Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence
June S. Beittel
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
May 15, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40582
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence
Summary
Drug-related violence in Mexico has spiked in recent years as drug trafficking organizations
(DTOs) have competed for control of smuggling routes into the United States. Drug trafficking
issues are prominent in Mexico because the country has for at least four decades been among the
most important producers and suppliers of heroin, marijuana and (later) methamphetamine to the
U.S. market. Today it is the leading source of all three drugs and is now the leading transit
country for cocaine coming from South America to the United States. Although previous
Mexican governments had accommodated some drug trafficking in the country, when President
Felipe Calderón came into office in December 2006 he made battling the Mexican drug
trafficking organizations a top priority. He has raised spending on security and sent thousands of
troops and federal police to combat the DTOs in states along the U.S.-Mexico border and
throughout the country. In response to the government’s crackdown, the DTOs have responded
with escalating violence.
In recent years, drug trafficking violence in Mexico has claimed thousands of lives and reached a
level of intensity and ferocity that has exceeded previous periods of drug-related violence. The
government’s intensified campaign against the DTOs resulted in changes in the structure of these
criminal organizations. The seven major DTOs in Mexico have reconfigured. The fracturing of
some of the most powerful drug trafficking syndicates and the reemergence of once powerful
DTOs have led to bloody conflict within and among the DTOs. Today a small number of DTOs
control the lucrative drug trafficking corridors through which drugs flow north from Mexico into
the United States and high-powered firearms and cash flow south fueling the narcotics trade.
President Calderón has demonstrated what has been characterized as an unprecedented
willingness to cooperate with the United States on counterdrug measures. In October 2007, both
countries announced the Mérida Initiative to combat drug trafficking, gangs and organized crime
in Mexico and Central America. To date, the U.S. Congress has appropriated a total of $700
million for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative. The program, which combines counternarcotics
equipment and training with rule of law and justice reform efforts, is still in its initial stages of
implementation.
The scope of the drug violence and its location—much of it in northern Mexico near the U.S.-
Mexico border—has been the subject of intense interest in Congress. The 111th Congress has held
more than a dozen hearings dealing with the increased violence in Mexico as well as U.S. foreign
assistance and border security efforts. This report examines the causes for the escalation of the
violence in Mexico. It provides a brief overview of Mexico’s counterdrug efforts, a description of
the major DTOs, the causes and trends in the violence, the Calderón government’s efforts to
crackdown on the DTOs, and the objectives and implementation of the Mérida Initiative and
other measures the U.S. government has taken to support Mexico in its battle with the drug
traffickers. For related information about Mexico and the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report
RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel
and CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy
Issues, by Clare Ribando Seelke and June S. Beittel. For more information on international drug
policy, see CRS Report RL34543, International Drug Control Policy. This report will be updated
as events warrant.
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Contents
Drug Trafficking in Mexico......................................................................................................... 1
Background on Mexico’s Anti-drug Efforts ........................................................................... 2
Major DTOs in Mexico ......................................................................................................... 3
Other Groups and Emergent Cartels ...................................................................................... 5
The Mexican State v. The DTOs............................................................................................ 8
Pervasive Corruption and the Drug Trade .............................................................................. 9
Escalation of Violence in 2008 and 2009 ..................................................................................... 9
Causes for the Spiraling Violence........................................................................................ 10
Location of the Violence and Mexico’s Drug War Strategies................................................ 12
The U.S. Policy Response ......................................................................................................... 14
The Mérida Initiative .......................................................................................................... 15
Implementation of Mérida ................................................................................................... 17
Figures
Figure 1. Mexican DTOs Area of Influence ................................................................................. 7
Figure 2. Map of Mexico............................................................................................................. 7
Figure 3. Cartel-Related Killings 2006-2008 ............................................................................. 10
Tables
Table 1. FY2008 to FY2010 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account ................................ 16
Appendixes
Appendix. Hearings on Increased Drug Violence in the 111th Congress...................................... 19
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 23
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Drug Trafficking in Mexico
Today Mexico is a major producer and supplier to the U.S. market of heroin, methamphetamine,
and marijuana and the major transit country for cocaine sold in the United States. According to
the Department of State’s 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, as much as 90%
of the cocaine entering the United States now transits through Mexico. A small number of
Mexican DTOs control the most significant drug distribution operations along the Southwest
border. The criminal activities of these Mexican DTOs reach well beyond the towns and cities of
the border, extending along drug trafficking routes into cities across the United States. The
Mexican DTOs have exhibited many characteristics of organized crime such as being organized
in distinct cells and controlling subordinate cells that operate throughout the United States.1
In the U.S. Justice Department’s National Drug Threat Assessment 2009 (published in December
2008), Mexican drug trafficking organizations were identified as the greatest drug trafficking
threat to the United States worldwide. Today’s situation arose with the closing of the Caribbean
route through which drugs, and particularly cocaine from Colombia, was channeled to the United
States in an earlier era. With increased U.S. efforts to interdict narcotic smugglers in the
Caribbean and Florida in the late 1980s and 1990s, the Colombian drug cartels began
subcontracting with Mexican DTOs to smuggle cocaine into the United States across the
Southwest border. By the late 1990s, Mexican DTOs had pushed aside the Colombians and
gained greater control and market share of cocaine trafficking into the United States. Mexican
DTOs now dominate the wholesale illicit market in the United States.2
The Mexican DTOs, often referred to as “drug cartels,”3 have become increasingly violent. The
National Drug Threat Assessment states that Mexico’s DTOs now “control most of the U.S. drug
market,” with distribution capabilities in 230 U.S. cities. Mexican President Felipe Calderón
began his assault on organized crime shortly after he took office in December 2006 and made
combating the DTOs a centerpiece of his policy. The Calderón government has devoted billions
of dollars4 to the offensive against Mexico’s entrenched drug trafficking organizations, and
deployed 45,000 soldiers and thousands of federal police in nearly a dozen of Mexico’s states in
the fight.5
1 CRS Report RL34215, Mexico’s Drug Cartels, by Colleen W. Cook.
2 For more information on the history of the drug cartels in Mexico, see CRS Report RL34215, Mexico’s Drug Cartels,
by Colleen W. Cook.
3 The term drug cartel remains the term used colloquially and in the press, but some experts disagree with this because
“cartel” often refers to price-setting groups and it is not clear that Mexican drug cartels are setting illicit drug prices.
4 It is unclear precisely how much the Calderón government spends on security. Estimates of $9 - $11 billion have been
reported. See “On the trail of the traffickers,” The Economist, March 7, 2009. The $11 billion figure (a cumulative
figure since the beginning of the Calderón administration) was provided in remarks of Manuel Suárez-Mier, Legal
Attaché, Embassy of Mexico at “Transnational Criminal Organizations in the Americas: Responding to the Growing
Threat,” A Colloquium at The George Washington University on January 29, 2009. Another article cites the Mexican
government as its source for 2009 spending levels: “This year, the Mexican government will spend $9.3 billion on
national security, a 99 percent increase since Calderón took office.” See, Steve Fainaru and William Booth, “As
Mexico Battles Cartels, The Army Becomes the Law,” Washington Post, April 2, 2009.
5 “Mexico: More Bloodshed,” Economist Intelligence Unit - Business Latin America, January 12, 2009; Steve Fainaru
and William Booth, “As Mexico Battles Cartels, The Army Becomes the Law,” Washington Post, April 2, 2009.
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More than 5,600 people died in drug trafficking violence in Mexico in 2008, more than double
the prior year. This escalation in the level of violence was matched by a growing ferocity.
Beginning in early 2008, there was an increase in assassinations of high-level law enforcement
officials, gruesome murders including beheadings, violent kidnappings, use of a growing and
varied arsenal of high-powered weapons, the indiscriminate killing of civilians and other random
acts of stylized terror. 6 The battle for control of the multi-billion dollar drug trade has been—and
continues to be—brutal. While the U.S. and Mexican media began to shift their attention away
from the sensational crimes allegedly committed by the Mexican DTOs in late spring, the high
numbers of killings have continued to an estimated 2,000 thus far in 2009.
Background on Mexico’s Anti-drug Efforts
For many years, the export of illegal substances to the United States, which shares a nearly 2,000-
mile border with Mexico, was tolerated by the Mexican government. The Mexican government
pursued an overall policy of accommodation, according to numerous accounts.7 Under this
system, arrests and eradication took place, but due to the effects of widespread corruption, the
system was “characterized by a working relationship between Mexican authorities and drug
lords” through the 1990s.8
In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S.-Mexico counternarcotics efforts were often marked by mistrust.
Beginning in 1986, when the U.S. President was required to certify whether drug producing and
drug transit countries were cooperating fully with the United States, Mexico usually was
criticized for its efforts leading to increased Mexican government criticism of the U.S assessment.
Reforms to the U.S. drug certification process enacted in September 2002 (P.L. 107-228)
essentially eliminated the annual drug certification requirement, and instead required the
President to designate and withhold assistance from countries that had “failed demonstrably” to
make substantial counternarcotics efforts.9 In the aftermath of these reforms, U.S. bilateral
cooperation with Mexico on counternarcotics efforts improved considerably during the
administration of Vicente Fox (2000-2006), and combating DTOs has become a priority of the
current Calderón administration.
The election of President Fox in 2000 ended 71 years of one-party rule in Mexico by the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), shifting Mexico toward a more democratic political
system. Fox, of the conservative National Action Party (PAN) believed that a more democratic
regime could lower internal security spending, a policy he pursued during his term in office. 10
Some critics argue the Fox administration’s lack of steady focus on the drug problem led to “lost
6 A grenade attack in Morelia, Michoacan, on Mexico’s Independence Day in September 2008 that took place in a
public square and resulted in eight deaths and more than 100 injured may indicate the indiscriminate killing of civilians
has become a new tactic of the Mexican DTOs. See Stratfor, Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and
Growing Violence, December 11, 2008. Other acts that seem to be an effort to establish a signature of violence such as
placing victims’ severed heads in public places or leaving threatening signs on or near victims’ bodies have proliferated
since early 2008.
7 Francisco E. González, “Mexico’s Drug Wars Get Brutal,” Current History, February 2009; Steven B. Duke, “Drugs:
To Legalize or Not,” Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2009; George W. Grayson, Mexico’s Struggle with ‘Drugs’ and
‘Thugs’, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 331, New York, NY, Winter 2009.
8 Francisco E. González, “Mexico’s Drug Wars Get Brutal,” Current History, February 2009.
9 See CRS Report 98-174, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action, 1986-2002, by K. Larry
Storrs.
10 Jane’s Information Group, “Security-Mexico,” February 20, 2009.
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years” in the battle against the DTOs. Others point to more effective antidrug policies that began
under Fox to build the institutional capacity for an effective counterdrug strategy. Under President
Fox, the federal police force was purged and reorganized and a more aggressive approach was
taken in fighting the DTOs including more arrests, increased seizures of drug shipments and the
extradition of major drug kingpins to the United States. These counternarcotics successes,
however, led to a wave of violence as arrests of DTO leaders resulted in bloody turf battles over
territory, resources and manpower.11
When President Felipe Calderón, (also of the center-right PAN party), won office in December
2006 with a very narrow victory, he made combating the drug cartels a top priority.12 He called
the increased drug violence a threat to the Mexican state and sent thousands of soldiers and
federal police to combat cartels in drug trafficking “hot spots.” Soldiers and federal law
enforcement officials have been tasked with arresting traffickers, establishing check points,
burning marijuana and opium fields, and interdicting drug shipments along the Mexican coasts.
Many have lauded President Calderón’s determination to make battling the DTOs and the
pervasive corruption they engender as a hallmark of his new administration.
In 2008, the government’s crackdown, and rivalries and turf wars among Mexico’s DTOs, fueled
an escalation in violence throughout the country, including in northern Mexico near the U.S.-
Mexico border. In an effort to control the most lucrative drug smuggling routes in Mexico, rival
DTOs have been launching attacks on each other, as well as on Mexican military and police. The
violence, as described in more detail below, has continued in 2009 and is posing a serious
challenge for Mexico’s security forces. Since coming into office in December 2006, President
Calderón has deployed some 45,000 troops and 5,000 federal police along the U.S.-Mexico
border and throughout the country’s interior.13 Over that time, approximately 10,000 people have
been killed in the violence.14 (For a detailed map of the drug killings since 2007 and other data
about the drug war in Mexico, see graphic in the Washington Post at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2009/04/01/GR2009040103531.html).
Major DTOs in Mexico15
The major DTOs in Mexico are all polydrug operations (handling methamphetamine, marijuana,
cocaine and heroin). Figure 1 shows the approximate areas of influence of the major Mexican
DTOs as of May 2009.16 The recent heightened violence suggests there has been a realignment of
11 Francisco González writes: “…the capture of some cartel leaders was tantamount to kicking hornets’ nests without
having the means to spray the rattled insects.”
12 “Fighting Back—Mexico Declares War on Drug Cartels,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1, 2007.
13 Vanda Felbab-Brown, The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia, The Brookings Institution,
Policy Paper, No. 12, Washington, DC, March 2009.
14 Steve Fainaru and William Booth, “As Mexico Battles Cartels, The Army Becomes the Law,” Washington Post,
April 2, 2009. Note reliable statistics on cartel killings remain illusive, with newspapers and other media organizations
in Mexico compiling statistics generally considered to be reflective of the overall situation.
15 This overview of Mexico’s major drug cartels draws extensively from Stratfor, Mexican Drug Cartels: Government
Progress and Growing Violence, December 11, 2008 and Jane’s Information Group, “Security-Mexico,” February 20,
2009. For background on the cartels, see CRS Report RL34215, Mexico’s Drug Cartels, by Colleen W. Cook;
“Mexico-U.S.: The Drug Wars- Dissecting the threat perceived in Washington,” Latin News: Security & Strategic
Review, January 2009.
16 The regions of control shown in Figure 1 are more fluid than indicated because of the continually changing alliances
in this multi-sided conflict.
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control of national markets and transport routes. The seven major cartels that once controlled
Mexico have reconfigured. The major criminal organizations that now are reported to dominate
the market are described below:
Sinaloa Federation and Cartel—In 2008, a federation dominated by the Sinaloa cartel that had
flourished throughout 2007 (which included the Beltrán Leyva Organization and the Carillo
Fuentes or Juárez cartel) broke apart. According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), the federation controlled 66% of the cocaine passing through Mexico to the United
States.17 The Sinaloa cartel itself remains strong and effective in smuggling cocaine from South
America to the United States, but it has lost control of territory in Mexico to its competitors as the
result of the inter-cartel battles during 2008. It is headed by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman,
probably the most wanted drug smuggler in Mexico.18
Gulf Cartel—A year ago, the Gulf cartel was considered the most powerful DTO in Mexico, but
it has been a steady target of the government campaign and now it is “an open question…whether
the cartel is intact.”19 The cartel’s headquarters is the northeastern Mexican state of Tamaulipas.
The suspected leader of the cartel, Osiel Cardenas Guillen, was arrested in 2003. However, he
was not extradited to the United States until 2007. The Gulf cartel no longer controls Los Zetas,
formerly their paramilitary enforcement arm. The relationship today between the Gulf cartel and
Los Zetas remains unclear though it is likely they still cooperate.20
Beltrán Leyva Organization—Until last year, this syndicate was a part of the Sinaloa federation.
As part of the Sinaloa federation, it controlled access to the U.S. border in Sonora state. It has
become independent of the Sinaloa federation and has grown to be one of the most powerful drug
trafficking organizations in Mexico, still controlling large areas of southern Mexico. It is believed
to be responsible for the May 2008, assassination of acting federal police director Edgar Millán
Gomez in Mexico City, and has gone after other high-ranking government officials. This
organization has quickly secured narcotics transport routes in the states of Sinaloa, Durango,
Sonora, Jalisco, Michoacan, Guerrero and Morelos. Their attempt to take territory from their
former Sinaloa partners reportedly unleashed a wave of violence.
Arrellano Felix Organization/Tijuana Cartel—This syndicate, once one of the two most
powerful DTOs,21 was weakened significantly in 2008 by both U.S. and Mexican law
enforcement efforts to capture their highest ranking leadership. The arrest of Eduardo “El Doctor”
Arrellano Felix, in October 2008, the last of the Arrellano brothers to be captured or killed, was
symbolic of its demise. This cartel split into two groups whose conflict for dominance led to
extensive violence in the Tijuana area.
Vicente Carillo Fuentes Organization/Juárez Cartel—This organization is based in Ciudad
Juárez in Chihuahua state, across the border from El Paso, Texas. It operates in much of northern
Chihuahua state and part of Nuevo Leon and Sonora states. Over the past year there has been an
17 Jane’s Information Group, “Security-Mexico,” February 20, 2009.
18 "Mexico drug violence rises on border despite army," Reuters News, May 11, 2009.
19 Stratfor, Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence. December 11, 2008.
20 Ibid.
21 Jane’s Information Group, “Security-Mexico,” February 20, 2009. The article notes: “In the late 1990s and early
2000s, the two dominant organizations were the Juárez cartel, based in the Texas border city of Ciudad Juárez, and its
principal rival the Tijuana cartel, based in the California border city of Tijuana.”
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ongoing violent battle between Sinaloa (their former partner) and this cartel for control of
Juárez.22 The Juárez cartel has a longstanding alliance with the Beltrán Leyva Organization. Some
analysts fear that this once very powerful cartel will again grow in power after splitting from
Sinaloa.
Los Zetas—This group of former military counternarcotics commandos,23 known for its violence
and effective use of tactics and weaponry, has grown in power even though it lost Daniel Perez
Rojas. He was arrested in Guatemala this past year and was allegedly the leader of the group’s
activities in Central America. Los Zetas, since their split with the Gulf cartel, have contracted
themselves to a variety of drug trafficking organizations throughout the country, notably the
Beltrán Leyva Organization. The Zetas who formed as fearsome enforcers for the Gulf cartel have
gained power under suspected Zeta leader Heriberto Lazcano. In 2009, U.S. authorities have
come to believe this organization may be operating as an independent DTO.24
Los Zetas quickly established a reputation as one of the most violent enforcer gangs with
military-level expertise in intelligence, weaponry and operational tactics. Some argue that the
escalation in violence in 2007 and 2008 can be traced in part to them.25 They have also brazenly
engaged directly with the Mexican military in firefights. A previous period of intense Zeta-led
violence was “the cross-border killing spree engaged in by Gulf cartel Zeta operatives in the
Laredo-Nuevo Laredo area during 2004-2005” according to DEA Special Agent Joseph M.
Arabit.26 This precedent for the current “epidemic” of DTO killings in the border region
demonstrates the inherent violence of drug gangs.27 The enforcer gangs employed by the cartels
have gained power as they fill voids in cartel leadership following arrests by the Mexican
government. Los Zetas have reportedly recruited former Guatemalan special forces, Kaibiles, to
join them and have contracted with members of violent Central American gangs, such as Mara
Salvatrucha (MS-13), to act as distributors.
Other Groups and Emergent Cartels
Other enforcer gangs have modeled themselves on the Zetas, but are generally considered less
sophisticated assassins.28 The Sinaloa cartel formed heavily-armed enforcer gangs, the Negroes
and the Pelones, who have battled with the Zetas over contested turf. La Familia Michoacana,
once a criminal group affiliated with the Sinaloa cartel and now described by the DEA as an
22 The violence in Juárez this past year has been extreme with more than 1,600 homicides in 2008. In December, four
policemen in Juárez were killed in a half hour period and one of them decapitated. See coverage in: Tom Miller,
“Twilight Zone,” Washington Post, February 8, 2009.
23 Most reports indicate that Los Zetas were created by a group of 30 lieutenants and sub-lieutenants who deserted from
the Mexican military’s Special Air Mobile Force Group (Grupos Aeromóviles de Fuerzas Especiales, GAFES) to the
Gulf Cartel in the late 1990s. See CRS Report RL34215, Mexico’s Drug Cartels, by Colleen W. Cook.
24 Steve Fainaru and William Booth, “As Mexico Battles the Cartels, The Army Becomes the Law; Retired Soldiers
Tapped to Run Police Forces,” Washington Post, April 2, 2009. See also Samuel Logan, “Los Zetas: Evolution of a
Criminal Organization,” March 12, 2009, available at
[http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Dark_Side_4/Los_Zetas_Evolution_of_a_Criminal_Organization.shtml].
25 Jane’s Information Group, “Security-Mexico,” February 20, 2009.
26 Testimony of Joseph M. Arabit, Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division, Drug Enforcement Administration,
before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies,
March 24, 2009.
27 Ibid.
28 CRS Report RL34215, Mexico’s Drug Cartels, by Colleen W. Cook.
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“emergent cartel,” is active in the struggle for control of drugs arriving from Colombia in the
seaports of Michoacán, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Chiapas states. La Familia was among three DTOs
designated as significant foreign narcotics traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act, on April 15, 2009 by President Barack Obama in advance of his trip to Mexico
to meet with President Calderón.29 Four days after this designation, which imposes U.S. financial
sanctions on group members, the Mexican government arrested an entire party of suspected La
Familia members at a christening hosted by Rafael Cedeña Hernández, allegedly the number two
in the gang.30
DTOs and their violent enforcers have moved into other profitable criminal activities to
supplement their income including kidnapping, human trafficking, extortion and a network of
other illegal businesses. The surge in violence due to inter- and intra-cartel conflict over lucrative
drug smuggling routes or “plazas” has been matched by an increase in kidnapping for ransom
(sometimes ending with the death of the victim) and a brisk business in other criminal enterprises.
Some argue that this diversification into alternative criminal activities may be a sign that U.S. and
Mexican drug enforcement measures are suppressing drug trafficking profits.31
29 The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S.-Mexico Discuss New Approach to Bilateral Relationship,” April 16, 2009.
30 “Gang Warns Church,” Latin American Weekly Report, April 23, 2009.
31 Jane’s Information Group, “Security-Mexico,” February 20, 2009. Stratfor, Mexican Drug Cartels: Government
Progress and Growing Violence. December 11, 2008.
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Figure 1. Mexican DTOs Area of Influence
Source: U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, May 2009, adapted by CRS Graphics.
Figure 2. Map of Mexico
Source: ESRI Community Data, adapted by CRS Graphics.
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The Mexican State v. The DTOs
The growth and dramatic character of the violence, the targeting of civil and law enforcement
officials, and the direct battle with police and military units, have led some observers to question
the strength of the Mexican government, even characterizing it as potentially a “failing” state. A
report released in December 2008 by the U.S. Joint Forces Command argued that Mexico
potentially could face rapid and sudden collapse in the future because the government, its
politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are under sustained assault by criminal gangs and
drug cartels.32 In late March 2009, however, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair
asserted to reporters that “Mexico is in no danger of becoming a failed state.”33 Moreover, during
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s trip to Mexico in March 2009, the Secretary said that the
Mexican government was making “great progress” against the drug cartels, and asserted that she
does not believe “that there are any ungovernable territories in Mexico.”34
Mexican officials have strongly contested the claim that Mexico is a failed or failing state.
Indeed, Mexican officials claim the heightened violence may be a sign that the cartels are losing
ground and turning on each other as their markets shrink.35 Former Director of the U.S. Office of
National Drug Control Policy (2001-2009), John P. Walters, agrees with this assessment.36 The
Mexican government acknowledges that the country does face a significant challenge from well-
financed criminal gangs through violence and corruption, but asserts that the description of
Mexico as a failed or failing state “grossly distorts the facts on the ground.” According to the
government, “by all significant measure, Mexico has a functioning state,” that provides
education, health, security and other government services to millions of people.37
Some observers have noted that the DTOs are not seeking to defeat the state, but rather subvert it.
The competition to control drug trafficking routes frequently puts the DTOs in battles with state
security forces. Effective control of trafficking routes depends upon corrupt government officials
and law enforcement.38 Each year the Mexican drug trafficking organizations repatriate huge
sums of money from drug sales in the United States to Mexico, estimated to range from $15
billion to $25 billion annually.39 Some of this money is used to buy weapons in the United States
to arm the DTOs and their enforcers, while other proceeds are used to corrupt law enforcement
and public officials to enable the DTOs to operate with impunity.
32 United States Joint Forces Command, “The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the
Future Joint Force,” December 2008.
33 Ken Ellingwood, “Clinton: U.S. Shares Blame for Mexico Ills,” Los Angeles Times, March 26, 2009; and “Mexico
Will Not Become ‘Failed State’: U.S. Spy Chief,” Agence France Presse, March 26, 2009.
34 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary
Patricia Espinosa After Their Meeting,” Mexico City, Mexico, March 25, 2009.
35 “On the trail of the traffickers,” The Economist, March 7, 2009.
36 John P. Walters, “Drugs: To Legalize of Not,” Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2009.
37 Embassy of Mexico, Washington, DC. “Mexico and the Fight Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime:
Setting the Record Straight,” March 2009.
38 Jane’s Information Group, “Security-Mexico,” February 20, 2009.
39 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute, The United States and Mexico: Towards a
Strategic Partnership, January 2009.
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Pervasive Corruption and the Drug Trade
The large sums of cash generated by drug sales and smuggled back to Mexico is used to corrupt
Mexican law enforcement and public officials to either ignore cartel activities or to actively
support and protect them. Corruption of local, state and federal police has resulted in Calderón’s
reliance on the military to combat DTOs, and remains a major challenge for U.S.-Mexican law
enforcement cooperation. Corruption of government officials has also been a significant problem
that has made the campaign against DTOs more difficult. In late October 2008, an elite unit
within the federal Attorney General’s office known as SIEDO was implicated in a scandal
involving payoffs for sensitive information about antidrug activities, with at least 35 officials and
agents fired or arrested.40 In November 2008, the former head of SIEDO, Noe Ramirez
Mandujano, was arrested and accused of accepting bribes from a drug cartel. In October and
November of 2008, two former heads of Interpol in Mexico were arrested for alleged ties to the
Sinaloa cartel.41 In early December 2008, President Calderón stated that some 11,500 public
employees had been sanctioned for corruption in the two years since he took office.
Escalation of Violence in 2008 and 2009
While there has been a variance in available statistics on drug-related killings in Mexico, the
overall trend has been a dramatic increase since 2007. Newspapers and other media organizations
track drug trafficking crime by keeping daily tallies which are considered to be representative of
the overall situation.42 At times, the Mexican government and Mexican officials have used
different numbers, but the trend has still been in the same upward direction. For example, in April
2009 the Mexican Attorney General said at a bilateral security forum in Cuernavaca that 5,600
people had been killed in DTO violence in 200843 in contrast to a graphic published on the
Mexican Embassy website which indicates there were more than 6,800 drug-related killings last
year.44
Using as a base the Mexican Attorney General’s statistics of more than 5,600 killed in drug
trafficking violence in 2008, this represented a 110% increase over 2007.45Among those
murdered were 522 Mexican military and law enforcement officials according to recent testimony
of the U.S. Department of State.46 In the first two months of 2009, the violence grew with almost
1,000 drug-related killings in Mexico or 146% more than in the comparable period in 2008.47
According to the same publication, the 1000th murder in 2008 did not take place until April 22
40 Tracy Wilkinson, “Mexico Under Siege: Elite Police Tainted by Drug Gang,” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2008.
41 “Ex-heads of Interpol Mexico to face trial for cartel ties,” EFE News Service, January 19, 2009.
42 Jane’s Information Group, “Security-Mexico,” February 20, 2009.
43 “Calderón scores some successes,” Latin American Regional Report: Mexico & NAFTA, April 2009.
44 Embassy of Mexico, Washington, DC. “Mexico and the Fight Against Drug-Trafficking and Organized Crime:
Setting the Record Straight,” March 2009, available at
http://portal.sre.gob.mx/eua/pdf/SettingTheRecordStraightFinal.pdf.
45 “Mexico-U.S.: The Drugs War—Dissecting the threat perceived in Washington,” Latin American Security &
Strategic Review, January 2009.
46 Testimony of David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs, before the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, Related Programs of House
Committee on Appropriations, March 10, 2009.
47 “Cartels add political dimension to ‘drugs war’,” Latin American Security & Strategic Review, February 2009.
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Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence
(compared to February in 2009), suggesting the pace of killings have continued to rise rapidly.48
(See Figure 3, for the tally of drug killings 2006-2008).
Figure 3. Cartel-Related Killings 2006-2008
6,000
5,000
5,630
4,000
3,000
2,700
2,000
1,000
1,500
0
2006
2007
2008
Source: Mexico City’s daily newspaper, El Universal. Adapted by CRS Graphics.
Causes for the Spiraling Violence
The violence in Mexico has included the assassination of high level government officials as well
as gruesome murders (often carried out with garish one-upmanship) and kidnappings. Mexican
officials have argued that the extraordinary violence has resulted from government successes in
disrupting drug transit routes, and that the violence has been concentrated in a few border cities.
Others have noted less positive trends. The willingness of DTO gunmen to take on the army
directly rather than avoid confrontation has been a pattern in recent encounters.49 Some estimate
that those employed by the major DTOs in Mexico may number up to 100,000 or more,
approaching parity with the Mexican armed forces.50 Moreover, areas of conflict appear to be
48 According to the Latin American Weekly Report: “Already this year, over 2,000 people have been killed by gang
members. This is twice as many as were killed in the same period of 2008. This year, the date at which the 1000th
person was killed by gangsters was 20 February. In 2008 the 1,000 death mark was only passed on 22 April.” See
“Mexican army ‘on streets until 2013,;” Latin American Weekly Report, April 23, 2009.
49 “Cartels add political dimension to ‘drugs war’,” Latin American Security & Strategic Review, February 2009. In
early May 2009, Joaquin Guzman, the billionaire who reportedly heads the Sinaloa cartel threatened a more aggressive
approach toward competitors and U.S. law enforcement, instructing his associates to use deadly force to get deliveries
through and protect drug trafficking operations. See Josh Meyer, “Sinaloa cartel may resort to deadly force in U.S.,”
Los Angeles Times, May 6, 2009.
50 Sara A. Carter, “100,000 foot soldiers in cartels; Numbers rival Mexican army,” Washington Times, March 3, 2009;
Steve Fainaru and William Booth, “As Mexico Battles Cartels, The Army Becomes the Law,” Washington Post, April
2, 2009.
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Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence
spreading into new territory including to the southern border with Guatemala suggesting the
heightened violence may not end soon.51
The DEA reports that inter-cartel conflict (between and among members of different DTOs) and
intra-cartel conflict (between members of the same DTO) have long been associated with
Mexico’s criminal drug enterprises. The new variable is the Calderón government’s crackdown
which in DEA’s assessment has driven “in large measure…the current surge in violence.”52 The
violence and brutality of the Mexican DTOs has escalated as they battle for control of multi-
billion dollar narcotics markets. With the break up of both the Sinaloa federation into competing
groups and the Gulf DTO into two factions (and the suspected transformation of Los Zetas from
largely an enforcer group into a competing cartel), the opportunities for violence have
mushroomed. Conclusions about the current alliances, objectives and the internal structure of the
cartels are difficult to draw because the situation is highly fluid, and, of course, quite secretive.53
Several analysts have characterized 2008 as a year of flux and turmoil as the drug cartels battled
for market dominance and responded violently to their government’s unprecedented campaign
against them. In evaluating the progress of the government crackdown, one think tank’s annual
assessment of Mexico’s drug war concludes: “The increased turbulence in inter-cartel relations
has produced unprecedented levels in violence that shows no sign of abating.”54 The realignment
of Mexico’s drug syndicates in 2008 and their violent turf battles appear to be the result of a
splintering of the so-called Sinaloa federation of DTOs, the split in the Gulf cartel and the
reemergence of DTOs once thought to be obsolete which are battling for control of national
markets and transport routes.55 What was once a bi-polar competition between the powerful Gulf
cartel and the Sinaloa federation has been transformed by the government’s anti-crime initiatives
into significant inter-cartel and intra-cartel violence.
Violence is a tool of the drug trafficking business and the objectives of the violence seem to vary.
Much of the violence has been a result of conflict between the cartels for control of territory, to
punish betrayals and inflict revenge against the government’s successes. Violence is also used to
intimidate government officials, the police and the general public. The cartels prefer to intimidate
and subvert a government rather than to bring it down according to one analysis because an
intimidated government can deflect effective law enforcement initiatives and it allows the drug
cartels to operate largely undisturbed.56 The cartels may also be using violence against the
government to reestablish patterns of protection by corrupt officials that prevailed in much of
Mexico for many years.57
Kidnapping for money has also increased significantly in Mexico. In 2008, 1,028 persons were
kidnapped, 31% of them concentrated in the Federal District and the state of Mexico. Reportedly
51 CRS interview with DEA official on May 6, 2009.
52 Testimony of Joseph M. Arabit, Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division, Drug Enforcement Administration,
before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies,
March 24, 2009.
53 Jane’s Information Group, “Security-Mexico,” February 20, 2009.
54 Stratfor, Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence, December 11, 2008.
55 Ibid.
56 Ray Walser, Mexico, Drug Cartels, and the Mérida Initiative: A Fight We Cannot Afford to Lose, Heritage
Foundation, Executive Summary: Backgrounder No. 2163, Washington, DC, July 22, 2008.
57 Francisco E. González, “Mexico’s Drug Wars Get Brutal,” Current History, February 2009.
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at least 69 of those abducted were murdered.58 The actual number of kidnappings is reportedly far
higher, according to the State Department’s human rights report on Mexico. In August 2008, the
killing of a kidnap victim, Fernando Martí, the 14-year-old son of a wealthy businessman,
resonated throughout Mexico. It prompted demonstrations calling for the government to take
action against the escalation in violence. Kidnapping victims have not only included the rich, but
also working class Mexicans whose families have been asked to pay as little as $500 in ransom.59
In late October 2008, the five-year-old son of a poor family, was kidnapped from a Mexico City
market and then killed by injecting acid into his heart.60 In December 2008, an American anti-
kidnapping negotiator, Felix Batista, was abducted in Saltillo, the capital of the border state of
Coahuila. His fate remains unknown.
Mexican officials have urged the United States to cut off the flow of high-powered guns to the
Mexican DTOs which they believe have also increased the violence. The Mexican government
estimates that 2,000 firearms are smuggled across the Southwest border daily.61 For many
observers, this north-to-south “iron river,” as it has been called, has arguably increased since
2004, when the federal ban on assault weapons in the United States expired. On April 16-17,
2009, when President Obama traveled to Mexico to meet with President Calderón to discuss
cooperation in the fight against the escalating drug violence and other bilateral issues he
acknowledged that “more than 90% of the guns recovered in Mexico come from the United
States.”62 Drug cartel enforcers are purchasing semiautomatic versions of AK-47 and AR-15
style assault rifles, including .50 caliber snipers rifles in the United States. With these rifles some
estimate the cartel gunmen may soon exceed the firepower of the Mexican Army and law
enforcement. In addition, a small percentage of the weapons which have been seized by Mexican
authorities from drug crimes are military-grade weapons such as a portable shoulder-fired anti-
tank rocket launcher and grenade launchers (although the source of these weapons is far less
clear).63 President Calderón urged President Obama to clamp down on the flow of arms
southward during their meetings.
Location of the Violence and Mexico’s Drug War Strategies
Cartel-related killings are highly concentrated in a few states. In 2008, more than 60% of the
killings took place in Baja California, Sinaloa and Chihuahua and within those states killings
were reportedly concentrated in three cities: Tijuana, Culiacán and Ciudad Juárez. In 2008, by far
the greatest numbers of drug-related homicides took place in Chihuahua state where highly
contested Ciudad Juárez is located just across the border from El Paso, Texas.64 (See Figure 2,
Map of Mexico). Ciudad Juárez is a strategic location for both drugs and weapons trafficking and
58 Benito Jiménez y Verónica Sánchez, “Aumentan secuestros,” Reforma (Mexico), April 5, 2009.
59 Ken Ellingwood, “In Mexico, A Bounty on Every Head,” Los Angeles Times, September 1, 2008.
60 “Killing of 5-Year-Old Kidnapped from Market Shocks Mexico,” New York Times, November 4, 2008.
61 Alfredo Corchado, “Mexico’s Violence to Intensify Officials from Both Sides of Border May Be Targets, Experts
Predict,” Dallas Morning News, January 4, 2009.
62 “President Obama and Mexican President Felipe Calderón Hold News Conference,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts,
April 16, 2009.
63 E. Eduardo Castillo and Michelle Roberts, “AP IMPACT: Mexico’s weapons cache stymies tracing,” Washington
Post, May 7, 2009.
64 The violence in Juárez this past year was substantial with more than 1,600 homicides in 2008. In December, four
policemen in Juárez were killed in a half hour period and one of them decapitated. See coverage in: Tom Miller,
“Twilight Zone,” Washington Post, February 8, 2009.
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it has emerged as a key battleground. The dominant Sinaloa cartel has competed for control of the
city with the local Juárez (or Vicente Fuentes) DTO.65 The violence in Juárez has continued in
2009. In February, the police chief resigned after cartel gunmen left written warnings on the
bodies of a slain police officer and prison guard that they would kill one officer every 48 hours
until he left his post.66 Three days after his resignation, a convoy of police vehicles escorting state
governor José Reyes Baeza in Chihuahua city, was fired upon, allegedly by cartel gunmen.67
President Calderón has demonstrated an unmatched willingness to collaborate with the United
States on joint counterdrug measures. He has mobilized tens of thousands of military troops to
confront the DTOs in drug trafficking “hotspots.” For example, in February 2009 he sent a surge
of 5,000 troops to hyperviolent Juárez , supplementing 2,500 troops and federal police already in
place there. The Mexican military took over all the local law enforcement functions and the
running of the prisons in the border city. With more troops added in March that brought the
overall federal force to 10,800, (approximately 8,000 military) the murder rate in Ciudad Juárez
finally began to fall.68
President Calderón’s crackdown significantly disrupted the cartels’ operations in 2008, and this
has continued in 2009. In March 2009, in an effort to increase pressure on the drug cartels, the
Mexican authorities offered rewards for information leading to the capture of 24 of the top drug
traffickers, with each reward set at $2 million.69 Since the government’s crackdown, large caches
of weapons and drugs have been seized, key members of the cartels arrested, and a record number
have been extradited to the United States.
While such action has been popular, the Calderón Administration may be “racing against the
clock” to maintain public support. Frustration may grow if the drug war in Mexico fails to
produce more measurable results and the public is unlikely to tolerate a bloody war with the
DTOs indefinitely. In mid-term elections in July 2009, the PRI is expected to win more seats in
the national legislature and in local and state elections than Calderón’s PAN party. According to
a poll by the Mexican newspaper Reforma on March 1, 2009, 40% of Mexicans disapprove of
how Calderón has handled drug trafficking and his broader security program.70
The militarization of law enforcement in Mexico has also been criticized by Mexican civil society
and human rights organizations.71 The Calderón government has argued that the military will be
needed in its domestic security role until at least 2013 because state and local police have been
too compromised by corruption, and only the military can compete with the heavy weaponry of
65 Jane’s Information Group, “Security-Mexico,” February 20, 2009. The article notes that the city is a key entry point
for cocaine coming from South America, synthetic drugs from a variety of sources and marijuana cultivated in Sinaloa,
Durango, and Chihuahua, as well as a key entry point for firearms flowing the other direction from the United States
into Mexico.
66 David Luhnow and José de Cordóba, “The Perilous State of Mexico,” Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2009.
67 “Cartels add political dimension to ‘drugs war’,” Latin American Security & Strategic Review, February 2009.
68 "'Flooding’ strategy tried out in Juárez," Latin American Security & Strategic Review, March 2009.
69 Jose de Cordoba, “Drug Cartels Rise on U.S. Agenda -- As Clinton Plans Visit This Week, Mexico Offers Rewards
for Capture of Traffickers,” Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2009.
70Pamela Starr, “PAN Mid-term Election Loss Could Cripple Calderón,” Focal Point, online newsletter of the
Canadian Foundation for the Americas, April 2009. Available at:
http://www.focal.ca/publications/focalpoint/fp0409/?lang=e&article=article2.
71 Miguel Agustin Pro Juárez Human Rights Center, Human Rights Under Siege: Public Security and Criminal Justice
in Mexico, September 2008.
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the DTOs. In a report released in April 2009, Human Rights Watch alleges serious human rights
violations by the military.72 The report describes 17 cases involving more than 70 victims in what
it describes as “egregious crimes” such as enforced disappearances, killings, torture, rapes, and
arbitrary detention. Several of the cases are from 2007 and 2008. Also, according to Mexico’s
National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), human rights violations by Mexican security
forces have surged. In 2008, CNDH reported 631 complaints about military actions—64% more
than in 2007.73 Other concerns about the military involvement in civilian law enforcement include
the possibility that the longer these forces serve in this capacity there is an increasing chance they
too will be subject to corruption by the DTOs. About 10% of the approximately 10,000 killed in
Mexico’s drug violence since Calderón came into office are from the Mexican military.
Notwithstanding the ongoing violence, Mexico continues to have one of the lower homicide rates
in the region. At 11 murders per 100,000 according to the Mexican government, it is lower than
those in Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador and Brazil.74
The U.S. Policy Response
Violence in Mexico, much of it centered in states close to the Southwest border, has generated
widespread concern about spillover into the United States. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano noted in March 2009 congressional testimony that the United States has a significant
security stake in helping Mexico in its efforts against the drug cartels and organized crime, with
three major roles to play: providing assistance to Mexico to defeat the cartels and suppress the
flare-up of violence in Mexico; taking action on the U.S. side of the border to cripple smuggling
enterprises; and guarding against and preparing for the possible spillover of violence into the
United States. Secretary Napolitano noted that there already has been a limited increase in drug-
related violence in the United States (such as a rise in kidnappings and weapons violations in
cities close to the border such as Phoenix), but maintained that the increase is not the same kind
or nearly the same scale as in Mexico.75
Through a range of federal agencies including the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Justice, and the Department of State, the United States has taken numerous
measures to increase border security and cooperate with Mexico to combat the drug cartels.
Initiatives have been started or strengthened to deny the DTOs illicit arms, to reduce money
laundering and bulk cash smuggling (the preferred mode of transferring drug proceeds by the
Mexican DTOs), 76 to reduce the trafficking of drug precursor chemicals and to suppress human
72 Human Rights Watch, Uniform Impunity: Mexico’s Misuse of Military Justice to Prosecute Abuses in
Counternarcotics and Public Security Operations, April 2009. Available at:
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico0409web.pdf.
73 “Rights violations & ‘collateral damage’ in Mexico,” LatinNews Daily, May 6, 2009.
74 Marc Lacey, “Killings in Drug War in Mexico Double in ’08,” New York Times, December 9, 2008. The article cites
figures from Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Medina-Mora.
75 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Testimony of Secretary of Homeland Security
Janet Napolitano, hearing on “Southern Border Violence: Homeland Security Threats, Vulnerabilities, and
Responsibilities,” March 25, 2009.
76 Testimony of Andrew Selee, Director of the Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center before the House
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
March 12, 2009.
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smuggling.77 Direct assistance to Mexico to support its efforts against the DTOs is provided
under the Mérida Initiative with implementation led by the Department of State.
The U.S. Congress has also expressed concern over the situation in Mexico and potential
“spillover” effects in the United States. Thus far in 2009, the 111th Congress has held 14 hearings
on Mexico’s drug trafficking violence and border security and U.S. foreign assistance. (See
Appendix for a listing of the hearings).
The Mérida Initiative78
The United States and Mexico issued a joint statement on October 22, 2007, announcing a multi-
year plan for $1.4 billion in U.S. assistance to combat drug trafficking and other criminal
organizations in Mexico and Central America. The Mérida Initiative, named for the location of a
March 2007 meeting between Presidents Bush and Calderón, expands bilateral and regional
cooperation to combat organized crime, DTOs, and criminal gangs. To carry out the Mérida
Initiative, the Bush Administration requested $500 million for Mexico in a FY2008 supplemental
appropriations request and another $450 million for Mexico in the FY2009 regular foreign aid
request, for a total request of $950 million. To date Congress has appropriated a total of $700
million for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative: with $352 million in FY2008 supplemental
assistance and $48 million in FY2009 bridge funds, both funded by P.L. 110-252, and $300
million in regular FY2009 assistance funded in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-
8), signed into law in March 2009.
The objective of the Mérida Initiative, according to the October 2007 joint statement, is to
maximize the effectiveness of our efforts to fight criminal organizations—so as to disrupt drug-
trafficking (including precursor chemicals), weapons trafficking, illicit financial activities, and
currency smuggling, and human trafficking.79 The joint statement highlighted efforts of both
countries, including Mexico’s 24% increase in security spending in 2007, and U.S. efforts to
reduce weapons, human, and drug trafficking along the Mexican border. Although the statement
did not announce additional funding for U.S. domestic efforts, it cited several efforts to combat
drugs and crime that are already in place. Those included the 2007 Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy, the 2008 National Drug Control Strategy, and the 2007 U.S. Strategy
for Combating Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico.
The Bush Administration had requested that all proposed funding for the Mérida Initiative be
designated for the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account,
administered by the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL), but Congress ultimately appropriated the assistance within the
INCLE, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Economic Support Fund (ESF) accounts (see
Table 1). Congress also stipulated that none of the funds may be used for budget support or as
cash payments to Mexico.
77 The scope of this multi-dimensional response is described in more detail in CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S.
Relations: Issues for Congress.
78 For more information, see CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and
Policy Issues, by Clare Ribando Seelke and June S. Beittel.
79 U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Merida Initiative,” October 22, 2007.
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The law has human rights conditions softer than earlier House and Senate versions, in large part
because of Mexico’s objections that some of the conditions would violate its national sovereignty.
As enacted, the Secretary of State, after consultation with Mexican authorities, is required to
submit a report on procedures in place to implement Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act
(FAA) of 1961. That section of the FAA “prohibits assistance to any unit of the security forces of
a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed
gross violations of human rights.” An exception to this prohibition in Section 620J is if the
Secretary of State determines and reports to Congress that the government of such country is
taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.
The report is a condition to release 15% of the INCLE and FMF assistance under Mérida.
Table 1. FY2008 to FY2010 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account
($ in millions)
FY2008
FY2009 Bridge
FY2009 House
Suppl. Funds
Funds (P.L. 110-
Appropriations
(P.L. 110-252)
252)
FY2009
FY2009
Committee-
Omnibus
Supplemental
reported Bill
FY2010
Account
(P.L. 111-8)
Request
(H.R. 2346)
Request
ESF 20.0
0.0
15.0
0.0
0.0 0.0
INCLE 215.5 48.0 246.0 66.0 160.0 450.0
FMF 116.5 0.0 39.0
0.0
310.0 0.0
Total 352.0
48.0 300.0
66.0
470.0 450.0
Source: U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan; P.L. 111-8, Omnibus
Appropriations Act 2009 (Division H and Joint Explanatory Statement, H.R. 1105); FY2009 Supplemental
Justification, Department of State & U.S. Agency for International Development; H. Rpt. 111-105; and U.S.
Department of State, “Summary and Highlights, International Affairs, Function 150, Fiscal Year 2010.”
In March 2009 legislative action on P.L. 111-8, Congress provided $300 million for Mexico under
the Mérida Initiative within the INCLE, ESF, and FMF accounts, with not less than $75 million
for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law activities. The measure
has human rights conditions similar to those in P.L. 110-252. It requires that prior to the
procurement or lease of aircraft, that the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations an
Analysis of Alternatives for the acquisition of all aircraft for the Mérida Initiative.
On April 9, 2009, the Obama Administration submitted a FY2009 supplemental request that
includes an additional $66 million in INCLE assistance for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative.
According to the request, the assistance would be used to acquire three Blackhawk helicopters for
Mexico’s civilian Public Security Secretariat to provide them urgently needed air transport
capacity, and to provide spare parts and support. On May 7, 2009, the House Appropriations
Committee reported out a FY2009 supplemental appropriations measure, subsequently introduced
as H.R. 2346, that would increase funding levels to $160 million in INCLE funding (an increase
of $94 million) and an additional $310 million in FMF funding for a total of $470 million for
Mexico. (In addition, the supplemental request and House Appropriation Committee-reported bill
also included $350 million in Department of Defense Operation and Maintenance for
counternarcotics and other activities, including assistance to other Federal agencies, on the U.S.
border with Mexico.) In a parallel development, the White House rolled out its FY2010 budget
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request on May 7, 2009. In the proposed budget, President Obama requested $450 million in the
INCLE account for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative.
Implementation of Mérida
The growth and dramatic character of the violence in Mexico and the potential threat for spillover
north of the border has focused concern on the pace of the implementation of Mérida aid in both
countries. Increasing criticism from Mexican officials has been reported as well as from Members
of the U.S. Congress about the slowness of delivery of promised assistance to Mexico under the
Mérida Initiative. When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Mexico on March 25 – 26,
2009, she commented on the importance of bilateral cooperation under the Initiative and she
expressed concern about the slow pace of implementation.80 In her testimony before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on April 22, 2009, she repeated that concern.81
According to the Department of State,82 which is leading Mérida Initiative implementation, the
first pot of $400 million for the foreign aid program provided in P.L. 110-252 includes funding
for the following:
• helicopters (up to five Bell 412 helicopters) and surveillance aircraft (up to two
CASA maritime patrol aircraft) to support interdiction and rapid response of
Mexican law enforcement agencies;
• non-intrusive inspection equipment, ion scanners, and canine units for Mexican
customs, the new Mexican federal police and the military to interdict trafficked
drugs, arms, cash, and persons;
• technologies and secure communications to improve data collection and storage;
• and technical advice and training to strengthen the institutions of justice, to
improve vetting for the Mexican police force, to provide case management
software to track investigations through the legal process, to support offices of
citizen complaint and professional responsibility, and to promote the
establishment of witness protection programs.
On December 3, 2008, the United States and Mexico signed a Letter of Agreement, allowing
$197 million of the first pot of Mérida funds to be disbursed.83 Later in December, the
80 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa After Their
Meeting,” Mexico City, Mexico, March 25, 2009, available at:
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/03/120905.htm. Secretary Clinton stated: “With respect to the helicopters, I
am well aware that our long process of approval was cumbersome and challenging for the Mexican Government. We’re
going to see what we can do to cut that time…We think they are a necessary and important tool in the fight against the
drug cartels and criminals. It’s also suggested to us we ought to look at this more generally, that it takes too long from a
decision to delivery, and we’ll see what we can do to shorten that.”
81Testimony of Secretary of State Clinton before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, April 22, 2009. She stated at
the hearing: “On the Mérida Initiative, we’ve got to get the money flowing. Honestly, I don’t understand why it’s so
hard, and we’re really digging deep to figure that out.”
82 U.S. Embassy, Mexico, “U.S.-Mexico At a Glance: The Mérida Initiative,” September 2008; U.S. Department of
State, “FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan, Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican
Republic,” September 4, 2008.
83 The $197 million is from the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) foreign aid funding
account, and will fund equipment, training, and technology programs. In addition, more than $136 million under the
(continued...)
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governments of Mexico and the United States met to coordinate implementation of the Mérida
Initiative through a cabinet-level High Level group reflecting the urgency on both sides of the
border to address the growing violence in Mexico. According to the State Department, a working-
level meeting was held February 3, 2009, in Mexico City “with the aim of accelerating the
implementation of the 48 projects through nine working groups for Mexico under the Initiative.”
This meeting was followed by another on March 2, 2009.84
Only the initial phases of implementation have begun. Although some programs are scheduled to
become operational starting in the spring through the end of 2009, others that fund military
equipment have a longer procurement process. This is especially true for assistance in the Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) account that provides for equipment such as Bell helicopters and
CASA surveillance aircraft that may take from one to two years for delivery to Mexico.
According to press reports, just $7 million of the initial $400 million pot of assistance has been
spent, while U.S. officials have attributed delays to cumbersome U.S. government contracting
regulations, negotiations with Mexico about what equipment is actually needed, and the difficulty
of delivering an aid package that involves so many agencies and has some four dozen programs.85
The 111th Congress has expressed interest in cooperating with the Mexican government as it
battles the DTOs and tries to bring the mayhem and violence down to a level that can be managed
as a public security rather than a military concern. The heightened violence in Mexico, much of
it in cities and states that border the United States, has been the focus of 14 congressional
hearings to date.86 On April 16, 2009, President Obama made his first trip to Mexico to discuss
common security issues and cooperation and other issues in the bilateral relationship. In advance
of the trip, the President added three Mexican DTOs (Sinaloa cartel, Los Zetas and La Familia
Michoacana) to the list of drug kingpins subjecting them to financial sanctions under the U.S.
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120). The President also urged the Senate
to provide its advice and consent to the pending CIFTA treaty.87 Congressional hearings indicate
that further initiatives are likely, including a significant increase of Mérida funding in the FY2009
supplemental appropriations bill and in the President’s FY2010 budget request. Motivated by
concern about Mexican spillover violence and the corrosive impact of Mexican drug trafficking
on the stability of Mexico’s democracy and economy, further appropriations in the foreign
operations and domestic context may be forthcoming.
(...continued)
Mérida Initiative from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts will be
used to support antidrug and anticrime programs. See Embassy of the United States in Mexico, Press Release, “Mérida
Initiative Monies Released; Letter of Agreement signed,” December 3, 2008.
84 Testimony of David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs, before the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, Related Programs of House
Committee on Appropriations, March 10, 2009.
85 William Booth and Steve Fainaru, “U.S. Aid Delays in Drug War Criticized,” Washington Post, April 5, 2009.
86See Appendix for a listing of these hearings in the 111th Congress.
87 In light of intensified U.S. efforts to curb the flow of weapons to Mexico, the Obama Administration has joined some
policy advocates in calling for the U.S. Senate to act on a pending treaty, the Inter-American Convention Against the
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Material, known by
its Spanish acronym CIFTA. See, The White House, “FACT SHEET: US-Mexico Discuss New Approach to Bilateral
Relationship,” April 16, 2009. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-US-Mexico-
Discuss-New-Approach-to-Bilateral-Relationship.
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Appendix. Hearings on Increased Drug Violence in
the 111th Congress
This compilation of selected hearings, prepared by Julissa Gomez-Granger, Information Research
Specialist with the Knowledge Services Group of CRS, focuses on increasing violence in Mexico
as well as U.S. foreign assistance and border security programs.
House
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security. Escalating Violence in Mexico and the Southwest Border as a Result of the
Illicit Drug Trade. Hearing held May 5, 2009.
Witnesses: Stuart G. Nash, Associate Deputy Attorney General, and Director Organized
Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), U.S. Department of Justice; Salvador
Nieto, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, DHS; Janice Ayala, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of
Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, DHS; Anthony Placido,
Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S.
Department of Justice; William J. Hoover, Acting Deputy Director, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Department of Justice
Available at: http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_090506.html
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Emergency
Communications, Preparedness and Response. Examining Preparedness and Coordination Efforts
of First Responders Along the Southwest Border. Hearing held March 31, 2009.
Witnesses: Richard Barth, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy, DHS; Janice Ayala,
Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, DHS; Maj. Gen. Peter Aylward, Director, Joint Staff, National Guard Bureau;
Sigifredo Gonzalez Jr., Sheriff, Zapata County, Texas; Larry Dever, Sheriff, Cochise County,
Arizona
Available at:
http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/transcripts/congression
al/111/congressionaltranscripts111-000003091913.html@committees&metapub=CQ-
CONGTRANSCRIPTS&searchIndex=0&seqNum=23#speakers
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
Science and Related Agencies. Drug Enforcement Administration. Hearing held March 26, 2009.
Witness: Michelle M. Leonhart, Acting Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration
Available at: http://appropriations.house.gov/Subcommittees/sub_cjs.shtml
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Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
Science and Related Agencies. Federal Law Enforcement Response to US-Mexico Border
Violence. Hearing held March 24, 2009.
Witnesses: Bill Newell, Special Agent in Charge, ATF Phoenix Division; Joseph Arabit,
Special Agent in Charge, Drug Enforcement Administration, El Paso, TX; Phil Gordon,
Mayor, City of Phoenix ; David Shirk, Assistant Professor and Director of the Trans-Border
Institute
Available at: http://appropriations.house.gov/Subcommittees/sub_cjs.shtml
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere.
Guns, Drugs and Violence: The Merida Initiative and the Challenge in Mexico. Hearing held
March 18, 2009.
Witnesses: David Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Roberta S. Jacobson, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State; M.
Kristen Rand, Legislative Director, Violence Policy Center; Andrew Selee, Ph.D., Director,
Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Michael A. Braun,
Managing Partner, Spectre Group International, LLC
Available at: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1055
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs. Money, Guns, and Drugs: Are U.S. Inputs Fueling
Violence on the U.S.-Mexico Border? Hearing held March 12, 2009.
Witnesses: Andrew Selee, Director, Woodrow Wilson Center Mexico Institute; Michael
Braun, Former DEA Assistant Administrator; Tom Diaz, Senior Policy Analyst, Violence
Policy Center; Jonathan Paton, Arizona State Senate
http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/transcripts/congression
al/111/congressionaltranscripts111-000003074885.html@committees&metapub=CQ-
CONGTRANSCRIPTS&searchIndex=2&seqNum=109#speakers
U.S Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Maritime and Global
Counterterrorism. Border Violence: An Examination of DHS Strategies and Resources. Hearing
held March 12, 2009.
Witnesses: Roger T. Rufe, Jr., Director, Office of Operations Coordination, DHS; Alonzo,
Pena, Attache, U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, DHS; John, Leech, Acting Director, Office of
Counternarcotics Enforcement, DHS; Salvador, Nieto, Deputy Assistant Commissioner,
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Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence
Intelligence and Operations Coordination, Customs and Border Protection; Kumar, Kibble,
Deputy Director, Office of Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Available at:
http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/transcripts/congression
al/111/congressionaltranscripts111-000003074816.html@committees&metapub=CQ-
CONGTRANSCRIPTS&searchIndex=2&seqNum=110#speakers
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Homeland Security.
Department of Homeland Security Response to Violence on the Border with Mexico. Hearing held
March 10, 2009.
Witnesses: Mark Koumans, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for
International Affairs; Jayson Ahern, Acting Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection,
DHS; Marcy Forman, Director, Office on Investigations, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, DHS; David Aguilar, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol
Available at: http://appropriations.house.gov/Subcommittees/sub_dhs.shtml
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Homeland Security.
Secure Border Initiative and Control of the Land Border. Hearing held March 10, 2009.
Witnesses: Jayson Ahern, Acting Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection, DHS;
David Aguilar, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol; Mark Borkowski, Executive Director, Secure
Border Initiative
Available at: http://appropriations.house.gov/Subcommittees/sub_dhs.shtml
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs. Merida Initiative. Hearing held March 10, 2009.
Witnesses: Thomas Shannon, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs;
David Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement; Rodger Garner, Mission Director for Mexico, Agency for International
Development; Lisa Haugaard, Executive Director, Latin American Working Group; Joy
Olson, Director, Washington Office on Latin America; Ana Paula Hernandez, General
Director, Colectivo por una Politica Integral hacia las Drogas
Available at:
http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/transcripts/congression
al/111/congressionaltranscripts111-000003073406.html@committees&metapub=CQ-
CONGTRANSCRIPTS&searchIndex=2&seqNum=131
or at: http://appropriations.house.gov/Subcommittees/sub_sfo.shtml
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Senate
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S.-Mexico Border Violence. Field
hearing held March 30, 2009. El Paso, Texas.
Witnesses: Jamie Esparza, District Attorney, El Paso, TX; William McMahon, Deputy
Assistant Director, US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Washington,
DC; Joseph Arabit, Special Agent in charge, Drug Enforcement Administration, El Paso, TX;
Ricardo Garcia Carriles, Former Police Chief of Ciudad Juarez, El Paso, TX ; The Honorable
Harriet C. Babbitt, Former Ambassador to Organization of American States, Washington, DC;
Howard Campbell, Professor, University of Texas at El Paso
Available at: http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2009/hrg090330a.html
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Southern
Border Violence. Hearing held March 25, 2009.
Witnesses: Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security; James B. Steinberg, Deputy
Secretary of State; David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice
Available at:
http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/transcripts/congression
al/111/congressionaltranscripts111-000003084334.html@committees&metapub=CQ-
CONGTRANSCRIPTS&searchIndex=7&seqNum=7#speakers
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Southern
Border Violence: State and Local Perspectives. Field hearing held April 20, 2009. Phoenix,
Arizona.
Witnesses: Janice K. Brewer, Governor, State of Arizona; Terry Goddard, Attorney General,
State of Arizona; Phil Gordon, Mayor, City of Phoenix, Arizona; Octavio Garcia-Von Borstel,
Mayor, City of Nogales, Arizona; Ned Norris, Jr., Chairman, Tohono O'odham Nation; Jack F.
Harris, Public Safety Manager, City of Phoenix, Arizona; Clarence W. Dupnik, Sheriff,
County of Pima, Arizona; Larry Dever, Sheriff, County of Cochise, Arizona
Available at:
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=f259bf1c-
934d-41af-8ff3-72140882b3c3
U.S. Congress. Senate. Senate Judiciary Committee. Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs; with the
Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control. Law Enforcement Responses to Mexican Drug
Cartels. Joint hearing held March 17, 2009.
Witnesses: Terry Goddard, Attorney General, State of Arizona, Phoenix, AZ; William Hoover,
Assistant Director for Field Operations, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
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Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence
Explosives; Anthony P. Placido, Assistant Administrator and Chief of Intelligence, Drug
Enforcement Administration; Kumar Kibble, Deputy Director, Office of Investigations,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, DHS; Denise Eugenia Dresser Guerra, Professor,
Department of Political Science, Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico, Mexico City,
Mexico; Jorge Luis Aguirre, Journalist, El Paso, Texas
Available at: http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=3718
or
at:
http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/transcripts/congression
al/111/congressionaltranscripts111-000003078495.html@committees&metapub=CQ-
CONGTRANSCRIPTS&searchIndex=9&seqNum=2#speakers
Author Contact Information
June S. Beittel
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
jbeittel@crs.loc.gov, 7-7613
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