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Pr
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Many potential chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism agents lack
available countermeasures. In 2003, President Bush proposed Project BioShield to address this
need. The 108th Congress passed the Project BioShield Act of 2004, and President Bush signed it
into law on July 21, 2004 (P.L. 108-276).
The main provisions of this law include (1) relaxing procedures for some CBRN terrorism-related
spending, including hiring and awarding research grants; (2) guaranteeing a federal government
market for new medical countermeasures; and (3) permitting emergency use of unapproved
countermeasures. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has used each of these
authorities. The HHS used expedited review authorities to approve grants relating to developing
treatments for radiation exposure. The HHS used the authority to guarantee a government market
to obligate approximately $2.3 billion to acquire countermeasures against anthrax, botulism,
radiation, and smallpox. In response to the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) “swine flu” outbreak, HHS
has used the emergency use authority to ease the distribution of two antiviral medications and to
allow their use in children younger than the ages for which the drugs are currently approved.
Certain respirators and a diagnostic test were also approved for emergency use against this
outbreak.
HHS Project BioShield countermeasure procurement funding comes from the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-90), which appropriated $5.593 billion for
FY2004 to FY2013. Congress subsequently removed $25 million from this account through
rescissions in FY2004 and FY2005. In the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8),
Congress transferred $412 million from this account to other programs to support countermeasure
advanced research and development and pandemic influenza preparedness and response.
Since passing the Project BioShield Act, subsequent congresses have considered several
additional measures to further encourage countermeasure development. The 109th Congress
passed the Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417) to create the Biomedical
Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in the Department of Health and
Human Services. Questions remain regarding the impact BARDA will have on countermeasure
development, the continuing implementation of Project BioShield, and whether additional
legislation would further encourage countermeasure development.

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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Project BioShield............................................................................................................................. 1
Expedited Procedures................................................................................................................ 1
Market Guarantee...................................................................................................................... 2
Emergency Use of Unapproved Products ................................................................................. 3
Reporting Requirements............................................................................................................ 4
Appropriations........................................................................................................................... 4
Policy Issues .................................................................................................................................... 4
Stockpile Replenishment........................................................................................................... 4
Broad Spectrum Countermeasures ............................................................................................ 5
Increasing Basic Research......................................................................................................... 5
The Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority ........................................... 6

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Author Contact Information ............................................................................................................ 7

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Following the terrorist attacks of 2001, the federal government determined that it would need
additional medical countermeasures (e.g., diagnostic tests, drugs, vaccines, and other treatments)
to respond to an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents.1 The
paucity of CBRN agent countermeasures is attributed to the lack of a significant commercial
market.2 Because these diseases and conditions occur infrequently, little economic incentive
exists to invest the millions of dollars required to bring treatments to market.
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To encourage the development of new CBRN countermeasures, President Bush proposed Project
BioShield in his 2003 State of the Union address. The 108th Congress considered this proposal
and passed the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-276, signed into law July 21, 2004).3 This
act has three main provisions. It provides the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
expedited procedures for CBRN terrorism-related spending including procuring products, hiring
experts, and awarding research grants. The act creates a government-market guarantee by
allowing the HHS Secretary to obligate funds to purchase countermeasures while they still have
several more years of development. However, companies only receive payment when
development is complete and the product is delivered. The act also authorizes the HHS Secretary
to temporarily allow the emergency use of countermeasures that lack Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval.
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The act relaxes procedures under the Federal Acquisition Regulation for procuring property or
services used in performing, administering, or supporting CBRN countermeasure research and
development (R&D). This decreases both the amount of paperwork required for these
expenditures and the potential for oversight. The act increases the maximum, from $100,000 to
$25 million, for contracts awarded under simplified acquisition procedures. It also allows these
purchases using other than full and open competition. Another provision increases the micro-
purchase maximum from $2,500 to $15,000. These increases are similar to, but greater than,
changes granted to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other departments and
agencies in the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) and the National Defense Authorization
Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-136). According to its annual reports to Congress required by this act, HHS
has not used these authorities.4

1 For additional information and analysis of the procurement provisions of Project BioShield, see CRS Report
RL33907, Project BioShield: Appropriations, Acquisitions, and Policy Implementation Issues for Congress, by Frank
Gottron.
2 Alan Pemberton, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives Select Committee on Homeland Security, May 15, 2003.
3 For a detailed comparison of the legislative proposals, see CRS Report RL32549, Project BioShield: Legislative
History and Side-by-Side Comparison of H.R. 2122, S. 15, and S. 1504, by Frank Gottron and Eric A. Fischer.
4 These reports are available online at http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/barda/bioshield/annualreport/.
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The act authorizes the HHS Secretary to use an expedited award process, rather than the normal
peer review process, for grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements related to CBRN
countermeasure R&D activity, if the Secretary deems there is a pressing need for an expedited
award. This power is limited to awards of $1.5 million or less. Some scientists have expressed
concerns that an expedited peer review process will reduce the research quality.5 The normal peer
review process is designed to provide proposals with greater scientific merit a higher probability
of receiving funding. Congress allowed HHS to establish the details of this new alternative
expedited award process.
Through the latest reporting period, HHS has awarded 14 grants through this expedited peer
review process.6 The National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) awarded
these grants between three and five months after the application deadline.7 All of these awards
were related to medical countermeasures to be used following radiation exposure.
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The act is designed to guarantee companies that the government will buy new, successfully
developed CBRN countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).8 The act allows
the HHS Secretary, with the concurrence of the DHS Secretary and upon the approval of the
President, to promise to buy a product up to eight years before it is reasonably expected to be
delivered. A company is paid only on the delivery of a substantial portion of the countermeasure.
Therefore, this guarantee reduces the market risk for the company but does not affect its exposure
to development risk (i.e., the risk that the countermeasure will fail during testing and be
undeliverable). The Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417) modified the
Project BioShield Act to allow for milestone-based payments of up to half of the total award
before delivery.9
The Project BioShield Act allows the purchase of unapproved and unlicenced countermeasures. It
requires the HHS Secretary to determine that “... sufficient and satisfactory clinical experience or
research data ... support[s] a reasonable conclusion that the product will qualify for approval or
licensing ... within eight years.”10 The approval and licensing processes are designed to preclude
the marketing of ineffective or dangerous treatments. Because most drugs that begin this process
fail to become approved treatments, critics of this provision suggest that the government will end
up purchasing countermeasures that may never be approved. To reduce the government’s
financial risk associated with this provision, the act allows contracts to be written so that
unapproved products may be purchased at lower cost than approved products.

5 John Miller, “Interview with Richard Ebright,” The Scientist, vol. 17 (7), April 7, 2003, p. 52.
6 See HHS, Project BioShield: Annual Report to Congress July 2004—July 2006, January 2007, p. 2, and HHS, Project
BioShield: Annual Report to Congress August 2006—July 2007, p. 32.
7 Grants that go through the normal peer review process typically take nine to 18 months to receive funding. See
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/ncn/grants/charts/timeline_resub.htm.
8 The SNS contains pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical supplies, and medical equipment to respond to terrorist attacks
and other emergencies.
9 For more on this law, see CRS Report RL33589, The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417):
Provisions and Changes to Preexisting Law, by Sarah A. Lister and Frank Gottron.
10 118 Stat. 844.
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The first Project BioShield contract was announced November 4, 2004.11 VaxGen Inc. would
have received $878 million to deliver 75 million doses of a new type of anthrax vaccine within
three years. On December 17, 2006, HHS terminated this contract because VaxGen failed to meet
a contract milestone.12 Other contracts include $1.095 billion for 43 million doses of the currently
approved anthrax vaccine (Emergent BioSolutions); $165 million for 20,000 doses of ABthrax, a
treatment for anthrax (Human Genome Sciences); $144 million for 10,000 doses of Anthrax
Immune Globulin, a treatment for anthrax (Cangene); $363 million for 200,000 doses of
botulinum antitoxin, a treatment for botulinum toxin exposure (Cangene); $16 million for 5
million doses of a pediatric form of potassium iodide, a treatment for radioactive iodine exposure
(Fleming & Company); $22 million for 395,000 doses of Ca-DTPA and 80,000 doses of Zn-
DTPA, two treatments for internal radioactive particle contamination (Akorn); and $500 million
for 20 million doses of a new smallpox vaccine (Bavarian Nordic). Thus, excluding the canceled
VaxGen contract, HHS has obligated approximately $2.267 billion to date. Future targets for
Project BioShield procurement include countermeasures against anthrax, viral hemorrhagic
fevers, and radiation.13
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The act also allows the HHS Secretary to authorize the emergency use of medical products that
are not approved by the FDA or HHS. To exercise this authority the HHS Secretary must
conclude: (1) the agent for which the countermeasure is designed can cause serious or life-
threatening disease; (2) the product may reasonably be believed to be effective in detecting,
diagnosing, treating, or preventing the disease; (3) the known and potential benefits of the product
outweigh its known and potential risks; (4) no adequate alternative to the product is approved and
available; and (5) any other criteria prescribed in regulation are met.14 Although this provision
would permit the Secretary to circumvent the normal approval process, its use appears to be
intended to be limited to dire circumstances.
The HHS Secretary has used this Emergency Use Authority (EUA) several times. The emergency
use of four countermeasures has been permitted in response to the 2009 influenza A(H1N1)15
outbreak: the antiviral influenza treatments Tamiflu (oseltamivir) and Relenza (zananivir),16 N95
respirators, and a diagnostic kit to help identify cases of this disease.17 In October 2008, the
antibiotic kits containing Doxycycline Hyclate were allowed to be distributed to certain people

11 See the HHS Project BioShield procurement page for status of current requests and contracts at http://www.hhs.gov/
aspr/barda/procurement/cbrnactivities.html. For issues regarding these awards, see CRS Report RL33907, Project
BioShield: Appropriations, Acquisitions, and Policy Implementation Issues for Congress, by Frank Gottron.
12 HHS, “Termination Letter - Contract No. HHSO100200500001C,” Letter to VaxGen, Inc., December 19, 2006.
13 HHS Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise, “Implementation Plan For Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats,” 72 Fed. Reg. 20122, April 23, 2007.
14 118 Stat. 855.
15 The new flu strain was initially dubbed “swine flu” because it contained genetic material from flu strains that
normally circulate in swine. However, there has been no evidence to date that pigs are involved in the transmission of
this virus. There have been concerns that the term “swine flu” has had unwarranted trade implications for swine and
pork products, among other concerns. On April 30, 2009, WHO began referring to the new strain as influenza A(H
1N1). For additional information, see CRS Report R40554, The 2009 H1N1 “Swine Flu” Outbreak: An Overview, by
Sarah A. Lister and C. Stephen Redhead.
16 Although the antiviral treatments had been previously approved for treating influenza, the EUA makes it easier to
distribute these treatments and allows their use for infants and children younger than had been previously allowed.
17 For more information on these EUAs, see http://www.cdc.gov/swineflu/eua/.
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participating in the Cities Readiness Initiative.18 In January 2005, the HHS Secretary used this
authority to allow the vaccination of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel with a specified
type of anthrax vaccine.19 This EUA expired in January 2006.
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The Project BioShield Act of 2004 requires annual reports from the HHS Secretary about the
exercise of the authorities granted in this bill.20 This act also requires the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to produce a report to assess actions taken under authorities granted
by the act, to determine the effectiveness of the act, and to recommend additional measures to
address deficiencies. This report is expected to be issued in July 2009.21
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This act did not appropriate any money. Instead, it authorized the appropriation of up to a total of
$5.593 billion for FY2004 to FY2013 for countermeasures procurement. The Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-90) appropriated this amount with explicit
windows in which the money could be obligated. The act specified that $3.418 billion was
available for obligation for FY2004 to FY2008. The balance of the advance appropriation plus
the unobligated funds for FY2004 to FY2008 became available for FY2009 to FY2013. This
money is only for the procurement of countermeasures using the Project BioShield authorities,
not for grants to support countermeasure development.
Although Congress advance-appropriated the 10-year program, it retains the power to annually
increase or decrease the amount available for Project BioShield. Congress removed $25.475
million from this account through rescissions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L.
108-199) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-447). The Omnibus
Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8), transferred $412 million from this account. Of this
amount, $275 million went to fund countermeasure advanced research and development through
the Biodefense Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), and $137 million
went to help respond to and prepare for pandemic influenza.22
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Like all medicines, those added to the SNS through Project BioShield have explicit expiration
dates, after which they are no longer legally usable. For example, to maintain a stockpile of at

18 73 Fed. Reg. 62507. For more on this program, see http://www.bt.cdc.gov/cri/.
19 70 Fed. Reg. 5452.
20 Available online at http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/barda/bioshield/annualreport/.
21 Personal communication with GAO, April 10, 2009.
22 U.S. Congress, House Appropriations, Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (H.R. 1105; P.L. 111-8), committee print,
111th Cong., 1st sess., March 2009, p. 1301.
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least 10 million doses from 2006 to 2011, HHS had to buy 29 million doses of anthrax vaccine.23
The GAO suggested an inventory-sharing agreement between HHS and DOD, to allow DOD to
use the HHS vaccines in its active troop vaccination program before expiration.24 These agencies
subsequently implemented this type of shared stockpile approach for anthrax vaccines and
pandemic influenza countermeasures.25 However, this solution would not be applicable to the
expiration problems of countermeasures lacking other high-volume users. Such countermeasures
may require additional periodic purchases to replenish the stockpile to maintain a consistent
readiness level. Congress may consider whether such purchases should be funded through the
advance-appropriated Project BioShield account or through annual SNS budget authorities.
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Many experts believe that broad spectrum countermeasures, those that address multiple CBRN
agents, would be the most valuable additions to the SNS. Such nonspecific countermeasures
might be the best defense against currently unknown threats, such as emerging diseases or
genetically engineered pathogens. Furthermore, such countermeasures are more likely to have
other nonbiodefense-related applications. P.L. 108-276 does not exclude procuring such
countermeasures; however it does require that the presence of another commercial market be
factored into the HHS Secretary’s decision to purchase the countermeasure. HHS has stated its
interest in using Project BioShield to acquire new broad spectrum countermeasures.26 However,
all the Project BioShield contracts to date have been specifically targeted at individual threat
agents, a strategy commonly described as “one bug, one drug.” Congress may decide that HHS
needs further guidance or authorities to encourage the development and acquisition of new broad
spectrum countermeasures.
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Following the anthrax attacks, Congress increased the National Institutes of Health budget for
CBRN countermeasure research to approximately $1.5 billion per year. It is difficult to determine
the optimal funding level for basic research, but eventually the law of diminishing returns will
apply. Some scientists have suggested that this has already occurred and inevitably leads to
funding unworthy projects.27 Additionally, some scientists argue that the increases in bioterrorism
research have come at the expense of other important infectious disease research,28 although
others dispute this assertion.29

23 HHS News Release, “HHS Purchases Additional Anthrax Vaccine For Stockpile,” September 26, 2007.
24 Government Accountability Office, Project BioShield: Actions Needed to Avoid Repeating Past Problems with
Procuring New Anthrax Vaccine and Managing the Stockpile of Licensed Vaccine, GAO-08-88, October 2007.
25 Robin Robinson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, HHS,
testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, April 24, 2008.
26 HHS Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise, “Implementation Plan For Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats,” 72 Fed. Reg. 20122, April 23, 2007.
27 John Miller, “Bioterrorism Research: New Money, New Anxieties,” The Scientist, vol. 17(7), April 7, 2003, p. 52.
28 Sidney Altman, et al., “An Open Letter to Elias Zerhouni,” Science, March 4, 2005, p. 1409.
29 Gerald Epstein, “Security Is More Than Public Health: Commentary on Casting a Wider Net For Countermeasure
R&D Funding Decisions,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, vol. 5(4), 2007,
pp. 353-357.
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Since the passage of the Project BioShield Act, Congress has scrutinized its implementation and
effectiveness. Such evaluation is likely to continue through the 111th Congress and beyond. As
part of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417), Congress created the
Biodefense Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in HHS to increase the
effectiveness of the government’s ability to acquire CBRN countermeasures.
Some experts suggested that Project BioShield would more effectively encourage countermeasure
development if modeled after the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
DARPA funds many projects with a potential high risk of failure. These contracts often last a few
years and can be renewed if specified milestones are met. Companies are allowed to make a
defined profit during the development phase. Although the direct funding of risky development
projects implies that the government will fund many products that never make it to market, the
government might also structure the contracts so that this assumption of development risk
translates into lower procurement costs. The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (P.L.
109-417) allows HHS to use similar contracting mechanisms through BARDA. These
transactions are not funded through Project BioShield appropriations, but rather through a
separate account, the Biodefense Medical Countermeasure Development Fund.
Another area that some experts thought required improvement was how the government helped
transition promising leads from basic research to the product development stage. This period in
development is often referred to as the “valley of death” for pharmaceuticals since some
seemingly promising drugs are not developed past this point due to lack of funding. Several
federal programs exist to encourage research, development, and commercialization of new
products. Such programs include cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs)
between government laboratories and universities or industry; the Central Intelligence Agency-
funded, nonprofit, venture capital corporation In-Q-Tel; the Small Business Technology Transfer
Program; and the Small Business Innovation Research Program. In contrast to Project BioShield’s
market guarantee at the end of a potentially long and risky development process, each of these
programs offers direct help during the development process and provides incentives for
commercialization of the results. In BARDA, Congress created a dedicated infrastructure to
manage and fund advanced development and commercialization of CBRN countermeasures. In
theory, BARDA funding will take those promising drugs from the basic research through the
advanced development stage, which may include clinical trials. Critics of such programs suggest
that because of the high product failure rate in advanced development, the government will
inevitably fund unusable products. In addition to removing the development risks traditionally
borne by industry, it inserts government decision makers into the countermeasure development
process, a role critics argue is better suited to industry experts and entrepreneurs.30 Some critics
would prefer to have the government set product requirements and have industry determine how
best to meet them. Because advanced research and development activities generally take several
years, it will likely take more time to determine the full effect BARDA has on U.S. civilian
biodefense preparedness.

30 See CRS Report RL33528, Industrial Competitiveness and Technological Advancement: Debate Over Government
Policy, by Wendy H. Schacht.
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Frank Gottron

Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
fgottron@crs.loc.gov, 7-5854

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