states at the summit declined to commit
themselves to provide gas supplies for Nabucco. Nevertheless, Richard Morningstar, U.S. Special
Envoy for Eurasian Energy, was an observer at the Prague summit and hailed the results achieved
there.
Another U.S.-backed proposal is a Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) gas pipeline. The connection of the
Turkish and Greek gas pipelines was completed in November 2007. The Greek and Italian gas
transport systems are scheduled to be connected by 2012. The Prague Southern Corridor Summit
foresees linking TGI to Nabucco.
Turkey plays a central role in all of these pipeline projects. Turkey limits shipping in the
Bosporus Strait due to environmental concerns. This reduces the potential for tankers to use the
Black Sea to ship oil and gas to European markets. Therefore, supplies from the Caucasus and
Central Asia must cross Turkey’s territory or transit across the Black Sea from the Caucasus in the
east to the Balkans in the west. The United States has supported the American Macedonian
Bulgarian Oil pipeline (AMBO), another Bosporus bypass project. It could supply Caspian oil
from the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas through Macedonia to Albania’s Adriatic port of
Vlore. It is expected to be completed in 2011.
Turkey’s role is also critical in the Nabucco pipeline, which crosses its territory. One factor
holding up Nabucco, observers say, is Turkey’s hard bargaining for favorable terms for its
participation in the project. Turkey may also be playing Russia off against the EU. It is also
considering proposals from Russia to expand the use of its existing Blue Stream pipeline to
Turkey and to build a new pipeline, dubbed Blue Stream 2, alongside it. Such a move could
make Turkey a major player in the gas market, and also hurt the prospects for Nabucco, if such a
pipeline is extended on the Balkans.
The United States has advocated extending an existing oil pipeline that currently runs from the oil
terminal at Odesa in Ukraine to Brody, on the Polish border. This pipeline could then be extended
to Gdansk in northern Poland. However, the project remains stalled due to a lack of financing. At
present, the Odesa-Brody pipeline runs in the reverse direction, pumping Russian oil to Odesa.
In October 2007, representatives of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Ukraine, Romania,
Georgia, and Azerbaijan met with EU and U.S. officials at an Energy Security Conference in
Vilnius, Lithuania to discuss how to reduce the dependence of vulnerable countries on Russian
energy resources and pipelines. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Poland signed an
agreement to fund a feasibility study on the Odesa-Brody extension project. Another proposal at
the conference was a gas pipeline dubbed White Stream, which would provide gas from the
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Caspian through a pipeline under the Black Sea from Georgia to Crimea, in Ukraine. The pipeline
would have to pass over Russia’s Blue Stream pipeline on the seabed.32 In April 2009, Georgia
and the White Stream Pipeline Company signed a memorandum of understanding on the project.
However, it is unclear whether the pipeline can find financing in the current economic climate, or
a source of supply.
U.S. officials have criticized Nord Stream, which would traverse the Baltic Sea floor, supplying
Germany and other western European countries with natural gas, and bypassing the central and
eastern European countries through which the main current pipelines run. The U.S. has supported
discussions by Poland, the Nordic countries, and the Baltic states on alternatives, including
delivering Norway’s expanding gas production to northern Europe via Danish pipelines and by
developing liquified natural gas terminals in Poland and the Baltic states.33 U.S. officials have
also criticized South Stream, saying that it will not reduce dependence on Russian supplies.
Germany supports Nord Stream, as it is looking for a dependable source of natural gas,
particularly after the natural gas and oil crises between Russia and Ukraine and Belarus, which
briefly interrupted supplies in 2006 and 2007. Gazprom owns 51% of Nord Stream, while two
German firms and a Dutch firm own the rest. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder is
chairman of the Nord Stream consortium. On the other hand, the Baltic countries, Poland and
Ukraine have expressed opposition to Nord Stream, fearing that it will give Moscow more
leverage on energy issues with them. Estonia has blocked Nord Stream requests to conduct
surveys in the waters of its exclusive economic zone for the pipeline. Sweden has objected on
environmental grounds to the current path the pipeline would take through its own waters, forcing
the consortium to submit to it another proposed route for approval. The pipeline would also run
through the economic zones of Finland, and Denmark.
Obstacles to U.S.-Supported Pipelines
These U.S. efforts at “pipeline diplomacy” face challenges. The success or failure of these
projects will likely depend more on whether private energy firms find them profitable than on
U.S. diplomatic skill and energy. A particular concern is whether there is enough oil and natural
gas to supply the various pipelines. Russian-supported pipelines appear to have the upper hand
because they have copious supplies available. Their potential profitability makes them tempting
even to central and eastern European countries that are trying to reduce dependence on Russia. In
addition, Moscow can offer them and western European firms participation in exploiting oil and
natural gas fields in Russia.
For example, the prospects for Nabucco are clouded as Moscow has proposed alternative
pipelines on similar routes in order to steer European countries away from full support for the
U.S. and EU-backed projects. South Stream appears to be a direct challenge to Nabucco, and
already has the support of Italy, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary. The Austrian state-controlled
energy firm OMV has agreed to sell a 50% stake in its Baumgarten gas storage and distribution
center. The move could allow Moscow to block Nabucco, as Baumgarten is the planned terminus
of the project.34 In March 2009, in what some observers viewed as another possible effort to

32 Eurasia Daily Report, October 12, 2007.
33 Testimony of Gregory Manuel, Matthew Bryza, and Steven Mann in a hearing before the Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, June 25, 2007.
34 Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 19, 2007.
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block Nabucco, the Russian firm Surgutneftegas acquired from OMV a large stake in the
Hungarian energy giant MOL, a key player in the Nabucco project. The Hungarian government
has supported both Nabucco and South Stream.
Russian firms will hold a majority stake in an oil pipeline under the Black Sea connecting Russia
to Bulgaria’s port of Burgas, then on to Alexandroupolis on Greece’s Aegean coast. It is
scheduled to start construction in 2010. This project could compete with the U.S.-backed AMBO
pipeline project, scheduled for completion in 2011.
It is less clear whether sufficient oil and gas supplies exist for U.S.-supported alternative routes.
The United States is strongly opposed to tapping Iran’s energy resources, due to Iran’s support of
terrorism, its nuclear ambitions, its policy in Iraq, and other factors. Turmoil in Iraq makes it
uncertain whether supplies can be drawn from there in the near future. The main U.S. hopes lie
with Central Asia and Azerbaijan. However, Moscow retains strong levers of influence over oil-
rich Kazakhstan and key natural gas supplier Turkmenistan, including control over the pipelines
transporting most of their current output. In December 2007, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and
Russia signed an agreement to build a new natural gas pipeline from Central Asia along the
Caspian Sea to Russia, in yet another apparent effort to eclipse U.S.-led alternatives. However,
little progress has been made on the project since the initial agreement.
Russia and Iran have imposed another obstacle to U.S.-supported efforts. They have asserted that
no country bordering the Caspian Sea can legally undertake projects such as building a pipeline
on the seabed or drilling for oil and gas there without the consent of all Caspian littoral states.
Although the other littoral states reject the Russo-Iranian view, this position could make potential
investors leery of investing in such a project. Shipments via tanker across the Caspian to Baku
can be increased, but would be more expensive.
On the other hand, given the fact that Moscow has often struck a hard bargain with Central Asian
countries on the use of Russian pipelines, alternative routes may be tempting to them in the
future. Until 2009, Turkmenistan had been forced to sell its gas to Gazprom for less than half of
the price that Gazprom gets when it resells it to European countries. Nevertheless, the
dissatisfaction of Central Asian energy producers with Russia may not necessarily mean that they
will opt for U.S.-supported pipelines to Europe. They are developing pipelines eastward, toward
China and the rest of Asia. Increased transport of energy to Asia through non-Russian pipelines
could have a significant impact on the energy plans of the United States, the European Union, and
Russia.
In March 2008, Gazprom agreed to bring prices it pays for Central Asian gas to European market
levels, starting in 2009. This may make it more difficult for the United States and the EU to
persuade Turkmenistan and other Central Asian countries to provide gas for Nabucco. (On the
other hand, a dispute erupted between Russia and Turkmenistan over responsibility for an
explosion in a gas pipeline in Turkmenistan in April 2009. Subsequently, Turkmen leaders have
said that they are looking to diversify their supply routes. In a possible signal that Turkmenistan
was interested in selling gas to European customers, Turkmen leaders offered an gas exploration
contract to RWE, a German firm that is a key investor in Nabucco.
Azerbaijan is the most eager advocate in the region of the U.S.-supported pipeline plans, but has
the disadvantage that it has only modest amounts of oil and natural gas to export at present. The
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United States hopes that this will change by 2015 or 2016 as Azerbaijan develops its gas fields.35
However, Azerbaijan has shown increasing impatience with delays in the Nabucco project. In
March 2009, Russia and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum of understanding to sell Azerbaijani
gas to Russia. The decision could deal a serious blow to Nabucco, depending on the volumes of
gas that are eventually exported to Russian under the deal.
Other Policy Issues
The Europeans, supported by the United States, may be able to take other steps to diversify their
energy supplies. Oil and natural gas pipelines in Europe run in a mainly east-west direction. More
north-south interconnections within Europe could help to buffer any shortfalls in a particular
region. Larger storage facilities could also be helpful in this regard. European leaders have
endorsed European Commission proposals to enhance interconnections within Europe and
increase storage, but the initiatives remain in the planning stage.
In the longer run, given continued high energy prices, liquified natural gas (LNG) delivered to
terminals throughout Europe may be an economical substitute for natural gas from Gazprom
pipelines. Interconnections and LNG could help create an integrated gas market in Europe,
making it easier for countries to diversify their supplies, rather than rely on long-term contracts
signed with Gazprom, which could allow Russia to play them off against each other for its own
political or economic advantage. Already, LNG (largely from North Africa) makes up 15% of
Europe’s gas imports, and is particularly important for some western European countries. For
example, 65% of Spain’s gas imports are LNG..36 Poland intends to build an LNG terminal on the
Baltic Sea in order to diversity its supplies. For its part, Russia also has its own plans for LNG
exports so that it can sell more gas to Asia and even the United States, and avoid being locked
into Europe as its only customer. U.S. and European officials have stressed the need for countries
of the region to improve energy conservation and develop alternative fuels, although they
acknowledge that these efforts will take time.
Some experts have proposed that the United States and the EU block Russia’s accession to the
World Trade Organization unless it stops political manipulation of energy dependency in
Europe.37 However, negotiations between Russia and the U.S. and EU on Russia WTO
membership have focused on other concerns, such as Russia’s subsidized domestic energy prices
and Russia’s protection of intellectual property rights. Countries from the region that are already
WTO members, such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, could block Russia’s WTO membership
on the basis of energy concerns, but there are no indications so far that they are planning to do so.
In the long run, Russia’s statist, manipulative approach to energy policy may eventually be
moderated by its own needs. Some observers believe that Russia will need Western investment
and expertise to fully exploit new oil and natural gas fields as current ones decline over the next
decade. This may provide an opening for the United States and other countries to persuade Russia
to liberalize its energy sector. Russia’s current control of Central Asian supplies has allowed it to
postpone the massive investments needed to exploit remote areas of its own territory, such as

35 Testimony of Gregory Manuel, Matthew Bryza, and Steven Mann in a hearing before the Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, June 25, 2007.
36 See CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin.
37 Testimony of Keith C. Smith before the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, June 25, 2007.
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Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, and the Far East. However, this may change due to increasing
worldwide demand for energy and the diversification of export routes by Central Asian countries.
On the other hand, the current statist system has provided Russia’s leaders with immense personal
wealth and power, and afforded them the satisfaction of overseeing Russia’s renewed
international strength. They may not want to change this system, even if it might be in Russia’s
long-term interest to do so.
In addition to diplomacy, the United States has other tools to deal with the energy dependency
question. The United States has funded feasibility studies for some pipeline routes through the
Trade and Development Administration (TDA). For example, in August 2007, the TDA provided
$1.7 million for feasibility studies on building both an oil and a gas pipeline across the Caspian
Sea to link to the BTC pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline.38 The Export-Import Bank
has also provided funds for pipeline projects. The United States and EU are working with Ukraine
to develop an energy efficiency action plan for that country. The United States provides small
amounts of aid to the countries of the region to help build their energy security.
Congressional Response
Members of Congress have expressed concern about the impact of Russian energy dependency on
the countries of central and eastern Europe. Members have sharply criticized Russian policy and
called on the European Union to work with the United States in helping these countries diversify
their energy supplies. Senator Richard Lugar has called for a greater NATO role in energy
security issues, including providing emergency energy assistance to member states facing a
sudden energy cutoff.39 Bush Administration officials said NATO could play a greater role in the
security of pipelines and other energy infrastructure, but that broader energy issues are best dealt
with in other venues.
In the 111th Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held hearings on policy
toward Russia in March 2009 and energy security in May 2009. In both hearings, Senator John
Kerry, Chairman of the committee, Senator Lugar, and witnesses before the committee expressed
concern about Russia’s use of energy supplies for political purposes. In February 2009, in a
hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on U.S.-Russian relations, Chairman Howard
Berman and several witnesses criticized Russia’s political use of energy in Europe.
Congress has also passed resolutions that refer to concerns about Russian energy policy. S.Res.
530, in a list of criticisms of Russian policies on the eve of the St. Petersburg G-8 summit in July
2006, expressed disapproval of Russian energy policy toward Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and
other countries. H.Res. 500, passed in July 2007, charged that Russia and other countries in
creating a gas OPEC, and criticized Russia’s use of its gas supplies as a political tool against
Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, and other countries. In July 2008, the Senate passed S.Res. 612,
which called on the United States and other countries to build a constructive relationship with
Moscow at the 2008 G-8 summit, but criticized some Russian policies. It said that “the conduct of
Russian trade and energy policy has created a widespread perception that the Government of the

38 “Promoting Technology in the Oil and Gas Sector,” TDA website, http://www.ustda.gov.
39 “Remarks to the German Marshall Fund Conference,” Congressional Record, December 7, 2006, S11483-S11485.
For a discussion of NATO’s role in Western energy security, see CRS Report RS22409, NATO and Energy Security, by
Paul Gallis, updated regularly.
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Russian Federation is using oil and gas exports and economic policy as a means of political
pressure on countries that seek closer ties with the United States and Euro-Atlantic partners.”
In the 111th Congress, Representative Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.Con.Res. 61, which calls on
Russia’s G8 membership to be conditioned on its compliance with its international obligations
and commitment to democratic standards. The resolution says that the Russian government has
apparently used its energy resources as a political tool against neighboring states, harassed
domestic and foreign energy companies to gain control over these industries; and tried to gain
control over energy infrastructure in Europe in order to dominate European energy markets.
Congress may have the ability to address Russian energy policy in the future if it considers the
issue of permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) for Russia. If Russia is granted membership
in the World Trade Organization, the United States will have to grant Russia PNTR for Russia to
enjoy the benefit of WTO membership in its relations with the United States.
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Figure 1. Pipeline Map

Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration.
Country Brief: Russia, April 2007, form the EIA website http://www.eia.doe.gov

Author Contact Information

Steven Woehrel

Specialist in European Affairs
swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291

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