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Pr
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The Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget is expected to be submitted to Congress in early- to mid-
May. Although the Navy is required to submit a new 30-year shipbuilding plan each year, in
conjunction with its annual budget submission, it is not clear whether the Navy will submit a new,
FY2010 version of its 30-year shipbuilding plan when it submits its proposed FY2010 budget. A
February 2009 press report suggested that the Navy in late-2008 was examining options for
reducing the cost of the FY2010 version of its 30-year shipbuilding plan by reducing planned
procurements of certain higher-cost ships.
ŘŖŖşȱ
In February 2008, as part of its proposed FY2009 budget, the Navy submitted to Congress the
FY2009 version of its annual 30-year shipbuilding plan. The FY2009 30-year plan was intended
to support the Navy’s goal of achieving and maintaining a 313-ship fleet. The Navy first
presented the 313-ship plan to Congress in February 2006.
Although the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan, if implemented, would generally be adequate to
achieve and maintain a fleet of about 313 ships, it did not include enough ships to fully support
certain elements of the 313-ship fleet consistently over the long run—shortfalls would occur in
areas such as amphibious lift capability and the number of attack submarines. The FY2009 30-
year plan, moreover, included new assumptions about extended service lives for amphibious ships
and destroyers. If these longer service lives are not achieved, it could increase the shortfall in
amphibious lift capability and create a shortfall in the number of cruisers and destroyers.
The Navy in 2008 increased its estimate of the average annual cost to fund the 30-year plan by
about 44% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. The Navy’s revised estimated cost for implementing
the 30-year plan was within about 7% of estimates issued by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO). The Navy had downplayed CBO’s estimates in 2007, referring to them in testimony as
“worst-case analysis” or as an “extremely conservative” estimate.
The 2008 increase in the Navy’s estimated cost for implementing the plan was so large that the
Navy no longer appears to have a clearly identifiable, announced strategy for generating the funds
needed to implement the 30-year plan, at least not without significantly reducing funding for
other Navy programs or increasing the Navy’s programmed budget in coming years by billions of
dollars per year
Concerns about the Navy’s prospective ability to afford the 30-year shipbuilding plan, combined
with year-to-year changes in Navy shipbuilding plans and significant cost growth and other
problems in building certain new Navy ships, have led to strong concerns among some Members
about the status of Navy shipbuilding and the potential future size and capabilities of the fleet.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Introduction and Issue for Congress................................................................................................ 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Proposed 313-Ship Fleet ........................................................................................................... 2
FY2009-FY2013 Shipbuilding Plan.......................................................................................... 3
FY2009 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan .......................................................................................... 4
FY2010 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan .......................................................................................... 6
Oversight Issues for Congress ......................................................................................................... 6
Adequacy of Proposed 313-Ship Fleet...................................................................................... 6
Adequacy of Shipbuilding Plan for Maintaining 313 Ships...................................................... 7
Summary ............................................................................................................................. 7
Shortfalls Relative to 313-Ship Goals................................................................................. 9
Affordability and Executibility of Shipbuilding Plan ............................................................. 13
Overview........................................................................................................................... 13
June 2008 CBO Report ..................................................................................................... 14
Legislative Activity for FY2010.................................................................................................... 15
ȱ
Table 1. Recent Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals .................................................................... 2
Table 2. Navy FY2009-FY2013 Shipbuilding Plan ........................................................................ 3
Table 3. Navy FY2009 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ......................................................................... 5
Table 4. Navy Projection of Future Force Levels............................................................................ 7
Table 5. Projected Shortfall Relative to 313-Ship Force Structure.................................................. 9
Table 6. Projected Amount of Amphibious Lift .............................................................................11
Table 7. Average Annual Shipbuilding Costs ................................................................................ 15
Table F-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948...................................................... 30
Table F-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Projected, FY1982-FY2013 ....................................... 31
¡ȱ
Appendix A. Legislative Activity for FY2009 .............................................................................. 17
Appendix B. Potential For Changing 313-Ship Proposal.............................................................. 20
Appendix C. Modified Description of Required Number of Aircraft Carriers.............................. 23
Appendix D. Adequacy of Planned 313-Ship Fleet....................................................................... 24
Appendix E. Affordability of Navy 30-Year Plan in 2006-2007 ................................................... 27
Appendix F. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate ......................................................... 29
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 31
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The Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget is expected to be submitted to Congress in early- to mid-
May. Although the Navy is required to submit a new 30-year shipbuilding plan each year, in
conjunction with its annual budget submission, it is not clear whether the Navy will submit a new,
FY2010 version of its 30-year shipbuilding plan when it submits its proposed FY2010 budget. A
February 2009 press report suggested that the Navy in late-2008 was examining options for
reducing the cost of the FY2010 version of its 30-year shipbuilding plan by reducing planned
procurements of certain higher-cost ships.
In February 2008, as part of its proposed FY2009 budget, the Navy submitted to Congress the
FY2009 version of its annual 30-year shipbuilding plan. The FY2009 30-year plan was intended
to support the Navy’s goal of achieving and maintaining a 313-ship fleet. The Navy first
presented the 313-ship plan to Congress in February 2006.
Although the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan, if implemented, would generally be adequate to
achieve and maintain a fleet of about 313 ships, it did not include enough ships to fully support
certain elements of the 313-ship fleet consistently over the long run—shortfalls would occur in
areas such as amphibious lift capability and the number of attack submarines. The FY2009 30-
year plan, moreover, included new assumptions about extended service lives for amphibious ships
and destroyers. If these longer service lives are not achieved, it could increase the shortfall in
amphibious lift capability and create a shortfall in the number of cruisers and destroyers.
The Navy in 2008 increased its estimate of the average annual cost to fund the 30-year plan by
about 44% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. The Navy’s revised estimated cost for implementing
the 30-year plan was within about 7% of estimates issued by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO). The Navy had downplayed CBO’s estimates in 2007, referring to them in testimony as
“worst-case analysis” or as an “extremely conservative” estimate.
The 2008 increase in the Navy’s estimated cost for implementing the plan was so large that the
Navy no longer appears to have a clearly identifiable, announced strategy for generating the funds
needed to implement the 30-year plan, at least not without significantly reducing funding for
other Navy programs or increasing the Navy’s programmed budget in coming years by billions of
dollars per year
Concerns about the Navy’s prospective ability to afford the 30-year shipbuilding plan, combined
with year-to-year changes in Navy shipbuilding plans and significant cost growth and other
problems in building certain new Navy ships, have led to strong concerns among some Members
about the status of Navy shipbuilding and the potential future size and capabilities of the fleet.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
The issue for Congress that is discussed in this report is how to respond to the Navy’s proposed
force structure and shipbuilding plans. Decisions that Congress makes on this issue could
significantly affect future U.S. military capabilities, Navy funding requirements, and the Navy
shipbuilding industrial base.
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Table 1 shows the composition of the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet, which the Navy first
presented to Congress in February 2006, and compares the 313-ship plan to other recent Navy
ship force structure proposals. In September 2008, it was reported that the Navy is conducting a
force-structure review that could lead to a change in the planned size and composition of the
fleet;1 for further discussion, see Appendix B. The planned size and structure of the Navy could
also be discussed as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which is currently in
progress.
Table 1. Recent Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals
Early-2005 Navy
2006 Navy
proposal for fleet of
2002-2004 Navy
2001 QDR
Ship type
proposal for 313-
260-325 ships
proposal for 375-
plan for 310-
ship fleet
ship Navya
ship Navy
260-ships 325-ships
Ballistic missile
submarines
14 14 14
14 14
(SSBNs)
Cruise missile
submarines
4 4 4
4
2
or
4b
(SSGNs)
Attack submarines
(SSNs)
48 37 41
55 55
Aircraft carriers
11/12c 10 11
12 12
Cruisers,
destroyers, frigates
88 67 92
104 116
Littoral Combat
Ships (LCSs)
55 63 82
56
0
Amphibious
ships
31 17 24
37 36
MPF(F) shipsd 12d 14d 20d
0d
0d
Combat logistics
(resupply) ships
30 24 26
42 34
Dedicated mine
warfare ships
0 0 0
26e 16
Otherf
20 10 11
25 25
Total battle
force ships
313/314 260 325
375
310
or
312
Sources: U.S. Navy data.
a. Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.
1 Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Undergoing A New Force Structure Review Due This Fall,” Inside the Navy, September
29, 2008.
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b. The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s proposed
FY2001 Department of Defense (DOD) budget requested funding to support the conversion of two
available Trident SSBNs into SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking
up this request, supported a plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs.
c. 11 carriers, and eventually 12 carriers.
d. Today’s 16 Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps
operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force
ships. The Navy’s planned MPF (Future) ships, however, may be capable of contributing to Navy combat
capabilities (for example, by supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, MPF(F) ships are counted
here as battle force ships.
e. The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships includes 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status
called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as
battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness
status.
f. Includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.
ŘŖŖşȬŘŖŗřȱȱȱ
Table 2 shows the Navy’s FY2009-FY2013 ship-procurement plan, which was submitted to
Congress in February 2008. The plan included 47 new construction ships in FY2009-FY2013—a
reduction of 13 ships, or about 22%, from the 60 new-construction ships that were planned for
FY2009-FY2013 under the Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget. Most of the 13-ship reduction was
due to an 11-ship reduction in the number of Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) planned for FY2009-
FY2013, which was a consequence of the Navy’s 2007 restructuring of the LCS program.
Table 2. Navy FY2009-FY2013 Shipbuilding Plan
(Ships funded in FY2007 and FY2008 shown for reference)
Total
FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY09-
FY13
CVN-21
1
1 1
SSN-774
1
1
1
1 2 2 2 8
DDG-1000
2a
0a
1
1 1 1 1 5
CG(X)
1 1 2
LCS
0b 1
2 3 3 4 6 18
LPD-17
1
0
LHA(R)
1
0
TAKE
1
0c
2c
2
JCC(X)
1 1
TATF
0
JHSVd
1 1 1 1 1 5
MPF(F) TAKE
0
MPF(F) LHA(R)
1
1
MPF(F) LMSR
1 1
MPF(F) MLP
1 1 1
3
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Total
FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY09-
FY13
Total
5
4c
7 8 8 12 12 47
Subtotal: ships other than LCSs
5 3 5 5 5 8 6 29
Source: Navy FY2009 budget submission.
Key: CVN-21 = Ford (CVN-21) class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. SSN-774 = Virginia (SSN-774) class
nuclear-powered attack submarine. CG(X) = CG(X) class cruiser. DDG-1000 = Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class
destroyer. CG(X) = CG(X) class cruiser. LCS = Littoral Combat Ship. LPD-17 = San Antonio (LPD-17) class
amphibious ship. LHA(R) = LHA(R) class amphibious assault ship. TAKE =Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class
resupply ship. TAKE-MPF(F) = Modified TAKE intended for MPF(F) squadron. MPF(F) LHR(A) (also called
MPF(F) Aviation) = Modified LHA(R) intended for MPF(F) squadron. LMSR-MPF(F) = Modified large,
medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) sealift ship intended for MPF(F) squadron. MLP-MPF(F) = Mobile
Landing Platform ship intended for MPF(F) squadron. TATF = oceangoing fleet tug. JCC(X) = Joint command
and control ship. JHSV = Joint High-Speed Vessel transport ship.
a. Two DDG-1000s were procured in FY2007 using split-funding in FY2007 and FY2008.
b. Although two LCSs were originally funded in FY2007, the Navy canceled these ships as part of its 2007
restructuring of the LCS program.
c. Although Congress funded the procurement of one TAKE for Navy use in FY2008, the Navy is using much
of this funding to complete the cost of the TAKE funded in FY2007. (The Navy is using much of the funding
that Congress had provided for the FY2007 TAKE in turn to pay for cost growth on TAKEs procured in
earlier years.) The Navy consequently now records zero TAKEs as procured in FY2008 (rather than one),
and the total number of ships of all kinds procured in FY2008 as four (rather than five). One of the two
TAKEs requested for FY2009 is the same TAKE that Congress originally funded in FY2008.
d. Ships shown are those being procured for Navy use. Additional JHSVs are being procured
separately for Army use and are not shown in the Navy’s shipbuilding plan.
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Table 3 shows the Navy’s FY2009 30-year ship-procurement plan.
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Table 3. Navy FY2009 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
(including FY2009-FY2013 FYDP)
F
Ship type (see key below)
Y
C
S
L
S
S
S
A
C
M
S
T
V
C
C
S
S
S
W
L
P
u
O
N
S
N
G
B
S
F
F
p
T
N
N
(F)
t
A
L
09
1 2 1 1 1 1 7
10
1 3 1 2 1 8
11
2 3 2 1 8
12
1 1 4 2 2 2 12
13
2 6 2 1 1 12
14
1 6 2 2 2 13
15
2 6 2 1 2 13
16
1 2 6 2 1 12
17
2 6 2 1 1 12
18
2 6 2 1 1 1 13
19
2 4 2 1 1 10
20
2 2 2 2 2 10
21
1 2 2 2 7
22
2 2 1 1 2 2 10
23
1 2 1 2 3 9
24
2 2 1 1 2 2 10
25
1 3 2 1 2 2 11
26
3 2 1 2 2 10
27
3 2 1 6
28
3 2 1 1 7
29
1 3 1 1 1 1 1 9
30
3 2 1 1 1 8
31
3 1 1 1 1 7
32
3 1 2 1 2 1 1 11
33
3 1 1 1 1 7
34
1 3 2 2 1 1 10
35
3 5 1 1 1 11
36
3 5 2 1 11
37
3 5 1 9
38
1 3 5 2 2 13
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009.
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Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; SC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); LCS =
Littoral Combat Ships; SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile
submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) =
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support ships.
ŘŖŗŖȱřŖȬȱȱȱ
Although the Navy is required to submit a new 30-year shipbuilding plan each year, in
conjunction with its annual budget submission, it is not clear whether the Navy will submit a new,
FY2010 version of its 30-year shipbuilding plan when it submits its proposed FY2010 budget in
early- to mid-May.
A February 2009 press report suggested that the Navy in late-2008 was examining options for
reducing the cost of the FY2010 version of its 30-year shipbuilding plan by reducing planned
procurements of certain higher-cost ships. According to the report, proposals being considered by
the Navy include the following:
• shifting planned procurement of CVNs from one approximately every 4.5 years
to one every five years—a change that was endorsed by Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates as part of a series of proposals on the FY2010 defense budget that
he announced on April 6, 2009;
• reducing planned procurement of attack submarines (SSNs) over 30 years from
53 boats to 40 boats, a reduction of about 25%;
• reducing planned procurement of CG(X) cruisers from 19 (procured at a rate of
one or two per year) to 8 (procured at a rate of one every three years), a reduction
of about 58%;
• reducing planned procurement of destroyers over 30 years from 50 ships to 34, a
reduction of 32%; and
• eliminating the three modified large-deck amphibious assault ships
(LHAs/LHDs) from the planned Maritime Prepositioning Force of the Future
(MPF(F)) squadron.
This press report also suggests that the Navy is considering more than doubling planned
procurement of relatively inexpensive Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs), from 14 over 30 years
to 29, and increasing annual procurement rates of the relatively inexpensive Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) while maintaining a planned total of 55 LCSs.2
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Some observers have questioned whether the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet includes sufficient
numbers of certain ships. Areas of concern include planned numbers of amphibious ships and
attack submarines. For additional discussion of the issue, see Appendix D.
2 Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. May Cut 52 Ships From Plan,” Defense News, February 16, 2009, p. 1.
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Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of future force levels that would result from fully
implementing the Navy’s FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan.
As shown in the table, the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan, if implemented, would generally be
adequate to achieve and maintain a fleet of about 313 ships. Under the FY2009 30-year plan, the
Navy was to reach a total of at least 313 ships in FY2019—three years later than under the
FY2008 30-year shipbuilding plan. A primary cause of the three-year delay was the FY2009
plan’s 13-ship reduction in the total number of ships planned for procurement in FY2009-
FY2013. Most of the 13-ship reduction was due to an 11-ship reduction in the number of Littoral
Combat Ships (LCSs) planned for FY2009-FY2013, which is a consequence of the Navy’s
restructuring of the LCS program in 2007.3
Although the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan would generally be adequate to achieve and
maintain a fleet of about 313 ships, it did not include enough ships to fully support certain
elements of the 313-ship fleet consistently over the long run—shortfalls would occur in areas
such as amphibious lift capability and the number of attack submarines. The Navy’s report on the
30-year plan stated: “While in the main this plan achieves the necessary raw numbers of ships and
sustains the shipbuilding industrial base, there are certain time periods where the ship mix, and
therefore inherent capability of the force, varies from that required as a result of funding
constraints and the timing of legacy fleet service life limits.”4
The FY2009 30-year plan included new assumptions about extended service lives for amphibious
ships and destroyers. If these longer service lives are not achieved, it could increase the shortfall
in amphibious lift capability and create a shortfall in the number of cruisers and destroyers.
Table 4. Navy Projection of Future Force Levels
(resulting from implementation of 30-year shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3)
F
Ship type (see key below)
Y
C
S
L
S
S
S
A
M
C
M
S
T
V
C
C
S
S
S
W
I
L
P
u
O
N
S
N
G
B
S
W
F
F
p
T
N
N
(F)
t
A
L
09
11 109 2 53 4 14 31 31 14 0 17 286
10
11 111 2 52 4 14 32 30 14 0 17 287
11
11 113 2 52 4 14 34 28 14 0 17 289
12
11 110 3 53 4 14 34 29 14 0 18 290
3 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
4 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009, p. 5.
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F
Ship type (see key below)
Y
C
S
L
S
S
S
A
M
C
M
S
T
V
C
C
S
S
S
W
I
L
P
u
O
N
S
N
G
B
S
W
F
F
p
T
N
N
(F)
t
A
L
13
10 107 8 54 4 14 33 29 14 1 19 293
14
10 99 11 51 4 14 33 30 14 1 20 287
15
11 94 14 51 4 14 33 30 14 2 21 288
16
11 92 18 49 4 14 33 30 14 4 22 291
17
11 92 24 50 4 14 33 30 13 6 24 301
18
11 93 30 49 4 14 32 30 13 7 26 309
19
12 93 36 50 4 14 32 30 11 9 24 315
20
12 94 42 48 4 14 32 30 10 9 24 319
21
12 95 48 48 4 14 32 30 7 9 24 323
22
12 94 54 47 4 14 32 30 6 10 24 327
23
12 94 55 47 4 14 32 30 2 10 24 324
24
12 94 55 46 4 14 32 30 1 10 24 322
25
12 93 55 45 4 14 33 30 0 10 24 320
26
12 91 55 44 2 14 33 30 0 10 24 315
27
12 91 55 43 1 13 33 30 0 10 24 312
28
12 89 55 41 0 13 33 30 0 10 24 307
29
12 91 55 41 0 13 33 30 0 10 24 309
30
12 94 55 42 0 12 33 30 0 10 24 312
31
12 96 55 44 0 12 33 30 0 10 24 316
32
12 99 55 45 0 12 33 30 0 10 24 320
33
12 101 55 47 0 12 33 30 0 10 24 324
34
12 100 55 49 0 12 33 30 0 10 24 325
35
12 98 55 50 0 12 33 30 0 10 24 324
36
12 95 55 52 0 12 33 30 0 10 24 323
37
12 94 55 53 0 12 33 30 0 10 24 323
38
12 94 55 53 0 12 32 30 0 10 24 322
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; SC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); LCS =
Littoral Combat Ships; SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile
submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MIW = mine
warfare ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support ships.
As mentioned earlier, a February 2009 press report suggested that the Navy in late-2008 was
examining options for reducing the cost of the FY2010 version of its 30-year shipbuilding plan by
reducing planned procurements of certain higher-cost ships. If the FY2010 30-year shipbuilding
plan includes changes such as those reported in the press report, the result could be a future Navy
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that increases for a time to more than 313 ships as significant numbers of relatively inexpensive
JHSVs and LCSs enter service in the nearer term, but which subsequently falls to something less
than 300 ships as deliveries of JHSVs and LCSs end and existing higher-cost ships continue to
retire and are replaced on something less than a one-for-one basis.
The analysis in the sections below is based on the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan.
ȱȱȱřŗřȬȱ ȱ
The FY2009 version of the 30-year shipbuilding plan, like the FY2008 and FY2007 versions,
does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the planned 313-ship force
structure over the long run. As shown in Table 5 below, however, the total projected shortfall in
the 30-year plan relative to the 313-ship force structure has been reduced from about 39 ships two
years ago to 15 ships today. The reduction in the shortfall from about 39 ships two years ago to
about 26 ships one year ago was due primarily to a Navy decision to insert additional destroyers
into the final years of the FY2008 plan. The reduction in the shortfall from about 26 ships a year
ago to 15 ships today is due primarily to a new assumption incorporated into the FY2009 plan to
extend the service lives of the Navy’s 62 Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers by five
years (from 35 years to 40).
Table 5. Projected Shortfall Relative to 313-Ship Force Structure
Projected shortfall by ship
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009 (FY09-
type, in numbers of ships,
(FY07-FY36)
(FY08-FY37)
FY38) plan of
under...
plan of
plan of
Feb. 2008
Feb. 2006
Feb. 2007
Amphibious ships
1 1 0a
Attack submarines (SSNs)
8 8 7
Cruise missile submarines (SSGNs)
4 4 4
Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
0 0 2b
Cruisers and destroyers
~26 ~10 0
MPF(F) ships
0 0 2
Total projected shortfall
~39 ~26 15
Source: CRS analysis of Navy data.
a. Although the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan would support a force of 32 or 33 amphibious ships, as
opposed to 31 called for in the 313-ship plan, the 32- or 33-ship force would include nine LPD-17 class
ships, as opposed to the 10 called for in the 313-ship plan. The Marine Corps states that fully meeting the
requirement for an amphibious force capable of lifting the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary
Brigades (MEBs) would require a 33-ship amphibious force that includes 11 LPD-17s.
b. Although the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan includes 12 replacement SSBNs rather than the 14 called for
in the 313-ship plan, the Navy has testified that the 12 new SSBNs would be sufficient to perform the
missions of today’s 14-ship SSBN force because the 12 new ships would be built with life-of-the-ship nuclear
fuel cores and consequently would not require mid-life refuelings. The Navy states that the need for today’s
SSBNs to be taken out of service for some time to receive mid-life refuelings is what drives the need for a
13th and 14th SSBN.
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Although the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan would support a force of 32 or 33 amphibious
ships, as opposed to a total of 31 called for in the 313-ship plan, this 32- or 33-ship force would
include 9 San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships, as opposed to the 10 called for in the
313-ship plan.5 The Navy’s report on the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan states:
While the mix of the 33 [amphibious] ships reflected in this plan differs slightly from the
USMC requirement, it represents acceptable risk considering the amphibious ships planned
for decommissioning are not scheduled for dismantling or sinking to permit mobilization at a
later date if required. The decommissioning ships are being replaced with newer more
capable LPD 17 and LHA 6 class ships. The Navy will maintain the 33-ship requirement for
amphibious shipping through the FYDP while these new ships are integrated into the
battleforce. Consequently, there will be no amphibious ship capability gaps through at least
FY 2019.6
The Marine Corps states that lifting the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades
(MEBs)—a requirement that reflects Marine Corps responsibilities under U.S. war plans—would
require a 33-ship amphibious force that includes 11 LPD-17s.7 Table 6 shows the Marine Corps’
calculation of the amount of amphibious lift, relative to the 2.0 MEB lift goal, resulting from the
32- or 33-ship amphibious force that is projected in the Navy’s FY2009 30-year shipbuilding
plan. The table presents the five different elements of amphibious lift. In the table, a figure of 1.0
in a cell would meet 100% of the 2.0 MEB lift goal for that lift element, a figure of 1.5 would
exceed by 50% the 2.0 MEB lift goal for that element, and a figure of 0.75 would meet 75% of
the 2.0 MEB lift goal for that element.
As can be seen in the table, the Marine Corps calculates that the projected 32- or 33-ship
amphibious force would
• roughly meet the lift goal for VTOL aircraft spaces;
• exceed the lift goal for troops, space for cargo, and spaces for LCAC landing
craft; and
• fall short of meeting the lift goal for space for vehicles.
5 Congress, as part of its action on the FY2008 defense budget, provided $50 million in advance procurement funding
for a 10th LPD-17 to be procured in a fiscal year after FY2008. The FY2009 shipbuilding plan, like the FY2008
shipbuilding plan, does not include a 10th LPD-17, and calls for ending LPD-17 procurement with the ninth ship, which
was procured in FY2008. A 10th LPD-17, at a cost of $1,700 million, is the number-two item on the Navy’s FY2009
Unfunded Requirements List (URL) and the first item presented in the Marine Corps’ FY2009 URL.
6 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009, p. A-3.
7 The 33-ship force that would fully meet the 2.0 MEB lift requirement includes 11 large-deck amphibious assault ships
(LHAs/LHDs), 11 LPD-17s, and 11 LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships.
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Table 6. Projected Amount of Amphibious Lift
(Relative to 2.0 MEB lift requirement, Resulting From Amphibious Force Supported By FY2009 Navy 30-
Year Shipbuilding Plan)
2008 2009 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Troops
1.46 1.35 1.38 1.45 1.42 1.35 1.49 1.59
Vehicle (sq. ft.)
0.77
0.75
0.80
0.90
0.88
0.93 1.05 1.17
Cargo (cu. ft.)
2.02 1.90 1.92 2.07 2.04 1.95 2.28 2.49
VTOL aircraft
1.02
0.93
0.94 1.07 1.06 0.97 1.18 1.31
LCACs
1.81 1.75 1.79 1.79 1.75 1.77 1.65 1.50
Source: U.S. Marine Corps data provided to CRS, March 11, 2008. Calculations are based on 15 operational
ships per MEB. A figure of 1.0 in a cell would meet 100% of the 2.0 MEB lift goal for that lift element; a figure of
1.5 would exceed by 50% the goal for that element; and a figure of 0.75 would meet 75% of the goal for that
element.
If the Navy cannot extend the service lives of amphibious ships as much as assumed in the
FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan, then the amount of amphibious lift capability in future years
could be less than that shown in Table 6.
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Although the 313-ship plan calls for a total of 48 SSNs, the 30-year shipbuilding plan does not
include enough SSNs to maintain a force of 48 boats consistently over the long run. The Navy
projects that the SSN force will drop below 48 boats in 2022, reach a minimum of 41 boats
(14.6% less than the required figure of 48) in FY2028 and FY2029, and remain below 48 boats
through 2033. The Navy has completed a study on various options for mitigating the projected
SSN shortfall. One of these options is to procure one or more additional SSNs in the period
FY2008-FY2011. The issue is discussed in more detail in another CRS report.8
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Although the 313-ship plan calls for four SSGNs, the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan includes
no replacements for the four current SSGNs, which the Navy projects will reach retirement age
and leave service in FY2026-FY2028. The Navy’s report on the 30-year shipbuilding plan states:
Plans for recapitalization [i.e., replacement] of the OHIO class submarines that have been
converted to SSGN have been deferred until their warfighting utility can be assessed. Should
their replacement be required, it will be necessary to integrate their procurement with other
ship and submarine recapitalization efforts planned for the post-FY 2020 period.9
8 CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
9 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009, p. 8.
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Although the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan includes 12 replacement SSBNs rather than the
14 called for in the 313-ship plan, the Navy has testified that the 12 new SSBNs would be
sufficient to perform the missions of today’s 14-ship SSBN force because the 12 new ships would
be built with life-of-the-ship nuclear fuel cores and consequently would not require mid-life
refuelings. The Navy states that the need for today’s SSBNs to be taken out of service for some
time to receive mid-life refuelings is what drives the need for a 13th and 14th SSBN.
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Although the FY2009 30-year plan assumes a 5-year service life extension for the Navy’s 62
DDG-51s, a Navy official was quoted after the FY2009 30-year plan was released as stating that
the Navy had not yet officially approved the idea of extending the service lives of those ships.10
One potential oversight issue for Congress is why the 30-year plan assumed a 5-year service life
extension for the DDG-51s if the Navy had not yet officially approved the idea. If the Navy
approves the idea, a second potential oversight issue for Congress is whether the Navy will
actually be able to extend the service lives of the DDG-51s and operate them in a cost-effective
manner for 40 years, given the wear and tear that might accrue on the ships in coming years, as
well as the DDG-51 design’s space, weight, and electrical-power capacities. If a five-year service
life extension for the DDG-51s proves infeasible or not cost-effective, a shortfall in cruisers and
destroyers similar to that shown in the FY2008 column in Table 5 might reappear.
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The projected two-ship shortfall in MPF(F) ships is due to a decision to drop two Lewis and
Clark (TAKE-1) class dry cargo ships from the shipbuilding plan. These two ships were
previously planned for procurement in FY2010 and FY2011. Navy officials have stated the two
ships were removed from the plan pending the completion of a study on the MPF(F) concept of
operations, and that the two ships might be put back into the shipbuilding plan next year,
following the completion of this study.11
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As mentioned earlier, the Navy projects that the carrier force will drop from the current figure of
11 ships to 10 ships for a 33-month period between the scheduled retirement of the carrier
Enterprise (CVN-65) in November 2012 and scheduled the entry into service of its replacement,
the carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), in September 2015. The Navy projects that the force will
increase to 12 carriers starting in FY2019, when CVN-79 is commissioned.
10 USC §5062 requires the Navy to maintain an aircraft carrier force of at least 11 operational
ships. As it did for FY2008, the Navy for FY2009 requested a legislative waiver from Congress
that would permit the Navy to reduce the carrier force to 10 operational ships for the 33-month
10 Zachary M. Peterson, “Destroyer Extension Part of 313-Ship Plan,” NavyTimes.com, February 11, 2008.
11 See, for example, U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
FY 2009, p. 9.
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between the retirement of the Enterprise and the entry into service of the Ford. The issue is
discussed further in another CRS report.12
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One of the most significant features in the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan, compared to the
FY2008 30-year plan, is an apparent increase of roughly 44% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms in
the Navy’s estimated average annual cost to implement the 30-year plan. This roughly 44% real
increase was not due to significant changes in the composition of the 30-year plan, because the
types and quantities of ships to be procured under FY2009 30-year plan were generally the same
as those in the FY2008 30-year plan.13
In 2007, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that last year’s version of the 30-year
plan would cost roughly 35% more per year to implement than the Navy was estimating. The
Navy in 2007 downplayed CBO’s higher cost estimate, referring to it in testimony as “worst-case
analysis”14 or as an “extremely conservative” estimate.15 The Navy’s revised estimated cost for
the FY2009 30-year plan, however, is within about 7% of CBO’s estimates for the cost of the
plan.
In 2006 and 2007, the Navy had a clearly identifiable strategy for achieving the shipbuilding
budget that the Navy then estimated would be needed to implement the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
CRS and CBO discussed in reports and testimony in 2006 and 2007 how the Navy’s strategy for
executing the shipbuilding plan depended on a series of five assumptions concerning the future
size and composition of the Navy’s budget and the costs of future Navy ships. As noted by both
CRS and CBO in 2006 and 2007, all five of these assumptions could be viewed as risk items for
the plan, because there were grounds for questioning whether each of them would be borne out.
(For additional discussion, see Appendix E.)
The 2008 increase in the Navy’s estimated cost for implementing the 30-year plan was so large
that the Navy no longer appears to have a clearly identifiable, announced strategy for generating
the funds needed to implement the 30-year plan, at least not without significantly reducing
funding for other Navy programs or increasing the Navy’s programmed budget in coming years
by billions of dollars per year.
12 CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress,
by Ronald O’Rourke.
13 The FY2009-FY2038 plan includes 296 ships, or about 1.7% more than the 291 ships in the FY2008-FY2037 plan.
The types of ships procured under the two plans are essentially the same, and the total numbers of each type being
procured are in most cases similar.
14 Source: Transcript of spoken testimony of Vice Admiral Paul Sullivan before the Seapower and Expeditionary
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on March 20, 2007.
15 Source: Transcript of spoken testimony of Allison Stiller before the Defense subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee on April 25, 2007.
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A June 2008 CBO report on the Navy’s FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan states that CBO’s
analysis indicates the following:
—Executing the Navy’s most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan would cost an average of
about $27 billion a year (in [FY]2009 dollars), or more than double the $12.6 billion a year
that the Navy has spent, on average, since [FY]2003.... Since CBO testified on this topic on
March 14, [2008], the Navy provided additional information that led CBO to increase its
estimate of the annual cost of the shipbuilding plan from $25 billion to $27 billion.
—After releasing its [report on the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan], the Navy discovered
a calculation error that caused the costs initially reported in the [FY]2009 plan to be about 10
percent higher than the Navy now expects them to be. After correcting for that error, the
Navy’s estimate of the costs of implementing its 30-year shipbuilding plan is about 10
percent less than the estimates that CBO has prepared during the past three years.
—The Navy’s [FY]2009 budget request appears to depart from all of the budgetary
assumptions used to develop the service’s [FY]2007 and [FY]2008 shipbuilding plans.
—CBO’s estimates of the costs of the Navy’s shipbuilding program through the period
covered by the [FY]2009-[FY]2013 Future Years Defense Program are about 30 percent
higher than the Navy’s estimates. In particular, CBO estimates that the DDG-1000 guided-
missile destroyer and the CG(X) future cruiser would probably cost significantly more than
the Navy currently estimates.
—For the [FY]2009-[FY]2020 period—described as the “near term” in the Navy’s plan—
CBO estimates that new-ship construction alone would cost about 13 percent more than the
Navy indicates.
—For the period beyond [FY]2020—described as the “far term” in the Navy’s plan—CBO
estimates that costs would be about 8 percent greater than the Navy projects.16
Table 7, which is taken from CBO’s June 2008 report, summarizes Navy and CBO estimates of
the cost to implement the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
16 Source: Cover letter to Congressional Budget Office, Resource Implications of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2009
Shipbuilding Plan, Washington, 2008. (June 9, 2008) The cover letter, dated June 9, 2008, is from Peter Orszag,
Director, CBO, and is addressed to Representative Gene Taylor, the Chairman of the Seapower and Expeditionary
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, with copies to Representative Roscoe Bartlett, the
Ranking Member of the subcommittee, and Representatives Ike Skelton and Duncan Hunter, the Chairman and
Ranking Member, respectively, of the House Armed Services Committee.
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Table 7. Average Annual Shipbuilding Costs
(from June 2008 CBO report; figures in billions of constant FY2009 dollars)
New-ship
New-ship construction (including SSBNs),
construction
plus:
Excluding Including Nuclear
Nuclear refuelings, LCS
SSBNs
SSBNs
refuelings
mission modules, and
surface combat-ant
modernization
Actual Navy spending, FY03-
FY08
11.1 11.1 12.4
12.6
Average annual cost as estimated by:
Navy
20.4 23.2a
24.4b 25.2b
CBO
22.4 25.0 26.2
26.9
CBO’s estimate of the cost to fully fund the Navy’s 313-ship fleetc
22.5 25.5 26.7
27.4
Memorandum: Navy’s estimate average annual cost in 2006 and 2007
n.a. 16.1 17.2b
18.0b
Source: Table 3 from Congressional Budget Office, Resource Implications of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2009
Shipbuilding Plan, Washington, 2008. (June 9, 2008) p. 14.
a. The Navy’s estimate for new-ship construction plus the Navy’s cost target for SSBNs under the FY2007 and
FY2008 shipbuilding plans.
b. The Navy’s estimate for new-ship construction and cost target for SSBNs plus CBO’s estimates for the
additional costs.
c. CBO’s estimates of the costs to buy all of the attack submarines, guided-missile submarines, ballistic missile
submarines, logistics ships, and amphibious ships needed to maintain a 313-ship fleet.
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The Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget is expected to be submitted to Congress in early- to mid-
May.
For legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and modernization
programs, see:
• CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke;
• CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs:
Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke;
• CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background, Oversight
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke;
• CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke;
• CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke;
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• CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; and
• CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-652 of May 16, 2008) on H.R.
5658, included comments on aircraft carrier force structure (page 81), attack submarine force
structure requirements (pages 81-82), and service life extensions for existing attack submarines
(page 82), and stated that:
The committee remains concerned with the totality of the Navy shipbuilding plan. The
committee is not confident that the current mix of planned ship procurement is the most
effective way to balance the need for quantity versus capability across the spectrum of naval
requirements. Considering likely budget constraints for shipbuilding procurement, it is
evident that the long-range plan is unaffordable.
The committee is also concerned with short-term affordability. The key to efficient
shipbuilding is stability in programs and commonality between programs. With stability, the
shipbuilder can reasonably invest in infrastructure improvements for increased efficiency.
Commonality allows savings in order quantity across programs as well as life-cycle savings
in maintenance and repair parts. The goal of a 313-ship fleet will never be achieved until
very difficult decisions are made concerning quantity, capability, affordability, and stability.
The committee remains committed to building a capable naval force in sufficient quantity to
protect the nation’s interests. This force must consist of major combatant vessels with
multiple warfighting capabilities. It must also include ships with specific roles and missions,
from operations in the littoral regions, to the projection of power ashore from a sea-base. The
balance of capabilities within this force and the affordability of sustaining this force is the
key task before both the Navy and Congress throughout the foreseeable future.
The committee disagrees with the submitted Future Years Defense Plan and budget request
for: canceling the Amphibious Landing Ship-Dock (LPD 17) program at 9 ships; canceling
the procurement of the 13th and 14th Dry Cargo Ammunition Ships (T-AKE); not requesting
funding to increase the build rate of Virginia class deliver a coherent strategy for Littoral
Combat Ship acquisition.
The committee authorizes a reallocation of funding in the Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy account and the National Defense Sealift Fund. The committee recommends: full
funding for the 10th ship of the LPD 17 class; an increase in advance procurement funding
for the Virginia class submarine program, necessary for the procurement of 2 ships in fiscal
year 2010; advance procurement for the final 2 ships of the T-AKE class; and advance
procurement for the construction of DDG 51 class destroyers or DDG 1000 class destroyers.
The committee notes that due to the overall delay in the DDG 1000 destroyer program, the
Navy would be unable to execute the full funding request in fiscal year 2009 for the third
ship of the planned seven ship class. Additionally, the committee is concerned with potential
significant cost overruns in the DDG 1000 program and considers it prudent to pause the
program until technological challenges are completely understood.
The committee authorizes these programs without prejudice to any specific program. The
committee also understands the Navy is strongly considering re-starting the DDG 51 class
destroyer upgraded with an improved radar system to fill an urgent need in ballistic missile
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defense. The committee would only support that decision if the industrial base for surface
combatant construction is not affected. The committee expects the Secretary of Defense,
subject to the availability of appropriations, to enter into advance procurement and advance
construction contracts for the construction of surface combatants balanced between the two
current surface combatant shipyards, taking into account workforce challenges still in effect
on the Gulf Coast due to the lingering economic effects of Hurricane Katrina.
The committee expects the budget submission for fiscal year 2010 to contain a funding
request for the 11th ship of the LPD 17 class, a two-one-two build strategy (two ships in
2010, one ship in 2011, and two ships in 2012 and following years) for the Virginia class
submarine program, the balance of full funding for the 13th T-AKE, and a comprehensive
decision on the acquisition plan for surface combatants including the plan for the Littoral
Combat Ship class.
The committee expects the Navy to solve the capacity and capability issues of the surface
combatant, amphibious warfare, and submarine combatant forces before beginning multiple
new starts in programs to field the maritime prepositioning force (future) (MPF(F)). The
committee is supportive of the requirement to constitute a seabase with a flotilla of vessels
from which both combatant and non-combatant operations ashore could be launched.
However, the committee is not convinced the seabase should be composed of non-combatant
vessels such as the planned MPF aviation ship (MPF LHA) and the MPF landing platform
ship (MPF MLP). The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy, along with the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to report to the congressional
defense committees within 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, on the size and
composition of the naval amphibious force necessary (without the MPF LHA and MPF MLP
vessels) to conduct operations from a seabase, with a force comprising two marine
expeditionary brigades (MEB). (Pages 82-83)
ȱ
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 110-335 of May 12, 2008) on S.
3001, included report language on certain individual Navy shipbuilding and modernization
programs (see pages 76-80).
ȱ
In lieu of a conference report, there was a compromise version of S. 3001 that was accompanied
by a joint explanatory statement. Section 4 of S. 3001 states that the joint explanatory statement
“shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as if it were a joint
explanatory statement of a committee of conference.” S. 3001 and the accompanying joint
explanatory statement contain bill and report language on certain individual Navy shipbuilding
and modernization programs, but not on overall Navy force structure or shipbuilding plans.
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The House Appropriations Committee did not file a report on the FY2009 defense appropriations
bill. On July 30, 2008, Representative John Murtha, the chairman of the Defense subcommittee of
the House Appropriations Committee, issued a press release summarizing the subcommittee’s
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markup of the bill that same day. The press release mentions recommended changes to the
funding amounts requested for certain individual Navy shipbuilding programs, but does not
discuss overall Navy force structure or shipbuilding plans.17
ȱ
The Senate Appropriations Committee did not file a report on the FY2009 defense appropriations
bill. On September 10, 2008, the committee issued a press release summarizing the markup of the
bill that day by its Defense subcommittee. The press release mentions recommended changes to
the funding amounts requested for certain individual Navy shipbuilding programs, but does not
discuss overall Navy force structure or shipbuilding plans.18
ȱ
In lieu of a conference report, there was a compromise version of the FY2009 defense
appropriations bill that was incorporated as Division C of H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of September
30, 2008. (H.R. 2638, the FY2009 Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill, was
amended to become a consolidated appropriations bill that includes, among other things, the
FY2009 defense appropriations bill.) The compromise version of H.R. 2638 was accompanied by
an explanatory statement. Section 4 of H.R. 2638 states that the explanatory statement “shall have
the same effect with respect to the allocation of funds and implementation of this Act as if it were
a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.” The explanatory statement outlines
funding levels for individual Navy shipbuilding programs and discusses some of the programs in
report language, but does not discuss overall Navy force structure or shipbuilding plans.
17 July 30, 2008, press release from The Honorable John P. Murtha, entitled “Murtha Summary of the FY09 Defense
Appropriations Bill,” p. 2.
18 September 10, 2008, press release from Senate Appropriations Committee, entitled “Senate Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee Approves Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Appropriations Bill,” p. 2.
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A September 29, 2008 press report stated:
The Navy is conducting a force structure review that could change the number of ships the
service needs in the 2020 time frame to maintain sea control and support the maritime
strategy issued last year, the Navy’s top programmer told Inside the Navy in an exclusive
interview last week.
“The 313 plan, as it’s known, was based on a force-structure analysis done in 2005 and it has
served us very well,” Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy chief of naval operations for
integration of capabilities and resources, said Sept. 24. “But as we look at the changes in the
security environment in the newly published maritime strategy, we felt it was appropriate to
work through a similar methodology that we did in 2005 to make sure that we have our force
structure correct.”
Since Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead took over last fall, he has has
continually referred to the 313-ship mark as a “floor,” meaning the minimal number of ships
the Navy needs to conduct its myriad missions.
McCullough would not say if the number of ships the Navy wants in its future fleet will
change.
“I’m not going to tell you if it’s more or less or anything until we work through the reviews
with leadership,” he said....
The new force structure review should be complete in conjunction with the release of the
2008 Naval Operations Concept, which will outline how the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast
Guard will operate in accordance to the tri-service [Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard]
maritime strategy published last October.19
An April 2008 press report stated that:
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead has ordered internal reviews into the
Navy’s long-term basing requirements and strategies, as well as needs for personnel, ships
and aircraft, a Navy spokesman said.
The reviews, which probably will not be made public, will produce an “internal working
document” that will help Roughead and other top Navy commanders plan into the coming
decades, Navy spokesman Cmdr. Jeff Davis said. The findings probably will be incorporated
into future quadrennial defense reviews, shipbuilding plans and budget requests, Davis said.
19 Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Undergoing A New Force Structure Review Due This Fall,” Inside the Navy, September
29, 2008.
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Roughead mentioned his review of the Navy’s basing requirements and strategy—what he
called a “force rating” and Davis called a “strategic lay-down”—in response to questions
from a House panel in March....
Davis described the four other reviews Roughead requested when he took over:
* Force structure, including the numbers of aircraft and ships.
* The life span of those aircraft and ships.
* The Navy’s personnel requirements, including end strength and skill sets.
* Infrastructure requirements, including details about the physical state of the Navy’s
bases.20
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The Navy’s February 2008 report on the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan stated that the
Department of the Navy “is reviewing options to increase assault echelon amphibious lift to 33
ships to meet USMC requirements.”21 The report also states:
The Commandant of the Marine Corps has determined that a minimum of 33 amphibious
ships is necessary to support their assault echelon lift requirements; specifically, he has
requested a force of 11 aviation capable amphibious ships, 11 LPDs and 11 LSDs. The Chief
of Naval Operations supports the Commandant’s determination.22
The Navy’s February 2007 report on the FY2008 30-year shipbuilding plan stated:
Future combat operations may require us to revisit many of the decisions reflected in this
report, including those associated with amphibious lift. As the Navy embarks on production
of the Maritime Prepositioning Force in this FYDP, the Navy will continue to analyze the
utility of these ships in terms of their contribution to, and ability to substitute for, the assault
echelon forces in the Navy’s future battle-force inventory. The current force represents the
best balance between these forces available today. However, changing world events and
resulting operational risk associated with the various force structure elements that make up
these two components of overall lift will be analyzed to ensure the Navy is not taking
excessive risk in lift capability and capacity. While there needs to be a balance between
expeditionary and prepositioning ships for meeting the overall lift requirement, future reports
may adjust the level of support in one or both of these solutions. Any adjustments made in
these capabilities will have to be accommodated in light of the resources available and could
require the Navy to commit additional funding to this effort in order to support the overall
balance of our shipbuilding program.23
20 Philip Ewing, “CNO Orders Far-Reaching Base, Force Reviews,” NavyTimes.com, April 21, 2008.
21 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009, p. 5.
22 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009, p. A-3.
23 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2008, p. 5.
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The Navy testified in July 2008 that it no longer wants to procure additional Zumwalt (DDG-
1000) class destroyers, and instead now wants to restart procurement of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)
destroyers. The Navy’s new plan, if implemented, would change the planned composition of the
Navy’s destroyer fleet and possibly change the planned total number of cruisers and destroyers.24
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The Navy has testified in 2007 and 208 that its next-generation ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) are to be fueled with a nuclear fuel core sufficient for the ships’ entire expected service
lives. Consequently, the Navy has testified, these SSBNs, in contrast to today’s SSBNs, would not
need a mid-life nuclear refueling. As a result, the Navy testified, the Navy in the future may be
able to meet its requirements for SSBN deployments with a force of 12 SSBNs rather than 14.25
This testimony suggests that the Navy might at some point change the required number of SSBNs
in the 313-ship plan from 14 to 12. The Navy’s February 2008 report on the FY2009 shipbuilding
plan continues to state that the 313-ship force-structure includes 14 SSBNs, but the FY2009 30-
year shipbuilding plan includes 12 SSBNs rather than 14.
24 For further discussion of the Navy’s preferred new course for destroyer procurement, see CRS Report RL32109,
Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by
Ronald O’Rourke.
25 Source: Transcripts of Navy testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee, March 29, 2007, and to Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of House Armed Services Committee, March 14, 2008.
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In late-March 2007, the Navy modified its description of the number of aircraft carriers in the
313-ship proposal. From February 2006 through early March 2007, the Navy described the 313-
ship proposal as one centered on, among other things, 11 aircraft carriers.26 In late March 2007,
the Navy modified its description of the 313-ship proposal to one centered on, among other
things, 11, and eventually 12, aircraft carriers, the modification being the addition of the phrase
“and eventually 12.”27
The Navy’s modification of its description of the number of aircraft carriers in the 313-ship
proposal occurred about a week after the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy
(CV-67), which occurred on March 23, 2007. The decommissioning of the Kennedy reduced the
Navy’s carrier force from 12 ships to 11. The Navy had proposed decommissioning the Kennedy
in its FY2006 and FY2007 budgets, and opponents of the Kennedy’s retirement had resisted the
proposal. If the Navy, prior to the Kennedy’s decommissioning, had described the 313-ship fleet
as one centered on, among other things, 11, and eventually 12, aircraft carriers, opponents of the
Kennedy’s decommissioning might have cited the “eventually 12” part as evidence that the Navy
really requires 12 carriers, not just 11.28
The Navy’s February 2008 report on the FY2009 30-year shipbuilding plan states that the 313-
ship plan includes 11 carriers and does not include a reference to “eventually 12” carriers, but the
long-range force projection in the report continues to show a total of 12 carriers in FY2019 and
subsequent years.
26 See, for example, Navy testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March 1, 2007 (transcript of
hearing).
27 See, for example, Navy testimony before the Defense subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on
March 28, 2007, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, 2007 (transcripts of hearings).
28 For additional discussion of the debate over the Kennedy’s retirement, see CRS Report RL32731, Navy Aircraft
Carriers: Retirement of USS John F. Kennedy - Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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Some observers have questioned whether the Navy’s proposed total of 31 amphibious ships
within the 313-ship fleet will be sufficient. The Marine Corps has stated that a total of 33,
including 11 San Antonio (LPD-17) class ships, would be needed to meet the Marine Corps’
requirement for having a force capable of lifting the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary
Brigades (MEBs). The issue is discussed in more detail in another CRS report.29
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Some observers have questioned whether the Navy’s proposed total of 48 attack submarines
within the 313-ship plan will be sufficient, and have suggested that a total of 55 or more would be
more appropriate, particularly in light of requests for forward-deployed attack submarines from
U.S. regional military commanders, and the modernization of China’s naval forces, including its
submarine force. The issue is discussed in more detail other CRS reports.30
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Some observers have questioned whether the Navy’s proposed total of 11 aircraft carriers through
FY2018 will be sufficient, particularly in light of past Navy plans that have called for 12 carriers,
the Navy’s testimony in 2007 that the 313-ship proposal includes a requirement for an eventual
total of 12 carriers, and Navy plans to increase the carrier force back to 12 ships in 2019 and
maintain it at that level thereafter. The latter two points, they argue, suggest that the Navy would
actually prefer to have 12 carriers between now and FY2019, rather than 11.
Observers have expressed concern that the current carrier force of 11 ships will temporarily
decline further, to 10 ships, during the 33-month period between the scheduled retirement of the
carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in November 2012 and scheduled the entry into service of its
replacement, the carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), in September 2015. Even if an 11-carrier force
is adequate, these observers argue, a 10-carrier force might not be, even if only for a 33-month
period.
10 USC §5062 requires the Navy to maintain an aircraft carrier force of at least 11 operational
ships. The Navy for FY2009 is requesting a legislative waiver from Congress that would permit
the Navy to reduce the carrier force to 10 operational ships for the 33-month between the
retirement of the Enterprise and the entry into service of the Ford. The Navy made the same
request as part of its FY2008 budget submission; Congress did not act on the request in FY2008.
29 CRS Report RL32513, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background
and Oversight Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
30 CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke; and CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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Some observers have questioned whether the overall planned total of 313 ships would be
adequate, particularly in light of Navy plans in recent decades for larger total numbers of ships.
One possible method for assessing the appropriateness of the total number of ships being
proposed by the Navy is to compare that number to historical figures for total fleet size. Historical
figures for total fleet size, however, might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the
appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet, particularly if the historical figures are
more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships
that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing
missions all change over time.
The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of
FY1987,31 and as of June 5, 2008, had declined to a total of 280 battle force ships. The FY1987
fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on countering
Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the
June 2008 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of mission requirements centered
on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based military forces of potential
regional threats other than Russia, including non-state terrorist organizations. In addition, the
Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the June 2008 fleet in areas such as profusion of
precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of Tomahawk-capable ships, and sophistication
of C4ISR systems.32
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, to include, as a possible example, a greater
emphasis on being able to counter improved Chinese maritime military capabilities.33 In addition,
the capabilities of Navy ships will likely have changed further by that time due to developments
such as more comprehensive implementation of networking technology and increased use of ship-
based unmanned vehicles.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated
missions; the 280-ship fleet of June 2008 may or nor may not have been capable of performing its
stated missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be
capable of performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship
mixes, and technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of
one another.
31 Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a
peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is
not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total
number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy
included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of
317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships
in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the
number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of
ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
32 C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
33 For a discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might provide some insight
into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in
mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other force-
planning factors suggest that some caution should be applied in using past force structure plans
for this purpose, particularly if those past force structure plans are more than a few years old. The
Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions
focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning
the Navy today.34
34 Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship plan of the 1980s,
the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush
Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes
also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below
summarizes some key features of these plans.
Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan
600-ship
Base Force
1993 BUR
1997 QDR
Total ships
~600 ~450/416a 346
~305/310b
Attack submarines
100 80/~55c 45-55 50/55d
Aircraft carriers
15e 12
11+1f 11+1f
Surface combatants
242/228g ~150
~124 116
Amphibious ships
~75h 51i 36i 36i
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999.
b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55
from 50.
c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB).
i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Note how number needed to meet this goal changed from Base
Force plan to the BUR plan—a result of new, larger amphibious ship designs.
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In 2006 and 2007, the Navy’s position was that for its shipbuilding plan to be affordable and
executable, five things needed to happen:
• The Navy’s overall budget needed to remain more or less flat (not decline) in real
(inflation-adjusted) terms.
• Navy Operation and Maintenance (O&M) spending needed to remain flat (not
grow) in real terms.
• Navy Military Personnel (MilPer) spending needed to remain flat (not grow) in
real terms.
• Navy research and development (R&D) spending needed to decrease from recent
levels and remain at the decreased level over the long run.
• Navy ships needed to be built at the Navy’s currently estimated prices.
The Navy said that the first four things were needed for the Navy to be able to increase the
shipbuilding budget from an average in FY2002-FY2007 of about $9.6 billion per year in
FY2008 dollars to a long-term average of about $15.4 billion per year in FY2008 dollars—an
increase of about 60% in real terms.35 The fifth thing on the list, the Navy said, was needed if all
the ships in the shipbuilding plan were to be affordable within an average annual shipbuilding
budget of $15.4 billion in FY2008 dollars.
Some observers in 2006 and 2007 questioned whether all five of the above things would happen,
arguing the following:
• The need in coming years to fund an increase in Army and Marine end strength
could, within an overall DOD budget that remains more or less flat in real terms,
require funding to be transferred from the Air Force and Navy budgets to the
Army and Marine Corps budgets, which could, for a time at least, lead to a real
decline in the Air Force and Navy budgets.
• DOD in the past has not been fully successful in meeting its goals for controlling
O&M costs.
• The Navy does not have full control over its MilPer costs—they can be affected,
for example, by decisions that Congress makes on pay and benefits.
• While the Navy may be able to decrease R&D spending in coming years as a
number of new systems shift from development to procurement, it may be
difficult for the Navy to keep R&D spending at that reduced level over the long
run, because the Navy at some point will likely want to start development of
other new systems.
35 Source: CBO telephone conversation with CRS, May 31, 2006. See also Statement of J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant
Director, and Eric J. Labs, Principal Analyst, [On] Potential Costs of the Navy’s 2006 Shipbuilding Plan, [Testimony]
before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives, March
30, 2006.
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• Several Navy shipbuilding programs have experienced significant cost growth in
recent years, and CBO estimates that Navy ships will cost substantially more to
build than the Navy estimates.
If one or more of the five required things listed above did not happen, it was argued in 2006 and
2007, it might become difficult or impossible to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plans. The risk
of the plan becoming unexecutable, it was argued, might become particularly acute starting in
FY2011-FY2013, when the Navy planned to increase procurement rates for cruisers and
destroyers and for submarines.
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Table F-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the
numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count
toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures
reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and
subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules
established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy.
As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War
peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.36 The Navy fell below 300
battle force ships in August 2003 and included 280 battle force ships as of June 5, 2008.
As discussed in Appendix D, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable
yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet, particularly if
the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the
Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy
ships for performing missions all change over time. For similar reasons, trends over time in the
total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of
change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An increasing number of ships in the
fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions is increasing,
because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and
average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily
mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission
requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship
capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing
quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers.
36 Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical
Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as
of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships
in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this
case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential
statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a
single counting method.
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Table F-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948
FYa
Number FYa Number FYa Number
1948 737 1969 926 1990 547
1949 690 1970 769 1991 526
1950 634 1971 702 1992 466
1951 980 1972 654 1993 435
1952 1,097 1973 584 1994 391
1953 1,122 1974 512 1995 373
1954 1,113 1975 496 1996 356
1955 1,030 1976 476 1997 354
1956 973 1977 464 1998 333
1957 967 1978 468 1999 317
1958 890 1979 471 2000 318
1959 860 1980 477 2001 316
1960 812 1981 490 2002 313
1961 897 1982 513 2003 297
1962 959 1983 514 2004 291
1963 916 1984 524 2005 282
1964 917 1985 541 2006 281
1965 936 1986 556 2007 279
1966 947 1987 568 2008
1967 973 1988 565 2009
1968 976 1989 566 2010
Source: Compiled by CRS using U.S. Navy data. Numbers shown reflect changes over time in the rules
specifying which ships count toward the total. Figures for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force
ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy
discussions of the size of the Navy.
a. Data for earlier years may be for the end of the calendar year (or for some other point during the year),
rather than for the end of the fiscal year.
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Table F-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2008) and projected (FY2009-FY2013) rates of Navy ship
procurement.
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Table F-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Projected, FY1982-FY2013
(Procured FY1982-FY2009; projected FY2010-FY2013)
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
17 14 16 19 20 17 15 19 15 11 11 7 4 4 5 4
98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
5 5 6 6 6 5 7 8 4a
5a
3a 8 8 8 12 12
Source: CRS compilation based on examination of defense authorization and appropriation committee and
conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships that do not count toward the
313-ship goal, such as certain sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the Military Sealift Command and
oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA).
a. The totals shown for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, have been adjusted downward to reflect the
cancellation two LCSs funded in FY2006 and another two LCSs funded in FY2007, and the rescission of
funding for an LCS funded in FY2008.
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Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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