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Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

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The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is currently being developed by the Army and the Marine
Corps as a successor to the 11 different versions of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV) that have been in service since 1985. There are concerns about the affordability of
JLTVs and its redundancy with other tactical wheeled vehicles. This report will be updated as
events warrant.

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Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
JLTV Program ................................................................................................................................. 1
What Is the JLTV?..................................................................................................................... 1
Program Structure ..................................................................................................................... 1
Program History ........................................................................................................................ 2
Technology Development Contracts Awarded .......................................................................... 2
JLTV Contracts Protested.......................................................................................................... 3
Marines to Opt Out of JLTV Program?..................................................................................... 3
United States and Australia Agree on Joint JLTV Development............................................... 3
Program Cost and Funding........................................................................................................ 4
FY2010 JLTV Budget Request ................................................................................................. 4
Current JLTV Topics ....................................................................................................................... 4
JLTVs Versus MRAPs............................................................................................................... 4
International Procurement of JLTVs? ....................................................................................... 5
Potential Issues for Congress........................................................................................................... 6
JLTV Affordability .................................................................................................................... 6
Marine Corps Concerns with JLTV Weight and Transportability ............................................. 6
JLTV and the Army’s New Vehicle Modernization Program.................................................... 6

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Author Contact Information ............................................................................................................ 7

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The JLTV is an Army-led multi-service initiative to develop a family of future light tactical
vehicles to replace many of the 160,000 HMMWVs used by the armed services today.
HMMWVs, which first entered service in 1985, were developed during the Cold War when
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other anti-vehicle explosive devices were not a major
factor in military planning. The HMMWV’s demonstrated vulnerability to IEDs and the
difficulties and costs experienced in “up-armoring” HMMWVs already in the inventory have led
to renewed emphasis on vehicle survivability. With more than 50% of the Army’s total tactical
wheeled vehicle fleet nearing the end of its useful life, and with the needs of the services to repair
equipment and grow their forces, the JLTV, with its scalable armor protection, is intended to
replace a large portion of the HMMWV fleet. DOD officials have emphasized that JLTVs are not
intended to replace HMMWVs “one for one.”2 The Pentagon envisions HMMWVs remaining in
service for many years to come, and about 3,000 to 5,000 HMMWVs continue to be produced on
an annual basis.
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The JLTV program is a joint Army/Marine Corps effort to develop and produce three categories
of vehicles and associated trailers. Category A JLTVs are intended for general purpose mobility
and would carry a 3,500 lb. payload. Category Bs are intended to serve as infantry carriers,
command and control and reconnaissance vehicles, and weapons carriers and would
accommodate a 4,000 to 4,500 lb. payload. Category Cs are intended to serve as shelter carriers,
prime movers, and ambulances and would carry a 5,100 lb. payload. JLTVs are to be designed
with scalable armor, enhanced suspension, and drive train capability to accommodate future load
carrying capacity. As planned, JLTVs would be more mechanically reliable, maintainable (with
on-board diagnostics), all-terrain mobile, and equipped to link into current and future tactical data
nets. Strategic and operational transportability by ship and aircraft are also key JLTV design
requirements.
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The JLTV is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program.5 The Army bears the overall
responsibility for developing the JLTV through its Joint Program Office within the Army’s Tank,

1 Alan L. Gropman, “Combat Vehicle Sector Could be Headed for Turbulent Times,” National Defense, April 25,
2008, and James P. Miller, “Race is On to Replace Humvee,” Chicago Tribune, June 21, 2008.
2 Kris Osborn, “DOD’s JLTV Becoming an International Effort,” Defense News, August 4, 2008.
3 Information in this section is taken from the Army Product Manager, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle website,
http://peocscss.tacom.army.mil/pmJLTV.html, last visited January 7, 2009, and Marine Corps PEO Land Systems Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle website, http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/peolandssystems/jltv.aspx, last visited January 7,
2009.
4 CRS Report RL34026, Defense Acquisitions: Overview, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz,
provides an extensive discussion of the defense acquisition process.
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Automotive, and Armament Command (TACOM) in Warren, Michigan. Marine participation is
centered on a program office under the supervision of the Program Executive Officer Land
Systems (PEO LS) Marine Corps at Quantico, Virginia.
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In November 2006, the Joint Chief of Staff’s Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC)
approved the JLTV program. On December 22, 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L) signed an Acquisition Decision
Memorandum (ADM) directing the JLTV Program to move from the Concept Refinement Phase
into the Technology Development Phase (TDP) of the DOD System Acquisition Process. The
Army and Marines had intended to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) for Technology
Development Phase as early as October 2007. Concerned with funding adequacy, technical
maturity, and shifting requirements, the Pentagon’s acquisition executive, John Young,
disapproved the issuance of the RFP and directed the Army and Marines to “go back to the
drawing board and develop a robust technology development phase.”6 On February 5, 2008, an
RFP for Technology Development Phase was issued to industry.7 The RFP stated that the
government desired to award three contracts for the JLTV Technology Development Phase. The
RFP stipulated that proposals would be due April 7, 2008, and the TDP would last 27 months.
Contractors would build four test sub-configurations during the first 15 months, followed by 12
months of testing. The Army and Marines planned on issuing technology development contracts
in June 2008, but in order to have sufficient funding for more than two technology development
contracts, DOD requested to reprogram $60 million in FY2008 funds.8
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On October 28, 2008, three awards were made for the JLTV Technology Development Phase for a
total of $166 million. The three industry teams were BAE Systems Land and Armaments, Ground
Systems Division, Santa Clara, CA; General Tactical Vehicles, Sterling Heights, MI—a joint
venture between General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General; and Lockheed Martin
Systems Integration, Oswego, NY.

(...continued)
5 The 12th Edition of the Defense Acquisition University Glossary, July 2005, defines an ACAT 1D program as “a
Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) which is estimated by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) (USD (AT&L)) to require the eventual expenditure for Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $365 million (FY2000 constant dollars) or the procurement of more than $2.19
billion (FY2000 constant dollars).”
6 Jason Sherman, “Pentagon Halts JLTV Competition, Directs Revised Strategy,” InsideDefense.com, September 24,
2007.
7 JLTV Request for Proposal, W56HZV-08-R-0210, February 5, 2008, and Marjorie Censer, “JLTV Solicitation Calls
for Three Contractors: Officials Say More are Possible,” InsideDefense.com, February 5, 2008.
8 Jason Sherman, “Army Seeking Funds to Ensure Three JLTV Contracts; Delay Possible,” InsideDefense.com, July
17, 2008.
9 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from TACOM’s JLTV Program website,
http://contracting.tacom.army.mil/MAJORSYS/JLTV/jltv.htm, updated on November 13, 2008, accessed January 7,
2009, and the Marine Corps PEO Land Systems JLTV website, https//www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/peolandsystems/
jltv.aspx, accessed January 7, 2009.
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On November 7 and November 12, 2008, protests were filed with the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) against the Technology Development contract awards by the Northrop Grumman-
Oshkosh team and the Textron-Boeing-SAIC team alleging that there were “unintended
discrepancies” in how the government rated bids in terms of the criteria of systems maturity,
logistics, and costs.10 As a result of this protest, work on the JLTV program by the three winning
teams was suspended and the JLTV program office expected that it will would take GAO 90 to
120 days (February-March 2009 time frame) to complete its investigative report on the protests.
On February 17, 2009, GAO rejected the JLTV protests and the stop work orders were lifted.
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The Marines are reportedly considering dropping out of the JLTV program because, at its current
estimated weight of 20,000 lb., it does not lend itself to Marine Corps expeditionary operations.
Marine Corps leadership is concerned that the prototypes shown so far by industry are too heavy
to be transported by helicopters and faults industry for failing to stay “apace of the vision” for
JLTV. The Marines do not rule out removing themselves from the program and modifying current
vehicles if developers cannot address their specific requirements. The Army is said to be “moving
ahead” with the JLTV program, appearing less concerned than the Marines that final JLTV
versions will be CH-47 and CH-53 helicopter and C-130 cargo aircraft transportable. The Army
and Marines plan a JLTV program review sometime in June 2009 where vehicle weight concerns
will likely be a topic of discussion.12
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In February 2009, the Pentagon and the Australian Department of Defence signed an agreement
to coordinate the technology development for the JLTV. Under this agreement, 30 JLTV
prototypes will now be developed, with the United States funding the development of 21
prototypes and Australia will fund nine. Australia reportedly has a need for about 1,300 vehicles
with requirements similar to the JLTV, although Australian defense officials note that Australia’s
participation in JLTV technology development does not automatically mean that they will
eventually procure JLTVs. DOD is said to be pursuing similar arrangements with other countries,
and negotiations are ongoing with Israel, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

10 Marjorie Censer, “Following Northrop’s Lead, Boeing-Textron Team Files JLTV Protest,” InsideDefense.com,
November 12, 2008 and Ann Roosevelt, “Textron-Team Protests Army JLTV Awards,” Defense Daily, November 13,
2008; and Daniel Wasserbly, “U.S. GAO Rejects JLTV Protests,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 25, 2009, p. 12 .
11 Marjorie Censer, “Citing Weight, Commandant Says Marines May Have to Depart JLTV Program,”
InsideDense.com, April 29, 2009 and Dan Lamothe, “Weight Issues Aside, Army Sticks With JLTV,” Army Times,
May 18, 2009.
12 Marjorie Censer, “Army, Marines to Review JLTV Program in June,” InsideDefense.com, May 14, 2009.
13 Daniel Wasserbly, “U.S. and Australia to Join Forces on JLTV Programme,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 4, 2009,
p. 12 and Marjorie Censer, “DOD Inks Formal JLTV Agreement with Australia; More Partnerships Planned,”
InsideDefnse.com, February 26, 2009.
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DOD has not publically assigned a definitive cost to the JLTV program, suggesting that it is too
early in the development process to determine an accurate cost estimate. Some defense and trade
analysts suggest that the JLTV program will cost well over $10 billion and possibly as much as
$30 to $70 billion, depending on the final cost of the vehicles chosen and the number of vehicles
procured.15 The Army estimates that each JLTV will cost $418,000, almost 70% higher than the
target cost of $250,000 per vehicle that would have enabled the Army to replace all of its
HMMWV’s with JLTVs. The Army’s current JLTV requirement is 140,709 vehicles, and at the
estimated $418,000 per vehicle cost, the Army may be required to reduce total JLTV acquisition
quantities, scale back JLTV capabilities, or find additional funds for the program. One estimate by
the Center for Army Analysis suggests that it would require about $6.7 billion per year to outfit
all Army brigades over 15 years with JLTVs.
The FY2008 Budget Request for JLTV was $82.3 million in Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (RDT&E) funding, but Congress decreased funding to $38.5 million because of
contract award delays.16 The FY2009 Budget Request for JLTV was $ 66.1 million (RDT&E),
which was fully funded by Congress.17
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The FY2010 Budget Request for JLTVs is $32.1 million for Army Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $58.0 million for Marines Corps RDT&E, for a program total of
$90.1 million. This amount is requested in the Base Budget, and there is no JLTV funding request
in the FY2010 Other Contingency Operations (OCO) Budget Request.
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In late 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD) launched a major procurement initiative to
replace most uparmored High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) in Iraq with Mine-
Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles by FY2009. MRAPs have been described as
providing significantly more protection against IEDs than uparmored HMMWVs. DOD approved

14 Jason Sherman and Daniel G. Dupont, “JLTV Price Tag Drives New Three Step Tactical Vehicle Plan for the
Army,” InsideDefense.com, August 8, 2008.
15 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Companies Jockey for Huge U.S. Military Truck Program,” Reuters, November 12, 2007.
16 Report 110-434, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 3222, Department of Defense Appropriations Act for
FY2008, November 6, 2007, p. 272.
17 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, H.Rept. 110-652, May 16, 2008 and National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, S.Rept. 110-335, May 12, 2008.
18 United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification, May 2009.
19 For additional information on MRAPs, see CRS Report RS22707, Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP)
Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.

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the acquisition of 15,858 MRAPs of all categories.20 When the JLTV program first started in late
2006, the 15,858 MRAP requirement did not exist. The unforecasted procurement of significant
numbers of the costly MRAPs has had an impact on the JLTV program. The Army has stated that
MRAPs “fill a near-term, urgent joint service requirement for enhanced crew protection” for both
the Army and Marines and that JLTVs are the long term solution for the services.21 While the
services do not view the JLTV and MRAP as an “either/or” proposition, some might question the
affordability and necessity of maintaining both programs given their overlapping missions and
requirements.
DOD’s 2008 decision to acquire a new, lightweight MRAP—the MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle, or
M-ATV (in addition to the almost 16,000 MRAPs to be procured by the end of 2009) adds
another dimension to the JLTV versus MRAP debate.22 With anywhere from 2,000 to 10,000 of
these new vehicles to be procured, some analysts suggest that the number of JLTVs to be acquired
could be offset by these M-ATVs. Senior Army officials suggest that the M-ATV effort will not
“clash with JLTV,”23 but other defense officials note a “striking similarity” between the M-ATVs
and JLTVs, suggesting potential redundancies between the two vehicles.24 Other analysts also
suggest that a large M-ATV purchase (closer to 10,000 than 2,000) could affect the number of
JLTVs that the Army eventually purchases.25
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U.S. defense officials have expressed an interest in international involvement in the JLTV
program, and to date, Australia, Britain, and possibly Israel and Canada have indicated that they
may participate in and fund prototypes during the Technology Development phase.26 The
Pentagon’s planned initial purchase of 60,000 JLTVs for the services could be increased if there is
international participation in the program. There are concerns, however, that because of some of
the advanced technologies that may be incorporated into the JLTV, it may prove to be difficult to
obtain export licenses from the State Department.27 Some believe that Congress, too, could play a
role by expressly barring the sale of advance technology JLTVs to foreign governments, as it did
in the recent case of the F-22 Raptor aircraft.28 Others suggest that export problems are not likely
to arise in a light vehicle such as the JLTV, noting that HMMWVs have been sold to numerous

20 Marjorie Censer, “DOD Reports More Than 11,000 MRAP Vehicles Already in Theater,” InsideDefense.com,
August 11, 2008.
21 Statement of Lieutenant General Stephen M. Speakes before the House Air and Land Forces Subcommittee on the
Army Force Protection Program, January 18, 2007, pp. 1-2.
22 Kris Osborn, “DOD Doubles Potential Buy of Lighter MRAPs,” Defense News, November 17, 2008.
23 Emelie Rutherford, “Speakes: Potential MRAP Lite Effort Won’t Clash With JLTV,” Defense Daily, October 9,
2008.
24 Kris Osborn, “What’s Next for JLTV,” Defense News, November 10, 2008.
25 Kris Osborn, “DOD Double Potential Buy of Lighter MRAPs,” Defense News, November 17, 2008.
26 Edmond Lococo and Tony Capaccio, “U.S. Humvee-Replacement Effort May Get Funding from Four Allies,”
Bloomberg.com, October 1, 2008.
27 Kris Osborn, “DOD’s JLTV Becoming International Effort,” Defense News, August 4, 2008.
28 In CRS Report RS22684, Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan, by Christopher Bolkcom and Emma Chanlett-
Avery, CRS notes that export of the F-22 has been denied by Congress in FY1998, FY2001, and FY2005. This
provision, known has the “Obey Amendment,” was debated in the 109th Congress, and a move to repeal this
amendment in the FY2007 Defense Appropriations bill was blocked by the Senate.
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Asian and Middle Eastern countries.29 If JLTV export is permitted and countries order significant
numbers of JLTVs, the per-vehicle cost could possibly decrease, thereby addressing some of the
JLTV affordability concerns raised by U.S. officials.
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In a recent testimony on DOD weapons programs, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
asserted that total acquisition costs for the FY2007 portfolio of major defense acquisition
programs still in the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase increased 26% and
development costs increased by 40% from first estimates.30 As previously noted, while still in the
Technology Development (TD) phase, the Army now estimates that each JLTV will cost
$418,000—almost 70% higher than the target cost of $250,000 per vehicle. In comparison with
GAO’s data, JLTV costs appear to be significantly higher than FY2007 program averages and
could possibly increase even more as JLTV progresses through the SDD phase. JLTV’s early
above-average cost growth may merit greater congressional oversight. With possible foreign
involvement in JLTV development and acquisition, there might be potential cost savings that
could drive down the per unit cost of JLTVs destined for the U.S. military.
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Based on reports, there appears to be concern that JLTVs prototypes under development may
exceed air transportability requirements. Such concerns are not unfounded, given recent
experiences in developing MRAPs and with the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS)31 Manned
Ground Vehicles, which were originally intended to be C-130 transportable but during design
became too large and too heavy to fit on C-130s. Given the Marine’s stated concerns about
industry loosing sight of JLTV’s expeditionary requirements, Congress might wish to review the
current state of JLTV development with DOD and industry to insure that JLTVs remain both
“light” and expeditionary.
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On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates announced that he intended to significantly
restructure the Army’s FCS program.32 The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to accelerate the
spin out of selected FCS technologies to all brigade combat teams (BCTs) but will recommend
cancelling the manned ground vehicle (MGV) component of the program, which was intended to

29 Kris Osborn, “DOD’s JLTV Becoming International Effort,” Defense News, August 4, 2008.
30 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony, Defense Acquisitions: Results of Annual
Assessment of DOD Weapon Programs, GAO-08-674T, April 29, 2008, p. 2.
31 For additional information on the Future Combat System Program, seeCRS Report RL32888, The Army’s Future
Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert, The Army’s Future Combat System
(FCS): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
32 Information in this section is taken from a transcript of Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates Budget Press Briefing,
Arlington, VA April 6, 2009.
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field eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants. Secretary Gates was also critical that the
FCS program did not include a role for Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles that
have been used successfully in current conflicts. After re-evaluating requirements, technology,
and approach, DOD will re-launch the Army’s Vehicle Modernization Program, including a
competitive bidding process. While Army’s new Vehicle Modernization Program will likely focus
heavily on tracked and wheeled combat vehicles, transport vehicles such as the MRAP, M-ATVs,
HMMWVs, and JLTVs will probably also be included. Because of the significance that a new
Vehicle Modernization Program will have on Army force structure, operational capabilities,
procurement, and budget requirements—not just in terms of the JLTV but all Army vehicles—
Congress can be expected to be extensively involved in oversight activities. After DOD and the
Army complete their supporting studies, there is no guarantee that the Army’s current 140,000
JLTV requirement will be included in the new Vehicle Modernization Program.

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Andrew Feickert

Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673

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